London Review of Books
The Irresistible Illusion
Rory Stewart
We are accustomed to seeing Afghans through bars, or smeared windows, or the sight of a rifle: turbaned men carrying rockets, praying in unison, or lying in pools of blood; boys squabbling in an empty swimming-pool; women in burn wards, or begging in burqas. Kabul is a South Asian city of millions. Bollywood music blares out in its crowded spice markets and flower gardens, but it seems that images conveying colour and humour are reserved for Rajasthan.
Barack Obama, in a recent speech, set out our fears. The Afghan government
is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency . . . If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaida to go unchallenged – that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can . . . For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralysed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people – especially women and girls. The return in force of al-Qaida terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.
When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.
It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years after the Soviet withdrawal. And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the centre of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassah students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 per cent of the country, eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads and host al-Qaida.
It is tempting to assume that economic growth will not make Afghanistan into Obama’s terrorist haven or Brown’s strong democracy but rather into something more like its wealthier neighbours. Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan were at various points under the same Muslim empires. There are Persian, Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik populations in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Pushtun are only arbitrarily divided by the Durand Line from their Pakistani kinsmen. The economies are linked and millions of Afghans have studied and worked in Iran or Pakistan. There are more reasons for Afghanistan to develop into a country like one of its neighbours than for it to collapse into Somalian civil war or solidify into Malaysian democracy. But Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan present a bewildering variety of states: an Islamist theocracy, a surreal mock-tribal autocracy, a repressive secular dictatorship, a country trembling on the edge of civil war, a military dictatorship cum democracy. And it will be many years before Afghanistan’s economy or its institutions draw level with those of its neighbours.
Pakistan, which is often portrayed as a ‘failed state’, has not only the nuclear bomb and the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence but also the Friday Times and the National College of Arts. Progressive views are no longer confined to the wealthy Lahore elite: a mass commercial satellite television station championed a campaign to overturn the hudud ordinances, which conflated adultery and rape; 1500 women were released from jail as a result. There is no equivalent in Afghanistan of the Pakistani lawyers’ movement, which reinstated the chief justice after his dismissal by Musharraf.
Every Afghan ruler in the 20th century was assassinated, lynched or deposed. The Communist government tried to tear down the old structures of mullah and khan; the anti-Soviet jihad set up new ones, bolstered with US and Saudi cash and weapons supplied from Pakistan. There is almost no economic activity in the country, aside from international aid and the production of illegal narcotics. The Afghan army cannot, like Pakistan’s, reject America’s attempt to define national security priorities; Afghan diplomats cannot mock our pronouncements. Karzai is widely criticised, but more than seven years after the invasion there is still no plausible alternative candidate; there aren’t even recognisable political parties.
Obama’s new policy has a very narrow focus – counter-terrorism – and a very broad definition of how to achieve it: no less than the fixing of the Afghan state. He presents this in a formal syllogism. The final goal in the region is
to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.
A necessary condition of the defeat of al-Qaida is the defeat of the Taliban because
if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban . . . that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.
Such efforts are hampered by the nature of the Afghan economy and government. We must implement a counter-insurgency strategy, which includes
the deployment of 17,000 troops [to] take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east
but also adopt a more ‘comprehensive approach’, aiming to
promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government . . . advance security, opportunity and justice . . . develop an economy that isn’t dominated by illicit drugs.
Finally, Afghanistan cannot be addressed without addressing Pakistan:
To defeat an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war, we must recognise the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Or, in the pithier statement made by Obama last October:
In order to catch Osama bin Laden we have to win in Afghanistan and stabilise Pakistan.
Obama, then, combines a negative account of Afghanistan’s past and present – he describes the border region as ‘the most dangerous place in the world’ – with an optimism that it can be transformed. He assumes that we have a moral justification and obligation to intervene, that the US and its allies have the capacity to address the threat and that our global humanitarian and security objectives are consistent and mutually reinforcing.
Afghanistan was ‘the right war’. In Iraq, one could criticise the breaking of international law, the lies about weapons of mass destruction, the apparent corruption of contractors, the anarchy in Baghdad and the torture at Abu Ghraib. But the intervention in Afghanistan was a response to 9/11, sanctioned by international law and a broad coalition; the objectives were those of self-defence and altruism. Al-Qaida has killed and continues to try to kill innocent citizens, and it is right to prevent them. It is also right to defeat the Taliban, to bring development and an effective legitimate state to Afghanistan, and to stabilise Pakistan. The elected Afghan government and the majority of the Afghan people support our presence. And the international community has the capacity to transform the situation.
Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’
These connections are global: in Obama’s words, ‘our security and prosperity depend on the security and prosperity of others.’ Or, as a British foreign minister recently rephrased it, ‘our security depends on their development.’ Indeed, at times it seems that all these activities – building a state, defeating the Taliban, defeating al-Qaida and eliminating poverty – are the same activity. The new US army and marine corps counter-insurgency doctrine sounds like a World Bank policy document, replete with commitments to the rule of law, economic development, governance, state-building and human rights. In Obama’s words, ‘security and humanitarian concerns are all part of one project.’
This policy rests on misleading ideas about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state. Even if the invasion was justified, that does not justify all our subsequent actions. If 9/11 had been planned in training camps in Iraq, we might have felt the war in Iraq was more justified, but our actions would have been no less of a disaster for Iraqis or for ourselves. The power of the US and its allies, and our commitment, knowledge and will, are limited. It is unlikely that we will be able to defeat the Taliban. The ingredients of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Malaya – control of the borders, large numbers of troops in relation to the population, strong support from the majority ethnic groups, a long-term commitment and a credible local government – are lacking in Afghanistan.
General Petraeus will find it difficult to repeat the apparent success of the surge in Iraq. There are no mass political parties in Afghanistan and the Kabul government lacks the base, strength or legitimacy of the Baghdad government. Afghan tribal groups lack the coherence of the Iraqi Sunni tribes and their relation to state structures: they are not being driven out of neighbourhood after neighbourhood and they do not have the same relation to the Taliban that the Sunni groups had to ‘al-Qaida in Iraq’. Afghans are weary of the war but the Afghan chiefs are not approaching us, seeking a deal. Since the political players and state structures in Afghanistan are much more fragile than those in Iraq, they are less likely to play a strong role in ending the insurgency.
Meanwhile, the Taliban can exploit the ideology of religious resistance that the West deliberately fostered in the 1980s to defeat the Russians. They can portray the Kabul government as US slaves, Nato as an infidel occupying force and their own insurgency as a jihad. Their complaints about corruption, human rights abuses and aerial bombardments appeal to a large audience. They are attracting Afghans to their rural courts by giving quicker and more predictable rulings than government judges.
Like some Afghan government officials, the Taliban have developed an ambiguous and sometimes profitable relationship with the drug lords. They are able to slip back and forth across the Pakistani border and receive support there. They have massacred Alokozai elders who tried to resist them. They are mounting successful attacks against the coalition and the Afghan government in the south and east. They are operating in more districts than in 2006 and control provinces, such as Wardak, which are close to Kabul. They have a chance of retaking southern district towns such as Musa Qala and perhaps even some provincial capitals.
But the Taliban are very unlikely to take over Afghanistan as a whole. Their previous administration provided basic road security and justice but it was fragile and fell quickly. They are no longer perceived, as they were by some in 1994, as young student angels saving the country from corruption. Millions of Afghans disliked their brutality, incompetence and primitive attitudes. The Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek populations are wealthier, more established and more powerful than they were in 1996 and would strongly resist any attempt by the Taliban to occupy their areas. The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before. It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.
Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security. Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaida? And how safe would this safe haven be? They could give al-Qaida land for a camp but how would they defend it against predators or US special forces? And does al-Qaida still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?
Furthermore, there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy). Nor is there any necessary connection between state-formation and terrorism. Our confusions are well illustrated by the debates about whether Iraq was a rogue state harbouring terrorists (as Bush claimed) or an authoritarian state which excluded terrorists (as was in fact the case).
It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives? Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.
Yet the current state-building project, at the heart of our policy, is justified in the most instrumental terms – not as an end in itself but as a means towards counter-terrorism. Obama is clear about this:
I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.
In pursuit of this objective, Obama has so far committed to building ‘an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000’, and adds that ‘increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed.’ US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain’s). Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget.
Some policymakers have been quick to point out that this cost is unsustainable and will leave Afghanistan dependent for ever on the largesse of the international community. Some have even raised the spectre (suggested by the example of Pakistan) that this will lead to a military coup. But the more basic question is about our political principles. We should not encourage the creation of an authoritarian military state. The security that resulted might suit our short-term security interests, but it will not serve the longer interests of Afghans. What kind of anti-terrorist tactics would we expect from the Afghan military? What kind of surveillance, interference and control from the police? We should not assume that the only way to achieve security in a developing country is through the restriction of civil liberties, or that authoritarianism is a necessary phase in state-formation, or a precondition for rapid economic development, or a lesser evil in the fight against modern terrorism.
After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language and encrusted with moral claims, analogies and political theories that it can seem futile to present an alternative. It is particularly difficult to argue not for a total withdrawal but for a more cautious approach. The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer – perhaps 20,000. In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development and counter-terrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state. If the West believed it essential to exclude al-Qaida from Afghanistan, then they could do it with special forces. (They have done it successfully since 2001 and could continue indefinitely, though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.) At the same time the West should provide generous development assistance – not only to keep consent for the counter-terrorism operations, but as an end in itself.
A reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural development and in other areas favoured by development agencies. We should not control and cannot predict the future of Afghanistan. It may in the future become more violent, or find a decentralised equilibrium or a new national unity, but if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30 years, encourage the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.
Such arguments seem strained, unrealistic, counter-intuitive and unappealing. They appear to betray the hopes of Afghans who trusted us and to allow the Taliban to abuse district towns. No politician wants to be perceived to have underestimated, or failed to address, a terrorist threat; or to write off the ‘blood and treasure’ that we have sunk into Afghanistan; or to admit defeat. Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble; Obama’s motto is not ‘no we can’t’; soldiers are not trained to admit defeat or to say a mission is impossible. And to suggest that what worked in Iraq won’t work in Afghanistan (or that what worked in postwar West Germany or 1950s Souh Korea won’t work in Afghanistan) requires a detailed knowledge of each country’s past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.
Sober, intelligent ambassadors who were sceptical about Iraq presided over the troop surge in Afghanistan. Aid agencies, human rights activists and foreign correspondents have not opposed it. Politicians – Republican and Democrat, Conservative and Labour – have voted for it; the United Nations, Nato and Washington think-tanks support it. And finally, many Afghans encourage it, enthusiastically.
The fundamental assumptions remain that an ungoverned or hostile Afghanistan is a threat to global security; that the West has the ability to address the threat and bring prosperity and security; that this is justified and a moral obligation; that economic development and order in Afghanistan will contribute to global stability; that these different objectives reinforce each other; and that there is no real alternative. One indication of the enduring strength of such assumptions is that they are exactly those made in 1868 by Sir Henry Rawlinson, a celebrated and experienced member of the council of India, concerning the threat of a Russian presence in Afghanistan:
In the interests, then, of peace; in the interests of commerce; in the interests of moral and material improvement, it may be asserted that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty, and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Kabul will prove in the sequel to be true economy.
The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is described as
International . . . regional . . . joint civilian-military . . . co-ordinated . . . long-term . . . focused on developing capacity . . . an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; a hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success.
This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Our approach is short-term; it has struggled to develop Afghan capacity, resolve regional issues or overcome civilian-military divisions; it has struggled to respect Afghan sovereignty or local values; it has failed to implement international standards of democracy, government and human rights; and it has failed to set clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? (Similarly, we do not notice the tautology in claiming to ‘overcome corruption through transparent, predictable and accountable financial processes’.)
In part, it is because the language is comfortingly opaque. We can expose Rawlinson’s blunt calculus of national interest by questioning the costs, the potential gains or the likelihood of success. But a bewildering range of different logical connections and identities can be concealed in a specialised language derived from development theory and overlaid with management consultancy. What is concealed is our underlying assumption that when we want to make other societies resemble our (often fantastical) ideas of our own society, we can. The language of modern policy does not help us to declare the limits to our power and capacity; to concede that we can do less than we pretend or that our enemies can do less than we pretend; to confess how little we know about a country like Afghanistan or how little we can predict about its future; or to acknowledge that we might be unwelcome or that our presence might be perceived as illegitimate or that it might make things worse.
We claim to be engaged in a neutral, technocratic, universal project of ‘state-building’ but we don’t know exactly what that means. Those who see Afghanistan as reverting to the Taliban or becoming a traditional autocratic state are referring to situations that existed there in 1972 and 1994. But the international community’s ambition appears to be to create something that has not existed before. Obama calls it ‘a more capable and accountable Afghan government’. The US White Paper calls it ‘effective local governance’ and speaks of ‘legitimacy’. The US, the UK and their allies agreed unanimously at the Nato 60th anniversary summit in April to create ‘a stronger democratic state’ in Afghanistan. In the new UK strategy for Afghanistan, certain combinations of adjective and noun appear again and again in the 32 pages: separated by a few pages, you will find ‘legitimate, accountable state’, ‘legitimate and accountable government’, ‘effective and accountable state’ and ‘effective and accountable governance’. Gordon Brown says that ‘just as the Afghans need to take control of their own security, they need to build legitimate governance.’
What is this thing ‘governance’, which Afghans (or we) need to build, and which can also be transparent, stable, regulated, competent, representative, coercive? A fact of nationhood, a moral good, a cure for corruption, a process? At times, ‘state’ and ‘government’ and ‘governance’ seem to be different words for the same thing. Sometimes ‘governance’ seems to be part of a duo, ‘governance and the rule of law’; sometimes part of a triad, ‘security, economic development and governance’, to be addressed through a comprehensive approach to ‘the 3 ds’, ‘defence, development and diplomacy’ – which implies ‘governance’ is something to do with a foreign service.
By contrast, in 1868, Rawlinson’s views were defeated. Sir John Lawrence, the new viceroy, persuaded Lord Derby’s government that Afghanistan was less important than it appeared, that our resources were limited, and that we had other more pressing priorities. Here, in a civil service minute of 1867 (I found this in Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac’s Tournament of Shadows), he imagines what would happen if the Russians tried to invade:
In that case let them undergo the long and tiresome marches which lie between the Oxus and the Indus; let them wend their way through poor and difficult countries, among a fanatic and courageous population, where, in many places, every mile can be converted into a defensible position; then they will come to the conflict on which the fate of India will depend, toil-worn, with an exhausted infantry, a broken-down cavalry, and a defective artillery.
He concludes:
I am firmly of opinion that our proper course is not to advance our troops beyond our present border, not to send English officers into the different states of Central Asia; but to put our own house in order, by giving the people of India the best government in our power, by conciliating, as far as practicable, all classes, and by consolidating our resources.
Lawrence does not predict what the Russians might want to do in Afghanistan. Nor does he attempt to refute Rawlinson’s vision of stability, his economic theories, his moral justification or his idea of moral responsibility. A modern civil servant might express such an argument as follows:
the presence of Nato special forces, the challenging logistical and political conditions in Afghanistan and lack of technological capacity, are likely to impede al-Qaida in Afghanistan from posing a significant threat to UK or US national security. Instead development in South Asia should remain the key strategic priority for the UK government in the region.
Lawrence, as viceroy of India, might have been expected to have a more confident or arrogant view of British power than policy-makers today. But in fact he believed that the British government lacked power, lacked knowledge (even though he and his colleagues had spent decades working on the Afghan frontier) and lacked legitimacy (he writes that Afghans ‘do not want us; they dread our appearance in the country . . . will not tolerate foreign rule’).
But he undermines the fantasy of an Afghan threat as much through the rhythm of his prose as through his arguments. His synecdoche, ‘the Oxus and the Indus’, emphasises to a domestic policymaker the unknown and alien nature of the landscape; the archaism ‘wend’ illustrates the circuitous routes; his repetitions enact the repetitive and tiresome journey. He highlights the political and religious energies of the resistance (placing them ‘every mile’) and suggests internal divisions without asserting them (by describing Afghanistan not as a single state but as ‘countries’). His concessive subjunctive ‘let them’ reflects his attitude of uncertainty about the future. It is not an assessment of the likelihood of a Russian march but an enactment of its potential and it reduces the army by the end of the sentence to a decrepit band on the edge of the Indus, which it would be difficult to perceive as a threat.
The rickety and elaborate hubris of the Russian march – stretching through sub-clauses and rhetorical tricks, and weighed down with 11 emotive adjectives – contrasts with the British response in solid words, bolstered by a homely proverb and buttressed with strong caution. He does not draw analogies with other countries in other historical periods. The argument is contingent, cautious, empirical and local, rooted in a very specific landscape and time. It expresses a belief not only in the limits of Russian and Afghan threats but also in the limits of British power and capacity.
Rory Stewart is the Ryan Family Professor of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center on Human Rights Policy at Harvard.
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Thursday, July 9, 2009
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
US to employ novel approach to win over Muslims, says envoy By Anwar Iqbal
US to employ novel approach to win over Muslims, says envoy
By Anwar Iqbal
Friday, 03 Jul, 2009
WASHINGTON, July 2: The Obama administration wants to engage the Muslims in a way that is innovative, dynamic and out of the box, says Farah Pandith, America’s first special envoy to the Muslim communities.
The main objective behind the administration’s new strategy is to “know the next generation of (Muslim) thinkers. And in this role I’ll be doing that,” Ms Pandith told a briefing in Washington.
Farah Pandith is a Muslim-American, born in the Indian-occupied Kashmir. Her parents immigrated to the United States when she was an infant.
Former president George W. Bush hired Ms Pandith in early 2007 as his senior adviser for Muslim engagement in the European and Eurasian region. She has also worked for the US National Security Council and with the US Agency for International Development in Kabul.
Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appointed her America’s first special envoy to Muslim communities around the world.
In Washington, the creation of this new position is seen as the first step towards implementing President Barack Obama’s policy of reaching out to the Muslims announced in Cairo last month.
The strategy aims at undoing the negative impact of the Bush policies -- the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay, and the humiliation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.
The approach, however, has already annoyed American conservatives, causing a former Reagan aide to proclaim that President Obama was a closet Muslim.
Perhaps that’s why the administration made no public announcement when it created a new office of a Special Representative to Muslim Communities. News of its debut was buried in an internal State Department memo last week, and it was only after spokesman Ian Kelley was questioned by reporters that the State Department arranged a public briefing by Ms Pandith.
But this did not prevent some US commentators from questioning the need to appoint a special envoy for the Muslims while others described the move as ‘bizarre’.
So it’s no surprise that Ms Pandith, an experienced diplomat, was very careful in her first briefing. She was so careful that in an hour-long briefing she did not mention Kashmir or Palestine even once.
She did not go into specifics and instead couched her message in neutral terms, hoping to draw the attention of her co-religionists without irking others.
She was particularly careful not to annoy India where the appointment of a Kashmiri woman as a special envoy for Muslims initially caused some concerns. Later, New Delhi welcomed her appointment, pointing out that she was an Indian. “I was actually very overwhelmed with the response in India,” said Ms Pandith. “I really have to say it was really special for me as somebody of Indian heritage.”
During the briefing, Ms Pandith used words like ‘listening’ and ‘nuance’ at least 20 times while describing how she would deal with her new assignment.
“I think it is nuance, I think it’s respect, I think it’s listening, I think it’s being creative,” she said. “And I think it’s creating many different types of initiatives to be able to do that.”
She also acknowledged that there was no magic bullet that could resolve all the differences between the Islamic and Western worlds overnight.
“There is not one programme that’s going to be the magic programme to engage with Muslims. It’s really listening,” she said.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/us-to-employ-novel-approach-to-win-over-muslims,-says-envoy-379
Copyright © 2009 - Dawn Media Group
By Anwar Iqbal
Friday, 03 Jul, 2009
WASHINGTON, July 2: The Obama administration wants to engage the Muslims in a way that is innovative, dynamic and out of the box, says Farah Pandith, America’s first special envoy to the Muslim communities.
The main objective behind the administration’s new strategy is to “know the next generation of (Muslim) thinkers. And in this role I’ll be doing that,” Ms Pandith told a briefing in Washington.
Farah Pandith is a Muslim-American, born in the Indian-occupied Kashmir. Her parents immigrated to the United States when she was an infant.
Former president George W. Bush hired Ms Pandith in early 2007 as his senior adviser for Muslim engagement in the European and Eurasian region. She has also worked for the US National Security Council and with the US Agency for International Development in Kabul.
Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appointed her America’s first special envoy to Muslim communities around the world.
In Washington, the creation of this new position is seen as the first step towards implementing President Barack Obama’s policy of reaching out to the Muslims announced in Cairo last month.
The strategy aims at undoing the negative impact of the Bush policies -- the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay, and the humiliation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.
The approach, however, has already annoyed American conservatives, causing a former Reagan aide to proclaim that President Obama was a closet Muslim.
Perhaps that’s why the administration made no public announcement when it created a new office of a Special Representative to Muslim Communities. News of its debut was buried in an internal State Department memo last week, and it was only after spokesman Ian Kelley was questioned by reporters that the State Department arranged a public briefing by Ms Pandith.
But this did not prevent some US commentators from questioning the need to appoint a special envoy for the Muslims while others described the move as ‘bizarre’.
So it’s no surprise that Ms Pandith, an experienced diplomat, was very careful in her first briefing. She was so careful that in an hour-long briefing she did not mention Kashmir or Palestine even once.
She did not go into specifics and instead couched her message in neutral terms, hoping to draw the attention of her co-religionists without irking others.
She was particularly careful not to annoy India where the appointment of a Kashmiri woman as a special envoy for Muslims initially caused some concerns. Later, New Delhi welcomed her appointment, pointing out that she was an Indian. “I was actually very overwhelmed with the response in India,” said Ms Pandith. “I really have to say it was really special for me as somebody of Indian heritage.”
During the briefing, Ms Pandith used words like ‘listening’ and ‘nuance’ at least 20 times while describing how she would deal with her new assignment.
“I think it is nuance, I think it’s respect, I think it’s listening, I think it’s being creative,” she said. “And I think it’s creating many different types of initiatives to be able to do that.”
She also acknowledged that there was no magic bullet that could resolve all the differences between the Islamic and Western worlds overnight.
“There is not one programme that’s going to be the magic programme to engage with Muslims. It’s really listening,” she said.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/us-to-employ-novel-approach-to-win-over-muslims,-says-envoy-379
Copyright © 2009 - Dawn Media Group
Unresolved Issues Between Washington and Moscow -- Stratfor
Unresolved Issues Between Washington and Moscow -- Stratfor
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/07/geopolitical_diary__the_unresolved_issues_between_washington_and_moscow_96886.html
Obama Gambles on a Russian Wedge -- Joshua Tucker, The New Republic
http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2009/07/07/obama-s-russia-gamble.aspx
America's Arms Control Amnesia -- Keith Paine, Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124693303362103841.html
Don't Abandon Russia's Democrats -- Boris Nemstov, Wall Street Journal opinion
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124693161375903683.html
What's at Stake -- Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Washington Times opinion
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/07/whats-at-stake/
A Good Start on Restarting US-Russia Engagement -- Los Angeles Times editorial
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-russia7-2009jul07,0,3810480.story
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/07/geopolitical_diary__the_unresolved_issues_between_washington_and_moscow_96886.html
Obama Gambles on a Russian Wedge -- Joshua Tucker, The New Republic
http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2009/07/07/obama-s-russia-gamble.aspx
America's Arms Control Amnesia -- Keith Paine, Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124693303362103841.html
Don't Abandon Russia's Democrats -- Boris Nemstov, Wall Street Journal opinion
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124693161375903683.html
What's at Stake -- Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Washington Times opinion
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/07/whats-at-stake/
A Good Start on Restarting US-Russia Engagement -- Los Angeles Times editorial
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-russia7-2009jul07,0,3810480.story
U.S. Warns Of Multiple al-Qaida Plots Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri From WTOP
U.S. Warns Of Multiple al-Qaida Plots Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
From WTOP:
WASHINGTON - Last week, German authorities discovered that groups of terrorists may have been dispatched from training bases in Pakistan to launch crippling attacks.
In April, U.S. intelligence officials warned Germany about possible terror attacks. Since that time German security officials have reportedly been preparing for massive, multi-layered attacks for which al-Qaida has become known.
Shortly after the April warning, German Ambassador Klaus Scharioth said in an unrelated interview, "You will understand that I can't go into the details of the terrorist threat, but I can only tell you that we all know that we have to be vigilant and that we have to continue to work very hard on that, but I do not want to go into details."
Read more .... http://www.wtop.com/?nid=778&sid=1711695
From WTOP:
WASHINGTON - Last week, German authorities discovered that groups of terrorists may have been dispatched from training bases in Pakistan to launch crippling attacks.
In April, U.S. intelligence officials warned Germany about possible terror attacks. Since that time German security officials have reportedly been preparing for massive, multi-layered attacks for which al-Qaida has become known.
Shortly after the April warning, German Ambassador Klaus Scharioth said in an unrelated interview, "You will understand that I can't go into the details of the terrorist threat, but I can only tell you that we all know that we have to be vigilant and that we have to continue to work very hard on that, but I do not want to go into details."
Read more .... http://www.wtop.com/?nid=778&sid=1711695
Obama Slouching Towards an Iran War? by Tony Karon
Obama Slouching Towards an Iran War? by Tony Karon
http://tonykaron.com/2009/07/07/obama-slouching-towards-an-iran-war/
http://tonykaron.com/2009/07/07/obama-slouching-towards-an-iran-war/
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Abiding by Commitments Col. (Ret.) Shaul Arieli, former commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip; board member, Israel’s Council for Peace
Abiding by Commitments
Col. (Ret.) Shaul Arieli, former commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip; board member, Israel’s Council for Peace and Security. Interview with Middle East Bulletin. http://middleeastprogress.org/2009/07/abiding-by-commitments/
July 7, 2009
West Bank settlement of Adam (AP)
"[S]ettlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands. It is important to remember that 84 out of a 100 outposts are built fully or partially on private Palestinian lands."
What is happening on the ground currently in terms of construction in settlements and outposts?
In many settlements there is ongoing construction of new neighborhoods, for example, in Ma’ale Adumim, Modi’in Ilit and other smaller settlements. There are no new settlements, but that has been the case for years. In terms of outposts, there is no construction of new outposts but there is institutionalization of existing outposts through positioning of new house trailers, permanent buildings and so forth.
Heads of the settler movement have been complaining about a de facto construction freeze in settlements in the past few months.
That is not true. I was on a tour in the West Bank last Wednesday, for example, and saw a new neighborhood being built in the settlement of Maale Michmash.
Can you clarify the current disagreement between the United States and Israel regarding the issue of settlements?
The United States is demanding a settlement freeze after Israel has used every subtlety and excuse to expand settlements. Even in 2004 when Israel said it would only add rooms to existing houses for natural growth, this expansion turned into new neighborhoods or outposts. There is also a clear Israeli obligation to remove all outposts created since 2001; that is 24 out of 100 outposts.
How is the current conversation between the United States and Israel about settlements different than those in the past?
Throughout the years there were some understandings and agreements and mostly turning a blind eye on the part of the United States. First, for some years the Americans did not care about this issue that much. Second, the previous administration viewed the disengagement from Gaza as important and wanted to bolster former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. And third, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held peace talks with the Palestinians, which the United States wanted to support. But Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu isn’t doing that.
Another difference is that the current administration is coordinated with the Europeans on the issue of settlements, as was seen in Netanyahu’s visit in Europe last week when Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi also demanded a settlement freeze.
President Obama has also spoke about settlements in terms of Road Map obligations. What are Israel’s obligations under the Road Map? What are the parallel demands from the Palestinians?
In 2003, the United States demanded a settlements freeze, including for needs of natural growth, as well as removal of outposts built after 2001. Israel did not agree to the natural growth part, but committed to construction only within the built-up area of existing settlements. In practice, however, Israel kept building dramatically.
The Palestinian obligations are reforms in government and security forces, real war on terror, state building, transparency, elimination of corruption and so forth. Except for what is happening in Gaza, which makes it impossible for the Palestinian Authority to fight terror and make sure there is only one security apparatus, they have fulfilled all of their Road Map commitments.
What tools does the United States have to reinforce the demand to freeze settlements?
The tools are diplomatic ones. I personally oppose the idea of U.S. sanctions on Israel and would like to see an inclusive U.S. proposal that would address both final status negotiations as well as steps that need to take place throughout the negotiations, including a settlement freeze. At the same time, the United States can offer Israel carrots such as facilitation of the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Arab world, something on which they have been working, global acceptance of Israel and an upgrade of the economic agreements between Israel and the Europeans, who are coordinated with the Americans on this front.
Can you elaborate on the importance of the issue of settlements to the peace process?
Settlements determine facts on the ground that make it more difficult politically for the government of Israel to reach an agreement on the territorial issue because it turns it into an internal governmental issue, an internal Israeli societal issue. It also constantly increases the rate of compensation settlers will get under an agreement.
Moreover, settlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands. It is important to remember that 84 out of a 100 outposts are built fully or partially on private Palestinian lands.
How does the issue of settlements tie in with the issue of movement and access which Prime Minister Netanyahu has expressed an interest in moving forward?
The other side of the settlements coin is movement and access. To guarantee the settlers’ safety, Israel prevents the Palestinians from using more and more main transportation routes, which of course hinders the development of the Palestinian economy due to enormous shipping and handling costs, and in turn the development of the future Palestinian state.
How does that fit in with Netanyahu’s vision of economic peace?
It does not.
Have things changed in terms of roadblocks and checkpoints in the past few months?
There is a change. In the past six months, five or six significant checkpoints, some of which were manned, were removed. Yet, there are still approximately 600 checkpoints and roadblocks so there is not sufficient improvement to move the economy forward.
Can more be done without comprising the safety of settlers in the West Bank?
Absolutely. It is not easy but more can be done.
Some, both on the right and on the left, are criticizing the U.S. demand to freeze settlements arguing it is a final status issue that will only be resolved in an agreement and that until then, freezing settlements is overrated and not feasible. What’s your take on that?
That is nonsense. Since 1993 when we signed the Oslo Accords and realized that the solution would be based on UN Security Council resolution 242 and separation to two states, the number of Israelis residing beyond the Green Line multiplied two and a half times—today the formal number of settlers is 470,000 versus 222,000 in 1993, including in Jerusalem. The actual number now is even higher. This settlement expansion required the investment of billions of dollars which Israel needed in other areas, increased the compensation settlers will get once evacuated, expanded the areas that would have to be swapped in an agreement, hurt the contiguity of the future Palestinian state and damaged the ability of the Palestinian Authority to develop the economy and gain support for peaceful two-state solution.
Is it possible to freeze settlements?
Yes. Technically, there are hundreds of empty apartments that can be marketed so there is no need to build new projects. Second, Israel can decide that it will allow the construction only of projects on the verge of completion and there are thousands of housing units in that phase.
The term ‘natural growth’ is nonsense. First of all Israel used it dishonestly since it was coined. Second, if there is no more room, settlers should seek a different place to live. If the son of Minister of Defense Ehud Barak wanted to live next to his father in a luxury tower in Tel Aviv, would the government approve the construction of another tower for him? No. he would look for some place else to live. The same rule should apply to settlers.
Some argue that the expansion of settlements is limited to the large settlement blocs which would stay under Israeli sovereignty anyway in a peace agreement.
The four blocs referred to are Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion, Gush Hashmonaim and Gush Ariel but there was never a real definition of these blocs, not to mention that expansion takes place everywhere, in and outside these blocs, for example in Maale Michmash and Kochav Yaakov, which are located east of the separation barrier, and also in Anatot and other settlements.
Can you outline generally the types of settlers in the West Bank?
We are speaking of some 300,000 settlers in the West Bank, not including the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, who can be divided as follows: 48% Haredim, Orthodox Jews, who moved there only due to density of housing in Haredi cities inside Israel and who live in settlements adjacent to the Green Line; 25% national religious and Haredim who are in the West Bank for ideological reasons and who reside in the heart of the Palestinian population; and 27% of secular Israelis who wanted cheap housing and to improve their quality of lives.
Under any model of agreement, even under the Geneva Accords in which Israel annexes only two percent of the West Bank, not more than 100,000-120,000 settlers would have to be evacuated, meaning a quarter of the total number.
What tools are at the disposable of the Israeli government in handling the issue of settlements?
First and foremost, Israel should pass a law for voluntary evacuation-compensation which can change the whole picture at least for secular settlers. The Haredim live close to the Green Line in large settlement blocs. The greatest challenge would be evacuation of the hard line settlers which will be done as part of an agreement. In addition, outposts should be dismantled for two reasons: first, Israel is obligated to do so internationally, and second, to preserve law and order internally.
From your experience in the Israeli Defense Forces, do you understand the fear, often raised in Israel, that with more and more religious soldiers and young officers serving in combat units, some would refuse orders to evacuate outposts and settlements?
These fears were raised first in 1982 with the evacuation of Sinai and since then have floated to the surface every once in a while. We might witness some extreme phenomena which would have to be dealt with legally and forcefully, but overall the mainstream national religious current which serves in the IDF, is responsible and law-abiding.
What lessons can be learned from the disengagement from Gaza and how to deal with evacuees?
There is a need to work on two patterns of absorption both at the individual level and the community level.The settlers in Gaza did not cooperate with the government, which resulted in some of them still not having been absorbed properly in other places. It was not a governmental failure, but the government should learn the lessons and prepare better for the evacuation of West Bank settlers.
You wrote a book about the separation barrier and are very active advising the Supreme Court on changing its route. Can you please tell us a little bit about your efforts and the status of the barrier now?
The original plan for the barrier was designed to include 20 percent of the West Bank in the Israeli side. As a result of the efforts of the Council on Peace and Security, the pressure of the international community and the rulings of the Supreme Court, the plan reduced this percentage to 8.5 and practically, the built barrier includes only 4.5 percent, which is still reasonable for land swaps as part of a final status agreement.
Since November 2007 the construction of the barrier practically stopped. The state argues that it is due to budgetary constraints but it also has to do with political reasons. The parts which have not been built yet are in areas where there is controversy as to whether the border will be acceptable in a peace agreement. It is common knowledge that the route that the government approved would not get the approval of the United States and the international community as well as the Supreme Court so their construction is being put off.
The impact of the barrier on the Palestinians is most severe in East Jerusalem. The separation from the rest of the West Bank led to East Jerusalem being on the verge of collapse economically and socially. Moreover, the barrier hurts many Palestinian farmers whose lands are on the Israeli side which makes it extremely hard for them to work the land. Finally, in those areas where the construction of the barrier has not been completed, security concerns prevent Palestinians from driving on main roads.
Two-thirds of the Israeli public show consistent support for a peaceful two-state solution yet many fear that territorial withdrawals would leave behind bases for terror organizations to attack Israel. How would you address these concerns?
Israel withdrew from occupied territories four times: the withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the disengagement from Gaza were done unilaterally whereas the withdrawals in the form of land for peace with Jordan and Egypt were part of agreements. There is a stark difference between the results of unilateral moves and those of bilateral ones and therefore we should learn from our history and withdraw from the West Bank in an agreement.
Israel’s military supremacy combined with international guarantees and legitimacy as well as with the Palestinian interest to avoid risking the results achieved in a peace agreement would all protect Israel’s security after a withdrawal takes place.
You served as commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip. How would you resolve the problem of getting aid into Gaza and beginning its reconstruction without strengthening Hamas?
It is possible to condition the humanitarian aid with ensuring that its passage goes through the Palestinian Authority or perhaps through the arrangements which might be agreed upon between Fatah and Hamas in their reconciliation discussions.
Yet, strengthening pragmatists and undermining extremists, Hamas included, requires changing the reality on the ground side-by-side with effective credible diplomatic negotiations on final status agreement. Such a process would demonstrate that diplomacy is rewarding and on the other hand, that violence is not. That is the only way.
Col. (Ret.) Shaul Arieli, former commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip; board member, Israel’s Council for Peace and Security. Interview with Middle East Bulletin. http://middleeastprogress.org/2009/07/abiding-by-commitments/
July 7, 2009
West Bank settlement of Adam (AP)
"[S]ettlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands. It is important to remember that 84 out of a 100 outposts are built fully or partially on private Palestinian lands."
What is happening on the ground currently in terms of construction in settlements and outposts?
In many settlements there is ongoing construction of new neighborhoods, for example, in Ma’ale Adumim, Modi’in Ilit and other smaller settlements. There are no new settlements, but that has been the case for years. In terms of outposts, there is no construction of new outposts but there is institutionalization of existing outposts through positioning of new house trailers, permanent buildings and so forth.
Heads of the settler movement have been complaining about a de facto construction freeze in settlements in the past few months.
That is not true. I was on a tour in the West Bank last Wednesday, for example, and saw a new neighborhood being built in the settlement of Maale Michmash.
Can you clarify the current disagreement between the United States and Israel regarding the issue of settlements?
The United States is demanding a settlement freeze after Israel has used every subtlety and excuse to expand settlements. Even in 2004 when Israel said it would only add rooms to existing houses for natural growth, this expansion turned into new neighborhoods or outposts. There is also a clear Israeli obligation to remove all outposts created since 2001; that is 24 out of 100 outposts.
How is the current conversation between the United States and Israel about settlements different than those in the past?
Throughout the years there were some understandings and agreements and mostly turning a blind eye on the part of the United States. First, for some years the Americans did not care about this issue that much. Second, the previous administration viewed the disengagement from Gaza as important and wanted to bolster former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. And third, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held peace talks with the Palestinians, which the United States wanted to support. But Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu isn’t doing that.
Another difference is that the current administration is coordinated with the Europeans on the issue of settlements, as was seen in Netanyahu’s visit in Europe last week when Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi also demanded a settlement freeze.
President Obama has also spoke about settlements in terms of Road Map obligations. What are Israel’s obligations under the Road Map? What are the parallel demands from the Palestinians?
In 2003, the United States demanded a settlements freeze, including for needs of natural growth, as well as removal of outposts built after 2001. Israel did not agree to the natural growth part, but committed to construction only within the built-up area of existing settlements. In practice, however, Israel kept building dramatically.
The Palestinian obligations are reforms in government and security forces, real war on terror, state building, transparency, elimination of corruption and so forth. Except for what is happening in Gaza, which makes it impossible for the Palestinian Authority to fight terror and make sure there is only one security apparatus, they have fulfilled all of their Road Map commitments.
What tools does the United States have to reinforce the demand to freeze settlements?
The tools are diplomatic ones. I personally oppose the idea of U.S. sanctions on Israel and would like to see an inclusive U.S. proposal that would address both final status negotiations as well as steps that need to take place throughout the negotiations, including a settlement freeze. At the same time, the United States can offer Israel carrots such as facilitation of the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Arab world, something on which they have been working, global acceptance of Israel and an upgrade of the economic agreements between Israel and the Europeans, who are coordinated with the Americans on this front.
Can you elaborate on the importance of the issue of settlements to the peace process?
Settlements determine facts on the ground that make it more difficult politically for the government of Israel to reach an agreement on the territorial issue because it turns it into an internal governmental issue, an internal Israeli societal issue. It also constantly increases the rate of compensation settlers will get under an agreement.
Moreover, settlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands. It is important to remember that 84 out of a 100 outposts are built fully or partially on private Palestinian lands.
How does the issue of settlements tie in with the issue of movement and access which Prime Minister Netanyahu has expressed an interest in moving forward?
The other side of the settlements coin is movement and access. To guarantee the settlers’ safety, Israel prevents the Palestinians from using more and more main transportation routes, which of course hinders the development of the Palestinian economy due to enormous shipping and handling costs, and in turn the development of the future Palestinian state.
How does that fit in with Netanyahu’s vision of economic peace?
It does not.
Have things changed in terms of roadblocks and checkpoints in the past few months?
There is a change. In the past six months, five or six significant checkpoints, some of which were manned, were removed. Yet, there are still approximately 600 checkpoints and roadblocks so there is not sufficient improvement to move the economy forward.
Can more be done without comprising the safety of settlers in the West Bank?
Absolutely. It is not easy but more can be done.
Some, both on the right and on the left, are criticizing the U.S. demand to freeze settlements arguing it is a final status issue that will only be resolved in an agreement and that until then, freezing settlements is overrated and not feasible. What’s your take on that?
That is nonsense. Since 1993 when we signed the Oslo Accords and realized that the solution would be based on UN Security Council resolution 242 and separation to two states, the number of Israelis residing beyond the Green Line multiplied two and a half times—today the formal number of settlers is 470,000 versus 222,000 in 1993, including in Jerusalem. The actual number now is even higher. This settlement expansion required the investment of billions of dollars which Israel needed in other areas, increased the compensation settlers will get once evacuated, expanded the areas that would have to be swapped in an agreement, hurt the contiguity of the future Palestinian state and damaged the ability of the Palestinian Authority to develop the economy and gain support for peaceful two-state solution.
Is it possible to freeze settlements?
Yes. Technically, there are hundreds of empty apartments that can be marketed so there is no need to build new projects. Second, Israel can decide that it will allow the construction only of projects on the verge of completion and there are thousands of housing units in that phase.
The term ‘natural growth’ is nonsense. First of all Israel used it dishonestly since it was coined. Second, if there is no more room, settlers should seek a different place to live. If the son of Minister of Defense Ehud Barak wanted to live next to his father in a luxury tower in Tel Aviv, would the government approve the construction of another tower for him? No. he would look for some place else to live. The same rule should apply to settlers.
Some argue that the expansion of settlements is limited to the large settlement blocs which would stay under Israeli sovereignty anyway in a peace agreement.
The four blocs referred to are Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion, Gush Hashmonaim and Gush Ariel but there was never a real definition of these blocs, not to mention that expansion takes place everywhere, in and outside these blocs, for example in Maale Michmash and Kochav Yaakov, which are located east of the separation barrier, and also in Anatot and other settlements.
Can you outline generally the types of settlers in the West Bank?
We are speaking of some 300,000 settlers in the West Bank, not including the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, who can be divided as follows: 48% Haredim, Orthodox Jews, who moved there only due to density of housing in Haredi cities inside Israel and who live in settlements adjacent to the Green Line; 25% national religious and Haredim who are in the West Bank for ideological reasons and who reside in the heart of the Palestinian population; and 27% of secular Israelis who wanted cheap housing and to improve their quality of lives.
Under any model of agreement, even under the Geneva Accords in which Israel annexes only two percent of the West Bank, not more than 100,000-120,000 settlers would have to be evacuated, meaning a quarter of the total number.
What tools are at the disposable of the Israeli government in handling the issue of settlements?
First and foremost, Israel should pass a law for voluntary evacuation-compensation which can change the whole picture at least for secular settlers. The Haredim live close to the Green Line in large settlement blocs. The greatest challenge would be evacuation of the hard line settlers which will be done as part of an agreement. In addition, outposts should be dismantled for two reasons: first, Israel is obligated to do so internationally, and second, to preserve law and order internally.
From your experience in the Israeli Defense Forces, do you understand the fear, often raised in Israel, that with more and more religious soldiers and young officers serving in combat units, some would refuse orders to evacuate outposts and settlements?
These fears were raised first in 1982 with the evacuation of Sinai and since then have floated to the surface every once in a while. We might witness some extreme phenomena which would have to be dealt with legally and forcefully, but overall the mainstream national religious current which serves in the IDF, is responsible and law-abiding.
What lessons can be learned from the disengagement from Gaza and how to deal with evacuees?
There is a need to work on two patterns of absorption both at the individual level and the community level.The settlers in Gaza did not cooperate with the government, which resulted in some of them still not having been absorbed properly in other places. It was not a governmental failure, but the government should learn the lessons and prepare better for the evacuation of West Bank settlers.
You wrote a book about the separation barrier and are very active advising the Supreme Court on changing its route. Can you please tell us a little bit about your efforts and the status of the barrier now?
The original plan for the barrier was designed to include 20 percent of the West Bank in the Israeli side. As a result of the efforts of the Council on Peace and Security, the pressure of the international community and the rulings of the Supreme Court, the plan reduced this percentage to 8.5 and practically, the built barrier includes only 4.5 percent, which is still reasonable for land swaps as part of a final status agreement.
Since November 2007 the construction of the barrier practically stopped. The state argues that it is due to budgetary constraints but it also has to do with political reasons. The parts which have not been built yet are in areas where there is controversy as to whether the border will be acceptable in a peace agreement. It is common knowledge that the route that the government approved would not get the approval of the United States and the international community as well as the Supreme Court so their construction is being put off.
The impact of the barrier on the Palestinians is most severe in East Jerusalem. The separation from the rest of the West Bank led to East Jerusalem being on the verge of collapse economically and socially. Moreover, the barrier hurts many Palestinian farmers whose lands are on the Israeli side which makes it extremely hard for them to work the land. Finally, in those areas where the construction of the barrier has not been completed, security concerns prevent Palestinians from driving on main roads.
Two-thirds of the Israeli public show consistent support for a peaceful two-state solution yet many fear that territorial withdrawals would leave behind bases for terror organizations to attack Israel. How would you address these concerns?
Israel withdrew from occupied territories four times: the withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the disengagement from Gaza were done unilaterally whereas the withdrawals in the form of land for peace with Jordan and Egypt were part of agreements. There is a stark difference between the results of unilateral moves and those of bilateral ones and therefore we should learn from our history and withdraw from the West Bank in an agreement.
Israel’s military supremacy combined with international guarantees and legitimacy as well as with the Palestinian interest to avoid risking the results achieved in a peace agreement would all protect Israel’s security after a withdrawal takes place.
You served as commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip. How would you resolve the problem of getting aid into Gaza and beginning its reconstruction without strengthening Hamas?
It is possible to condition the humanitarian aid with ensuring that its passage goes through the Palestinian Authority or perhaps through the arrangements which might be agreed upon between Fatah and Hamas in their reconciliation discussions.
Yet, strengthening pragmatists and undermining extremists, Hamas included, requires changing the reality on the ground side-by-side with effective credible diplomatic negotiations on final status agreement. Such a process would demonstrate that diplomacy is rewarding and on the other hand, that violence is not. That is the only way.
Iraqis Project Hopes, Fears onto Biden; Biden Firm that US will Engage Iran; If Israel wants an Attack, must carry it out Itself by Juan Cole
INFORMED COMMENT
7/6/09
Iraqis Project Hopes, Fears onto Biden; Biden Firm that US will Engage Iran; If Israel wants an Attack, must carry it out Itself
Juan Cole
The top myths in the press this weekend about Vice President Joe Biden are that he was rebuffed in Iraq when he offered his good offices with regard to effecting Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, and that he gave Israel a green light to attack Iran. Neither thing appears to be true.
So what really happened? Biden was given the job of working on Iraq reconciliation precisely because most elected Iraqi leaders want reassurance that the US is not abandoning the country to its fate.
Biden met with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, with Vice Presidents Adel Abdel Mahdi and Tariq al-Hashimi, and talked on the phone with President Jalal Talabani. The NYT reported Biden saying,
“To quote one of the four principals with whom I met: ‘With your concerns with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Korea, we were concerned we were moved to the bottom shelf,’ ” he said. “And so I said, ‘Well, you’re not. And evidence of that is, as the vice president of the United States I’m here talking to you.’ And it was clear that they – it was like, ‘Yeah, we get it.’ ”
On ABC This Week with George Stephanopolous, Biden explained what exactly his mission was in Iraq this weekend:
' one of the reasons I'm here, George, is to push the last end of that, which is the need for political settlement on some important issues between Arabs and Kurds and among the confessional groups. And I think we're well on our way . . .
What we offered the prime minister, as well as the speaker, as well as the two vice presidents, was that to the extent -- let me give you an example. The United Nations has started a process to deal with what they called the "disputed internal borders." And that is the debate between the Kurds and the Arabs as to where the line is.
Kirkuk is probably the biggest flashpoint. And we were asked that we would -- would we be helpful to the United Nations in doing this? I was further asked that would I communicate to the Kurdish leadership, who I have a close relationship with, that their passing a constitution through their parliament in Kurdistan was not helpful to the process that was under way. '
So the conflict over the disposition of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, among Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, has heated up in recent months, as this detailed Observer report shows.
This conflict has the potential to provoke an Arab-Kurdish civil war in the north and to draw in Turkey (and maybe also Iran and Syria).
Biden's task is to use diplomacy to settle this issue before it can tear Iraq apart.
On the one hand, Az-Zaman writing in Arabic maintains that Biden's offer of mediation between the two sides was received lukewarmly and not in the way the Americans had hoped for.
On the other hand, Biden according to the NYT is seeking a new discourse that will underline the central Iraqi role in their security, downplaying the American connection.
The two reports seem contradictory because high Iraqi politicians are themselves sometimes at odds over the relationship with America. Or, as Biden suggests, some politicians may be aiming their talking points at the Jan. 2010 parliamentary elections, and so seeking to maintain an image in public of independence and sovereignty even as they behind the scenes seek US support and cooperation.
A complicating factor is the growing dispute between the Arab members of the federal parliament and the parliament of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The civil Kurdistan parliamentarians are working on a new constitution that Arabs see as threatening the unity of Iraq.
Biden was asked by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to lend his good offices to resolving those affairs. He initially had planned a trip to the Kurdistan capital of Irbil, but this weekend's massive sandstorm knocked him out of it, and he had to speak to the Kurdistan leaders by phone.
As for the other news of the weekend, I think Biden's remarks on Israel and Iran were aimed at underlining the independence of US policy-making toward Iran. He underlined twice that the US would not alter its own posture toward Iran, regardless of what others did. That he also said that the Israelis are sovereign and that the US could not stop them from launching a missile strike on Iran, is just the United Nations Charter. I.e. it is boilerplate. In my view the significant bit is this:
' BIDEN: Look, Israel can determine for itself -- it's a sovereign nation -- what's in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Whether we agree or not?
BIDEN: Whether we agree or not. They're entitled to do that. Any sovereign nation is entitled to do that. But there is no pressure from any nation that's going to alter our behavior as to how to proceed.
What we believe is in the national interest of the United States, which we, coincidentally, believe is also in the interest of Israel and the whole world. And so there are separate issues. '
So what Biden was really saying is that the Obama administration intends to engage Iran diplomatically, and that if anyone wants Iran attacked they will have to do it themselves. This is not a green light to the Israelis, who hardly need one. It is a tough message to the right wing of the Israel lobbies that the Obama administration is not going to launch any hostilities with Iran, even after the hard line power grab of three weeks ago.
Oh, and the statement may serve as a reminder to a recalcitrant Iran of what might happen to Tehran if it refuses to negotiate in good faith over its nuclear enrichment program. (By the way, that there is no good evidence that Iran is working on a nuclear warhead, and that its current technological capacity is too limited for it to dream of such a thing any time soon, was again underlined by incoming International Atomic Energy Agency head Yukiya Amano.
Meanwhile, the real administration position on hostilities with Iran was clearly stated by Adm. Mike Mullen, which is that they would produce enormous instability (implied is that such instability would be bad for US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan).
In my view, Biden watchers still for the most part haven't gotten him right.
7/6/09
Iraqis Project Hopes, Fears onto Biden; Biden Firm that US will Engage Iran; If Israel wants an Attack, must carry it out Itself
Juan Cole
The top myths in the press this weekend about Vice President Joe Biden are that he was rebuffed in Iraq when he offered his good offices with regard to effecting Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, and that he gave Israel a green light to attack Iran. Neither thing appears to be true.
So what really happened? Biden was given the job of working on Iraq reconciliation precisely because most elected Iraqi leaders want reassurance that the US is not abandoning the country to its fate.
Biden met with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, with Vice Presidents Adel Abdel Mahdi and Tariq al-Hashimi, and talked on the phone with President Jalal Talabani. The NYT reported Biden saying,
“To quote one of the four principals with whom I met: ‘With your concerns with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Korea, we were concerned we were moved to the bottom shelf,’ ” he said. “And so I said, ‘Well, you’re not. And evidence of that is, as the vice president of the United States I’m here talking to you.’ And it was clear that they – it was like, ‘Yeah, we get it.’ ”
On ABC This Week with George Stephanopolous, Biden explained what exactly his mission was in Iraq this weekend:
' one of the reasons I'm here, George, is to push the last end of that, which is the need for political settlement on some important issues between Arabs and Kurds and among the confessional groups. And I think we're well on our way . . .
What we offered the prime minister, as well as the speaker, as well as the two vice presidents, was that to the extent -- let me give you an example. The United Nations has started a process to deal with what they called the "disputed internal borders." And that is the debate between the Kurds and the Arabs as to where the line is.
Kirkuk is probably the biggest flashpoint. And we were asked that we would -- would we be helpful to the United Nations in doing this? I was further asked that would I communicate to the Kurdish leadership, who I have a close relationship with, that their passing a constitution through their parliament in Kurdistan was not helpful to the process that was under way. '
So the conflict over the disposition of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, among Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, has heated up in recent months, as this detailed Observer report shows.
This conflict has the potential to provoke an Arab-Kurdish civil war in the north and to draw in Turkey (and maybe also Iran and Syria).
Biden's task is to use diplomacy to settle this issue before it can tear Iraq apart.
On the one hand, Az-Zaman writing in Arabic maintains that Biden's offer of mediation between the two sides was received lukewarmly and not in the way the Americans had hoped for.
On the other hand, Biden according to the NYT is seeking a new discourse that will underline the central Iraqi role in their security, downplaying the American connection.
The two reports seem contradictory because high Iraqi politicians are themselves sometimes at odds over the relationship with America. Or, as Biden suggests, some politicians may be aiming their talking points at the Jan. 2010 parliamentary elections, and so seeking to maintain an image in public of independence and sovereignty even as they behind the scenes seek US support and cooperation.
A complicating factor is the growing dispute between the Arab members of the federal parliament and the parliament of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The civil Kurdistan parliamentarians are working on a new constitution that Arabs see as threatening the unity of Iraq.
Biden was asked by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to lend his good offices to resolving those affairs. He initially had planned a trip to the Kurdistan capital of Irbil, but this weekend's massive sandstorm knocked him out of it, and he had to speak to the Kurdistan leaders by phone.
As for the other news of the weekend, I think Biden's remarks on Israel and Iran were aimed at underlining the independence of US policy-making toward Iran. He underlined twice that the US would not alter its own posture toward Iran, regardless of what others did. That he also said that the Israelis are sovereign and that the US could not stop them from launching a missile strike on Iran, is just the United Nations Charter. I.e. it is boilerplate. In my view the significant bit is this:
' BIDEN: Look, Israel can determine for itself -- it's a sovereign nation -- what's in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Whether we agree or not?
BIDEN: Whether we agree or not. They're entitled to do that. Any sovereign nation is entitled to do that. But there is no pressure from any nation that's going to alter our behavior as to how to proceed.
What we believe is in the national interest of the United States, which we, coincidentally, believe is also in the interest of Israel and the whole world. And so there are separate issues. '
So what Biden was really saying is that the Obama administration intends to engage Iran diplomatically, and that if anyone wants Iran attacked they will have to do it themselves. This is not a green light to the Israelis, who hardly need one. It is a tough message to the right wing of the Israel lobbies that the Obama administration is not going to launch any hostilities with Iran, even after the hard line power grab of three weeks ago.
Oh, and the statement may serve as a reminder to a recalcitrant Iran of what might happen to Tehran if it refuses to negotiate in good faith over its nuclear enrichment program. (By the way, that there is no good evidence that Iran is working on a nuclear warhead, and that its current technological capacity is too limited for it to dream of such a thing any time soon, was again underlined by incoming International Atomic Energy Agency head Yukiya Amano.
Meanwhile, the real administration position on hostilities with Iran was clearly stated by Adm. Mike Mullen, which is that they would produce enormous instability (implied is that such instability would be bad for US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan).
In my view, Biden watchers still for the most part haven't gotten him right.
Pro-Defense Senators Will Oppose the F-22
Next week the Senate will likely debate an amendment to strip out of the National Defense Authorization bill 7 additional F-22 fighters -- made (according to Lockheed) in 44 states. Almost universally seen as an extraordinary (but hugely expensive) fighter, the F-22 has for too long had a free ride on its capability, as described by its advocates. In fact, it should be understood as a gigantic disappointment as a fighter, and because of it astronomical cost, it has helped to make our Air Force smaller, older, and less ready to fight - at greatly increased cost.
A new piece in the July 6 Politico summarizes why the F-22 makes America weaker. Find this piece at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24538.html, and below.
As the Senate debate heats up, I hope to distribute a longer piece on the F-22, co-authored by combat aircraft designer Pierre M. Sprey, to expand on the points presented in summary here.
[http://www.politico.com/]
Gates is right on the F-22
By: Winslow T. Wheeler
July 6, 2009 04:50 AM EST
Congress is busying itself trying to overturn Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's decision to stop producing the F-22 fighter. But President Barack Obama has threatened to veto a spending bill for the entire Defense Department if it contains a single F-22 over the 187 now authorized.
Gates has said that, without a doubt, Obama should veto a bill that includes additional F-22s. The fact that there are doubts demonstrates the mess our defenses are in.
The House committee wants to make a down payment on 12 more F-22s in 2011; the Senate committee wants seven more in 2010.
The House passed its version of the bill on June 25 by a vote of 389-22. So Obama and Gates have a long way to go to show that they have the 145 or so votes they would need to sustain a veto.
Gates and Obama's case against the F-22 is reasonable but needs to be more comprehensive.
Gates has argued that not a single F-22 has flown in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there simply are no enemy air forces there.
Also, the F-22 is outrageously expensive. The 187 now authorized are costing the nation more than $65 billion, almost $350 million for each one.
More important, but so far unaddressed, is whether the F-22 is even a good fighter. Actually, it is a gigantic disappointment.
Its boosters advertise the F-22 as a technological wonder - which it isn't.
Its "stealth" characteristic is greatly exaggerated. And, while the F-22 is less detectable by some radar at certain angles, it is easily detectable to many types of radar in the world, including early Russian and Chinese models. Just ask the pilots of the two stealthy F-117 bombers that were put out of action by Serbs in the 1999 Kosovo air war using antiquated radar systems.
Worse, the F-22 depends on its radar and long-range, radar-guided missiles. Such "beyond visual range" radar-based air warfare has failed time and time again in war.
There are two problems. First, even the low probability of intercept radar in the F-22 is vulnerable to detection by enemies, especially with the proliferation of spread-spectrum technology in cell phones and laptops. The radar not only signals the F-22's presence to enemies but also acts as a beacon for their radar-homing missiles. While both the Russians and the Chinese specialize in such missiles, our Air Force, in its exercises, insists that such capabilities do not exist.
Second, its aerodynamic performance, short-range missiles and guns are nothing special, which I observed at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada when an F-16 "shot down" an F-22 in exercises.
A vote in Congress for more F-22s is a vote to decay our pilots' skills, shrink our Air Force at increasing cost and reward Congress's lust for pork. Congress's new defense bill should, indeed, be vetoed if a single F-22 is added. Pro-defense members of Congress will support that move.
Winslow T. Wheeler is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information. He is the author of the new anthology "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."
© 2009 Capitol News Company, LLC
A new piece in the July 6 Politico summarizes why the F-22 makes America weaker. Find this piece at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24538.html, and below.
As the Senate debate heats up, I hope to distribute a longer piece on the F-22, co-authored by combat aircraft designer Pierre M. Sprey, to expand on the points presented in summary here.
[http://www.politico.com/]
Gates is right on the F-22
By: Winslow T. Wheeler
July 6, 2009 04:50 AM EST
Congress is busying itself trying to overturn Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's decision to stop producing the F-22 fighter. But President Barack Obama has threatened to veto a spending bill for the entire Defense Department if it contains a single F-22 over the 187 now authorized.
Gates has said that, without a doubt, Obama should veto a bill that includes additional F-22s. The fact that there are doubts demonstrates the mess our defenses are in.
The House committee wants to make a down payment on 12 more F-22s in 2011; the Senate committee wants seven more in 2010.
The House passed its version of the bill on June 25 by a vote of 389-22. So Obama and Gates have a long way to go to show that they have the 145 or so votes they would need to sustain a veto.
Gates and Obama's case against the F-22 is reasonable but needs to be more comprehensive.
Gates has argued that not a single F-22 has flown in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there simply are no enemy air forces there.
Also, the F-22 is outrageously expensive. The 187 now authorized are costing the nation more than $65 billion, almost $350 million for each one.
More important, but so far unaddressed, is whether the F-22 is even a good fighter. Actually, it is a gigantic disappointment.
Its boosters advertise the F-22 as a technological wonder - which it isn't.
Its "stealth" characteristic is greatly exaggerated. And, while the F-22 is less detectable by some radar at certain angles, it is easily detectable to many types of radar in the world, including early Russian and Chinese models. Just ask the pilots of the two stealthy F-117 bombers that were put out of action by Serbs in the 1999 Kosovo air war using antiquated radar systems.
Worse, the F-22 depends on its radar and long-range, radar-guided missiles. Such "beyond visual range" radar-based air warfare has failed time and time again in war.
There are two problems. First, even the low probability of intercept radar in the F-22 is vulnerable to detection by enemies, especially with the proliferation of spread-spectrum technology in cell phones and laptops. The radar not only signals the F-22's presence to enemies but also acts as a beacon for their radar-homing missiles. While both the Russians and the Chinese specialize in such missiles, our Air Force, in its exercises, insists that such capabilities do not exist.
Second, its aerodynamic performance, short-range missiles and guns are nothing special, which I observed at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada when an F-16 "shot down" an F-22 in exercises.
A vote in Congress for more F-22s is a vote to decay our pilots' skills, shrink our Air Force at increasing cost and reward Congress's lust for pork. Congress's new defense bill should, indeed, be vetoed if a single F-22 is added. Pro-defense members of Congress will support that move.
Winslow T. Wheeler is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information. He is the author of the new anthology "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."
© 2009 Capitol News Company, LLC
The Long, Hard Road to Nuclear Safety Bryan Bender, The Boston Globe
The Long, Hard Road to Nuclear Safety
Bryan Bender, The Boston Globe
Two stories underground, in a concrete room with a heavy steel door, gloved technicians wearing smocks carefully measure and weigh the charcoal-gray pellets, 182 in all. They are among the most dangerous materials in the world: highly enriched uranium, the main ingredient for a nuclear bomb.
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2009/07/05/the_long_hard_road_to_nuclear_safety/
Bryan Bender, The Boston Globe
Two stories underground, in a concrete room with a heavy steel door, gloved technicians wearing smocks carefully measure and weigh the charcoal-gray pellets, 182 in all. They are among the most dangerous materials in the world: highly enriched uranium, the main ingredient for a nuclear bomb.
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2009/07/05/the_long_hard_road_to_nuclear_safety/
Serbia, IAEA Sign Additional Protocol on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Serbia, IAEA Sign Additional Protocol on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Xinhua
Serbia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed here on Friday an additional protocol to the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/04/content_11649540.htm
Xinhua
Serbia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed here on Friday an additional protocol to the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/04/content_11649540.htm
Saudis Give Nod to Israeli Raid on Iran
Saudis Give Nod to Israeli Raid on Iran
Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, The Sunday Times
Editor's Note: The Saudi and Israeli governments have denied the claim of any talks having taken place to discuss the possibility of Israeli jets flying over Saudi Arabia to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
The head of Mossad, Israel's overseas intelligence service, has assured Benjamin Netanyahu, its prime minister, that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over the kingdom during any future raid on Iran’s nuclear sites.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6638568.ece
Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, The Sunday Times
Editor's Note: The Saudi and Israeli governments have denied the claim of any talks having taken place to discuss the possibility of Israeli jets flying over Saudi Arabia to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
The head of Mossad, Israel's overseas intelligence service, has assured Benjamin Netanyahu, its prime minister, that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over the kingdom during any future raid on Iran’s nuclear sites.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6638568.ece
Biden: Israel has right to deal with nuclear Iran
Biden: Israel has right to deal with nuclear Iran
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56507F20090706?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56507F20090706?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
U.S. and Russia to Reduce Arsenals
U.S. and Russia to Reduce Arsenals
Michael A. Fletcher and Philip P. Pan, The Washington Post
President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reached a preliminary agreement Monday to cut the American and Russian nuclear arsenals by as much as a third while exploring options for cooperation on missile defense.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070600784.html
* Press Conference by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Conference-by-President-Obama-and-President-Medvedev-of-Russia/
Michael A. Fletcher and Philip P. Pan, The Washington Post
President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reached a preliminary agreement Monday to cut the American and Russian nuclear arsenals by as much as a third while exploring options for cooperation on missile defense.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070600784.html
* Press Conference by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Conference-by-President-Obama-and-President-Medvedev-of-Russia/
A Response to Jon Kyl and Richard Perle
A Response to Jon Kyl and Richard Perle
James Acton, George Perkovich, and Pierre Goldschmidt, Proliferation Analysis
Nuclear DeterrentPresident Obama's speech on April 5, 2009, in Prague, in which he pledged "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," was the most important statement of nuclear weapons policy in a generation. It is absolutely right to subject this policy to scrutiny. The critique by Senator Jon Kyl and Richard Perle in the Wall Street Journal last week is to be welcomed as a stimulus to analysis and debate. See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124623202363966157.html
The Kyl and Perle op-ed is, however, based on a series of invalid premises. It focuses on arguments not actually made by those who advocate the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23354&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
James Acton, George Perkovich, and Pierre Goldschmidt, Proliferation Analysis
Nuclear DeterrentPresident Obama's speech on April 5, 2009, in Prague, in which he pledged "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," was the most important statement of nuclear weapons policy in a generation. It is absolutely right to subject this policy to scrutiny. The critique by Senator Jon Kyl and Richard Perle in the Wall Street Journal last week is to be welcomed as a stimulus to analysis and debate. See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124623202363966157.html
The Kyl and Perle op-ed is, however, based on a series of invalid premises. It focuses on arguments not actually made by those who advocate the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23354&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT: KYRGYZSTAN REVERSES ON MANAS
U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT: KYRGYZSTAN REVERSES ON MANAS
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev on July 7 signed into law a deal that will
allow the United States to maintain access to Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base. The
status of the base has been reversed several times over the past few years as
Kyrgyzstan used the base to extract concessions from both Russia and the United
States, who each have strategic interests in Central Asia. The July 7 deal
reverses a February decision to evict U.S. forces from Manas. There is no
question that Russia played a key role in this decision, as Russia maintains a
profound level of influence in Kyrgyzstan, and the decision was clearly timed to
coincide with the meetings between Russian leaders and U.S. President Barack
Obama.
Under the new deal with Kyrgyzstan, the United States will extend a package
worth $180 million, including an annual rental fee and several tens of millions
of dollars worth of infrastructure investment. On top of that, the United States
will reportedly pay $60 million worth of signing bonuses. In exchange, the
United States will be allowed to transport supplies through the base to
Afghanistan to support the mission there.
Manas is a hub for C-17 transports to Afghanistan, and is the lead aerial
refueling location for U.S. and NATO efforts there. Although U.S. military
officials have repeatedly stated that the base in Manas is not critical to
operations, the loss of the air transport route into Afghanistan would certainly
be a logistical nightmare. With supply transport routes through Pakistan
undergoing increased stress and instability, alternate routes into Afghanistan
are both strategically critical and difficult to come by.
Russia's interest in the base is multifaceted. In the short term, it serves as a
pressure point on the United States during Russia's resurgence onto the
international stage. The base also plays into Russia's own concerns, as Russia
does not want to see a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan any more than the United
States does, although Russia is in no way interested in committing its own
scarce military resources to the task.
In the long term, however, Russia would dearly like to see U.S. operations out
of Central Asia. One of Russia's clearest imperatives is to secure complete
control over its near abroad. This is a goal that most certainly does not
include U.S. military assets being based just south of Russia's border, in a
former Soviet state.
These interests are driving the July 7 decision to allow the United States to
keep its use of the base at Manas. Russia can afford to offer up the base to the
United States, secure in the knowledge that the concession can always be revoked
should relations turn sour or other interests take precedence.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev on July 7 signed into law a deal that will
allow the United States to maintain access to Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base. The
status of the base has been reversed several times over the past few years as
Kyrgyzstan used the base to extract concessions from both Russia and the United
States, who each have strategic interests in Central Asia. The July 7 deal
reverses a February decision to evict U.S. forces from Manas. There is no
question that Russia played a key role in this decision, as Russia maintains a
profound level of influence in Kyrgyzstan, and the decision was clearly timed to
coincide with the meetings between Russian leaders and U.S. President Barack
Obama.
Under the new deal with Kyrgyzstan, the United States will extend a package
worth $180 million, including an annual rental fee and several tens of millions
of dollars worth of infrastructure investment. On top of that, the United States
will reportedly pay $60 million worth of signing bonuses. In exchange, the
United States will be allowed to transport supplies through the base to
Afghanistan to support the mission there.
Manas is a hub for C-17 transports to Afghanistan, and is the lead aerial
refueling location for U.S. and NATO efforts there. Although U.S. military
officials have repeatedly stated that the base in Manas is not critical to
operations, the loss of the air transport route into Afghanistan would certainly
be a logistical nightmare. With supply transport routes through Pakistan
undergoing increased stress and instability, alternate routes into Afghanistan
are both strategically critical and difficult to come by.
Russia's interest in the base is multifaceted. In the short term, it serves as a
pressure point on the United States during Russia's resurgence onto the
international stage. The base also plays into Russia's own concerns, as Russia
does not want to see a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan any more than the United
States does, although Russia is in no way interested in committing its own
scarce military resources to the task.
In the long term, however, Russia would dearly like to see U.S. operations out
of Central Asia. One of Russia's clearest imperatives is to secure complete
control over its near abroad. This is a goal that most certainly does not
include U.S. military assets being based just south of Russia's border, in a
former Soviet state.
These interests are driving the July 7 decision to allow the United States to
keep its use of the base at Manas. Russia can afford to offer up the base to the
United States, secure in the knowledge that the concession can always be revoked
should relations turn sour or other interests take precedence.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
Upheaval In Iran Stephen Glain
Upheaval In Iran
Stephen Glain
The Majalla 07/01/09
The death of an old order is easier to spot than the birth of a new one. A full century passed after the storming of the Bastille in 1789 and the demise of the dauphin before France finally emerged as a modern republic. (Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, when asked for his opinion of the French Revolution, famously replied that it was too early to tell.) Historians may date the end of Iran's Islamic Revolution - which this year celebrates its 30th anniversary - to the martyrdom of 27-year-old Neda Agha Soltan, a political innocent whose digitized shooting by riot police last week is now the burning pyre of a movement to depose another Ancién Regime.
But to what end? While the power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi has downshifted, the country is very much in play politically and Iran's deteriorating economy will severely limit the policy options available to whichever side prevails. Mousavi has little chance of getting the ballot recount he is demanding despite evidence of widespread fraud in Ahmadinejad's re-election landslide. Yet it is equally unlikely the regime can survive its brazen assault on Iran's constitutional ideals, and in the jerky digital images from Tehran there are contours of fin-de-siècle denouement.
"I don't think we've seen the end of this," said Abbas Milani an Iranian specialist at Stanford University. "Khamenei cannot regain his credibility. He does not have the power to contain this movement. Important constituencies are with the transition."
Even by its uniquely low standards, the government reacted to the uproar over Ahmadinejad's alleged victory in an extraordinarily ham-fisted manner. No sooner had Supreme Leader Khamanei declared the poll results valid did an oversight council announce that the number of votes registered in 50 cities exceeded the number of eligible voters by three million. The Guardian Council, meanwhile, has rejected all charges of fraud in the hotly contested national campaign. Clearly panicked, the regime has arrested many hundreds of protestors, journalists, and academics.
Anyone who questions the legitimacy of the elections, and therefore the integrity of the government itself, is fair game for detention at the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or Pasdaran. According to The New York Times, the Islamic Republic of Iran "is no longer a theocracy, but a government headed by military chiefs."
The backlash appears to have caught the clerics by surprise - except perhaps Khamenei himself, who according to Milani asked his aides several years ago to conduct a study of the so-called "colored" revolutions that brought down despotic governments in the former Soviet Union. What felled other sclerotic autocracies, Khamenei may have reasoned, could presumably envelope his own.
Now, Khamenei and his conservative allies find themselves stalked by a noose of green sash and any decent economist could tell them why. Iran is both poorer and younger than it was in 1998 and 2005, the last time popular outrage erupted into street protests. In 1996, in the aftermath of a severe economic downturn, young people between the ages of 15 to 29 accounted for 28.4 percent of the population; a decade later they account for more than 35 percent of the citizenry and 70 percent of the unemployed - among the highest such rates globally and the highest for the Middle East. Many of the demonstrators on the streets of Tehran and other major cities are the children of Iranians who two decades ago dismissed themselves as part of a lost generation. Now their sons and daughters face the same fate. Neither demographic has much to lose in a winner-take-all clash with the regime.
For Iran's forlorn youth, as well as those old enough to have watched the revolution devour its own, Ahmadinejad's supposed victory was the final affront. The Iranian government - estranged from its people through years of endemic corruption, brutality, and ineptitude - has fractured into shards for all to see. The Supreme Leader, widely regarded as an arriviste because he was elevated as part of a compromise over who would succeed Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has come under personal attack.
The respected Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's designated heir who was sacked in 1989 after he openly criticized regime militarism, has challenged both the election results and Khamenei's credibility. Members of parliament angered by the ferocity of the crackdown have summoned the heads of the interior, justice, and intelligence ministries to a hearing to explain themselves. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president and formidable power broker, is negotiating a coalition of senior clerics in the sacred city of Qom in opposition to the regime. Never a monolith, despite the delusions of American neoconservatives, Iran's religious elites are in open rebellion.
It is an asymmetrical conflict, this as-yet peaceful resistance that Mousavi refers to as the savior of a movement that brought down Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi only to become militarized under Khamenei and the Pasdaran. (Both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have close links to the Pasdaran, and its veterans are well represented among government ministers.) While Khamenei has lethal might at his disposal and a clear proclivity for using it, Mousavi must show restraint or else forfeit his moral authority.
The prospect of compromise between Khamenei and Mousavi is dim given the utter lack of good will on both sides. Successful negotiations would require concessions, and both men remember how long the shah lasted after he assumed, in response to growing opposition to his rule, partial responsibility for offenses committed against the Iranian people.
Yet there are checks on Khamenei that, if shrewdly exploited, could subvert what is left of his mandate. In the latest display of how frivolous technology can be deployed with great effect in an insurgency, camera-phones and "twitter" texting have exposed Republican Guard atrocities and constrained a regime that fears a harvest of fresh martyrs.
"Khamenei," said Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, "is carefully calibrating the use of force because he recognizes that in 1978 the more people the shah killed, there was more mourning ceremonies and these protests simply mushroomed. And as time passed, the legitimacy of the regime - the shah's regime - eroded in the eyes of people. And that's exactly what's happening right now."
Unlike the leaders of China's doomed pro-democracy movement exactly twenty years and three weeks ago (2009 is shaping up to be quite a year for inauspicious anniversaries), the opposition in Iran appears to have adopted a tactical retreat. The next phase of the movement could take months, if not years to play out, according to Sadjadpour. Their large street rallies contained by state security, Mousavi and his allies may next call for a general strike that would cripple an already beleaguered economy. The success of such a move would hinge on support from leaders of Iran's mighty merchant class - the bazarris who were key allies of the clerics in their revolt thirty years ago, only to see commerce evaporate under international sanctions, economic mismanagement, and the frequent "bite" from corrupt police and security agents.
"The bazarris remain extremely powerful even though the revolution has been devastating for their businesses," said Sadjadpour. "They would be an important group to turn against the regime."
If nothing else, the mayhem and schismatic feuds in Iran have put to rest the former Bush administration's breathless interpretation of Iran as an ascendant regional power. What was characterized as a cohesive force for instability in the Middle East is in fact a dystopic regime held together by shadowy patronage systems, fuel subsidies, and easy credit financed by the country's oil sector.
Tehran faces a balance of payments deficit equal to about 10 percent of its gross domestic product. Yet unlike Saudi Arabia and other cash-rich petroleum producers, it lacks the reserves needed to cover a widening foreign exchange gap created by declining oil prices. To compensate, it must either increase non-oil exports, which demands a cheaper Iranian currency to make local goods more competitively priced overseas - and higher inflation, as a result - or it could cut imports. In the 1990s, faced with capital shortages amid an economic slowdown, Iran's state-owned companies turned to short-term borrowings from foreign lenders - an option that does not exist in today's tight lending environment.
Corruption in Iran today is considered to be far worse than it ever was under the shah. For years, the Republican Guard has been erecting its own economic empire, with investments in Gulf energy companies, construction firms (including Construction Jihad, a major developer), and Tehran's subway system and airport terminals. It also controls the country's nuclear-power facilities, the center of so much international grief, and long-range missile plants.
Then there are the Bonyads, or charitable foundations. They number in the hundreds and they are invested in everything from soybean farms to hotels. Their revenues, much of which comes from a massive smuggling trade, are estimated to account for about 30 percent of the Iranian economy. The Bonyads are untaxed, free from direct government control, and they are currently feasting on Iran's massive privatization program.
To make matters worse, Iran is burning through its petroleum stocks - the economy's very life blood - faster than it can regenerate them. Though blessed with some of the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves, Tehran is expected to be a net oil importer by 2020 due to chronic underinvestment in its energy fields.
The challenge of reforming the Islamic state is as daunting a task as removing the regime that turned it to rubble. On the other hand, it was Ahmadinejad's botching of the economy that put him on the defensive during the campaign, and as a growing trove of evidence suggests, obliged him and his confederates to finesse the results. Khomeini may have been at least half right in his oft-quoted remark that the 1979 revolt had nothing to do with the price of watermelons; like all successful revolts, it was about human dignity and government accountability as much as commerce. By indulging regime insiders while depriving the people of the most basic entitlements, however, Khomeini's successors hollowed out the revolution from within.
Revolutions, like pre-emptive wars, are highly exotic and unpredictable things. The vanguard of one movement often turns out to be a mere placeholder for another. (Just ask any good Trotskyite, if you can find one.) The warring factions in the current Persian drama, however distinct they may seem today, will likely assume different forms the longer the struggle lasts. Both rulers and challengers seem to be digging in for a long siege. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, a man who understood power and conflict better than he did the aspirations of subjugated peoples, we may be witnessing "the end of the beginning" of Iranians' struggle for renewal. And in true Persian fashion, the most decisive thrusts will be the ones we don't see.
Stephen Glain
The Majalla 07/01/09
The death of an old order is easier to spot than the birth of a new one. A full century passed after the storming of the Bastille in 1789 and the demise of the dauphin before France finally emerged as a modern republic. (Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, when asked for his opinion of the French Revolution, famously replied that it was too early to tell.) Historians may date the end of Iran's Islamic Revolution - which this year celebrates its 30th anniversary - to the martyrdom of 27-year-old Neda Agha Soltan, a political innocent whose digitized shooting by riot police last week is now the burning pyre of a movement to depose another Ancién Regime.
But to what end? While the power struggle between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi has downshifted, the country is very much in play politically and Iran's deteriorating economy will severely limit the policy options available to whichever side prevails. Mousavi has little chance of getting the ballot recount he is demanding despite evidence of widespread fraud in Ahmadinejad's re-election landslide. Yet it is equally unlikely the regime can survive its brazen assault on Iran's constitutional ideals, and in the jerky digital images from Tehran there are contours of fin-de-siècle denouement.
"I don't think we've seen the end of this," said Abbas Milani an Iranian specialist at Stanford University. "Khamenei cannot regain his credibility. He does not have the power to contain this movement. Important constituencies are with the transition."
Even by its uniquely low standards, the government reacted to the uproar over Ahmadinejad's alleged victory in an extraordinarily ham-fisted manner. No sooner had Supreme Leader Khamanei declared the poll results valid did an oversight council announce that the number of votes registered in 50 cities exceeded the number of eligible voters by three million. The Guardian Council, meanwhile, has rejected all charges of fraud in the hotly contested national campaign. Clearly panicked, the regime has arrested many hundreds of protestors, journalists, and academics.
Anyone who questions the legitimacy of the elections, and therefore the integrity of the government itself, is fair game for detention at the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or Pasdaran. According to The New York Times, the Islamic Republic of Iran "is no longer a theocracy, but a government headed by military chiefs."
The backlash appears to have caught the clerics by surprise - except perhaps Khamenei himself, who according to Milani asked his aides several years ago to conduct a study of the so-called "colored" revolutions that brought down despotic governments in the former Soviet Union. What felled other sclerotic autocracies, Khamenei may have reasoned, could presumably envelope his own.
Now, Khamenei and his conservative allies find themselves stalked by a noose of green sash and any decent economist could tell them why. Iran is both poorer and younger than it was in 1998 and 2005, the last time popular outrage erupted into street protests. In 1996, in the aftermath of a severe economic downturn, young people between the ages of 15 to 29 accounted for 28.4 percent of the population; a decade later they account for more than 35 percent of the citizenry and 70 percent of the unemployed - among the highest such rates globally and the highest for the Middle East. Many of the demonstrators on the streets of Tehran and other major cities are the children of Iranians who two decades ago dismissed themselves as part of a lost generation. Now their sons and daughters face the same fate. Neither demographic has much to lose in a winner-take-all clash with the regime.
For Iran's forlorn youth, as well as those old enough to have watched the revolution devour its own, Ahmadinejad's supposed victory was the final affront. The Iranian government - estranged from its people through years of endemic corruption, brutality, and ineptitude - has fractured into shards for all to see. The Supreme Leader, widely regarded as an arriviste because he was elevated as part of a compromise over who would succeed Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has come under personal attack.
The respected Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's designated heir who was sacked in 1989 after he openly criticized regime militarism, has challenged both the election results and Khamenei's credibility. Members of parliament angered by the ferocity of the crackdown have summoned the heads of the interior, justice, and intelligence ministries to a hearing to explain themselves. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president and formidable power broker, is negotiating a coalition of senior clerics in the sacred city of Qom in opposition to the regime. Never a monolith, despite the delusions of American neoconservatives, Iran's religious elites are in open rebellion.
It is an asymmetrical conflict, this as-yet peaceful resistance that Mousavi refers to as the savior of a movement that brought down Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi only to become militarized under Khamenei and the Pasdaran. (Both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have close links to the Pasdaran, and its veterans are well represented among government ministers.) While Khamenei has lethal might at his disposal and a clear proclivity for using it, Mousavi must show restraint or else forfeit his moral authority.
The prospect of compromise between Khamenei and Mousavi is dim given the utter lack of good will on both sides. Successful negotiations would require concessions, and both men remember how long the shah lasted after he assumed, in response to growing opposition to his rule, partial responsibility for offenses committed against the Iranian people.
Yet there are checks on Khamenei that, if shrewdly exploited, could subvert what is left of his mandate. In the latest display of how frivolous technology can be deployed with great effect in an insurgency, camera-phones and "twitter" texting have exposed Republican Guard atrocities and constrained a regime that fears a harvest of fresh martyrs.
"Khamenei," said Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, "is carefully calibrating the use of force because he recognizes that in 1978 the more people the shah killed, there was more mourning ceremonies and these protests simply mushroomed. And as time passed, the legitimacy of the regime - the shah's regime - eroded in the eyes of people. And that's exactly what's happening right now."
Unlike the leaders of China's doomed pro-democracy movement exactly twenty years and three weeks ago (2009 is shaping up to be quite a year for inauspicious anniversaries), the opposition in Iran appears to have adopted a tactical retreat. The next phase of the movement could take months, if not years to play out, according to Sadjadpour. Their large street rallies contained by state security, Mousavi and his allies may next call for a general strike that would cripple an already beleaguered economy. The success of such a move would hinge on support from leaders of Iran's mighty merchant class - the bazarris who were key allies of the clerics in their revolt thirty years ago, only to see commerce evaporate under international sanctions, economic mismanagement, and the frequent "bite" from corrupt police and security agents.
"The bazarris remain extremely powerful even though the revolution has been devastating for their businesses," said Sadjadpour. "They would be an important group to turn against the regime."
If nothing else, the mayhem and schismatic feuds in Iran have put to rest the former Bush administration's breathless interpretation of Iran as an ascendant regional power. What was characterized as a cohesive force for instability in the Middle East is in fact a dystopic regime held together by shadowy patronage systems, fuel subsidies, and easy credit financed by the country's oil sector.
Tehran faces a balance of payments deficit equal to about 10 percent of its gross domestic product. Yet unlike Saudi Arabia and other cash-rich petroleum producers, it lacks the reserves needed to cover a widening foreign exchange gap created by declining oil prices. To compensate, it must either increase non-oil exports, which demands a cheaper Iranian currency to make local goods more competitively priced overseas - and higher inflation, as a result - or it could cut imports. In the 1990s, faced with capital shortages amid an economic slowdown, Iran's state-owned companies turned to short-term borrowings from foreign lenders - an option that does not exist in today's tight lending environment.
Corruption in Iran today is considered to be far worse than it ever was under the shah. For years, the Republican Guard has been erecting its own economic empire, with investments in Gulf energy companies, construction firms (including Construction Jihad, a major developer), and Tehran's subway system and airport terminals. It also controls the country's nuclear-power facilities, the center of so much international grief, and long-range missile plants.
Then there are the Bonyads, or charitable foundations. They number in the hundreds and they are invested in everything from soybean farms to hotels. Their revenues, much of which comes from a massive smuggling trade, are estimated to account for about 30 percent of the Iranian economy. The Bonyads are untaxed, free from direct government control, and they are currently feasting on Iran's massive privatization program.
To make matters worse, Iran is burning through its petroleum stocks - the economy's very life blood - faster than it can regenerate them. Though blessed with some of the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves, Tehran is expected to be a net oil importer by 2020 due to chronic underinvestment in its energy fields.
The challenge of reforming the Islamic state is as daunting a task as removing the regime that turned it to rubble. On the other hand, it was Ahmadinejad's botching of the economy that put him on the defensive during the campaign, and as a growing trove of evidence suggests, obliged him and his confederates to finesse the results. Khomeini may have been at least half right in his oft-quoted remark that the 1979 revolt had nothing to do with the price of watermelons; like all successful revolts, it was about human dignity and government accountability as much as commerce. By indulging regime insiders while depriving the people of the most basic entitlements, however, Khomeini's successors hollowed out the revolution from within.
Revolutions, like pre-emptive wars, are highly exotic and unpredictable things. The vanguard of one movement often turns out to be a mere placeholder for another. (Just ask any good Trotskyite, if you can find one.) The warring factions in the current Persian drama, however distinct they may seem today, will likely assume different forms the longer the struggle lasts. Both rulers and challengers seem to be digging in for a long siege. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, a man who understood power and conflict better than he did the aspirations of subjugated peoples, we may be witnessing "the end of the beginning" of Iranians' struggle for renewal. And in true Persian fashion, the most decisive thrusts will be the ones we don't see.
Iran attacks Biden's Israel remarks
Iran attacks Biden's Israel remarks
Biden said the US would not stand in the way of Israel in its dealings with Iran's nuclear ambitions [AFP]
Iran will hold the US responsible for any Israeli attack against the country, Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament, has said.
His remarks came after Joe Biden, the US vice-president, said that Washington would not dictate the way Israel deals with Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
"We will consider the Americans responsible in any adventure launched by the Zionist entity," Larijani said in Doha, the capital of Qatar, on Monday during an official visit.
"No politician or person in the world can imagine that the Zionist entity can lead an operation without getting the green light from the United States."
Larijani said the Islamic republic's response to an attack would be "decisive and painful".
Israel's interest
Biden said in an interview on Sunday that the US would not stand in the way of Israel in its dealings with Iran's nuclear ambitions.
"Israel can determine for itself - it's a sovereign nation - what's in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else," he told ABC television.
"Whether we agree or not. They're entitled to do that ... We cannot dictate to another sovereign nation what they can and cannot do when they make a determination, if they make a determination, that they're existentially threatened."
Larijani said Biden's comments was "political manoeuvre. We have heard a lot of these words in the past".
"Biden, by saying that they (the United States) can't prevent such an operation, has taken the wrong route and revealed his card".
Asked about US calls for dialogue, Larijani said: "We want to work seriously. ... But on one side they tell us 'we want to resolve the problems and negotiate', on another we hear what Mr Biden says."
No 'green light'
Following the controversy triggered by Biden's interview, the US administration denied that it was giving Israel any green light to attack Iran or that it was reconsidering plans to engage diplomatically with Tehran.
"I certainly would not want to give a green light to any kind of military action," Ian Kelly, the US state department spokesman, said late on Monday.
But he echoed Biden's point that Washington considered Israel a "sovereign country" with a right to make its own military decisions.
"We're not going to dictate its actions," Kelly said.
"We're also committed to Israel's security. And we share Israel's deep concerns about Iran's nuclear programme."
Kelly brushed aside the idea that Biden was signalling a move by the Obama administration to drop its policy of diplomatic engagement with Iran, saying: "I wouldn't read into it any more than what you see."
Biden said the US would not stand in the way of Israel in its dealings with Iran's nuclear ambitions [AFP]
Iran will hold the US responsible for any Israeli attack against the country, Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran's parliament, has said.
His remarks came after Joe Biden, the US vice-president, said that Washington would not dictate the way Israel deals with Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
"We will consider the Americans responsible in any adventure launched by the Zionist entity," Larijani said in Doha, the capital of Qatar, on Monday during an official visit.
"No politician or person in the world can imagine that the Zionist entity can lead an operation without getting the green light from the United States."
Larijani said the Islamic republic's response to an attack would be "decisive and painful".
Israel's interest
Biden said in an interview on Sunday that the US would not stand in the way of Israel in its dealings with Iran's nuclear ambitions.
"Israel can determine for itself - it's a sovereign nation - what's in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else," he told ABC television.
"Whether we agree or not. They're entitled to do that ... We cannot dictate to another sovereign nation what they can and cannot do when they make a determination, if they make a determination, that they're existentially threatened."
Larijani said Biden's comments was "political manoeuvre. We have heard a lot of these words in the past".
"Biden, by saying that they (the United States) can't prevent such an operation, has taken the wrong route and revealed his card".
Asked about US calls for dialogue, Larijani said: "We want to work seriously. ... But on one side they tell us 'we want to resolve the problems and negotiate', on another we hear what Mr Biden says."
No 'green light'
Following the controversy triggered by Biden's interview, the US administration denied that it was giving Israel any green light to attack Iran or that it was reconsidering plans to engage diplomatically with Tehran.
"I certainly would not want to give a green light to any kind of military action," Ian Kelly, the US state department spokesman, said late on Monday.
But he echoed Biden's point that Washington considered Israel a "sovereign country" with a right to make its own military decisions.
"We're not going to dictate its actions," Kelly said.
"We're also committed to Israel's security. And we share Israel's deep concerns about Iran's nuclear programme."
Kelly brushed aside the idea that Biden was signalling a move by the Obama administration to drop its policy of diplomatic engagement with Iran, saying: "I wouldn't read into it any more than what you see."
Monday, July 6, 2009
FreedomGloryProject
Dear Friends and Family,
This project is near and dear to my heart because of
the recent events unfolding in Iran.
The goal is to keep Iran in the news and the
world aware of the the millions of Iranians'
quest for freedom.
Please give a listen to the song and forward to as
many people as possible!
http://www.freedomgloryproject.com/
Enjoy!
Ahmad
This project is near and dear to my heart because of
the recent events unfolding in Iran.
The goal is to keep Iran in the news and the
world aware of the the millions of Iranians'
quest for freedom.
Please give a listen to the song and forward to as
many people as possible!
http://www.freedomgloryproject.com/
Enjoy!
Ahmad
Cashing In On America’s Wars: Waste, Fraud, and a Cast of Thousands
Cashing In On America’s Wars: Waste, Fraud, and a Cast of Thousands
Jul 1, 2009
By: Stephen Glain
Ah, for the Victorian era of empire, when a Western power could subdue an entire country with little more than a regiment of grenadiers armed with breach-loaders and a sherpa or two to carry Colonel Blimp's brandy. Back then, "post-conflict resolution" meant jobs for the freshly occupied at rubber plantations and in tin mines. Roads, ports, and railways were laid down by the engineering corps to graft the conquered territory onto the mother stem and provide the illusion of modernity for its great unwashed.
Today, empire building is a different proposition entirely. It is not enough to account for more than half the world's defense spending, as does the United States. Invading foreign countries and transforming them into viable proxy states requires an overhaul or replacement of existing infrastructure. And because the private sector is considered more efficient than the public one - or so it seemed before it collapsed under the weight of its own gluttony about eighteen months ago - you must create a hierarchy of contractors. Mandates are doled out to the KBRs, the Bechtels, Dyncorps and Fluors, which in turn whelp a litter of squealing sub-contractors that could elude even the most Leviathan of oversight regimes. And that's when empire building becomes the highest expression of the free market: an untrammeled frenzy of corruption and greed.
It's all there in an interim report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was launched by Congress in 2008 to investigate abundant cases of fraud associated with war-related contracts. The 110-page expose, titled "At What Cost?" illustrates how much of the $830 billion Congress has appropriated to meet America's wartime commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan has simply disappeared. More than $13 billion in spending on post-war "stability operations" - everything from food preparation to laundry services and base security - is under scrutiny by lawmakers due to lax oversight, shoddy accounting and outright theft. For Americans old enough to remember the Pentagon's "$5,000 ashtrays" of the Reagan era, the Commissions findings offer a tinge of nostalgia. During a field trip to Kabul in April, Commission members toured the new US forces headquarters in Afghanistan. "We observed cracks, improper plumbing (and thus unusable bathrooms), an incorrectly sized sewage system, broken and leaking pipes, sinking sidewalks, and other construction defects," according to the report. In Iraq, meanwhile, the government approved millions of dollars to build a mess hall that was no longer needed after US troops began to withdraw from the country.
Some $3 billion to $5 billion of the king's ransom Washington distributed among the big contractors for Iraqi reconstruction is unaccounted for and much of the work they were hired to do - largely through those notorious "no-bid" contracts - have been dogged by delays and cost over-runs. The Baghdad electricity grid, for example, has yet to achieve pre-war levels of service.
Oversight has been lacking or non-existent. It was not until April 2007, for example, that agencies began identifying detailed costs from two mandates totaling $600 million awarded to Research Triangle Institute between 2003 and 2005 to develop local governance in Iraq. And that was for a general contractor. Sub-contractors - a quarter million of them now support the Pentagon in America's two Middle East wars and most are run by foreign nationals - operate with no oversight at all.
The report dresses down the Department of Defense for allocating too much of its resources for the war-fighting end of its campaigns - overkill, if you will - while neglecting the need for oversight of the rebuilding phase. Even now, according to the study, "the Department of Defense cannot provide a complete accounting of all the contracted support it relies upon....Inadequate oversight, poorly written statements of work, lack of competition, and contractor inefficiencies have contributed to billions of dollars in wasteful spending." Despite an abundance of various civilian and Pentagon agencies, in addition to private firms and non-governmental organizations, converging for reconstruction work, the report notes, "there is no locus of planning, coordination, and information [and] the government still lacks clear standards and policy on inherently governmental functions."
None of this should surprise anyone who witnessed first hand, as this columnist did, the chaos and incompetence that subverted the US occupation of Baghdad in those seminal first few months after US tanks rolled into the city. The circle of complicity is huge, with civilian leaders like then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his neocon hangers-on at its center. The current Secretary, Robert Gates, has worked heroically to clean up the mess Rumsfeld left behind. In addition to promoting larger budgets for civilian agencies like the United States Agency for International Development, which has been allowed to slip into near-oblivion while Pentagon outlays have achieved elephantine proportions, Gates has also set aside funds to hire 20,000 procurement officers to bring order to the anarchy of post-war spending in Iraq and Afghanistan. In effect, Gates is reversing the trend, which began under the Clinton administration and intensified in the Bush White House, to outsource core US government obligations and commitments to private firms such as Halliburton and the dreaded Blackwater.
Now, all Gates has to do is acknowledge what is by now obvious to everyone outside the Washington biosphere: the best way to reduce the costs of unnecessary wars like the one Washington waged so disastrously on Iraq is to make sure they don't happen again.
Jul 1, 2009
By: Stephen Glain
Ah, for the Victorian era of empire, when a Western power could subdue an entire country with little more than a regiment of grenadiers armed with breach-loaders and a sherpa or two to carry Colonel Blimp's brandy. Back then, "post-conflict resolution" meant jobs for the freshly occupied at rubber plantations and in tin mines. Roads, ports, and railways were laid down by the engineering corps to graft the conquered territory onto the mother stem and provide the illusion of modernity for its great unwashed.
Today, empire building is a different proposition entirely. It is not enough to account for more than half the world's defense spending, as does the United States. Invading foreign countries and transforming them into viable proxy states requires an overhaul or replacement of existing infrastructure. And because the private sector is considered more efficient than the public one - or so it seemed before it collapsed under the weight of its own gluttony about eighteen months ago - you must create a hierarchy of contractors. Mandates are doled out to the KBRs, the Bechtels, Dyncorps and Fluors, which in turn whelp a litter of squealing sub-contractors that could elude even the most Leviathan of oversight regimes. And that's when empire building becomes the highest expression of the free market: an untrammeled frenzy of corruption and greed.
It's all there in an interim report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was launched by Congress in 2008 to investigate abundant cases of fraud associated with war-related contracts. The 110-page expose, titled "At What Cost?" illustrates how much of the $830 billion Congress has appropriated to meet America's wartime commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan has simply disappeared. More than $13 billion in spending on post-war "stability operations" - everything from food preparation to laundry services and base security - is under scrutiny by lawmakers due to lax oversight, shoddy accounting and outright theft. For Americans old enough to remember the Pentagon's "$5,000 ashtrays" of the Reagan era, the Commissions findings offer a tinge of nostalgia. During a field trip to Kabul in April, Commission members toured the new US forces headquarters in Afghanistan. "We observed cracks, improper plumbing (and thus unusable bathrooms), an incorrectly sized sewage system, broken and leaking pipes, sinking sidewalks, and other construction defects," according to the report. In Iraq, meanwhile, the government approved millions of dollars to build a mess hall that was no longer needed after US troops began to withdraw from the country.
Some $3 billion to $5 billion of the king's ransom Washington distributed among the big contractors for Iraqi reconstruction is unaccounted for and much of the work they were hired to do - largely through those notorious "no-bid" contracts - have been dogged by delays and cost over-runs. The Baghdad electricity grid, for example, has yet to achieve pre-war levels of service.
Oversight has been lacking or non-existent. It was not until April 2007, for example, that agencies began identifying detailed costs from two mandates totaling $600 million awarded to Research Triangle Institute between 2003 and 2005 to develop local governance in Iraq. And that was for a general contractor. Sub-contractors - a quarter million of them now support the Pentagon in America's two Middle East wars and most are run by foreign nationals - operate with no oversight at all.
The report dresses down the Department of Defense for allocating too much of its resources for the war-fighting end of its campaigns - overkill, if you will - while neglecting the need for oversight of the rebuilding phase. Even now, according to the study, "the Department of Defense cannot provide a complete accounting of all the contracted support it relies upon....Inadequate oversight, poorly written statements of work, lack of competition, and contractor inefficiencies have contributed to billions of dollars in wasteful spending." Despite an abundance of various civilian and Pentagon agencies, in addition to private firms and non-governmental organizations, converging for reconstruction work, the report notes, "there is no locus of planning, coordination, and information [and] the government still lacks clear standards and policy on inherently governmental functions."
None of this should surprise anyone who witnessed first hand, as this columnist did, the chaos and incompetence that subverted the US occupation of Baghdad in those seminal first few months after US tanks rolled into the city. The circle of complicity is huge, with civilian leaders like then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his neocon hangers-on at its center. The current Secretary, Robert Gates, has worked heroically to clean up the mess Rumsfeld left behind. In addition to promoting larger budgets for civilian agencies like the United States Agency for International Development, which has been allowed to slip into near-oblivion while Pentagon outlays have achieved elephantine proportions, Gates has also set aside funds to hire 20,000 procurement officers to bring order to the anarchy of post-war spending in Iraq and Afghanistan. In effect, Gates is reversing the trend, which began under the Clinton administration and intensified in the Bush White House, to outsource core US government obligations and commitments to private firms such as Halliburton and the dreaded Blackwater.
Now, all Gates has to do is acknowledge what is by now obvious to everyone outside the Washington biosphere: the best way to reduce the costs of unnecessary wars like the one Washington waged so disastrously on Iraq is to make sure they don't happen again.
The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence by Anita Dancs
The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence
Anita Dancs
Jul 6, 2009
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6231
Anita Dancs
Jul 6, 2009
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6231
No cover up - The government takes on a "walking prison"
No cover up
Jun 25th 2009 | PARIS
From The Economist print edition
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13925890&source=most_commented
The government takes on a "walking prison"
WHEN the French government decided in 2004 to ban the Muslim headscarf in state schools and other public buildings, it set off a heated debate over religious expression and women's rights in a secular state. Now Nicolas Sarkozy has sparked another by calling the burqa, a head-to-toe Islamic garment, "a sign of subjugation…of debasement" that is "not welcome on French territory".
Mr Sarkozy's comments came after a group of deputies, led by André Gerin, a Communist, had called for a parliamentary inquiry into the wearing of the burqa, with a view to a possible ban. This would mean in all public places, since it is already banned in state institutions under the 2004 law. The deputies called burqas "veritable walking prisons".
France's strict secularism, entrenched by law since 1905, keeps religion firmly out of the state sphere. There are no religious studies (let alone nativity plays) in state schools, nor may public workers sport the headscarf. The government denies that such policies constrain religious freedom or are especially aimed at Islam. France welcomes private Muslim schools. Mosque-building is widespread. The 2004 headscarf ban outlawed "conspicuous" religious symbols of all faiths. Yet there are growing worries about the spread of hard-line Islamism in the heavily Muslim banlieues.
Rex Features Not welcome in France
Now that Mr Sarkozy has publicly condemned the burqa, the chances of a ban have risen sharply. Parliament has launched a cross-party mission to report back in six months. In fact, few women wear the full garment in France. But mayors of cities with big Muslim populations report a steady increase in numbers, due not to immigration but to its adoption by French-born women—often from North African countries where the burqa is not traditionally worn.
Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the official French Council of the Muslim Faith, has suggested that the inquiry would itself stigmatise Islam. A ban might be misunderstood abroad, and not only in the Muslim world. In his recent speech in Cairo, Barack Obama said that "it is important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit—for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear."
Not so, say many French politicians—including such prominent Muslims as Fadela Amara, the cities minister. The founder of a women's-rights group, Ms Amara has called the burqa "a coffin that kills individual liberties", and a sign of the "political exploitation of Islam".
Jun 25th 2009 | PARIS
From The Economist print edition
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13925890&source=most_commented
The government takes on a "walking prison"
WHEN the French government decided in 2004 to ban the Muslim headscarf in state schools and other public buildings, it set off a heated debate over religious expression and women's rights in a secular state. Now Nicolas Sarkozy has sparked another by calling the burqa, a head-to-toe Islamic garment, "a sign of subjugation…of debasement" that is "not welcome on French territory".
Mr Sarkozy's comments came after a group of deputies, led by André Gerin, a Communist, had called for a parliamentary inquiry into the wearing of the burqa, with a view to a possible ban. This would mean in all public places, since it is already banned in state institutions under the 2004 law. The deputies called burqas "veritable walking prisons".
France's strict secularism, entrenched by law since 1905, keeps religion firmly out of the state sphere. There are no religious studies (let alone nativity plays) in state schools, nor may public workers sport the headscarf. The government denies that such policies constrain religious freedom or are especially aimed at Islam. France welcomes private Muslim schools. Mosque-building is widespread. The 2004 headscarf ban outlawed "conspicuous" religious symbols of all faiths. Yet there are growing worries about the spread of hard-line Islamism in the heavily Muslim banlieues.
Rex Features Not welcome in France
Now that Mr Sarkozy has publicly condemned the burqa, the chances of a ban have risen sharply. Parliament has launched a cross-party mission to report back in six months. In fact, few women wear the full garment in France. But mayors of cities with big Muslim populations report a steady increase in numbers, due not to immigration but to its adoption by French-born women—often from North African countries where the burqa is not traditionally worn.
Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the official French Council of the Muslim Faith, has suggested that the inquiry would itself stigmatise Islam. A ban might be misunderstood abroad, and not only in the Muslim world. In his recent speech in Cairo, Barack Obama said that "it is important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practising religion as they see fit—for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear."
Not so, say many French politicians—including such prominent Muslims as Fadela Amara, the cities minister. The founder of a women's-rights group, Ms Amara has called the burqa "a coffin that kills individual liberties", and a sign of the "political exploitation of Islam".
The Ruse of a Palestinian State on Offer by Saree Makdisi
The Ruse of a Palestinian State on Offer
by Saree Makdisi / July 6th, 2009 (0)
To judge by the next day’s headlines, Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy speech last month was a great success. “Israeli Premier Backs State for Palestinians,” declared the New York Times. “Israel Endorses Two-State Goal,” said the Washington Post. “Netanyahu Backs Palestinian State,” announced The Guardian.
He did no such thing, of course, unless by “state” one understands an amorphous entity lacking a definite territory, not allowed to control its own borders or airspace, shorn of any vestige of sovereignty (other than a flag and perhaps a national anthem), not allowed to enter into treaties with other states—and permanently disarmed …
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/the-ruse-of-a-palestinian-state-on-offer/
by Saree Makdisi / July 6th, 2009 (0)
To judge by the next day’s headlines, Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy speech last month was a great success. “Israeli Premier Backs State for Palestinians,” declared the New York Times. “Israel Endorses Two-State Goal,” said the Washington Post. “Netanyahu Backs Palestinian State,” announced The Guardian.
He did no such thing, of course, unless by “state” one understands an amorphous entity lacking a definite territory, not allowed to control its own borders or airspace, shorn of any vestige of sovereignty (other than a flag and perhaps a national anthem), not allowed to enter into treaties with other states—and permanently disarmed …
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/the-ruse-of-a-palestinian-state-on-offer/
Why Jerusalem? Israel’s Hidden Agenda by Dan Lieberman
Why Jerusalem?
Israel’s Hidden Agenda
by Dan Lieberman / July 6th, 2009 (1)
Three huge granite stones rest comfortably on the top of Midbar Sinai Street, in Givat Havatzim, Jerusalem’s northernmost district. Cut to specification, the imposing stones represent one of several preparations by the Temple Mount and Land of Israel Faithful Movement to erect a Third Temple on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Since the Islamic Wafq owns and controls all the property on the Haram al-Sharif, these stones cannot be legally transferred to the Temple Mount nor can a Temple be constructed there? The provocation, represented by the stones, which the Israel government refuses to curtail, lead to a belief that an …
(Full article …)
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/why-jerusalem/
Israel’s Hidden Agenda
by Dan Lieberman / July 6th, 2009 (1)
Three huge granite stones rest comfortably on the top of Midbar Sinai Street, in Givat Havatzim, Jerusalem’s northernmost district. Cut to specification, the imposing stones represent one of several preparations by the Temple Mount and Land of Israel Faithful Movement to erect a Third Temple on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Since the Islamic Wafq owns and controls all the property on the Haram al-Sharif, these stones cannot be legally transferred to the Temple Mount nor can a Temple be constructed there? The provocation, represented by the stones, which the Israel government refuses to curtail, lead to a belief that an …
(Full article …)
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/07/why-jerusalem/
Honduras and the Bolivarian Revolution By Douglas Farah
Honduras and the Bolivarian Revolution
By Douglas Farah
Once again an outside power is meddling in the internal affairs of a small, poor Central American country and threatening military action if its preferred candidate is not restored to office. The irony is that it is not Uncle Sam interfering in Honduras-which has happened often enough-but Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, who has made a career of railing against foreign intervention. Chávez's belligerent threats of military action to restore his ally, ousted president Manuel Zelaya, to power are supported by Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, Bolivia's Evo Morales and the Castro brothers in Cuba.
The leaders, as part of Chávez's oil-fueled regional "Bolivarian revolution," have twisted their constitutions like pretzels, run roughshod over due process, worked to silence the press, concentrated power in their own hands, and fomented violence against the legal political opposition. In addition to their current autocratic and anti-democratic governing styles, Ortega led a violent, successful revolution and Chávez led an unsuccessful military coup attempt, making their outrage over a constitutional maneuver, no matter how questionable, ring hollow.
What is more disturbing is the growing ties between the Bolivarian revolutionary states and armed groups in Latin America and across the world, their open embrace of Iran, and the teaching of terrorist methodologies pioneered by radical Islamists as official military doctrine. The sole point of convergence between the Iranian theocracy and the secular Bolivarian populists is a deep hatred for the United States and liberal democracy. Zelaya, hooked on subsidized Venezuelan oil, was following the same autocratic and anti-democratic path pioneered by Chávez and joining an alliance that has strangled democratic development wherever the Bolivarian revolution has taken root.
Zelaya's ouster is the first clear sign that there will be a reaction against the abuses and excesses of the Bolivarian model of radical populism, megalomania and violence, often called "popular democracy" and described as 21st Century socialism. The concern of Chávez and his allies have for Zelaya has much more to do with a fear that the reaction against them will grow than it does with any commitment to democracy. A successful removal of Zelaya could be a model for their own demise.
Make no mistake. Giving the military a leading role in a political drama in Honduras may be akin to giving a pyromaniac matches and can of kerosene. It can end badly. I covered Honduras for 20 years and reported extensively both on the military's egregious human rights abuses and voracious economic appetite that sucked the national coffers dry, although the troops have stayed in the barracks for more than two decades.
But look at the alternatives. Zelaya was illegally attempting the same political move successfully executed by Chávez and Morales-a constitutional change that would allow him to stay in power indefinitely-always among the first actions of the Bolivarian leaders. The nation's supreme court ruled that his attempted referendum was unconstitutional. His party broke with him, his attorney general said it was illegal and the army refused to cooperate in light of the court ruling. Yet Zelaya proceeded, after leading a crowd to burn an army installation in protest of the institution's failure to defy the supreme court decision. He was flown into exile at gunpoint and replaced by Roberto Micheletti, of his own party and head of the National Assembly. Micheletti promises to hold scheduled presidential elections this year and not be a candidate. Time will tell.
The Honduras situation leaves the United States with difficult options. How the Obama administration handles this challenge against a government that was in the process of breaching the constitutional order will have powerful repercussions across Latin America. Similar challenges could appear in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Ecuador as the Bolivarian governments move to consolidate their hold on power and meet resistance.
It is tempting to see the restoration of Zelaya as the democratic imperative, and most of the international community is pressing for this outcome, while not endorsing Chávez's threats of violence. The Organization of American States is set to impose a series of crippling economic sanctions if Zelaya is not allowed to return in some form. But it is worth looking further at the implications of the Boliviarian revolution writ large.
It has been almost two decades since the democratic processes began in Central America, and a few years more since South America moved from military dictatorships and coups to liberal democracies with imperfect but improving institutional processes, transparency and freedoms. I lived in Latin America during civil wars and the difficult transition from decades of brutal authoritarian regimes to the fragile democratic structures, built through sweat and blood.
These still-fragile democracies are now in danger of being choked by the new radical populism, fueled by oil money, deep disillusionment with the corruption and mismanagement of the traditional political classes and exclusion based on race and class. The need for deep reform certainly exists. But Chávez's model is not the solution.
Reasons for deep concern about the spread of the Bolivarian revolution are far deeper than simple ideological disputes, and Zelaya's actions are only one piece of a wider pattern. The threat of Chávez and his allies goes to the heart of the region's democratic processes and institutionality. While the moves against civil society and institutions have been amply documented, the contours of the broader threat of the Bolivarian alliance and its ties to radical Islamist regimes, particularly Iran, are now clearer.
Venezuela has adopted an official military doctrine that is based on strategies Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups are already practicing, and one embraced to a significant degree by Iran, the primary state sponsor of those groups. The embrace of this doctrine provides an important link in understanding the ties of Venezuela and its allies to Iran.
Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela's security doctrine, replacing "imperialist" influences with a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan and Latin American security is a U.S. invasion. This doctrine is being taught by Venezuelan instructors to the militaries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras.
One of the main books Chávez has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare by the Spanish politician Jorge Verstrynge. Although he is not a Muslim Verstrynge's book lauds radical Islam (as well as past terrorists like Ilich RamÃrez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal) for expanding the parameters of what irregular warfare can encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons. He is particularly taken with suicide bombers, whom he praises for their willingness to die for the cause. Verstrynge has lauded Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is "de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized," a war where suicide bombers act as "atomic bombs for the poor."
Chávez invited Verstrynge to give keynote address to military leaders in a 2005 conference and ordered a special pocket size edition of the book to be printed up and distributed throughout the officer corps, to be studied cover to cover.
The fascination with asymmetrical warfare may explain why Chávez and other members of the Bolivarian axis maintain close ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated terrorist and drug trafficking organization by both the United States and the European Union. Chávez personally requested that the FARC train Venezuelan military and militias in guerrilla warfare in case of a U.S. invasion.
These actions are part of why many who viewed the Bolivarian revolutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras with hope are now turning away in disillusionment. With more and more avenues of legitimate protest, dissent and political change cut off, there few options to return to the values so many fought for in decades past-freedom of speech, the rule of law, unfettered media, a separation of powers and chance to replace poor governments with better ones in regularly scheduled elections. Zelaya's removal was evokes old school methods and appears to be ill-considered. But the Obama administration needs to weigh the bigger picture before handing Chávez and his allies an easy victory by backing Zelaya under the illusion that such a move will bring advance democracy in Honduras or Latin America.
July 3, 2009 09:17 AM Link http://counterterrorismblog.org/
By Douglas Farah
Once again an outside power is meddling in the internal affairs of a small, poor Central American country and threatening military action if its preferred candidate is not restored to office. The irony is that it is not Uncle Sam interfering in Honduras-which has happened often enough-but Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, who has made a career of railing against foreign intervention. Chávez's belligerent threats of military action to restore his ally, ousted president Manuel Zelaya, to power are supported by Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, Bolivia's Evo Morales and the Castro brothers in Cuba.
The leaders, as part of Chávez's oil-fueled regional "Bolivarian revolution," have twisted their constitutions like pretzels, run roughshod over due process, worked to silence the press, concentrated power in their own hands, and fomented violence against the legal political opposition. In addition to their current autocratic and anti-democratic governing styles, Ortega led a violent, successful revolution and Chávez led an unsuccessful military coup attempt, making their outrage over a constitutional maneuver, no matter how questionable, ring hollow.
What is more disturbing is the growing ties between the Bolivarian revolutionary states and armed groups in Latin America and across the world, their open embrace of Iran, and the teaching of terrorist methodologies pioneered by radical Islamists as official military doctrine. The sole point of convergence between the Iranian theocracy and the secular Bolivarian populists is a deep hatred for the United States and liberal democracy. Zelaya, hooked on subsidized Venezuelan oil, was following the same autocratic and anti-democratic path pioneered by Chávez and joining an alliance that has strangled democratic development wherever the Bolivarian revolution has taken root.
Zelaya's ouster is the first clear sign that there will be a reaction against the abuses and excesses of the Bolivarian model of radical populism, megalomania and violence, often called "popular democracy" and described as 21st Century socialism. The concern of Chávez and his allies have for Zelaya has much more to do with a fear that the reaction against them will grow than it does with any commitment to democracy. A successful removal of Zelaya could be a model for their own demise.
Make no mistake. Giving the military a leading role in a political drama in Honduras may be akin to giving a pyromaniac matches and can of kerosene. It can end badly. I covered Honduras for 20 years and reported extensively both on the military's egregious human rights abuses and voracious economic appetite that sucked the national coffers dry, although the troops have stayed in the barracks for more than two decades.
But look at the alternatives. Zelaya was illegally attempting the same political move successfully executed by Chávez and Morales-a constitutional change that would allow him to stay in power indefinitely-always among the first actions of the Bolivarian leaders. The nation's supreme court ruled that his attempted referendum was unconstitutional. His party broke with him, his attorney general said it was illegal and the army refused to cooperate in light of the court ruling. Yet Zelaya proceeded, after leading a crowd to burn an army installation in protest of the institution's failure to defy the supreme court decision. He was flown into exile at gunpoint and replaced by Roberto Micheletti, of his own party and head of the National Assembly. Micheletti promises to hold scheduled presidential elections this year and not be a candidate. Time will tell.
The Honduras situation leaves the United States with difficult options. How the Obama administration handles this challenge against a government that was in the process of breaching the constitutional order will have powerful repercussions across Latin America. Similar challenges could appear in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Ecuador as the Bolivarian governments move to consolidate their hold on power and meet resistance.
It is tempting to see the restoration of Zelaya as the democratic imperative, and most of the international community is pressing for this outcome, while not endorsing Chávez's threats of violence. The Organization of American States is set to impose a series of crippling economic sanctions if Zelaya is not allowed to return in some form. But it is worth looking further at the implications of the Boliviarian revolution writ large.
It has been almost two decades since the democratic processes began in Central America, and a few years more since South America moved from military dictatorships and coups to liberal democracies with imperfect but improving institutional processes, transparency and freedoms. I lived in Latin America during civil wars and the difficult transition from decades of brutal authoritarian regimes to the fragile democratic structures, built through sweat and blood.
These still-fragile democracies are now in danger of being choked by the new radical populism, fueled by oil money, deep disillusionment with the corruption and mismanagement of the traditional political classes and exclusion based on race and class. The need for deep reform certainly exists. But Chávez's model is not the solution.
Reasons for deep concern about the spread of the Bolivarian revolution are far deeper than simple ideological disputes, and Zelaya's actions are only one piece of a wider pattern. The threat of Chávez and his allies goes to the heart of the region's democratic processes and institutionality. While the moves against civil society and institutions have been amply documented, the contours of the broader threat of the Bolivarian alliance and its ties to radical Islamist regimes, particularly Iran, are now clearer.
Venezuela has adopted an official military doctrine that is based on strategies Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups are already practicing, and one embraced to a significant degree by Iran, the primary state sponsor of those groups. The embrace of this doctrine provides an important link in understanding the ties of Venezuela and its allies to Iran.
Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela's security doctrine, replacing "imperialist" influences with a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan and Latin American security is a U.S. invasion. This doctrine is being taught by Venezuelan instructors to the militaries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras.
One of the main books Chávez has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare by the Spanish politician Jorge Verstrynge. Although he is not a Muslim Verstrynge's book lauds radical Islam (as well as past terrorists like Ilich RamÃrez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal) for expanding the parameters of what irregular warfare can encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons. He is particularly taken with suicide bombers, whom he praises for their willingness to die for the cause. Verstrynge has lauded Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is "de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized," a war where suicide bombers act as "atomic bombs for the poor."
Chávez invited Verstrynge to give keynote address to military leaders in a 2005 conference and ordered a special pocket size edition of the book to be printed up and distributed throughout the officer corps, to be studied cover to cover.
The fascination with asymmetrical warfare may explain why Chávez and other members of the Bolivarian axis maintain close ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated terrorist and drug trafficking organization by both the United States and the European Union. Chávez personally requested that the FARC train Venezuelan military and militias in guerrilla warfare in case of a U.S. invasion.
These actions are part of why many who viewed the Bolivarian revolutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras with hope are now turning away in disillusionment. With more and more avenues of legitimate protest, dissent and political change cut off, there few options to return to the values so many fought for in decades past-freedom of speech, the rule of law, unfettered media, a separation of powers and chance to replace poor governments with better ones in regularly scheduled elections. Zelaya's removal was evokes old school methods and appears to be ill-considered. But the Obama administration needs to weigh the bigger picture before handing Chávez and his allies an easy victory by backing Zelaya under the illusion that such a move will bring advance democracy in Honduras or Latin America.
July 3, 2009 09:17 AM Link http://counterterrorismblog.org/
Intelligence and Meglomania Saddam Hussein's FBI Interviews
Intelligence and Meglomania
Saddam Hussein's FBI Interviews
http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick07062009.html
By PATRICK COCKBURN
Saddam Hussein was questioned by the FBI during 20 formal interviews and at least five "casual conversations" over a four-month period from February to May 2004 after his capture by US troops in December 2003.
Transcripts of the interviews were released last week in response to US Freedom of Information requests. Asked about his greatest achievements, the former Iraqi leader cited social progress for ordinary Iraqis, a temporary ceasefire with the Kurds in the early 1970s, the nationaliation of Iraq's oil in 1972, and support for the Arab side during the 1973 Middle East war with Israel.
The Saddam Hussein interviews are interesting for what they reveal and what they conceal. Probably right up to the end, Saddam was talking up the Iranian threat to Iraq, knowing that this would confirm American suspicions of Iran. The Iraqi leader would recall that a joint front against Iran had been the basis of Iraqi-American co-operation in the 1980s.
"Hussein explained that Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran," records FBI special agent George Piro who interviewed him. This is the explanation the Iraqi leader presents for keeping the world guessing if he had weapons of mass destruction. In reality, the Iraqi leader made every effort to prove that he had no WMD.
The anti-Iranian theme is constant throughout, and no doubt Saddam believed it as well as saying it out of political calculation. Of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, he says: "Khomeini and Iran would have occupied all of the Arab world if it had not been for Iraq."
But US intelligence documents about Iraqi intentions in 1980 show Saddam Hussein and other leaders launching a surprise attack on Iran because they thought it was militarily weak following the Iranian revolution of 1979. In a disastrous miscalculation they believed the war would be over soon and they would win back territorial concessions they had made to the Shah in 1975.
Saddam was astute in his assessment of internal Iraqi politics, but was catastrophically wrong in his calculations of how foreign powers would respond to his actions. This is not surprising for a man who only briefly left Iraq during his whole life. Most importantly, he wrecked his country by his two invasions: Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990.
He denies that the Baath party was Sunni-dominated when it first became a force in 1958-63, though this was true by 1968. He makes the unlikely claim that he was unaware for years that his long-time lieutenant Tariq Aziz was a Christian. Asked about the Shia uprising of 1991 in southern Iraq, in which as many 150,000 people may have been killed, he says the insurgents were "thieves, rebels" and came "from Iran". Yet thousands of bodies of Shia men, women and children have been unearthed from mass graves south of Baghdad and the few survivors leave no doubt they were killed in a mass punishment because they were Shia.
It is interesting to see Saddam deny that he was ever at the Dora farm in south Baghdad at which the US launched a missile attack at the start of the war in 2003 because of intelligence he was there. It would be interesting to know how many Iraqi civilians died because of such attacks based on dubious tips to the CIA.
Saddam Hussein's failing was not stupidity, but arrogance and brutality and this impression is confirmed by these interviews. He was a man of intelligence who came to believe that he had semi-divine attributes.
Patrick Cockburn is the co-author with Andrew Cockburn of Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession.
Saddam Hussein's FBI Interviews
http://www.counterpunch.org/patrick07062009.html
By PATRICK COCKBURN
Saddam Hussein was questioned by the FBI during 20 formal interviews and at least five "casual conversations" over a four-month period from February to May 2004 after his capture by US troops in December 2003.
Transcripts of the interviews were released last week in response to US Freedom of Information requests. Asked about his greatest achievements, the former Iraqi leader cited social progress for ordinary Iraqis, a temporary ceasefire with the Kurds in the early 1970s, the nationaliation of Iraq's oil in 1972, and support for the Arab side during the 1973 Middle East war with Israel.
The Saddam Hussein interviews are interesting for what they reveal and what they conceal. Probably right up to the end, Saddam was talking up the Iranian threat to Iraq, knowing that this would confirm American suspicions of Iran. The Iraqi leader would recall that a joint front against Iran had been the basis of Iraqi-American co-operation in the 1980s.
"Hussein explained that Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran," records FBI special agent George Piro who interviewed him. This is the explanation the Iraqi leader presents for keeping the world guessing if he had weapons of mass destruction. In reality, the Iraqi leader made every effort to prove that he had no WMD.
The anti-Iranian theme is constant throughout, and no doubt Saddam believed it as well as saying it out of political calculation. Of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, he says: "Khomeini and Iran would have occupied all of the Arab world if it had not been for Iraq."
But US intelligence documents about Iraqi intentions in 1980 show Saddam Hussein and other leaders launching a surprise attack on Iran because they thought it was militarily weak following the Iranian revolution of 1979. In a disastrous miscalculation they believed the war would be over soon and they would win back territorial concessions they had made to the Shah in 1975.
Saddam was astute in his assessment of internal Iraqi politics, but was catastrophically wrong in his calculations of how foreign powers would respond to his actions. This is not surprising for a man who only briefly left Iraq during his whole life. Most importantly, he wrecked his country by his two invasions: Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990.
He denies that the Baath party was Sunni-dominated when it first became a force in 1958-63, though this was true by 1968. He makes the unlikely claim that he was unaware for years that his long-time lieutenant Tariq Aziz was a Christian. Asked about the Shia uprising of 1991 in southern Iraq, in which as many 150,000 people may have been killed, he says the insurgents were "thieves, rebels" and came "from Iran". Yet thousands of bodies of Shia men, women and children have been unearthed from mass graves south of Baghdad and the few survivors leave no doubt they were killed in a mass punishment because they were Shia.
It is interesting to see Saddam deny that he was ever at the Dora farm in south Baghdad at which the US launched a missile attack at the start of the war in 2003 because of intelligence he was there. It would be interesting to know how many Iraqi civilians died because of such attacks based on dubious tips to the CIA.
Saddam Hussein's failing was not stupidity, but arrogance and brutality and this impression is confirmed by these interviews. He was a man of intelligence who came to believe that he had semi-divine attributes.
Patrick Cockburn is the co-author with Andrew Cockburn of Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession.
Obama's Strategic Blind Spot How many troops here; what anti-terror tactics to employ there -- those questions miss the point. By Andrew J. Bacevic
Los Angeles Times
July 6, 2009
Obama's Strategic Blind Spot
How many troops here; what anti-terror tactics to employ there -- those questions miss the point.
By Andrew J. Bacevich
'Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?" During the bitter winter of 1914-15, the first lord of the Admiralty posed this urgent question to Britain's prime minister.
The eighth anniversary of 9/11, now fast approaching, invites attention to a similar question: Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to choke on the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Back in December 1914, the Admiralty's impatient first lord was Winston Churchill, appalled by the slaughter on the Western Front. Intent on breaking the stalemate, Churchill became a font of ideas. Mired in Flanders? Then launch an amphibious assault against the Dardanelles, he urged. Were German machine guns cutting down British Tommies venturing into no man's land? Then support the infantry with tanks.
Yet Churchill's innovations failed to deliver a quick resolution. Instead, they prolonged the war and drove up its cost. When the guns finally fell silent in November 1918, "victory" left Britain economically and spiritually depleted. Revolution wracked much of Europe. And the seeds of totalitarianism had been planted, producing in their maturity an even more horrendous war. Some victory.
Churchill and his Cabinet colleagues had spent four years dodging fundamental questions. Fixated with tactical and operational concerns, they ignored matters of strategy and politics. Britain's true interest lay in ending the war, not in blindly seeing it through to the bitter end. This, few British leaders possessed the imagination to see.
A comparable failure of imagination besets present-day Washington. The Long War launched by George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11 has not gone well. Everyone understands that. Yet in the face of disappointment, what passes for advanced thinking recalls the Churchill who devised Gallipoli and godfathered the tank: In Washington and in the field, a preoccupation with tactics and operations have induced strategic blindness.
As President Obama shifts the main U.S. military effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, and as his commanders embrace counterinsurgency as the new American way of war, the big questions go not only unanswered but unasked. Does perpetuating the Long War make political or strategic sense? As we prepare to enter that war's ninth year, are there no alternatives?
Pragmatists shy away from first-order questions -- recall President George H. W. Bush's aversion to what he called "the vision thing." Obama is a pragmatist. Unlike his immediate predecessor, he inhabits a world where facts matter.
Yet pragmatism devoid of principle will perpetuate the strategic void that Obama inherited. The urgent need is for the administration to articulate a concrete set of organizing precepts -- not simply cliches -- to frame basic U.S. policy going forward.
What should those principles be?
First, the Long War may be long, but it should not get any bigger. The regime-change approach -- invade and occupy to transform -- hasn't worked; simply trying harder in some other venue (Somalia? Sudan?) won't produce different results. In short, no more Iraqs.
Second, forget the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake.
Third, no more crusades unless the American people buy in; expecting a relative handful of soldiers to carry the load while the rest of the country binges on consumption is unconscionable. At a minimum, the generation that opts for war should pay for it through higher taxes rather than foisting a burden of debt onto their grandchildren.
Fourth, the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world. It may or may not be true that a "mighty fortress is our God"; had the United States been a mighty fortress on 9/11, however, the 19 hijackers would have gotten nowhere.
Fifth, by all means let the United States promote the spread of freedom and democracy. Yet we're more likely to enjoy success by modeling freedom rather than trying to impose it. To provide a suitable model, we've considerable work to do here at home. Meanwhile, let's not deny others the prerogative of defining for themselves exactly what it means to be free.
Now, some may view these principles as inadequate. Fair enough: Come up with something better. The point is that unless we get the fundamentals right -- and we haven't since the Cold War ended -- the United States may yet share the fate suffered by Churchill's Britain, reduced from engine to caboose in the course of his own political career. Those are the consequences of strategic drift.
Obama has appointed czars for a host of issues, his administration today employing more czars than have occupied the Kremlin throughout its history. Yet there is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains unassigned.
That's unacceptable. Obama needs to appoint someone to fill the position -- or he could claim it for himself.
Andrew J. Bacevich is a professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
July 6, 2009
Obama's Strategic Blind Spot
How many troops here; what anti-terror tactics to employ there -- those questions miss the point.
By Andrew J. Bacevich
'Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?" During the bitter winter of 1914-15, the first lord of the Admiralty posed this urgent question to Britain's prime minister.
The eighth anniversary of 9/11, now fast approaching, invites attention to a similar question: Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to choke on the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Back in December 1914, the Admiralty's impatient first lord was Winston Churchill, appalled by the slaughter on the Western Front. Intent on breaking the stalemate, Churchill became a font of ideas. Mired in Flanders? Then launch an amphibious assault against the Dardanelles, he urged. Were German machine guns cutting down British Tommies venturing into no man's land? Then support the infantry with tanks.
Yet Churchill's innovations failed to deliver a quick resolution. Instead, they prolonged the war and drove up its cost. When the guns finally fell silent in November 1918, "victory" left Britain economically and spiritually depleted. Revolution wracked much of Europe. And the seeds of totalitarianism had been planted, producing in their maturity an even more horrendous war. Some victory.
Churchill and his Cabinet colleagues had spent four years dodging fundamental questions. Fixated with tactical and operational concerns, they ignored matters of strategy and politics. Britain's true interest lay in ending the war, not in blindly seeing it through to the bitter end. This, few British leaders possessed the imagination to see.
A comparable failure of imagination besets present-day Washington. The Long War launched by George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11 has not gone well. Everyone understands that. Yet in the face of disappointment, what passes for advanced thinking recalls the Churchill who devised Gallipoli and godfathered the tank: In Washington and in the field, a preoccupation with tactics and operations have induced strategic blindness.
As President Obama shifts the main U.S. military effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, and as his commanders embrace counterinsurgency as the new American way of war, the big questions go not only unanswered but unasked. Does perpetuating the Long War make political or strategic sense? As we prepare to enter that war's ninth year, are there no alternatives?
Pragmatists shy away from first-order questions -- recall President George H. W. Bush's aversion to what he called "the vision thing." Obama is a pragmatist. Unlike his immediate predecessor, he inhabits a world where facts matter.
Yet pragmatism devoid of principle will perpetuate the strategic void that Obama inherited. The urgent need is for the administration to articulate a concrete set of organizing precepts -- not simply cliches -- to frame basic U.S. policy going forward.
What should those principles be?
First, the Long War may be long, but it should not get any bigger. The regime-change approach -- invade and occupy to transform -- hasn't worked; simply trying harder in some other venue (Somalia? Sudan?) won't produce different results. In short, no more Iraqs.
Second, forget the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake.
Third, no more crusades unless the American people buy in; expecting a relative handful of soldiers to carry the load while the rest of the country binges on consumption is unconscionable. At a minimum, the generation that opts for war should pay for it through higher taxes rather than foisting a burden of debt onto their grandchildren.
Fourth, the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world. It may or may not be true that a "mighty fortress is our God"; had the United States been a mighty fortress on 9/11, however, the 19 hijackers would have gotten nowhere.
Fifth, by all means let the United States promote the spread of freedom and democracy. Yet we're more likely to enjoy success by modeling freedom rather than trying to impose it. To provide a suitable model, we've considerable work to do here at home. Meanwhile, let's not deny others the prerogative of defining for themselves exactly what it means to be free.
Now, some may view these principles as inadequate. Fair enough: Come up with something better. The point is that unless we get the fundamentals right -- and we haven't since the Cold War ended -- the United States may yet share the fate suffered by Churchill's Britain, reduced from engine to caboose in the course of his own political career. Those are the consequences of strategic drift.
Obama has appointed czars for a host of issues, his administration today employing more czars than have occupied the Kremlin throughout its history. Yet there is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains unassigned.
That's unacceptable. Obama needs to appoint someone to fill the position -- or he could claim it for himself.
Andrew J. Bacevich is a professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
President Obama in Moscow: "What's Russian for 'Empathy'?"
Readers may be interested in the following article from today's WP. Written by Mark Medish, a former NSC senior official for Russia, it contrasts the US approach based on "visionary pragmatism" and the Russian approach based on "cynical realism."
President Obama in Moscow: "What's Russian for 'Empathy'?"
The link is http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070601517.html
President Obama in Moscow: "What's Russian for 'Empathy'?"
The link is http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070601517.html
Sunday, July 5, 2009
US-Russian Arms Negotiators "Under the Gun," Might Temporarily Bypass Senate Ratification For Treaty
US-Russian Arms Negotiators "Under the Gun," Might Temporarily Bypass Senate Ratification For Treaty
From ABC News:
MOSCOW -- With the clock running out on a new US-Russian arms treaty before the previous Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, expires on December 5, a senior White House official said Sunday said that the difficulty of the task might mean temporarily bypassing the Senate’s constitutional role in ratifying treaties by enforcing certain aspects of a new deal on an executive levels and a “provisional basis” until the Senate ratifies the treaty.
"The most ideal situation would be to finish it in time that it could be submitted to the Senate so that it can be ratified," said White House Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security and Arms Control Gary Samore. "If we're not able to do that, we'll have to look at arrangements to continue some of the inspection provisions, keep them enforced in a provisional basis, while the Senate considers the treaty."
Read more .... http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/07/us-russian-arms-negotiators-under-the-gun-might-temporarily-bypass-senate-ratification-for-treaty.html
Kudos to Jack Tapper for exposing the problems that both sides are having in coming to a new agreement. The Russians see anti-missile defense as a deal breaker .... the Americans do not.
My bet is that the Americans are going to bend on missile defense .... but the fall out is going to be disastrous with our Eastern European allies who were promised by the U.S. that such a system would be installed in Poland with the radar system in the Czech republic.
There is also going to be fallout back home. Most Americans do not share the Administrations views towards missile defense, and see it as a positive program that should be continued. The political price that the Democrats are going to pay will be steep .... starting with the Senate who will probably not feel comfortable in ratifying such an agreement.
From ABC News:
MOSCOW -- With the clock running out on a new US-Russian arms treaty before the previous Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, expires on December 5, a senior White House official said Sunday said that the difficulty of the task might mean temporarily bypassing the Senate’s constitutional role in ratifying treaties by enforcing certain aspects of a new deal on an executive levels and a “provisional basis” until the Senate ratifies the treaty.
"The most ideal situation would be to finish it in time that it could be submitted to the Senate so that it can be ratified," said White House Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Security and Arms Control Gary Samore. "If we're not able to do that, we'll have to look at arrangements to continue some of the inspection provisions, keep them enforced in a provisional basis, while the Senate considers the treaty."
Read more .... http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/07/us-russian-arms-negotiators-under-the-gun-might-temporarily-bypass-senate-ratification-for-treaty.html
Kudos to Jack Tapper for exposing the problems that both sides are having in coming to a new agreement. The Russians see anti-missile defense as a deal breaker .... the Americans do not.
My bet is that the Americans are going to bend on missile defense .... but the fall out is going to be disastrous with our Eastern European allies who were promised by the U.S. that such a system would be installed in Poland with the radar system in the Czech republic.
There is also going to be fallout back home. Most Americans do not share the Administrations views towards missile defense, and see it as a positive program that should be continued. The political price that the Democrats are going to pay will be steep .... starting with the Senate who will probably not feel comfortable in ratifying such an agreement.
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