Uri Avnery's Column
BANANAS
04/07/09
NOT EVERY day, and not even every decade, does the Supreme Court rebuke the Military Advocate General. The last time this happened was 20 years ago, when the Advocate General refused to issue a proper indictment against an officer who ordered his men to break the arms and legs of a bound Palestinian. The officer argued that he considered this to be his duty, after the Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Rabin, had called for “breaking their bones”.
Well, this week it happened again. The Supreme Court made a decision that was tantamount to a slap in the face of the army’s current chief legal officer, Brigadier Avichai Mendelblit.
The incident in question took place in Ni’alin, a village which has been robbed of a great part of its land by the Separation Fence. Like their neighbors in Bilin, the villagers demonstrate every week against the Fence. Generally, the army’s reactions in Ni’alin are even more violent than in Bilin. Four protesters have already been killed there.
In this particular incident, Lieutenant Colonel Omri Borberg took a Palestinian demonstrator, who was sitting on the ground, handcuffed and blindfolded, and suggested to one of his soldiers “let’s go aside and give him a rubber”. He ordered the soldier to shoot a rubber bullet, point blank.
For those who do not know: “rubber bullets” are steel bullets coated with rubber. From a distance, they cause painful injuries. At short range, they can be fatal. Officially, soldiers are allowed to use them at a minimum range of 40 meters.
Without hesitating, the soldier shot the prisoner in the foot, although this was a “manifestly illegal order”, which a soldier is obliged by army law to disobey. According to the classic definition of Judge Binyamin Halevy in the 1957 Kafr Kassem massacre case, the “black flag of illegality” is waving over such orders. The prisoner, Ashraf Abu-Rakhma, was hit and fell on the ground.
Veterans of the Ni’alin and Bilin demonstrations know that such and similar incidents happen all the time. But the Abu-Rakhma case was special for one reason: it was documented by a young local woman from a balcony near the crime scene with one of the cameras provided to villagers by B’tselem, an Israeli human rights organization.
Thus the Lt. Col. committed an unforgivable sin: he was photographed in the act. Generally, when peace activists disclose such misdeeds, the army spokesman reaches into his bag of lies and comes up with some mendacious statement or other (“Attacked the soldier”, “Tried to grab his weapon”, “Resisted arrest”). But even a talented spokesman has difficulties denying something that is clearly seen on film.
When the Military Advocate General decided to prosecute the officer and the soldier for “conduct unbecoming”, Abu-Rakhma and some Israeli human rights organizations applied to the Supreme Court. The judges advised the Advocate to change the indictment. He refused, and so the matter reached the court again.
This week, in a decision unusual for its severe language, the three justices (including a female judge and a religious one) found the “conduct unbecoming” charge itself unbecoming. They ordered the indictment of both officer and soldier on a far more serious criminal charge, in order to make it clear to all military personnel that mistreating a prisoner “is contrary to the spirit of the state and the army”.
After such a slap in the face, any decent person would have resigned in shame. But not Mendelblit. The bearded and kippa-wearing brigadier is a personal friend of the Chief of Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, and is expecting promotion to Major General at any moment.
Recently, the Advocate General refused to indict a senior officer who asserted in court, while testifying on behalf of a subordinate, that it is right to abuse Palestinians physically.
Ashkenazi owes a lot to his Advocate General, and for other reasons. Mendelblit has made a huge effort to cover up war crimes committed during the recent Gaza War, from Ashkenazi’s war plan itself to the crimes of individual soldiers. Nobody has been put on trial, nobody even seriously investigated.
ON THE day the Supreme Court decision concerning Mendelblit was published, another brigadier also made the headlines. Curiously enough, his first name is also Avichai (not a very common name), he is also bearded and wears a kippa.
In a speech before religious female soldiers, the Chief Rabbi of the army, Brigadier Avichai Rontzky, expressed the opinion that the army service of women is forbidden by the Jewish religion.
Since every Jewish young woman in Israel is bound by law to serve for two years, and women perform many essential jobs in the army, this was a seditious statement. But nobody was really surprised by this Rabbi.
Rontzky was chosen for this post by the former Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz. He knew what he was doing.
The Rabbi was not born into a religious family. Indeed, he was quite “secular”, a member of an elite army unit, when he saw the light and was “reborn”. Like many of this kind, he did not stop halfway but went to the furthest extreme, becoming a settler and setting up a Yeshiva (religious seminary) in one of the most fanatical settlements.
Rontzky is a man in the spirit of the person who appointed him. It will be remembered that, when asked what he felt when dropping a one-ton bomb on a residential area, Air Force General Halutz answered: “a slight bump on the wing”. In a discussion about whether to treat a wounded Palestinian on the Shabbat, Rontzky wrote that “the life of a goy is certainly valuable…but the Shabbat is more important.” Meaning: a dying goy should not be treated on Shabbat. Later he retracted. (In modern colloquial Hebrew, a goy is a non-Jew. The term has distinctly derogatory connotations.)
The Israeli army has something that is called the “Ethical Code”. True, the spiritual father of the Code, Professor Asa Kasher, did defend the atrocities of the “Molten Lead” operation, but Rontzky went much further: he stated unequivocally that “When there is a clash between…the Ethical Code and the Halakha (religious law), certainly the Halakha must be followed.”
In a publication distributed by him, it was said that “the Bible prohibits us from giving up even one millimeter of Eretz Israel”. In other words, the Chief Rabbi of the army, a Brigadier of the IDF, asserts that the official policy of the Israeli government – from Ariel Sharon’s “Separation” to the recent speech by Binyamin Netanyahu on a “demilitarized Palestinian State” – is a mortal sin.
But the peak was reached in a brochure that the army rabbinate distributed to soldiers during the Gaza War: “Exercising mercy towards a cruel enemy means being cruel towards innocent and honest soldiers. In war as in war.”
That was a clear incitement to brutality. It can be seen as a call for acts that constitute war crimes – the very same acts that his colleague, the Military Advocate General, has done everything possible to cover up.
NEITHER OF the two bearded brigadiers would have remained in office for a single day had they not enjoyed the full support of the Chief of Staff. The army is a hierarchical institution, and full responsibility for everything that happens falls squarely and entirely on the Chief.
Unlike his predecessors, Gaby Ashkenazi does not show off and does not speak in public frequently. If he has political ambitions, he is hiding them well. But during his term in office, the army has assumed a certain character, which is perfectly represented by these two officers.
This did not start, of course, with Ashkenazi. He is continuing – and perhaps intensifying – a tendency that started long ago, and that has been changing the Israeli army beyond recognition.
The founder of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, famously wrote in his book “Der Judenstaat”, the founding document of the movement: “We shall know how to keep our clerics in the temples, as we shall know how to keep our regular army in the barracks…they will not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the state.”
Now the very opposite is happening: the rabbis have penetrated the army, the army officers come from the synagogues.
The hard core of the fanatical settlers, which is almost entirely composed of religious people (many of whom are “reborn Jews”) decided long ago to gain control of the army from within. In a systematic campaign, which is in full swing, they penetrate the officers’ corps from below - from the junior ranks to the middle to the senior ones. One can see their success in statistics: from year to year the number of kippa-wearing officers is growing.
When the Israeli army came into being, the officers’ corps was full of kibbutz members. Not only were kibbutzniks considered the elite of the new Hebrew society, which was based on values of morality and culture, and not only were they the first to volunteer for every national task, but there were also inbuilt “technical” reasons.
The nucleus of the army came from the pre-state Palmach. The Palmach companies constituted a fully-mobilized regular army, part of the underground military organization, the Haganah. They could exist and operate freely only in the kibbutzim, where their identity could be camouflaged. As a result, almost all the outstanding commanders in the 1948 war were from the Palmach, kibbutz members or close to them.
These did everything to imbue the new Defense Forces with the spirit of a pioneering, moral and humanist citizens army, the very opposite of an occupation army. True, the reality was always different, but the ideal was important as an aim to strive for. As I showed in my 1950 book, “The Other Side of the Coin”, our “purity of arms” has always been a myth. But the aspiration to be an army with humanist values was important. Atrocities were hidden or denied, because they were considered shameful and dishonoring our camp.
Nothing has remained of all this, except phrases. Since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, the character of the army has changed completely. The army that was founded in order to protect the state from external dangers has become an army of occupation, whose task is to oppress another people, crush their resistance, expropriate land, protect land robbers called settlers, man roadblocks, humiliate human beings every day. Of course, it is not the army alone that has changed, but also the state that gives the army its orders as well as its ongoing brainwashing.
In such an army, a process of natural selection takes place. People of discrimination, with a high moral standard, who detest such actions, leave sooner or later. Their place is taken by other types, people of different values or no values at all, “professional soldiers” who “just follow orders”.
Of course, one must beware of generalizing. In today’s army there are not a few people who believe that they are fulfilling a mission, for whom the Ethical Code is more than just a compilation of sanctimonious phrases. These people are disgusted by what they see. >From time to time we hear their protests and see their disclosures. However, it is not they who set the tone, but types like Rontzky and Mendelblit.
THAT SHOULD worry us very much. We cannot treat the army as if it was a foreign realm that does not concern us. We cannot tell ourselves: “we don’t want to have anything to do with the army of a Moshe Ya’alon, a Shaul Mofaz, a Dan Halutz or a Gabi Ashkenazi.” We cannot turn our back on the problem. We must face it, because it is our problem.
The state needs an army. Even after achieving peace, we shall need a strong and effective army in order to protect the state until peace strikes deep roots and we can set up a regional body along the lines of the European Union, perhaps.
The army is us. Its character has an impact on all our lives, on the life of our state itself. It has already been said: “Israel is not a banana republic. It is a republic that slips on bananas.” And what bananas!
Reflections from news and commentary of the day
Subscribe To
Posts
All Comments
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Biden: US Won't Stand in Israel's Way on Iran
Biden: US Won't Stand in Israel's Way on Iran
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/07/05/biden-us-not-stand-in-israels-way-on-iran/
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/07/05/biden-us-not-stand-in-israels-way-on-iran/
Saudis Give Nod To Israeli Raid On Iran Copyright Equilibri.net 2008 (Image taken from Stefano Torelli
Saudis Give Nod To Israeli Raid On Iran Copyright Equilibri.net 2008 (Image taken from Stefano Torelli
From The Sunday Times:
The head of Mossad, Israel's overseas intelligence service, has assured Benjamin Netanyahu, its prime minister, that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over the kingdom during any future raid on Iran's nuclear sites.
Earlier this year Meir Dagan, Mossad's director since 2002, held secret talks with Saudi officials to discuss the possibility.
The Israeli press has already carried unconfirmed reports that high-ranking officials, including Ehud Olmert, the former prime minister, held meetings with Saudi colleagues. The reports were denied by Saudi officials.
Read more .... http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6638568.ece
The enemy of my enemy is my friend. If this news story is true, I guess this quote is also true.
The interesting part of this story is that the Saudis do not have confidence that the American/Iraqi coalition would permit Israel to fly over Iraqi airspace to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. This proposal also tells me that the Saudis are more willing to accommodate the Israelis than the Americans.
Wow .... how things have changed in just 6 months.
From The Sunday Times:
The head of Mossad, Israel's overseas intelligence service, has assured Benjamin Netanyahu, its prime minister, that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over the kingdom during any future raid on Iran's nuclear sites.
Earlier this year Meir Dagan, Mossad's director since 2002, held secret talks with Saudi officials to discuss the possibility.
The Israeli press has already carried unconfirmed reports that high-ranking officials, including Ehud Olmert, the former prime minister, held meetings with Saudi colleagues. The reports were denied by Saudi officials.
Read more .... http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6638568.ece
The enemy of my enemy is my friend. If this news story is true, I guess this quote is also true.
The interesting part of this story is that the Saudis do not have confidence that the American/Iraqi coalition would permit Israel to fly over Iraqi airspace to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. This proposal also tells me that the Saudis are more willing to accommodate the Israelis than the Americans.
Wow .... how things have changed in just 6 months.
Saturday, July 4, 2009
The Chinese Proposal for a New Global Super Currency Nouriel Roubini
The Chinese Proposal for a New Global Super Currency Nouriel Roubini | Jun 26, 2009 As I discussed a few weeks ago in a New York Times op-ed the Chinese are flexing their muscles on the question of the global reserve currency system dominated by the dollar.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/257169/the_chinese_proposal_for_a_new_global_super_currency
With the revision of the SDR basket (so far including only dollar, euro, yen and pound) coming to the table next year it is clear that the Chinese will push for including the renminbi in the new SDR basket. And senior Brazilian policy sources suggest in private that, if the RMB is included in the SDR, so should the Brazilian Real as there is already a much deeper bond market for Real debt and as - unlike China - Brazil has a more liberalized capital account. And the Russians are now openly pushing for commodity currencies - the Canadian and Australian dollar but also the Ruble - to be included in the SDR basket. And the BRICs are on record pushing for the IMF to issue SDR denominated debt.
So the process that will lead - in the medium-long term - to a challenge of the US dollar as the major global reserve currency has started. The US creditors - the BRICs, the Gulf states and others - are becoming increasingly alarmed that the US will deal with its unsustainable fiscal path via inflation and debasement of the value of the dollar via depreciation. So they will not sit idly waiting for this to happen: they are already diversifying into gold, into resources (as China purchases mines and energy, mineral and commodity resources all over the world) and into shorter term maturity US Treasuries that have less market risk than longer term Treasuries. With two-thirds of US Treasuries, being held by non-residents and the average maturity of such government debt down to 4.5 years, the risk of a refinancing crisis and disorderly fall in the dollar will increase over time unless the US presents a credible plan for medium term fiscal consolidation.
Increasingly it is clear that unless such reduction in fiscal deficits occurs the incentive to continue monetizing them will increase. In the short run such massive monetization has not been inflationary as money velocity has collapsed and as the slack in goods and labor markets is still rapidly rising. But over time - late 2010 and 2011 - deflationary pressures will lead to an increase in expected inflation and then in actual inflation if monetization of persistently large fiscal deficits continues. Indeed some in the US argue that wiping out the real value of public debt and dealing with the private sector debt deflation through a bout of double digit inflation may be the most desirable way to reduce the overhang of public and private debt. While such arguments have many flaws as inflation will have serious collateral damage one cannot rule out that the US will use inflation and depreciation as a way out of its public and private debts. Greenspan's concerns about the long term inflationary effects of large US budget deficits - expressed today in a FT op-ed - go along the same lines. Thus, our creditors' nervousness about the eventual debasement of the US dollar has some increasing validity.
And here again is the full text of my recent NYT op-ed in case you missed it the first time:
From The New York Times:
THE ALMIGHTY RENMINBI?
By Nouriel Roubini
May 13, 2009
THE 19th century was dominated by the British Empire, the 20th century by the United States. We may now be entering the Asian century, dominated by a rising China and its currency. While the dollar status as the major reserve currency will not vanish overnight, we can no longer take it for granted. Sooner than we think, the dollar may be challenged by other currencies, most likely the Chinese renminbi. This would have serious costs for America, as our ability to finance our budget and trade deficits cheaply would disappear.
Traditionally, empires that hold the global reserve currency are also net foreign creditors and net lenders. The British Empire declined and the pound lost its status as the main global reserve currency when Britain became a net debtor and a net borrower in World War II. Today, the United States is in a similar position. It is running huge budget and trade deficits, and is relying on the kindness of restless foreign creditors who are starting to feel uneasy about accumulating even more dollar assets. The resulting downfall of the dollar may be only a matter of time.
But what could replace it? The British pound, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc remain minor reserve currencies, as those countries are not major powers. Gold is still a barbaric relic whose value rises only when inflation is high. The euro is hobbled by concerns about the long-term viability of the European Monetary Union. That leaves the renminbi.
China is a creditor country with large current account surpluses, a small budget deficit, much lower public debt as a share of G.D.P. than the United States, and solid growth. And it is already taking steps toward challenging the supremacy of the dollar. Beijing has called for a new international reserve currency in the form of the International Monetary Fund special drawing rights (a basket of dollars, euros, pounds and yen). China will soon want to see its own currency included in the basket, as well as the renminbi used as a means of payment in bilateral trade.
At the moment, though, the renminbi is far from ready to achieve reserve currency status. China would first have to ease restrictions on money entering and leaving the country, make its currency fully convertible for such transactions, continue its domestic financial reforms and make its bond markets more liquid. It would take a long time for the renminbi to become a reserve currency, but it could happen. China has already flexed its muscle by setting up currency swaps with several countries (including Argentina, Belarus and Indonesia) and by letting institutions in Hong Kong issue bonds denominated in renminbi, a first step toward creating a deep domestic and international market for its currency.
If China and other countries were to diversify their reserve holdings away from the dollar, and they eventually will, the United States would suffer. We have reaped significant financial benefits from having the dollar as the reserve currency. In particular, the strong market for the dollar allows Americans to borrow at better rates. We have thus been able to finance larger deficits for longer and at lower interest rates, as foreign demand has kept Treasury yields low. We have been able to issue debt in our own currency rather than a foreign one, thus shifting the losses of a fall in the value of the dollar to our creditors. Having commodities priced in dollars has also meant that a fall in the dollar value doesn't lead to a rise in the price of imports.
Now, imagine a world in which China could borrow and lend internationally in its own currency. The renminbi, rather than the dollar, could eventually become a means of payment in trade and a unit of account in pricing imports and exports, as well as a store of value for wealth by international investors. Americans would pay the price. We would have to shell out more for imported goods, and interest rates on both private and public debt would rise. The higher private cost of borrowing could lead to weaker consumption and investment, and slower growth.
This decline of the dollar might take more than a decade, but it could happen even sooner if we do not get our financial house in order. The United States must rein in spending and borrowing, and pursue growth that is not based on asset and credit bubbles. For the last two decades America has been spending more than its income, increasing its foreign liabilities and amassing debts that have become unsustainable. A system where the dollar was the major global currency allowed us to prolong reckless borrowing.
Now that the dollar position is no longer so secure, we need to shift our priorities. This will entail investing in our crumbling infrastructure, alternative and renewable resources and productive human capital, rather than in unnecessary housing and toxic financial innovation. This will be the only way to slow down the decline of the dollar, and sustain our influence in global affairs.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at the New York University Stern School of Business and the chairman of an economic consulting firm.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/opinion/14Roubini.html?_r=2
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/257169/the_chinese_proposal_for_a_new_global_super_currency
With the revision of the SDR basket (so far including only dollar, euro, yen and pound) coming to the table next year it is clear that the Chinese will push for including the renminbi in the new SDR basket. And senior Brazilian policy sources suggest in private that, if the RMB is included in the SDR, so should the Brazilian Real as there is already a much deeper bond market for Real debt and as - unlike China - Brazil has a more liberalized capital account. And the Russians are now openly pushing for commodity currencies - the Canadian and Australian dollar but also the Ruble - to be included in the SDR basket. And the BRICs are on record pushing for the IMF to issue SDR denominated debt.
So the process that will lead - in the medium-long term - to a challenge of the US dollar as the major global reserve currency has started. The US creditors - the BRICs, the Gulf states and others - are becoming increasingly alarmed that the US will deal with its unsustainable fiscal path via inflation and debasement of the value of the dollar via depreciation. So they will not sit idly waiting for this to happen: they are already diversifying into gold, into resources (as China purchases mines and energy, mineral and commodity resources all over the world) and into shorter term maturity US Treasuries that have less market risk than longer term Treasuries. With two-thirds of US Treasuries, being held by non-residents and the average maturity of such government debt down to 4.5 years, the risk of a refinancing crisis and disorderly fall in the dollar will increase over time unless the US presents a credible plan for medium term fiscal consolidation.
Increasingly it is clear that unless such reduction in fiscal deficits occurs the incentive to continue monetizing them will increase. In the short run such massive monetization has not been inflationary as money velocity has collapsed and as the slack in goods and labor markets is still rapidly rising. But over time - late 2010 and 2011 - deflationary pressures will lead to an increase in expected inflation and then in actual inflation if monetization of persistently large fiscal deficits continues. Indeed some in the US argue that wiping out the real value of public debt and dealing with the private sector debt deflation through a bout of double digit inflation may be the most desirable way to reduce the overhang of public and private debt. While such arguments have many flaws as inflation will have serious collateral damage one cannot rule out that the US will use inflation and depreciation as a way out of its public and private debts. Greenspan's concerns about the long term inflationary effects of large US budget deficits - expressed today in a FT op-ed - go along the same lines. Thus, our creditors' nervousness about the eventual debasement of the US dollar has some increasing validity.
And here again is the full text of my recent NYT op-ed in case you missed it the first time:
From The New York Times:
THE ALMIGHTY RENMINBI?
By Nouriel Roubini
May 13, 2009
THE 19th century was dominated by the British Empire, the 20th century by the United States. We may now be entering the Asian century, dominated by a rising China and its currency. While the dollar status as the major reserve currency will not vanish overnight, we can no longer take it for granted. Sooner than we think, the dollar may be challenged by other currencies, most likely the Chinese renminbi. This would have serious costs for America, as our ability to finance our budget and trade deficits cheaply would disappear.
Traditionally, empires that hold the global reserve currency are also net foreign creditors and net lenders. The British Empire declined and the pound lost its status as the main global reserve currency when Britain became a net debtor and a net borrower in World War II. Today, the United States is in a similar position. It is running huge budget and trade deficits, and is relying on the kindness of restless foreign creditors who are starting to feel uneasy about accumulating even more dollar assets. The resulting downfall of the dollar may be only a matter of time.
But what could replace it? The British pound, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc remain minor reserve currencies, as those countries are not major powers. Gold is still a barbaric relic whose value rises only when inflation is high. The euro is hobbled by concerns about the long-term viability of the European Monetary Union. That leaves the renminbi.
China is a creditor country with large current account surpluses, a small budget deficit, much lower public debt as a share of G.D.P. than the United States, and solid growth. And it is already taking steps toward challenging the supremacy of the dollar. Beijing has called for a new international reserve currency in the form of the International Monetary Fund special drawing rights (a basket of dollars, euros, pounds and yen). China will soon want to see its own currency included in the basket, as well as the renminbi used as a means of payment in bilateral trade.
At the moment, though, the renminbi is far from ready to achieve reserve currency status. China would first have to ease restrictions on money entering and leaving the country, make its currency fully convertible for such transactions, continue its domestic financial reforms and make its bond markets more liquid. It would take a long time for the renminbi to become a reserve currency, but it could happen. China has already flexed its muscle by setting up currency swaps with several countries (including Argentina, Belarus and Indonesia) and by letting institutions in Hong Kong issue bonds denominated in renminbi, a first step toward creating a deep domestic and international market for its currency.
If China and other countries were to diversify their reserve holdings away from the dollar, and they eventually will, the United States would suffer. We have reaped significant financial benefits from having the dollar as the reserve currency. In particular, the strong market for the dollar allows Americans to borrow at better rates. We have thus been able to finance larger deficits for longer and at lower interest rates, as foreign demand has kept Treasury yields low. We have been able to issue debt in our own currency rather than a foreign one, thus shifting the losses of a fall in the value of the dollar to our creditors. Having commodities priced in dollars has also meant that a fall in the dollar value doesn't lead to a rise in the price of imports.
Now, imagine a world in which China could borrow and lend internationally in its own currency. The renminbi, rather than the dollar, could eventually become a means of payment in trade and a unit of account in pricing imports and exports, as well as a store of value for wealth by international investors. Americans would pay the price. We would have to shell out more for imported goods, and interest rates on both private and public debt would rise. The higher private cost of borrowing could lead to weaker consumption and investment, and slower growth.
This decline of the dollar might take more than a decade, but it could happen even sooner if we do not get our financial house in order. The United States must rein in spending and borrowing, and pursue growth that is not based on asset and credit bubbles. For the last two decades America has been spending more than its income, increasing its foreign liabilities and amassing debts that have become unsustainable. A system where the dollar was the major global currency allowed us to prolong reckless borrowing.
Now that the dollar position is no longer so secure, we need to shift our priorities. This will entail investing in our crumbling infrastructure, alternative and renewable resources and productive human capital, rather than in unnecessary housing and toxic financial innovation. This will be the only way to slow down the decline of the dollar, and sustain our influence in global affairs.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at the New York University Stern School of Business and the chairman of an economic consulting firm.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/opinion/14Roubini.html?_r=2
Declaration of Independence
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
--Declaration of Independence
--Declaration of Independence
Friday, July 3, 2009
Iran’s Green Wave Robert Dreyfuss
THE NATION
7/1/09
Iran’s Green Wave
Robert Dreyfuss
Just before midnight on a Friday evening a week before Iran's much-disputed June 12 election, the initial tremors of the earthquake that has shaken the country to its core were palpable deep in south Tehran, a gritty, working-class section of the city with a reputation for being a stronghold of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Past shuttered shops and empty, debris-strewn sidewalks, a late-night stream of cars, trucks and motorcycles, engines revving, horns honking, roared along the wide boulevard. >From open car windows emerged shouts and cheers, raised fists and hands brandishing posters of opposition contender Mir-Hossein Moussavi's bearded, smiling visage. In the traffic ahead of us, a ramshackle open-air panel truck transported at least two dozen Ahmadinejad supporters clad in T-shirts, jeering at their opponents. As I traveled north from sprawling Imam Khomeini Square up to Ferdowsi Square and on the miles-long Vali Asr Street, the scene was similar. In a country not known for street politics, the tableau was stunning. My Iranian companion, an older man with years of experience in his country's affairs, smiled and shook his head. "This is something new," he said.
Indeed. Just over a year ago, when I visited Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan and Qom on the eve of the March 2008 parliamentary elections, I spoke to scores of Iranians who were glumly considering whether to drag themselves to the polls and vote for the least-bad candidate or, more likely, not bother to vote at all. In 2009 the contrast could not have been more stark. The city was electric. Into the wee hours tens of thousands campaigned in a citywide free-for-all. Every morning Tehran was abuzz with the latest election news. Men crowded around newsstands to read the headlines and to discuss the previous night's candidate debate. Just inside the main gate to Tehran University, two days before the election, a middle-aged guard who had lost a leg in the war with Iraq in the 1980s marveled at the thousands of students marching past, flying green banners in support of Moussavi's reformist movement. "Enghelab!" he said, nodding. "It's a revolution!" It's a word I'd hear over and over again, from students, office workers, taxi drivers and passersby--before, during and after the election.
Of course, it's not a revolution--not yet, anyway. Although opposition crowds swelled from several tens of thousands at pre-election rallies to perhaps a million or more afterward, the regime controls a vast repressive apparatus. It includes the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the police; the paramilitary, mosque-based Basij; vigilante groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah; the army; and a much-dreaded intelligence service, VEVAK, which was responsible for the assassination of hundreds of dissidents and activists in the 1990s. It's a fearsome machine prepared to enforce the dictums of Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the rahbar (Leader), who warned a week after the election that street protests would no longer be tolerated.
And the opposition's leaders are not exactly revolutionaries. The coalition ranged against Khamenei and Ahmadinejad is a kind of counter-establishment representing a huge split within Iran's secular and clerical elites. It includes the reformists, led by Moussavi, who served as prime minister during the tumultuous and violently repressive 1980s, and Mehdi Karroubi, a cleric and former speaker of Parliament, both of whom ran against Ahmadinejad. It includes relatively moderate, pragmatic conservatives and the wealthy business elite, typified by the behind-the-scenes role of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the wily billionaire mullah and wheeler-dealer who was president in the 1990s. And it includes many hardline conservatives from the so-called "principlist" faction, which previously lined up behind Ahmadinejad but this time rallied behind opposition candidate Mohsen Rezai, a founder of the IRGC, who has been bitterly critical of the president and who at least initially claimed election fraud.
But there's no denying that for the first time since the1978-79 revolution, which led to the Islamic Republic, Iran's leadership is confronted with an explosive and unpredictable challenge: from below, a mass movement whose street energy and high-tech organizing savvy spread from Tehran to Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad and other cities. And within the elite there is a swelling wave of dissatisfaction with the narrow-minded radicals in power, who are blamed for having squandered the country's oil wealth, mismanaged its economy and forced Iran into a crippling regime of sanctions that have walled it off from the technology and foreign investment it desperately needs.
As a result, Iran is at a crossroads.
In one direction is a slide toward greater xenophobia and ultra-nationalism, in part because the radical forces stirred up among Ahmadinejad's electoral base will be hard to put back in the box. The broad consensus behind Iran's system of rule-by-clergy has been shattered, and the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime has lost its legitimacy. To shore up support, it's blaming various greater and lesser satans in the United States, Europe and Israel for Iran's troubles, making it exceedingly difficult for the country to re-establish ties to the West. At best, Iran will remain embroiled in the stalemate it has faced since 2005, with the economy continuing to unravel. At worst, it could fall into North Korea-like isolation, with fundamentalists and the security establishment preaching that subsistence-level economic privation must be endured for the sake of Islamic purity.
At the very least, the clergy-run, quasi-democratic Iranian state has been replaced by something that looks a lot more like a military dictatorship. Since his election in 2005, Ahmadinejad has installed scores of ex-commanders from the IRGC throughout government ministries and as governors and local officials in all thirty provinces. Ahmadinejad's cronies have created a powerful clique loyal to Khamenei but, at the same time, encircling the office of the Leader. The conventional wisdom--that the Leader is the all-powerful commander in chief, while the president is an elected figurehead with little real power--may be tilting, if it has not already been turned on its head.
In the other direction, a victory by the opposition--as unlikely as it appears in the wake of the regime's crackdown--might let in a lot of fresh air. It could smooth the path for an accord with the West, pave the way toward greater cultural and civil liberties, and reverse the downward economic spiral. Under this scenario, Iran could still cling to much of its current form of government, though it would be less rigid. But what scares many conservatives, and no doubt much of the establishment, is that this time it might not be so easy to stuff the genie of reform back into its bottle. A large number of those supporting Moussavi--it's impossible to know how many--want far more than reform. They want an end to the very idea of an Islamic Republic. Their hero is Mohammad Mossadegh, the prime minister who nationalized Iran's oil in 1951, challenged the shah and was toppled in a coup by MI-6 and the CIA in 1953. Reform in Iran is a slippery slope, and once reforms get started the very fabric of the Islamic Republic could unravel.
It's that scenario that Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their IRGC and Basij allies are determined to resist at all costs. And they're prepared to unleash Tiananmen Square levels of violence to make sure it doesn't happen.
A few days before the vote, as Moussavi's "Green Wave" began to crest, there were already signs that things might get ugly. On June 9 a widely reported leak from the Interior Ministry said that Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi had issued a fatwa permitting vote counters to manipulate the results in favor of the candidate who is truly a devotee of Islam. "To you, as administrators of the election, everything is permitted to this end," Mesbah Yazdi wrote. The ayatollah, who is Ahmadinejad's chief sponsor among the clerical elite in Qom, Iran's religious capital, is also godfather to a network of scholars and activists from the ideologically rigid Haqqani School, which he established. For that network--which includes many of Ahmadinejad's IRGC allies--the word of Mesbah Yazdi is law. The following day, June 10, Yadollah Javani, ideological czar of the IRGC, issued a warning that the regime was prepared to take strong action against the Green Wave movement, which had burst onto the scene to back Moussavi. "There are many indications that some extremist [i.e., reformist] groups have designed a 'color' revolution," said Javani. "Any attempt at a velvet revolution will be nipped in the bud." It was a chilling reminder of who had the guns.
It was clear by nightfall on election day, June 12, that something was wrong. Across Tehran, troop transports rumbled out of the IRGC's fortified bases. Before the polls had even closed, Tehran took on the air of an occupied city. Later that night, ominously, my cellphone went dead, like everyone else's. Not long past midnight, the Interior Ministry declared Ahmadinejad the victor, crediting him with nearly two-thirds of a record turnout, having accomplished the near-magical feat of counting tens of millions of paper ballots in a couple of hours. Later that day, as outrage over what was widely seen as a manipulated result rippled across the city, Khamenei confirmed Ahmadinejad's win. Hundreds of thousands poured into the streets in protest.
"Moussavi and Karroubi had earlier established a joint committee to protect the people's votes," Ibrahim Yazdi, who was foreign minister in the early days after the revolution and who now leads the suppressed Freedom Movement of Iran, told me. "Many young people volunteered to work on that committee. But the authorities didn't let it happen. Last night [election night] the security forces closed it down." Describing what the regime did as a "coup d'etat," he said, "The security forces occupied the offices of many newspapers, to make sure their reports on the election were favorable. They changed many headlines." Over the next days newspapers were closed, Internet sites blocked or disabled and opposition campaign offices attacked and shuttered. Hundreds of officials, journalists and dissidents--perhaps as many as 2,000--were arrested, including Yazdi.
Some analysts argue that Ahmadinejad may have won, citing his populist appeal, but that's farfetched. An analysis prepared by Chatham House in London argues persuasively that the vote was skewed, comparing it with the totals for 2005. It showed that, in at least ten provinces, in order to have amassed the totals given him, Ahmadinejad would have had to win all the voters who backed him in 2005, all the voters who last time voted for Rafsanjani, all the voters who last time sat out the election and didn't vote at all, and--varying by province--up to 44 percent of the voters who in 2005 backed the reformist slate. Other analyses piled up similar anomalies. One employee of the Interior Ministry told reporters that the ministry "didn't even look at the vote" but made up the numbers. Said Yazdi, "The counting of the votes took place in the personal office of the minister of the interior, with only two aides present."
Exactly one week after the election, Khamenei threw down the gauntlet, forbidding street protests and warning of "bloodshed." He added, "Nothing can be changed. It's finished, the presidential campaign." Dashing the hopes of reformers and oppositionists that Khamenei might toss Ahmadinejad overboard to calm the protests, the Leader has steadfastly held to his stance, denouncing peaceful demonstrators as "terrorists" backed by Zionists, "evil" Britain and the CIA. In so doing, Khamenei tethered himself to Ahmadinejad's presidency, abandoning the pretense that the Leader is above the fray of petty politics. It was as if he'd painted a target on his forehead. In the streets a daring and unprecedented insult to the country's Leader was heard for the first time in the Islamic Republic: "Death to Khamenei!"
Within ten days of the election, though, the street protests had withered under the unrelenting muscle of the IRGC and the Basij. The regime choked off virtually all opposition communications, arrested most of Moussavi's campaign staff, shuttered his newspaper and banned him from state-controlled radio and TV. Basij thugs invaded homes to beat people who, at night, climbed to the rooftops to shout their defiance. Round one, at least, seemed to have been won by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.
As recently as May, Mir-Hossein Moussavi--an architect, artist and president of the Iranian Academy of the Arts, who speaks Farsi, English, Arabic and Turkish fluently--could not have imagined himself leading a throng of followers, some of them calling for the downfall of Khamenei. But in the election's aftermath Moussavi declared his willingness to be a "martyr," urged his supporters to take to the streets and issued a series of stirring manifestoes. "A reference point in history is being shaped these days and nights," Moussavi proclaimed. In direct defiance of Khamenei's proclamation that the election was over, he said, "I insist that nullifying the election, and recasting the votes, is a nonnegotiable right." And he denounced the bloody assaults on peaceful demonstrators.
He'd come a long way.
With impeccable establishment credentials honed during his stint as prime minister, Moussavi took sides in a left-versus-right split among the Iranian elite, including the clergy, that resulted in the creation of two broad factions at the end of the 1980s. The left-leaning Association of Combatant Clergy, also known as the Roohanioon, quit the more conservative Association of Militant Clergy, known as the Roohaniyat, which was loyal to the newly inaugurated Ayatollah Khamenei, who succeeded the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic. Among the Roohanioon leaders were Moussavi, Mohammad Khatami and a group of relatively progressive, open-minded thinkers who became known as Iran's "reformists." In 1997, at the end of Rafsanjani's presidency, the reformists' first choice to run for president was Moussavi. When he demurred, Khatami ran and--to the surprise of everyone--won overwhelmingly. Moussavi was a key adviser to President Khatami.
The hard right, egged on by Khamenei, counterattacked. It used death squads, vigilantes, secret intelligence units, the Guardian Council and the judiciary to cripple Khatami's presidency. In 2005, with the backing of the IRGC, the hardliners rallied behind the candidacy of Ahmadinejad, who after his election promptly launched a political, cultural and economic reversal. The IRGC itself became Iran's most powerful institution. Alongside its military might, it acquired a vast economic empire, from oil and construction to cellphone technology. Suddenly its personnel were everywhere. "The IRGC commanders, both active and retired, act as a kind of fraternity or freemasonry, wielding power that goes far beyond their official positions by virtue of the informal network they operate," an Iranian insider told me, looking to his left and right to make sure he wasn't being overheard in a busy Tehran lounge.
When Moussavi decided to run for president this past March, almost no one believed he could get traction. Though his stewardship during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s gave him cachet with veterans, like Khatami he is relatively soft-spoken, with little charisma. Secular liberals, leftists and more militant reformists looked askance at Moussavi's premiership, since it was during his tenure that some of the worst human rights abuses, including mass executions, were carried out. Although it was Khomeini, Khamenei and the secretive intelligence ministry that directed the slaughter, Moussavi did not resign or protest.
Several factors combined to make Moussavi a viable candidate. First, with organizational and financial support from the Rafsanjani family and wealthy mullahs and businessmen tired of Ahmadinejad's cronies running the economy, Moussavi built a formidable countrywide campaign machine. Second, the brilliant Green Wave strategy, designed by a 27-year-old whiz kid named Mostafa Hassani, caught fire, and soon green ribbons, armbands, headbands, scarves and flags festooned Iranian cities. "I wanted something simple, something that could be replicated even by poor people in remote villages," the long-haired, lanky Hassani told me, sitting in Moussavi's cluttered campaign headquarters during election week. And then, on June 3, Moussavi electrified Iran during an unprecedented televised debate with Ahmadinejad. With the president sitting across from him, Moussavi called Ahmadinejad a liar and accused him of pushing Iran toward "dictatorship." The next day, green-wearing crowds began chanting, "Death to the liar!" and "Death to the dictator!" Nothing like it had ever been seen in Iranian politics.
Moussavi had another not-so-secret weapon: his wife, Zahra Rahnavard. A noted intellectual and sculptor, Rahnavard campaigned alongside her husband, sometimes holding his hand. Clearly a liberated woman, she called for an end to the much-despised harassment of women by the cultural police and backed equal rights for women. At a vast rally in downtown Tehran, I watched her mesmerize the crowd. "We are going to make a revolution in the revolution!" she cried. "We are going to make it modern and up-to-date!" As one, tens of thousands of people chanted: "Moussavi! Rahnavard! Equal rights for men and women!" Women in pink lipstick and with blond highlights in partly uncovered hair shouted beside women in black chadors.
And then there was the Obama factor. Countless Iranians watched his June 4 Cairo speech, and its transcript was parsed word by word. By offering to respect Iran rather than locating it in the "axis of evil," Obama appealed to secular nationalists, activists seeking greater individual freedom and businessmen hungering for an end to the sanctions strangling Iran's economy. Nearly everyone I spoke with during the ten days I was in Iran brought up Obama, whether I asked or not. At a frenzied Moussavi rally in the city of Karaj, west of the capital, I met a campaign organizer, Hojatolislam Akbar Hamidi, 48, a distinguished cleric who's known Moussavi for more than twenty years. "I listened to Obama's speech, and it made me very happy," he told me. "But we're afraid that some Iranian authorities do not understand the positive message of Obama." In interviews at polling places on election day, dozens of voters praised Obama's opening to Iran. At a Tehran mosque where hundreds of people were lined up to vote, several dozen crowded around as I asked an older woman why she supported Moussavi. When I suggested, "Perhaps Moussavi and Obama might meet someday soon?" the crowd, translating for one another, erupted in cheers, laughter and thumbs-up signs.
More prosaically, many plugged-in Iranians told me that nearly the entirety of Iran's business class is fed up with Ahmadinejad's bellicose rhetoric, and they want to put an end to sanctions. Saeed Laylaz, an economist and former official at the Ministry of Industry, said that as a result of sanctions critical sectors of the economy--including computers and information technology, oil and natural gas, and civil aviation--are suffering badly. "Ahmadinejad's is the first right-wing government since the revolution, and it has been a catastrophe," he said. "You cannot run the government with populism. You need experts. You need technocrats. You need planners." (Laylaz was arrested days after the election; he's still in detention.) To get a sense of what the business community thinks, during election week I attended a forum packed with executives at the offices of Etelaat, a liberal newspaper, where eight former ministers of oil, industry and mining slammed the government over its incompetence. Later, at Moussavi's campaign office, one of them, Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, who was minister of industry under Khatami, told me that he'd put his business on hold to travel across the country working for Moussavi. "I'm a businessman, and I've been reluctant to get into politics," he told me over several cups of tea. "It's the desire of most of us in the business community to rebuild relations with the United States," he said. "It doesn't mean that we have to give up our independence or our dignity."
Besides reformists, students, women and businessmen, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are losing their core constituency: the clergy. And given that Iran is a state run by the priestly class, that might prove their undoing. I spoke to a dozen or so clerics, from low- to mid-ranking mullahs to a few who'd attained the rank of hojatolislam, just below ayatollah. There are hundreds of thousands of mullahs in Iran, perhaps a hundred or more who have attained the rank of ayatollah, and just two dozen or so who have developed sufficient reputation and following to be called grand ayatollah. And more and more of them, including many grand ayatollahs, have joined the opposition. "After the television debates with Ahmadinejad, a large number of mullahs who'd been undecided went over to Moussavi," one hojatolislam told me. They were offended, he said, by Ahmadinejad's insulting attitude toward Moussavi--particularly his rhetorical assault on his wife, Rahnavard, whom he accused of falsifying her academic credentials--and his accusations against Rafsanjani and Khatami. "A president should be polite," the cleric told me. "Impolite behavior and ugliness cannot be accepted."
Another cleric, who campaigned for Moussavi in dozens of Iranian towns and cities, said that the majority of mullahs had abandoned the president. "There is a big gap between Ahmadinejad and the clergy," he told me. "Many of the grand ayatollahs are angry, because the president has taken many actions without consulting with them. They are especially unhappy because he has shown an aggressive face of Islam to the world, and Islam is not aggressive. It is a religion of peace." Some three-quarters of the grand ayatollahs in Iran support Moussavi, he told me. Ten of them sent a joint letter to Ahmadinejad, but he ignored them, he said. Several others have openly castigated the regime for its treatment of protesters.
A very well-connected mullah I talked with said that he is a friend and follower of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri. Back in the late 1980s, Montazeri was the designated successor to Khomeini as Iran's Leader, but hardliners--including Khomeini's son and a circle around Khamenei--ousted him, he told me, because of his liberal views and installed Khamenei. Through this mullah and several other intermediaries, both Moussavi and former president Khatami keep in close contact with Montazeri, as well as with many in the clerical establishment in Qom. In the wake of the election Moussavi and his supporters began organizing what they hoped would be a broad consensus among senior ayatollahs to force Ahmadinejad out or, if it comes to that, to replace Khamenei himself. "Khamenei does not deserve the position that he has," the mullah told me. "He has become a politician, and as a politician he has been corrupted." Describing Khamenei in these terms is extremely unusual, and indicates how much the Ahmadinejad-Khamenei axis has lost its legitimacy. "Khamenei has lost the support of many high-ranking clergy in Qom," declared Ibrahim Yazdi in my interview with him.
Trying to pull together this opposition is Rafsanjani, who so far has stayed behind the scenes but according to numerous reports from Iran is playing a critical role in efforts to counter both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. The former president is chair of the Assembly of Experts, a group of more than eighty clerics who have the power, under Iran's Constitution, to appoint or dismiss the Leader. "Rafsanjani has convinced the majority of the Assembly of Experts and several dozen clerics in Qom to support an effort to overturn the election results," a well-connected Iranian told me. According to Yazdi and several other Iranian activists and analysts, at least some of the clergy want to replace Khamenei with a far more moderate, less political council of ayatollahs as a way of restoring consensus in the leadership [see Sarfaraz, "Iran's New Revolutionaries," in last week's issue]. It would in effect be the end of the Khomeini doctrine of velayat-e-faqih ("rule of the jurisprudent"), which is the underpinning of the notion of a Supreme Leader, a concept invented by Khomeini that is far outside mainstream Muslim, and even Shiite, thinking.
The turmoil in Iran surprised not only Iran's leaders but America's. So far, at least, Obama has maintained a measured tone in response to the crisis, condemning the brutality of the crackdown but reaffirming his policy of trying to establish a dialogue with Tehran. He's resisted calls from ideologues and neoconservatives to adopt a harder line, such as tougher sanctions or overt support for regime change. But realistically, the likelihood of a productive US-Iran conversation is sharply lower now, and it may be months before any such discussions take place, if they happen at all. If, as many Iranian insiders told me in Iran, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad saw value in a rapprochement with the United States before June 12, the explosion since then may have convinced them that now is not the time; at the very least, they will enter any such talks with far less willingness to compromise. On the American side, whatever Obama's intent, he is now faced with the enormously greater problem of trying to sell the idea of talks with Iran to US skeptics. "This has certainly influenced the public appetite in the US for the Iranian regime, which makes it very hard for the president to...hold the door open for dialogue," says Tom Pickering, a veteran US diplomat who's been involved in unofficial talks with Iranian counterparts. "On the other hand, he should be taking the view, if he comes under pressure, that you should be talking to your most difficult enemies. Not talking to them punishes you and your strategic interests, not them."
If Ahmadinejad and Khamenei retain their iron grip on power, both Iran and the United States will face inevitable pressure to resume diplomacy. "On both sides, the interest in pursuing a dialogue will emerge intact," says Sir Richard Dalton, who served as Britain's ambassador in Tehran until 2006. The start of such talks might be "slightly delayed" in the aftermath of the crisis, he says, but that's hardly a tragedy.
But Obama will have to ignore calls to set a short deadline on such talks. They could easily drag on, well into the middle of next year and beyond. If talks fail to produce immediate results, the president will have to resist arguments from Israeli hardliners and their US allies to take harsh measures against Iran--including military action. Obama's earlier outreach undercut the hardliners and gave a psychological boost to Iran's reformists and to millions of Iranians who saw Moussavi as a vehicle through which to improve US-Iranian relations. If Obama wants to support the opposition, the best thing he can do is to continue to extend his open hand to Iran.
7/1/09
Iran’s Green Wave
Robert Dreyfuss
Just before midnight on a Friday evening a week before Iran's much-disputed June 12 election, the initial tremors of the earthquake that has shaken the country to its core were palpable deep in south Tehran, a gritty, working-class section of the city with a reputation for being a stronghold of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Past shuttered shops and empty, debris-strewn sidewalks, a late-night stream of cars, trucks and motorcycles, engines revving, horns honking, roared along the wide boulevard. >From open car windows emerged shouts and cheers, raised fists and hands brandishing posters of opposition contender Mir-Hossein Moussavi's bearded, smiling visage. In the traffic ahead of us, a ramshackle open-air panel truck transported at least two dozen Ahmadinejad supporters clad in T-shirts, jeering at their opponents. As I traveled north from sprawling Imam Khomeini Square up to Ferdowsi Square and on the miles-long Vali Asr Street, the scene was similar. In a country not known for street politics, the tableau was stunning. My Iranian companion, an older man with years of experience in his country's affairs, smiled and shook his head. "This is something new," he said.
Indeed. Just over a year ago, when I visited Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan and Qom on the eve of the March 2008 parliamentary elections, I spoke to scores of Iranians who were glumly considering whether to drag themselves to the polls and vote for the least-bad candidate or, more likely, not bother to vote at all. In 2009 the contrast could not have been more stark. The city was electric. Into the wee hours tens of thousands campaigned in a citywide free-for-all. Every morning Tehran was abuzz with the latest election news. Men crowded around newsstands to read the headlines and to discuss the previous night's candidate debate. Just inside the main gate to Tehran University, two days before the election, a middle-aged guard who had lost a leg in the war with Iraq in the 1980s marveled at the thousands of students marching past, flying green banners in support of Moussavi's reformist movement. "Enghelab!" he said, nodding. "It's a revolution!" It's a word I'd hear over and over again, from students, office workers, taxi drivers and passersby--before, during and after the election.
Of course, it's not a revolution--not yet, anyway. Although opposition crowds swelled from several tens of thousands at pre-election rallies to perhaps a million or more afterward, the regime controls a vast repressive apparatus. It includes the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the police; the paramilitary, mosque-based Basij; vigilante groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah; the army; and a much-dreaded intelligence service, VEVAK, which was responsible for the assassination of hundreds of dissidents and activists in the 1990s. It's a fearsome machine prepared to enforce the dictums of Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the rahbar (Leader), who warned a week after the election that street protests would no longer be tolerated.
And the opposition's leaders are not exactly revolutionaries. The coalition ranged against Khamenei and Ahmadinejad is a kind of counter-establishment representing a huge split within Iran's secular and clerical elites. It includes the reformists, led by Moussavi, who served as prime minister during the tumultuous and violently repressive 1980s, and Mehdi Karroubi, a cleric and former speaker of Parliament, both of whom ran against Ahmadinejad. It includes relatively moderate, pragmatic conservatives and the wealthy business elite, typified by the behind-the-scenes role of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the wily billionaire mullah and wheeler-dealer who was president in the 1990s. And it includes many hardline conservatives from the so-called "principlist" faction, which previously lined up behind Ahmadinejad but this time rallied behind opposition candidate Mohsen Rezai, a founder of the IRGC, who has been bitterly critical of the president and who at least initially claimed election fraud.
But there's no denying that for the first time since the1978-79 revolution, which led to the Islamic Republic, Iran's leadership is confronted with an explosive and unpredictable challenge: from below, a mass movement whose street energy and high-tech organizing savvy spread from Tehran to Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad and other cities. And within the elite there is a swelling wave of dissatisfaction with the narrow-minded radicals in power, who are blamed for having squandered the country's oil wealth, mismanaged its economy and forced Iran into a crippling regime of sanctions that have walled it off from the technology and foreign investment it desperately needs.
As a result, Iran is at a crossroads.
In one direction is a slide toward greater xenophobia and ultra-nationalism, in part because the radical forces stirred up among Ahmadinejad's electoral base will be hard to put back in the box. The broad consensus behind Iran's system of rule-by-clergy has been shattered, and the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime has lost its legitimacy. To shore up support, it's blaming various greater and lesser satans in the United States, Europe and Israel for Iran's troubles, making it exceedingly difficult for the country to re-establish ties to the West. At best, Iran will remain embroiled in the stalemate it has faced since 2005, with the economy continuing to unravel. At worst, it could fall into North Korea-like isolation, with fundamentalists and the security establishment preaching that subsistence-level economic privation must be endured for the sake of Islamic purity.
At the very least, the clergy-run, quasi-democratic Iranian state has been replaced by something that looks a lot more like a military dictatorship. Since his election in 2005, Ahmadinejad has installed scores of ex-commanders from the IRGC throughout government ministries and as governors and local officials in all thirty provinces. Ahmadinejad's cronies have created a powerful clique loyal to Khamenei but, at the same time, encircling the office of the Leader. The conventional wisdom--that the Leader is the all-powerful commander in chief, while the president is an elected figurehead with little real power--may be tilting, if it has not already been turned on its head.
In the other direction, a victory by the opposition--as unlikely as it appears in the wake of the regime's crackdown--might let in a lot of fresh air. It could smooth the path for an accord with the West, pave the way toward greater cultural and civil liberties, and reverse the downward economic spiral. Under this scenario, Iran could still cling to much of its current form of government, though it would be less rigid. But what scares many conservatives, and no doubt much of the establishment, is that this time it might not be so easy to stuff the genie of reform back into its bottle. A large number of those supporting Moussavi--it's impossible to know how many--want far more than reform. They want an end to the very idea of an Islamic Republic. Their hero is Mohammad Mossadegh, the prime minister who nationalized Iran's oil in 1951, challenged the shah and was toppled in a coup by MI-6 and the CIA in 1953. Reform in Iran is a slippery slope, and once reforms get started the very fabric of the Islamic Republic could unravel.
It's that scenario that Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their IRGC and Basij allies are determined to resist at all costs. And they're prepared to unleash Tiananmen Square levels of violence to make sure it doesn't happen.
A few days before the vote, as Moussavi's "Green Wave" began to crest, there were already signs that things might get ugly. On June 9 a widely reported leak from the Interior Ministry said that Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi had issued a fatwa permitting vote counters to manipulate the results in favor of the candidate who is truly a devotee of Islam. "To you, as administrators of the election, everything is permitted to this end," Mesbah Yazdi wrote. The ayatollah, who is Ahmadinejad's chief sponsor among the clerical elite in Qom, Iran's religious capital, is also godfather to a network of scholars and activists from the ideologically rigid Haqqani School, which he established. For that network--which includes many of Ahmadinejad's IRGC allies--the word of Mesbah Yazdi is law. The following day, June 10, Yadollah Javani, ideological czar of the IRGC, issued a warning that the regime was prepared to take strong action against the Green Wave movement, which had burst onto the scene to back Moussavi. "There are many indications that some extremist [i.e., reformist] groups have designed a 'color' revolution," said Javani. "Any attempt at a velvet revolution will be nipped in the bud." It was a chilling reminder of who had the guns.
It was clear by nightfall on election day, June 12, that something was wrong. Across Tehran, troop transports rumbled out of the IRGC's fortified bases. Before the polls had even closed, Tehran took on the air of an occupied city. Later that night, ominously, my cellphone went dead, like everyone else's. Not long past midnight, the Interior Ministry declared Ahmadinejad the victor, crediting him with nearly two-thirds of a record turnout, having accomplished the near-magical feat of counting tens of millions of paper ballots in a couple of hours. Later that day, as outrage over what was widely seen as a manipulated result rippled across the city, Khamenei confirmed Ahmadinejad's win. Hundreds of thousands poured into the streets in protest.
"Moussavi and Karroubi had earlier established a joint committee to protect the people's votes," Ibrahim Yazdi, who was foreign minister in the early days after the revolution and who now leads the suppressed Freedom Movement of Iran, told me. "Many young people volunteered to work on that committee. But the authorities didn't let it happen. Last night [election night] the security forces closed it down." Describing what the regime did as a "coup d'etat," he said, "The security forces occupied the offices of many newspapers, to make sure their reports on the election were favorable. They changed many headlines." Over the next days newspapers were closed, Internet sites blocked or disabled and opposition campaign offices attacked and shuttered. Hundreds of officials, journalists and dissidents--perhaps as many as 2,000--were arrested, including Yazdi.
Some analysts argue that Ahmadinejad may have won, citing his populist appeal, but that's farfetched. An analysis prepared by Chatham House in London argues persuasively that the vote was skewed, comparing it with the totals for 2005. It showed that, in at least ten provinces, in order to have amassed the totals given him, Ahmadinejad would have had to win all the voters who backed him in 2005, all the voters who last time voted for Rafsanjani, all the voters who last time sat out the election and didn't vote at all, and--varying by province--up to 44 percent of the voters who in 2005 backed the reformist slate. Other analyses piled up similar anomalies. One employee of the Interior Ministry told reporters that the ministry "didn't even look at the vote" but made up the numbers. Said Yazdi, "The counting of the votes took place in the personal office of the minister of the interior, with only two aides present."
Exactly one week after the election, Khamenei threw down the gauntlet, forbidding street protests and warning of "bloodshed." He added, "Nothing can be changed. It's finished, the presidential campaign." Dashing the hopes of reformers and oppositionists that Khamenei might toss Ahmadinejad overboard to calm the protests, the Leader has steadfastly held to his stance, denouncing peaceful demonstrators as "terrorists" backed by Zionists, "evil" Britain and the CIA. In so doing, Khamenei tethered himself to Ahmadinejad's presidency, abandoning the pretense that the Leader is above the fray of petty politics. It was as if he'd painted a target on his forehead. In the streets a daring and unprecedented insult to the country's Leader was heard for the first time in the Islamic Republic: "Death to Khamenei!"
Within ten days of the election, though, the street protests had withered under the unrelenting muscle of the IRGC and the Basij. The regime choked off virtually all opposition communications, arrested most of Moussavi's campaign staff, shuttered his newspaper and banned him from state-controlled radio and TV. Basij thugs invaded homes to beat people who, at night, climbed to the rooftops to shout their defiance. Round one, at least, seemed to have been won by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.
As recently as May, Mir-Hossein Moussavi--an architect, artist and president of the Iranian Academy of the Arts, who speaks Farsi, English, Arabic and Turkish fluently--could not have imagined himself leading a throng of followers, some of them calling for the downfall of Khamenei. But in the election's aftermath Moussavi declared his willingness to be a "martyr," urged his supporters to take to the streets and issued a series of stirring manifestoes. "A reference point in history is being shaped these days and nights," Moussavi proclaimed. In direct defiance of Khamenei's proclamation that the election was over, he said, "I insist that nullifying the election, and recasting the votes, is a nonnegotiable right." And he denounced the bloody assaults on peaceful demonstrators.
He'd come a long way.
With impeccable establishment credentials honed during his stint as prime minister, Moussavi took sides in a left-versus-right split among the Iranian elite, including the clergy, that resulted in the creation of two broad factions at the end of the 1980s. The left-leaning Association of Combatant Clergy, also known as the Roohanioon, quit the more conservative Association of Militant Clergy, known as the Roohaniyat, which was loyal to the newly inaugurated Ayatollah Khamenei, who succeeded the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic. Among the Roohanioon leaders were Moussavi, Mohammad Khatami and a group of relatively progressive, open-minded thinkers who became known as Iran's "reformists." In 1997, at the end of Rafsanjani's presidency, the reformists' first choice to run for president was Moussavi. When he demurred, Khatami ran and--to the surprise of everyone--won overwhelmingly. Moussavi was a key adviser to President Khatami.
The hard right, egged on by Khamenei, counterattacked. It used death squads, vigilantes, secret intelligence units, the Guardian Council and the judiciary to cripple Khatami's presidency. In 2005, with the backing of the IRGC, the hardliners rallied behind the candidacy of Ahmadinejad, who after his election promptly launched a political, cultural and economic reversal. The IRGC itself became Iran's most powerful institution. Alongside its military might, it acquired a vast economic empire, from oil and construction to cellphone technology. Suddenly its personnel were everywhere. "The IRGC commanders, both active and retired, act as a kind of fraternity or freemasonry, wielding power that goes far beyond their official positions by virtue of the informal network they operate," an Iranian insider told me, looking to his left and right to make sure he wasn't being overheard in a busy Tehran lounge.
When Moussavi decided to run for president this past March, almost no one believed he could get traction. Though his stewardship during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s gave him cachet with veterans, like Khatami he is relatively soft-spoken, with little charisma. Secular liberals, leftists and more militant reformists looked askance at Moussavi's premiership, since it was during his tenure that some of the worst human rights abuses, including mass executions, were carried out. Although it was Khomeini, Khamenei and the secretive intelligence ministry that directed the slaughter, Moussavi did not resign or protest.
Several factors combined to make Moussavi a viable candidate. First, with organizational and financial support from the Rafsanjani family and wealthy mullahs and businessmen tired of Ahmadinejad's cronies running the economy, Moussavi built a formidable countrywide campaign machine. Second, the brilliant Green Wave strategy, designed by a 27-year-old whiz kid named Mostafa Hassani, caught fire, and soon green ribbons, armbands, headbands, scarves and flags festooned Iranian cities. "I wanted something simple, something that could be replicated even by poor people in remote villages," the long-haired, lanky Hassani told me, sitting in Moussavi's cluttered campaign headquarters during election week. And then, on June 3, Moussavi electrified Iran during an unprecedented televised debate with Ahmadinejad. With the president sitting across from him, Moussavi called Ahmadinejad a liar and accused him of pushing Iran toward "dictatorship." The next day, green-wearing crowds began chanting, "Death to the liar!" and "Death to the dictator!" Nothing like it had ever been seen in Iranian politics.
Moussavi had another not-so-secret weapon: his wife, Zahra Rahnavard. A noted intellectual and sculptor, Rahnavard campaigned alongside her husband, sometimes holding his hand. Clearly a liberated woman, she called for an end to the much-despised harassment of women by the cultural police and backed equal rights for women. At a vast rally in downtown Tehran, I watched her mesmerize the crowd. "We are going to make a revolution in the revolution!" she cried. "We are going to make it modern and up-to-date!" As one, tens of thousands of people chanted: "Moussavi! Rahnavard! Equal rights for men and women!" Women in pink lipstick and with blond highlights in partly uncovered hair shouted beside women in black chadors.
And then there was the Obama factor. Countless Iranians watched his June 4 Cairo speech, and its transcript was parsed word by word. By offering to respect Iran rather than locating it in the "axis of evil," Obama appealed to secular nationalists, activists seeking greater individual freedom and businessmen hungering for an end to the sanctions strangling Iran's economy. Nearly everyone I spoke with during the ten days I was in Iran brought up Obama, whether I asked or not. At a frenzied Moussavi rally in the city of Karaj, west of the capital, I met a campaign organizer, Hojatolislam Akbar Hamidi, 48, a distinguished cleric who's known Moussavi for more than twenty years. "I listened to Obama's speech, and it made me very happy," he told me. "But we're afraid that some Iranian authorities do not understand the positive message of Obama." In interviews at polling places on election day, dozens of voters praised Obama's opening to Iran. At a Tehran mosque where hundreds of people were lined up to vote, several dozen crowded around as I asked an older woman why she supported Moussavi. When I suggested, "Perhaps Moussavi and Obama might meet someday soon?" the crowd, translating for one another, erupted in cheers, laughter and thumbs-up signs.
More prosaically, many plugged-in Iranians told me that nearly the entirety of Iran's business class is fed up with Ahmadinejad's bellicose rhetoric, and they want to put an end to sanctions. Saeed Laylaz, an economist and former official at the Ministry of Industry, said that as a result of sanctions critical sectors of the economy--including computers and information technology, oil and natural gas, and civil aviation--are suffering badly. "Ahmadinejad's is the first right-wing government since the revolution, and it has been a catastrophe," he said. "You cannot run the government with populism. You need experts. You need technocrats. You need planners." (Laylaz was arrested days after the election; he's still in detention.) To get a sense of what the business community thinks, during election week I attended a forum packed with executives at the offices of Etelaat, a liberal newspaper, where eight former ministers of oil, industry and mining slammed the government over its incompetence. Later, at Moussavi's campaign office, one of them, Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, who was minister of industry under Khatami, told me that he'd put his business on hold to travel across the country working for Moussavi. "I'm a businessman, and I've been reluctant to get into politics," he told me over several cups of tea. "It's the desire of most of us in the business community to rebuild relations with the United States," he said. "It doesn't mean that we have to give up our independence or our dignity."
Besides reformists, students, women and businessmen, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are losing their core constituency: the clergy. And given that Iran is a state run by the priestly class, that might prove their undoing. I spoke to a dozen or so clerics, from low- to mid-ranking mullahs to a few who'd attained the rank of hojatolislam, just below ayatollah. There are hundreds of thousands of mullahs in Iran, perhaps a hundred or more who have attained the rank of ayatollah, and just two dozen or so who have developed sufficient reputation and following to be called grand ayatollah. And more and more of them, including many grand ayatollahs, have joined the opposition. "After the television debates with Ahmadinejad, a large number of mullahs who'd been undecided went over to Moussavi," one hojatolislam told me. They were offended, he said, by Ahmadinejad's insulting attitude toward Moussavi--particularly his rhetorical assault on his wife, Rahnavard, whom he accused of falsifying her academic credentials--and his accusations against Rafsanjani and Khatami. "A president should be polite," the cleric told me. "Impolite behavior and ugliness cannot be accepted."
Another cleric, who campaigned for Moussavi in dozens of Iranian towns and cities, said that the majority of mullahs had abandoned the president. "There is a big gap between Ahmadinejad and the clergy," he told me. "Many of the grand ayatollahs are angry, because the president has taken many actions without consulting with them. They are especially unhappy because he has shown an aggressive face of Islam to the world, and Islam is not aggressive. It is a religion of peace." Some three-quarters of the grand ayatollahs in Iran support Moussavi, he told me. Ten of them sent a joint letter to Ahmadinejad, but he ignored them, he said. Several others have openly castigated the regime for its treatment of protesters.
A very well-connected mullah I talked with said that he is a friend and follower of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri. Back in the late 1980s, Montazeri was the designated successor to Khomeini as Iran's Leader, but hardliners--including Khomeini's son and a circle around Khamenei--ousted him, he told me, because of his liberal views and installed Khamenei. Through this mullah and several other intermediaries, both Moussavi and former president Khatami keep in close contact with Montazeri, as well as with many in the clerical establishment in Qom. In the wake of the election Moussavi and his supporters began organizing what they hoped would be a broad consensus among senior ayatollahs to force Ahmadinejad out or, if it comes to that, to replace Khamenei himself. "Khamenei does not deserve the position that he has," the mullah told me. "He has become a politician, and as a politician he has been corrupted." Describing Khamenei in these terms is extremely unusual, and indicates how much the Ahmadinejad-Khamenei axis has lost its legitimacy. "Khamenei has lost the support of many high-ranking clergy in Qom," declared Ibrahim Yazdi in my interview with him.
Trying to pull together this opposition is Rafsanjani, who so far has stayed behind the scenes but according to numerous reports from Iran is playing a critical role in efforts to counter both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. The former president is chair of the Assembly of Experts, a group of more than eighty clerics who have the power, under Iran's Constitution, to appoint or dismiss the Leader. "Rafsanjani has convinced the majority of the Assembly of Experts and several dozen clerics in Qom to support an effort to overturn the election results," a well-connected Iranian told me. According to Yazdi and several other Iranian activists and analysts, at least some of the clergy want to replace Khamenei with a far more moderate, less political council of ayatollahs as a way of restoring consensus in the leadership [see Sarfaraz, "Iran's New Revolutionaries," in last week's issue]. It would in effect be the end of the Khomeini doctrine of velayat-e-faqih ("rule of the jurisprudent"), which is the underpinning of the notion of a Supreme Leader, a concept invented by Khomeini that is far outside mainstream Muslim, and even Shiite, thinking.
The turmoil in Iran surprised not only Iran's leaders but America's. So far, at least, Obama has maintained a measured tone in response to the crisis, condemning the brutality of the crackdown but reaffirming his policy of trying to establish a dialogue with Tehran. He's resisted calls from ideologues and neoconservatives to adopt a harder line, such as tougher sanctions or overt support for regime change. But realistically, the likelihood of a productive US-Iran conversation is sharply lower now, and it may be months before any such discussions take place, if they happen at all. If, as many Iranian insiders told me in Iran, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad saw value in a rapprochement with the United States before June 12, the explosion since then may have convinced them that now is not the time; at the very least, they will enter any such talks with far less willingness to compromise. On the American side, whatever Obama's intent, he is now faced with the enormously greater problem of trying to sell the idea of talks with Iran to US skeptics. "This has certainly influenced the public appetite in the US for the Iranian regime, which makes it very hard for the president to...hold the door open for dialogue," says Tom Pickering, a veteran US diplomat who's been involved in unofficial talks with Iranian counterparts. "On the other hand, he should be taking the view, if he comes under pressure, that you should be talking to your most difficult enemies. Not talking to them punishes you and your strategic interests, not them."
If Ahmadinejad and Khamenei retain their iron grip on power, both Iran and the United States will face inevitable pressure to resume diplomacy. "On both sides, the interest in pursuing a dialogue will emerge intact," says Sir Richard Dalton, who served as Britain's ambassador in Tehran until 2006. The start of such talks might be "slightly delayed" in the aftermath of the crisis, he says, but that's hardly a tragedy.
But Obama will have to ignore calls to set a short deadline on such talks. They could easily drag on, well into the middle of next year and beyond. If talks fail to produce immediate results, the president will have to resist arguments from Israeli hardliners and their US allies to take harsh measures against Iran--including military action. Obama's earlier outreach undercut the hardliners and gave a psychological boost to Iran's reformists and to millions of Iranians who saw Moussavi as a vehicle through which to improve US-Iranian relations. If Obama wants to support the opposition, the best thing he can do is to continue to extend his open hand to Iran.
Spending $102 Billion a Year on 800 Worldwide Military Bases Is Bankrupting the Country By Chalmers Johnson, Tomdispatch.com
Spending $102 Billion a Year on 800 Worldwide Military Bases Is Bankrupting the Country
By Chalmers Johnson, Tomdispatch.com
World: We're building new "embassies" that run close to $1 billion and host countries keep jacking the rent for existing bases.
http://www.alternet.org/world/141071/spending_%24102_billion_a_year_on_800_worldwide_military_bases_is_bankrupting_the_country/
By Chalmers Johnson, Tomdispatch.com
World: We're building new "embassies" that run close to $1 billion and host countries keep jacking the rent for existing bases.
http://www.alternet.org/world/141071/spending_%24102_billion_a_year_on_800_worldwide_military_bases_is_bankrupting_the_country/
Thursday, July 2, 2009
Israel worries over intense 'legal war' Amir Mizroch , THE JERUSALEM POST
The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition
Israel worries over intense 'legal war'
Amir Mizroch , THE JERUSALEM POST
The defense establishment is concerned at intensifying legal campaigns in foreign courts that aim to deter Israel from using force against Hamas and Hizbullah.
Reeling from four damning reports in one week from human rights organizations about the IDF's conduct in Operation Cast Lead, the sense among senior defense officials is that the "legal front" against Israel is growing at an alarming rate.
There is also a palpable urgency within the legal and defense establishments to thoroughly and professionally investigate allegations of war crimes against the IDF, not only because this has been standard practice, but also in an effort to ward off foreign lawsuits, investigations and arrest warrants against officers.
Officials are calling for an increased appreciation throughout the government of the complexities of fighting and winning asymmetric wars within the boundaries of international humanitarian law. There is also a certain level of frustration within the defense establishment at the disconnect between what is believed here to have been a carefully thought-out operation, where huge efforts were invested in minimizing harm to Palestinian civilians, and the growing tide of international accusations of war crimes emanating from the offensive against Hamas six months ago.
"There is a war being waged against us in the legal sphere. Its aim is to delegitimize Israel and to create deterrence against a possible use of force in Gaza and Lebanon again," a senior defense official told The Jerusalem Post.
The Post has also learned that, increasingly, legal officers, as well as soldiers from the IDF Spokesman's Office, are taking part in operational planning for possible future conflicts, at the highest levels.
"The last Gaza war is not over yet. It is being fought on another front for now. It is not just in Spain, England and Belgium. Lawyers and jurists in many countries, some of them Arab, some Jewish, are using legal means to attack Israel.
"There are hundreds of petitions, cases, legal opinions and actions cropping up across the world. The phenomenon is very wide and growing. The other side has a lot of money that comes from countries and people not friendly to Israel. This is another front in the war, and if we don't realize it we'll have a problem," the senior defense source said.
To counter this legal offensive, the IDF Military Prosecutor's unit has steadily increased its involvement across all levels of the army, in an attempt to give commanders the tools to be able to win wars while staying within the bounds of international humanitarian law. Legal officers have been attached to commanders from the Brigade level up and are present when the target banks are drawn up, where questions are asked about whether the target is purely military or has a dual purpose.
Legal officers work closely with commanders to give "dynamic interpretations" of international humanitarian law during combat. That means they need to get as close as possible to commanders, but to also take care not to get in their way too much. It's a delicate but crucial balance. The final decisions are still in the hands of the commanders, sources said.
"The best way to deal with the legal onslaught is to check every complaint and investigate every accusation. There is no need to be afraid of the truth. If someone did commit a crime, he will pay for it, and it's best he pays for it here in Israel rather than abroad, where he could be at the mercy of legal systems hijacked by political activists," the official said.
This week, Spain's highest court rejected a petition by a local judge to investigate senior Israeli officials involved in the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh, the commander of Hamas's military wing, in 2002. The court found that the Israeli probe into the attack, which killed Shehadeh, his deputy and 13 civilians, was sufficiently serious - planners had been given intelligence that only Shehadeh and his wife were at home - and that there was no need for the Spanish legal system to get involved.
The ruling is seen in Israel as first and foremost a victory for Spain, which has been increasingly embarrassed by the activism of some of its judges. It is also, however, being seen here as a warning that pro-Palestinian groups across the EU are finding attentive ears among the judiciaries of certain European countries. Furthermore, because of the makeup of the EU, there is now the possibility of issuing a continent-wide arrest warrant. So it is quite possible that someone on a private trip in Czechoslovakia may be picked up for an arrest warrant issued in Spain. There is the potential of widespread abuse of universal jurisdiction by anti-Israeli activists, the defense official warned.
The IDF has faced a barrage of war crimes allegations and potential charges this week. Former Hague court judge Richard Goldstone started off the week by collecting evidence in Gaza against Israel for the UN Human Rights Council. Next, a Gisha report slammed Israel's policy of not allowing Palestinians to exit the Gaza Strip. Then the Red Cross criticized Israel for the continued blockade of Gaza.
The next day, a Free Gaza ship tried to run the blockade and was apprehended by Israel Navy commandos. The activists onboard the Spirit of Humanity said that Israel was violating international humanitarian law by not allowing them to deliver medicine and toys to Gazans. That same day, Human Rights Watch slammed Israel for the indiscriminate killing of civilians in Gaza through the use of airborne drones.
And finally, on Thursday, Amnesty International released a mammoth 117-page report accusing Israel of war crimes during Operation Cast Lead.
The problem with these and other reports, according to defense officials, is that they group all of the IDF's actions in Gaza into one bundle, which paints a grim picture of alleged disproportionate use of force, instead of investigating alleged incidents one by one.
"There was absolutely no policy to break international law during the fighting in Gaza. There was a policy to operate within the boundaries of the law," the official said.
There are dozens of internal IDF probes into Cast Lead that are still to be completed, but the sense in the defense establishment is that even if there were individuals who acted in unlawful ways, there are no recorded or proven instances of war crimes.
"This approach puts all of the IDF's actions together in one picture and argues that there are 1,400 people killed on the other side, with just under one third being civilians, a few hundred people [figures that Israel vehemently disputes, insisting that most of the dead were combatants] while Israel lost in total 13 people, most of them soldiers in friendly-fire incidents, so this is not proportional. In addition, look at all the devastation you left there. This approach has many proponents.
"This approach also says that because Israelis are in trauma over seeing soldiers return in body bags, the IDF exaggerates its use of force in order to protect its soldiers. This is what we're fighting against. We think it is more fair to check individual instances to see whether or not we behaved according to the rules," the official said.
"It is untenable, in this day and age, to be ostracized, to be like al-Qaida, to have no alliances and no friends. In the past it was harder to explain this to officers in the field. Since the Second Lebanon War, and especially since Operation Cast Lead, the penny has dropped.
"In legal terms, nothing has changed. The IDF has always operated according to international law. What has changed is that now even a company commander is aware of the legal implications of his actions. Officers are sent to the school for military law where they are taught the dos and don'ts of war.
"Just as officers are taught to navigate, to attack, to use weapons, they are also taught to fight within the bounds of international law. This is part of modern warfare, a language that the whole world speaks in, except for certain groups in the Arab world," the senior official said.
"For Hamas and Hizbullah, who fight within their civilian populations, it's a win-win situation: Either you don't attack them and they win, or you do attack them, their civilians are killed, they reap the dividends in the realm of public opinion, your legitimacy is eroded, and that makes it harder for you to continue fighting. After Kafr Kana II [when Israel killed civilians in an errant strike in south Lebanon in 2006], US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice effectively grounded the IAF for 48 hours," the official said.
For more of Amir's articles and posts, visit his personal blog Forecast Highs
Israel worries over intense 'legal war'
Amir Mizroch , THE JERUSALEM POST
The defense establishment is concerned at intensifying legal campaigns in foreign courts that aim to deter Israel from using force against Hamas and Hizbullah.
Reeling from four damning reports in one week from human rights organizations about the IDF's conduct in Operation Cast Lead, the sense among senior defense officials is that the "legal front" against Israel is growing at an alarming rate.
There is also a palpable urgency within the legal and defense establishments to thoroughly and professionally investigate allegations of war crimes against the IDF, not only because this has been standard practice, but also in an effort to ward off foreign lawsuits, investigations and arrest warrants against officers.
Officials are calling for an increased appreciation throughout the government of the complexities of fighting and winning asymmetric wars within the boundaries of international humanitarian law. There is also a certain level of frustration within the defense establishment at the disconnect between what is believed here to have been a carefully thought-out operation, where huge efforts were invested in minimizing harm to Palestinian civilians, and the growing tide of international accusations of war crimes emanating from the offensive against Hamas six months ago.
"There is a war being waged against us in the legal sphere. Its aim is to delegitimize Israel and to create deterrence against a possible use of force in Gaza and Lebanon again," a senior defense official told The Jerusalem Post.
The Post has also learned that, increasingly, legal officers, as well as soldiers from the IDF Spokesman's Office, are taking part in operational planning for possible future conflicts, at the highest levels.
"The last Gaza war is not over yet. It is being fought on another front for now. It is not just in Spain, England and Belgium. Lawyers and jurists in many countries, some of them Arab, some Jewish, are using legal means to attack Israel.
"There are hundreds of petitions, cases, legal opinions and actions cropping up across the world. The phenomenon is very wide and growing. The other side has a lot of money that comes from countries and people not friendly to Israel. This is another front in the war, and if we don't realize it we'll have a problem," the senior defense source said.
To counter this legal offensive, the IDF Military Prosecutor's unit has steadily increased its involvement across all levels of the army, in an attempt to give commanders the tools to be able to win wars while staying within the bounds of international humanitarian law. Legal officers have been attached to commanders from the Brigade level up and are present when the target banks are drawn up, where questions are asked about whether the target is purely military or has a dual purpose.
Legal officers work closely with commanders to give "dynamic interpretations" of international humanitarian law during combat. That means they need to get as close as possible to commanders, but to also take care not to get in their way too much. It's a delicate but crucial balance. The final decisions are still in the hands of the commanders, sources said.
"The best way to deal with the legal onslaught is to check every complaint and investigate every accusation. There is no need to be afraid of the truth. If someone did commit a crime, he will pay for it, and it's best he pays for it here in Israel rather than abroad, where he could be at the mercy of legal systems hijacked by political activists," the official said.
This week, Spain's highest court rejected a petition by a local judge to investigate senior Israeli officials involved in the targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh, the commander of Hamas's military wing, in 2002. The court found that the Israeli probe into the attack, which killed Shehadeh, his deputy and 13 civilians, was sufficiently serious - planners had been given intelligence that only Shehadeh and his wife were at home - and that there was no need for the Spanish legal system to get involved.
The ruling is seen in Israel as first and foremost a victory for Spain, which has been increasingly embarrassed by the activism of some of its judges. It is also, however, being seen here as a warning that pro-Palestinian groups across the EU are finding attentive ears among the judiciaries of certain European countries. Furthermore, because of the makeup of the EU, there is now the possibility of issuing a continent-wide arrest warrant. So it is quite possible that someone on a private trip in Czechoslovakia may be picked up for an arrest warrant issued in Spain. There is the potential of widespread abuse of universal jurisdiction by anti-Israeli activists, the defense official warned.
The IDF has faced a barrage of war crimes allegations and potential charges this week. Former Hague court judge Richard Goldstone started off the week by collecting evidence in Gaza against Israel for the UN Human Rights Council. Next, a Gisha report slammed Israel's policy of not allowing Palestinians to exit the Gaza Strip. Then the Red Cross criticized Israel for the continued blockade of Gaza.
The next day, a Free Gaza ship tried to run the blockade and was apprehended by Israel Navy commandos. The activists onboard the Spirit of Humanity said that Israel was violating international humanitarian law by not allowing them to deliver medicine and toys to Gazans. That same day, Human Rights Watch slammed Israel for the indiscriminate killing of civilians in Gaza through the use of airborne drones.
And finally, on Thursday, Amnesty International released a mammoth 117-page report accusing Israel of war crimes during Operation Cast Lead.
The problem with these and other reports, according to defense officials, is that they group all of the IDF's actions in Gaza into one bundle, which paints a grim picture of alleged disproportionate use of force, instead of investigating alleged incidents one by one.
"There was absolutely no policy to break international law during the fighting in Gaza. There was a policy to operate within the boundaries of the law," the official said.
There are dozens of internal IDF probes into Cast Lead that are still to be completed, but the sense in the defense establishment is that even if there were individuals who acted in unlawful ways, there are no recorded or proven instances of war crimes.
"This approach puts all of the IDF's actions together in one picture and argues that there are 1,400 people killed on the other side, with just under one third being civilians, a few hundred people [figures that Israel vehemently disputes, insisting that most of the dead were combatants] while Israel lost in total 13 people, most of them soldiers in friendly-fire incidents, so this is not proportional. In addition, look at all the devastation you left there. This approach has many proponents.
"This approach also says that because Israelis are in trauma over seeing soldiers return in body bags, the IDF exaggerates its use of force in order to protect its soldiers. This is what we're fighting against. We think it is more fair to check individual instances to see whether or not we behaved according to the rules," the official said.
"It is untenable, in this day and age, to be ostracized, to be like al-Qaida, to have no alliances and no friends. In the past it was harder to explain this to officers in the field. Since the Second Lebanon War, and especially since Operation Cast Lead, the penny has dropped.
"In legal terms, nothing has changed. The IDF has always operated according to international law. What has changed is that now even a company commander is aware of the legal implications of his actions. Officers are sent to the school for military law where they are taught the dos and don'ts of war.
"Just as officers are taught to navigate, to attack, to use weapons, they are also taught to fight within the bounds of international law. This is part of modern warfare, a language that the whole world speaks in, except for certain groups in the Arab world," the senior official said.
"For Hamas and Hizbullah, who fight within their civilian populations, it's a win-win situation: Either you don't attack them and they win, or you do attack them, their civilians are killed, they reap the dividends in the realm of public opinion, your legitimacy is eroded, and that makes it harder for you to continue fighting. After Kafr Kana II [when Israel killed civilians in an errant strike in south Lebanon in 2006], US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice effectively grounded the IAF for 48 hours," the official said.
For more of Amir's articles and posts, visit his personal blog Forecast Highs
Amnesty accuses Israel of using human shields in Gaza By Patrick Moser
Non-American media have reported the Amnesty International report on Gaza somewhat differently than our own, which have tended to equate Israel and Hamas -- which one would think was an unwelcome equation by Israeli standards, however favorable to Israel it may relatively be ....
Amnesty accuses Israel of using human shields in Gaza
By Patrick Moser
JERUSALEM (AFP) — Amnesty accused Israeli forces on Thursday of war crimes in Gaza, saying they used children as human shields and conducted wanton attacks on civilians, in a report rejected as "unbalanced" by Israel.
The London-based human rights group also accused Hamas of war crimes, but said it found no evidence to support Israeli claims that Gaza's Islamist rulers used civilians as human shields during Israel's massive 22-day offensive.
It reiterated its call for international arms embargoes against Israel and Hamas, and called for "criminal investigations in national courts" under universal jurisdiction wherever there is sufficient evidence of war crimes.
"Much of the destruction was wanton and resulted from direct attacks on civilian objects," Amnesty said in a report on the December-January war on the Gaza Strip.
In numerous cases, Israeli troops forced Palestinians to stay in one room of their home while turning the rest of the house into a base and sniper position, "effectively using the families, both adults and children, as human shields and putting them at risk," the group said.
"Intentionally using civilians to shield a military objective, often referred to as using 'human shields' is a war crime," Amnesty said.
One Palestinian was quoted as saying Israeli troops forced him to go into a house to check whether gunmen holed up inside were still alive. They were, and threatened to kill him if he returned. The soldiers later forced him to check on the fighters two more times.
The report said it found no evidence Palestinian fighters directed civilians to shield military objectives from attacks, forced them to stay in buildings used by militants or prevented them from leaving commandeered buildings.
But it said Palestinian armed groups fired hundreds of rockets into southern Israel which "constitute war crimes."
Amnesty also accused Hamas of endangering Palestinian civilians by firing rockets from residential areas and storing weapons and ammunition there.
More than 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis died during the offensive Israel launched in response to rocket fire by militants in the impoverished and overcrowded territory.
Amnesty said 300 children were among those killed.
It said hundreds of civilians were killed with high-precision weapons. "Others, including women and children, were shot at short range when posing no threat to the lives of the Israeli soldiers," it said.
"Wilful killings of unarmed civilians are war crimes," Amnesty said.
It said Israel's use of white phosphorus shells was also a clear breach of international law.
White phosphorus is not illegal if used as a smokescreen in open areas "but it should not be used in a densely populated area as it was used here," said Donatella Rovera, who led an Amnesty mission to Gaza and southern Israel.
The Israeli military called the report "unbalanced" and "distorted."
"The slant of their report indicates that the organisation succumbed to the manipulations of the Hamas terror organisation," a statement said.
The military insisted its forces used "fighting methods and advanced technology to minimise harm to the civilian population while engaging terrorists who were operating from densely populated areas and using the local population as 'human shields'."
It also accused Amnesty of ignoring "the blatant violations of international law perpetrated by Hamas."
Hamas also sharply criticised the report.
"It falsely accuses Hamas while playing down the seriousness of the crimes committed by the Israeli occupation," Sami Abu Zuhri, a spokesman for the Islamist movement.
"It puts the executioner and the victim on the same footing," he said.
Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved
Amnesty accuses Israel of using human shields in Gaza
By Patrick Moser
JERUSALEM (AFP) — Amnesty accused Israeli forces on Thursday of war crimes in Gaza, saying they used children as human shields and conducted wanton attacks on civilians, in a report rejected as "unbalanced" by Israel.
The London-based human rights group also accused Hamas of war crimes, but said it found no evidence to support Israeli claims that Gaza's Islamist rulers used civilians as human shields during Israel's massive 22-day offensive.
It reiterated its call for international arms embargoes against Israel and Hamas, and called for "criminal investigations in national courts" under universal jurisdiction wherever there is sufficient evidence of war crimes.
"Much of the destruction was wanton and resulted from direct attacks on civilian objects," Amnesty said in a report on the December-January war on the Gaza Strip.
In numerous cases, Israeli troops forced Palestinians to stay in one room of their home while turning the rest of the house into a base and sniper position, "effectively using the families, both adults and children, as human shields and putting them at risk," the group said.
"Intentionally using civilians to shield a military objective, often referred to as using 'human shields' is a war crime," Amnesty said.
One Palestinian was quoted as saying Israeli troops forced him to go into a house to check whether gunmen holed up inside were still alive. They were, and threatened to kill him if he returned. The soldiers later forced him to check on the fighters two more times.
The report said it found no evidence Palestinian fighters directed civilians to shield military objectives from attacks, forced them to stay in buildings used by militants or prevented them from leaving commandeered buildings.
But it said Palestinian armed groups fired hundreds of rockets into southern Israel which "constitute war crimes."
Amnesty also accused Hamas of endangering Palestinian civilians by firing rockets from residential areas and storing weapons and ammunition there.
More than 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis died during the offensive Israel launched in response to rocket fire by militants in the impoverished and overcrowded territory.
Amnesty said 300 children were among those killed.
It said hundreds of civilians were killed with high-precision weapons. "Others, including women and children, were shot at short range when posing no threat to the lives of the Israeli soldiers," it said.
"Wilful killings of unarmed civilians are war crimes," Amnesty said.
It said Israel's use of white phosphorus shells was also a clear breach of international law.
White phosphorus is not illegal if used as a smokescreen in open areas "but it should not be used in a densely populated area as it was used here," said Donatella Rovera, who led an Amnesty mission to Gaza and southern Israel.
The Israeli military called the report "unbalanced" and "distorted."
"The slant of their report indicates that the organisation succumbed to the manipulations of the Hamas terror organisation," a statement said.
The military insisted its forces used "fighting methods and advanced technology to minimise harm to the civilian population while engaging terrorists who were operating from densely populated areas and using the local population as 'human shields'."
It also accused Amnesty of ignoring "the blatant violations of international law perpetrated by Hamas."
Hamas also sharply criticised the report.
"It falsely accuses Hamas while playing down the seriousness of the crimes committed by the Israeli occupation," Sami Abu Zuhri, a spokesman for the Islamist movement.
"It puts the executioner and the victim on the same footing," he said.
Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved
U.S. Targets Firms Tied To N. Korea Arms Trade Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post
U.S. Targets Firms Tied To N. Korea Arms Trade
Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post
The Obama administration yesterday began a campaign to curtail North Korea's ability to finance its trade in missiles and nuclear materials, with the Treasury and State Departments announcing actions against two North Korean companies, including one allegedly connected to the building of a nuclear reactor in Syria.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063004169.html
Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post
The Obama administration yesterday began a campaign to curtail North Korea's ability to finance its trade in missiles and nuclear materials, with the Treasury and State Departments announcing actions against two North Korean companies, including one allegedly connected to the building of a nuclear reactor in Syria.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063004169.html
Japan’s Amano new U.N. nuclear watchdog chief Reuters
Japan’s Amano new U.N. nuclear watchdog chief
Reuters
Japanese diplomat Yukiya Amano was elected director-general the United Nations nuclear watchdog on Thursday.
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-40764620090702
Reuters
Japanese diplomat Yukiya Amano was elected director-general the United Nations nuclear watchdog on Thursday.
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-40764620090702
U.S. Hardens Its Stance Ahead of Summit With Russia
U.S. Hardens Its Stance Ahead of Summit With Russia
Jonathan Weisman, Gregory White, Alan Culliso, The Wall Street Journal
The Obama White House on Wednesday adopted a hard line against negotiating away missile-defense sites in Eastern Europe and limiting NATO expansion in the former Soviet Union, just days ahead of a summit meeting in Moscow.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124648454414282621.html
Jonathan Weisman, Gregory White, Alan Culliso, The Wall Street Journal
The Obama White House on Wednesday adopted a hard line against negotiating away missile-defense sites in Eastern Europe and limiting NATO expansion in the former Soviet Union, just days ahead of a summit meeting in Moscow.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124648454414282621.html
FRANCE: Ambiguous on Nuclear Disarmament By Alecia D. McKenzie
FRANCE: Ambiguous on Nuclear Disarmament
By Alecia D. McKenzie
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47426
By Alecia D. McKenzie
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47426
Time for an Israeli Strike? John R. Bolton, The Washington Post
Time for an Israeli Strike?
John R. Bolton, The Washington Post
With Iran's hard-line mullahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps unmistakably back in control, Israel's decision of whether to use military force against Tehran's nuclear weapons program is more urgent than ever.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103020.html
John R. Bolton, The Washington Post
With Iran's hard-line mullahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps unmistakably back in control, Israel's decision of whether to use military force against Tehran's nuclear weapons program is more urgent than ever.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR2009070103020.html
North Korea Test-Fires 4 Short-Range Missiles Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/asia/03korea.html?_r=1&hpw
North Korea Test-Fires 4 Short-Range Missiles
Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times
North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles into the sea that lies between it and Japan on Thursday, amid simmering tensions over the latest international sanctions against the Communist state, according to news reports and a spokesman for the South Korean government.
North Korea fired two missiles from a base near Wonsan, a major city on the North’s east coast, at 5:20 p.m. and at 6 p.m. local time, said a spokesman at the South Korean Defense Ministry who spoke on condition of anonymity because a formal announcement had not been made yet.
North Korea Test-Fires 4 Short-Range Missiles
Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times
North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles into the sea that lies between it and Japan on Thursday, amid simmering tensions over the latest international sanctions against the Communist state, according to news reports and a spokesman for the South Korean government.
North Korea fired two missiles from a base near Wonsan, a major city on the North’s east coast, at 5:20 p.m. and at 6 p.m. local time, said a spokesman at the South Korean Defense Ministry who spoke on condition of anonymity because a formal announcement had not been made yet.
bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable:The US redeployment from Iraqi cities, July 2, 2009
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 25 Volume 7 - July 02, 2009
The US redeployment from Iraqi cities
• Taking the wheel, slowly - Greg Bruno
The true test for Iraq and America's future there will come with parliamentary elections in January 2010.
• Challenges and opportunities - Safa A. Hussein
Now it will be a hard sell for the militants to convince people that they are fighting for liberty.
• The view from Kurdistan - Hiwa Osman
Unlike in the rest of the country, in the Kurdish cities no public holiday was declared.
• Redeployment is only part of a vast mosaic - Waleed Sadi
The US had no choice but to disengage from Iraq militarily in order to engage the entire region politically.
Taking the wheel, slowly
Greg Bruno
With over six years of war now in the rearview mirror, American troops have officially been relegated to the back seat. The June 30 implementation of a security agreement inked late last year means US military bases inside most Iraqi cities are now abandoned. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki marked the occasion by declaring a national holiday this week (kicked off with fireworks), and American military officials have so far made no effort to dampen Baghdad's mood. "I think this is the right time for us to turn responsibility over to the Iraqis," Gen. Raymond Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq, told FOX News in late June.
Yet for all the pomp and sovereign pageantry, analysts say the American exit from most major cities raises just as many questions as answers for the frustratingly-long American mission. "This is only an interim step," says Kenneth Katzman, a specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs for the non-partisan Congressional Research Service in Washington. Americans "are relocating bases," Katzman says, "but the actual impact is yet to be determined."
A number of strategic uncertainties cloud the withdrawal (which, in truth, has been underway for months). In many urban areas and towns, American bases have been closed. But in Baghdad, analysts suggest it is the definition of "city" that will change, not necessarily the locale or staffing of American strongholds. Nor will the total number of US troops in Iraq decline; roughly 130,000 troops are scheduled to remain until at least September, encircling cities if not saturating them. And while American troops will officially assume a training and support role, US patrols could continue in some cities including Basra, while hulking armored vehicles will continue to troll Iraqi streets. "There are lots of ambiguities" with this handover, says Sam Parker, an Iraq expert at the United States Institute of Peace. "A lot of this is about semantics."
The true test for Iraq and America's future there, experts say, will come with parliamentary elections in January 2010, and the date US President Barack Obama has set for the end of combat operations, August 2010. While Maliki has sold the American retreat from cities as a victory for his countrymen, Iraq remains heavily dependent on the American military for training, surveillance and mission support.
Perceptions matter, of course, and trend lines indicate that now is as good a time as any to scale back, however slightly. Overall attacks are down, bazaars are open and disputes--once settled with bullets--are increasingly handled by ballots. But observers both western and Iraqi say a return to sustained bloodshed remains a distinct possibility. In the north, lingering tensions between Kurds and Sunni Arabs over Kirkuk, and political struggles in Mosul, have kept violence at the fore. Kenneth M. Pollack, an Iraq expert at the Brookings Institution, told the Council on Foreign Relations in late June that ongoing political disagreements, especially between rival Shi'ite parties, could pose challenges in Baghdad. Stephen Biddle, a defense policy expert at the CFR, warns that decentralized, negotiated ceasefires inked in 2006 to keep the peace between Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias could crumble in the absence of American oversight. And as a series of bombings across Iraq last week illustrates, tensions simmer just below the surface. "The violence is increasing as the Americans withdraw," one worried Baghdadi told London's Sunday Times. "Whatever the reasons behind it, we will be its victims."
Both Washington and Baghdad have reason to avert such a scenario. Maliki, for one, has staked his political future on a strong nationalist front. Maliki's Dawa party cruised to victory in parliamentary elections in January, trouncing many rivals, but keeping a grip on power will likely require backing up his pledges of continued security. For Washington the aim is even more tactical. Janet St. Laurent, a defense analyst with the Government Accountability Office, a congressional watchdog agency, told lawmakers in February 2009 that the Pentagon's planned ramp-up of military efforts in Afghanistan is at least partly dependent on a drawdown in Iraq.
While US forces will technically only be a phone call away, says Katzman, some Iraqi leaders are skeptical they can handle the responsibility. In a statement posted on his website, Tariq al-Hashimi, Iraq's Sunni vice-president, suggested Iraqis should now "avoid, whenever possible, crowded areas unless there is something important". For now, Washington appears intent on letting go of the wheel. But as Pollack suggests, the true test may come if and when Iraq needs a little push down the road. "One of the big problems we have had has been this fervent desire on the part of the American people and their political leaders to try to just ignore Iraq as much as we can," Pollack says. "The simple fact is that we may not like the war in Iraq, but we can't afford to walk away from it."- Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Greg Bruno is a staff writer at CFR.org.
Challenges and opportunities
Safa A. Hussein
On June 30, Iraqi tanks and vehicles rolled out to participate in a national celebration of the withdrawal of American forces from Iraqi cities. Article 24 of the security agreement set this day as a deadline for US combat forces to withdraw from all Iraqi cities, villages and localities. The agreement also calls for all US forces to be withdrawn by December 31, 2011. Actually, the American military had been gradually pulling its combat forces out of Iraq's population centers for months and completed the withdrawal two days ahead of the deadline.
When Iraqis and Americans concluded their negotiations on a security agreement last December, many observers wondered what would be the effect of an early, fixed-date withdrawal of American forces on Iraq's stability. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to his credit, insisted that withdrawal would provide substantial momentum for the political process and would outweigh the security risks that might result from the withdrawal.
What, then, are the challenges and opportunities that withdrawal brings?
The first challenge is security: the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces to successfully assume responsibility in each province. In the ten days preceding withdrawal, a series of attacks targeting civilians killed more than 200 Iraqis. Maliki had warned of a potential increase in attacks around the withdrawal date aimed at discrediting the Iraqi government and ISF, but he was confident that the ISF would be capable of providing security for Iraqi cities after US combat troops withdrew. Senior American officers affirmed this and emphasized that their forces would work aggressively in the outer rural belts to prevent infiltration of terrorists into the cities.
The ISF are making real progress and building confidence in the Iraqi capacity to cope with security challenges, including al-Qaeda and other militants. Iraq's intelligence capabilities also continue to mature. A series of large offensive operations conducted by the ISF in spring/summer 2008 demonstrated their ability to rapidly deploy in large numbers. Local security forces in Samarra (100 km north of Baghdad) successfully protected more than 200,000 pilgrims who visited the holy site on June 26. Two years ago, Samarra was a dangerous area for visitors as well as for local residents.
Political reconciliation, required to remedy Iraq's political, ethnic and sectarian divisions, is the largest challenge facing the Iraqi government. Tensions between Arabs and Kurds over disputed territory, distribution of wealth and oil revenues and distribution of power in the north between the regional and federal governments is critical to Iraq's future. The Kurdistan Region constitution that was passed recently by the Kurdish parliament may add to these tensions. United States forces had been playing a roll in easing them by encouraging dialogue to try and bridge differences. This role should now be transferred to the US embassy with the resources necessary to accomplish it.
Implementation of the security agreement and the withdrawal of American troops also present new opportunities to the Iraqi government. Iraqi public opinion generally sees the US as an occupying power and wants it and other coalition forces to leave as soon as possible. Various militant groups have exploited the slogan of "resisting the occupiers" in their struggle for power.
Now, with the withdrawal of American forces, it will be a hard sell for the militants to convince people that they are fighting for liberty. Unless they lay down their weapons and reconcile, they will lose many of their supporters. Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose militants are a major security threat, released a statement urging Iraqi citizens to support the ISF and counseled his followers to participate in a new era of "political resistance" in Iraq and reject violent activities. Even a top figure in the insurgency, Izzat al-Douri (Saddam Hussein's former deputy), published a speech on the web early Tuesday calling on his group not to attack Iraqi security forces, though he urged Iraqis to keep fighting Americans "wherever they may be in Iraq".
The US redeployment also presents an opportunity to Iraq regarding its foreign relations. Some neighboring countries held negative attitudes toward Iraq because they felt the presence of American forces there posed a direct threat to them. They reacted by intervening to destabilize Iraq. The withdrawal of American forces will enhance the opportunity to build healthy relations with these countries.
In addition, many countries were hesitant to build normal economic and diplomatic relations with Iraq because of their doubts regarding the ability of Iraq's government to prevail. Prime Minister Maliki has rightly described the transition as "a new phase that will bolster Iraqi's sovereignty and send a message to the world that we are now able to safeguard our security and administer our internal affairs." - Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council.
The view from Kurdistan
Hiwa Osman
On June 30, the US military pullout from the cities dominated Iraqi news bulletins. But in the Kurdistan region, people were busy with regional parliamentary elections. Unlike in the rest of the country, there were no US troops in the Kurdish cities, the actual day did not mean much and no public holiday was declared.
There is however another category of Kurds, those who live under the control of the central government in the areas bordering the Kurdistan Region. Kirkuk is one of them. It has, in many ways, become a gauge of Iraqi politics, stability and prosperity. There, these were the headlines:
* a car bomb in Kirkuk's Kurdish quarters killed over 30 people;
* the Arab and Turkoman representatives of the city call for the pullout of Kurdish forces;
* President Obama asks Vice President Biden to oversee US departure from Iraq and to promote internal political reconciliation.
The events of pullout day reminded Kurds of their dilemma and uncertainty regarding the future. They are seen as one of the Iraqi groups closest to the United States. In the various official statements about the pullout, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, was the only one who thanked the US troops for their sacrifices and efforts.
Hence, the Kurds are a target for every anti-American group, and these are not few, in the region. The car bomb demonstrated this clearly. The statement of the Arab and Turkoman representatives also highlights the need for a real settlement of the disputed areas that are covered by article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. Article 140 lays out a roadmap for solving the status of the areas that were Arabized by Saddam Hussein, who expelled the original Kurdish population to the northern governorates and replaced them with Arabs from the south.
So long as the issue of Kirkuk and other Arabized areas remains unresolved, the situation will continue to be volatile and the Kurds who live in these areas will feel vulnerable and fear retaliatory attacks by extremist groups. Despite repeated assurances from some politicians, fear that the situation could degenerate into a violent conflict has always been present. Recent history shows that terrorist activities thrive on areas of conflict. Kirkuk is one of them.
So far, Baghdad has been unable to protect these areas. The Kurds have had to fill the security gap and for them, this was not unusual. A leading Kurdish figure said: "Why was it okay for us to go all the way to Baghdad and protect them from al-Qaeda, and we are not allowed to protect our fellow Kurds in Kirkuk?"
When the Arab and Turkoman representatives of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul requested that Kurdish forces leave the disputed areas, the Kurdish reaction was that this can only happen if Article 140 is implemented. The burden of implementing the article and settling the issue lies with Baghdad. No real practical step has been taken yet.
The UN submitted a report to the various parties that laid out a few scenarios for solving the issue. However, none of the parties seemed to accept it. An added complication to the issue is anticipated ratification of the Kurdish constitution on the day of the regional parliamentary poll, July 25.
Kurdish politicians and leaders say that now is the time for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to show statesmanship and step in. He can seize the moment, capitalize on the "victory" and broker a settlement. Given the current deadlock between Baghdad and Arbil, resolving one issue may pave the way for solving the rest.
It is particularly important that Maliki not appear to be taking sides, just as he passed the test of impartiality when dealing with the security situation in Basra and other areas.
Every Iraqi and American involved in the Iraqi political scene agrees that now is the time for politics to settle outstanding issues. This would be Maliki's first post-pullout political test. If he fails it, Biden will have to fix it for him.- Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Hiwa Osman is the Iraq country director of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Baghdad.
Redeployment is only part of a vast mosaic
Waleed Sadi
There is really nothing especially magical about the June 30 date for the US redeployment from urban areas in Iraq. Nor is there any significant military reason for the US armed forces to set a 2011 deadline for their complete withdrawal from Iraq. What is important is that these dates signify a wholesale shift in US policy in the entire region. Disengagement and withdrawal from Iraq, to all intents and purposes, mean a wholesale rejection of previous US regional policy. Just as well. These proved to be disastrous and counterproductive.
The agreement between Washington and Baghdad to withdraw from Iraqi cities was prompted in part by the fanciful notion that the situation in the country had stabilized sufficiently to warrant such a withdrawal. In actual terms, at least 10 high profile bomb attacks have taken place in Iraq in the past few weeks. As recently as last week, a truck bomb was detonated outside a mosque near Kirkuk killing at least 70 people. Not a single week passes by in Iraq without a major terrorist attack.
The US has been seeking a face-saving exit strategy from Iraq ever since finally discerning the futility of its six-year occupation of a large Arab country and the failure to achieve any comprehensive military victory against Iraqi insurgents. The US military disengagement from Iraq also acquired added impetus when Barack Obama was elected president. Obama has ushered in a new US approach to the entire region including, of course, to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which continues to defy all attempts to solve it on durable and just grounds.
President Obama's recent speech in Cairo to the Arab and wider Muslim world signaled a significant turn-about in the US approach to the region, above all the Arab-Israel conflict. The new US tone on the Middle East was amply reflected in the extremely conciliatory words Obama used to declare the opening of a new page in his country's relations with the Arab and wider Muslim world. In doing so, Obama has in effect established a link between what goes on in Iraq and in other parts of the region, including the occupied Palestinian territories. What Obama is aiming for is a comprehensive policy for all the conflicts in the region. He has rightly understood that they are interrelated and impact one another in more ways than one.
What was equally impressive and remarkable in this context is the Arab reaction to Obama's speech. Reading between the lines of the recent declaration adopted by the Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, one can easily discern Arab joy at this new US stance. First of all, the tone of the meeting was extremely positive and conciliatory toward the US and its new regional policies. Second, the Arab foreign ministers' final communique was adopted without a single voice of dissent. When it comes to reacting to US policy in the region, seldom has the Arab world managed to agree unanimously on interpreting a US initiative in a positive light.
Finally, the Arab foreign ministers also signaled, in no uncertain terms, that Arab countries would entertain taking confidence-building measures in support of Obama's new initiative the minute Israel halts its colonization program in occupied territory. These developments are remarkable and reflect the positive mood in the Arab world in reaction to President Obama's bold stance on Israel, even if Israel continues to defy his counsel to stop its settlement program.
But the US redeployment in Iraq plays an important role in these regional developments. Indeed, the scheduled US withdrawal from Iraq has laid the foundation for the adoption of a new and comprehensive policy by the US administration. As long as the US continued to occupy an Arab country there would have been no way to nurture better relations between Washington and the Arab and wider Muslim world. The US had no choice but to disengage from Iraq militarily in order to engage the entire region politically.
There is therefore strong justification for the sudden euphoria generated by Obama's Cairo speech. It is now possible to hope that all regional conflicts can begin to be disentangled, one by one. The end of the US occupation of Iraq could lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories.
Of course all these positive forecasts will ultimately depend on Israel consenting to play ball with the US. For now, President Obama appears determined to exercise pressure on Israel. He knows that without succeeding on the Arab-Israel fronts, his entire regional policy for the Middle East and beyond may not survive long.- Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 25 Volume 7 - July 02, 2009
The US redeployment from Iraqi cities
• Taking the wheel, slowly - Greg Bruno
The true test for Iraq and America's future there will come with parliamentary elections in January 2010.
• Challenges and opportunities - Safa A. Hussein
Now it will be a hard sell for the militants to convince people that they are fighting for liberty.
• The view from Kurdistan - Hiwa Osman
Unlike in the rest of the country, in the Kurdish cities no public holiday was declared.
• Redeployment is only part of a vast mosaic - Waleed Sadi
The US had no choice but to disengage from Iraq militarily in order to engage the entire region politically.
Taking the wheel, slowly
Greg Bruno
With over six years of war now in the rearview mirror, American troops have officially been relegated to the back seat. The June 30 implementation of a security agreement inked late last year means US military bases inside most Iraqi cities are now abandoned. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki marked the occasion by declaring a national holiday this week (kicked off with fireworks), and American military officials have so far made no effort to dampen Baghdad's mood. "I think this is the right time for us to turn responsibility over to the Iraqis," Gen. Raymond Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq, told FOX News in late June.
Yet for all the pomp and sovereign pageantry, analysts say the American exit from most major cities raises just as many questions as answers for the frustratingly-long American mission. "This is only an interim step," says Kenneth Katzman, a specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs for the non-partisan Congressional Research Service in Washington. Americans "are relocating bases," Katzman says, "but the actual impact is yet to be determined."
A number of strategic uncertainties cloud the withdrawal (which, in truth, has been underway for months). In many urban areas and towns, American bases have been closed. But in Baghdad, analysts suggest it is the definition of "city" that will change, not necessarily the locale or staffing of American strongholds. Nor will the total number of US troops in Iraq decline; roughly 130,000 troops are scheduled to remain until at least September, encircling cities if not saturating them. And while American troops will officially assume a training and support role, US patrols could continue in some cities including Basra, while hulking armored vehicles will continue to troll Iraqi streets. "There are lots of ambiguities" with this handover, says Sam Parker, an Iraq expert at the United States Institute of Peace. "A lot of this is about semantics."
The true test for Iraq and America's future there, experts say, will come with parliamentary elections in January 2010, and the date US President Barack Obama has set for the end of combat operations, August 2010. While Maliki has sold the American retreat from cities as a victory for his countrymen, Iraq remains heavily dependent on the American military for training, surveillance and mission support.
Perceptions matter, of course, and trend lines indicate that now is as good a time as any to scale back, however slightly. Overall attacks are down, bazaars are open and disputes--once settled with bullets--are increasingly handled by ballots. But observers both western and Iraqi say a return to sustained bloodshed remains a distinct possibility. In the north, lingering tensions between Kurds and Sunni Arabs over Kirkuk, and political struggles in Mosul, have kept violence at the fore. Kenneth M. Pollack, an Iraq expert at the Brookings Institution, told the Council on Foreign Relations in late June that ongoing political disagreements, especially between rival Shi'ite parties, could pose challenges in Baghdad. Stephen Biddle, a defense policy expert at the CFR, warns that decentralized, negotiated ceasefires inked in 2006 to keep the peace between Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias could crumble in the absence of American oversight. And as a series of bombings across Iraq last week illustrates, tensions simmer just below the surface. "The violence is increasing as the Americans withdraw," one worried Baghdadi told London's Sunday Times. "Whatever the reasons behind it, we will be its victims."
Both Washington and Baghdad have reason to avert such a scenario. Maliki, for one, has staked his political future on a strong nationalist front. Maliki's Dawa party cruised to victory in parliamentary elections in January, trouncing many rivals, but keeping a grip on power will likely require backing up his pledges of continued security. For Washington the aim is even more tactical. Janet St. Laurent, a defense analyst with the Government Accountability Office, a congressional watchdog agency, told lawmakers in February 2009 that the Pentagon's planned ramp-up of military efforts in Afghanistan is at least partly dependent on a drawdown in Iraq.
While US forces will technically only be a phone call away, says Katzman, some Iraqi leaders are skeptical they can handle the responsibility. In a statement posted on his website, Tariq al-Hashimi, Iraq's Sunni vice-president, suggested Iraqis should now "avoid, whenever possible, crowded areas unless there is something important". For now, Washington appears intent on letting go of the wheel. But as Pollack suggests, the true test may come if and when Iraq needs a little push down the road. "One of the big problems we have had has been this fervent desire on the part of the American people and their political leaders to try to just ignore Iraq as much as we can," Pollack says. "The simple fact is that we may not like the war in Iraq, but we can't afford to walk away from it."- Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Greg Bruno is a staff writer at CFR.org.
Challenges and opportunities
Safa A. Hussein
On June 30, Iraqi tanks and vehicles rolled out to participate in a national celebration of the withdrawal of American forces from Iraqi cities. Article 24 of the security agreement set this day as a deadline for US combat forces to withdraw from all Iraqi cities, villages and localities. The agreement also calls for all US forces to be withdrawn by December 31, 2011. Actually, the American military had been gradually pulling its combat forces out of Iraq's population centers for months and completed the withdrawal two days ahead of the deadline.
When Iraqis and Americans concluded their negotiations on a security agreement last December, many observers wondered what would be the effect of an early, fixed-date withdrawal of American forces on Iraq's stability. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to his credit, insisted that withdrawal would provide substantial momentum for the political process and would outweigh the security risks that might result from the withdrawal.
What, then, are the challenges and opportunities that withdrawal brings?
The first challenge is security: the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces to successfully assume responsibility in each province. In the ten days preceding withdrawal, a series of attacks targeting civilians killed more than 200 Iraqis. Maliki had warned of a potential increase in attacks around the withdrawal date aimed at discrediting the Iraqi government and ISF, but he was confident that the ISF would be capable of providing security for Iraqi cities after US combat troops withdrew. Senior American officers affirmed this and emphasized that their forces would work aggressively in the outer rural belts to prevent infiltration of terrorists into the cities.
The ISF are making real progress and building confidence in the Iraqi capacity to cope with security challenges, including al-Qaeda and other militants. Iraq's intelligence capabilities also continue to mature. A series of large offensive operations conducted by the ISF in spring/summer 2008 demonstrated their ability to rapidly deploy in large numbers. Local security forces in Samarra (100 km north of Baghdad) successfully protected more than 200,000 pilgrims who visited the holy site on June 26. Two years ago, Samarra was a dangerous area for visitors as well as for local residents.
Political reconciliation, required to remedy Iraq's political, ethnic and sectarian divisions, is the largest challenge facing the Iraqi government. Tensions between Arabs and Kurds over disputed territory, distribution of wealth and oil revenues and distribution of power in the north between the regional and federal governments is critical to Iraq's future. The Kurdistan Region constitution that was passed recently by the Kurdish parliament may add to these tensions. United States forces had been playing a roll in easing them by encouraging dialogue to try and bridge differences. This role should now be transferred to the US embassy with the resources necessary to accomplish it.
Implementation of the security agreement and the withdrawal of American troops also present new opportunities to the Iraqi government. Iraqi public opinion generally sees the US as an occupying power and wants it and other coalition forces to leave as soon as possible. Various militant groups have exploited the slogan of "resisting the occupiers" in their struggle for power.
Now, with the withdrawal of American forces, it will be a hard sell for the militants to convince people that they are fighting for liberty. Unless they lay down their weapons and reconcile, they will lose many of their supporters. Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose militants are a major security threat, released a statement urging Iraqi citizens to support the ISF and counseled his followers to participate in a new era of "political resistance" in Iraq and reject violent activities. Even a top figure in the insurgency, Izzat al-Douri (Saddam Hussein's former deputy), published a speech on the web early Tuesday calling on his group not to attack Iraqi security forces, though he urged Iraqis to keep fighting Americans "wherever they may be in Iraq".
The US redeployment also presents an opportunity to Iraq regarding its foreign relations. Some neighboring countries held negative attitudes toward Iraq because they felt the presence of American forces there posed a direct threat to them. They reacted by intervening to destabilize Iraq. The withdrawal of American forces will enhance the opportunity to build healthy relations with these countries.
In addition, many countries were hesitant to build normal economic and diplomatic relations with Iraq because of their doubts regarding the ability of Iraq's government to prevail. Prime Minister Maliki has rightly described the transition as "a new phase that will bolster Iraqi's sovereignty and send a message to the world that we are now able to safeguard our security and administer our internal affairs." - Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. He served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council.
The view from Kurdistan
Hiwa Osman
On June 30, the US military pullout from the cities dominated Iraqi news bulletins. But in the Kurdistan region, people were busy with regional parliamentary elections. Unlike in the rest of the country, there were no US troops in the Kurdish cities, the actual day did not mean much and no public holiday was declared.
There is however another category of Kurds, those who live under the control of the central government in the areas bordering the Kurdistan Region. Kirkuk is one of them. It has, in many ways, become a gauge of Iraqi politics, stability and prosperity. There, these were the headlines:
* a car bomb in Kirkuk's Kurdish quarters killed over 30 people;
* the Arab and Turkoman representatives of the city call for the pullout of Kurdish forces;
* President Obama asks Vice President Biden to oversee US departure from Iraq and to promote internal political reconciliation.
The events of pullout day reminded Kurds of their dilemma and uncertainty regarding the future. They are seen as one of the Iraqi groups closest to the United States. In the various official statements about the pullout, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, was the only one who thanked the US troops for their sacrifices and efforts.
Hence, the Kurds are a target for every anti-American group, and these are not few, in the region. The car bomb demonstrated this clearly. The statement of the Arab and Turkoman representatives also highlights the need for a real settlement of the disputed areas that are covered by article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. Article 140 lays out a roadmap for solving the status of the areas that were Arabized by Saddam Hussein, who expelled the original Kurdish population to the northern governorates and replaced them with Arabs from the south.
So long as the issue of Kirkuk and other Arabized areas remains unresolved, the situation will continue to be volatile and the Kurds who live in these areas will feel vulnerable and fear retaliatory attacks by extremist groups. Despite repeated assurances from some politicians, fear that the situation could degenerate into a violent conflict has always been present. Recent history shows that terrorist activities thrive on areas of conflict. Kirkuk is one of them.
So far, Baghdad has been unable to protect these areas. The Kurds have had to fill the security gap and for them, this was not unusual. A leading Kurdish figure said: "Why was it okay for us to go all the way to Baghdad and protect them from al-Qaeda, and we are not allowed to protect our fellow Kurds in Kirkuk?"
When the Arab and Turkoman representatives of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul requested that Kurdish forces leave the disputed areas, the Kurdish reaction was that this can only happen if Article 140 is implemented. The burden of implementing the article and settling the issue lies with Baghdad. No real practical step has been taken yet.
The UN submitted a report to the various parties that laid out a few scenarios for solving the issue. However, none of the parties seemed to accept it. An added complication to the issue is anticipated ratification of the Kurdish constitution on the day of the regional parliamentary poll, July 25.
Kurdish politicians and leaders say that now is the time for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to show statesmanship and step in. He can seize the moment, capitalize on the "victory" and broker a settlement. Given the current deadlock between Baghdad and Arbil, resolving one issue may pave the way for solving the rest.
It is particularly important that Maliki not appear to be taking sides, just as he passed the test of impartiality when dealing with the security situation in Basra and other areas.
Every Iraqi and American involved in the Iraqi political scene agrees that now is the time for politics to settle outstanding issues. This would be Maliki's first post-pullout political test. If he fails it, Biden will have to fix it for him.- Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Hiwa Osman is the Iraq country director of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Baghdad.
Redeployment is only part of a vast mosaic
Waleed Sadi
There is really nothing especially magical about the June 30 date for the US redeployment from urban areas in Iraq. Nor is there any significant military reason for the US armed forces to set a 2011 deadline for their complete withdrawal from Iraq. What is important is that these dates signify a wholesale shift in US policy in the entire region. Disengagement and withdrawal from Iraq, to all intents and purposes, mean a wholesale rejection of previous US regional policy. Just as well. These proved to be disastrous and counterproductive.
The agreement between Washington and Baghdad to withdraw from Iraqi cities was prompted in part by the fanciful notion that the situation in the country had stabilized sufficiently to warrant such a withdrawal. In actual terms, at least 10 high profile bomb attacks have taken place in Iraq in the past few weeks. As recently as last week, a truck bomb was detonated outside a mosque near Kirkuk killing at least 70 people. Not a single week passes by in Iraq without a major terrorist attack.
The US has been seeking a face-saving exit strategy from Iraq ever since finally discerning the futility of its six-year occupation of a large Arab country and the failure to achieve any comprehensive military victory against Iraqi insurgents. The US military disengagement from Iraq also acquired added impetus when Barack Obama was elected president. Obama has ushered in a new US approach to the entire region including, of course, to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which continues to defy all attempts to solve it on durable and just grounds.
President Obama's recent speech in Cairo to the Arab and wider Muslim world signaled a significant turn-about in the US approach to the region, above all the Arab-Israel conflict. The new US tone on the Middle East was amply reflected in the extremely conciliatory words Obama used to declare the opening of a new page in his country's relations with the Arab and wider Muslim world. In doing so, Obama has in effect established a link between what goes on in Iraq and in other parts of the region, including the occupied Palestinian territories. What Obama is aiming for is a comprehensive policy for all the conflicts in the region. He has rightly understood that they are interrelated and impact one another in more ways than one.
What was equally impressive and remarkable in this context is the Arab reaction to Obama's speech. Reading between the lines of the recent declaration adopted by the Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, one can easily discern Arab joy at this new US stance. First of all, the tone of the meeting was extremely positive and conciliatory toward the US and its new regional policies. Second, the Arab foreign ministers' final communique was adopted without a single voice of dissent. When it comes to reacting to US policy in the region, seldom has the Arab world managed to agree unanimously on interpreting a US initiative in a positive light.
Finally, the Arab foreign ministers also signaled, in no uncertain terms, that Arab countries would entertain taking confidence-building measures in support of Obama's new initiative the minute Israel halts its colonization program in occupied territory. These developments are remarkable and reflect the positive mood in the Arab world in reaction to President Obama's bold stance on Israel, even if Israel continues to defy his counsel to stop its settlement program.
But the US redeployment in Iraq plays an important role in these regional developments. Indeed, the scheduled US withdrawal from Iraq has laid the foundation for the adoption of a new and comprehensive policy by the US administration. As long as the US continued to occupy an Arab country there would have been no way to nurture better relations between Washington and the Arab and wider Muslim world. The US had no choice but to disengage from Iraq militarily in order to engage the entire region politically.
There is therefore strong justification for the sudden euphoria generated by Obama's Cairo speech. It is now possible to hope that all regional conflicts can begin to be disentangled, one by one. The end of the US occupation of Iraq could lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories.
Of course all these positive forecasts will ultimately depend on Israel consenting to play ball with the US. For now, President Obama appears determined to exercise pressure on Israel. He knows that without succeeding on the Arab-Israel fronts, his entire regional policy for the Middle East and beyond may not survive long.- Published 2/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.
Obama, A Study In American Ambiguity Norman Birnbaum
From El PaÃs (Madrid), 2 July 2009
Obama, A Study In American Ambiguity
Norman Birnbaum
“God, protect me from my friends. I will deal with my enemies.” President Obama has regretted that he does not speak fluent French---in the eyes of many citizens, an unpatriotic thought. Still, he appears to know Voltaire’s bon mot.. In addition to rebukes to American profligacy by our major creditor, China, and criticism of US economic management by everyone else, he inherited multiple crises— each potentially damaging to his Presidency. The new Israeli government is intransigent and self-destructive.. The North Koreans are recklessly provocative. The Iranian regime is unmoved by invitations to discussion. Russia refuses to accept relegation to a secondary international role. The US army in Iraq is at risk, the country near civil war. The mission in Afghanistan is unsustainable, whatever our military-political theologians say. Pakistan is in increasing danger of disintegration, as it responds to US pressure to repress its Islamists. In Central America, US forces were sent to train the Honduran army in obedience to civilian authority—with rather limited success. .
Nothing hampers the President more than the narcissistic obsessions of American imperial ideology—which intensify as American power diminishes.
At a press conference, he was asked what steps he would take if Iran refused to annul the Presidential election. The President’s response, that he did not follow the 24 hour news cycle but had to consider the long term, was largely ignored. He has drawn upon the support of those in the armed forces, and government, who reject a permanent war on Islam, who do not think Israel and US interests are inseparable, who conclude that the use of armed force frequently entails incalculable consequences. He listens to elders ( Baker, Brzezinski, Carter, Powell, Scowcroft) who have experienced the limits of US power. The President has divided the more liberal and reflective supporters of Israel from its unconditional adherents. He has said that the Republican unilateralists are loudly but convincingly ignorant. However, he has accepted the Bush doctrine of virtually unlimited Presidential power in matters of national security---implying a permanent state of emergency. That is a concession to the security services, and recognition of the capacity of his antagonists to convince the nation that he is insufficiently commited to its defense.
The President’s ambiguity is purposeful. Those who insist that he break at once with the pursuit of global hegemony have not convinced sizeable segments of the public, much less a majority, of its increasing costs and its unattainability. The public thinks the war in Iraq a failure and the one in Afghanistan dubious, but (an articulate minority apart) has little conception of the institutional and ideological forces which make these disasters inevitable.
There is no broad demand for a reduction of military expenditures, closing of bases abroad, a redefinition of our responsibilities.
The parallel with his reluctance, in economic policy, to greatly increase the power of the state over the market is striking. Rebalancing is sought by a vanguard---but the public, apprehensive about economic security, sceptical of the banks, does not think an alternate system is possible. It is especially susceptible to shopworn notions of the dangers of public expenditure and state deficits. Faced with immense international problems, the President decided that he had to turn to the more rational imperial managers (Gates and the senior military.) Confronting economic crisis, he did not think he could initiate a new New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt drew on three decades of economic and social experiment beginning with the projects of his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. A divided Democratic Party chose the President rather than Hillary Clinton because it doubted the ideas and programs of its recent past. The projects, social movements, and Congressional majorities which could free him of the necessity of relying on the bankers are conspicuous by their absence.
Will he have enough time and political space to develop serious alternatives? He has to improve the provision of education and health care, restore employment and income. The European Union could help---by developing autonomous projects which would substantiate the President’s foreign policy message, that the US is one nation amongst many. Most of all, however, those Americans who invested their hopes in his candidacy will have to experiment, themselves, in new forms of political participation. The President’s ambiguity, after all, is a consequence of their relapse into passivity.
Obama, A Study In American Ambiguity
Norman Birnbaum
“God, protect me from my friends. I will deal with my enemies.” President Obama has regretted that he does not speak fluent French---in the eyes of many citizens, an unpatriotic thought. Still, he appears to know Voltaire’s bon mot.. In addition to rebukes to American profligacy by our major creditor, China, and criticism of US economic management by everyone else, he inherited multiple crises— each potentially damaging to his Presidency. The new Israeli government is intransigent and self-destructive.. The North Koreans are recklessly provocative. The Iranian regime is unmoved by invitations to discussion. Russia refuses to accept relegation to a secondary international role. The US army in Iraq is at risk, the country near civil war. The mission in Afghanistan is unsustainable, whatever our military-political theologians say. Pakistan is in increasing danger of disintegration, as it responds to US pressure to repress its Islamists. In Central America, US forces were sent to train the Honduran army in obedience to civilian authority—with rather limited success. .
Nothing hampers the President more than the narcissistic obsessions of American imperial ideology—which intensify as American power diminishes.
At a press conference, he was asked what steps he would take if Iran refused to annul the Presidential election. The President’s response, that he did not follow the 24 hour news cycle but had to consider the long term, was largely ignored. He has drawn upon the support of those in the armed forces, and government, who reject a permanent war on Islam, who do not think Israel and US interests are inseparable, who conclude that the use of armed force frequently entails incalculable consequences. He listens to elders ( Baker, Brzezinski, Carter, Powell, Scowcroft) who have experienced the limits of US power. The President has divided the more liberal and reflective supporters of Israel from its unconditional adherents. He has said that the Republican unilateralists are loudly but convincingly ignorant. However, he has accepted the Bush doctrine of virtually unlimited Presidential power in matters of national security---implying a permanent state of emergency. That is a concession to the security services, and recognition of the capacity of his antagonists to convince the nation that he is insufficiently commited to its defense.
The President’s ambiguity is purposeful. Those who insist that he break at once with the pursuit of global hegemony have not convinced sizeable segments of the public, much less a majority, of its increasing costs and its unattainability. The public thinks the war in Iraq a failure and the one in Afghanistan dubious, but (an articulate minority apart) has little conception of the institutional and ideological forces which make these disasters inevitable.
There is no broad demand for a reduction of military expenditures, closing of bases abroad, a redefinition of our responsibilities.
The parallel with his reluctance, in economic policy, to greatly increase the power of the state over the market is striking. Rebalancing is sought by a vanguard---but the public, apprehensive about economic security, sceptical of the banks, does not think an alternate system is possible. It is especially susceptible to shopworn notions of the dangers of public expenditure and state deficits. Faced with immense international problems, the President decided that he had to turn to the more rational imperial managers (Gates and the senior military.) Confronting economic crisis, he did not think he could initiate a new New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt drew on three decades of economic and social experiment beginning with the projects of his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. A divided Democratic Party chose the President rather than Hillary Clinton because it doubted the ideas and programs of its recent past. The projects, social movements, and Congressional majorities which could free him of the necessity of relying on the bankers are conspicuous by their absence.
Will he have enough time and political space to develop serious alternatives? He has to improve the provision of education and health care, restore employment and income. The European Union could help---by developing autonomous projects which would substantiate the President’s foreign policy message, that the US is one nation amongst many. Most of all, however, those Americans who invested their hopes in his candidacy will have to experiment, themselves, in new forms of political participation. The President’s ambiguity, after all, is a consequence of their relapse into passivity.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
The Chinese Proposal for a New Global Super Currency Nouriel Roubini
The Chinese Proposal for a New Global Super Currency Nouriel Roubini | Jun 26, 2009 As I discussed a few weeks ago in a New York Times op-ed the Chinese are flexing their muscles on the question of the global reserve currency system dominated by the dollar.
With the revision of the SDR basket (so far including only dollar, euro, yen and pound) coming to the table next year it is clear that the Chinese will push for including the renminbi in the new SDR basket. And senior Brazilian policy sources suggest in private that, if the RMB is included in the SDR, so should the Brazilian Real as there is already a much deeper bond market for Real debt and as - unlike China - Brazil has a more liberalized capital account. And the Russians are now openly pushing for commodity currencies - the Canadian and Australian dollar but also the Ruble - to be included in the SDR basked. And the BRICs are on record pushing for the IMF to issue SDR denominated debt.
So the process that will lead - in the medium-long term - to a challenge of the US dollar as the major global reserve currency has started. The US creditors - the BRICs, the Gulf states and others - are becoming increasingly alarmed that the US will deal with its unsustainable fiscal path via inflation and debasement of the value of the dollar via depreciation. So they will not sit idly waiting for this to happen: they are already diversifying into gold, into resources (as China purchases mines and energy, mineral and commodity resources all over the world) and into shorter term maturity US Treasuries that have less market risk than longer term Treasuries. With two-thirds of US Treasuries, being held by non-residents and the average maturity of such government debt down to 4.5 years, the risk of a refinancing crisis and disorderly fall in the dollar will increase over time unless the US presents a credible plan for medium term fiscal consolidation.
Increasingly it is clear that unless such reduction in fiscal deficits occurs the incentive to continue monetizing them will increase. In the short run such massive monetization has not been inflationary as money velocity has collapsed and as the slack in goods and labor markets is still rapidly rising. But over time - late 2010 and 2011 - deflationary pressures will lead to an increase in expected inflation and then in actual inflation if monetization of persistently large fiscal deficits continues. Indeed some in the US argue that wiping out the real value of public debt and dealing with the private sector debt deflation through a bout of double digit inflation may be the most desirable way to reduce the overhang of public and private debt. While such arguments have many flaws as inflation will have serious collateral damage one cannot rule out that the US will use inflation and depreciation as a way out of its public and private debts. Greenspan's concerns about the long term inflationary effects of large US budget deficits - expressed today in a FT op-ed - go along the same lines. Thus, our creditors' nervousness about the eventual debasement of the US dollar has some increasing validity.
And here again is the full text of my recent NYT op-ed in case you missed it the first time:
From The New York Times:
THE ALMIGHTY RENMINBI?
By Nouriel Roubini
May 13, 2009
THE 19th century was dominated by the British Empire, the 20th century by the United States. We may now be entering the Asian century, dominated by a rising China and its currency. While the dollar status as the major reserve currency will not vanish overnight, we can no longer take it for granted. Sooner than we think, the dollar may be challenged by other currencies, most likely the Chinese renminbi. This would have serious costs for America, as our ability to finance our budget and trade deficits cheaply would disappear.
Traditionally, empires that hold the global reserve currency are also net foreign creditors and net lenders. The British Empire declined and the pound lost its status as the main global reserve currency when Britain became a net debtor and a net borrower in World War II. Today, the United States is in a similar position. It is running huge budget and trade deficits, and is relying on the kindness of restless foreign creditors who are starting to feel uneasy about accumulating even more dollar assets. The resulting downfall of the dollar may be only a matter of time.
But what could replace it? The British pound, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc remain minor reserve currencies, as those countries are not major powers. Gold is still a barbaric relic whose value rises only when inflation is high. The euro is hobbled by concerns about the long-term viability of the European Monetary Union. That leaves the renminbi.
China is a creditor country with large current account surpluses, a small budget deficit, much lower public debt as a share of G.D.P. than the United States, and solid growth. And it is already taking steps toward challenging the supremacy of the dollar. Beijing has called for a new international reserve currency in the form of the International Monetary Fund special drawing rights (a basket of dollars, euros, pounds and yen). China will soon want to see its own currency included in the basket, as well as the renminbi used as a means of payment in bilateral trade.
At the moment, though, the renminbi is far from ready to achieve reserve currency status. China would first have to ease restrictions on money entering and leaving the country, make its currency fully convertible for such transactions, continue its domestic financial reforms and make its bond markets more liquid. It would take a long time for the renminbi to become a reserve currency, but it could happen. China has already flexed its muscle by setting up currency swaps with several countries (including Argentina, Belarus and Indonesia) and by letting institutions in Hong Kong issue bonds denominated in renminbi, a first step toward creating a deep domestic and international market for its currency.
If China and other countries were to diversify their reserve holdings away from the dollar, and they eventually will, the United States would suffer. We have reaped significant financial benefits from having the dollar as the reserve currency. In particular, the strong market for the dollar allows Americans to borrow at better rates. We have thus been able to finance larger deficits for longer and at lower interest rates, as foreign demand has kept Treasury yields low. We have been able to issue debt in our own currency rather than a foreign one, thus shifting the losses of a fall in the value of the dollar to our creditors. Having commodities priced in dollars has also meant that a fall in the dollar value doesn't lead to a rise in the price of imports.
Now, imagine a world in which China could borrow and lend internationally in its own currency. The renminbi, rather than the dollar, could eventually become a means of payment in trade and a unit of account in pricing imports and exports, as well as a store of value for wealth by international investors. Americans would pay the price. We would have to shell out more for imported goods, and interest rates on both private and public debt would rise. The higher private cost of borrowing could lead to weaker consumption and investment, and slower growth.
This decline of the dollar might take more than a decade, but it could happen even sooner if we do not get our financial house in order. The United States must rein in spending and borrowing, and pursue growth that is not based on asset and credit bubbles. For the last two decades America has been spending more than its income, increasing its foreign liabilities and amassing debts that have become unsustainable. A system where the dollar was the major global currency allowed us to prolong reckless borrowing.
Now that the dollar position is no longer so secure, we need to shift our priorities. This will entail investing in our crumbling infrastructure, alternative and renewable resources and productive human capital, rather than in unnecessary housing and toxic financial innovation. This will be the only way to slow down the decline of the dollar, and sustain our influence in global affairs.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at the New York University Stern School of Business and the chairman of an economic consulting firm.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini
With the revision of the SDR basket (so far including only dollar, euro, yen and pound) coming to the table next year it is clear that the Chinese will push for including the renminbi in the new SDR basket. And senior Brazilian policy sources suggest in private that, if the RMB is included in the SDR, so should the Brazilian Real as there is already a much deeper bond market for Real debt and as - unlike China - Brazil has a more liberalized capital account. And the Russians are now openly pushing for commodity currencies - the Canadian and Australian dollar but also the Ruble - to be included in the SDR basked. And the BRICs are on record pushing for the IMF to issue SDR denominated debt.
So the process that will lead - in the medium-long term - to a challenge of the US dollar as the major global reserve currency has started. The US creditors - the BRICs, the Gulf states and others - are becoming increasingly alarmed that the US will deal with its unsustainable fiscal path via inflation and debasement of the value of the dollar via depreciation. So they will not sit idly waiting for this to happen: they are already diversifying into gold, into resources (as China purchases mines and energy, mineral and commodity resources all over the world) and into shorter term maturity US Treasuries that have less market risk than longer term Treasuries. With two-thirds of US Treasuries, being held by non-residents and the average maturity of such government debt down to 4.5 years, the risk of a refinancing crisis and disorderly fall in the dollar will increase over time unless the US presents a credible plan for medium term fiscal consolidation.
Increasingly it is clear that unless such reduction in fiscal deficits occurs the incentive to continue monetizing them will increase. In the short run such massive monetization has not been inflationary as money velocity has collapsed and as the slack in goods and labor markets is still rapidly rising. But over time - late 2010 and 2011 - deflationary pressures will lead to an increase in expected inflation and then in actual inflation if monetization of persistently large fiscal deficits continues. Indeed some in the US argue that wiping out the real value of public debt and dealing with the private sector debt deflation through a bout of double digit inflation may be the most desirable way to reduce the overhang of public and private debt. While such arguments have many flaws as inflation will have serious collateral damage one cannot rule out that the US will use inflation and depreciation as a way out of its public and private debts. Greenspan's concerns about the long term inflationary effects of large US budget deficits - expressed today in a FT op-ed - go along the same lines. Thus, our creditors' nervousness about the eventual debasement of the US dollar has some increasing validity.
And here again is the full text of my recent NYT op-ed in case you missed it the first time:
From The New York Times:
THE ALMIGHTY RENMINBI?
By Nouriel Roubini
May 13, 2009
THE 19th century was dominated by the British Empire, the 20th century by the United States. We may now be entering the Asian century, dominated by a rising China and its currency. While the dollar status as the major reserve currency will not vanish overnight, we can no longer take it for granted. Sooner than we think, the dollar may be challenged by other currencies, most likely the Chinese renminbi. This would have serious costs for America, as our ability to finance our budget and trade deficits cheaply would disappear.
Traditionally, empires that hold the global reserve currency are also net foreign creditors and net lenders. The British Empire declined and the pound lost its status as the main global reserve currency when Britain became a net debtor and a net borrower in World War II. Today, the United States is in a similar position. It is running huge budget and trade deficits, and is relying on the kindness of restless foreign creditors who are starting to feel uneasy about accumulating even more dollar assets. The resulting downfall of the dollar may be only a matter of time.
But what could replace it? The British pound, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc remain minor reserve currencies, as those countries are not major powers. Gold is still a barbaric relic whose value rises only when inflation is high. The euro is hobbled by concerns about the long-term viability of the European Monetary Union. That leaves the renminbi.
China is a creditor country with large current account surpluses, a small budget deficit, much lower public debt as a share of G.D.P. than the United States, and solid growth. And it is already taking steps toward challenging the supremacy of the dollar. Beijing has called for a new international reserve currency in the form of the International Monetary Fund special drawing rights (a basket of dollars, euros, pounds and yen). China will soon want to see its own currency included in the basket, as well as the renminbi used as a means of payment in bilateral trade.
At the moment, though, the renminbi is far from ready to achieve reserve currency status. China would first have to ease restrictions on money entering and leaving the country, make its currency fully convertible for such transactions, continue its domestic financial reforms and make its bond markets more liquid. It would take a long time for the renminbi to become a reserve currency, but it could happen. China has already flexed its muscle by setting up currency swaps with several countries (including Argentina, Belarus and Indonesia) and by letting institutions in Hong Kong issue bonds denominated in renminbi, a first step toward creating a deep domestic and international market for its currency.
If China and other countries were to diversify their reserve holdings away from the dollar, and they eventually will, the United States would suffer. We have reaped significant financial benefits from having the dollar as the reserve currency. In particular, the strong market for the dollar allows Americans to borrow at better rates. We have thus been able to finance larger deficits for longer and at lower interest rates, as foreign demand has kept Treasury yields low. We have been able to issue debt in our own currency rather than a foreign one, thus shifting the losses of a fall in the value of the dollar to our creditors. Having commodities priced in dollars has also meant that a fall in the dollar value doesn't lead to a rise in the price of imports.
Now, imagine a world in which China could borrow and lend internationally in its own currency. The renminbi, rather than the dollar, could eventually become a means of payment in trade and a unit of account in pricing imports and exports, as well as a store of value for wealth by international investors. Americans would pay the price. We would have to shell out more for imported goods, and interest rates on both private and public debt would rise. The higher private cost of borrowing could lead to weaker consumption and investment, and slower growth.
This decline of the dollar might take more than a decade, but it could happen even sooner if we do not get our financial house in order. The United States must rein in spending and borrowing, and pursue growth that is not based on asset and credit bubbles. For the last two decades America has been spending more than its income, increasing its foreign liabilities and amassing debts that have become unsustainable. A system where the dollar was the major global currency allowed us to prolong reckless borrowing.
Now that the dollar position is no longer so secure, we need to shift our priorities. This will entail investing in our crumbling infrastructure, alternative and renewable resources and productive human capital, rather than in unnecessary housing and toxic financial innovation. This will be the only way to slow down the decline of the dollar, and sustain our influence in global affairs.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at the New York University Stern School of Business and the chairman of an economic consulting firm.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini
Locking down the NPT BY HENRY SOKOLSKI AND VICTOR GILINSKY
Locking down the NPT
BY HENRY SOKOLSKI AND VICTOR GILINSKY
The ability of countries to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without penalty must be rectified. The recent nuclear test by North Korea, a former treaty member, is a case in point.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/locking-down-the-npt
BY HENRY SOKOLSKI AND VICTOR GILINSKY
The ability of countries to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without penalty must be rectified. The recent nuclear test by North Korea, a former treaty member, is a case in point.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/locking-down-the-npt
How will Arabs judge Obama's Gitmo policy?
How will Arabs judge Obama's Gitmo policy?
Tue, 06/30/2009 - 9:27am
Yesterday afternoon, I joined a small number of al-Qaeda experts at the Department of Justice for a long meeting with President Obama's Detention Policy Task Force. I don't envy their job of trying to figure out how to untangle the myriad political, legal, and security issues which the Bush administration dumped in their lap. Under the house rules, I won't discuss any of the actual deliberations of the task force meetings, but I am free to offer some of my own thoughts on the matter.
I'm not a lawyer, and I can't speak about the perplexing legal issues surrounding this debate. But I do have some thoughts on the impact of Obama's choices on Guantanamo and detention policy on his wider strategy for the Middle East. How Guantanamo policy affects al-Qaeda's propaganda, mainstream Muslim opinion, and assessments of Obama's credibility may not be the most important considerations for the policy, but they certainly should factor in to the decision. If Obama gets the decision right, it could have a major positive effect in responding to the most persistent ongoing Arab critique of his administration -- that it has not matched its words with deeds. And if he gets it wrong, it could have a devastating symbolic effect on his credibility in the region far beyond its objective significance.
I wouldn't pose the question here in terms of al-Qaeda itself. I don't think that his decision will have much effect one way or the other on al-Qaeda as an organization, its views of the U.S., or its strategy. It will continue to use Guantanamo as a feature of its propaganda and rhetoric no matter what Obama decides. The real question is whether those arguments gain traction beyond the tiny (albeit dangerous) salafi-jihadist core and help al-Qaeda to regain credibility and support with parts of the Arab and Muslim mainstream (which, as I've argued elsewhere, it has largely lost over the last year or two).
Who is the relevant public? The broad mainstream of Arabs and Muslims, who are generally hostile to U.S. foreign policy and suspicious of American motives, but are tentatively hopeful that Obama will change it in a positive direction. This broad middle has little sympathy with Al-Qaeda’s salafi-jihadist agenda, but shares much of its critique of U.S. foreign policy. It tends to watch al-Jazeera and to identify with its framing of core Arab issues (especially during moments of crisis), supports the idea of resistance (muqawima) but is outraged about terrorism (especially where there are Muslim victims), backed Hezbollah in 2006, suffered over Gaza in 2009, and came to be convinced during the Bush years that the U.S. was waging a war with Islam.
Guantanamo has for many long years been a key symbolic node in that shared narrative. While the U.S. debate usually focuses on the "worst of the worst", the Arab discourse generally focuses on people viewed as innocent and unjustly detained -- such as the al-Jazeera cameraman Sami al-Hajj. This epitomized in their eyes all that was wrong with Bush's war on terror. It helps that Guantanamo can now be portrayed as the stuff of the past, a sin to be redeemed. But this in turn plays into one of the most prominent themes in current Arab political discourse: that Obama's attractive words have not yet been matched by deeds, and that he hasn't really changed anything significant about U.S. policy.
And that credibility issue is really the key which the policy review needs to keep in mind. For all their hope, and all the buzz around the Cairo speech, this Arab mainstream remains deeply skeptical that Obama will actually be able to deliver on his promised change. Popular Arab media will feature intense and skeptical scrutiny of every American move, will leap on every report in the American media, every hint of backtracking or hypocrisy. The two most prominent focal points for this scrutiny are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Guantanamo --- and U.S. credibility will be especially hurt by new information which fits into this narrative of Obama offering words but not deeds. This places a very high premium on establishing credibility through deeds.
The policy needs to be clear and bold to have the desired impact. The Arab public will not carefully assess the details of a particular plan. Instead, they will form impressions based on a fairly crude binary judgment: is Obama keeping his promise or not? Artful attempts to slice the problem with carefully calibrated dodges will likely fail. The skepticism is so high that anything other than a crystal clear closure of Guantanamo will register on the wrong side of that binary. And because of the symbolic prominence of the Guantanamo issue, and the high priority Obama himself has given it in his outreach to the Muslim world, failure there will have serious spill-over effects for credibility on all other issues in the region.
The plan, no matter how well-conceived, will not speak for itself. The U.S. needs to not only select a policy which is clear and robust enough to defy hostile spin, but also have an aggressive, ongoing, strategic communications campaign ready to go on day one explaining the policy. This campaign should use it as a lever to respond to the “words/deeds” critique and to establish credibility. The images of a joyful release of many of the detainees -- combined with the prosecution of the genuine al-Qaeda bad guys like KSM -- would offer a powerful graphic demonstration of Obama's commitment to make meaningful distinctions between the real extremists and the rest. Ideally, it would result in al-Jazeera programs and editorials by influential authors to the effect of "we didn't believe that Obama would actually deliver, but he did" --- which would have positive externalities across a wide range of issues.
Like I said above, the impact on the Arab and Muslim arenas may not be the most important part of the decision about detention policy. Legal or security or ethical issues may weigh more heavily. But the decision will have a significant impact on these strategic issues whether or not the administration prioritizes them. I hope they get it right.
Marc Lynch
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/
Tue, 06/30/2009 - 9:27am
Yesterday afternoon, I joined a small number of al-Qaeda experts at the Department of Justice for a long meeting with President Obama's Detention Policy Task Force. I don't envy their job of trying to figure out how to untangle the myriad political, legal, and security issues which the Bush administration dumped in their lap. Under the house rules, I won't discuss any of the actual deliberations of the task force meetings, but I am free to offer some of my own thoughts on the matter.
I'm not a lawyer, and I can't speak about the perplexing legal issues surrounding this debate. But I do have some thoughts on the impact of Obama's choices on Guantanamo and detention policy on his wider strategy for the Middle East. How Guantanamo policy affects al-Qaeda's propaganda, mainstream Muslim opinion, and assessments of Obama's credibility may not be the most important considerations for the policy, but they certainly should factor in to the decision. If Obama gets the decision right, it could have a major positive effect in responding to the most persistent ongoing Arab critique of his administration -- that it has not matched its words with deeds. And if he gets it wrong, it could have a devastating symbolic effect on his credibility in the region far beyond its objective significance.
I wouldn't pose the question here in terms of al-Qaeda itself. I don't think that his decision will have much effect one way or the other on al-Qaeda as an organization, its views of the U.S., or its strategy. It will continue to use Guantanamo as a feature of its propaganda and rhetoric no matter what Obama decides. The real question is whether those arguments gain traction beyond the tiny (albeit dangerous) salafi-jihadist core and help al-Qaeda to regain credibility and support with parts of the Arab and Muslim mainstream (which, as I've argued elsewhere, it has largely lost over the last year or two).
Who is the relevant public? The broad mainstream of Arabs and Muslims, who are generally hostile to U.S. foreign policy and suspicious of American motives, but are tentatively hopeful that Obama will change it in a positive direction. This broad middle has little sympathy with Al-Qaeda’s salafi-jihadist agenda, but shares much of its critique of U.S. foreign policy. It tends to watch al-Jazeera and to identify with its framing of core Arab issues (especially during moments of crisis), supports the idea of resistance (muqawima) but is outraged about terrorism (especially where there are Muslim victims), backed Hezbollah in 2006, suffered over Gaza in 2009, and came to be convinced during the Bush years that the U.S. was waging a war with Islam.
Guantanamo has for many long years been a key symbolic node in that shared narrative. While the U.S. debate usually focuses on the "worst of the worst", the Arab discourse generally focuses on people viewed as innocent and unjustly detained -- such as the al-Jazeera cameraman Sami al-Hajj. This epitomized in their eyes all that was wrong with Bush's war on terror. It helps that Guantanamo can now be portrayed as the stuff of the past, a sin to be redeemed. But this in turn plays into one of the most prominent themes in current Arab political discourse: that Obama's attractive words have not yet been matched by deeds, and that he hasn't really changed anything significant about U.S. policy.
And that credibility issue is really the key which the policy review needs to keep in mind. For all their hope, and all the buzz around the Cairo speech, this Arab mainstream remains deeply skeptical that Obama will actually be able to deliver on his promised change. Popular Arab media will feature intense and skeptical scrutiny of every American move, will leap on every report in the American media, every hint of backtracking or hypocrisy. The two most prominent focal points for this scrutiny are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Guantanamo --- and U.S. credibility will be especially hurt by new information which fits into this narrative of Obama offering words but not deeds. This places a very high premium on establishing credibility through deeds.
The policy needs to be clear and bold to have the desired impact. The Arab public will not carefully assess the details of a particular plan. Instead, they will form impressions based on a fairly crude binary judgment: is Obama keeping his promise or not? Artful attempts to slice the problem with carefully calibrated dodges will likely fail. The skepticism is so high that anything other than a crystal clear closure of Guantanamo will register on the wrong side of that binary. And because of the symbolic prominence of the Guantanamo issue, and the high priority Obama himself has given it in his outreach to the Muslim world, failure there will have serious spill-over effects for credibility on all other issues in the region.
The plan, no matter how well-conceived, will not speak for itself. The U.S. needs to not only select a policy which is clear and robust enough to defy hostile spin, but also have an aggressive, ongoing, strategic communications campaign ready to go on day one explaining the policy. This campaign should use it as a lever to respond to the “words/deeds” critique and to establish credibility. The images of a joyful release of many of the detainees -- combined with the prosecution of the genuine al-Qaeda bad guys like KSM -- would offer a powerful graphic demonstration of Obama's commitment to make meaningful distinctions between the real extremists and the rest. Ideally, it would result in al-Jazeera programs and editorials by influential authors to the effect of "we didn't believe that Obama would actually deliver, but he did" --- which would have positive externalities across a wide range of issues.
Like I said above, the impact on the Arab and Muslim arenas may not be the most important part of the decision about detention policy. Legal or security or ethical issues may weigh more heavily. But the decision will have a significant impact on these strategic issues whether or not the administration prioritizes them. I hope they get it right.
Marc Lynch
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/
China requests reserve currency debate at G8 -sources
China requests reserve currency debate at G8 -sources
(This story is without a dateline to protect the identities of the sources)
July 1 (Reuters) - China has asked to debate proposals for a new global reserve currency at next week's Group of Eight summit in Italy and the issue could be referred to briefly in the summit statement, G8 sources said on Wednesday.
One G8 source who was involved in the negotiations said China made the request during preparatory talks about a joint statement to be issued on the second day of the summit in L'Aquila by the G8 plus the G5 (Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa) and also Egypt.
This forum, the so-called "G14", meets on July 9 to discuss the financial crisis, trade and climate change and for the first time a G8 summit will also produce a joint G14 statement.
A European source with knowledge of preparations for the summit also said China had raised the subject of a reserve currency debate and that it might be mentioned during the meeting, though the source added: "Any country at the meeting can raise issues they see fit."
"But whether there is a specific mention in the communique remains open," said the European source, adding that sherpas would discuss this further in preparatory talks on Friday.
The debate centres on proposals by some emerging powers that an alternative should be found to the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency, to reflect the shifting balance of power in the globalised economy.
China's central bank governor said in March the world should consider using the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a super-sovereign currency. The SDR is an international reserve asset allocated to IMF members and its exchange rate is determined by a basket of dollars, euros, sterling and yen.
But the Chinese proposal failed to gain ground after several world leaders, and officials from the IMF, backed the dollar as the global reserve currency. (Reporting by Reuters bureaux)
http://www.reuters.com/article/usDollarRpt/idUSLAG00356720090701
(This story is without a dateline to protect the identities of the sources)
July 1 (Reuters) - China has asked to debate proposals for a new global reserve currency at next week's Group of Eight summit in Italy and the issue could be referred to briefly in the summit statement, G8 sources said on Wednesday.
One G8 source who was involved in the negotiations said China made the request during preparatory talks about a joint statement to be issued on the second day of the summit in L'Aquila by the G8 plus the G5 (Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa) and also Egypt.
This forum, the so-called "G14", meets on July 9 to discuss the financial crisis, trade and climate change and for the first time a G8 summit will also produce a joint G14 statement.
A European source with knowledge of preparations for the summit also said China had raised the subject of a reserve currency debate and that it might be mentioned during the meeting, though the source added: "Any country at the meeting can raise issues they see fit."
"But whether there is a specific mention in the communique remains open," said the European source, adding that sherpas would discuss this further in preparatory talks on Friday.
The debate centres on proposals by some emerging powers that an alternative should be found to the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency, to reflect the shifting balance of power in the globalised economy.
China's central bank governor said in March the world should consider using the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a super-sovereign currency. The SDR is an international reserve asset allocated to IMF members and its exchange rate is determined by a basket of dollars, euros, sterling and yen.
But the Chinese proposal failed to gain ground after several world leaders, and officials from the IMF, backed the dollar as the global reserve currency. (Reporting by Reuters bureaux)
http://www.reuters.com/article/usDollarRpt/idUSLAG00356720090701
Has the U.S. Played a Role in Fomenting Unrest During Iran's Election? | by Jeremy R. Hammond
Has the U.S. Played a Role in Fomenting Unrest During Iran's Election? | by Jeremy R. Hammond
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/06/23/has-the-u-s-played-a-role-in-fomenting-unrest-during-irans-election/
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/06/23/has-the-u-s-played-a-role-in-fomenting-unrest-during-irans-election/
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)