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Saturday, May 31, 2025
[Salon] A Gulf bonanza for the 'dealmaker in chief' - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
A Gulf bonanza for the 'dealmaker in chief'
Summary: Two top Washington Middle East analysts join Arab Digest editor William Law to discuss President Trump’s recent trip to the Gulf. Annelle Sheline and Jon Hoffman reflect on the deals made, Trump’s meeting with the former jihadist and now president of Syria Ahmad al-Sharaa and the significance of the president deciding to bypass Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu as he swept through Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.
The following is a transcript, edited for length and clarity of our 21 May podcast with Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow with the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute and Jon Hoffman, a Research Fellow in Defence and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute. You can find the full podcast here.
Amidst all the gold and glitter that Trump loves so much, what did you make of President Trump's Riyadh visit Jon?
With all of these lavish deals a dose of skepticism is needed. We've seen Trump announce grandiose deals like this in the past that did not materialise. I'm thinking back to the $100 million dollar arms deal with Riyadh announced during his first term. So until we see this money materialise, I'd say we can't speak of concrete deals, per se. But on the trip overall, I think it shows a few things. First, a continued shift of the region's centre of gravity towards the Gulf. The Gulf dictatorships have really asserted themselves to the forefront of the Arab world. This is buoyed, of course, by petrodollars, as the rest of the region faces economic malaise. Something else notable is that this trip did not include Israel, as his trip to the region did during his first term. Lastly, his comments in his speech in Riyadh taking aim at past US interventions in the region, attempts at nation building and so on, were quite significant.
Saudi Arabia was Trump's first visit during his first term, now his first visit during his second term. I would say there's not only a conflict of interest here, given his family's extensive financial ties within the kingdom and the deal between the PIF and LIV Golf, there's a lot of personal incentives for Trump to be doing this.
Now Annelle, Mr. Trump then proceeded on to Doha, where a $42 billion weapons deal was signed, also the announcement that the Qataris would purchase 28 Boeing passenger jets, All of this is coming in the wake of the gifting of a rather special passenger jet to the presidential library. Is this an example of transactional diplomacy or is it bribery?
It's fairly clear that it's bald-faced bribery. This is a gift intended for Trump himself. So I would certainly characterise that as a very clear example of bribery. That being said, Trump is an example of making American policies just that much more explicit. It is not so different from how previous presidents operated, it's just that they liked to characterise it as somehow being in the interest of the rest of the world or for the purpose of expanding democracy or human rights or whatever. While this gift is certainly above and beyond what we've typically seen presidents accept in the past, US foreign policy has been quite transactional for quite a while in that wealthy countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar or the UAE purchase large amounts of US-made weapons, these enrich US defence contractors and weapons manufacturers, which in turn enrich members of Congress through essentially bribery, but lobbying efforts.
Jon, he then heads on to Abu Dhabi and meets with the UAE boss Mohammed bin Zayed. Again, massive deals are proclaimed, an artificial intelligence campus covering 10 square miles of prime Abu Dhabi real estate, a $1.4 trillion investment in US AI tech over 10 years, more than $40 billion investment in the energy sector, eye watering figures. But beyond the commercial deals was there any suggestion the US might have expressed some concern about the UAE’s support for bad actors in places like Libya, Somalia or Sudan?
On the commercial deals, particularly the 1.4 trillion the UAE said it would invest in the US, I would again say a lot of caution is needed here. The UAE GDP is roughly $514 billion per year. The UAE sovereign wealth fund collectively holds an estimated 1.7 trillion in assets, which is just slightly above the 1.4 trillion number. So this is really money the UAE doesn't have. So again, just like the talk about the deals in Saudi Arabia, until we see these things actually materialise I would be a little skeptical.
Regarding concerns about the UAE support for malign actors in Libya, Sudan and so on, I highly doubt these were raised. The US has really turned a blind eye to Abu Dhabi's various activities in the region and here in the United States for quite some time. This is a bipartisan turning a blind eye. In Sudan in particular, the UAE has been instrumental in fueling the war through support for the Rapid Support Forces, the RSF, and this war has claimed more than 150,000 lives, displaced more than 11 million. The US government, specifically Blinken in January before the Biden administration left office, determined that the RSF and RSF-aligned militias have committed genocide in Sudan. But both the previous administration and the current administration view this conflict as peripheral to other perceived interests in the region.
Many commentators have noted that Trump did not include Israel in his tour and there's a suggestion that that was a snub to Netanyahu. How do you see it?
There's been a flurry of reports about Trump bypassing Netanyahu. Most notable of all these reports is an article published in Israel Hayom, which is owned by Miriam Adelson, the hawkish pro-Israel mega donor to both of Trump's presidential campaigns. The article claimed that Trump was ‘disappointed’ with the Israeli premier. But any rift between Trump and Netanyahu can only be judged on tangible US policy change, not rhetoric.
Under the Biden administration, we saw reports constantly of strain between the Israeli premier and the former president, but it really never led to meaningful policy change. It's a little different with Trump because we have seen some notable policy changes in Syria and in Yemen for example. All of these developments are significant in their own right, but when viewed within a broader context I would say they're secondary really to the challenges of the Gaza war and Iran. This is where the so-called rift will be decided.
Even if he does break with Netanyahu on the war in Gaza and nuclear negotiations with Iran, I wouldn't confuse this rift between Netanyahu and Trump with a rift between the United States and Israel itself. Trump has shown no indication of challenging the structural foundations of this relationship.
Annelle, there was that extraordinary moment when Donald Trump met the new president of Syria, Ahmed Al Sharaa. What do you make of the thought that Al Sharaa agreed to take a significant number of Palestinians in Gaza in return for the dropping of sanctions?
It's not yet clear what exactly Trump got out of his agreement to lift US sanctions on Syria. Although I haven't seen any clear evidence that Syria is going to accept refugees from Gaza, I would not be at all surprised if part of Trump's willingness to lift sanctions on Syria does reflect an agreement by Al Sharaa to take in Palestinian refugees from Gaza. That being said, there are already over 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria and I know that Al Sharaa is already dealing with some degree of pushback. Given that he rose to prominence as a jihadi he has to maintain credibility with people who were willing to fight alongside him because of his vision for Syria, which was an Islamist vision.
It remains to be seen how much Trump may be trying to push Al Sharaa to agree to various things, maybe even to normalise with Israel, which could really undermine his credibility and even his ability to control Syria, which could plunge the country back into civil war. My hope is that whoever is advising Trump on Syria has a clear sense of the tensions and fragilities there.
We can say many things about the way Donald Trump handles foreign affairs, but it has to be conceded he moves the needle in ways that no other president in recent memory has done. In his first term it was the Abraham Accords. Now we see him coming off a tour of the Gulf with massive commercial deals. So Jon, a triumph for Trump?
It's a little too early to tell how Trump's Middle East policy is going to shake out over four years. It's only been four months, though it feels like four years. I would say that Trump will likely continue the broad strokes of US Middle East policy, whether this be support for autocrats, support for the US-Israel special relationship, even if he does ‘break with Netanyahu’ and so on. His moves regarding Syria and Yemen are definitely steps in the right direction. I've always been a proponent of US foreign policy leading with diplomacy and economics as opposed to more militarised interventions but we haven't seen yet whether he can withstand pressure from hawks in Washington and Israel regarding his efforts to seal a deal with Iran. This would certainly be a triumph for America, keeping the US out of war with Tehran.
If he recognises - and this is a big if - if he recognises that US support for the war in Gaza is of zero strategic benefit for the United States this could lead to pressure from the administration that could end the bloodshed. Donald Trump has leverage. Biden had it too. He just decided not to use it. But to end the war in Gaza, it also requires Trump to step back from this proposal to ethnically cleanse and have the United States take over the Strip. For now it's still a wait and see. It's an ongoing battle between those who want to see more skeptical US foreign policy and those who would prefer continuation and a much more hawkish approach. Just four months in it's a little too early to tell, but I hope the skeptical camp prevails.
Annelle, what do you think?
I was struck by the remarks he made in Riyadh and Jon alluded to them. In particular, it reminded me of Obama's 2009 Cairo speech which was heralded at the time as a break with the Bush administration and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. I was living in Egypt at the time and subsequently I remember just this creeping disappointment, because although Obama said he was going to adopt a new approach to the Middle East in many ways much of what he did represented a continuation of the Bush era.
Trump's remarks where he acknowledged the efforts of Arab societies themselves, without this notion that these countries need the United States to get involved and to help them, was a very welcome message. Although I don't expect Trump to fundamentally rethink US foreign policy, I do welcome his openness to a new view of America's role in the world. Trump's model is to sell lots of weapons and accept lavish gifts. It is not ideal. It's a baby step, but I do think that it may be a step in the right direction.
[Salon] Hegseth Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ Should China Seek to ‘Conquer’ Taiwan - Guest Post
https://www.masslive.com/politics/2025/05/pentagon-boss-hegseth-warns-of-devastating-consequences-if-china-looks-to-conquer-taiwan.html
Friday, May 30, 2025
Thursday, May 29, 2025
Wednesday, May 28, 2025
Martyrs of the New Millennium: Persecution at Our Doorstep - The Catholic Thing
Martyrs of the New Millennium: Persecution at Our Doorstep - The Catholic Thing
Senior Editor Brad Miner interviews Editor-in-Chief Robert Royal about his new book Martyrs of the New Millennium: Global Persecution of Christians in the 21st Century. Their discussion explores the idea of martyrdom, the violent repression of Christians in regions like China, Nigeria, and Nicaragua, and the rise of hostility in the West. Robert draws distinctions between classic martyrdom in odium fidei, Pope John Paul II’s “new martyrs,” and Pope Francis’ “oblatio vitae.” With insight drawn from decades of Catholic commentary and collaboration with Aid to the Church in Need, this is an urgent call to vigilance, solidarity, and courage in the face of mounting global threats to religious freedom—especially against Christians. In this conversation we are reminded that persecution is not only happening abroad—it is at our doorstep.
Tuesday, May 27, 2025
Monday, May 26, 2025
Sunday, May 25, 2025
Saturday, May 24, 2025
[Salon] The Yemeni Peace Process - Guest Post Arab Digest.org
The Yemeni Peace Process
Summary: during his visit to the Middle East Trump barely mentioned the Yemen conflict publicly while praising his hosts and ending sanctions against Syria. The lack of attention and the continued reliance on outdated UN resolutions highlight the intractability of the Yemeni situation and the weakness of the internationally recognised government.
We thank Helen Lackner for today's newsletter. An expert on Yemen, Helen’s latest book Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope, is published by SAQI Books. You can listen to her latest Arab Digest podcast here.
In early May, preparing his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, Trump announced the ending of US air strikes on Yemen. During his visit, Yemen was barely mentioned: there was a brief allusion in his speech to the GCC summit, and in Qatar Trump said ‘we’re trying to give Yemen a chance … they have a tremendous Huthi problem. I believe that’s a problem for them… It’s a tricky part of the world. But we were asked to stop firing at the Huthis. And that’s something that they’ve never asked because they’re tough and they’re good fighters and all… And we want them to get along with Saudi Arabia.’ This contrasts with his endless hyperbolic praise for his hosts and, more to the point, his important decision to end sanctions against Syria at the request of Mohammed bin Salman. This lack of international and regional attention to Yemen demonstrates both the intractability of the situation and the inability of Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) to feature as a meaningful force.
Trump, an admirer of strong men, regardless of their politics, expressed admiration for the Huthis, but neither he nor the Saudis even mentioned the IRG in any public forum. Nor did UN Special Envoy Grundberg mention it by name in his latest briefing to the Security Council, simply stating that the UN ‘will continue to work to bring the parties to the table to identify and agree on solutions that are acceptable to all’. While his focus on the suffering of the Yemeni people is extremely welcome, the impotence of the IRG is one of the many causes of their deteriorating living conditions.
UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg enjoying Yemeni coffee in a mall in Sana'a in May 2023
Grundberg only mentioned the 10 year old ‘peace process’ in the context of ending US airstrikes. Alongside so many others, the Yemeni peace process is increasingly just another one on a list of many failures, the most disgraceful being the now notorious Palestinian one. So why such failures?
There are a number of fundamental flaws to the UN-mediated peace process some of which are country-specific, and others inherent to the difficulties faced by the UN in general. In the Yemeni case, the main flaws are clearly outlined in a recent analysis by Richard Barltrop. The three references on which UN efforts are based, are UNSC Resolution 2216 of 2015, the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference (completed in January 2015) and the Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement of 2011. A superficial look at a map showing who controls where in Yemen in 2025 combined with the dates of these documents demonstrates their irrelevance.
Yemenis and others have been calling for the replacement of UNSC Resolution 2216 as early as 2017. It demands that the Huthis abandon all the gains they made since 2011 and return to their isolated marginalised (and now bombed to smithereens) area in the far north of the country. Given the situation on the ground and the fact that they now control, govern and fully administer 70% of the country’s population, let alone their international interventions over Gaza since late 2023, such a demand is so unrealistic as to be farcical.
As early as 2018, the IRG was officially described by the UN’s Panel of experts as having ‘eroded to the point that it is doubtful whether it will ever be able to reunite Yemen as a single country’. Things have not improved; the weaknesses of the IRG are discussed in a previous Arab Digest posting.
As Barltrop points out, reasons why western and Arab states have been unable to address the problem appropriately include their refusal to address different aspects of reality. They avoid calling the Huthi movement by its official name, Ansar Allah, insisting on terms such as ‘militias, rebels, Iran-backed and terrorists.’ The most recent example was at the GCC summit on14 May, when MBS reprimanded the Ruler of Kuwait for referring to the ‘relevant authorities in Sana’a’ later corrected to ‘the illegitimate authorities’. Meanwhile the Omani foreign minister replaced his reference to the ‘relevant authorities’ by one using Ansar Allah. At the UNSC no statement uses the name Ansar Allah.
Another case is the international community’s refusal to acknowledge the issues which divide the parties to the conflict: examples are the air and sea blockades, public sector salaries, and the fragmentation of the country over administration, currency and access to resources. For years, the UN process ignored the fundamental role of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the UN was marginalised when Saudi-Huthi direct negotiations started in 2022. In late 2023, they were close to reaching an agreement which would have formally been one between the Yemeni opponents, mainly to protect the Saudis from accusations of war crimes as this would have cast them as witnesses to the agreement rather than participants in the war, and to save face for the UN which would thus be formally involved. This was interrupted by the Gaza war and Huthi attacks on Red Sea navigation and Israel, and the subsequent air strikes by the US, UK and now Israel on Huthi-controlled areas.
To improve future efforts, lessons from past misguided approaches should be learned. As Barltrop points out, the UN process strengthened the most intransigent hardcore elements in Ansar Allah at the expense of the movement’s moderate wing, giving it time to ‘consolidate power and become entrenched in uncompromising foreign and domestic policies’. International decision makers should abandon the obsolete three references, and address the actual situation on the ground. The ritualised calls for a ‘Yemeni-led’ process have largely ignored most Yemeni views and focused on the current leaderships which have brought about the current disastrous situation.
Following the interruption of US (and presumably UK, as the latter only acts to support the US) strikes, a new window may open for a Huthi-Saudi deal, a priority for both. The original included significant Saudi financial support for reconstruction and salary payments; while these may be problematic given the Trump administration’s official designation of the Huthis as a terrorist organisation, mechanisms to circumvent it can be found, serving the interests of both Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah. This would lead to a modified version of the UN’s ‘road map’ regarding which, as Grundberg recognises ‘the mediation environment has changed significantly since late 2023’. It is worth remembering that this road map’s basic features are hardly earth shattering: ‘a ceasefire, economic recovery, and an inclusive political process in order to move forward.’
Millions of Yemenis are longing for the end of this war and the opportunity to start rebuilding their country and improving their disastrous living conditions.
[Salon] Oil, arms and corruption: the three pillars of the US-Saudi alliance - Guest Post ArabDigest.org
Oil, arms and corruption: the three pillars of the US-Saudi alliance
Summary: the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the West evolved from economic and military patronage to a system in which military contracts became the primary means for Western wealth recovery. Shrouded in "national security” and reinforced by shared anti-Islamic sentiments and corruption, this arrangement continues to shape regional politics.
In the early 20th century Britain maintained stability and influence in the Persian Gulf, supporting local rulers in order to protect its interests, especially the trade route to India. Following the pivotal meeting between US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy in February 1945 Saudi Arabia began transitioning towards the US instead, a move solidified in the 1960s and 1970s. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent oil prices boom, the relationship between the Gulf states and the West experienced another fundamental change when it became stark that unless special measures were undertaken the world was about to witness the largest wealth transfer in history.
In an attempt to forestall this, western governments’ initial solution was selling Saudi Arabia and other major Arab oil exporters large volumes of expensive consumer goods and infrastructure. It soon became clear, however, that there were simply too few Saudis and too much oil money for this to serve as a practical means to reverse the vast sums being spent. A new mechanism was quickly sought and found: military contracts. This proved ideal for all concerned, firstly because military equipment is inherently expensive and needs constant upgrades which means it can be used to justify any amount of expenditure and, secondly, it means all business can be conveniently shrouded under the rubric of ‘national security’, opening the door to immense corruption. ‘National security’ remains the sine qua non of the Saudi-Western relationship to this day as the details are highly politically toxic for both parties.
Selling Saudi Arabia vast quantities of military hardware has been one of the central pillars of the Kingdom's relationship with the West ever since. Even though much of it is strategically useless or completely unsuitable for the desert environment, the West got its money back and Arab dictators got to enrich themselves beyond the dreams of avarice, because military contracts with western defence firm typically include more than 50% commission payments and then they can be inflated a second time when the materiel is distributed to the armed forces inside the country. This enduring relationship exists between Al Saud as a family and the White House, transcending individual presidencies and resisting any alteration by members of the Saudi royal family. The only losers have been ordinary citizens, long reduced to humiliated onlookers at the flagrant looting of their patrimony.
Last week President Trump’s three-country tour of the Gulf continued this long-standing tradition. Like his predecessors, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman continues to regard the United States as an omnipotent entity, a paramount power whose sphere of influence is indispensable. Continued political, military, and economic alignment remains a Saudi strategic imperative, precluding any shift in allegiance towards other global powers such as Russia or China, or the adoption of an independent decision-making posture. National security priorities such as oil, foreign affairs, intelligence, and politics all remain fully entrusted to the United States, with the Saudi military having only a minimal protective role.
President Donald Trump, who dodged the draft for the Vietnam War, sparked controversy after returning a salute to Saudi military officials during a formal reception on his visit to Riyadh
Under MBS, this framework of subordination has extended even further. The Crown Prince, who regards traditional Arab social kinship and tribal structures as potential sources of opposition, desires even to assimilate American cultural norms which he considers superior. This is manifested in the importation of American food, beverages, cinema, and various forms of entertainment, like wrestling, tennis and golf, with the United States always serving as the primary reference point. Saudi Arabia’s investments are also predominantly directed towards the United States, a policy widely held within the Al Saud family and emphasised under the current Crown Prince.
What is new in the US-Saudi relationship is the impulsive, mercurial, ignorant and clinically narcissistic character of Donald Trump. He possesses qualities to which Arab leaders are magnetically attracted, above all his propensity to accept bribes, often facilitated through intermediaries such as Jared Kushner or the Crown Prince's brothers. Significant Saudi financial resources are channeled through these avenues for the personal benefit of the President and as a result Trump has continuously offered the Crown Prince political protection, for example by vetoing resolutions passed by Congress that sought to end US military support for Saudi Arabia or disputing the CIA findings over Jamal Khashoggi's murder. "I saved his ass," Trump said, according to US journalist Bob Woodward. "I was able to get Congress to leave him alone. I was able to get them to stop."
Besides corruption, the other tie binding Arab dictators to the US President is their mutual hostility towards Islam, both as a religion and in politics. Both the Saudi Crown Prince and the UAE’s MBZ regard Islam and Islamism as the leading threat to their authority and so seek to undermine its ideological foundations and diminish its influence, particularly targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and the Salafi movement known as Wahabism. Regionally and globally, MBZ and MBS combat Islamic activism, support anti-Islam entities, and hinder the growth of Islamic movements. Both exhibit a strong disinclination towards religious observance and exclude religious individuals from their inner circles. Any outward displays of religious endorsement are purely for public consumption. Their engagement with certain religious figures, such as the Saudi regime’s favourite Islamic scholar Sheikh Dr. Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa, is part of an effort to distort the image of Islam and neutralise authentic Islamic forces by fostering cooperation between pro-regime “Islamic” elements and Zionist and Western powers. Their relationship with Syria is contingent on Ahmed Al Shara’a’s abandonment of political Islam and jihadist projects.
Donald Trump's tour of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha, fueled by greed and underwritten by betrayal, was no peace mission and it made no mention of the Palestinian children being starved and bombed just a few hundred miles away. The billions invested will go directly into the US and Israeli genocide machine. Ironically, however, in the long run it might just end up inadvertently serving Palestinian interests. As the President's political standing strengthens from his triumph in the Gulf, his reliance on Saudi, Qatari and Emirati financial support could outweigh concerns related to Zionist interests, potentially leading to a divergence from traditional U.S. policy frameworks, a completely unintended benefit for the Palestinian cause.
Poll: 82% of Israelis Back Gaza Expulsion, Nearly Half Support Biblical Massacres - Palestine Chronicle
Poll: 82% of Israelis Back Gaza Expulsion, Nearly Half Support Biblical Massacres - Palestine Chronicle
The poll results reported by the Hebrew edition of HAARETZ and cited in the article at the the link transmitted below may be of interest.
Ominously, while support for the genocide of the Palestinian people is lowest among young Americans, it is highest among young Israelis.
NOTE: Some Israeli polls include all Israeli citizens, of whom roughly 20% are Palestinians, and others include only Jewish Israelis. This poll included only Jewish Israelis. Had it included all Israelis, the 82% "Israeli" support for the total ethnic cleansing of the Gaza Strip would have been virtually unanimous among Jewish Israelis. Another recent poll which showed 53% of Israelis opposed to permitting any "humanitarian" aid to enter Gaza included all Israeli citizens. Had it included only Jewish Israelis, the percentage approving the current starvation strategy would have been roughly two-thirds.
Who Won a Seat at Trump’s Crypto Dinner? - The New York Times
Who Won a Seat at Trump’s Crypto Dinner? - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/23/us/politics/trump-crypto-dinner-attendees.html
Who Won a Seat at Trump’s Crypto Dinner?
The New York Times reviewed a guest list and social media posts to identify who was invited to President Trump’s private event for customers of his cryptocurrency business on Thursday and a White House tour on Friday. Here are some of them.
Friday, May 23, 2025
Thursday, May 22, 2025
Wednesday, May 21, 2025
[Salon] The Defense Department’s intelligence shop delivers a list of potential weapons potentially used by potential foes - Guest Post
https://www.pogo.org/newsletters/the-bunker/introducing-the-bunker?utm_source=bunker&utm_medium=email&utm_content=logo&emci=26e0c492-aa35-f011-a5f1-6045bda9d96b&emdi=0e3455c1-3236-f011-a5f1-6045bda9d96b&ceid=201249
5/21/25
The Bunker: The Defense Department’s intelligence shop delivers a list of potential weapons potentially used by potential foes."
This week in The Bunker: The Defense Department’s intelligence shop delivers a list of potential weapons potentially used by potential foes to justify President Trump’s Golden Dumb missile system; hyping the Russian military threat (again!) despite its abysmal performance in Ukraine; Pentagon pill-popping for pilots; and more.
BE AFRAID. BE VERY AFRAID.
And be broke. Be very broke.
One thing the U.S. military knows how to do is follow orders. Or at least fakin’ it pretty good. So when the president says he wants to build a fiscally and physically impossible wonder weapon to shield the U.S. from all aerial threats (except lost luggage on major American airlines), you can count on the nation’s top military spies to step up and salute. That’s why they have just published what they call a “report” titled Golden Dome for America: Current and Future Missile Threats to the U.S. Homeland.
Actually, it’s not a report. It’s not even an “assessment,” as the Defense Intelligence Agency also calls it. In fact, it’s a one-page infographic (PDF) “to depict threats a sophisticated missile defense system for the United States would defend against,” according to a May 13 DIA press release.
A sales brochure, in other words (it also reminds The Bunker of the Ripley’s Believe It or Not! comic he loved as a kid; the parallels are striking). Its centerpiece shows the U.S. as a bull’s-eye, with multi-colored arrows bombarding it from the other side of the globe. Subtle, it ain’t.
Aerial threats to the U.S. “will expand in scale and sophistication” over the coming decade, the Pentagon’s intel pros say. The nation’s leaky intercontinental ballistic missile shield will be worthless against a growing array of Bad Guy wonder weapons. According to the DIA, beyond your garden-variety land-and-submarine-based ballistic missiles, they include this roster of incoming threats:
Aeroballistic missiles: “A type of hypersonic missile carrying nuclear or conventional warheads that can be launched from air, sea, or ground platforms and combines aerodynamic maneuvers with phases of ballistic loft to extend range.”
Hypersonic glide vehicles: “A maneuverable aerodynamic body that is typically delivered by a ballistic missile, achieves sustained hypersonic glide at altitudes of 15-50 km, and glides for at least half of its flight to its target.”
Land-attack cruise missiles: “A missile that flies through the atmosphere, potentially with reduced signatures, that can maneuver extensively in flight and be armed with a nuclear or conventional warhead; some may achieve hypersonic speeds.”
Fractional orbital bombardment systems: “An ICBM that enters a low-altitude orbit before reentering to strike its target, with much shorter flight times if flying the same direction as traditional ICBMs, or can travel over the South Pole to avoid early warning systems and missile defenses.”
Trump announced May 20 that he wants $25 billion to begin building the shield, and will complete it within three years for $175 billion.
But not to worry. The day before DIA issued its infographic, Trump signed an executive order seeking to lower prescription drug prices. The resulting reduced federal spending on drugs “will easily pay for the Golden Dome,” he said, “and we’ll have a lot of money left over.”
No wonder his companies have filed for bankruptcy six times.
THE THREATS JUST KEEP ON RESUMING
The Russians are coming. Again.
Perspective is generally MIA when it comes to assessing threats faced by the U.S. — and it’s not only from the government. Veteran Washington Post columnist Lee Hockstader wrote May 14 that Europe’s rearmament effort is “badly lagging Russia’s breakneck transition to a war footing.”
Huh?
It was only three years ago that the chattering combat class were stunned by how poorly Russian troops had fared following their invasion of Ukraine. Have we forgotten so soon?
More importantly, things are not getting better for Moscow. Ukraine has “successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater,” the independent Institute for the Study of War noted May 15. “Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale invasion.”
As the Soviet Union, Russia’s Cold War military parades sent shivers around the world and fattened the Pentagon’s annual Soviet Military Power books (and budgets) with dire warnings of Moscow’s might during the Reagan administration. Of course, once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, we learned that its military was little more than a paper tiger.
Seems like we need to keep relearning that lesson.
SLEEP CYCLES
Keeping pilots’ eyes open
The U.S. military asks a lot of its pilots. Not only are their jobs technically and physically demanding, sometimes they require bending the time-space continuum to ensure aviators can accomplish their mission. That’s why the military has a medicine-chestful of drugs to keep pilots awake — and to put them to sleep.
“Sustained high-operations tempo over the past several decades, among other factors, has generated persistent demand for the use of pharmacological measures,” the Congressional Research Service reportedMay 13. “The operational need for these measures and comparative effectiveness with non-pharmacological measures have been the subject of debate in modern warfare.”
While there is no Pentagon-wide policy on the use of such drugs, each military service drafts its own. Among other drugs, Dexedrine, Geldex, Procentra, and Provigil are approved stimulants (known as “go-pills”) “to counter aviator fatigue and improve alertness and performance.”
Ambien, Restoril, and Sonata are approved sedatives (“no-go pills”) “to aid in sleep initiation when an operational need exists.” Side effects can range from addiction to “an increased risk of vehicle accidents,” which is why such pharmaceuticals are prescribed and monitored by flight surgeons. They were implicated in a 2002 U.S. “friendly fire” attack in Afghanistan that killed four Canadian soldiers.
Concern over such drug use has led to the Pentagon’s Alert WARfighter Enablement (AWARE) program. It wants to turn such drugs, once in a pilot’s body, on or off using infrared light delivered into the pilot’s brain via “wearable light emitters.”
The ultimate night fight flight light, you might say.
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