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Friday, February 28, 2025
[Salon] Trump, Vance Clash With Zelensky During White House Meeting - Guest Post by Kyle Anzalone, Antiwar.com
https://news.antiwar.com/2025/02/28/trump-vance-clash-with-zelensky-during-white-house-meeting/
Trump, Vance Clash With Zelensky During White House Meeting
Following the meeting, Trump posted on TruthSocial that Zelensky was not ready for peace
by Kyle Anzalone
A press conference in the Oval Office with President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and Ukrainian President Zelensky turned contentious after Vance slammed Zelensky for campaigning with former Vice President Kamala Harris. The chaotic meeting appears to have squashed Zelensky’s opportunity to sign a mineral deal with the US.
During the presser, Zelensky posed a question to Vance, “what kind of diplomacy JD” can you have with Russian President Vladimir Putin?
Vance fired back, “I’m talking about the kind of diplomacy that will bring an end to the destruction of your country.” After Zelensky attempted to interject, the Vice President stopped him and said it was “disrespectful for you to come into the Oval Office and litigate this in front of the American media. Right now, you are forcing conscripts to the first lines because you have manpower problems. You should be thanking the President for trying to bring an end to the conflict.”
In his response, Zelensky irritated Trump when he argued that Russia would one day threaten the US. Trump cut off Zelensky saying, “Don’t tell us what we’re going to feel. We’re trying to solve a problem. Don’t tell us what we are going to feel because you are in no position to dictate that.” He continued as he talked over Zelensky, “You’re gambling with the lives of millions of people. You’re gambling with WWIII. What you’re doing is very disrespectful to the country, this country.”
Vance then attacked Zelensky over campaign with Vice President Kamala Harris shortly before the election. After a brief exchange, Trump interrupted Zelensky stating, “You’ve done a lot of talking. Your country is in big trouble. You’re not winning.” He added, “It’s going to be very hard to do business like this.”
At the start of the press conference, Trump said he expected Zelensky to sign the mineral deal on Friday. As the press conference continued, Trump questioned whether Zelensky wanted an agreement and implied that future US aid to Ukraine depended on Kiev signing the deal. He told Zelensky, “You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out, and if we’re out, you’ll fight it out. I don’t think it’s going to be pretty, but you’ll fight it out.”
The deal would have established a fund where Ukraine will put 50% of its proceeds from rare earth minerals and other resources that will be used for investment projects in Ukraine. The deal would not have explicitly given security guarantees to Ukraine.
Throughout the press conference, Trump said he wanted to end the deal and would make a deal with Putin. Zelensky said he would be unwilling to make compromises with Russia. Trump disagreed saying both sides would have to make concessions.
Following the presser, Trump posted on TruthSocial that the deal was off. “We had a very meaningful meeting in the White House today. Much was learned that could never be understood without conversation under such fire and pressure. It’s amazing what comes out through emotion, and I have determined that President Zelensky is not ready for Peace if America is involved, because he feels our involvement gives him a big advantage in negotiations. I don’t want advantage, I want PEACE. He disrespected the United States of America in its cherished Oval Office. He can come back when he is ready for Peace.”
Thursday, February 27, 2025
Trump floats $5 million 'gold card' as a route to US citizenship | Reuters
Trump floats $5 million 'gold card' as a route to US citizenship | Reuters
WASHINGTON, Feb 25 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday floated the idea of replacing a visa program for foreign investors with a so-called "gold card" that could be bought for $5 million as a route to American citizenship.
Trump told reporters he will replace the "EB-5" immigrant investor visa program, which allows foreign investors of large sums of money that create or preserve U.S. jobs to become permanent residents, with a so-called "gold card."
The EB-5 program grants "green cards" to foreigners promising to invest in U.S. businesses.
"We are going to be selling a gold card," Trump said. "We are going to be putting a price on that card of about $5 million," he added.
"It's going to give you green card privileges plus its going to be a route to (American) citizenship, and wealthy people would be coming into our country by buying this card," Trump said, adding that details about the scheme will come out in two weeks.
Trump added it is possible Russian oligarchs could qualify for the gold cards, when asked by a journalist if those people would be eligible. "Yeah, possibly. Hey. I know some Russian oligarchs that are very nice people," he said.
The EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, administered by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, was created by Congress in 1990 to "stimulate the U.S. economy through job creation and capital investment by foreign investors," according to the USCIS website.
"The EB-5 program ... it was full of nonsense, make believe and fraud, and it was a way to get a green card that was low price. So the president said, rather than having this sort of ridiculous EB-5 program, we're going to end the EB-5 program. We're going to replace it with the Trump gold card," Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told reporters on Tuesday.
[Salon] U.S. House Foreign Affairs Chair Instructs Staff to Refer to West Bank as 'Judea and Samaria - Guest Post from John Whitbeck
FM: John Whitbeck
The HAARETZ report transmitted below states that a potentially imminent declaration by President Trump that the United States would recognize a formal Israeli annexation of the West Bank "would effectively serve as the final death knell for a two-state solution."
I disagree. It could and should have precisely the opposite effect, serving as a salutary wake-up call which inspires prompt and practical action to oppose such a blatant violation of international law, one which, if allowed to stand, could effectively serve as the final death knell of international law.
The United States does not determine international law. Like Israel, it treats it with contempt.
Only three of the 193 UN member states (Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay) have followed the American lead in recognizing Israel's illegal annexation of Palestinian East Jerusalem, and none have followed the American lead in recognizing Israel's illegal annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights.
The minimum appropriate response of the 47 UN member states which have not yet extended diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine (List of Shame attached) to any formal US-supported Israeli annexation of the West Bank should be to join the other 146 UN member states, encompassing the overwhelming majority of mankind, which currently recognize the State of Palestine, within its clearly defined and UN-recognized borders (all of that portion of historical Palestine which Israel has ocupied since June 1967, nothing more and nothing less), even while its entire territory remains under Israeli occupation and without waiting for Israel's prior permission.
Those states which do not wish to be perceived as outlaw states supporting apartheid and genocide should then proceed to implement the second step proposed in an article of mine published in November 2023 (https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/11/27/two-solutions-for-the-question-of-palestine) -- imposing crippling sanctions against Israel for as long as it takes until it ends its illegal occupation and fully withdraws from the State of Palestine.
For decades, the Global West has justified taking no useful action whatsoever to end Israel's illegal occupation by pretending to believe, contrary to all evidence, that the occupation was temporary. A formal annexation declaration would strip the Global West of its excuse for inaction.
A formal annexation declaration may therefore not be something to fear. It could offer hope for positive change and progress toward peace with some measure of justice.
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2025-02-26/ty-article/.premium/u-s-house-foreign-affairs-chair-instructs-staff-to-call-west-bank-judea-and-samaria/00000195-439b-df18-a1fd-cbdb32820000
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> U.S. House Foreign Affairs Chair Instructs Staff to Refer to West Bank as 'Judea and Samaria'
> Ben SamuelsFeb 26, 2025
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> WASHINGTON – Rep. Brian Mast, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, instructed committee staff to refer to the West Bank as "Judea and Samaria" in all official correspondence, communication, and documentation moving forward.
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> Mast's letter, sent to committee staff on Tuesday, is one of the most formal displays of Congressional support for Israel's potential annexation of the West Bank.
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> While other Republican lawmakers have previously introduced legislation supporting such name changes based on Israel's supposed right to the territory due to biblical roots, never before has such a move come from a powerful committee head.
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> "Long before Hamas killed Americans and Israelis on October 7, we saw vile acts meant to dehumanize Jewish people throughout the world and shatter Israelis' rights to live in peace," Mast wrote.
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> He added, "As a committee and as representatives of the American people, we must do our part to stem this reprehensible tide of antisemitism and recognize Israel's rightful claim to the cradle of Jewish civilization."
> A general view of the West Bank Jewish settlement of Efrat ,Tuesday, Nov. 12, 2024.
A general view of the West Bank Jewish settlement of Efrat ,Tuesday, Nov. 12, 2024.Credit: Ohad Zwigenberg,AP
Mast was surprisingly tapped to chair the influential committee during the presidential transition after Trump advocated on his behalf. The Florida congressman has long been considered the U.S. lawmaker most hostile to the Palestinians. He has decried efforts to bolster humanitarian aid for Gaza and dismissed the notion of innocent Palestinian civilians.
"I don't think we would so lightly throw around the term 'innocent Nazi civilians' during World War II. It is not a far stretch to say there are very few innocent Palestinian civilians," he said in remarks that led to an unsuccessful effort in the House to formally rebuke him.
Mast, an evangelical Christian, once volunteered with the Israeli military, and he wore his uniform in Congress in the days after the October 7 attack. This was a way to protest Rep. Rashida Tlaib's placing of a Palestinian flag outside her office.
Mast has also condemned the concept of a two-state solution while spearheading legislation to permanently cut U.S. funding for the UNRWA refugee agency, among other hostile bills. He has also slammed U.S. efforts to secure a cease-fire in Gaza and advocated for expedited and expanded weapons sales to Israel.
The memo, which is unenforceable to the committee's Democratic staff, comes one week before U.S. President Donald Trump's previously imposed deadline for deciding on whether the U.S. will recognize Israeli annexation of the West Bank, which would effectively serve as the final death knell for a two-state solution.
Since Trump's November election victory, settler groups and far-right supporters of Israel have proclaimed the president's return to the White House as an unprecedented opportunity to advance their cause – including the formation of a caucus dedicated to advancing the matter as well as direct lobbying from settler leaders and representatives.
Wednesday, February 26, 2025
[Salon] America as Republic, not as Empire – Europe’s “sound and fury” after jaw-dropping pivots in U.S. policy - Guest Post by Alastair Crooke
https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/02/26/america-as-republic-not-as-empire-europe-sound-and-fury-after-jaw-dropping-pivots-in-us-policy/
Alastair Crooke, February 26, 2025
America as Republic, not as Empire – Europe’s “sound and fury” after jaw-dropping pivots in U.S. policy
The bits are falling into a distinct pattern – a pre-prepared pattern.
Defence Secretary Hegseth at the Munich Security Conference gave us four ‘noes’: No to Ukraine in NATO; No to a return to pre-2014 borders; No to ‘Article 5’ peacekeeper backstops, and ‘No’ to U.S. troops in Ukraine. And in a final flourish, he added that U.S. troops in Europe are not ‘forever’ – and even placed a question mark over the continuity of NATO.
Pretty plain speaking! The U.S. clearly is cutting away from Ukraine. And they intend to normalise relations with Russia.
Then, Vice-President Vance threw his fire cracker amongst the gathered Euro-élites. He said that the élites had retreated from “shared” democratic values; they were overly reliant on repressing and censoring their peoples (prone to locking them up); and, above all, he excoriated the European Cordon Sanitaire (‘firewall’) by which European parties outside the Centre-Left are deemed non-grata politically: It’s a fake ‘threat’, he suggested. Of what are you really so frightened? Have you so little confidence in your ‘democracy’?
The U.S., he implied, will no longer support Europe if it continues to suppress political constituencies, arrest citizens for speech offenses, and particularly cancel elections as was done recently in Romania. “If you’re running in fear of your own voters”, Vance said, “there is nothing America can do for you”.
Ouch! Vance had hit them where it hurts.
It is difficult to say what specifically most triggered the catatonic European breakdown: Was it the fear of the U.S. and Russia joining together as a major power nexus – thus stripping Europe from ever again being able glide along on the back of American power, through the specious notion that any European state must have exceptional access to the Washington ‘ear’?
Or was it the ending of the Ukraine/Zelensky cult which was so prized amongst the Euro-élite as the ‘glue’ around which a faux European unity and identity could be enforced? Both probably contributed to the fury.
That the U.S. would in essence leave Europe to their own delusions would be a calamitous event for the Brussels technocracy.
Many may lazily assume that the U.S. double act at Munich was just another example of the well-known Trumpian fondness for dropping ‘wacky’ initiatives intended to both shock and kickover frozen paradigms. The Munich speeches did exactly that all right! Yet that does not make them accidental; but rather parts that fit into a bigger picture.
It is clear now that the Trump blitzkrieg across the American Administrative State could not have been mounted unless carefully pre-planned and prepared over the last four years.
Trump’s flurry of Presidential Executive Orders at the outset of his Presidency were not whimsical. Leading U.S. constitutional lawyer, Johnathan Turley, and other lawyers say that the Orders were well drafted legally and with the clear understanding that legal challenges would ensue. What’s more, that Trump Team welcome those challenges.
What is going on? The newly confirmed head of the Office of Budget Management(OBM), Russ Vought, says his Office will become the “on/off switch” for all Executive expenditure under the new Executive Orders. Vought calls the resulting whirlpool, the application of Constitutional radicalism. And Trump has now issued the Executive Order that reinstates the primacy of the Executive as the controlling mechanism of government.
Vaught, who was in OBM in Trump 01, is carefully selecting the ground for all-out financial war on the Deep State. It will be fought out firstly at the Supreme Court – which the Trump Team expect confidently to win (Trump has the 6-3 conservative majority). The new régime will then be applied across all agencies and departments of state. Expect shrieks of pain.
The point here is that the Administrative State – aloof from executive control – has taken to itself prerogatives such as immunity to dismissal and the self-awarded authority to shape policy – creating a dual state system, run by unelected technocrats, which, when implanted in departments such as Justice and the Pentagon, have evolved into the American Deep State.
Article Two of the Constitution however, says very bluntly: Executive power shall be vested in the U.S. President (with no ifs or buts at all.) Trump intends for his Administration to recover that lost Executive power. It was, in fact, lost long ago. Trump is re-claiming too, the Executive’s right to dismiss ‘servants of the State’, and to ‘switch off’ wasteful expenditure at his discretion, as part of a unitary executive prerequisite.
Of course, the Administrative State is fighting back. Turley’s article is headlined: They Are Taking Away Everything We Have: Democrats and Unions Launch Existential Fight. Their aim has been to cripple the Trump initiative through using politicised judges to issue restraint orders. Many mainstream lawyers believe Trump’s Unitary Executive claim to be illegal. The question is whether Congress can stand up Agencies designed to act independently of the President; and how does that square with the separation of powers and Article Two that vests unqualified executive power with one sole elected official – the U.S. President.
How did the Democrats not see this coming? Lawyer Robert Barnes essentially saysthat the ‘blitzkrieg’ was “exceptionally well-planned” and had been discussed in Trump circles since late 2020. The latter team had emerged from within a generational and cultural shift in the U.S.. This latter had given rise to a Libertarian/Populist wing with working class roots who often had served in the military, yet had come to despise the Neo-con lies (especially those of 9/11) that brought endless wars. They were animated more by the old John Adams adage that ‘America should not go abroad in search of monsters to slay’.
In short, they were not part of the WASP ‘Anglo’ world; they came from a different Culture that harked back to the theme of America as Republic, not as Empire. This is what you see with Vance and Hegseth – a reversion to the Republican precept that the U.S. should not become involved in European wars. Ukraine is not America’s war.
The Deep State, it seems, were not paying attention to what a posse of ‘populist’ outliers, tucked away from the rarefied Beltway talking shop, were up to: They (the outliers) were planning a concerted attack on the Federal expenditure spigot – identified as the weak spot about which a Constitutional challenge could be mounted that would derail – in its entirety – the expenditures of the Deep State.
It seems that one aspect to the surprise has been the Trump Team’s discipline: ‘no leaks’. And secondly, that those involved in the planning are not drawn from the preeminent Anglo-sphere, but rather from a strand of society that was offended by the Iraq war and which blames the ‘Anglo-sphere’ for ‘ruining’ America.
So Vance’s speech at Munich was not disruptive – merely for the sake of being disruptive; he was, in fact, encouraging the audience to recall early Republican Values. This was what is meant by his complaint that Europe had turned away from “our shared values” – i.e. the values that animated Americans seeking escape from the tyranny, prejudices and corruption of the Old World. Vance was (quite politely) chiding the Euro-élites for backsliding to old European vices.
Vance implicitly was hinting too, that European conservative libertarians should emulate Trump and act to slough-off their ‘Administrative States’, and recover control over executive power. Tear down the firewalls, he advised.
Why? Because he likely views the ‘Brussels’ Technocratic State as nothing other than a pure offshoot to the American Deep State – and therefore very likely to try to torpedo and sink Trump’s initiative to normalise relations with Moscow.
If these were Vance’s instincts, he was right. Macron almost immediately summoned an ‘emergency meeting’ of ‘the war party’ in Paris to consider how to frustrate the American initiative. It failed however, descending reportedly into quarrelling and acrimony.
It transpired that Europe could not gather a ‘sharp-end’ military force greater than 20,-000-30,000 men. Scholtz objected in principle to their involvement; Poland demurred as a close neighbour of Ukraine; and Italy stayed silent. Starmer, however, after Munich, immediately rang Zelensky to say that Britain saw Ukraine to be on an irrevocable path to NATO membership – thus directly contradicting U.S. policy and with no support from other states. Trump will not forget this, nor will he forget Britain’s former role in supporting the Russiagate slur during his first term in office.
The meeting did however, underline Europe’s divisions and impotence. Europe has been sidelined and their self-esteem is badly bruised. The U.S. would in essence leave Europe to their own delusions, which would be calamitous for the Brussels autocracy.
Yet, far more consequential than most of the happenings of the past few days was when Trump, speaking with Fox News,after attending Daytona, dismissed Zelensky’s canard of Russia wanting to invade NATO countries. “I don’t agree with that; not even a little bit”, Trump retorted.
Trump does not buy into the primary lie intended as the glue which holds this entire EU geo-political structure together. For, without the ‘Russia threat’; without the U.S. believing in the globalist linchpin lie, there can be no pretence of Europe needing to prepare for war with Russia. Europe ultimately will have to come to reconcile its future as a periphery in Eurasia.
[Salon] Interview — Graham Fuller: We Have a Choice, Folks - Guest Post
https://click-1663023.icptrack.com/icp/relay.php?r=45562686&msgid=209946&act=G6NU&c=1663023&pid=908591&destination=https%3A%2F%2Fschillerinstitute.com%2Fblog%2F2025%2F02%2F26%2Finterview-graham-fuller-we-have-a-choice-folks%2F&cf=5184&v=406976c45b03d4417e130383439070290448f285a9bf527ea86fc57ead46ff00
Interview — Graham Fuller: We Have a Choice, Folks
Feb. 19, 2025 (EIRNS)—EIR’s Mike Billington conducted an extensive interview today with Graham Fuller, which we transcribe in full below.
Billington: Greetings. This is Mike Billington with the Executive Intelligence Review and the Schiller Institute. I have the pleasure of interviewing today Mr. Graham Fuller, former long-time CIA official, including being the vice chairman at the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, responsible for long-term strategic forecasting. He’s also very much an expert on Arab issues, which we will mention during our discussion here.
Fuller: I just might mention Mike. I’ve also, from early days in my life, been very focused on Russia. I majored in Russian history and literature and language at Harvard. So I’m yes, a lot of Arab world stuff, but a lot in Türkiye, and in Hong Kong, in China for many years. It’s been a bit of a trip around the world.
Billington: Okay. So you’re a good person to have on because the whole world is changing very, very rapidly. So, I watched the joint interview that you did with Ray McGovern and Larry Wilkerson. In that interview, you said that the Arabs have been rather reserved in their support for the Palestinians, partially because the radical position taken by the Palestinians would tend to upset the kings and the emirs in the Arab world. But you also then said that the genocide of this last year has broken through some of that hesitancy and that the Arabs are coming together to support the Palestinians. Do you want to explain that process?
Fuller: Well, Mike, the ruling circles in the Arab world, and they’re all kings and emirs for the most part, have feared the revolutionary character of the Palestinian nationalist movement, which is essentially a national liberation movement and a movement seeking to free themselves and be more independent and under democratic rule. Furthermore, it’s a public movement. It’s a nationalist, emotional movement that Arab rulers fear because they don’t want people in the streets demonstrating on any issue, because it suggests people power in the streets, that one day could be the root of turning against the ruling circles themselves. So any kind of public agitation of that sort is not welcome. The Palestinians are the preeminent symbol of revolutionary change in the Middle East as are the Iranians, who are the other very feared state. It’s not that Arabs hate Persians, necessarily, but because the Iranians had a genuine revolution, a street revolution that we don’t see much of in the world anymore. They’re usually coups in the Arab world. But the Iranians, the Persians had a real revolution. And that scares the hell out of dictators and various authoritarians across the region. They may feel sorry for the Palestinians, but they don’t want mass agitation.
Billington: What did you mean when you said they’re starting to come together now, the Arab world?
Fuller: The outrage is that we’re all perceiving, in this genocide, this laying waste to the Gaza Strip, with Israel moving again, as they want to do, into Lebanon, into parts of Syria, annexing the Golan Heights—the real borders of Israel are known only to God because it’s all in the Bible. It all depends on how you interpret it. There are those Israelis and interpreters of the Holy Scripture that see signs that Israel, Greater Israel, has a place in parts of Saudi Arabia, going back to ancient days. Of course, Jordan is functionally, in many ways, a Palestinian state. It’s got a slight majority, a Palestinian majority in Jordan. Parts of Egypt have figured very prominently in Jewish history going way back. Nobody knows where Israel will stop when it’s in its expansionist mood, which is where it is now, and where its right wing certainly locates itself.
Billington: You have endorsed The LaRouche Oasis Plan which Lyndon LaRouche first devised back in the 1970s for a massive water and power development program for Palestine, but going beyond Palestine into the broader region. You’ve suggested in particular that such a plan should extend through Iraq and Iran and on into Afghanistan and Central Asia. What do you think about the Oasis Plan, and, in particular, what do you think would be the impact on the international discussion about the Mideast crisis if it were introduced as part of a peace plan for the region?
Fuller: I think you’re correct that it needs to be introduced as part of a broader peace plan. One of the reasons that, however fine an idea it has been, the fact is that the local rivalries and particularly rivalries projected by the United States in a Cold War mode has made regional cooperation all but impossible. I mean, Syria, for example, would need to figure quite seriously, or Iraq for that matter, the Tigris and Euphrates. All of these states would need to figure very seriously in any kind of regional water plan. But that’s been impossible when the United States has been at war with Iraq for a long time. In the past, Iraq was seen as the enemy. We can’t deal with Iran because they’re the enemy. Syria was seen as hostile to the U.S., so we couldn’t deal with Syria. In other words, the wherewithal of bringing these particular states together has not been there up to now. I think it’s only as you begin to see a motion, a movement towards broader regional cooperation that the water aspect, the engineering aspects, the power aspects, the social aspects, the political aspects really begin to come into play. The first very positive move in that direction, as you’re well aware, was that the so-called intractable hostility between Persians and Arabs, was essentially solved or mollified by Chinese intervention. A couple of years back, when they brought about a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, that was a remarkable event that many regional specialists would have said could never happen. So you can see the power of where serious political geopolitical thinking opens the door to the more practical aspects of broader regional water, agricultural, and hydrological projects. So I think maybe the day is getting closer when this project could be seen as feasible and manageable.
Billington: You brought up Iran. You suggested in that same interview I watched, you suggested that Trump, despite having been very critical of Iran, and ended the nuclear deal with Iran during his first term, but that nonetheless you say that if you compare this to his reaching out to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un during his first term, that Trump may be willing to make such a reconciliation with Iran. What makes you think that would be possible? And what do you think would be the result?
Fuller: Part of this involves Trump watching, which I think there’s no recognized expert of what Trump watching involves today. The whole world is watching with fascination. I mean, some people accuse Trump of having no principles, that it’s all me, me, me. That’s not altogether all bad, if Trump can see that.
If Trump finds gratification in having his name in lights, blazing lights, as the person who managed to bring North Korea and the rest of the world, or Iran and the rest of the world, into a more comfortable position, I think that’s great. Having him driven by ego to do those things would be superb. I was very impressed, as I think many people were, by what Trump tried to accomplish three times with Kim Jong Un, probably the most intractable problem and leader in the world. I think he might, well, he’s indicated a possible interest in taking on Iran. I think you and I and many people listening to this are well aware of the problems surrounding this, not least of all, is Israel. Israel treasures its hostility of Iran. It’s one of the reasons why Israel feels that it’s got to maintain a huge power, including nuclear power, and block any other power’s move towards nuclear, or even traditional military power on the part of Iran. So I think Trump is well aware that he would need to take that on. But hopefully, his desire for, adulation and for playing the role of a statesman could maybe overcome some elements of, Zionist and Israeli pressure, against any kind of rapprochement with Iran. But it’s key. Iran is key to the future of any kind of regional cooperation. And the Chinese, as I said, have opened the door by making a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Tehran possible.
Billington: Right. The problem, of course, is that Trump just invited Bibi Netanyahu to Washington. He treated him with glory. He came up with this idea of taking over Gaza and clearing out all the Palestinians, an idea which is clearly impossible and a bit nuts. What do you think can get Trump to generally break from this extreme right-wing Israeli leadership? Even the open genocide of the last year, which you said has begun to bring the Arab countries together, appears not to have fazed Trump and his open glorification of this government in Israel.
Fuller: Israel is a very tough nut to crack, if you will, in the sense of trying to limit its extraordinary power over American foreign policy in all areas. Some have described the American Congress as “Israeli occupied territory.” Whatever we think about that. I think it was interesting that when Netanyahu came to Washington very recently, it was clear that he was taken off guard by Trump’s suggestion that the U.S. would take over Gaza and had its own plan for the development of a beautiful new “Riviera” in the area. Netanyahu looked like he was quite surprised by that. And in fact, Trump was really saying, “No, Israel, Gaza would no longer be yours. It wouldn’t be yours to develop. It would be ours to develop.” I’m sure that this kind of encounter with Trump on the part of Bibi suggests that Trump is not to be taken for granted, that he can come up with some bold, even crazy or startling or original concepts that Israel cannot bank on with any certainty. Secondly, if you think about the power of the Israeli lobby, it might be interested to consider whether Trump, being in his second term, that the Israel lobby is no longer able to exercise the same power as it can in the first term, simply because he can’t run for office again and maybe doesn’t have to depend on that kind of politics. When people like, Miriam Adelson had donated $100 million to Trump for running again and winning this time around. Trump can really in many ways pocket it and say, “Okay, but what have you done for me lately?” He’s not running for office again as a lame duck, then he may be a little less dependent upon Zionist money to win the next election, including Miriam Adelson’s willingness to buy Trump. Maybe it’s harder to buy Trump these days. I’m just throwing out some thoughts here, uh, as to what might possibly weaken the Zionist death grip on American foreign policy in the Middle East?
By the way, I don’t want to let this idea get lost. But it’s not just in the Middle East. I would suggest that the Ukraine issue is quite fundamentally tied in with this. The neocons, who are, of course, to a man and a woman totally supportive of Israel, are also very hostile to Russia, deeply and ideologically. If Trump is able to bring about, as it looks now possible, to bring about some kind of settlement of the Ukrainian issue, this removes a major ideological issue from the hands of the neocons in Washington. I do not think they would welcome that kind of improvement of relations between Moscow and Washington. So you can see, if there is a settlement of the Ukrainian issue, I think it would have a direct impact on the power of the neocons in Washington, which would have an obvious effect in Gaza and the broader issue of Israel and the Middle East. It’s just a thought.
Billington: As you know, the Russian and American core leadership had a meeting today in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Do you want to comment on what you saw in that meeting?
Fuller: I’m not privy to what really took place there, except the vibe seemed to be very good. The meeting went on reportedly for four hours, which is remarkable for any kind of initial diplomatic meeting of that sort. Really quite difficult issues. So there’s that, and the fact that both sides expressed deep satisfaction with the progress made so far. So I’m just very encouraged at that taking place, I don’t think anybody in any of the readouts following the meeting talked about the impact on the Middle East, but it’s certain they they’re bound to have talked about it, because Russia is quite involved in the Middle East, and Washington is deeply involved in the Middle East. The issue of Russia’s role in all of that is bound to have been part of the discussion between the American and Russian parties. So yes, there may be a trickle down, important trickle down effect from a willingness to talk. It’s pretty shocking, Mike, that Biden over three years was more willing to go to war and kill, you know, tens of thousands of Ukrainians rather than talk once to Putin about the conflict, on how peace could be arrived at. That’s because all they wanted to do—they didn’t care about Ukraine itself. The goal was to weaken Russia, bring Russia down, humble Russia. That’s why Biden wasn’t even willing to talk to them. Well, we have a very different world now when we see these senior representatives of both states willing to talk to each other on a broad range of issues, which should have taken place starting three years ago, but for the reasons we talked about, did not take place.
Billington: Right. So we also have this extraordinary development of Tulsi Gabbard becoming the Director of National Intelligence, somebody who has been very forthright and open, attacking the crimes of the FBI and the so-called deep state. She will be the person briefing Donald Trump every day as the Director of National Intelligence. As a former leader of the intelligence agencies, as you were, how do you expect this to function?
Fuller: A couple of points, Mike. First of all, there’s the serious question, an eternal question, that existed when I was running the long term estimates for the CIA. Who reads these things? Does the president read them? Which president reads them? Supposedly Obama had a deep interest in reading this kind of intelligence analysis and reporting. But I think Biden was less inclined to do so. Trump apparently doesn’t like really reading at all. George W Bush, apparently, according to the people who were sent to brief him, had limited interest in what the intelligence community had to say. George W Bush knew what he wanted to know, or believed. He knew what he knew, and so that was that. So I hope that Tulsi Gabbard might well have this president’s ear, because he played such a role in bringing her into her present position, but we just don’t know how much Trump is going to read into it, if he gets intelligence that is not what he wants to hear. Other presidents have this problem. They don’t want to get the bad news from the intelligence communities, from their reporting. Secondly, I don’t know how much influence Tulsi Gabbard personally—it’s part of the same issue—but, how much influence she’ll really have over Trump in this regard.
And she’s coming up against some other major big players. That’s all along been an issue. The Pentagon has its own intelligence organization and it has its own agenda. It has its own views of Russia. If you come in with a report that “peace is breaking out all over”—I’m not saying that that’s going to happen. But in the event that you have very positive vibes coming out of American and Russian encounters, the Pentagon might feel that some issues for them, maybe their own ox is being gored, or what is the voice of the huge mass of the American military industrial complex. That’s who feeds off hostility between Russia and the United States, or for that matter, Iran and the United States, or China and the United States. That’s grist for their mill. So they will be wanting to push back against voices that are maybe encouraging rapprochement and finding opportunities for closer cooperation between the United States and Russia.
So, yes, I’m very delighted that Tulsi Gabbard is there. I think she’s a very intelligent woman, strong morals and strong principled views on what’s going on in the world that hopefully will have a positive impact on the situation.
Billington: You might know that we published the pamphlet called “The Liars Bureau,” whose purpose was to encourage the members of the U.S. Senate to confirm Tulsi Gabbard, as well as Kash Patel as the FBI chief, by pointing out that the people we know well from the intelligence community over the last decade or more have tended to be massive liars. We pointed out the work of Dick Cheney, James Clapper, Mike Pompeo and others who promoted these illegal wars in Iraq and Syria and Libya and so forth, who manufactured the whole. “Russia, Russia, Russia,” Russia-gate hoax to drive Trump out of office, and more. How do you explain the sorry state of the U.S. intelligence agencies that we’re now facing we have to clear up?
Fuller: I was relieved, Mike, to see that I was not included among the members of the Liars Club, despite my many years in the CIA, both as an operations officer overseas and in terms of long range forecasting. I think, um, the real question again comes down to what kind of access and influence that the chief of intelligence will have over the president and his followers. Also, we have to remember that it’s not just a question of what the President believes, but the congressional opinions and views matter very heavily in this as well. We know that Congress is heavily bought and paid for. I mean, we all know the famous remark by Mark Twain that “America has the finest Congress that money can buy.” It’s hard to know how much congressmen who are bought and paid for by the military industrial complex or the Israeli lobby, how much they will be influenced by what a supposedly objective intelligence community is saying and how much money will speak to them. That’s, I think, one of the really key considerations.
And secondly, I would have to say over time, and I’ve had, you know, over 30 years or so, had a lot to do with the intelligence community. My sense is that it has become increasingly politicized over time, since when I first went in. Most of us junior CIA officers, most of us felt somehow that if we could just get the word back to Washington as to “what the real situation was,” that politicians would move and act appropriately in adjusting their policies. The real coming of age for young CIA officers is when you begin to find out that maybe what you thought was a great report from a great agent source in the Middle East or Russia or China or wherever else, maybe will reach the table of some important person, but will he or she really read it? Or more to the point, will they believe it? Or do they want to believe it? Or will they act on it? Those are all great unknowns. So these issues I think, have become more politicized. The appointments to top positions in the CIA have become more politicized over time. And that, I think, has greatly weakened and damaged the reputation of the CIA. And frankly, I’ve been quite shocked at many of the statements of CIA in recent years, especially in Ukraine, where seemingly not only the New York Times assured us every day that Russia was losing the war in Ukraine, that Ukraine had virtually won the war. But apparently CIA reports were telling the president the same thing. And Biden wanted to believe and wanted to hear it. So there we are.
Billington: Much of your career was focused on the Arab world. There’s now great discord in the Arab world over how to deal with the crisis in Palestine. Um, how are they responding to Trump’s call for the U.S. to come in and take it over and build Gaza?
Fuller: Well, I think I think first of all, the Arab world has been angry for some long time about the treatment of Palestinians and the expansion of Israeli power and influence in the region, and the assassination of leaders, one after another after another. Regional leaders, both Arab and Iranian. As I said earlier, the Israeli destruction, horrifying destruction, turning Gaza into something that looks like Berlin after World War Two, the tragic scenes of the human losses, of men, women and children in Gaza, has horrified the Arab world as it has horrified so much else of the world.
Secondly, I think now that much of Arab leadership—they may not love the Palestinians and may be afraid of political agitation on the part of Palestinians. But they can’t push back against that anymore. They’ve got to ride with it and support it. So I would say, they are far more willing to speak out now. Thirdly, I think there’s a sense among Arabs and especially Arab leaders to be really angry at the idea that Washington—and I’ll use a vulgarism here because it’s really accurate—that Washington is putting all its shit on top of the Arab leaders. Uh, you know, “We fucked up here, but you guys are going to have to take care of it. You’re going to have to take the Palestinians. You’re going to have to pay for it. We don’t want to have to get involved in that.” That really enrages the Arab world and the Arab leadership, the Muslim world and the regional leadership that sees America and Israel as fundamentally the source, the cause behind this, this tragic genocide in Gaza, which has been preceded by decades and decades of Israeli dominance, geopolitical dominance and military dominance over all Arab states. So I think we’ve seen—as Marx said, who used the term “quantitative into qualitative change”—the anger, I think, now has begun to turn into something quite different. I would not want to predict where it’s going to go, but I fear it’s going to result in far more violence. I happen to think that war between Israel and Iran now is more likely than ever before. One, because Bibi Netanyahu knows that his ability to stay in power depends on the perpetuation of war. And it’s part of the Israeli myth that Iran is our greatest enemy and that if we don’t crush it and destroy its nuclear capabilities, then we’re forever at risk. This is the mantra of Israel today, and a mantra that they’ve tried to impose on Washington thinking.
So I, I’m very, very nervous about the possibility of a war in which Bibi himself is working to try to draw the U.S. into such a war, to back it both militarily and diplomatically, across the board. I don’t think any Arab state really wants to go to war with Israel. I think they would know they their armies are not up to it, that they would suffer considerably, but they’ve got to show that they’ve got some cojones, let’s say, to demonstrate to their people that they’re not going to take infinite insults and injuries and disrespect from Israeli policies. I don’t see this going in any good direction, unless there’s a dramatic change in Palestine, in Gaza. For all Trump’s efforts, I don’t really see that happening now, and especially with the power of the Israeli lobby that still seems to be singing from the same hymn book. So I’m quite positive about Ukraine, but I’m not very positive about Palestine and Gaza, except for the fact that maybe an American-Russian rapprochement could begin to deliver some kind of regional settlement. But. Bibi will be dragged kicking and screaming every inch of the way against it. So that does not bode well.
Billington: Have you had the opportunity to see what the Egyptian plan is, which I don’t think has been made public yet, but are you aware of what they’re preparing, their plan for the reconstruction of Gaza?
Fuller: No. For one thing, Egypt is dirt poor at this point, barely surviving on many international handouts. I would expect that Egypt would make nominal efforts to contribute to some kind of Palestinian reconstruction, but it will really be nominal. They can’t afford it, but they can’t afford not to do anything. Trump indeed will tell the Arabs that they have got to come together and contribute to a rebuilding of Gaza. So I wouldn’t expect a lot of Arab states except the rich Gulf states that can afford it.
Billington: Right. You are well known as an expert on Türkiye in particular. I believe you’re also familiar with the Turkish language and that you’ve written a great deal about Türkiye and so forth. They are playing an increasingly important role in the region. What do you think about their role and how is it changing, and where is it heading?
Fuller: You’re quite right, Mike, that Türkiye’s role has been increasing in the Middle East, in the entire region. I would argue, at least 30 years now, since Erdoğan has been in power, Türkiye has said, “We’re not the old loyal NATO American ally, as you thought we were for a long time. We are the inheritors of the great Ottoman Empire, which spread out across huge areas, geographic areas of the world.” And so the Turks say: “We are not just a Mediterranean power. We’re a middle eastern power. We are a Muslim power. We are a Caucasian power. We are a Central Asian power. We are a Red sea power. We’re a North African power.” Türkiye is really playing at a very high level. Now, that would have been astonishing to think of some 30 years ago. I think the West and Washington in particular is quite uncomfortable with that, because it means that Türkiye now has become an independent actor. That must be taken into consideration independently of Washington’s own desires and plans. It’s not NATO. Türkiye as a NATO player is really almost irrelevant today. There’s some talk in NATO that Türkiye has become so contrary to NATO’s own wishes, that maybe they should throw Türkiye out. But I have commented that I think that NATO needs Türkiye more than Türkiye needs NATO.
I don’t think Türkiye is going to be expelled from NATO unless something truly egregious happens, like a Turkish attack on Israel. I would not put that, by the way, entirely out of the picture, because Türkiye came nearly to some sort of naval blows some years ago in the first conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, when Türkiye sent a flotilla of arms and food and other produce to the Palestinians across the high seas in what was called the the MV Mavi Marmara, the blue Marmara, operation, and the Israelis essentially shot it out of the water, refusing to allow them to deliver any of these goods to the Palestinians. I think there’s going to be increasing tension as Türkiye wants to up its ante, play a more and more important role. It’s quite striking that the two powers in the region that are really speaking out very strongly on the Palestinian Gaza issue Are not even Arab states, they are Türkiye and Iran. Neither of them are Arab. But they have more powerful arguments, more vehement arguments against, and speaking out more boldly against Israel than any of the Arab leaders, except for poor Yemen, which is really a dirt poor country. They are wonderful, generous, hospitable people, gutsy people. They are shooting. They’re playing way above, they’re punching way above their weight, by blocking Red sea shipping that are destined for Israel. But in any case, all I’m pointing out is, this is an extraordinary anomaly, that it’s not the Arab leaders, it’s the Persian and Turkish leaders that are moving this, driving this. And I think it is bringing many of these Arab leaders to shame in what they are not doing. So I again, I feel, have a very uncomfortable feeling that Arabs are going to feel they have to do something of a bolder nature than simply speaking out, mildly, as it has been. I think the speech has now gotten bolder. I wouldn’t be surprised if there’s some kind of bolder military or semi-military or quasi military action, on the part of some Arab states, Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia, who are the only two states with real military power among the Arabs. Otherwise, no Arab states in the region have that kind of military power, and none of it, certainly not Egyptian power, is not up to taking on the Israelis at this point.
Billington: All right. Graham . Well, thank you very much. Is there any sort of closing statement you’d like to make or a message to our readership around the world?
Fuller: Yes, I might want to say, Mike. And I know that you and the Schiller Institute are very much on board with this message. I think we are in deeply consequential times. I have never seen such a dramatic geopolitical shift in my life, in my adult professional life, other than the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which changed the world in remarkable ways, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, which changed it further. Both of which led to the emergence of the United States as the sole hegemon, global hegemon in the world. And the U.S. took that role accordingly aboard, and has been acting like the world’s sole global superpower that can do anything it wants, anywhere it wants, and expect other powers and countries to act accordingly according to American wishes. Those days are really on the way out. I’m hardly the only one saying that, but I think Washington as a country, as a government, is in denial. I think the United States is in denial, believing that it’s still the world’s sole superpower, the indispensable player and the most powerful nation in the world. All of these things are growing Increasingly unreal and increasingly dangerous to believe, to actually believe it, to act on on that basis. I’m heartened, frankly, that the emergence of other powers in the world that do not necessarily have to be enemies, can perhaps balance us in constant desire to be the sole superpower in the world that can call the shots all over the world. We are not able to do that. We have in numbers of states, like the BRICs nations, the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, now joined by Saudi Arabia and Iran and many other candidate states that want to join this. This is a formidable new movement that I see as a latent or nascent, if you will, a nascent new UN organization. The UN has fundamentally, ever since its formulation, has been a gathering of formerly colonial powers that did run the world for the last hundred years, perhaps, and thereby was able to take the dominant position in the UN. Those days, I think, are disappearing. We have new voices, who have new interests, who do not want to be pushed around by Washington or Western Europeans economically or militarily or socially or politically or in any other term. We see now, I think, the recent move by Trump and by Peter Hegseth to tell the Europeans that essentially the game in Ukraine is over. What he is saying, basically, is the NATO game is over. And above all else, I think it is maybe starting to call for a rethinking of the source of global conflict in general.
Why do we have to have conflict? Is conflict inevitable among states? I’m going to make a criticism of John Mearsheimer here. I think John Mearsheimer is a wonderful observer and theoretician on global issues. His reading of Ukraine and his reading of Gaza is some of the best in the world. But John Mearsheimer also has this theory: the theoretical view of international relations that I cannot buy, and that I don’t even think is consistent with his own geopolitical views. He really understands Ukraine and Gaza, but not because of his own geopolitical ideas. I think he feels that if you’ve got two major powers that they have to conflict.
I just find this a very mechanical, and rather crude, frankly, view of the world. States, over the history of the world—Germany and France were at each other’s throats. France and England were at each other’s throats for hundreds of years. Russia and China were at each other’s throats. Russia and Germany and the U.S. were at each other’s throats. But the world changes. Time changes. Situations change. Other countries have agency. There’s no reason why the United States has to be at war, or find Russia to be our chief opponent or that we have to find China as our chief opponent.
This is a choice. We have choice, folks. We have decided that we want Russia to be our enemy, and our government feeds off that. Mike, you and I have talked about this. The military industrial complex loves war, the Pentagon loves it. But there is no reason why there has to be that kind of conflict. And essentially Hegseth, I think, was beginning to hint at that fact, that, “Look, we can sit down. We don’t necessarily have to go to war.” But when the United States spends most of its time in its foreign policy blocking people that it fears are enemies—of course, you’re creating enemies. You’re telling people “you are our enemy. You are a peer competitor.” That’s a threat to these countries, to tell them that kind of thing. What do you think? If I tell you, Mike, that, you know, you’re a nice guy, but you’re my enemy. You draw certain conclusions, you act accordingly. I think we need to rethink this, as to why we automatically have to be at war with other powerful countries in the world. And that goes for Russia. It goes even more for China.
I’m heartened that somebody like Trump or others—Jeffrey Sachs at Harvard often raises similar kinds of questions. These are eternal questions. Why do we have to have to go to war? The U.S. foreign policy essentially over the last decade has been nothing but “block Russia,”block China.” This is a world of suffering from all kinds of problems, of health and food and regional local conflicts. Et cetera, et cetera, that the United States should be spending most of its money and treasure and time and energy on identifying enemies to which we have to build the world’s biggest budget, uh, military budget in the world, more than all the other countries of the world put together, more or less. This is not a very constructive or imaginative American foreign policy.
So I don’t want to go on about this further. I think the point is clear, but I’m heartened that, for whatever Trump’s strange or disturbing views on many American domestic issues, we’re three weeks into this guy’s policies. We have a long way to go, but I am heartened to see that some questions that nobody has bothered to ask for years are now being raised by this administration. You can call the questions crazy or maybe long overdue. They’re both. But it’s time to have a real shift of paradigm. And I see glimmerings of that now. And I’m heartened by that.
Billington: Right. Not only stop blocking them, but join them. I mean, why don’t we join the BRICS and start doing what we thought we should have been doing all along, which is helping to build countries around the world industrially, turning them into modern industrial nations. This is exactly what the LaRouche movement has always been committed to, which is that we have to really think in terms of using the history of America as a nation-building power instead of a nation-destroying power. So thanks very much, Graham. We’ll definitely get this report out everywhere through the Schiller Institute and EIR.
Fuller: Good. Well thank you, Mike. I really have immense respect for you, for Schiller, for you for asking these questions, promoting these issues tirelessly at a time when they hadn’t really been front and center of at least the last administration’s thinking. I think you may be getting some traction now, which is long overdue and welcome.
Billington: Yes, it’s good to see. Okay. Thank you very much.
MoA - Does Trump Really Have A Plan For Ukraine? Guest Post
MoA - Does Trump Really Have A Plan For Ukraine?
Does Trump Really Have A Plan For Ukraine?
The weird thing about President Trump's plans for Ukraine is that no knows what they actually are.
Over the last days I have tried to understand what he is trying to achieve. I fail to come up with a theory that makes sense. His behavior is inconsistent. There are also no helpful hints from the White House or leaks to the press. There is frenetic action here and there and pompous pronouncements. But what are the overall plans?
Prof. Mearsheimer likewise says (vid) that Trump's behavior makes no sense. Blackmailing Ukraine into a resource extraction deal is not a realist position. It is not even mercantilistic. There is nothing to sell there and any deal will be scuppered by courts under oligarch pressure. It makes no sense.
So what is the evidence that Trump has a plan? What is the evidence that he is really negotiating with Russia? What is he factually doing to shut down the war as he has claimed he would do?
Yves Smith, quoting contrarian opinions of Brian Berletic and John Helmer, is likewise wondering what Trump is about:
Because the Trump Administration has no clear idea of what it wants in terms of a Ukraine end game, save being able to claim that Trump ended the war and is therefore a great deal-maker, it is at serious risk of falling into the behavior Sun Tsu warned about: “All tactics and no strategy is the noise before the defeat.”
Specifically, we’ll discuss how oddly under-amplified assessments by Brian Berletic and John Helmer, show that the idea, popular in the independent media, that Trump represents a great foreign policy break from the past is exaggerated. His difference in methods are being unduly confused with differences in aims.
But we’ll first address the way a new Administration pet fixation, that of wresting a minerals/other economic rights deal from Ukraine, is contrary to the aim of reaching an agreement with Russia.
...
Now this Ukraine minerals deal may be an example of Trump habits operating to his detriment. Consider how the Trump approach of maximizing his possible negotiating space by advancing all sorts of frame-breaking ideas is not such a hot idea when done reflexively, as seems to be the case in Trump 2.0, as opposed to deliberately.
Trump himself regularly threatens radically extreme actions, like ethnic cleansing in Gaza, and browbeats heads of state to try to get his way. Not only is Trump not getting his Riviera development there, but his bullying makes him look like a petulant jerkface. Why should anyone want to get in any relationship with a partner who relishes not just crass dominance displays but even humiliating heads of state (witness King Abdullah of Jordan) and is indifferent to destabilizing the entire region? These actions are inimical to building trust and dealing with anything other than subservient parties.
...
Or perhaps Trump and his operatives still believe that Russia is having trouble sustaining its war effort, and so shoring up US credibility and commitment will lead Russia to make concessions.
Neither approach one might think Trump is taking - to use a Ukraine resource deal to keep the U.S. in Ukraine and the war going, or to use the Ukraine resource deal to finally break with Ukraine - is consistent with a realistic assessment of the facts on the ground. At least not if the aim of the game is to make peace.
Trump is may be just rearranging the chairs before continuing with the same old imperial program:
Brian Berletic contends that most independent commentators have fallen for the MAGA/America First hype when Trump represents strategic continuity for the US by trying to maintain dominance, particularly vis-a-vis China. In particular, Berletic described, based on watching the full confirmation hearings for Trump defense and intelligence picks, that the US was not getting rid of the USAID regime change/messaging apparatus, merely shuttering its DEI and other MAGA-disapproved elements.
...
Needless to say, this assessment, based on what the Trump Administration has said it intends to do with USAID operations, is very much at odds with the conventional, complacent view that Trump has gotten the US out of the regime change business. Why pray tell, would it have been in the US’ strategic interest to do so? It’s not as if we could win any concessions for eliminating that apparatus.
Yves Smith's take on John Helmer's analysis:
Helmer based on his own experience in the Carter Administration as well as input from Russian sources confirming what could be inferred from the remarks of various participants [of the talks in Riyadh] was that the session, from the Russian vantage, was a train wreck. Even if you didn’t have the benefit of the reports afterwards, the way the US went about it was nuts. The US side demanded an immediate high level session, when those typically do not happen before adequate ground work has been undertaken. On top of that, the key members of the Trump foreign policy team had only just been installed. And with DOGE running a bulldozer through State, it’s not as if Rubio and his colleagues had any expertise (such as from career staffers who’d been there before Team Biden came in) to draw on.
...
He reprised some of its findings, and added new observations, in a talk with Nima of Dialogue Works.
From the very top:
Helmer: The Russian perception is that the American side is a kasha, is a porridge, is a mess. But it’s necessary not to be impolite and say so…..First, what should the Russian side do next?
This problem is actually serious. The US called for a high-level meeting and had no idea what to do then, no agenda, no asks, no proposals. The point seemed to be to create a perception of momentum and pretend that Trump was making serious progress on ending the war. Helmers points to the almost desperation of the US side in saying the fact of this meeting proved that Trump was the only man who could end the war … in lieu of having anything else to say.
The conclusion for me is that there is no Trump plan at all to make peace in Ukraine.
The conflict - in consequence - will have to be decided on the battlefield.
Axios Macro - Guest Post
Axios Macro
Today, we examine how and when federal cutbacks might start to show up in national economic data. (Hint: It's probably going to be slower and less dramatic than headlines might suggest.)
Plus, what Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent had to say at the Australian embassy this morning. 🦘
👀 Situational awareness: Continuing a trend we outlined yesterday, the Conference Board's consumer confidence index registered the largest monthly drop since 2021 — down 7 points in February — as expectations about the future darkened.
Today's newsletter, edited by Ben Berkowitz and copy edited by Katie Lewis, is 790 words, a 3-minute read.
1 big thing: How DOGE cuts might show up in the data
Illustration of graph showing stock arrowing upwards being cut by a hand holding scissors
Illustration: Lazaro Gamio/Axios
Efforts by the Trump administration and Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency to cut vast numbers of federal jobs will surely show up in national economic data — but don't expect the impact to be massive, or immediate.
Why it matters: In a $30 trillion economy with 159 million jobs, it takes a lot to meaningfully move the dial. The types of cuts to federal employment and government contracts that have been enacted thus far by the DOGE crew are comparatively small scale.
That could change if President Trump and congressional Republicans enact a bigger agenda of austerity.
State of play: The administration is seeking to lay off probationary federal employees (those who've been on the job for less than a year), of which there are about 220,000, assuming they overcome pending legal challenges.
Another 77,000 federal workers have accepted DOGE's buyout, which keeps them on the payroll through September.
An open question is how many of those workers find new jobs, how many experience prolonged unemployment, and how many exit the workforce entirely.
By the numbers: SGH Macro Advisors estimates that a third of laid-off workers find a new job within three weeks, 50%-55% remain unemployed for a longer period of time and around 15% leave the workforce.
That's based on the Labor Department's Displaced Worker Survey, which tracks what happens to laid-off workers.
Using that arithmetic, it implies 220,000 federal layoffs would only raise the national unemployment rate by 0.07%, not the kind of move that makes economists — or central bankers — panic.
Yes, but: With so many federal workers entering the job market at once, it could prove a more challenging job market for displaced federal workers than the historical experience would suggest.
Of note: February jobs data due out Friday is unlikely to show much impact. The "reference week" for that payrolls report is the week that included Feb. 12, when the cutbacks were just getting started.
If you squint, you can start to see evidence of cutbacks in the weekly initial jobless claims data.
Over the last two weeks, there have been an average of 1,654 new claims for unemployment benefits in the District of Columbia, which is about three times the 2024 average.
There were 613 claims to the unemployment insurance program for federal workers in the week ended Feb. 8, up from 382 a year ago. That number is released with a two-week delay and will presumably rise further.
Reality check: The potential labor market effects are larger if the Trump administration and Congress enact major reductions to federal spending — in the hundreds of billions, not the comparatively small programs DOGE has targeted so far.
House leadership is planning a vote on a path forward for a tax bill that includes $2 trillion in spending cuts over the next decade, concentrated in Medicaid, food assistance and clean energy subsidies.
The bottom line: "The Federal Reserve is unlikely to react to a 0.1% rise in unemployment, particularly one that is easily identifiable and more of a one-off change in policy," wrote Tim Duy and Josh Lehner, of SGH Macro, in a note.
"However, any broader impact hinges on federal spending," they added.
Tuesday, February 25, 2025
[Salon] How Europe can go it alone - Guest Post by Stephen Kinzer
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/02/25/opinion/europe-nato-ukraine-trump-vance/
How Europe can go it alone
European countries are unprepared for being abandoned by the United States. But they do have options for ensuring their security.
By Stephen Kinzer – Boston Globe - February 25, 2025
How do you react when your longtime partner dumps you? Stunned European leaders are suddenly facing that question. Their countries and the United States have long been locked in intimate embrace. Suddenly the United States has announced that the affair is over. Europe is on its own. It faces a highly uncertain future for which it is unprepared.
Since the establishment of NATO in 1949, European countries have had little incentive to build up their own armies or plan for their continent’s security. They left that to Washington. Now they are scrambling for ideas. The era of Atlanticism, when Europe looked across the ocean for its security, has abruptly ended.
Despite a series of wake-up calls in past years, European countries did not anticipate this. They violated a cardinal rule of geopolitics: Always prepare for worst-case scenarios. For 75 years the United States, through NATO, lulled them into a comfortable sense of safety. Now it has cast them out to fend for themselves.
This sudden crisis was set off in Brussels, where a decade ago NATO built a mammoth headquarters that cost more than a billion dollars. The building itself was seen as a symbol that NATO would last forever. It was shaken to its foundations this month when Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced there that the United States would begin negotiating directly with Russia to end the Ukraine war.
Hegseth said the United States would no longer pursue “illusory goals” in Ukraine. He declared that Ukraine would not join NATO and should abandon hope of recovering territories that Russia has annexed. European leaders protested that he was accepting conditions laid down by President Vladimir Putin of Russia. He insisted that he was only accepting “the hard power realities on the ground.” That shattered the Western consensus on Ukraine, which was that the war there should continue for “as long as it takes” to defeat Russia.
Then Hegseth took direct aim at the Old Continent. He said that “new strategic realities” mean the United States “can no longer be focused on the security of Europe.” He even suggested that the United States might close some of the 80 military bases it maintains there.
This speech, along with one by Vice President JD Vance and a series of astonishing comments from President Trump suggesting that he is not concerned with the security of either Ukraine or Europe, shattered a marriage that Europeans had considered eternal.
European countries joined the United States in sending billions of dollars in weaponry to Ukraine. That might have earned them a seat at the table when American and Russian negotiators meet to decide Ukraine’s fate. Trump’s envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, laughed off that idea. He said Europe’s failure to prevent the war shows that it “couldn’t participate effectively in the peace process.”
In this new world, Europe can defend itself and its interests only by acting boldly. Boldness, however, is not part of its toolkit. Europe is flabby and out of shape after three generations of sleepwalking. Now its security blanket is gone. What should it do?
The boldest step imaginable would be for European countries to quit NATO and replace it with an army of their own.
But without the strict American schoolmaster to keep them in line, who would be in command? It’s difficult to imagine France putting its troops under a German general, or vice versa. It’s just as unlikely that Russia’s battle-hardened military would be intimidated by regiments from those countries, much less if they’re from other NATO countries like Albania, Portugal, or North Macedonia.
Without American backing, it’s hard to see how Europe’s armies, as they are now constituted, could deter a future Russian attack on Ukraine or defend against it. That leaves Europe the option of making its own deal with Russia. Anti-Russia passion is so high in Europe, however, that such a deal is difficult to imagine. President Emmanuel Macron of France has called Russia “an existential threat to Europe.” Many other European leaders agree.
This could change with the rise of populist, right-wing, or anti-establishment political parties in Europe. Hungary and Slovakia are already flirting with Russia. France could join them if Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 presidential election. So could other countries where politics has become volatile in recent years.
Building a European army and strengthening Ukraine’s ability to defend itself is a promising short-term strategy. That, however, would address only the immediate Russia-Ukraine crisis, not the root causes of the war. The main dispute is over Ukraine’s status in Europe. If Ukraine and the rest of Europe accept that Ukraine will be a genuinely neutral state, that might guarantee its safety more than any European army could.
The United States has made clear that henceforth it will defend only itself, not its former partners. Europe should do the same. Once it recovers from its shock, it should do what wise rejected lovers do. Its message to the United States should be: We can thrive without you, find new partners, and maybe even surprise you with our resilience.
Stephen Kinzer is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.
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