Abiding by Commitments Col. (Ret.) Shaul Arieli, former commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip; board member, Israel’s Council for Peace

Abiding by Commitments
Col. (Ret.) Shaul Arieli, former commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip; board member, Israel’s Council for Peace and Security. Interview with Middle East Bulletin. http://middleeastprogress.org/2009/07/abiding-by-commitments/


July 7, 2009

West Bank settlement of Adam (AP)
"[S]ettlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands. It is important to remember that 84 out of a 100 outposts are built fully or partially on private Palestinian lands."

What is happening on the ground currently in terms of construction in settlements and outposts?

In many settlements there is ongoing construction of new neighborhoods, for example, in Ma’ale Adumim, Modi’in Ilit and other smaller settlements. There are no new settlements, but that has been the case for years. In terms of outposts, there is no construction of new outposts but there is institutionalization of existing outposts through positioning of new house trailers, permanent buildings and so forth.

Heads of the settler movement have been complaining about a de facto construction freeze in settlements in the past few months.

That is not true. I was on a tour in the West Bank last Wednesday, for example, and saw a new neighborhood being built in the settlement of Maale Michmash.

Can you clarify the current disagreement between the United States and Israel regarding the issue of settlements?

The United States is demanding a settlement freeze after Israel has used every subtlety and excuse to expand settlements. Even in 2004 when Israel said it would only add rooms to existing houses for natural growth, this expansion turned into new neighborhoods or outposts. There is also a clear Israeli obligation to remove all outposts created since 2001; that is 24 out of 100 outposts.

How is the current conversation between the United States and Israel about settlements different than those in the past?

Throughout the years there were some understandings and agreements and mostly turning a blind eye on the part of the United States. First, for some years the Americans did not care about this issue that much. Second, the previous administration viewed the disengagement from Gaza as important and wanted to bolster former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. And third, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held peace talks with the Palestinians, which the United States wanted to support. But Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu isn’t doing that.

Another difference is that the current administration is coordinated with the Europeans on the issue of settlements, as was seen in Netanyahu’s visit in Europe last week when Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi also demanded a settlement freeze.

President Obama has also spoke about settlements in terms of Road Map obligations. What are Israel’s obligations under the Road Map? What are the parallel demands from the Palestinians?

In 2003, the United States demanded a settlements freeze, including for needs of natural growth, as well as removal of outposts built after 2001. Israel did not agree to the natural growth part, but committed to construction only within the built-up area of existing settlements. In practice, however, Israel kept building dramatically.

The Palestinian obligations are reforms in government and security forces, real war on terror, state building, transparency, elimination of corruption and so forth. Except for what is happening in Gaza, which makes it impossible for the Palestinian Authority to fight terror and make sure there is only one security apparatus, they have fulfilled all of their Road Map commitments.

What tools does the United States have to reinforce the demand to freeze settlements?

The tools are diplomatic ones. I personally oppose the idea of U.S. sanctions on Israel and would like to see an inclusive U.S. proposal that would address both final status negotiations as well as steps that need to take place throughout the negotiations, including a settlement freeze. At the same time, the United States can offer Israel carrots such as facilitation of the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Arab world, something on which they have been working, global acceptance of Israel and an upgrade of the economic agreements between Israel and the Europeans, who are coordinated with the Americans on this front.

Can you elaborate on the importance of the issue of settlements to the peace process?

Settlements determine facts on the ground that make it more difficult politically for the government of Israel to reach an agreement on the territorial issue because it turns it into an internal governmental issue, an internal Israeli societal issue. It also constantly increases the rate of compensation settlers will get under an agreement.

Moreover, settlements change the reality on the ground in a way that makes the contiguity of the Palestinian territories less and less viable, not to mention the grabbing of private Palestinian lands. It is important to remember that 84 out of a 100 outposts are built fully or partially on private Palestinian lands.

How does the issue of settlements tie in with the issue of movement and access which Prime Minister Netanyahu has expressed an interest in moving forward?

The other side of the settlements coin is movement and access. To guarantee the settlers’ safety, Israel prevents the Palestinians from using more and more main transportation routes, which of course hinders the development of the Palestinian economy due to enormous shipping and handling costs, and in turn the development of the future Palestinian state.

How does that fit in with Netanyahu’s vision of economic peace?

It does not.

Have things changed in terms of roadblocks and checkpoints in the past few months?

There is a change. In the past six months, five or six significant checkpoints, some of which were manned, were removed. Yet, there are still approximately 600 checkpoints and roadblocks so there is not sufficient improvement to move the economy forward.

Can more be done without comprising the safety of settlers in the West Bank?

Absolutely. It is not easy but more can be done.

Some, both on the right and on the left, are criticizing the U.S. demand to freeze settlements arguing it is a final status issue that will only be resolved in an agreement and that until then, freezing settlements is overrated and not feasible. What’s your take on that?

That is nonsense. Since 1993 when we signed the Oslo Accords and realized that the solution would be based on UN Security Council resolution 242 and separation to two states, the number of Israelis residing beyond the Green Line multiplied two and a half times—today the formal number of settlers is 470,000 versus 222,000 in 1993, including in Jerusalem. The actual number now is even higher. This settlement expansion required the investment of billions of dollars which Israel needed in other areas, increased the compensation settlers will get once evacuated, expanded the areas that would have to be swapped in an agreement, hurt the contiguity of the future Palestinian state and damaged the ability of the Palestinian Authority to develop the economy and gain support for peaceful two-state solution.

Is it possible to freeze settlements?

Yes. Technically, there are hundreds of empty apartments that can be marketed so there is no need to build new projects. Second, Israel can decide that it will allow the construction only of projects on the verge of completion and there are thousands of housing units in that phase.

The term ‘natural growth’ is nonsense. First of all Israel used it dishonestly since it was coined. Second, if there is no more room, settlers should seek a different place to live. If the son of Minister of Defense Ehud Barak wanted to live next to his father in a luxury tower in Tel Aviv, would the government approve the construction of another tower for him? No. he would look for some place else to live. The same rule should apply to settlers.

Some argue that the expansion of settlements is limited to the large settlement blocs which would stay under Israeli sovereignty anyway in a peace agreement.

The four blocs referred to are Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion, Gush Hashmonaim and Gush Ariel but there was never a real definition of these blocs, not to mention that expansion takes place everywhere, in and outside these blocs, for example in Maale Michmash and Kochav Yaakov, which are located east of the separation barrier, and also in Anatot and other settlements.

Can you outline generally the types of settlers in the West Bank?

We are speaking of some 300,000 settlers in the West Bank, not including the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, who can be divided as follows: 48% Haredim, Orthodox Jews, who moved there only due to density of housing in Haredi cities inside Israel and who live in settlements adjacent to the Green Line; 25% national religious and Haredim who are in the West Bank for ideological reasons and who reside in the heart of the Palestinian population; and 27% of secular Israelis who wanted cheap housing and to improve their quality of lives.

Under any model of agreement, even under the Geneva Accords in which Israel annexes only two percent of the West Bank, not more than 100,000-120,000 settlers would have to be evacuated, meaning a quarter of the total number.

What tools are at the disposable of the Israeli government in handling the issue of settlements?

First and foremost, Israel should pass a law for voluntary evacuation-compensation which can change the whole picture at least for secular settlers. The Haredim live close to the Green Line in large settlement blocs. The greatest challenge would be evacuation of the hard line settlers which will be done as part of an agreement. In addition, outposts should be dismantled for two reasons: first, Israel is obligated to do so internationally, and second, to preserve law and order internally.

From your experience in the Israeli Defense Forces, do you understand the fear, often raised in Israel, that with more and more religious soldiers and young officers serving in combat units, some would refuse orders to evacuate outposts and settlements?

These fears were raised first in 1982 with the evacuation of Sinai and since then have floated to the surface every once in a while. We might witness some extreme phenomena which would have to be dealt with legally and forcefully, but overall the mainstream national religious current which serves in the IDF, is responsible and law-abiding.

What lessons can be learned from the disengagement from Gaza and how to deal with evacuees?

There is a need to work on two patterns of absorption both at the individual level and the community level.The settlers in Gaza did not cooperate with the government, which resulted in some of them still not having been absorbed properly in other places. It was not a governmental failure, but the government should learn the lessons and prepare better for the evacuation of West Bank settlers.

You wrote a book about the separation barrier and are very active advising the Supreme Court on changing its route. Can you please tell us a little bit about your efforts and the status of the barrier now?

The original plan for the barrier was designed to include 20 percent of the West Bank in the Israeli side. As a result of the efforts of the Council on Peace and Security, the pressure of the international community and the rulings of the Supreme Court, the plan reduced this percentage to 8.5 and practically, the built barrier includes only 4.5 percent, which is still reasonable for land swaps as part of a final status agreement.

Since November 2007 the construction of the barrier practically stopped. The state argues that it is due to budgetary constraints but it also has to do with political reasons. The parts which have not been built yet are in areas where there is controversy as to whether the border will be acceptable in a peace agreement. It is common knowledge that the route that the government approved would not get the approval of the United States and the international community as well as the Supreme Court so their construction is being put off.

The impact of the barrier on the Palestinians is most severe in East Jerusalem. The separation from the rest of the West Bank led to East Jerusalem being on the verge of collapse economically and socially. Moreover, the barrier hurts many Palestinian farmers whose lands are on the Israeli side which makes it extremely hard for them to work the land. Finally, in those areas where the construction of the barrier has not been completed, security concerns prevent Palestinians from driving on main roads.

Two-thirds of the Israeli public show consistent support for a peaceful two-state solution yet many fear that territorial withdrawals would leave behind bases for terror organizations to attack Israel. How would you address these concerns?

Israel withdrew from occupied territories four times: the withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the disengagement from Gaza were done unilaterally whereas the withdrawals in the form of land for peace with Jordan and Egypt were part of agreements. There is a stark difference between the results of unilateral moves and those of bilateral ones and therefore we should learn from our history and withdraw from the West Bank in an agreement.

Israel’s military supremacy combined with international guarantees and legitimacy as well as with the Palestinian interest to avoid risking the results achieved in a peace agreement would all protect Israel’s security after a withdrawal takes place.

You served as commander of the northern brigade in the Gaza Strip. How would you resolve the problem of getting aid into Gaza and beginning its reconstruction without strengthening Hamas?

It is possible to condition the humanitarian aid with ensuring that its passage goes through the Palestinian Authority or perhaps through the arrangements which might be agreed upon between Fatah and Hamas in their reconciliation discussions.

Yet, strengthening pragmatists and undermining extremists, Hamas included, requires changing the reality on the ground side-by-side with effective credible diplomatic negotiations on final status agreement. Such a process would demonstrate that diplomacy is rewarding and on the other hand, that violence is not. That is the only way.