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Friday, January 30, 2026
Thursday, January 29, 2026
[Salon] Welcome to the Jungle: Trump’s Board of Peace goes global - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Welcome to the Jungle: Trump’s Board of Peace goes global
Summary: the US president’s Board of Peace has less to do with peace, in Gaza or elsewhere, and more to do with enforcing a new, transactional global order. Welcome to the America-First Trumpian world.
We thank Hugh Lovatt for today’s newsletter, an edited version of his article first published on the European Council on Foreign Relation’s website. Hugh is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at the ECFR and chairman of the Brussels-based European Middle East Project (EuMEP). @h_lovatt on X
President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP) is not much of a peace mechanism. Look no further than its logo—a US-first western hemisphere flanked by rip-off UN olive branches burnished in Trumpian gold—to see the BoP for what it really is: a top-down project to assert Trump’s control over global affairs.
At its Davos inauguration, the US president delivered a rambling speech to the 19 countries present, hailing them “the most powerful people in the world.” Belarus’s autocratic leader and an early BoP signatory, Aleksandr Lukashenko, was unable to attend due to European sanctions over human rights abuses. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, was also absent, facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant over alleged war crimes in Gaza.
The Guardian cartoon on Donald Trump and his ‘Board of Peace’
After Trump’s “top leaders” were presented, Jared Kushner unveiled a $30bn “Trump development plan” for “New Gaza.” Complete with a skyscraper-crammed coastline, the vision would see the wholesale bulldozing of the Strip to create a newly engineered society and economy under BoP supervision. Judging by the Arabic spelling mistakes in the PowerPoint presentation, no Palestinians were consulted on their “prosperous future”.
What began with a mandate to implement Washington’s Gaza ceasefire plan, as enshrined in UN Security Council resolution 2803, has morphed into a personal vehicle for a Trumpist world order. The BoP’s charter omits any reference to Gaza and echoes Trump’s criticism of the UN, calling for “courage to depart from…institutions that have often failed” by establishing “a more nimble and effective international peace-building body”.
European leaders broadly backed resolution 2803, but have avoided the BoP (bar Hungary and Bulgaria), expressing concerns over its mandate, legality and challenge to the UN. They are right to stay away: the board’s purpose, governance and financial entanglements risk legitimising a system in which loyalty and money outweigh international law. Joining such a body would dilute Europe’s voice and erode what remains of the multilateral rules-based system.
How the Board of Peace works
BoP can be thought of as a Trump-owned US company, with the US president as permanent chairman and majority shareholder. According to the board’s charter, all decisions and power emanate from Trump as he selects and presides over a subordinate governing board of member states.
Board members will serve three-year terms, renewable at the chairman’s discretion. Out of the 50-60 countries invited, 21 have so far joined. Many no doubt value the opportunity of a closer, more transactional US relationship. Others share Trump’s hostility to the UN-sponsored liberal order. Together, they will vote on the BoP’s budget, international agreements and “peace-building initiatives”, with only a simple majority—and the approval of the chairman—required.
While the charter describes funding as voluntary, Trump’s track record suggests he will press members to “pay up”, with big payers likely to have the most influence. (Those paying $1bn will be given permanent membership.)
Below the board is an Executive Board and CEO appointed by Trump. This is where the power lies, tasked with day-to-day running of the board and the managing of funds. It also has the mandate to set the agenda for each board meeting, further reducing member-state autonomy.
Among its members are senior US officials and businessmen: Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and founder of Affinity Partners, an American investment firm with close ties to Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds; Marc Rowan, CEO of asset management firm Apollo Global Management which invests in private equity and real estate; and Ajay Banga, another business executive and president of the World Bank Group.
The mixture of private investment funds with American power and geopolitics, combined with likely opaque decision-making and financial expenditure is a recipe for kleptocratic oligarchy. Already, the Guardian is reporting that Albania joined the BoP just as Kushner gained approval from the Albanian government to build a $1.4bn luxury resort on Sazan Island. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s outgoing prime minister, Rosen Zhelyazkov, reportedly joined the BoP at the urging of a Bulgarian oligarch sanctioned by the US for corruption.
What this means for Gaza
The BoP has several subsidiary entities focused on Gaza, which Trump has “exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve.” First is the Gaza Executive Board to oversee the implementation of Trump’s 20-point plan, including a Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). Composed of 15 members led by Ali Shaath and charged with Gaza’s day-to-day management, the NCAG sits at the bottom of the hierarchy with little influence or agency. So far, Israel has not even let members into the war-torn Strip.
As per the 20-point plan, the BoP will also establish a Gaza International Stabilisation Force (ISF) led by American General Jasper Jeffers, though it is not clear who in the BoP he will report to. Questions similarly remain over the scope of the ISF’s mandate to enforce the disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza.
In addition, Trump has appointed two White House advisors, Aryeh Lightstone and Josh Gruenbaum, as senior BoP advisors. They will be enforcers of Trump’s writ. Lightstone’s background should be cause for concern: he was an advisor to former US ambassador David Friedman and is a “staunch defender” of Israel’s settlement project. He was also reportedly involved in establishing the disastrous Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (which caused the deaths of numerous Gazan aid seekers) and is now working through the Gaza Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) to develop US plans for post-conflict Gaza.
Having long asserted that the US will “take over” and “own” Gaza, Trump now wields near-total control of the Strip through the BoP. The involvement of private investment funds, many with real-estate interests, reinforces his vision of a US-backed, corporate-built “Gazan Riviera” as showcased in Davos.
A week earlier, the CMCC had already moved in this direction, reportedly presenting plans for a “Gaza First Planned Community” designed to house up to 25,000 Palestinians in a residential neighbourhood built on the ruins of Rafah. The scheme appears to revive Israeli plans for “humanitarian bubbles” of “Hamas-free” areas secured by foreign contractors, with residents subject to relentless external vetting and biometric checks. Such an approach would deepen Gaza’s territorial and societal fragmentation and do little to counter Hamas, which remains deeply imbedded in Palestinian politics and society.
The main checks on Trump’s “Gazan Riveria” vision will be Hamas’s continued control on the ground but also the extent to which Arab members of the BoP can push back internally and condition their funding on a more holistic reconstruction, predicated on Israel’s full withdrawal from Gaza and the return of the Palestinian Authority.
What Europeans can do
Outside the Trump-controlled BoP, European states have significant influence. They should engage directly with the Gaza Executive Committee which is more in line with UNSCR 2803 and where there is strong European representation through Nikolay Mladenov, Tony Blair and Sigrid Kaag. Arab partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia who are represented on both the Board and Gaza Executive Committee are also indispensable partners in shaping BoP actions from the inside.
Being relevant on Gaza does not mean toeing the US-line. It means making commitments to empower the Palestinian National Committee as it comes under tremendous pressure to follow the US and potentially sign murky real estate development deals. Such deals might generate profits for the BoP’s investment fund, but will do little to support ordinary Gazans who want to rebuild their homes and communities in safety and unlock economic re-development (which requires an end to Israel’s decades-long siege of the Strip).
European states should also look for ways to support the ISF once concerns over its mandate and command and control structure are addressed. This could include funding, technical support, and even limited troop contributions (as they have done in other peacekeeping missions). By being proactive, Europeans would strengthen their hand with Trump, who remains the best hope of pressing Netanyahu into a full withdrawal from Gaza and broader Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
European countries are stronger when they hold the line together in defence of European interests. On Greenland, for example, their collective pushback forced Trump to climb down—at least for the time being. With this in mind, Europeans should engage with the BoP on specific issues from the outside and work with partners on the inside. The goal should be to shape BoP engagement in line with Europe’s vision for peace in Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and the broader Middle East where renewed US strikes on Iran risk renewed regional convulsion.
But Europeans should also be aware of the dangers of short-term transactionalism. By buying into the BoP, they would risk legitimising a Trumpian order centred on the president and his reversion to 19th century geopolitics where might is right and territorial conquest by great powers is legitimate. With the rules-based order already in trouble before Trump’s return to the White House, Europe will have to look to itself to secure its interests.
How tradition carries the gift of love across generations
How tradition carries the gift of love across generations
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In an age dominated by individualism, tradition draws our focus outward, grounding us in a shared history and collective responsibility.
The word “tradition” originates from the Latin tradere, meaning “to hand over” or “to deliver.” It evokes the image of passing on something precious — knowledge, culture, and faith — from one generation to the next. Tradition is a collection of customs or rituals. But it is also a profound act of communion that binds us to the past, roots us in the present, and prepares us for the future.
Tradition reminds us that the world we inhabit was not built in isolation. It was crafted by countless hands and minds, many of whom we will never know. The homes we live in, the roads we walk, and the prayers we say are gifts we’ve received from others — evidence of their lives, hopes, and wisdom. This heritage is not ours to hoard or disregard; it is a shared responsibility.
As the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, “Tradition is to be distinguished from the various theological, disciplinary, liturgical, or devotional traditions, born in the local churches over time. These are the particular forms, adapted to different places and times, in which the great Tradition is expressed” (CCC 83).
This underscores tradition’s dynamic nature: while its core truths remain unchanging, its expressions adapt to meet the needs of every age.
"Procession in Naples" (Detail) by Franz Richard Unterberger, c. 1878
Procession in Naples (Detail) by Franz Richard Unterberger, c. 1878
Wikimedia Commons | Public Domain
Fostering a shared life
More than continuity, tradition fosters conviviality — a shared life that transcends the boundaries of the living and the dead. When we engage with tradition, we participate in a dialogue with those who came before us and those who will follow. We experience this vividly in the Eucharist, where the faithful across time and space are united in Christ. Similarly, cultural and familial traditions remind us that our lives are not isolated but are part of a much larger story.
This perspective reshapes how we understand community. In an age dominated by individualism, tradition draws our focus outward, grounding us in a shared history and collective responsibility. It invites us to care for what we’ve been given—not as museum keepers preserving relics, but as stewards who nurture and enhance these gifts for future generations. G.K. Chesterton captured this well, describing tradition as “the democracy of the dead,” a way of giving a voice to our ancestors in shaping the present.
Procession through the streets of contemporary Naples
A procession through the streets of contemporary Naples
Imma Gambardella | Shutterstock
Preserving tradition doesn’t mean resisting change. It means transforming what we’ve inherited with care and integrity, ensuring its values endure while addressing contemporary realities. In this sense, tradition is both a gift and a task. It demands humility to recognize that we are part of something greater than ourselves and courage to discern when transformation is necessary.
Tradition is a living chain that connects us to those who came before us, to one another, to those who will come after us and, ultimately, to God. It reminds us that we belong to a community far larger than ourselves — one that spans generations and points toward eternity. By embracing, preserving, and enriching what we’ve received, we affirm that the world is not ours alone; it is a gift meant to be shared and handed on.
Wednesday, January 28, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Third Sunday in Ordinary Time -
I once read a story about tourists visiting the famous Carlsbad Caverns in New Mexico. While they were deep below the surface in the giant cavern, the lights suddenly went out. Among those trapped in the darkness were two children: an 8-year-old boy and his 5-year-old sister.
It was a frightening moment for everyone, especially the children. The little girl began to cry, but her brother stayed calm. “Don’t worry,” he whispered. “There’s a man up there who knows how to turn the lights on again.”
That story beautifully captures the prophecy of Isaiah in today’s first reading – the same prophecy Matthew applies to Jesus in the Gospel: “The people who live in darkness have seen a great light; upon those who dwelt in the land of gloom, a light has shone.”
Before Jesus came, the world was dark and full of fear, much like that cavern when the lights went out. Yet into that darkness came Isaiah’s reassuring voice, promising that a great light would soon shine and scatter the shadows. That promise was fulfilled in Jesus, the Light of the World.
Spiritual writers often tell us that what happened to Israel as a nation happens to each of us personally. We all experience times when the lights seem to go out – moments of confusion, fear, or loss. And just like those children in the Caverns, we need to know that Someone above us knows how to turn the lights back on.
Bethany Hamilton, the professional surfer, learned this firsthand. Surfing since childhood, she was already competing professionally by age 10. But at 13, she lost her left arm when she was attacked by a tiger shark.
For a time, she wondered if she would ever surf again. But through determination and deep faith in God, she returned to the water with a redesigned board that allowed her to continue her career. She has often said that her faith in God gave her strength, purpose and resilience – and her story even inspired a major film.
For Bethany, the lights went out, but they soon came back on. And I’ve heard similar stories from countless people who have walked through darkness. The lights always return.
We all face moments that throw us into darkness: the loss of someone we love, a devastating diagnosis, a broken marriage, a shattered dream, the loss of a job. Any of these can leave us feeling as if we are stumbling in the dark.
But when those moments come, remember Isaiah’s promise: “The people who live in darkness will see a great light.”
The dark times in life do not have to be the end. They can be the beginning. And when the lights return, they often shine brighter and more radiantly than before.
And if you need one more assurance, my friends, remember today’s psalm: “The Lord is my light and my salvation.”
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, January 27, 2026
[Salon] Yemen: the Internationally Recognized Government escapes a crisis - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Yemen: the IRG escapes a crisis
Summary: the quick collapse of the STC’s breakaway movement has ruptured relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and created an opening for fresh dialogue that could possibly lead to peace but many obstacles remain.
We thank our regular contributor Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war, what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book Yemen: Poverty and Conflict was published by Routledge in 2022. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.
The crisis within Yemen’s internationally recognised government [IRG] looks to be easing. A new Prime Minister, the former Foreign Minister Shaye al Zindani, is expected to announce his new government in coming days and the Saudi-sponsored southern dialogue is likely to take place in the coming weeks. So what is the outcome of two months of acute crisis within the IRG?
A quick reminder of the facts: in early December last year with, at the very least UAE complicity, the Southern Transitional Council [STC] under the leadership of Aidarous al-Zubaydi sent its forces to take over the northern part of Hadhramaut governorate and al Mahra governorate, the two parts of the territory of the former PDRY which it did not already control. Summoned to withdraw by Rashad al-Alimi the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council [PLC] and by the Saudis, the STC refused and instead moved further north towards the Saudi border. On 30 December, the IRG terminated its defence agreement with the UAE, giving it 24 hours to get out of the country. On the same day the Saudis launched air attacks on Hadhramaut’s capital Mukalla which struck and damaged two Emirati ships arriving from Fujairah loaded with military equipment for the STC.
The reversal of the STC conquests rapidly spread, with pro-IRG forces taking over military positions throughout the southern governorates and reaching Aden by 6 January. With the rout clear to all, former senior STC officials were quick to declare support for the IRG and the Saudis. Two of the more prominent to switch sides were the Governor of Shabwa Abdul Rahman al Muharrami, head of the main ‘Amaliqa’ separatist forces and a former deputy of al-Zubaydi and Tariq Saleh, a non-separatist PLC member who had backed the STC only a few weeks earlier. Both men publicised their meetings with Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi Minister of Defence on 4 January.
MBS’s younger brother and Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman posted a photo on his X account of him meeting the Vice President of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC) and head of the main ‘Amaliqa’ separatist forces Abu Zaraa al-Mahrami where Prince Khalid said they discussed the latest developments “by the spirit of brotherhood and understanding.”
Instead of going to Riyadh to join the proposed southern dialogue, al-Zubaydi escaped to Abu Dhabi thanks to UAE logistics. His call for uprisings were ignored and the STC was formally dissolved by leaders busy preparing the southern dialogue. On 7 January he was charged with high treason. Al-Zubaydi’s remaining support is primarily from people originally from his home area, a few districts of Lahej, Abyan and al Dhali’, north of Aden. However his statements supporting the establishment of relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords and his publicised corruption certainly reduced his popularity, alongside President al Alimi’s wisdom in appointing senior officials from that same area.
By 8 January, forces loyal to the IRG, including those who until recently were part of the STC, had taken control of the temporary capital Aden, promptly followed by a delegation of senior Saudi military officers. The new military committee is focusing on removing army camps from Aden in anticipation of bringing the newly formed government back to the city.
A few pointers in the coming weeks/months:
The Huthis have barely figured in this saga. They have not been involved in a crisis that has shaken the IRG to its core. The prospect of a more effective and united IRG is bad news for them. Such an entity, particularly if deeply supported by the Saudis, might well build military forces to confront the Huthis more effectively than in the past. Whether this is likely to increase or decrease the likelihood of their reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia is open to debate. The UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg is continuing exchanges with the IRG and international parties, and there may be an opening for his efforts in coming months, particularly if the Huthis consider that the time has come to end the fundamental conflict.
How stable will the new IRG be? Having one international sponsor, rather than two rival ones, will enable it to confront the multiple problems of administering the parts of Yemen it controls. Composition of the new government will be an indicator of the likelihood of success. PLC stability has improved as both al-Zubaydi and Faraj al-Bahsani a former governor of Hadhramaut have been removed and replaced by southerners who support the leadership: Mahmoud al Subayhi, former Defence Minister who was detained by the Huthis for 7 years and Salem al-Khanbashi the new governor of Hadhramaut. However, there are still significant differences and competition within the PLC, with some of its members’ loyalty to Saudi Arabia’s strategy doubtful.
How successful the IRG is likely to be partly depends on the outcome of the southern dialogue. There are a multiplicity of southern political ambitions and many southern separatist organisations with the now-disbanded STC being only one of them. There are also supporters of Yemeni unity. In Hadhramaut, people are divided between supporters of Hadhrami autonomy or even independence and those who would be satisfied with a distant relationship with the capital, whether Aden or Sana’a. Long established political and economic relations between Hadhramaut and Saudi Arabia are important but they do not mean that Hadhramis are subservient. Overall, it would be wise for the Saudis to manage this dialogue in a way which enables Yemenis to reach solutions that are in the interests of the country as a whole.
Who will control Yemen? There is little doubt that the main decision makers will be the Saudis directly involved with Yemen, namely Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman [brother of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] and the Saudi ambassador Mohammed al Jaber. The financial dependence of the IRG on Saudi Arabia for everything from fuel to operate power stations to funds for development and rehabilitation activities give Riyadh unprecedented power. The extent to which the IRG will be able to develop autonomous policies addressing the needs and priorities of the Yemeni people is unclear. Certainly the Saudis care little about millions of poor and hungry Yemenis, nor is their neo-liberal philosophy likely to establish equitable social policies at a time when it is removing them at home. On the other hand, continued unrest in Yemen is not a desirable situation, so some degree of compromise and some investment in public services is to be expected.
What is the likely future involvement of the UAE? The expulsion of the Emiratis from Yemen has been covered extensively by world media with the word ‘humiliating’ featuring prominently. This is certainly embarrassing for the regime in Abu Dhabi, alongside the blame it has received for its support for the genocidal RSF in Sudan, let alone its increasingly close relationship with Israel. In Yemen, it will most likely continue to undermine the rule of the IRG via its remaining contacts, mainly those elements still loyal to al-Zubaydi. In the past, collusion with al Qaeda has been suspected and may well be another mechanism used to sustain instability in coming months. The UAE leadership’s disruptive capacity should not be underestimated in the new regional context where its competition with the Saudi regime has turned into open rivalry. The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland, alongside Israel’s recent unique recognition of that state can reasonably be perceived as threatening to the very security of Saudi Arabia, worsening what is already a serious rift and leading the Saudis to consolidate their relationship with opponents of the UAE.
Monday, January 26, 2026
Sunday, January 25, 2026
Saturday, January 24, 2026
Friday, January 23, 2026
[Salon] The Making of an Israel– Türkiye Cold War - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
The Making of an Israel– Türkiye Cold War
Summary: in a fractious and volatile Middle East Türkiye and Israel are eying each other warily seeking to gain advantage as both jostle for the mantle of regional hegemon.
We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter.
As protests swept across Iran, the limits of Tehran’s regional project are becoming harder to ignore even as this latest popular revolt was crushed. Iran’s ambitions are not finished, but the balance of regional competition is shifting. Israel, long focused on containing Tehran, is increasingly turning its attention to a different challenger. The year ahead will be shaped by a deepening rivalry between Israel and Türkiye, one that will span diplomacy, security, and influence across multiple fronts.
The Middle East has entered a new phase, one in which the opportunity to shape the region’s political and security architecture is once again up for grabs. While Israel and Türkiye have long quarreled, they were once close allies. But today they are increasingly becoming strategic rivals, with competing visions for Palestine, Syria, energy policy, and maritime access. Unlike Israel’s confrontation with Iran, tensions with Türkiye, a NATO member, pose a growing dilemma for the United States.
The rivalry came into sharp relief after Hamas’ October 2023 attack on Israel, which prompted an all-out Israeli war posture that has devastated Gaza and decimated the Palestinian population, drawing mounting accusations of war crimes. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has emerged as Israel’s most outspoken state critic, leveraging the Gaza war to reassert Türkiye’s claim to leadership in the Muslim world.
Since the October 2025 ceasefire, Israel has moved to strip the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) of diplomatic immunity and restrict its ability to deliver essential services in Gaza and the West Bank. The latest assault saw UNRWA headquarters in East Jerusalem demolished on Tuesday. Türkiye, by contrast, had opened a new UNRWA liaison office just a few days earlier. Erdoğan has called it “essential” for Muslim states to lead Gaza’s reconstruction. At the same time, Israel has pressed the United States to block Türkiye from joining the Board of Peace and the International Stabilisation Force in an effort to limit Ankara’s role in postwar Gaza. Yesterday, in a sign that Israel’s influence with Trump may be slipping Türkiye was among eight nations to agree to join Trump’s board.
Israeli occupation forces destroyed the UN agency for Palestinian refugees' (UNRWA) main headquarters in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of occupied Jerusalem
Syria may prove an even more consequential front. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024 and the rise of a new Syrian government with close ties to the Turkish military establishment has given Ankara a strategic foothold. Erdoğan has backed the consolidation of state authority under President al-Sharaa, while Israel has explicitly sought to prevent the emergence of a centralised Syrian state it views as hostile. Immediately after al-Assad’s fall, Israeli forces crossed into a UN-administered buffer zone in southern Syria. Since then, Israel has hit deeper into Syria, including strikes inside Damascus in July, in the name of protecting the Druze minority, elements of which had clashed with the new authorities.
Tensions have since escalated further. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan accused Kurdish political and military factions in northeastern Syria—backed by the United States in the fight against the Islamic State—of stalling integration talks with Damascus and coordinating with Israel. Recent clashes between Kurdish fighters and the central authorities in late December and early January in Aleppo have led to the displacement of tens of thousands and killed at least 24 civilians. Turkey has threatened military intervention of its own, warning that continued instability along its border is unacceptable. This raises the risk that competing interventions will entrench, rather than resolve, Syria’s fragmentation. And despite earlier promising support for Syrian Kurds Israel stood by as al-Sharaa’s Syrian Army forces routed the Kurds from much of the territory they had held east of the Euphrates River over several years. Meanwhile President Erdoğan was quick to hail the SDF defeat.
From Ankara’s perspective, Israel’s expanding regional footprint increasingly resembles encirclement. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel’s deepening energy and military cooperation with Greece and Cyprus reinforces Turkish fears of being boxed out of gas development and maritime access through exclusionary alliances that challenge its claims and naval reach. Further south, Israel’s announcement that it would recognise Somaliland has heightened unease in Ankara. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar visited Somaliland in early January, signaling a move that gives Israel access to a critical Red Sea chokepoint, strengthening its ability to target Yemen’s Huthis and ensure security for its ships in the world’s busiest maritime trade route. For its part, Somaliland said it intends to join the Abraham Accords.
As Somalia’s largest investor with close diplomatic and military ties to the federal government, Türkiye is alarmed by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. It cuts directly across Turkish interests, threatening Ankara’s influence in the Horn of Africa and adding another front to an already widening rivalry.
Taken together, these overlapping flashpoints point to a structural problem between the two regional powers. Israel and Türkiye are not simply clashing over individual crises, but rather trying to advance their own competing visions. For the United States, this shift presents an increasingly fraught dilemma. Israel remains Washington’s closest regional ally, while Türkiye is embedded in Western military, political, and economic institutions. Managing tensions between the two strains U.S. influence at a moment when Washington is less willing, and less able, to act as the region’s primary arbiter. While we should not expect outright conflict, the tense bilateral equilibrium will impact not only Israeli-Turkish relations, but the balance of power across the Middle East and its neighbouring regions.
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