[Salon] Between a Rock and Hard Place: Egypt’s Precarious Struggle for Geopolitical Autonomy - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Between a Rock and Hard Place: Egypt’s Precarious Struggle for Geopolitical Autonomy Summary: to maintain domestic stability and financial inflows, the Sisi regime has formed deep alliances with the UAE and Israel, but these partnerships are now increasingly at odds with Egypt’s core national security interests in Gaza, Sudan, and Somalia. Ultimately, the regime is trapped by its own economic fragility, forced to perform a precarious balancing act between its revisionist allies and potential new partners like Turkey and Saudi Arabia to ensure its survival. We thank our regular contributor Maged Mandour for today’s newsletter. Maged is a political analyst who also contributes to Middle East Eye and Open Democracy. He is a writer for Sada, the Carnegie Endowment online journal and the author of the recently published and highly recommended Egypt under El-Sisi (I.B.Tauris) which examines social and political developments since the coup of 2013. You can find Maged’s most recent AD podcast here. Over the past 12 years, the Sisi regime has followed a clear foreign policy rationale: prioritise regime consolidation and the solicitation of massive capital inflows while avoiding costly foreign adventures. This strategy fostered a deep alliance with the UAE and Israel, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, though the relationship with Riyadh has soured over the past few years. However, these alliances are now under significant strain. The interventionist policies of the UAE and Israel as they attempt to reshape the region are increasingly at odds with traditional Egyptian national security interests. Compounded by economic fragility, this has left the regime with dwindling room for maneuver. As regional rifts widen, the regime may soon be forced to choose: remain subservient to the UAE-Israel axis or pivot toward Saudi Arabia and Turkey to balance against these revisionist powers. This conflict between the regime’s pursuit of domestic stability and foreign investment versus its regional security interests has become so severe that it likely poses a bigger risk to Sisi's power than his critics at home. Israel provides the most striking example of this tension. Prior to October 7, 2023, the regime enjoyed close security and economic ties with Tel Aviv - even running domestic propaganda campaigns to soften the Egyptian public’s stance on key issues like, for example, by utilising regime-affiliated talk show hosts to convince viewers to accept the 2018 U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem. This dynamic shifted fundamentally with the genocide in Gaza. Israeli plans to ethnically cleanse the strip were openly rejected by Sisi as a red line for the regime, leading to a palpable chill in relations and accusations of Egyptian military build-ups in violation of the Camp David Accords. Tensions have extended beyond Gaza to the Horn of Africa where Egypt views the territorial integrity of Somalia as a vital national security interest. Egypt was deeply unsettled by Israel’s recognition of the breakaway province of Somaliland in December - the first country in the world to do so - because Cairo has strategically deepened its ties with Mogadishu to help contain Ethiopia, a long-term rival due to the ongoing dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). In January 2024, Cairo issued a joint statement with the Somali government formally rejecting a deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland that would have exchanged diplomatic recognition for the construction of an Ethiopian naval base. In August, the regime solidified this stance by signing a defence pact to deploy 10,000 Egyptian troops to Somalia, half of whom will serve as part of the African Union’s peacekeeping mission. Saudi Arabia and Egypt issued a joint statement on Monday saying they firmly support Somalia's unity and territorial integrity and reject any attempts to divide the country or diminish its sovereignty Despite this, the regime maintains a “soft” approach toward Israel. Even though, in an historic first, Sisi called Israel an enemy, Cairo chose not to formally join the ICJ genocide case and last month it signed a new gas deal worth 35 billion USD, the largest in Israel’s history. This restraint stems from domestic fragility. Sisi’s strategy appears to rely on leveraging the United States to restrain Israel’s worst excesses - a precarious policy at best. A similar logic applies to the UAE, the regime’s primary financial benefactor. While the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) recent capture of El-Fasher solicited strongly worded statements from Cairo about its red lines and Sudanese unity, little action has followed. Though some reports suggest increasing Egyptian support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), it has not yet turned the tide. The regime is trapped in a difficult balancing act as it needs to avoid alienating the UAE, whose investments are essential to staving off another Egyptian financial collapse. This leaves the regime with two primary paths: remain a silent partner in the UAE-Israel axis or align with Saudi Arabia and Turkey to contain them. There are signs of a pivot; the regime recently stated its positions are “identical” to Saudi Arabia’s on Sudan and Yemen, and defence cooperation with Turkey is expanding as both nations back the SAF. However, considering the regime's economic position and reliance on capital inflows, a complete break with the UAE and by extension Israel remains unlikely, unless Saudi Arabia plugs the gap - an improbable scenario. Riyadh faces its own fiscal pressures, with a projected budget deficit of 44 billion USD in 2026, leading to a scale-back of its own mega-projects. With oil prices forecast to remain low, pressure on the Kingdom’s finances is set to continue for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the Egyptian regime’s perceived failure to implement economic reforms - a key Saudi demand - and the lingering dispute over the transfer of the Tiran and Sanafir islands which were ceded to Saudi Arabia in 2017 continue to hinder the relationship. The more likely scenario is a policy of “passing the buck” - hoping the U.S., Saudi Arabia or Turkey will restrain the UAE and Israel, while Cairo maintains ties to everyone, allowing the regime to keep the investments flowing. Yet as the rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia widens, the ability to “dance to all tunes” will diminish. The choices Sisi makes now will have major consequences for the regime’s survival. In a bitter irony, the primary threats to the regime now stem from its allies, not its foes.