Global Power Unbalanced by William Pfaff

Sofia, Bulgaria, October 12, 2010 -- The most striking
phenomenon at the discussions taking place at the New Policy Forum
held here last weekend, under the sponsorship of Moscow’s Gorbachev
Forum and the Bulgarian Slavyani Foundation, was that the great
American Long War on global terror and violent extremism was not once
mentioned. No one seemed to think it worth attention, although the
present national outlook for the United States was alluded to,
usually in pessimistic terms.

Since the conference participation was East-Central European and
Eurasian, as well as West European-British-American, this seemed an
interesting comment on how little interested others are in
Washington’s present military and geo-strategic preoccupations.

There was much more interest in the various possible future
configurations of global political and economic power of Russia and
its Central Asian and Caucasian neighbors, the European Union bloc
(to which Bulgaria is the most recent adherent), and China.

The formal subject was “Europe Looks East,” and while that seemed to
mean Atlantic and Central Europe looking at Russia and beyond, more
important was Western Europe looking at relations between Europe and
Russia, plus Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Moldova. The second
perplexing subject was the Balkans, still the location of Europe’s
most persistent (and contagious) troubles, including those of West
Europe’s own problems in dealing with Balkan immigrants and migrants.

In Balkan state relations, much now is blamed by the interested
parties on the American-drafted Dayton Accords that ended the war of
Yugoslav succession, following NATO bombing of Serbia, and the
effective amputation of Kosovo from Serbia (while leaving several
other ethnically-defined nations on the fringes, in parlous
independence).

However the American intervention was the consequence of West
Europe’s own disgraceful refusal to deal seriously with the Yugoslav
succession wars, instigated by Serbia’s efforts to seize the Serbian-
populated areas of neighboring Croatia and Bosnia. Instead of
demanding that Slobodan Milosevic desist, under threat of a (UN-
mandated} European military intervention (the U.S. refrained – “we
have no dog in this fight,” James Baker said; and indeed it was time
for Western Europe to assume responsibility), the Europeans settled
for an absurd and pusillanimous UN peace-keeping resolution and mission.

Since there was no peace to keep, this mission spent its time being
shot at by both sides until the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, and
Serbia’s repression of the Kosovo population, prompted the Europeans
to appeal to the U.S. for help. NATO bombing of Bosnia and
Herzegovina followed, and then of Serbia, until the Dayton Accords
ended the war.

These events produced several troublesome precedents: NATO’s illegal
bombing intervention, and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence in 2008, confirmed in international law in 2010. (It
has been suggested that on the Kosovo precedent, the Palestinians
could demand UN enforcement of their national independence within the
territories assigned Palestine by the UN partition of the country in
1948. Caucasian irredentists also have taken note of the
possibilities of unilateral declarations of independence.) It has
also left the European Union with the question of admitting to the
Union the Balkan states still outside it – and if not, what to do
about them.

Turning to the larger geopolitical issues, Russian membership in
the EU was broached, not too seriously, as was Russia’s joining NATO.
The latter would seem to make NATO’s existence rather pointless,
although presumably leaving the United States the permanent leader,
which would please Washington. The mission of the alliance in the
past was to fight Russia. Now it seems to be to fight America’s
wars, which one would think Russia reluctant to do. (What would
Georgia and the Baltic states make of Russian membership, since
their main reason for belonging to NATO is to be protected from Russia?)

Among the Russians present at the meeting, and some of the Europeans,
there seemed more interest in a Russian-European Union grouping –
Mikhail Gorbachev’s Common European Home -- which offers peaceful
relations as well as economic and trade advantages, especially with
respect to energy markets and supplies. However under Vladimir
Putin, at least, this relationship with Russia is understood in
Western Europe as containing an unspoken danger, implying
possibilities ranging from political intimidation by Russian energy
suppliers, to wholesale energy blackmail, a serious source of conflict.

No one knows quite what to make of China’s future, nor of what its
role would be in a future global geopolitical scheme, the
possibilities seemingly including conflict with the United States
over Far Eastern domination (or global rule, as the neo-conservatives
would suggest). During the European Cold War there was concern in
Europe about the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.’s dividing up Europe
between them. What would Japan make of an (improbable, let me add)
American-Chinese political condominium?

All of this leaves the Afghanistan war seeming simple. All the NATO allies have
to do is to go home, and leave the Afghans (Talibans and the others), Pakistanis,
Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pamirs, and Indians to settle the region’s
problems among themselves, which in the end is what they will do.

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