The Great Battle for Asia: China vs. America
08/12/14
Hugh White
Security, China
"Now China believes it’s strong enough to contest U.S. primacy, and it’s doing so."
Editor’s Note:
The Australian Policy Institute (ASPI) has recently been debating the
future of the Asian security order. We present the final part of this
debate:
Well, this has been an interesting exchange and I thank Peter Jennings for launching it, the team on The Strategist for
hosting it, and distinguished colleagues for taking the time to
contribute. The exchange has helped to clarify the most important
underlying points of difference between us about Australia’s interests
in the Asian order. And I’m grateful for the chance to offer some brief
concluding thoughts.
In fact Nick Bisley put
his finger on it: the key difference between my view and many others’
lies in our different ideas about the future of the regional order. I
think the strategic status quo in Asia will not last, while others believe it will.
Let
me recap why I think the order is going to change—indeed, is already
changing. It’s simple. Asia has been stable since 1972 because China has
accepted U.S. primacy as the foundation of the Asian order. China did
so because it believed it was too weak to contest it effectively. Now
China believes it’s strong enough to contest U.S. primacy, and it’s
doing so.
Asia’s
post-Vietnam order, based on uncontested U.S. primacy, has therefore
passed into history. The question now is what kind of new order will
take its place. There are several possibilities. None of them would be
as good for Australia as the order we have known since 1972, but some
would be much better for us than others. We should be trying to nudge
the region towards a new order that would work well for us, and away
from ones that would be bad for us.
Most
of the posts in our debate differ from my position by arguing, or
implying, that we should aim to preserve the status quo instead. That
case is made in several different ways.
Rod Lyon rightly
draws attention to the risks of moving to a new order that concedes a
bigger role to China. But those risks must be balanced against the risks
of trying and failing to preserve the status quo. If we refuse to
accommodate China to some extent, the most likely result is escalating
strategic rivalry.
Read full articlehttp://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-great-battle-asia-china-vs-america-11064
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