Ex-Soviet States Meet For 'Russian NATO' Summit

Ex-Soviet States Meet For 'Russian NATO' Summit
The Collective Security Treaty Organization is holding a meeting in Kyrgyzstan starting Friday.

From AFP:

CHOLPON-ATA, Kyrgyzstan (AFP) – The presidents of seven ex-Soviet states ended a summit Friday of a Russia-led security grouping touted as an eastern counterweight to NATO but riven by disagreements.

The leaders of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) sought at a lakeside resort in Kyrgyzstan to smooth out differences over a June 14 deal to establish the group's first joint rapid reaction force.

Read more ....
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090731/wl_afp/russiakyrgyzstancstodefencesummit_20090731183541

More News On The CSTO Summit

CSTO Leaders Gather For Informal Summit -- Radio Free Europe
http://www.rferl.org/content/CSTO_Leaders_Gather_For_Informal_Summit/1789724.html

Russia, Kyrgyzstan to sign base deal: official -- China Daily
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-08/01/content_8501505.htm

Russia wants second base in Kyrgyzstan -- AP
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jHHlPCDUu_GtwxY5nSrhXVO3ZDLwD99O8HLG0

Former Soviet Republics Expected to Form Joint Rapid Reaction Forces -- Novinite
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=106395

Saudi Arabia Rejects President Obama's Approach To Middle East Peace

Saudi Arabia Rejects President Obama's Approach To Middle East Peace


Saudis Reject 'Incrementalism' Of U.S.-Backed Peace Plan -- CNN

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Saudi Arabia on Friday bluntly rejected a call for step-by-step moves toward Middle East peace, an approach supported by the United States.

The United States had hoped that the Saudis would announce "confidence-building measures" that would break the current impasse and lead to a new round of talks.

"Incrementalism and a step-by-step approach has not and -- we believe -- will not lead to peace," Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said at the State Department Friday after meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Read more ....
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/31/saudis.middle.east.peace/

My Comment: This is a major rejection and repudiation of President Obama's approach towards resolving the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. This is a major setback .... and one that has been completely under reported in the American Press.

More News On Saudi Arabia's Rejection Of U.S. Middle East Peace Efforts

Saudi FM puts burden on Israel to make peace -- AFP
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gpxBQgU4aB99Jg9zQMh6crgfNJdw

Saudi Minister Takes Hard Line Against Peace Gestures to Israel -- Voice of America
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-07-31-voa53.cfm

Saudi Arabia rejects U.S. pleas on Israel -- Reuters
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56U6XF20090731

Saudi rebuffs US on improving ties with Israel -- AP
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gTBP4wt-rjhrqkQpgAnyWL3I3iqQD99PLJAO0

S Arabia rejects ties with Israel -- Al Jazeera
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/07/2009731204851470666.html

Remarks With Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal -- U.S. Department Of State
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126829.htm

Arabs losing hope in Obama's ability to broker Mideast peace

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

7/29/09

Arabs losing hope in Obama's ability to broker Mideast peace

In a push for progress, three heavy hitters from the administration – Mitchell, Gates, and Jones – visited the region this week.

Ilene R. Prusher

JERUSALEM -- Nearly two months after President Obama's historic address to the Muslim world from Cairo, his administration made a high-profile drive this week to shore up Arab and Israeli support for a comprehensive peace deal.

A trio of senior officials – US Mideast envoy George Mitchell, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and US National Security Advisor James Jones – have visited officials throughout the region, with particular emphasis on Israel.

Since his June 4 Cairo speech, Mr. Obama has shown a new US willingness to take Israel to task for its expansion of settlements in the West Bank. But he has simultaneously begun to press the Arab world to do its part to foster peace, sending letters in advance of this week's visits to encourage action from leaders who are reluctant to make a move before Israel agrees to end the official state of war with its Arab neighbors.

"There's far more motion right now in US policy," says Phyllis Bennis, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington.

But Mr. Obama and his team are running up against Arab skepticism. Though Obama still commands credibility in the eyes of many citizens from Syria to Saudi Arabia, many are still waiting for clear progress – or even a concrete plan.

"Where is this initiative?" asks Saudi businessman Turki F. Al Rasheed, who says Obama has retained credibility among Saudis despite doubts about what he can accomplish. "There is talk, but no initiative. If Obama wants peace, he has to come up with a clear-cut plan," not requests for Arab states "to give Israelis a nice gesture."

'THERE'S ONLY SO MUCH OBAMA CAN DO'

The Saudis came up with such a plan in 2002, but Israel has yet to act on it. The so-called Arab Peace Initiative offers Israel full diplomatic normalization and peace with all Arab states in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in a shared Jerusalem.

From the Arab perspective, to give a dramatic gesture in advance of an Israeli halt to settlement expansion in the Palestinian territories – which many see as jeopardizing an eventual Palestinian state – would open Arab governments to criticism from their own people for giving something away for nothing.

"Normalization comes after achieving these goals, not before it," Saudi Foreign Ministry spokesman Osama Nugali told Agence France-Presse this week. "As we all know, Israel is continuing to take unilateral measures by changing the geographic and demographic facts on the ground, by building settlements and expanding the existing ones."

The Obama administration has publicly insisted that Israel freeze all expansion – even in East Jerusalem, which Israel claims as part of its undivided and eternal capital.

So far, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has defied Washington's demand, though senior US officials have indicated that an agreement is forthcoming.

"Netanyahu has made it clear from the very start that he's not interested in peace," says Sami Moubayed, a political analyst in the Syrian capital, Damascus. "It shows you exactly what the Syrians have been saying for the last three or four months: There is no peace partner today. People thought Barack Obama would have enough clout to force Netanyahu to change his attitude, but there's only so much Obama can do."

Saudis also express doubt that Obama will succeed.

"We think Obama maybe came at the wrong time [because], unfortunately, with the current Israeli government, we think there is no hope to make any progress," says one senior civil servant who asked not to be named because he is not authorized to speak on the matter.

Mr. Rasheed, the Saudi businessman, points out that when Netanyahu visited the White House in May, "he basically told Obama to get lost. So now, what is the president of the United States going to do?"

He notes that many of Obama's close Mideast advisers are considered pro-Israeli – a point echoed by Zaim Abdullah, an unemployed recent graduate of Sanaa University in Yemen, who argues that Obama is so sympathetic to the Jewish perspective that he practically shares their religion. But Mr. Abdullah also criticizes Arabs.

"Arab countries, if unified, could destroy everyone, but they are all divided," he says. "That is the biggest problem."

OBAMA'S MIDEAST POLICY NEEDS TEETH

Many Arabs are looking for a tougher approach from Obama, with some invoking a popular Arabic saying: "You can't chew meat unless you have some teeth."

"We're willing to make peace, but we want the [Israeli-occupied] Golan [Heights] back," says Ahmad, a taxi driver in Damascus. "Until the Americans match their actions with their words and put the Israelis under real pressure, nothing will happen."

But others are more optimistic. "His credibility is [high] and a lot of people have a lot of hopes invested in him," says Muhammed al-Katatni, a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated member of Egypt's parliament.

In Syria, there was a new surge of enthusiasm after Mitchell informed President Bashar al-Assad this weekend that the Obama administration would work to ease US sanctions. The US also recently announced that it would send an ambassador to Syria, ending a four-year hiatus in diplomatic relations.

"That Mitchell has come twice in such a short period of time shows that the Americans are serious [about restarting peace talks]. This is a sign that something is happening, that they are going into more details," says Thabet Salem, a Syrian political analyst.

"The Syrians are happy ... because the Americans are bringing the Israelis back to reason," he says. "They believe that the Americans are serious about doing something this time."

SAUDIS FED UP WITH PALESTINIAN INFIGHTING

Palestinians, meanwhile, have been trying to sway Arab countries from moving toward normalization.

"The Arabs must also remember that they have offered the maximum they can give through the Arab initiative, and until now, Israel did not move one inch forward to show that it is serious about peace," Mohammad al-Soudy wrote Wednesday in the West Bank-based newspaper al-Ayyam newspaper. "The Arabs must also remember that it is easy for Israel to resume settlement expansion, but it is very difficult for them [Israel] to revoke normalization once they start with it."

Saudi Arabia, which, together with Egypt, has the clout to push the Arab Peace Inititiave forward, is loath to budge without a move from Israel. But it's also fed up with Palestinian infighting, says Abdullah A. Al Shammri, a Saudi political observer.

"We are feeling cool to the Palestinian issue, since we are seeing Palestinian fighting and arguing every day. We consider it ... a shame that they are killing each other and arguing with each other."

In addition, the Saudi public is divided about which Palestinian faction to support. While the government is pro-Fatah, many influential religious and business figures favor Hamas. These divisions, and the public's impatience with Palestinian internal dissension, lessen the government's willingness to take dramatic steps, Mr. Shammri adds.

Still, some Saudis are not yet ready to dismiss Obama's efforts.

"I think it's too early in the game to say the efforts are not a success. We really need to give this time," says a Saudi who keeps in touch with the royal court. Recalling the landmark 1979 peace deal between Israel and Egypt reached at Camp David, he notes: "It was a long time before a deal was consummated."

Caryle Murphy, Ashraf Khalil in Cairo, Julien Barnes-Dacey in Damascus, and Benedict Moran in Sanaa, Yemen, contributed reporting.

Commentary: Flipping enemies By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE UPI Editor at Large

http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2009/07/30/Commentary-Flipping-enemies/UPI-92691248959950/

Commentary: Flipping enemies

By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE
UPI Editor at Large

Two academic specialists on Afghanistan argue the Taliban insurgency can be flipped. A third academic, and the most knowledgeable on the Middle East and South Asia , says flipping Taliban is a “fantasy.” Pros and cons — and the cons have it.

WASHINGTON , July 30 (UPI) — Geopolitical trendies ran a new one up the international flagpole to see if anyone saluted. It claimed to be the magic formula on “How to Win in Afghanistan .”

“Flipping the Taliban” is the new recipe for success in Afghanistan . In the July/August 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, Fotini Christia, a member of the Security Studies Program at MIT, and Michael Semple, an Irish official with the EU delegation who was expelled from Afghanistan last December for his involvement in a Taliban reconciliation effort, put forward their “flipping” the enemy thesis that makes the exercise a tad harder than flipping hamburgers.

Western logic is not a good guide when assessing the psychological profile of men who curse the birth of a girl and exalt a baby boy, born with a Kalashnikov in his cradle. The current generation of Afghan men and their sons has fought almost non-stop for the past 30 years. While in power (1996-2001), Taliban clerics ordered women stoned to death for being seen out of their ambulatory burqa tents with non-family men and banned education for all females. Result: Only 3 percent of them can read and write.

The Christia-Semple duo remind us that Taliban leader and al-Qaeda ally Mullah Omar, still eluding capture after eight years on the lam, recently offered, ironically, to give safe passage to NATO forces that choose to leave the country, just as the mujahedin offered safe passage to Soviet troops when they decamped and went home two decades ago. But the authors fail to point out this is precisely the reason why Taliban “reconcilables,” as perceived by European interlocutors, will remain irreconcilable. All Afghans, uneducated as most of them are, have one incontrovertible historical fact engraved in their DNA: They have defeated every empire that occupied Afghan land, from Alexander the Great to Genghis Khan’s Mongol hordes to the Persian Empire, India ’s Mughal Empire, to the British, Russian and American empires. On Jan. 13, 1842, a British army doctor reached a British sentry post at Jalalabad, the sole survivor of a 16,000-strong Anglo-Indian expeditionary force, allowed to escape to tell the world the story of a massacre strewn along the 95-mile road from Kabul . During the decadelong Soviet occupation of the 1980s, 14,500 Soviet troops were killed and 54,000 seriously wounded.

So cajoling a few Taliban “reconcilable” foot soldiers to abandon the fight and rally to NATO’s side will not flip anything. The Vietnam War is long since forgotten and its lessons ignored by virtue of not being remembered. And before that France ’s eight-year war in Algeria . And before that France ’s eight-year war in Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia . In each one of these conflicts, the illusion was nurtured about splitting hard-as-nails insurgent fronts in the vain hope of getting the “reconcilables,” or turncoats, to carry the white man’s burden. Guerrilla movements frequently fostered the illusion of fissures to split the ranks of their enemies.

Over the years, the authors argue, Afghan Taliban commanders often switched sides mid-conflict. That was true as the Taliban (student movement), sponsored by Pakistan ’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, set out to end a post-Soviet-exit civil war and establish its rule over the whole country. Loyalties caromed from tribe to ethnic group as ISI’s nationwide campaign gathered steam and lined up behind the Taliban. The defections were to the Taliban with 80 percent of the territory — or to the rival, non-Pashtu Northern Alliance that held its ground and sided with U.S.-led invaders in October 2001.

Flipping Taliban is a “fantasy,” said Anthony Cordesman, one of America ’s leading strategic thinkers, after spending a month in Afghanistan as a member of an official Strategic Advisory Group. A senior scholar and strategy director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Cordesman said this week that Afghanistan is “a disorganized mess. The impact of years of inadequate resources, stovepipes rather than unity of effort, a lack of realistic goals and measures of effectiveness, a focus on post-conflict reconstruction in mid-war, and a failure to come to grips with the limits and corruption of the Afghan government, have taken their toll.

“What should be an integrated civil-military effort on winning the war in the field,” said Cordesman in his report,” is a dysfunctional, wasteful mess focused in Kabul and crippled by bureaucratic divisions, Afghan power brokering, national caveats (against offensive operations) and tensions, and a critical lack of resources at every level.”

The Christia-Semple thesis says that “for many Taliban fighters, insurgency has nothing to do with Islamic zealotry; it is a way of life.” Reconciliation efforts, as the authors see it, will have to zero in on the particular characteristics of each group: its tribal links, its traditions, the special conditions under which it functions. Good luck. In light of what Tony Cordesman saw and heard, that would mean at least three more stovepipes parceled out among 40 different nationalities.

Afghanistan , like Vietnam during the eight-year war fought by the French, followed by the 10-year war fought by the United States , is friend by day and enemy by night with no end in sight. U.S. soldiers, going up and down mountains lugging 60 to 80 pounds, are easy pickings for concealed guerrillas. So the Christia-Semple formula may well serve as a fig leaf for withdrawal short of “Mission Accomplished.”

LINKS OF INTEREST * Russia and the United States

LINKS OF INTEREST

* Russia and the United States
The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2009

http://www.stimson.org/nuke/pdf/Russia_US_Format_FINAL.pdf

Myanmar Activities Fuel NKorea Nuclear Suspicions: Expert Agence France-Presse

Myanmar Activities Fuel NKorea Nuclear Suspicions: Expert
Agence France-Presse
There is no hard evidence that two of the world's pariah states are sharing nuclear technology, but one US expert says some of Myanmar's activities raise suspicions of such links with North Korea.

http://www.mysinchew.com/node/27502

China, U.S. Press North Korea to Rejoin Disarmament Talks Global Security Newswire

China, U.S. Press North Korea to Rejoin Disarmament Talks
Global Security Newswire
The United States yesterday indicated that China, North Korea's most powerful ally, agreed with U.S. officials that Pyongyang should return to six-party denuclearization talks, the Yonhap News Agency reported (see GSN, July 28).

http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090729_9143.php

China Seizes Smuggled Metal Bound for North Korea Reuters

China Seizes Smuggled Metal Bound for North Korea
Reuters
Chinese border police have seized 70 kg (154 lb) of the strategic metal vanadium bound for North Korea, a local newspaper said on Tuesday, foiling an attempt to smuggle a material used to make missile parts.

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE56R1QP20090728

Russia: Bushehr Power Plant Likely to Go Online in Months Fars News Agency

Russia: Bushehr Power Plant Likely to Go Online in Months
Fars News Agency
The Bushehr nuclear reactor could go online by the end of the year, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said.

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8805010527

Jordan Seeks to Join Nuclear Energy Club Randa Habib, Middle East Online

Jordan Seeks to Join Nuclear Energy Club
Randa Habib, Middle East Online
Jordan is forging ahead with a peaceful nuclear programme that would turn the energy-poor kingdom into an exporter of electricity, nuclear chief Khaled Tukan said.

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=33400

Yep, Waste Dump Still on Track for Deep-Sixing Lisa Mascaro, Las Vegas Sun

Yep, Waste Dump Still on Track for Deep-Sixing
Lisa Mascaro, Las Vegas Sun
MinutemanAnother sign of the possible demise of the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository could be seen Wednesday on the floor of the Senate as the chamber worked its way through the annual energy spending bill for 2010.

The bill, which passed late in the day, reduces funding to develop the radioactive waste dump 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas as part of the Obama administration’s vow to terminate the project.

http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jul/30/yep-waste-dump-still-track-deep-sixing/

bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable: The Sixth Fateh Copngress and Arab politics, July 30, 2009.

bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable

Edition 29 Volume 7 - July 30, 2009

The Sixth Fateh Congress and Arab politics

• Fateh needs more than superficial unity - Lamis Andoni
The fundamental struggle for Fateh at this historic juncture is to restore its identity.

• A diaspora left out in the cold - Ghada Karmi
What we need urgently today is unity.

• The end of illusions - Oraib Al Rantawi
Fateh's leadership of the Palestinian national movement is in regression.

• Breathing new life into Fateh - an interview with Sufyan Abu Zaida
Mahmoud Abbas will be stronger after the conference than before.

Fateh needs more than superficial unity
Lamis Andoni

Fateh, the movement that has led the Palestinian struggle for decades, is at a dangerous crossroads. At stake is not only its unity but more significantly its mere survival.

It faces tough choices. In order to keep itself relevant on a regional and international level it would need to project itself as a "moderate" force committed to a non-existing peace process, thus risking the further demise of popular legitimacy. To salvage its legitimacy and unity it would need to disengage from the Palestinian Authority's compliance to American and Israeli terms that aim at turning the movement into a malleable political tool and an enforcer of Israeli security.

But more so than ever in its history, Fateh is facing a real rival that has popular legitimacy and backing by key regional powers. Iran and Syria are seeking to further boost their negotiating credentials by supporting the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, and are ready to accelerate the demise of both Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Qatar openly aids and promotes Hamas as the alternative movement, again to enhance its role as a regional power broker to be reckoned with.

Egypt, Jordan and other so called "moderate" countries, the supposed backers of Fateh, are junior partners of Washington in its plans to turn the movement into a huge security apparatus and ensure the Palestinian people's submission. More significantly, they could easily switch sides if the US and Israel decide that Hamas is ready to accept the terms of engagement in the "peace process" or that it could be a more effective enforcer of Israeli security.

But the fundamental struggle for Fateh at this historic juncture is to restore its identity, unity and the core of its soul. Its merger into the Palestinian Authority after the signing of the Oslo accords distorted its identity and function. The one-time backbone of the Palestine Liberation Organization and embodiment of Palestinian national rights, Fateh has been reduced to a ruling party largely, but not solely, dependent on proving itself as a "peace partner" in a process that has so far consolidated Israeli occupation and expansionism.

Under the leadership of the late Yasser Arafat Fateh did not lose its soul: it walked a tightrope, balancing between its contradictory roles as the main pillar of a Palestinian Authority bound by agreements to contain resistance to the occupation and the role of a defiant movement that had not abandoned its main goal of leading Palestinians into freedom. Arafat himself personified that soul of Fateh and in broader terms the spirit of the Palestinian struggle. He became the master of compromise, earning the wrath of many disillusioned Palestinians. But when it came to the ultimate test he refused to sign away Palestinian rights, defying American and Israeli pressures at Camp David in the summer of 2000.

Arafat ultimately paid the price for his defiance, but his act revived Fateh and the Palestinian spirit of resistance, leading to the eruption of the second intifada less than two months after the failed Camp David talks.

But on the eve of the Fateh Congress, to be convened for the first time since 1989 next Tuesday in the Palestinian town of Bethlehem , the movement is struggling not only for its soul but for its mere survival. Years of exile, especially after the PLO lost its sanctuary in Lebanon in 1982, a failed "peace process", the loss of Arafat, the ruthless Israeli clampdown on Fateh after the second intifada, combined with unprecedented divisions and a brewing power struggle, have eaten up the fabric of the movement's unity.

The absence of Arafat as a unifying leader could prove fatal. It is not clear if Marwan Barghouti, a leader of the first and second intifadas, could inspire and lead the movement into recovery from his Israeli jail cell. Arafat himself had contributed to the slow but steady weakening of Fateh. His authoritarian style, failure to encourage new generations to assume leadership and even his decision to endorse the militarization of the second intifada dealt constant blows to the body of the movement.

But it was mainly the path pursed by the Palestinian leadership after his death that led the movement to lose its compass. President Mahmoud Abbas, the architect of the Oslo agreement, is a staunch believer that accommodation of the "peace process" and especially of the American terms will lead to the end of the occupation.

Abbas the president may be restricted by obligations to the agreements and conditions to secure the flow of international and Arab funding to the Palestinian territories. But Abbas as leader of Fateh failed to nurture the movement and instead marginalized and curbed dissent within Fateh, further weakening its spirit.

His keen public interest in appeasing American administrations in the name of widening the gap between Washington and Israel helped portray Fateh as collaborationist and an arm of Israeli occupation. Rampant corruption, which actually predated Abbas, further eroded Fateh's popularity, leading to the surprise Hamas victory in the 2006 elections.

The elections ended Fateh's exclusive leadership of the Palestinian struggle. Fateh, however, did not seize the opportunity to restructure itself and revise its position. Instead Fateh leaders inside the Palestinian Authority further maligned the movement by posing as guarantors of the Hamas-led government's compliance with Israeli and international conditions.

The elections, and later on the Gaza war prompted by the Israeli rejection of Hamas, encouraged regional and international powers to look for the Islamic resistance movement as a substitute for both Fateh and the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Ironically, it is the threat of what the mainstream Palestinian group correctly views as a regional agenda to end the movement or help it kill itself that has restored some sense of urgency and unity among the fighting Fateh tribes on the eve of its crucial congress. The explosive accusations by Farouk Qaddumi, an original co-founder of Fateh and consistent opponent of the Oslo process, that Abbas and former security chief Mohammad Dahlan were implicated with Israel in the death of Arafat, were seen by many in Fateh to unwittingly serve a regional agenda to finish off the movement.

Fear of extinction may unite Fateh's congress, but a superficial unity will not save the movement from its contradictions unless it succeeds in charting a clear path and direction--and shedding its growing collaborationist image.- Published 30/7/2009 © bitterlemons.org

Lamis Andoni is a journalist and commentator on Middle East affairs.

A diaspora left out in the cold
Ghada Karmi

At a rally in Gaza on July 25, a DFLP leader, Salah Zeidan, demanded an end to the Fateh-Hamas unity talks that have been taking place in Cairo over the last few months because, as he said, they leave out the smaller Palestinian parties like the PFLP and the DFLP. What, on that basis, should the largest Palestinian party, the diaspora, say of its own exclusion from these and all other deliberations in the Palestinian arena?

Take, for example, Fateh's upcoming conference on August 4. This long awaited convention is due to take place in Bethlehem under the auspices of Mahmoud Abbas' leadership. It will be Fateh's sixth conference and comes after several postponements and a delay of over a decade. From the start the conference preparations have been riven with internal disputes, conflicts and threatened splits. There were differences over where it should be held, many members arguing for Amman as a place not subject to Israeli restrictions. Farouk Qaddumi, the head of the PLO's political department and an old rival to Abbas, refused to meet in any territory under Israeli occupation. He followed this up two weeks ago with the shocking accusation that Abbas had been behind a plot in collusion with Israel to poison Yasser Arafat in 2004.

Whether true or not, this can only deepen the already existing rupture in Fateh between the old and the young, and between Qaddumi's followers and those of Abbas. It may even lead to two Fateh conferences, one in Bethlehem and another elsewhere, perhaps in Damascus or Beirut. Even without that, those Fateh delegates opposed to Abbas are likely to be excluded from the Bethlehem meeting, as are the delegates from Gaza whom Hamas' foreign minister, Mahmoud Zahar, has vowed to prevent from attending as long as Hamas prisoners languish in Palestinian Authority jails . What credibility or legitimacy the resulting conference will be left with under these circumstances is unclear.

Those of us in the diaspora, watching these developments, can only feel a mixture of concern and impotence, angry at this pointless internecine fighting and unable to stop it. Worse still to imagine how triumphant Israel must feel for having created a situation where over half the Palestinian people are excluded from their own political process, while a minority of them tears itself apart under its occupation. Destroying the Palestinian national cause by fragmenting the Palestinians was always Israel's aim. The PLO, established in 1964, was able to halt this process for decades by creating a unifying structure, a substitute homeland, for the dispossessed majority. Whatever its imperfections, the PLO succeeded in foiling Israel's strategy and kept the national cause alive.

It all came to an end when the PLO leadership decided to return to the Palestinian territories in 1994 under the Oslo agreement. Unknowingly, that fateful move was to signal the start of a process of disintegration of the Palestinian national cause. No real provision was made for the diaspora community after the main PLO departure, leaving it leaderless and increasingly demoralized. All eyes were focused instead on the occupied territories with the hope that an independent Palestinian state would soon emerge. Many diaspora Palestinians, seeking a relevant role in these new circumstances, began to invest in the putative state, and the center of Palestinian life shifted firmly to the inside. International funding poured in to foster this arrangement, but also to support the illusion of a 'state-around-the-corner'. Soon the debate was no longer about reclaiming the whole of Palestine, as had been the national objective, but only a small part of it. The wrangling with Israel ove! r percentages of land in the denuded parts of Palestine left over is the logical consequence.

Throughout this process and the tortuous peace negotiations between the PA and Israel that followed the Oslo accords, the assumption has grown that the PA represents not just the people under occupation but all Palestinians. This dangerous misapprehension, made possible by the ambiguity of having the same man as leader of the PA and of the PLO, has dragged the diaspora into the infighting between Fateh and Hamas, and soon probably within Fateh itself. It could also portend a situation whereby a PA leadership, which excludes diaspora participation by definition, may be in a position to sign away diaspora rights.

The only possible reason for shedding such fundamental rights has been the argument that a Palestinian state, once established, would be the first step to the liberation of the entire homeland and the return of diaspora Palestinians. But no such state is in sight, and without it, these Palestinian sacrifices of national unity and national cause have been in vain. What we need urgently today is unity, not just at the Fateh conference or between Fateh and Hamas, but between the outside and the inside.- Published 30/7/2009 © bitterlemons.org

Ghada Karmi is the author of "Married to another man: Israel's dilemma in Palestine".

The end of illusions
Oraib Al Rantawi

Nearly two years ago, Jordan opened its doors to the attempt by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to restore and awaken the Fateh movement. Fateh is the backbone of the Palestinian national movement and the main Palestinian partner in the peace process to which Jordan attaches special attention. The rise of the Hamas movement and its landslide victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections played a major role in encouraging Jordan to move away from its usual caution and provide all possible facilities for holding the Fateh congress and rebuilding the movement.

The prevailing belief among the Palestinian leadership since 2006 holds that only Fateh can confront the rise of radical Islamic movements in Palestine and provide the "moderate Palestinian alternative" that believes in the peace process and the two-state solution. Jordan perceives a vital interest in this matter, for two reasons. First, Jordan itself faces a powerful Islamist movement that is strongly supportive of Hamas and is to a large extent strengthened by the rise of Hamas. Second, Jordan believes that the establishment of a viable Palestinian state is an expression of its principal national interest in the face of what it believes to be plans for resolving the issue of Palestine at its expense and against its interests.

Instructions have been issued by the highest political authorities in Jordan to provide all possible facilities to the Preparatory Committee for the Sixth Fateh Congress. The Palestinian president, who also heads Fateh, was offered the opportunity to meet tens of leading Fateh personalities who had been banned from entering Jordan for decades. Amman became the permanent headquarters for meetings of the Fateh Central Committee and the Preparatory Committee for the congress.

As an expression of support for President Abbas and for what and whom he represents, the Jordanian monarch took the initiative to attend some of the Fateh Central Committee meetings held in Amman. This signified that Jordan stands firmly on the side of the Palestinian line of moderation and Palestinian legitimacy as represented by Abbas in his quest to build an independent Palestinian state and in the face of what was regarded in Amman as winds of extremism and fundamentalism that could threaten the peace process in its various components, outputs and opportunities.

This significant support to the Fateh movement coincides with Fateh's efforts to restore its unity and its leading historic role. It has also reflected an extreme deterioration in Jordan's relations with Hamas, culminating in the official government declaration in Amman of the discovery of a Hamas cell that was seeking to implement terrorist operations in Jordan and strike at the heart of Jordanian security. This deepened the estrangement between Amman and the Palestinian Islamist group, though eventually relations were restored through the "secure" communication channel set up by the former chief of intelligence and the strong man in the regime at the time, General Mohammad Al Dahabi.

Jordan's position regarding the internal Palestinian conflict and its two main factions has been influenced by many factors, of which several are particularly important. For one, Jordan looks at the conflict between Fateh and Hamas as part of the larger clash between the camps of "moderation" and "resistance" in the region. Then too, Jordanian fears have been based on the rise of the Islamic movement in Jordan, which felt strong and refreshed due to Hamas' sweeping victory in the Palestinian elections to the extent that some leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan began talking about a similar readiness for the movement to form a government in Jordan in the event of its victory in democratic elections. Finally, Jordan is keen to speed up the peace process and to close the pressing Palestinian file, reflecting Jordanian decision-making priorities.

More than three years have passed since Hamas' victory in elections and the formation of its government in Gaza. For a time, Jordan feared that its reliance on the awakening, development and strengthening of the Fateh movement was exaggerated insofar as neither isolation nor sanctions--and consequently war--succeeded in toppling the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Jordan had doubts about the status of Fateh and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank amid reports that what was preventing a repetition of the Gaza experience in the West Bank was the Israeli occupation of Palestinian areas and not PA security forces.

This caused Jordanian diplomacy to back away a little from relations with Fateh and cautiously advance in its relations with Hamas. Jordan kept its distance from the Fateh-Hamas conflict as well as Fateh's own endless internal conflicts and opened a secure communications line with Hamas.

When PLO Political Department head and secretary general of Fateh Farouk Qaddumi dropped the bombshell accusation that Abbas and his advisor Mohammad Dahlan had plotted with PM Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz to assassinate PLO leader Yasser Arafat, Jordan tried to steer clear of internal Fateh controversy. Jordan was keen that these statements issued in Amman not be interpreted as a change in the Jordanian stance or an indication that it supported Qaddumi against Abbas.

The Jordanian government also stressed that while it did not ask Qaddumi to leave Jordan it requested that he not issue statements that would embarrass the government or tarnish its image of support for the Palestinian people in general. Jordan has never maintained good relations with Qaddumi; on the contrary, the veteran Palestinian diplomat has often clashed politically and diplomatically with Jordanian foreign ministers in Arab inter-governmental and regional meetings.

Today, Amman awaits the convening of the Fateh Congress in Bethlehem after it was decided to hold it inside the Palestinian territories (the Fateh faction led by Abbas was never serious about holding the Congress in an Arab capital). Jordan hopes the congress will boost Fateh's unity and enhance its role in the moderate Palestinian camp. Officially, it views the holding of the congress "internally" as a victory for the moderate movement in Fateh.

Nevertheless, Jordan does not pin much hope on Fateh regaining the reigns of leadership and on the movement's role in general. The experience of the past few years has without any doubt demonstrated that Fateh's leadership of the Palestinian national movement is in regression. Day by day it is turning into a functional body of the Palestinian Authority; it suffers from the same ailments as the PA itself.- Published 30/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oraib Al Rantawi is director of Al Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman.

Breathing new life into Fateh
an interview with Sufyan Abu Zaida

BI: Why is the Fateh conference in Bethlehem on August 4 so important?

Abu Zaida: Any political movement needs, from time to time, to evaluate, to discuss policy, to elect new leaders. There's been a delay of 20 years. It's a very long time. It's important for Fateh to go through this process.

BI: Do you expect significant changes in the leadership structure?

Abu Zaida: For sure. More than half of the current leadership will be changed or replaced.

BI: This is a significant change?

Abu Zaida: In my opinion, yes.

BI: How will this affect the movement?

Abu Zaida: For a long time, Fateh has functioned without leadership and without proper institutions. Once there is functioning leadership and functioning institutions it will be a very different movement.

BI: Today there is a lot of talk of the many factions in Fateh. Will this change after the conference?

Abu Zaida: In any political party, anywhere in the world, there are different camps and opinions. This is the same in Fateh. There are no ideological divisions in Fateh. Everyone in Fateh has accepted the Oslo project without any problem. Yes, there are camps, but these are personal, not ideological.

BI: You say more than half the current leadership will change. In favor of whom?

Abu Zaida: In favor of a younger generation of leaders.

BI: Will the conference strengthen Mahmoud Abbas?

Abu Zaida: Mahmoud Abbas will be stronger after the conference than before.

BI: And in terms of the division between Fateh and Hamas, what will the conference mean?

Abu Zaida: It means there will be a leadership in Fateh that can decide about strategy, about what to do, how to do it and when to do it.

BI: Will this aide unity efforts?

Abu Zaida: Let's wait and see the results of the conference, and if Hamas allows Fateh members from Gaza to come or not.

BI: Are you optimistic about the conference?

Abu Zaida: Yes. I believe the conference and new blood in the leadership will inject new life into Fateh.

BI: There was controversy over holding the conference in Bethlehem...

Abu Zaida: There were two opinions. Some wanted to hold the conference outside Palestine to be away from any Israeli pressure. Others called for holding the conference in Palestine in spite of the fact that we don't have full sovereignty. What's better? Here, in spite of Israel's control, or outside, in spite of the problems in getting Fateh members from the West Bank and Gaza there. I think the approach of Abu Mazen [Abbas] that we have our land and it is better to have it in Bethlehem was the right one.

BI: What about those who were excluded from coming?

Abu Zaida: They decided not to come. Abu Mazen promised everyone that they could come without restriction. There was a problem with Farouk Qaddumi, but after his shameful interview and press conference Qaddumi lost all his credibility and any chance of ever being a Fateh leader again.

BI: So he is one of the leaders you expect will be replaced.

Abu Zaida: For sure.- Published 30/7/2009 © bitterlemons.org

Sufyan Abu Zaida is a member of Fateh and a former Palestinian Authority minister.

The Road Ahead For The Global Economy Nouriel Roubini, 07.30.09, 12:01 AM EDT Will a weak recovery lapse into chronic stagnation?

The Road Ahead For The Global Economy
Nouriel Roubini, 07.30.09, 12:01 AM EDT
Will a weak recovery lapse into chronic stagnation?


The global recession may end toward the end of 2009--instead of sooner--but the global recovery in 2010 will be anemic and well below trend as households, firms and financial institutions are constrained in their ability to borrow, lend and spend.

Meanwhile, a perfect storm of the following has inched a little closer on the radar of this cloudy global economic outlook: persistently large fiscal deficits and public debt accumulation; monetization of such deficits that will eventually increase expected inflation; rising government bond yields; soaring oil prices; weak profits; still-falling job figures; and stagnant growth. It's a storm that could blow the recovering world economy back into a double-dip recession by late 2010 or 2011.

After rising sharply for three months, asset markets in the mature economies have paused and started a tentative correction in the last few weeks. Risk investors that had driven up prices have partially taken profits, and suddenly they are wary. They are right to be wary.

Before the recent correction started, there was a very sharp rise in asset prices, beginning around March 9. Equities rose, oil and energy prices rose, commodities rose. Credit spreads sharply contracted, indicating a surge of new confidence in the corporate sector. Long-term government interest rates shot up as ten-year Treasurys rose from 2% to 4% before retracing, suggesting that markets saw growth returning in the near future. The volatility of asset prices also fell, and that is always a sign of increasing confidence and lower risk-aversion.

Emerging market asset prices--equities, bonds and currencies--have, if anything, been more bullish. The broad indexes of the BRICs showed that, in early 2009, some investors again began to believe that these economies, starting with China, will recover and experience further rises in commodity prices.

In other words, markets, which only four months ago were pricing-in an L-shaped global near-depression and a near financial meltdown, were three weeks ago pricing-in a rapid V-shaped recovery toward potential growth. And there are some good reasons for part of this rally. At the beginning of the year gross domestic product (GDP) was falling at a rate that suggested that something close to economic depression really was looming, and there was a widespread sense that many of the world's biggest financial institutions were effectively insolvent.

Today, both of those fears have been, for now, checked; the tail risk of an L-shaped near-depression is significantly lower. We have seen policy action by the U.S., Europe, Japan, China and many other economies that has been unprecedented, with interest rates reduced to near zero, with much bad debt ring-fenced (although not written off or worked out), with liquidity created by orthodox and unorthodox means and with final demand in many economies primed by central governments. The rate of output decline has shallowed dramatically, the "tail risk" of a chronic slump has been suppressed, and financial institutions are recording profitable quarters, at least on paper, as forbearance and public subsidies are, for now, hiding their mounting losses.

All this creates a moment when risk to a rally is to be expected. As tail risk is reduced, investors move back into equities, credit and commodities.

But better fundamentals are not the only drivers at work. Some proportion of the market upturn is the result of liquidity itself--and governments have raised a massive wall of liquidity, a wave that is now surging into asset markets. Take China: Most of the new credit that has been officially created has gone to state-owned enterprises that stockpiled raw materials and drove commodity prices higher.

Fear of the expected inflation that is likely to be caused by all this easy money is also a driver. When investors and companies see inflation coming, they seek an inflation hedge, and they reason that commodities today will be better than cash tomorrow.

Some argue that none of this matters. Who cares if credit spreads narrow, and asset prices--including equities--go up? After all, that is good for wealth and good for growth. But if it all happens too fast, too soon, the effect may be the opposite: Oil and energy prices rising too fast, too soon are a negative shock to oil-importing economies, and the rally in risky assets may deflate if weaker than expected economic and financial news reemerges. A new tipping point for the economy may be created.

The effect of that tipping point depends on how optimistic markets have become about the medium-term prospects and on how realistic that optimism is. Until recently, the level of optimism was not realistic. Markets were not just pricing-in a realistic calculation of the reduction in risk and a reduced risk of an L-shaped near-depression. They were pricing-in the expectation that the economies of the U.S. and Europe were close to returning to their potential growth levels, a V-shaped recovery. That is not realistic at all, as a weak, anemic U-shaped recovery is the most likely scenario for advanced economies.

For one thing, the recession is not about to end, with unemployment still rising and house prices still falling: The contraction has at least five months to run until year-end, and maybe a little longer. Second, the growth that will be achieved when the recession does end will be U-shaped, with weak growth, and it will stay weak for an extended period. Trend growth in the U.S. is around 3%, but with final demand so weak--as highly leveraged financial institutions restrain credit growth and as highly leveraged households and companies reduce their consumption and capital expenditure--growth of around 1% is more likely for 2010-11.

Most important, weak growth prepares the ground for a second leg down, back into recession--the "W-shaped" recession that may emerge in late 2010 or 2011 that markets seem to have forgotten about. If oil prices rise too fast because of the wall of liquidity and long-term government bond yields keep rising (because large fiscal deficits keep on being monetized, leading to a rise in expected inflation after a long bout of deflation)--all against a background of weak demand and continued consumer distress--markets and the broader economy will slide hand-in-hand down the next steep slope of recession.

Two factors are especially important in the shorter run. One is the employment-housing nexus. The other is financial industry distress.

Employment and housing are inextricably linked. Unemployment is growing--in the U.S. almost half a million people lost their jobs in June, and on top of that a larger number are having their disposable income cut by shorter hours, lower hourly wages or enforced furloughs and cuts in hours. The unemployment rate in the euro zone is equally weak--the figures are almost identical to the U.S.' So income throughout the OECD is weak, which means consumption is weak, and no practical amount of temporary government tax rebates will change that--for example, most of last year's $100 billion rebate in the U.S. was saved, not spent, and the same will be true this year.

This background of job losses and declining income guarantees that house prices will continue to fall to a cumulative decline of 40% to 45% from their peak; thus, another 13% to 18% fall in home prices is still ahead. Historically, house prices do not bottom out while unemployment is rising. Already this crisis will see over 8 million mortgage holders in the U.S. lose their jobs by year-end and be unable to service their mortgages.

Further declines in housing prices will in turn help generate a new round of financial industry distress. Investor sentiment toward large lenders has improved greatly in the last four months on the assumption that most of their housing- and consumption-related lending (two things that are impossible to disaggregate because they are often the same thing) has been accurately repriced. But it hasn't. These loans have just been relabeled as "stress-tested," but that is the equivalent of putting a bill in the filing cabinet instead of paying it. The toxic content has not been purged, not least because the stress tests were so feeble. The worst-case assumption of the U.S. stress tests were that unemployment could average 10.3% next year. The reality is clearly going to be worse as the unemployment rate is likely to peak around 11%.

Banks are going to go on filing bills instead of paying them for a couple of quarters more. Reality will sink in eventually, and the reality is that a higher level of bad-debt provision needs to be made for mortgages (whether subprime or prime), commercial real estate, personal loans, auto loans, credit cards and much more--but that may not happen until later this year or next year, when provisions for loan losses cannot be further postponed. And when that does happen it is very likely that the financial institutions of Europe will suffer most. European banks have built up higher leverage, with risky lending and massive exposure, especially to official and private borrowers in eastern Europe (lending that also has foreign-currency exposure, which, as the Asian financial crisis showed, is highly dangerous).

By that time it will also be clear that expectations of corporate earnings will have to be downgraded again. Today the market consensus is that next year's profits will be around a third higher than this year's. That view is based on another expectation--that growth will recover rapidly to trend levels and deflationary pressures will disappear. But these expectations are very likely to be disappointing: For the next year and a half, deflationary pressures will dominate in the mature economies as goods and labor markets remain very slack. Demand will be weak, most prices will be falling, and companies will therefore have little pricing power and their profit margins will remain squeezed. The expectation that in these conditions profits will rebound strongly is quite far-fetched.

A correction of the prices of risky assets--equities, credit and commodity prices--therefore seems inevitable and has already partially started in July. In the second half of 2009 the correction will be driven by worse macroeconomic performance than is currently expected. It will be driven by worse than expected shocks to financial institutions, with further writedowns of banking sector assets and greater than expected capital needs. And it will be driven by downside surprises on corporate profits when weak consumption will reemerge as the temporary effects of the tax rebates fizzle out over the summer.

The world economy can withstand such a correction without falling into an L-shaped near-depression. Near-depression would mean unemployment even higher than 11% and GDP growth negligible or negative for years. But while a near-depression will be avoided, the road ahead will be tough. Today, markets think that a strong recovery is just around the corner. There will be a recovery, but it will take another six months for all the indicators to start pointing in the right direction.

In the larger picture, it does not matter exactly when the turning point is reached: What matters is what kind of recovery we will see. An analysis of macro and financial fundamentals suggests that it will be weak for an extended period of time (what the wise folks at PIMCO call "the new normal"). And the risk that a weak recovery will relapse into a chronic stagnation, where inflation gradually takes over from deflation, is actually increasing, as the most likely scenario is that large fiscal deficits will keep on being monetized for quite a while and eventually lead to higher than expected inflation.

Emerging-market economies may fare better than advanced economies as--paradoxically--many of them have sounder macro and financial fundamentals. But the growth recovery of emerging markets will be constrained by the growth weakness in the G3 economies. Indeed, many emerging-market economies--starting with China--still significantly rely on net external demand as a major source of economic growth; the structural policy changes that will lead to lower savings, and greater private domestic demand (especially private consumption) will take many years to be implemented. Thus China and emerging-market economies cannot fully decouple from the fortunes--or misfortunes--of the advanced economies.

In conclusion, we are now closer than we were six months ago to the end of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and worst global recession in decades. But the road ahead will be very rough and bumpy: The recession in advanced economies will continue through year-end, the recovery will be very anemic and well below trend, the risks of a double-dip W-shaped recession are rising, and the growth recovery of emerging-market economies will be constrained by the weakness of advanced economies.

Nouriel Roubini, a professor at the Stern Business School at New York University and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, is a weekly columnist for Forbes. at New York University and chairman of , is a weekly columnist for Forbes.

http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/29/global-economy-depression-recession-unemployment-consumption-opinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html?feed=rss_opinions

A View from the Ground Taghreed El-Khodary, New York Times correspondent in Gaza; International Crisis Group analyst. Interview with Middle East Bull

A View from the Ground
Taghreed El-Khodary, New York Times correspondent in Gaza; International Crisis Group analyst. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
July 28, 2009

Taghreed El-Khodary
"[T]he international community must realize that by leaving Gaza they are creating something that is unknown. They are creating a population that is completely isolated from the world—completely isolated from everything."

Tell us what the situation on the ground is like.

The siege is continuous and very depressing. You can feel it on a daily basis. It’s touching every element of society. It is interesting to observe the people on the ground and how they are coping. They keep asking me, as a journalist, ‘when is it going to be over?’ But, they understand that it could go on for a long time, especially with the continuous failure of the dialogue in Cairo and also with the absence of international intervention to do something regarding Palestinian unity, regarding Israel and the siege, but they are coping despite their painful experiences. Each has a story on how the siege has affected them.

The question is who benefits from the siege? The people are suffering, but you have those who are in control, Hamas, who are benefiting big time. For example, there are the tunnels. Hamas is not digging tunnels, but there are those in Rafah, including Fatah, who are digging. There are some businessmen in Gaza City and the rest of Gaza Strip who are investing in these tunnels and are making a lot of money. There is only a specific segment of society that benefits from the tunnels, aside from Hamas, of course, which gets money from outside and generates money inside. And a new uneducated class is emerging that benefits from the situation.

This new informal economy doesn’t benefit everyone. There is no construction, so you are talking about unemployment that keeps getting higher and higher. You have money laundering, which is also an issue. But, the private sector is dead. Many businessmen left Gaza for good or are planning to leave for good. So in the long term this will lead to the weakening of independent voices in society.

Those who are suffering are the sick, those who suffer from serious diseases who need treatment outside. Students who dream of studying abroad are also in pain because they cannot leave. But, also on a daily basis, there are things that are missing. Israel has eased up a little bit, there is more stuff coming in, but it’s not everything. There is an absence of a formal economy.

So, if nothing happens and the international community does not intervene, in the long term you will have an ignorant society that is not exposed to the world trying to cope with these needs. I don’t know what the long-term results will be; how their minds will be shaped by this reality. Right now you have critical voices here and there, but I don’t know, if the closure will continue, what will come out. Who will dare to speak out? People will become very passive.

What’s going on with the banks?

Take me, for example. I work for the New York Times and for a long time the Times office in Jerusalem could not transfer my salary. Why? Israel refuses to transfer any money to Gaza, even to someone like me, meaning also others like me. So we came to the conclusion that they should transfer my salary directly from New York to Gaza. But I go to the bank, and I cannot withdraw my money. Why? Because there is no liquidity in the bank. Israel is not letting the money in. So when I go to the bank, I beg the manager to withdraw part of my salary. He will tell me, for example, if I want to withdraw $1,000, ‘no, no, no, it’s too much, there are not enough dollars. I can only give you $200.’ And it takes so much time to convince him to give me the $1,000. But for other people, he won’t give them the $1,000. He will give them $200 or tell them, ‘okay, we can give you the $1,000, but in shekels.’ But you lose a lot of money changing dollars at the bank, due to the informal economy, due to the absence of liquidity. So that’s why people want to withdraw all their money in dollars and change them outside the bank. And then the banks complain because Israel isn’t letting more dollars through. For a while, there have been no dollars in the banks. Last time I was in Bank of Palestine I saw women who work for international NGOs, who are paid in dollars, begging to get their salaries. And the bank said, ‘no, we can give you part of your salary’—despite the fact that the employer has been transferring the whole amount of the salary. So, you experience the closure in your daily life.

But Hamas has set up its own bank, right?

Yes, to pay their employees. Because, as you know, the Palestinian Authority [PA], in what I think was not a wise decision, asked teachers to stay at home, asked civil servants to stay at home—in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. So, what did Hamas do? They filled the gaps with people who support Hamas or people who were simply unemployed and seeking a job. Hamas then had to pay all these employees, those also who are working as police, and established a bank. They would say it’s not Hamas, but it is, of course. You cannot just move around with money. Now they have a bank and employees are paid by the bank. They are even opening accounts for guys who cannot open accounts with other banks because they belong to a military wing, for example and that category of young people within the society is excited to open an account for the first time in their life. So, in a way, they are finding ways to cope with the reality..

What is very sad, as I mentioned, is that when the PA offered the teachers to stay at home, older, sometimes secular, teachers with lots of experience were replaced by Hamas with younger, inexperienced teachers who are only confident with religion. And that, I think, is scary. When it comes to creating a new, educated generation exposed to the different elements of life and how things work, it’s very important to have a teacher who has been exposed to the world and received training, not a teacher without life experience who has never been out of Gaza and is only competent with one subject, religion.

So, it sounds as if Hamas has created its own infrastructure that is completely parallel to what was there before, not just in education.

Yes, it’s a new structure they are creating, and it makes a segment of society happy. Who is happy? Hamas supporters. Who else? Poor people, because they benefit from the international aid organizations and at the same time from Hamas, which has supported the poor all along, but now the international community is focusing on humanitarian aid to them also. So, it’s the best arrangement for them because never before have they gotten so much assistance. So, there is a segment of society that is happy, the ones who are praising the new awareness campaign that Hamas is using instead of imposing the veil and Sharia, by force. Before they used to be in the mosques, but now they are ministers, they’re in the schools—they have so much access to society.

There was a tendency within an element of Hamas to impose Sharia law, but the stronger tendency was against it. That was smart on the part of the current senior political leaders, because if they do so, it will undo their progress among the international community and so far Hamas are not keen to undermine themselves with the international community because they seek contact with it. From my observations, I would say that they would be interested in getting direct contact with the American administration. So, indirectly, they are working on it. They are not imposing anything. So you have a segment of society that is happy, about Gaza being a conservative place. In Palestinian society, if you go to the West Bank—the West Bank is not only Ramallah—if you go to Nablus, if you go to Hebron, if you go to different villages in the West Bank, they are very conservative. So, that speaks to the public.

There are a lot of reports about economic progress in the West Bank, and things like this, does that filter into Gaza? How is it perceived?

There is indirect contact between Gaza and the West Bank, by phone. People really communicate—they have relatives, they have friends, they have families over there. So, if you ask many people what they think, so far the people in the West Bank—and I talk to many West Bankers—would say they can feel that internal security has improved a little bit. When it comes to economy, it’s becoming a little bit better, but so far, there is no freedom of movement. The main checkpoints are still there. Israel said they did dismantle a few, but they didn’t dismantle the main ones that obstruct movement. I think it’s going to take time. So far, the West Bank is not paradise. The international community has an option to create a paradise in the West Bank, for the Gazans to learn a lesson when it comes to the upcoming elections. But the international community must realize that by leaving Gaza they are creating something that is unknown. They are creating a population that is completely isolated from the world—completely isolated from everything. People view it as collective punishment. Think about those seeking medical treatment; there are many women and children and that breaks people’s hearts. They can’t understand how the world can justify punishing such a segment of society. And Gaza has become only a humanitarian case. Which is, for many people, very depressing—for educated people, mainly, it’s very depressing, very insulting and very humiliating. From my observations I would say it’s a very risky policy. Because, after all, if you talk to many people on the ground, if you ask them are you interested in the peace process, in the two-state solution, the answer would be, ‘no, first national unity, then talk to us about two-state solution.’ It doesn’t make sense for many people to talk about the option of two-state solution when the Palestinians are divided.

Is that the way the Obama Administration’s efforts at creating a two-state solution are being understood there?

For example, when I’ve spoken to Hamas recently about the idea of the West Bank turning into paradise, they said that they don’t care about that. They believe that the Israelis will ultimately give Abu Mazen nothing. And even the people cannot see a two-state solution if Gaza and the West Bank remain as they are. How can you endorse a peace process given that division? It’s so hard to foresee. After all, some people will benefit by the improvement in the West Bank but others will not. The economy is not everything. It’s a political issue, not an economic issue. And if you diagnose it as a political issue, you have to resolve it and then you move ahead. The focus is very limited now and I think the international community is avoiding the real work. Many people would say the international community must impose unity between the Palestinians. They see the international community, mainly the American administration, as contributing to this division, which is very negative, I would say.

So far, everybody is optimistic about Obama, but nothing on the ground is tangible when it comes to Gaza. Israel is letting a little bit more stuff cross , but none of it can lead to the revival of the the private sector. So far the current situation is as it was under President Bush; there is no difference whatsoever. There is not tangible change. The speech in Cairo was marvelous. The people were so happy when they heard Obama’s speech in Cairo. But so far, they are waiting for the change on the ground. The issue of the Jewish settlements is crucial, but people are stuck dealing with survival in their daily lives.

But you seem to be tying progress to national unity, and it doesn’t seem like either the PA or Hamas want national unity.

I don’t think either party is interested. Hamas’ focus is on governance, ending the siege, direct talks with the international community—mainly the U.S. administration. Hamas would say no to elections unless they have a chance to govern. Their supporters argue that they haven’t been given a chance to govern. ‘End the siege, let us govern, let us perform and then we would be willing to go for another election.’ That’s Hamas position now.

When it comes to Fatah priorities, they are not interested either—just like Hamas—in national reconciliation. Fatah’s priority is the conference they are going to hold in Bethlehem. That is the main priority. They want to be stronger when they go to talks with Hamas, and they think that after that conference they will be stronger. Another priority for Fatah is the creation of a model in the West Bank so that Gazans revolt against Hamas. I think that is wishful thinking. Hamas is in complete control of the Gaza Strip. As time passes, they are increasingly in control. There are those who are angry at them, but so far no revolt. Many people in Gaza are married and have kids. Who is going to risk their life? There is an absence of an alternative, too. Will they give their life for Fatah? That’s the question, and you cannot feel that on the ground.

The Palestinians in Gaza are divided. There is this voice that says ‘OK, Fatah used to be thieves, corrupt, but we had a life.’ Then there is another voice that says ‘Hamas hasn’t been given a chance, but if they cannot govern, if the world doesn’t want them to govern, let them step aside. Let whatever happen, we need to live.’ They believe that Hamas is a victim here for not being given a chance. But at the same time, they are asking them to remain just as a resistance movement and to step aside from government. Then you have another voice that is in complete support of Hamas because they are not corrupt, for achieving internal security on the ground, for helping the poor. You have all of that.

You’ve spoken a lot in the past about working from the ground up, and thinking about the people separately from Hamas. Do you think that that is still possible, and what can be done?

Yes, I think one option is to strengthen the private sector. You have Hamas, and it’s a fact on the ground. The international community says that if we end the siege, Hamas will benefit. But with the siege they also benefit, because they are in complete control of all aspects of society, and the more time, the more support they will attract—especially from among the poor. So why not strengthen the private sector? End the siege, focus on strengthening the private sector, focus on education, because that’s where you create the alternative. That way, you are strengthening an independent voice. In the current situation, I don’t think the international community is contributing to the strengthening of that voice, or the creation of more voices, or of an independent party that is not Fatah nor Hamas. So I think it is very healthy to think of options that would lead to such a thing. It’s healthy.

Military groups also benefit from the situation. The world has isolated them so they are focusing on different things, like how to develop long-range rockets. That’s the focus of the military people. For the political people, they are focusing on how to reach the public, and of course it is hard but so far they are coping and coming up with creative ideas.

I was in one of the settlements that Israel evacuated where Hamas built a park, planted apple trees and filled a pool with fish for the kids. I talked to people and asked them why they liked going there. They said ‘there is a zoo, a pool full of fish.’ So I went there and it’s the saddest thing I’ve ever seen. The zoo was one cage of monkeys. And imagine, these people were so impressed that they called it an amusement park. You go there and it’s so bad, but they’ve never seen anything else. For them, one cage of monkeys was a zoo. You go to the fish farm that they created, and it’s smelly, but for the children it was meaningful and exciting. It’s a place to sit, a place to barbeque. They have a new project in the evacuated Israeli settlements for farmers to rent land and grow produce to sell at market. So they are becoming creative. For workers who used to work in Israel, they are also giving money. From my observations, it’s depressing, but this segment of society is happy with it. That’s the thing.

They are producing films, too. The latest one was about Emad Akel, who was 23 when he was killed by Israel in 1993. He was a fighter that Hamas portrays as establishing a whole military philosophy. Why? Because he managed to target Israeli soldiers only. So they made a story about him. And who wrote the script? Mahmoud Zahar, a senior Hamas leader. And that will be shown to the public starting August 1. And everybody, whether they like Hamas or not, wants to go because it’s entertainment, and because there are no other movie theaters. Then you have a play by an independent writer. In the play they mock the firing of the rockets as useless—the fighters fire them just for the sake of firing.

These are examples of how Hamas is promoting their agenda but they are also letting other voices come out. And it’s fine—anyone can criticize—but there are limits, of course. They know that there is criticism of the rockets from the people on the ground, so they listen. They are coping. The topic for them now is PR and how to promote their ideas. Because after the war, they realized that they didn’t win. In Gaza, a huge segment of the population blamed Hamas for the war, and Hamas is realizing that neither they nor Israel won the war. Israel is complaining about international public opinion, which was really bad for Israel after the war. So, in a way they think they lost the war and they didn’t stop the rockets. Hamas, of course, didn’t stop the rockets, but the people in Gaza were very frustrated and think that Hamas invited Israel to go for it and people believe they are the ones who paid the price But Hamas won the war in the Arab Muslim world. Arabs think Hamas won the war. And Hamas are employing this to their advantage within the Islamic-Arab world. So they are in the process of focusing on finding ways out.

Last year there was a problem with the Fulbright program. What is your sense of educational exchanges this year? Do you think there will be a Fulbright program?

The Americans are working on it and it’s a priority for them. I heard that the Fulbright students will leave soon, likely the beginning of next month. I think they are getting the Israeli permits and everything they need. The story we did last year created pressure on Israel to let the Fulbrighters leave and for the Americans to work more on it. I think they were aware of the benefit of education. The Americans can do it, though not many people get Fulbrights. But you have to think also of European countries that provide scholarships for young people. These scholarships are not available because these European countries do not have the same power as the U.S to get the students the Israeli permits. So these students do not get to leave the Gaza Strip. Also, Rafah doesn’t open. It only opens from time to time for three days. I know a case of a woman who wanted her son who has been living in the U.S. for 10 years to visit. He came down to Dubai for her to go to see him. For a variety of reasons, she could not cross. In the end, her son had to go back to the U.S. and she didn’t see him. She hadn’t seen him for ten years. You have many other cases of people seeking medical treatment. Education is something, but you have all these painful stories around you. It’s very depressing. And people don’t just blame Hamas. Of course, Hamas is one element to such pain. But they also blame Egypt, Israel, the U.S., the international community. Everyone gets blame from the people on the ground.

You had a chance to go to Damascus. It seems like it’s very hard to understand what’s going on in terms of what Hamas is thinking about. For example, Khaled Meshaal said Thursday that Hamas would not stand in the way of an agreement between the PA and Israel if it came to a referendum. It seems that there is an element of a public relations effort to make Hamas seem more willing to engage. Is there anything you can say about that?

I was the one who did the interview for The New York Times. I sat with Meshaal for many hours, for two days, and the sense is that Hamas is very keen to engage in international politics. Meshaal told me that they are willing to be part of a solution when it comes to a peace process, and that they are not going to be the one obstructing an agreement. The international community must really read between the lines. There has to be an understanding, because after all, on the ground, Hamas is in Gaza, Fatah is in the West Bank, completely isolated from each other. I think you also need to learn from Oslo. Hamas was out of the game, therefore they obstructed. At that time they obstructed through a series of suicide bombings. This disequilibrium will always be there if the international community strives to marginalize a party that is too influential. I think the challenge is to come out with a solution given the current situation.

Is there anything positive that you’ve seen recently? Any hope you can give us?

So far, no. But I am an optimist, as you know, and I am an observer. I always observe the people—how they feel—and the dynamics around me. And I think to myself, this is frustrating because there is no change whatsoever. There are people suffering on a daily basis due to the policy of the siege. It’s very sad, all these stories around you. I don’t know, I cannot see anything positive. I managed to cross through the Erez crossing after a long time. It was the first time for me to leave since the war, through Erez, to Israel. It was humiliating. I was locked in a room. If you treat some one like me, who works for an international paper, who is an independent, that way, how do others get treated? I don’t understand, it’s very frustrating on the ground. So if you’re asking me if I see something positive, I can’t. There are no positive stories.

But I’ll tell you something—how people are coping with this reality gives you hope. They can joke, they can laugh, you go here and there and there is a humor—it’s dark but it’s funny. So they go on, but, if you talk about the silent majority, they are frustrated by both parties.

Family Feud Six ways that Obama can regain Israeli trust. by Yossi Klein Halevi

THE NEW REPUBLIC

7/28/09

Family Feud

Six ways that Obama can regain Israeli trust.

Yossi Klein Halevi

Jerusalem, Israel -- Are we in the early stages of an American-Israeli crisis? Or are the growing and public disagreements between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government over settlements and Jerusalem merely arguments "within the family," as President Obama insisted in his recent meeting with American Jewish leaders?

According to one poll, only six percent of Israelis consider Obama a friend. That perception of hostility is new. Israelis welcomed Barack Obama when he visited here in July 2008 and many responded enthusiastically to his election. But Israelis sense that Obama has placed the onus for restarting negotiations on Israel. Worse, he is perceived as showing weakness toward the world's bullies while acting resolutely only toward Israel. Many Israelis--and not only on the right--suspect that Obama actually wants a showdown with Jerusalem to bolster his standing in the Muslim world. If those perceptions aren't countered, the Israeli public will reject Obama's peace initiatives.

On the assumption that the pessimists among us are wrong and the Obama administration isn't seeking a pretext to create a crisis in American-Israeli relations, here are some suggestions for Washington about how to reassure increasingly anxious Israelis.

1. Make clear that renewing the peace process requires simultaneous Israeli and Arab concessions.

The impression conveyed by the administration's relentless public focus on the settlements is that a settlement freeze is the sole prerequisite toward jump-starting peace talks. After the disastrous consequences of the Oslo process (which led to more than five years of suicide bombings in Israeli cities) and of the withdrawal from Gaza (which led to three years of rocket attacks on Israeli towns near the Gaza border), the Israeli public is in no mood for unilateral concessions.

The administration insists that its intentions have been misunderstood, that it expects the Arab world to offer gestures of normalization to Israel. But unlike its hectoring tone toward Israel, there has been little public rebuke directed toward Arab leaders. True, Secretary of State Clinton recently did note that America expects a more forthcoming Arab attitude toward Israel. But that statement has hardly resonated, and the media focus remains on the settlements as the main obstacle to renewing the peace process.

2. Reaffirm the Israeli status of the settlement blocs in a future agreement.

In weighing the future of the settlements, Israelis will be looking not only for tangible signs of Arab goodwill but also of American goodwill--specifically, a reiteration of the Bush administration's endorsement of Israeli sovereignty over the major settlement blocs as part of a peace agreement. In return, a future Palestinian state would receive compensatory territory from within Israel proper.

The administration is right to insist that the current Israeli government must be bound by the commitments of previous Israeli governments (a position that Prime Minister Netanyahu has in fact upheld). But that same principle should also apply to Washington. Obama should not dismiss previous administration promises to Israel--even those made by George W. Bush.

3. Actively confront Palestinian demonization of Israel.

In his Cairo speech, Obama called for an end to Palestinian incitement against Israel. A systematic culture of denial--denying any historical legitimacy to the Jewish presence in the land of Israel--is being nurtured not only by Hamas but by the Palestinian Authority. In recent months, for example, the Fatah media has promoted a campaign denying the historical attachments of Jews to Jerusalem.

Challenging that campaign of lies would be a good way for the administation to begin proving its seriousness on incitement. Negating any Jewish rights to Jerusalem reinforces the very rejectionism among Palestinians that led to the collapse of the Oslo proces--surely no less a threat to peace than building 20 apartments in East Jerusalem.

4. Affirm Israel's historical legitimacy to the Muslim world.

In his Cairo speech, Obama rightly noted that the key obstacle on the Arab side toward making peace is the ongoing refusal to accept Israel's right to exist. Crucially, he has made clear that he intends to carry the issue of Israel's legitimacy into his dialogue with the Muslim world. This presents an unprecedented opportunity for Muslims to hear Israel's case. So far, though, the president has failed to make it. By referring only to the Holocaust, and ignoring the historical Jewish attachment to the land of Israel, the president has inadvertently reinforced Muslim misconceptions regarding Jewish indigenousness. The Holocaust helps explain why Israel fights, not why Israel exists. It doesn't explain why thousands of Ethiopian Jews walked across jungle and desert to reach Zion; nor for that matter why some Jews leave New York and Paris to raise families in a Middle Eastern war zone.

5. Make clear that the impending nuclearization of Iran, and not the Palestinian problem, is the region's most urgent crisis.

Continuing to publicly reprimand Israel over settlement building while only reluctantly and belatedly criticizing the Iranian regime for suppressing dissent has further alienated Israelis from the Obama adminstration. In one recent cartoon in the daily Maariv, Obama is depicted as a waiter serving Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Obama offers him two plates: On one is a carrot, and on the other--a carrot.

Israelis need to know that there is no substantive difference between Obama and Netanyahu on the need to prevent an Iranian bomb at all costs--or to put it more bluntly, that there is as much urgency over a nuclear Iran in Washington as there is in Riyadh and Paris.

6. Don't treat the Netanyahu government as a pariah.

For weeks Israelis have been reading in their newspapers about a near-total breakdown in trust between Washington and Jerusalem. For his part, Netanyahu has repeatedly praised Obama's friendship for Israel, and refused to attack his Iran policy. During his meeting with Jewish leaders, Obama reaffirmed his friendship for Israel but seems to have mentioned no words of friendship for Israel's prime minister. Israelis need to hear some words of warmth from the White House toward their elected leader. That's what one expects from friends, to say nothing of family.

Yossi Klein Halevi is a contributing editor of The New Republic and a senior fellow at the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies of the Shalem Center in Jerusalem.

Waiting for Obama By Leon Hadar

http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/waiting_for_obama

Waiting for Obama

By Leon Hadar | Posted: July 29, 2009

IT IS A FAMILIAR STORY: Israel and its global patron had a strong and unshakable relationship. Few could remember a time when the bond between the two countries was not close. And key to the partnership was the two countries’ close cooperation in containing the threat of radical Middle Eastern regimes and movements.

Following years of political turbulence and economic troubles, however, an historic election produced a major electoral realignment in the patron state. A freshly elected and very popular president took dramatic steps to transform his nation’s foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East. He withdrew military forces from an occupied Arab country and went to great lengths to improve ties with other countries in the region.

In the face of this historic change, Israel grew increasingly worried about whether the new president would continue maintaining the close, unshakeable relationship pursued by his predecessors. Its growing concerns notwithstanding, the Jewish state decided to dismiss its patron’s advice and launched a military strike against a Middle Eastern country. The patron’s new president condemned the attack and began the process of ending the diplomatic and military alliance with its Middle Eastern client. Israel thus set out in search of a new powerful patron.

WHEN FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE took steps to terminate the 20-year French alliance with Israel in the aftermath of its military victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, his decision sent shockwaves around the world. Israel and France had been close since the late 1940s, and their relationship turned into a full-blown strategic alliance after the popular and charismatic Egyptian army officer Gamal Abdel Nasser began providing assistance to rebels fighting French colonial rule.

In 1956, Israel joined France and Britain in an elaborate and ill-fated plan to attack Egypt and retake the Suez Canal after Nasser had nationalized it. In addition to providing Israel with sophisticated military technology, including French-made Mirage and Mystère jets, the French helped the Israelis build a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing plant. The Israel-French alliance aimed at containing the growing power of Pan Arabism was a central component in Israeli national security doctrine at the time.

But de Gaulle’s election in 1958 changed all that. Confounding many of his supporters, de Gaulle embraced a transformative foreign policy agenda that led eventually to granting independence to Algeria in 1962 and to a process of repairing relations with Egypt and the rest of the Arab World. With tension rising in the Middle East in 1967, de Gaulle pressed the Israelis not to attack Egypt and declared on June 2 an arms embargo against the country, just three days before the outbreak of the war. De Gaulle's position in 1967 at the time of the Six Day War played a part in France's newfound popularity in the Arab world, while Israel turned towards the United States for arms and diplomatic support.

COULD U.S. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA play the role of an American de Gaulle? Would a decision by Israel to reject Obama’s advice against launching a military strike against Iran’s alleged nuclear sites lead to a historic reassessment in the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem?

Historian Margaret Macmillan cautions in her new book Uses and Abuses of History that while history provides useful analogies for understanding the present, they can also lead to serious errors in judgment.

So, what distinguishes the French and U.S. cases? Well, for one thing, U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been more heavily influenced by the power of public opinion, the media, and Congress than French policy, which tends to be determined by a powerful executive and elite groups. The pro-Israel orientation of the U.S. Congress has clearly played an important role in constraining any U.S. president from trying to re-orient the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Hence, the expectations are that Congress will play that long-established role if Obama decides to “do a de Gaulle.”

Nevertheless, recalling the dramatic changes in French-Israeli relations in the 1960s provides us with an instructive case in point. Relationships between nation-states, and in particular between patrons and clients, are subject to change. And many Israelis, as I discovered during a recent trip to the region, are all too well aware of this.

In fact, the de Gaulle/Obama analogy was raised several times in interviews I had with Israeli officials and political analysts, reflecting the growing concern in Israel, and especially in the Likud-led government of Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, that President Obama is intent on reshaping U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Indeed, during my visit, I was struck by the sense of inevitability shared by both Israelis and Palestinians that Washington would eventually adopt an activist role in resolving the conflict over the Holy Land.

But notwithstanding such fears on the Israeli side—and glimmers of hope among Palestinians—Obama and his aides have yet to issue any comprehensive Middle East peace plan or to take any other steps that hint of historic change, a la de Gaulle.

President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have repeatedly asserted established U.S. positions, including the need for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines—with minor territorial adjustments—as part of an Arab-Israeli accord; opposition to the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories; and support for the idea that the control over Jerusalem, including its religious sites, should be shared by Israelis and Palestinians.

Nevertheless, the perception in Washington and in Middle East capitals is that “something” has changed in the U.S. approach. But that “something” reflects more a change in tone and style than one of substance. There is also the sharp contrast between Obama and the George W. Bush government, which put dramatic emphasis on U.S.-Israeli ties and common interests in fighting extremism in the region. Compared to the rhetoric of Bush’s neoconservative advisors, the Obama team and its restatement of long-standing U.S. policy goals could easily appear to be ground-shaking.

THE ELECTION OF BENYAMIN NETANYAHU as prime minister of Israel also provided Obama with an opportunity to create the perception that “something” was indeed changing in the U.S. approach to the Middle East. Netanyahu has long been a favorite of U.S. neoconservatives. After their humiliating fall from power in the United States, the neocons seemed to have won a major political victory in one of the outposts of the U.S. empire with Netanyahu’s election. By endeavoring to distance himself from both Netanyahu and his neocon cheerleaders, the Obama administration has been able to market its message of change in the Arab World.

The political and ideological affair between Netanyahu and neoconservatives goes back to the Reagan presidency and the final years of the Cold War, when Bibi served as Israel’s representative to the United Nations and later as ambassador to Washington. The first generation of neoconservative intellectuals—including Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, and Max Kampleman—occupied top foreign-policy positions in the Reagan administration at the time. To the then-ruling Likud Party, the policies of the Republican Party seemed to offer Israel time to consolidate its hold on the West Bank and Gaza as Washington viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict through a Cold War lens, identifying Palestinian nationalism as an extension of Soviet-induced international terrorism.

As the Cold War came to end, Netanyahu returned to Israel to serve first as foreign minister and then as prime minister. He proved masterful in replacing the moribund Soviet threat with a new Middle Eastern bogeyman, persuading many beltway allies that with the Soviet Union gone, Israel could help protect U.S. interests in the Middle East against Arab nationalists (Saddam Hussein), Muslim fundamentalists (the mullahs in Iran), and the PLO, which was transformed in the Likud-neocon spin from a radical left-wing to a radical Islamic terrorist group. But George H.W. Bush and his realist foreign-policy advisers didn’t buy into this narrative and decided to confront the Likud government over the issue of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

After his reelection in 1996, Netanyahu paid a visit to neoconservative icon Richard Perle in Washington. According to journalist Craig Unger, the topic of their conversation was a policy paper that Perle and other analysts had written for an Israeli-American think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic Political Studies. Titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” the paper proposed a radical new vision of Israeli policy. The paper proposed that by waging wars against Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Israel—with U.S. support—could reshape the political landscape and thus ensure its security.

Netanyahu’s meeting with Obama in Washington early this year took place eight years after such ideas helped inspire one of the worst strategic fiascos in U.S. history—the 2003 invasion of Iraq. To say that Obama, unlike his predecessor, had very little interest in listening to the Israeli prime minister’s Middle East tutorials would be an understatement. Instead, Obama demanded that Netanyahu cease settlement expansion in the West Bank.

This somewhat more even-handed U.S. position has irritated Netanyahu. During his visit to Washington, Netanyahu stressed the need to deal with the potential threat of a nuclear Iran before taking steps to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians, a position that has been rejected by Obama, who has stressed that the two issues be handled congruently.

While Netanyahu has grudgingly announced that he would support the creation of a limited Palestinian state—albeit, one not acceptable to Palestinians—the Israeli government has continued to resist U.S. pressure for a complete cessation of Jewish settlement construction. Some political analysts remain skeptical about whether the Israeli leader is truly willing to embrace a two-state solution or is just trying to buy time. In any case, the conventional wisdom in Israel is that a confrontation between Obama and Netanyahu would lead to the collapse of the current Israeli government and to a new election in Israel, which could force Washington to put on hold its diplomatic push for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The simple truth is, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians—whose leadership is sharply divided—have leaders with sufficient charisma and authority to make the hard choices that would put the two communities on a path toward even superficial reconciliation.

CAN PRESIDENT OBAMA FILL the political vacuum in Israel and Palestine and start pressing the two sides to consider making painful compromises? Will Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab states be able to assist the Americans if and when they decide to jump into the cold water of the Middle East peace process? Will Iran and its regional allies attempt to sabotage U.S. efforts or decide to jump on the U.S.-led bandwagon? Will Obama have the political backbone to confront the powerful groups in Washington backing Netanyahu?

These are a few of the questions being asked by observers in the Middle East and elsewhere as they wait for Obama to launch his long-awaited Middle East initiative in the coming months. But another key concern is whether—Obama’s good intentions notwithstanding—the erosion in U.S. strategic and economic power might set enormous constraints on the president’s ability to transform U.S. policy in the Middle East and bring peace to the Holy Land. In the end, it may require a reckless attack by an intransigent client state on a Middle East regime to get the global patron to make the difficult steps necessary for lasting change.

Leon Hadar, a research fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributor to PRA’s Right Web (http://rightweb.irc-online.org/), is author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East (2006). He blogs at globalparadigms.blogspot.com.

How Iran's Nuclear Power Play Can Change Global Politics Pepe Escobar, Asia Times

How Iran's Nuclear Power Play Can Change Global Politics
Pepe Escobar, Asia Times
World: A nuclear Iran would inevitably turbo-charge a new, emerging multipolar world; one where the U.S. won't be relied on to control Mideast oil.

http://www.alternet.org/world/141628/how_iran%27s_nuclear_power_play_can_change_global_politics/

In Israel, no settlement deal for US envoy – just more settlers

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

7/28/09

In Israel, no settlement deal for US envoy – just more settlers

During Mitchell's visit, activists set up 11 outposts. A report said the number of Israelis living in the West Bank has surpassed 300,000.

Ilene R. Prusher

JERUSALEM -- US Mideast envoy George Mitchell wrapped up three days of talks here on Tuesday, heralding "good progress" in his meetings with Israeli officials. But he made no mention of a much anticipated agreement on the most visible point of contention in recent weeks and a key issue for Arabs: freezing settlement construction in the West Bank.

One of the main goals of Mr. Mitchell's visit, part of a regional trip that includes stops in Arab Gulf states later this week, had been to get Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to stop the expansion of settlements – a move President Obama sees as a jumping-off point to getting Israeli and Palestinian leaders to agree on a two-state solution. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has said that he will not return to talks with Israel unless such a freeze is instituted.

Figures released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) this week indicate that settlements grew at a rate of 2.3 percent for the first half of this year, pushing the total number of Israelis living in West Bank settlements above 300,000 for the first time.

The Israeli media have been abuzz with reports that the IDF is preparing to implement a government order to evacuate 23 illegal settlement outposts to fulfill a long-standing promise to Washington.

But in the midst of Mitchell's three-day visit, right-wing activists set up 11 new outposts in defiance of Netanyahu's engagement with the Obama administration on the settlement issue.

NETANYAHU: 'WE ARE OPENING THE ROADS TO PEACE'

Netanyahu and Mitchell had their final meeting at the Allenby Crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, where Netanyahu touted having extended the hours per day that the passage is open as a sign of his easing restrictions on Palestinians. In recent weeks, Israel has removed dozens of army road blocks and has eased up on checkpoints around the West Bank in a goodwill gesture meant to help create an atmosphere for peace talks.

"We're continuing our efforts to make life easier for the Palestinians," Netanyahu said, "and this is part of the policy to work in parallel – top-down politically, bottom-up economically."

He agreed to open Allenby until midnight for the next two months, after which the demand will be reevaluated with an eye towards having the key passage point open 24 hours a day. Palestinians say the limited hours and long lines constrain economic growth and freedom of movement. "We are opening roadblocks, we are opening ties, we are opening the roads to peace," Netanyahu said.

OBAMA PAVED MITCHELL'S WAY WITH LETTERS TO ARAB LEADERS

Mitchell is now scheduled to continue his Middle East peacemaking mission in the Arab Gulf states, in sync with expectations that Obama administration officials are working to broker some kind of kick-off for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. In exchange for Israel showing it is serious about stopping settlement growth and reaching a two-state solution with the Palestinians, moderate Arab states that support the peace process would undertake steps toward "normalization" with Israel.

"President Obama's vision is of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, which includes peace between Israel and the Palestinians, between Syria and Israel, and between Israel and Lebanon, and also the full normalization between Israel and its neighbors in the region," Mitchell said in a press conference with Netanyahu on Tuesday. "That is our objective and it is that to which we have committed ourselves fully."

Mitchell's emphasis on normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors comes amid US urging Arab states to do more to support the Arab Peace Initiative introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002. In short, it offers Israel peace and normalization of relations with a panoply of Arab states if it reaches a statehood deal with the Palestinians.
Keen to see progress, Obama has sent letters to several Arab leaders asking them to commit to steps toward Israel as well to live up to their economic pledges of support for the Palestinian Authority, according to several media outlets, including the BBC and Yediot Aharonoth, an Israeli newspaper.

Odds Against Nuclear Disarmament

Odds Against Nuclear Disarmament

Charles Peña has some news you may not like

http://original.antiwar.com/pena/2009/07/28/nuclear-disarmament/

Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit A Conversation with Chas Freeman

SUSRIS

7/28/09

Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit
A Conversation with Chas Freeman

Pat Ryan

Editor's Note: In “Revisiting Obama's Riyadh Meeting,” on the Foreign Policy blog The Cable, Laura Rozen wrote on July 17 about the President's meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia early last month. From Obama's perspective the visit, according to sources cited by The Cable, did not “go well” in “persuading the King to be ready to show reciprocal gestures to Israel, which Washington has been pushing to halt settlements..” and that special assistant Dennis Ross said Obama was “upset [about the meeting] because he got nothing out of it..

Administration officials, Rozen wrote, “pushed back hard” on the allegations “disputing every aspect of the accounts.” She also talked with former U.S. Ambassador Chas Freeman who offered that he was not surprised there may have been different expectations for the meeting, but that he “spoke to the king's advisors on the topic not long after the meeting, and they thought it went extremely well."
Meanwhile, The Cable reported on July 26, 2009 that President Obama recently sent letters to leaders of seven Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, “seeking confidence building measures toward Israel which Washington has been pushing to agree to a freeze of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.”

To provide additional context to The Cable reports on the Obama visit and “reciprocal gestures,” SUSRIS talked with Ambassador Freeman about the President's June 3, 2009 meeting with King Abdullah. In addition to the views he shared on U.S.-Saudi relations vis a vis the peace process he asserted that President Obama's Middle East diplomatic efforts were being deliberately undermined in Washington -- including among some in his Administration -- with the goal of reducing American pressure on Israel over settlements in the Occupied Territories.

Ambassador Freeman shared his insights in this SUSRIS exclusive interview by phone from his office in Washington on July 22, 2009.

Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit
A Conversation with Chas Freeman

SUSRIS: Thank you for taking time to share your perspective on relations between American and Saudi leaders, particularly on the subject of Middle East peace. As you know The Cable recently reported on President Obama's June meeting with King Abdullah that some sources characterized as a failure to win “reciprocal gestures” from Riyadh for Israeli. The President, according to the report, made the trip which was an add-on leg to previously planned overseas travel, with the hopes of persuading Saudi leaders to “take steps toward Israel.” What's that all about?


Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Jr.: Here's the issue. In order to be disillusioned you have to have illusions. There's a long history of Americans having illusions as to what Saudis and other Arabs might be prepared to do in different contexts.


There was, for example, the effort by Secretary of State Alexander Haig at the outset of the Reagan administration to persuade the Arabs, and Saudis in particular, that they should join in a grand coalition with Israel against the Soviet Union. Haig convinced himself that this was possible, and he was very disillusioned when it turned out, not to the surprise of anybody who actually knew the Arabs or the Saudis, that it was not.


More recently we have seen illusions about the Saudis and other Arabs in the form of the assertion that somehow there could be a grand coalition of so-called Sunni conservative powers and the Israelis against Iran in order to facilitate an Israeli strike on Iran. That, frankly, just doesn't have much credibility. Certainly there is concern on the part of the Saudis and other Arabs with Iran's political prestige but this does not translate into a willingness to associate with Israel and it certainly doesn't translate into a willingness to facilitate an Israeli military strike on a fellow Muslim country, even if it's not Arab and even if the Arabs have their differences with it.


The biggest point of delusion, if you will, on the American side is that somehow or other if Israel could be persuaded to stop doing the self-destructive things that it has been doing – among them settlement building -- that this should evoke an Arab, particularly a Saudi, gesture intended to make it worth Israel's while. This is simply not reasonable from the perspective of the Arabs.


The fact that we, on the American side, could come up with such a notion says a great deal about our misunderstanding of the region and the dysfunctional biases of the people we have managing Middle East policy.


SUSRIS: Can you talk more about the idea of confidence building measures being expected?


Freeman: That is the point I tried to make in the brief response I had to what Laura Rozen reported at The Cable. The Saudis and others feel that they have been repeatedly subjected to blandishments from well-wishers of Israel. Some were sincere efforts toward peace in the Middle East; some were disingenuous. People have said if the Arabs do something nice for Israel this will somehow get you something in terms of an Israeli gesture -- progress towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
In fact absolutely none of the gestures that have been made, including the very important one of the Arab League's Beirut Declaration of 2002 -- the so-called Arab Peace Initiative -- has resulted in any positive response from the Israelis. They have been content to pocket whatever has been offered and to do nothing in return.


There is no predisposition whatsoever -- in fact a lot of predisposition to the contrary -- on the Arab side to pay for what Israel, in its own interest, ought to do. Moreover, the matter at issue is much less than Israel pulling settlements out of the Occupied Territories. The United States is now simply asking Israel to stop their expansion. While that would be a very useful first step in getting back into a dialogue or process that could lead to peace, in itself it doesn't produce peace. It doesn't undo the damage that Israel has done to the prospects for peace by building settlements all over the place.


It's also quite apparent from Prime Minister Netanyahu's comments, for example about Jerusalem, that the current Israeli government, and probably the majority of Israelis as well, do not accept the premises that the United States is putting forward.
In the case of the Saudis and Arabs, they have offered what they believe is a very reasonable quid pro quo for peace in the form of a bonus to Israel for reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. They believe that it is in Israel's interest to do so. The Arabs are not prepared to make down payments, to bargain or to haggle over the details of what the Israeli and Palestinian peace is going to look like. That is something that Israel must do with its captive Palestinians, not the Arabs at large. I don't expect this position to change.


The Saudis in particular and the Arabs in general have already put a very generous offer on the table in the form of the Beirut Declaration. It is an incentive, a major incentive in their view, for Israel to reach agreement with the Palestinians. The Arabs believe that Israel ought to want to reach such an agreement. Their reward to Israel for such a self-interested agreement would be the normalization of Israel's relations with all the Arab countries including Saudi Arabia. This is a major gesture for the Saudis to have made. They neither asked for nor have they received any quid pro quo for it.


Nobody in the region outside Israel wants more “peace process;” they want an actual peace. So I think it's a basic misreading of Arab sentiment and the Saudi position to presume that somehow there are trade-offs to be done in return for some sort of Israeli inching toward a return to a “peace process.” But the possibility of such a trade-off seems to be the basic assumption in the Administration's policy. If that was the assumption of the president's staff and they went to Riyadh only to discover that this assumption was emphatically not shared by the Saudis, and was in fact rejected, that entirely predictable outcome would account for the reported sense on the part of some that things didn't go well. It is not, of course, that the United States cannot or should not ask help from the Saudis on peace in the Holy Land, it is that such requests have to be realistic. They have to take account of Saudi views if they are to have any chance of success.


The Saudis, for their part, in saying that things did go well, seem to have been referring to the fact that they were impressed by the President's sincerity and seriousness of purpose on this issue. They appear to accept that this is a man who understands the issues and is trying to find a way to deal with them. However, until the United States persuades Israel to accept and begin implementing the framework of peace -- the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the “road map” and other agreements which call for Israel's acceptance -- until that moment I don't think there's any prospect of a quid pro quo from the Arabs.


So you have a difference of opinion. The American side is thinking that any gesture by Israel, of any kind, should be paid for with some gesture from the Arabs. You have the Arabs saying no, we've made it clear that we're not paying anything until something concrete happens.


SUSRIS: How do you account for the variance between what the Administration thought it could achieve in Riyadh – if one were to accept the premise of “The Cable” report – and what the sentiment was in the Kingdom toward a reciprocal gesture.


Freeman: There are two broad issues. First, there's the question that many people have asked, "Can the same old people produce a new policy?" What you have is an amazing amount of continuity on this issue from one Administration to another in terms of people who are dealing with it. Dennis Ross has emerged as a symbol of this for all concerned.


Second there is frankly an issue of objectivity and effectiveness. Can a group of people, virtually all of whom have close personal ties to Israel and much empathy for the Israeli point of view but no such experience, ties, or feeling for the Arab world, can they accurately predict or gauge the political requirements of the Arab sides to this dispute as they do for the Israeli side? The evidence over the past twenty years is no, they cannot. That is to my mind part of the reason for the failure of the second Camp David process. The Bush Administration didn't even try until the very end and then it did so in a way that was almost farcically unrealistic.


We now seem to have another American diplomatic effort essentially focused on Israeli politics, and helping the Israelis make decisions that they ought to be able to make on their own, if they are really interested in achieving acceptance in the region. Acceptance is, of course, the issue. The State of Israel cannot presume that people in the region will accept or endorse its right to exist until they see that its existence is compatible with the cause of justice and consistent with their own interests.


Israel has certainly not recently been prepared to do anything to end that lack of acceptance by its neighbors. But Israel absolutely requires such acceptance to guarantee its existence as a state in the Middle East over the long term. So this is a major problem. It is pretty clear that the present government of Israel believes it doesn't need political acceptance from its Arab neighbors because it has the drop on them -- military superiority -- and a continuing blank check from the United States. So, in its view, it doesn't really have to compromise on the issue of a Palestinian state.


I would say the Netanyahu government has not just zero credibility on this in the region and more broadly in the international community, but it has actually less than zero credibility. That's because almost everybody believes it is acting insincerely and in a deceptive fashion. So in this context to ask the Arabs to do something for Israel just seems quite unrealistic.


SUSRIS: What role can the Saudis and other Arab leaders play to make progress?


Freeman: It isn't a quid pro quo for minor gestures by Israel. The real question is this. Are there measures that the Arabs can take that would be helpful in terms of rebuilding some capacity on the Palestinian side? The Palestinians are disunited. There is no longer an effective Palestinian national movement. Part of Palestine, Gaza, is ruled by an electorally endorsed movement which has, however, been rejected as an interlocutor by Israel. The other part of Palestine, the West Bank, is ruled by people with little or no credible political support, who lost an election, and who are increasingly seen as collaborators in the Israeli occupation.


The terms under which Israel seems to be willing to deal with the Arabs over whom it rules resemble those of a jailer dealing with prisoners more than they do a respectful dialogue between equal parties. This is a very bad context in which to ask others to come forward and do things helpful to Israel.


The question then is, what can one do to strengthen the hand of the prisoners -- to follow that analogy -- to give them both a reason to bargain more effectively and sincerely and to keep whatever bargains they strike with their jailer? And that is something that the Arabs might be asked to address to promote the prospect of peace.


In fact the Arabs, including Saudi Arabia, are afraid of Hamas -- don't like it -- and they are not impressed by Fatah and are not convinced that there is now anyone with the ability to make a deal on behalf of Palestinians that they would seriously keep. If the Arabs really want peace, they will have to address these issues, not leave them to Israel or the United States.


I come back to the thought that if you're going to persuade people to do things you want them to do, as we know and as we in fact do when we are dealing with the Israelis, you have to understand their hopes and fears and their attitudes and beliefs and convictions. And you have to craft something that deals with those political realities. We don't seem to be capable of doing that with the Arab side. That's reflected, as I said, in the fact that almost no one involved with this really has a strong set of ties to the Arabs or any empathy for their position.

The Obama Administration so far hasn't changed that.


SUSRIS: Among the points made in The Cable report we've been discussing was an observation of David Markovsky, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He called Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's major address on U.S. foreign policythis month a recalibration of the Administration's approach and that Obama has expectations on both sides. What do you make of this position, as assessed by WINEP's Markovsky, that was put forward subsequent to Obama's hopes of a quid pro quo reportedly being rebuffed in Riyadh?


Freeman: I don't know whether the King had a tirade or not, as was stated by a source in The Cable piece, but I think the Arab perception is that interaction between the sides in the Holy Land resembles a dialogue between a jail keeper and his inmates; it's very one sided, and rather arbitrary and capricious on the Israeli side. On the Palestinian side it's not unified or authoritative. If that's the perception then it's hardly surprising that a proposal that the Arabs should reciprocate some slight correction of misbehavior on the part of the jail keeper with a gesture of their own would draw an angry response.


SUSRIS: We talked with Georgetown Professor Jean-Francois Seznec before Obama's June visit to Riyadh about the relationship between President and King. They had previously met at the G-20 meeting in April. He thought they showed good chemistry, that they have a similar philosophy in dealing with people – inclusiveness – and an understanding of other cultures and religions, that they have mutual respect. What are your impressions of the relationship between President Obama and King Abdullah?


Freeman: Well, I think it's actually pretty good for the reasons you state.


Let me add something more about the reporting on the Riyadh meeting. Let's not forget that this kind of story should be suspected to have a political motivation. It's clearly in the interest of the supporters of the Netanyahu government, or the attitude that it embodies, to demonstrate that it's not worth working with the Saudis. It's misguided and possibly injurious to do so, in their view. So why bother?


That's accompanied by the broader notion that there's no reason to pay attention to Arab opinion because the Arabs are unhelpful or they have a bad attitude or whatever. So it seems to me very likely that all of this was a story line contrived for effect and that it was intended precisely to undermine the Administration's effort to persuade Israel to address the issue of, the first step, of settlement expansion. What The Cable reported was in fact another aspect of the effort that was reflected in Ehud Olmert's op-ed in the Washington Post – “stop bothering us with this issue.” [“How to Achieve a Lasting Peace - Stop Focusing on the Settlements”]


The issue is pretty central because if you accept the position of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who insists that Jerusalem is not on the table and that there's no reason not to expand settlements elsewhere, then you clearly have nowhere to go in your diplomacy.
So I think this was part of a concerted effort to discredit the Obama diplomacy and I think it's coming from people in his own Administration as well as from people associated with AIPAC, like WINEP.


I was really struck by something in “The Cable” posting. I had responded that it wasn't surprising the Saudis -- given that they had made an offer in the form of a bonus -- were not prepared to haggle over the terms of the bonus when, in their view, there had been no step whatsoever to create the conditions in which the bonus would have to be awarded. An anonymous source was quoted as responding to this point by saying that we certainly don't need to accept the Saudi position on that, we should just keep haggling. Of course we don't have to accept the Saudi position but we cannot simply ignore it in formulating our own. It appears that we have a set of presumptions on which we are going to act regardless of whether they are realistic. That is, not surprisingly, a formula for accomplishing nothing.


The same people who dismiss the relevance of the Saudi position argue, in the case of Israel, that we have to start with Israeli positions and work backwards. There's something to that but we don't start with the Arab position and work backwards. This reflects the problem I was talking about, that is the lack of empathy, of real expertise on the Arab world or Saudi Arabia in particular, in official Washington. It reflects the essential one-sidedness of U.S. policy.


I don't think the President is one-sided. At Cairo he expressed a balanced view and made it clear that he would like to do something that is really good for both Israel and the Arabs. I just don't think he's getting a lot of effective support for the tactics of dealing with the Arabs from his own subordinates.


SUSRIS: Any last thoughts on these issues.


Freeman: What I found of interest in The Cable piece was not so much the views that it reported, which I think, indeed, are held. It was the glimpse it gave of the more general effort to discredit Obama's diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and to cause the administration to end the pressure it has begun to put on Israel to address the longstanding issue of the settlements.


So I think the complaints about Saudi Arabia are part of a wider campaign and need to be seen in that context. To my mind, this is not really a bilateral issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home

There follows a memorandum from Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq


It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home



As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed.



Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.



The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.



The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions

b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders



It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.


The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.



Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.



The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.



For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable.”



The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events – mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.



Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.

NKorean call for dialogue ‘fails to meet’ demands: US Agence France-Presse

NKorean call for dialogue ‘fails to meet’ demands: US
Agence France-Presse
North Korea's call Monday for a dialogue "fails to meet" demands it return to nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United States and four other countries, a senior US official said Monday.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jvziVZoX7Lzz4ItSfYwsC_hVWysg

Senate warns against concessions on nuclear treaty Jim Abrams, Associated Press

Senate warns against concessions on nuclear treaty Jim Abrams, Associated Press

The Senate is making it clear to the Obama administration that it will look askance at concessions, particularly on missile defense, that the United States might make to conclude a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iLxDjhE67P2IVhWnnDg9gLlTccawD99MM4T00

McCain to consider support of nuclear test ban Desmond Butler, Associated Press

McCain to consider support of nuclear test ban
Desmond Butler, Associated Press
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, who helped vote down U.S. ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty ten years ago, said he would now consider supporting it.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hH4ImPwTL6SwKuYgCmKvIVyUZwRwD99L1TEO1

India submarine 'threatens peace'

India submarine 'threatens peace'
BBC India's launch of a nuclear-powered submarine is a threat to regional peace and security, Pakistan has said. "Pakistan will take appropriate steps to safeguard its security without entering an arms race," foreign office spokesman Abdul Basit said.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8171715.stm

Gates Says U.S. Overture To Iran Is ‘Not Open-Ended’ Elisabeth Bumiller, The New York Times

Gates Says U.S. Overture To Iran Is ‘Not Open-Ended’
Elisabeth Bumiller, The New York Times
Strains between the United States and Israel surfaced publicly in Jerusalem on Monday, as Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tried to reassure Israelis that American overtures to Iran were not open-ended, and as Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Israel expressed impatience with the Americans for wanting to engage Iran at all.


http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/world/middleeast/28military.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper

U.S. nuclear warheads, 1945-2009 BY ROBERT S. NORRIS AND HANS M. KRISTENSEN

U.S. nuclear warheads, 1945-2009
BY ROBERT S. NORRIS AND HANS M. KRISTENSEN
Of 100 types of U.S. warheads developed since 1945, only 15 remain active. New warhead production ceased in 1992, but modified warheads continue to be introduced.

http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/213757w058n98374/?p=2f144bf6812d4757b51a0461916f45d1&pi=7

Is North Korea's reprocessing facility operating? By Hui Zhang | 23 July 2009

Is North Korea's reprocessing facility operating?
BY HUI ZHANG
Just because air samples and satellite imagery haven't detected the telltale signs that Pyongyang is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel doesn't mean that it's not happening.

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/north-koreas-reprocessing-facility-operating

Is North Korea's reprocessing facility operating?
BY HUI ZHANG
Just because air samples and satellite imagery haven't detected the telltale signs that Pyongyang is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel doesn't mean that it's not happening.

Rebutting the standard arguments against disarmament BY GEORGE PERKOVICH AND JAMES M. ACTON

Rebutting the standard arguments against disarmament
BY GEORGE PERKOVICH AND JAMES M. ACTON
Opponents of a nuclear-weapon-free world tend to knock down the same old straw men. Here are five arguments nuclear abolitionists aren't making.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/rebutting-the-standard-arguments-against-disarmament

KURT ZENZ HOUSE Putting the cost of going green in context

KURT ZENZ HOUSE
Putting the cost of going green in context
Plans to retool the country's energy infrastructure, from Al Gore to Google, are better understood when compared with the nation's past efforts to win World War II and build the Interstate Highway System.

http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kurt-zenz-house/putting-the-cost-of-going-green-context

The Levy-Frum debate by Stephen Walt

FOREIGN POLICY – STEPHEN WALT

7/24/09

The Levy-Frum debate

Stephen Walt

The Economist magazine is performing a valuable public service this week, hosting an on-line debate between Daniel Levy of the New American Foundation and David Frum of the American Enterprise Institute. The motion they are debating is "This House Believes that Barack Obama's America is now an Honest Broker between Israel and the Arabs." Levy defends the motion; Frum opposes it. Consistent with their usual practice, the Economist also solicited outside commentary from a number of other experts -- Henry Siegman, John Mearsheimer, Aaron David Miller, and James Zogby -- who are adding their thoughts throughout the week.

The two opening statements and rebuttals by Levy and Frum are well-worth reading, as they nicely illuminate the divide over U.S. policy towards this issue. Defending the motion, Levy points out that the United States is still providing Israel with large amounts of material and diplomatic support, and takes the sensible view that the United States is a better friend to Israel when it uses its influence to get Israel to abandon policies (i.e., the settlements) that are harmful to U.S. and Israeli interests alike.

For his part, Frum claims that Obama is "tilted so far against Israel that even-handedness looks like up from down here." He claims the real threat is Iran, and chides Obama for placing too much weight on the Holocaust as a justification for Israel's existence and for ignoring the Jewish people's millennial claim to the land. Tellingly, Frum never says whether he thinks Israel's occupation is a bad thing or not, or whether he thinks a two-state solution would be desirable (though he seems to have his doubts). Indeed, Frum offers the bizarre claim that Israel's settlements "are the consequences of Palestinian and Arab intransigence, not the cause." He is in effect saying that Israel had no choice but to spend the past 41 years (two-thirds of its history) encouraging half of million people to colonize the lands seized in 1967, at a cost of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. (If Frum wants to know how and why this really happened, he should read Zertal and Eldar's Lords of the Land, Gershom Gorenberg's Accidental Empire or former IDF general Shlomo Gazit's Trapped Fools).

The Levy-Frum debate really boils down to a simple question. On one side are those who believe that the continued attempt to hold onto "Greater Israel" poses the real existential threat to Israel's existence, because Jews will eventually be a minority in the lands they control and they will be forced to create a full-fledged apartheid state in order to preserve Israel’s Jewish character. Such fears are amplified by the growing influence of orthodox and ultra-Orthodox groups in Israel, by the signs that younger, more secular Israelis are living abroad in larger numbers, and by the overtly racist policies advocated by politicians like current Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. On the other side are those who either actively favor a "greater Israel" or who don't think the occupation poses a serious long-term problem. The former group wants the United States to use its power and influence to push both sides to a viable two-state solution before it is too late; the latter group wants the US to use its power and influence primarily against other states in the region and to maintain a "special relationship" that is defined as unconditional and uncritical support for just about anything Israel wants to do. The two groups see different threats, and therefore favor radically different American policies.

But don't take my word for it. Just read the exchange, and learn.

India Launches Nuclear Powered Submarine for Trials - Anjana Pasricha, Voice of America.

India Launches Nuclear Powered Submarine for Trials - Anjana Pasricha, Voice of America.

India has launched its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles. The submarine, once in service, will give the country the capability to fire nuclear weapons from sea besides land and air. The Indian navy flooded a dry dock in the southern port city of Visakhapatnam to send out the nuclear-powered submarine named Arihant, for extensive sea trials in the Bay of Bengal. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who launched the submarine, called it a "historic milestone in the country's defense preparedness. It has taken India nearly two decades to develop the Arihant, which means "Destroyer of Enemies." It has been built with technical assistance from Russia. Defense officials say Arihant is powered by a nuclear reactor, and will be armed with ballistic missiles. It will carry a crew of about 100 men. New Delhi-based National Maritime Foundation director Uday Bhaskar says the launch is an important technological step putting India in a small group of nations capable of designing and building nuclear-powered submarines. But he stresses that it could be several years before the submarine is inducted into the Indian navy.

http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-07-26-voa13.cfm

Clinton’s leaky ‘defense umbrella’

Clinton’s leaky ‘defense umbrella’

Iran’s nuclear program is suddenly receiving a flurry of attention from top Obama administration officials. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Israel today to exchange views on the subject with Ehud Barak, his counterpart. National Security Advisor James Jones will soon arrive in Israel, presumably to discuss the same topic.

Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a U.S. “defense umbrella” over the entire Middle East should Iran fail to cease work on its nuclear complex. Other officials in the Obama administration soon attempted to repeal Clinton’s remarks, while simultaneously implying that some kind of U.S. security umbrella has always been over the Middle East.

Just as the Truman and Eisenhower administration officials figured out at the beginning of the Cold War, a “defense umbrella” or security guarantee presents itself as a seemingly painless solution to an intractable security challenge. At first glance, issuing a promise to use military force later seems to be a more attractive choice than committing to use military force now. In the case of Iran, sanctions won’t work before Iran has nuclear weapons. And a preventive air campaign is unappealing for a variety of reasons. Thus, a U.S. security guarantee for friends in the region seems like an easy solution.

But anyone who remembers the Cold War should recall that U.S. security guarantees for Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea were not easy, cheap, or simple. A U.S. guarantee for the Middle East against Iranian aggression will be even more problematic than were America’s guarantees during the Cold War.

1) Will the supposed beneficiaries of the guarantee take the guarantee seriously? It is one thing to make a promise, it is another to deliver on it under stress. The credibility of a U.S. security guarantee would increase if there were visible presidential speeches on the subject, a Senate-ratified treaty, and permanent U.S. force structure commitments and deployments to back it up. Until these things happen, statesmen in Israel and the friendly Arab regimes will be rightfully skeptical.

2) Locking in a nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will shift the conflict onto the irregular warfare playing field. Iran will have the advantage on this field while the U.S. and its friends will most likely be stuck on defense. Here again there are parallels with the Cold War. With a nuclear standoff in place, the Soviet Union’s political and military subversions and proxy wars achieved success in Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa and the Middle East. Quantitatively Iran is no Soviet Union. But qualitatively, Iran is organized for subversion and prolonged irregular and proxy warfare, just as was the Soviet Union. A U.S. security guarantee policy that accepts an Iranian nuclear weapons capability will have to prepare for another such “twilight struggle.”

3) Be ready to relearn some old Cold War terms such as “hair-trigger alert,” “launch on warning,” “second strike reserve,” “counter-force versus counter-value targeting,” etc. This time, the standoff will be three-sided (Israel vs. Iran vs. Saudi Arabia) just like the gunfight at the end of “The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly.” And Middle East nuclear strategists will look back to the Cold War with envy when ICBM flight times were a leisurely 25 minutes.

Secretary Clinton’s “defense umbrella” seems like an easy way out. But such comfort is an illusion. For today’s policymakers trying to figure out what to do about Iran, the lessons of the Cold War are very much alive.


http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/clintons-leaky-defense-umbrell/

End of an Era – Jim Puplava

End of an Era – Jim Puplava

http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/update.html

Animal Farm - 2009 – James Quinn

Animal Farm - 2009 – James Quinn

http://theburningplatform.com/economy/animal-farm-2009

Attack on Iran: Israel Turns to Russia

Attack on Iran: Israel Turns to Russia

http://globalpolitician.com/25736-israel-russia-iran-nuclear-military

Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact: A Case Study of Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) By Matthew Levitt

Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact: A Case Study of Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
By Matthew Levitt

On July 14-15, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) sponsored a conference in Washington DC at the National Press Club on "The Foreign Fighter Problem." I presented a paper for a panel on "Foreign Fighters and their Economic Impact," focused on the case study of Syria as a foreign fighter hub for AQI. The following is taking from the introduction to my paper:

Running an insurgency is an expensive endeavor. Financing and resourcing insurgent activities, from procuring weapons and executing attacks to buying the support of local populations and bribing corrupt officials, requires extensive fundraising and facilitation networks that often involve group members, criminal syndicates, corrupt officials, and independent operators such as local smugglers. Along these lines, a report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international body focused on anti-money laundering and combating terror finance, found that while financing any singular attack may be relatively inexpensive compared to the damage incurred, “maintaining a terrorist network, or a specific cell, to provide for recruitment, planning, and procurement between attacks represents a significant drain on resources. A significant infrastructure is required to sustain international terrorist networks and promote their goals over time.” Creating and maintaining such support and facilitation networks, FATF concluded, requires significant funds.

FATF’s findings are certainly the case in Syria, where terrorist and insurgent groups have established sophisticated networks to facilitate the movement of foreign fighters from around the world into Iraq. These networks are especially important since foreign fighters facilitated through Syria have been responsible for the most spectacular attacks on Iraqis and coalition forces. Given the priority that Iraq and Syria both play in the Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the Middle East, as well as the wealth of information now available on Syrian-based foreign fighter facilitation networks, this paper focuses its attention on the case study of Syria, foreign fighters in the Iraqi insurgency, and their economic impact.

Foreign fighters’ use of third party countries for training, fundraising, and transit is not merely an operational phenomenon, but an economic one as well. There are both direct and indirect economic consequences – both positive and negative – that result from the existence and operation of foreign fighter networks in Syria, for example. These consequences impact Syria and the Syrian government, various elements of the Syrian populace, from the political, social, and religious elites to the locals living in towns along the Syrian-Iraqi border, Iraq as the foreign fighter destination, and other countries in the region as well. Developing realistic strategies to contend with foreign fighter networks operating in third party countries is contingent upon first developing a holistic comprehension of the phenomenon, including an understanding of the economic impact

The full paper is available online here.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1314

US Wars Not Going According to Plan And it's worse than Vietnam, says William Pfaff

US Wars Not Going According to Plan

And it's worse than Vietnam, says William Pfaff
http://original.antiwar.com/pfaff/2009/07/23/from-iraq-to-afghanistan-us-wars-not-going-according-to-plan/

Israeli missile-defense test aborted

Israeli missile-defense test aborted
Amy Teibel, Associated Press
Tests of a missile-defense system meant to shield Israel from Iranian attack were aborted over the past week on three occasions because of various malfunctions, Israeli defense officials said Thursday.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iVqjXPWQGE0sY-00wrn_8YksbwJwD99K4PJO1

Israel, Brazil spar over nuclear ambitions in Middle East

Israel, Brazil spar over nuclear ambitions in Middle East Agence France-Presse Israel and Brazil sparred Wednesday over nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, especially Iran's atomic development program, during a visit by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hmjY7vUaoed0DT_AN6LuaBA0SUoA

NRC to press ahead with Yucca review H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press

NRC to press ahead with Yucca review
H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will press ahead with its review of a license for a nuclear waste dump in Nevada, even as the Obama administration has made clear it is abandoning the project, the commission's chairman said Tuesday.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jPoKykY1Gl1Xzp2MBc-Ndq0d2dgQD99J4MMG1

N. Korea Escalates War of Words, Calls Clinton Vulgar, Unintelligent Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post

N. Korea Escalates War of Words, Calls Clinton Vulgar, Unintelligent
Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post
The war of words between North Korea and the United States escalated Thursday, with North Korea's Foreign Ministry lashing out at Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in unusually personal terms for "vulgar remarks" that it said demonstrated "she is by no means intelligent."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/23/AR2009072300299.html

Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast From Iran Mark Landler, David E. Sanger, The New York Times

Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast From Iran
Mark Landler, David E. Sanger, The New York Times

Stiffening the American line against Iran, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned Wednesday that the United States would consider extending a “defense umbrella” over the Middle East if the country continued to defy international demands that it halt work that could lead to nuclear weapons.
While such a defensive shield has long been assumed, administration officials in Washington acknowledged Wednesday that no senior official had ever publicly discussed it. Some of the officials said the timing of Mrs. Clinton’s remarks reflected a growing sense that President Obama needed to signal to Tehran that its nuclear ambitions could be countered militarily, as well as diplomatically.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html?_r=2&ref=todayspaper

Many call for US to deal with Hamas by Steven Stanek, Foreign Correspondent

Many call for US to deal with Hamas

Steven Stanek, Foreign Correspondent

July 17. 2009

WASHINGTON // The Obama administration is committed to a prominent role in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but officials have offered little insight into whether they will endorse a tactical shift seen by an increasing number of analysts as necessary to a lasting peace: engaging with Hamas.

Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, this week echoed previous statements by top administration officials, including the president, when she said the US would not deal with Hamas unless the group recognises Israel, renounces violence and accepts prior agreements.

“At this stage, what we want to do is to get the negotiations going between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority,” said Mrs Clinton, responding to a question about whether “any conceivable situation” exists for Hamas to play a role in the peace process.

The US position on Hamas – that it is a terrorist group – has not changed since the Bush administration. But many hope that Barack Obama, who has shown a willingness to open a dialogue with other traditional US adversaries such as Iran and Syria, can change the dynamics of that relationship. So far, the US approach to the region has centred on propping up Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah Party in the West Bank, but that alone is seen by some as a partial solution to a conflict that, for better or worse, involves another key Palestinian player.

Once improbable, the notion that the United States could one day be sitting across the table from Hamas – even if it does not accept all of the US preconditions – has become widely accepted among academics and former US government officials.

“Within the foreign policy establishment, this is now a respectable position,” said Nathan Brown, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. Mr Brown was among several Middle East experts who participated in a panel discussion on engaging Hamas at the US Institute of Peace this week. “In some ways I would say there is kind of an emerging consensus that you can’t ignore Hamas,” he said.
The strongest endorsement of that position has come from Jimmy Carter, the former US president, who travelled to Gaza City in June to meet with Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s prime minister. Mr Carter’s outreach – as a private citizen, not as a representative of the US government – has been criticised by some officials in the United States and Israel, where he is viewed as partial towards Palestinians.


Thomas Pickering, a former undersecretary of state and US ambassador to the United Nations, also met with Hamas officials in June, according to a report in the Washington Post. The administration has said that Mr Pickering, now the co-chair of the International Crisis Group, was not representing the US government.

Other prominent figures such as James Baker, the secretary of state under George HW Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the senior Bush’s national security adviser, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to Mr Carter, have endorsed opening a dialogue with Hamas.

Those who advocate US-Hamas engagement were heartened by Mr Obama’s subtle overtures to Hamas during his speech in Cairo in early June.

“Hamas does have support among some Palestinians, but they also have responsibilities,” Mr Obama said. “To play a role in fulfilling Palestinian aspirations, and to unify the Palestinian people, Hamas must put an end to violence, recognise past agreements, and recognise Israel’s right to exist.”

Some have also been encouraged by signs that Hamas may be willing to deal with the international community. In June, Khaled Meshaal, the exiled Hamas leader, praised “Obama’s new language toward Hamas”.

“It is the first step in the right direction toward a dialogue without conditions, and we welcome this,” he said in a speech in Damascus.

But a formal opening to Hamas would also likely mean a new wave of criticism for a president who is already defending his efforts to engage Iran.

Many believe Hamas’ recent talk of a 10-year truce is really a ploy to gain time for rearmament. Others have chastised the group for not denouncing its founding charter, which includes harsh anti-Semitic language and calls for the obliteration of Israel through jihad. Future talks would also be complicated by the fact that Israel’s hawkish prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has little appetite for dealing with a sworn enemy.

David Makovsky, a Middle East expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that engaging Hamas would have a slew of negative consequences, including undermining the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

“Are we trying to basically help the people that maybe we should be hurting and hurting the people we should be helping?” asked Mr Makovsky, who also participated in the panel discussion on engaging Hamas.

Still, many others believe that Hamas’ legacy of providing basic social services, its opposition to corruption, and its landslide victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections leave mediators such as the United States with little choice but to bring them into the fold.

“At some stage the United States is going to have to engage Hamas because it is a large and influential political organisation and very much a player in the Israel-Palestinian conflict,” said Philip Wilcox, a US consul general in Jerusalem in the 1990s and the president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace.

“As long you do not accord Hamas any permanent legitimacy, I don’t see what you have to lose,” added Wayne White, a top Middle East analyst for the state department’s bureau of intelligence and research until 2005. “I don’t think that success, if we proceed with Hamas, is all that possible, but I know that without Hamas a meaningful result is impossible.”

Mr White, who also took part in the panel discussion, said he believes that the Obama administration is still “trying to sort out their options” regarding Hamas.

“The interesting thing that we do have in front of us is that they do have an open mind,” he said.

sstanek@thenational.ae

Commentary: Rough verbal riders By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE UPI Editor at Large

http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2009/07/23/Commentary-Rough-verbal-riders/UPI-87581248364140/

Commentary: Rough verbal riders

By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE
UPI Editor at Large

A large segment of the U.S. population believes President Obama is a card-carrying socialist who was not born in the United States and is now plotting the revenge of those defeated in the Cold War. They also love the extremes of conservative talk shows, liberal talk shows, from one extreme to another to the anything-goes Internet.

WASHINGTON, July 23 (UPI) -- The party's getting rough. Elementary manners, let alone civility, are anachronisms on the evening cable talk programs where Larry King is the courteous softball exception. Gossip is served up as news, whammy as commentary, fiction as fact, biases as straight news reporting. A new journalism of assertion and vilification has displaced the old journalism of verification. Inflammatory verbal images equate their fellow Americans with traitors deserving the ultimate punishment. The left talking about the right usually conjures up images that range from neo-Nazi sympathizers to dangerous Twittering half-morons with a penchant for circular firing squads; the right talking about the left, and we have violent enemies of the nation who coddle illegal immigrants, murdering scumbags from Mexico.

President Obama is now a card-carrying socialist or borderline Marxist. He is the Manchurian candidate. He was not born in the United States. He never produced a birth certificate. And now this closet neo-Marxist is plotting the revenge of those defeated in the Cold War. Therefore, he should be impeached and removed from office because his plan is to place America in a government-owned straightjacket. It's vicious stuff. One of the kinder of the vociferous voices is Dick Morris, who moved from the liberal camp under President Clinton to the hard right with his new book "Catastrophe," which is what Obama has wrought on America.

Between talk radio and talk television, some 30 million Americans are subject to a barrage of invective that goes a long way to explaining what columnist David Brooks calls the "dignity code" now "completely obliterated." The rules that guided generations since founder George Washington, says Brooks, "are simply gone."

Obama has already met his Waterloo, according to political analyst Morris. "He never lost a battle before; now he may never win one," he says. And, of course, everything the president says proves that he's desperate and/or a prisoner of his socialist ideology. He wants a complete socialist takeover as he sees his approval numbers drop below 50 percent. His Middle East initiative is going nowhere, and close friends of George Mitchell, the president's special envoy in charge of finding a Palestinian solution, are advising him to resign after three more months of shuttling between the two sides, at which point Obama's magisterial June 4 message to the Muslim world will have been drained of any significant content. In other words, POTUS backs down when faced with the Israeli lobby on Capitol Hill. Pity the poor listeners and viewers trying to sort fact from fancy.

Yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theater is a nightly spectacle on TV talk shows. Staged rage by wingnuts is a new genre of pontificating. Absurd and offensive viewpoints, punctuated by left/right ravings and left/right rantings, tend to be repeated as facts in real life next day. Truth is butchered with alacrity on both sides of the political divide. There are things worth fighting and dying for, one conservative spinmeister told his millions of listeners after last November's elections, and the example he gave was to prevent "Mussolini Nancy Pelosi" from becoming speaker of the House.

No sooner was Obama through with his one-hour news conference on healthcare reform than the know-it-alls were on the air saying fact certain POTUS' plan would cost more than several trillion dollars over 10 years; life expectancy will drop like in Russia since the end of the Cold War; Obama's plan "will kill you"; federal boards will decide whether you can have a hip replacement; seniors will be deprived of functional hips in favor of younger people; and thousands of doctors and nurses will switch to other professions. Ann Coulter's suggested, "Take two aspirin and call me when your cancer is Stage 4."

Stripped of preposterous claims and of what the culprits regard as mandatory hype, there is still real anger on both left and right. But to voice strong feelings, even hostility, what's wrong with the civilized discourse of the Sunday morning network talk shows -- FOX, CNN and Fareed Zakaria's weekly GPS? They have become the equivalent of "Question Time" in Britain's House of Commons. They are not boring. In fact, they are far more interesting than the congressional debates they have replaced, which few people watch. PBS' Washington Week in Review and Charlie Rose's nightly interview set the right tone.

But FOX has the numbers on its side. Nightly mud-slinging has rolled over CNN. In one recent 12-month period, FOX was up 24 percent and CNN was down 22 percent. Fox was also up 109,000 viewers year over year; CNN lost 113,000. With Rush Limbaugh's daily 20 million listeners and FOX's Bill O'Reilly and Sean Hannity with record ratings, it becomes clear liberals do not have a lock on the airwaves. Witness Robert Firth's "Warning from America" on the World Wide Web: "We in America are watching the final days of a 50-year process to destroy our economy and our country. Obama and his minions will finish the white middle class. They, the libs, lefties, bleeding hearts, dems, commies, socialists and America haters have filled the welfare rolls to over 50 million." Have we taken leave of our critical faculties?


_______________________________________________

Israel/Palestine - a Glimmer of Hope? by William Pfaff

Israel/Palestine - a Glimmer of Hope?

William Pfaff

Athens, July 21, 2009 – Alarmed reports in the Israeli press that
the United States has threatened to reduce by a billion dollars the guarantee
the U.S. Treasury customarily provides for Israel state borrowings,
so as to assure for them the best commercial terms, indicate that
the Obama government is serious about halting Israel’s colonization
of the Palestinian territories, and about imposing, rather than
merely inviting, a two-state Middle East solution.

During the next two years Israel would lose more than a
quarter of its U.S. loan guarantees, a sum equal to the estimated
total the Netanyahu government now proposes to spend on the 120 West
Bank colonies, where 300 thousand Israelis live. This penalty
excludes Israel’s borrowing for military purposes, ordinarily
underwritten by the U.S., thus defending President Obama from a
charge of weakening Israel’s security. It is also recognition that
nearly all that Israeli military spending goes to American companies.

This measure seems to have antedated the defiant announcement
by Netanyahu last Monday that Israel will construct a new housing
project for Jews in Arab Jerusalem, the issue responsible for much
current uproar. He declared that Israel can do whatever it pleases
anywhere in Jerusalem since “united Jerusalem” has been pronounced
“the capital of the Jewish people and of the state pf Israel,” and
“our sovereignty over it cannot be challenged.”

This statement followed Washington’s summons of Israel’s ambassador
to the State Department to be told that the construction project
“must stop” as it is illegal (and unofficially, that it is an
unacceptable slap in the face to the U.S.).

Israel in fact possesses no sovereignty whatever over East
Jerusalem, which it seized from Jordon in the 1967 war. Its presence
is as military occupier, and the legitimacy of its presence depends
upon the UN General Assembly partition of Palestine in 1947. That
resolution recognized Israel within defined borders, but also
Palestinian territory outside those borders of Israel, as set by UN
Resolution 181, as belonging to the Palestinian people, who have the
sovereign right to establish their own state there. That includes
East Jerusalem.

These legal considerations, generally neglected by the
international public and deliberately obfuscated by Israel, have
suddenly become relevant for two reasons.

The first, as set out by Henry Siegman, former national director of
the American Jewish Congress, now head of the U.S./Middle East
Project in New York, and the most persistent, conscientious and
learned of American Middle East experts, is that President Barack
Obama has set out to get an Israeli-Palestinian two-state settlement,
and is going about it beginning with an issue where the Netanyahu
government and its Likud allies in the United States are the most
vulnerable, the settlements.

The settlements are illegal in international law, condemned by the
international community, an enormous political and security liability
to Israel, a burden on the state budget, and they enjoy relatively
little support from the American Jewish community and the ordinary
citizens of Israel. The notion that popular support for the colonies
makes them untouchable by the government is, Siegman says, “absurd.”
“Draconian laws” on illegal construction are regularly enforced
inside Israel, and anyone who pleaded “natural growth” as a reason to
be exempted from such law would be told to move: there are plenty of
empty apartments in Israel, where the Jewish population of European
descent is diminishing.

A recent book (The Hebrew Republic by Bernard Avishai) notes that
up to a third of the children of the Israeli elite lives abroad, and
a 2006 study found that 44% of young Israelis “would seriously think
of leaving Israel” if it would improve their living standards.
Siegman says that Obama is determined to establish a settlement
based on UN resolutions, agreements Israel has already signed but
ignores, and international law.

Such a proposal would be powerfully reinforced by the second new
factor in the situation: the European Union proposal made last week
by its foreign policy chief, Javier Solana. This would have the
Security Council set (an early) deadline for Israel and the
Palestinians to agree on a settlement.

If they fail, as they have until now, the Security Council would
employ its own legal authority over the still unresolved Palestinian
partition decided by the UN in 1947, and itself set the borders for
Israel and the new Palestinian state, as well as establishing
Security Council terms for settling the other permanent issues:
Jerusalem, refugees and security.

The responsibility to settle the matter, if the parties can’t do it
themselves, is implicit in the UN resolutions that created Israel and
awarded a right to self-determination to the Palestinians.

If the United States and the European Union join forces to impose
such UN settlement terms, and back them with their combined political
and economic resources, sending an international force to enter the
currently occupied Palestinian territories to establish the rule of
law, assist the Palestinians in building government institutions, and
to assure Israel’s security, this dangerous and endlessly painful
stalemate might at last be ended to everyone’s relief, the profound
benefit of the whole region, and to the credit of Barack Obama and
Janvier Solana.

© Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.


http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=415

Who killed Arafat and why? Ramzy Baroud

A view from the Middle East....


The Middle East's Leading English Language Daily
Web Bug from http://www.arabnews.com/images/pixel.gif

Thursday 23 July 2009 (30 Rajab 1430)


Who killed Arafat and why?
Ramzy Baroud | Arab News —


Who killed Yasser Arafat? When the Palestinian leader was declared dead in a French hospital on Nov. 11, 2004, there was no way of knowing how questions related to his death should be phrased. Was he killed or did he die from old age? If he was killed, then who killed him and why? The “mysterious” nature of his symptoms gave birth to a theory that he was poisoned over a period of time, provided enough evidence that foul play was involved, even accusing some of those closest to him. Although the man’s story has been recorded in the ever-growing chronicle of the Palestinian struggle and Palestinians have somehow moved on, recent breaking news has blown his story wide open once again, breeding new controversy and stories of conspiracy.

Nearly five years have passed since Arafat died. During those years, a number of high-ranking Palestinian leaders, especially from the Hamas movement, have been assassinated by Israel in various and consistently gory methods. Among Palestinians, Arafat is referred to like all those killed by Israel, as a “martyr”, an indication of the widespread belief that his death was hardly the result of natural causes.

If Arafat was indeed killed and since his death was not caused by an Israeli airstrike or an assassin’s bullet, a key question has been lingering, giving rise to all sorts of answers — who killed Arafat and how?

Israelis made little secret of their desire to see Arafat dead. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon expressed regret in a newspaper interview on Feb. 1, 2002 that he hadn’t killed Arafat decades earlier when he had had the chance. Sharon told Israeli newspaper Maariv that he should have “eliminated” Arafat during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. “Do you regret it (not killing Arafat)?” he was asked. “Certainly, yes,” he replied.

On the day of Arafat’s death, BBC news carried comments by then Israeli opposition leader Shimon Peres, saying it is “good that the world is rid of him...The sun is shining in the Middle East.” Held hostage in his bullet-riddled West Bank office for years, Arafat represented an international embarrassment for Israel. He was not “moderate” enough to concede all Palestinian rights, but ‘moderate’ enough to maintain an aura of international attention and support among Arab, Muslim, European and other nations.

Still, in the minds of some, Arafat was determined, and often declared to represent an ‘obstacle’. The PA’s truly “moderate” camp disliked him for his tireless compromises aimed at preventing factional infighting, thus blocking their attempts at dominating Palestinian society. Israel despised him for numerous reasons, not least his refusal to “concede” issues of paramount importance, such as refugees and Jerusalem. The Bush administration took every opportunity to discredit, discount and insult him, constantly propping up an “alternative” leadership, namely, Mahmoud Abbas, Mohammed Dahlan and others.

Strangely enough, even Abbas and other high-ranking PA officials refer to Arafat as a “martyr,” especially whenever they need to capitalize on his legacy among low-ranking Fatah members and ordinary Palestinians. But the story was meant to end here, with Abbas and Dahlan, carrying the torch of Arafat the “martyr” as they continue with their rhetoric-based “revolution” to liberate Palestine. That was the case until the second highest-ranking Fatah member and one of the PLO’s most visible leaders, Farouk Qaddoumi, went public with a document that contained some unanticipated surprises: that Abbas and Dahlan, along with Sharon, US Undersecretary of State William Burns, and others jointly plotted the assassination of Arafat. Qaddoumi’s document contained the minutes of that meeting, in 2004.

Qaddoumi broke the news in a press conference in Amman, Jordan on July 12, 2009, asserting that Arafat had entrusted him with the minutes of that secret meeting involving top Israeli, Palestinian and American leaders and officials. The plot, according to Qaddoumi included the assassination of other Palestinian leaders, some of them have indeed been assassinated since while others are still alive, thanks to the failure of Israeli missiles and car bombs.

Expectedly, the Ramallah-based Fatah leaders launched fierce verbal attacks against Qaddoumi, questioning his objectives, timing and even his sanity. Abbas accused Qaddoumi of wanting to torpedo the Fatah faction’s long-delayed congress, scheduled to convene in Bethlehem on Aug. 4. “He (Qaddoumi) knows full well that this information is false; he has released it to undermine the convention but we are continuing with the preparations,” Abbas said. Qaddoumi had in fact criticized the convention of a supposedly ‘revolutionary’ movement held with Israeli consent, if not support.

The fact is, we may never know the authenticity of Qaddoumi’s report without an independent investigation or irrefutable evidence. However, just as with Arafat’s death, conclusive evidence is not always required for the public to formulate an opinion. Considering Israel’s threats to Arafat, Palestinians have no reason to believe that Israel did not kill him. Similarly, ordinary Palestinians, especially those in Gaza, have little reason to trust that corrupt Palestinians were not involved in Arafat’s death. A clique of the Palestinian elite have made it clear that their personal interests surpass those of the Palestinian people; Dahlan openly advocated the toppling of an elected government in Gaza as the Ramallah-based “revolutionary” movement, was dispatching US-armed and trained Palestinian fighters to crack down on Israel’s enemies in various West Bank towns.

As bizarre as all of this may sound, it is at least enough to explain why Palestinians are willing to believe the recent statements made by Qaddoumi, a respected figure among all Palestinian factions. True, Qaddoumi’s accusations have yet to be authenticated by an independent investigation, but they are made in a fractious, if not peculiar political context that makes them most plausible and, in a sense, that is the real tragedy.

US Will Take 'Crippling Action' if Iran Becomes Nuclear, says Clinton By Julian Borger

US Will Take 'Crippling Action' if Iran Becomes Nuclear, says Clinton

By Julian Borger

Hillary Clinton today signalled a significant shift in US foreign policy by discussing publicly how a nuclear-armed Iran could be contained in the Middle East. Continue
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article23120.htm

The "Swiftboating" of Human Rights Watch by Daniel Levy

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

7/20/09

The "Swiftboating" of Human Rights Watch

Daniel Levy

Last week witnessed a concerted attack against the credibility of the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW), seeking to link supposed fundraising activities in Saudi Arabia with that organization’s criticism (“bias”, according to its detractors) of Israeli practices in the occupied territories, also claiming HRW is soft peddling on Saudi violations. It started in a Wall Street Journal piece, the Israeli prime minister’s office and spokespeople weighed in, and then AIPAC and the rightwing blogosphere got onboard. The attack on HRW has now been ratcheted up according to today’sJerusalem Post.

The former right-wing Israeli Government Minister, Natan Sharansky (also an ex-Prisoner of Zion, President George W. Bush’s favorite author and occupation apologist) claims that HRW “has become a tool in the hands of dictatorial regimes to fight against democracies.” Ron Dermer, director of policy planning in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office adds: “We are going to dedicate time and manpower to combating these groups; we are not going to be sitting ducks in a pond for the human rights groups to shoot at us with impunity".

The apparent trigger for this assault on a group that represents the global gold standard in human rights monitoring, analysis, and advocacy, was a visit by HRW’s Middle East-North Africa director, Sarah Leah Whitson, to the Saudi kingdom. I happened to find myself on a panel at The Century Foundation discussing the Middle East with Whitson just days before this storm broke—I went back and watched tapes of that panel discussion. To accuse Whitson of being soft on the Saudis or somehow singling out Israel for criticism is quite astonishing as I’m sure you’ll agree if you take ten minutes to listen to her presentation—of that, more in a moment.

According to reports Whitson was hosted one evening in Riyadh by prominent businessman and intellectual, Emad bin Jameel Al-Hejailan, for a private dinner which included business leaders, civil society leaders, and well-connected Saudis. It was not a fundraising event. HRW was certainly not fundraising from the Saudi government. Spencer Ackerman of The Washington Independent quotes Whitson—“We have never raised any money from the Saudi government or any other agency in the world.” That HRW does not take government money is something that is already well-known.

HRW does, of course, receive contributions from individuals and foundations—something that does not prevent them from producing releases and reports critical of the states from whence donors hail.

Does HRW’s fundraising from private sources in the US prevent it being critical of American human rights violations (and I obviously acknowledge the differences between the US and Saudi Arabia)? Apparently not. Yes, donors have agendas, but as long as the organization adheres to standards of fact-checking and objectivity, its credibility is sustained.

Sadly, these attacks on HRW demonstrate no such objectivity or credibility—they come from a narrow and misguided right-wing Israel advocacy agenda. One group that has been plowing this terrain for some years is Gerald Steinberg’s odiously named “NGO Monitor,” in the attacks on HRW he is being joined by bigger guns. Steinberg accuses HRW of being “linked to the terrorist campaign” (of Hamas …etc), and whines that "Human Rights Watch is an organization with a budget of $40 million a year; they are a superpower”. Poor Mr. Steinberg, his supporters in the anti-HRW campaign over at AIPAC only had an “$80 million purse” at their disposal.

Ms. Whitson at HRW is not rolling over, this was her response: "Please, if there is something we got wrong, if one of the incidents or attacks we described is wrong, I would love to hear it. Because the Gerald Steinbergs of this world, and I guess now the Sharanskys of this world, love to give blanket denials, love to give blanket dismissals. But let's get down to the facts and let me know, did we get the fact wrong on any of these cases."

Whitson had also been accused of using HRW’s criticism of Israel and the hits that it takes on that score in order to curry favor with potential Saudi backers. According to reports, Whitson discussed HRW’s work on both Saudi practices and on the Israeli occupied territories among other issues. Jeffrey Goldberg in his Atlantic blog shares a thoughtful exchange on this with the executive director of HRW, Ken Roth.

I would suggest that Human Rights Watch is not at fault here, but rather those whose agenda is to smear its good name. The event held in Riyadh that has come under scrutiny is undoubtedly replicated by HRW in similar venues around the world and is crucial to their work in sensitizing elites—especially in countries where violations occur—to a broad human rights agenda, including its applicability to the venue in question.

The most perfunctory fact-checking debunks the claim of HRW having an anti-Israel obsession as being patently absurd. As Ali Gharib of IPS has pointed out, of more than 30 releases in June and July (so far) about the region, Israel was criticized three times, Saudi Arabia five times, and Iran on nine occasions.

And here’s how cuddling up to the Saudis and perhaps even seeking private Saudi money led to self-censorship by Sarah Leah Whitson in her criticism of Saudi Arabia at that TCF event: Whitson attacked the lack of due process in the recent Saudi terror trials. She described Saudi Arabia, along with Syria and Libya, as being on the less free side in terms of “the most basic human rights” violations in the region. She attacked Saudi Arabia’s lack of a penal code, and Whitson had this to say about women’s rights in the kingdom: “Saudi Arabia is the absolute worst. Women are treated as legal minor, as children.” Two of HRW’s recent releases are about women’s rights and domestic worker abuses in the kingdom.

So, why this coordinated attack on HRW all of a sudden? It pains me to say it, but this is all about Israel. The Israeli prime minister’s office was shameless enough to announce that it has decided to wage a battle with human rights NGOs and started with Human Rights Watch. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s spokesman, Mark Regev, (apparently without irony) accused HRW of having “seriously lost its moral compass.”

AIPAC then promoted the attack on HRW. The timing is not a coincidence. Human Rights Watch, similar to other global, respected human rights NGOs, obviously follows developments in the occupied Palestinian territories and obviously had something to say about Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza six months ago. Their recent Gazareport focused on the use or, rather, misuse of drones during these military attacks.Amnesty International has been similarly critical of the use of drones, asserting that Israeli forces did not employ insufficient care in preventing civilian casualties.

Or maybe, just maybe, something troubling from a human rights perspective might be taking place in Gaza and the rest of the occupied territories. This is a case of “shoot the messenger” on steroids. What happened to Gaza during Operation Cast Lead is being revealed not only by international sources, but also by Israeli sources, including this latest report from Israeli combat soldiers of the Breaking the Silence group, a collection of testimonies by Israeli combatants who served in Gaza.

Unfortunately, Israel did not—as was recommended by Israeli human rights groups including B’tselem—conduct its own credible state inquiry into the Gaza events. By leaving the Israeli Defense Forces to conduct their own cursory, closed, and, ultimately, not credible investigation, Israel has sent the signal to the international community, and notably to the human rights NGO community, that it will not do the job - that they will have to.

The logic of Israel’s continued occupation is such that the steps Israel is taking to maintain and entrench its presence in the territories are leading to ever-greater human rights violations. Often these practices are exposed, obviously human rights’ NGO’s do a lot of that exposing. In that context, one can expect the attacks on the human rights community to be ratcheted up. As Matt Yglesias has pointed out, there is “an increasing tendency by the Israeli government and by hawkish Jewish organizations to respond to criticism of Israel’s human rights record by lashing out against human rights groups.”

Attempts to defend the indefensible do not make for pretty viewing, even when beloved Israel is the subject (for another example see The Israel Project’s recent defense of settlements in the West Bank). Surely, one can both be a supporter of Israel and it’s security while at the same time, defending human rights by, for instance, advocating an end to the conflict, a two-state solution, and an end to the occupation. Surely, supporting Israel cannot be about undermining efforts to advance human rights around the world. That is not just fundamentally wrong, it strikes me as being fundamentally un-Jewish, and goes beyond the pale of what is legitimate or ethical.

Iraq-Kurd deadlock seen to threaten unrest Analysts warn tense faceoff betweens Iraqis and Kurds could inadvertently spark broader conflict.

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=33204=33204&format=0
2009-07-16

Iraq-Kurd deadlock seen to threaten unrest
Analysts warn tense faceoff betweens Iraqis and Kurds could inadvertently spark broader conflict.

By Mehdi Lebouachera - BAGHDAD

Kurdish demands to expand their autonomous region in northern Iraq to include the Kirkuk oil fields and other districts threaten to trigger armed conflict, diplomats and analysts warn.

Six years after the US-led invasion in which Kurdish rebel groups were key allies, their decades-old claims to historically Kurdish-inhabited areas remain unresolved by the new Iraqi government in which they hold both the presidency and a deputy premiership.

And opposition to the Kurdish demands remains as strong as ever, not only among the Sunni Arab minority that dominated Saddam Hussein's ousted regime but also among the Shiite majority community that leads the new government and among ethnic minorities such as the Turkmen.

As time drags on, Kurdish leaders have voiced mounting frustration at the impasse in their talks with Baghdad, sparking an increasingly heated war of words with Arab politicians.

"I think we are in a situation that neither side wants a war but, where there are serious tensions and people are extremely well armed, then something could easily happen," a senior Western diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Washington has been seeking to mediate in the negotiations between the Kurdish regional authorities and the central government in Baghdad but the talks have reached a standstill.

And there have been a growing number of incidents between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga militia, composed of former rebel fighters, which took control of many of the disputed areas during the 2003 invasion.

On May 8, there was a shootout at a checkpoint near the main northern city of Mosul when the provincial governor attempted to visit a nearby town under Kurdish control and was prevented from doing so by peshmerga militiamen.

"The tense faceoff could inadvertently spark broader conflict in the absence of swift and accurate communication and strong political leadership," a Brussels-based think-tank, International Crisis Group, said in a report.

In the summer of last year, the Baghdad government sent thousands of troops from the national army into the disputed districts where they are now deployed alongside the peshmerga forces.

The central government said the move was vital to the fight against Al-Qaeda loyalists and for the protection of key oil infrastructure.

But the army deployments have created tensions, particularly in the most hotly disputed area, the oil hub of Kirkuk, where the army's 12th Division is commanded by General Abdel Amir al-Zaydi, who served in Saddam's armed forces, accused by the Kurds of genocide.

Determined not to concede any ground in their territorial claims, members of the Kurdish regional parliament in Arbil last month approved a new constitution for their autonomous region formalising their claims to Kirkuk and the other disputed areas.

"Kirkuk is Kurdish, like Arbil, Sulaimaniyah or Dohuk, and is part of Kurdistan," regional president Massud Barzani said on Tuesday. "All of the historical and geographical documents prove this."

Kurdish rebels went to war with the Baghdad government in the early 1970s rather than accept its offer of limited autonomy over Iraq's three most northern provinces but not Kirkuk.

However, Arab politicians accuse the Kurds of persisting in their claims to Kirkuk's oil fields in a bid to secure the resource base to break away.

"The Kurdish constitution makes us furious because it is the first step in a move towards secession," Salah al-Obeidi, spokesman for the Shiite radical movement of Moqtada al-Sadr, said.

The senior Western diplomat said the dispute was especially difficult to resolve because of the "huge existential issue at stake."

"On the one hand, the Kurds talk about their own survival -- are the Arabs going to come back and do what they didn’t manage to do (under Saddam)? And as far as the rest of the country is concerned, are the Kurds going to prevent a viable Iraqi state," he said.

With US-backing, the United Nations has proposed a compromise solution in which Kirkuk would be given a special status with links to both the central government and the Kurdish regional authorities. But so far the proposal has failed to win much favour from either side.

Kurdish independent MP Mahmud Othman said the only way forward was to "create serious dialogue between Baghdad and Arbil."

"Both sides ... talk about talks but none of them take a real initiative to do it," he complained.

bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable: Arab normalization gestures to Israel, July 23, 2009

bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable

Edition 28 Volume 7 - July 23, 2009

Arab normalization gestures to Israel

• No normalization under occupation, just do the right thing - Akram Baker
Arab leaders (and people) would be fools to harbor the notion that Obama is going to do their bidding for them.

• Let the diplomatic games begin - Anouar Boukhars
The success of Obama's entire new foreign policy paradigm hinges on his ability to broker a just and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

• The US and confidence-building measures - Oded Eran
The value of small, partial Arab gestures has worn off.

• The Gulf states already have links with Israel - Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi
The two Gulf countries with the closest links to Israel also have the closest relations with Iran.

No normalization under occupation, just do the right thing
Akram Baker

Suggestions that the Obama administration has asked Arab countries to show a modicum of faith in his approach to Middle East peace-making by implementing a few confidence-building measures vis-a-vis Israel if and when it halts its settlement activity have raised a number of interesting and vital questions. Would this be normalization of relations with the Israeli occupier and a sell-out of Arab principles, or is it a good idea that merits further discussion? Is it the responsibility of the Arabs to reward Israel for ending illegal behavior or could these be the first steps toward a comprehensive settlement?

First of all, I do not believe in any normalization of relations with Israel so long as the Israeli occupation persists. There is no benefit in rewarding Israel for its continued intransigence. What I do believe is that the Arab countries should do all they can to support President Barack Obama in bringing a resolution to this horrific conflict. That can only be translated as the end of the Israeli occupation and the creation of a secure, independent and democratic state of Palestine based on UN Security Council resolutions. In the same vein, it is vital not to confuse rewarding Israel with helping Obama or--more importantly--helping one's self.

The reality is that there is no better chance than right now for Palestinians to finally succeed in achieving their legitimate right to freedom. It is equally Israel's big chance to achieve peace, security and normality after decades of being spoiled silly by the United States (which hasn't done anyone any good). Obama has proven time and again since his inauguration that he is very serious about bringing peace to the region. Whether we look at the appointment of George Mitchell as special envoy or his public assertions that settlements must end, the US president has made it crystal clear that he will not be taking a back seat in this fight. As the first American president since Jimmy Carter to unequivocally declare Israel's colonial settlement adventure illegal (and not a vague "obstacle to peace"), Obama is putting the US firmly back where it should be--in line with international legitimacy.

But Arab leaders (and people) would be fools to harbor the notion that Obama is going to do their bidding for them. For the first time in a generation, we see an administration in Washington that is looking after long-term US national security interests in the Middle East and not completely kowtowing to the extreme right wing of American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC. One needs to recognize that while Obama correctly deduced that the core issue at hand is land and that there is absolutely no chance in hell to reach an equitable solution with Israeli concrete flooding the West Bank, he was still putting his neck on the line in Cairo. But like everything he does, Obama is a master of choosing his own battles. A highly competitive man, he will not join a fight unless he is confident there is more than a reasonable chance of winning. The crux of the matter is that in this endeavor, success depends not only on Israel's reactions but also on the Arab world.

When seen from this perspective, it becomes clear that it is the responsibility of Arab leaders to show that they are willing to take a calculated risk for peace. During the George W. Bush administration, it probably didn't matter what the Arabs did, Bush would not have put any kind of pressure on Israel to cease and desist its settlement activity. However, the game has changed. So what does this mean in practical terms?

For example, the Gulf countries could open their air space to commercial Israeli flights to the Far East or India. This would have a positive effect in showing the world that Arabs are really serious about peace and it is Israel that is throwing a spanner in the process. If Israel refuses any type of equitable reciprocation, these rights can just as easily be withdrawn. By providing the president with extra leverage regarding settlements, the Arab countries would also be sending an emotionally resilient message of practical solidarity with Obama, the person and the office. In other words, they have everything to gain.

If Obama is to have any hope of bringing peace to the Middle East, he will need all the support that can be offered. Israel--especially the current Netanyahu government of right-wingers and outright racists--is not going to give anything up without a fight. But in order for the parties to comprehend that there is no option other than joint success or joint misery, the Arab world can take the courageous step of giving the US president a helping hand by just doing the right thing for everyone involved.- Published 23/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Akram Baker is an independent Palestinian political analyst. He is co-president of the Arab Western Summit of Skills, a platform for Arab professionals dedicated to reform and development in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Let the diplomatic games begin
Anouar Boukhars

In the last six months, the world has watched with interest and at times fascination the rearrangement of practices and strategies of American foreign policy. The new administration has articulated exciting bold principles and laid out new strategic parameters for how to tackle "the urgent, the important and the long-term all at once". With the conviction of a grandmaster and the humility of an inquisitive statesman, US President Barack Obama has embraced the complexities and uncertainties of geopolitical involvement. But nowhere has such involvement been so dramatic and bold as in the Middle East, where President George W. Bush's militaristic policies and dogmatic geopolitical thinking only prolonged conflicts and worsened crises, leaving a legacy of continuing devastation in Palestine and unfinished business in Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and elsewhere in the region.

Obama has to grapple with these realities. And grapple he has. Each decision he has taken or diplomatic foray he has made has been strategically calculated to remove what he called that "constant wound" or "constant sore" that infects all of America's interests in the Middle East. It is within this context that his elevation of the Arab-Israel conflict to a top priority of America's foreign policy can be understood. The president has stated numerous times that the status-quo in the region is untenable and Israel's continuing settlement expansion in its colonies in the Palestinian territories is deeply harmful to America's interests in the region and to Israel's own long-term security. Freezing those settlements is therefore the first basic step on the road to resolving the conflict. Prospects for such resolution are dauntingly challenging but nevertheless promising.

Obama's attempts to restore America's credibility as an honest broker of peace have shaken the usual diplomatic niceties and political dynamics in the Middle East, forcing the main protagonists to the conflict to go scrambling for responses to the new diplomatic game. The hawkish Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, is trying to come up with elaborate diplomatic maneuvers and tricks to continue his expansion of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, or at the very least, extract as many concessions from Arab states as possible before even committing to the well-known final parameters of a comprehensive settlement to the conflict: a return to the 1967 border with some minor adjustments as agreed to by the parties. Netanyahu's intention was articulated in the speech he delivered in mid-June in which he reaffirmed his vision for a disjointed Palestinian state that lacks contiguity, viability and all the essential attributes of sovereignty.

For their part, the Arab states are playing the same tiresome diplomatic dance, holding out for timetables and initiatives coming from elsewhere. Instead of uniting their ranks and publicly conveying their determination to see Obama succeed in his mission to bring peace to the region, they content themselves with reiterating their demands for Israel to abide by its international legal obligations. So far, they have resisted calls to engage in a confidence-building process with Israel as long as the latter refuses to positively respond to the comprehensive and historic peace initiative they offered in 2002.

Breaking down this frustrating kabuki dance that the parties are engaged in is the task Obama has taken upon himself. His credibility and the success of his entire new foreign policy paradigm hinge on his ability to broker a just and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Such goal is achievable but dependent on his ability to pressure all parties to comply with the legitimate requests he has announced so far. Israel must bring to a total halt all its settlement activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the Arabs must take steps to facilitate America's new role as an honest broker. Such confidence-building measures can include a revival of diplomatic contacts and reopening of Israeli interest sections in countries like Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. Major concessions should follow once all parties agree on the general parameters of a comprehensive peace plan that guarantees the security of Israel while ending its occupation of all Arab land, including the Syrian Golan Heights.- Published 23/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Anouar Boukhars is director of the Center for Defense & Security Policy at Wilberforce University. He is also a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center.

The US and confidence-building measures
Oded Eran

In his July 13 meeting with American Jewish leaders, President Barack Obama alluded to the new theme in US Middle East policy. In her July 15 speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was explicit. The US expects immediate Israeli action on settlements and Palestinian living conditions and it expects Arab gestures to Israel, even before the implementation of a comprehensive agreement.

Confidence-building measures are not a new concept in the history of attempts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. The most effective one was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. It convinced the majority of Israelis that he was sincere in his quest for peace and it enabled Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to agree to withdraw fully from Sinai. After the first Gulf war, the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo agreements, other less visible gestures were made. Israel opened diplomatic offices in Morocco and Qatar and Israeli citizens could travel to Morocco, Tunisia and some Persian Gulf states with relative ease. Several Arab states opened interest offices in Tel Aviv.

This exchange--negotiations between Israel and its immediate neighbors, the Jordanians and the Palestinians, and some Arab gestures--came to an end in 1996. Some say this was because of the reopening of an ancient tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem. Some argue that it was caused by the Likud electoral victory that year, though Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu went on to negotiate the January 1997 Hebron Agreement and the October 1998 Wye River Memorandum. Both are precedential in their nature in the Palestinian-Israeli context. But Arab-Israel relations were nonetheless frozen and they remain so.

The juxtaposition of a settlement freeze with Arab gestures will be of little impact. The majority of Israelis are ready for a settlement freeze--certainly when it comes to avoiding friction with the US. There is, however, no Arab gesture that would convince the other, pro-settlement part of Israeli society to agree to a total settlement freeze. The Israeli government itself already opposes a freeze in Jerusalem. A portion of those Israelis who strongly support settling in the West Bank might be swayed by Arab recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people as demanded by Netanyahu in his speech of June 14. This means that any Arab gesture short of such a major shift would have very marginal value for an Israeli government attempt to win support for even a limited freeze.

Moreover, the value of small, partial Arab gestures has worn off. Short of a spectacular event such as a Saudi royal or Syrian presidential visit to Jerusalem, there is little that can excite Israeli public opinion. A visit by the president of Israel to Damascus or Riyadh could have a similar impact. But the opening of an Israeli semi-diplomatic office in Doha, Qatar cannot stir emotions among Israelis--certainly not among those who support settlement activity.

One of the proposals aired recently in this context was Israeli flights in Arab airspace. This gesture has a practical meaning only in the case of Saudi Arabia and one or two Gulf states. Today, Israeli planes en route to Southeast Asia fly south over the Red Sea and then turn eastward. Permission to fly over Saudi Arabia would enable Israeli airlines to shorten the route. But that would still be a marginal concession, since Israelis (and others) can fly to Amman, Jordan and continue directly to any destination in East Asia. Royal Jordanian Airlines might be quite dismayed by such a Saudi gesture; it would lose a nice source of income.

The problem can be summed up as follows. On the one hand the Arab world, collectively or individually, is unlikely to offer the kind of CBMs that would be of a magnitude and a visibility to convince the relevant pro-settlement part of Israeli society and the government to make gestures such as a long-term, full freeze on settlements and/or improving living conditions for Palestinians. On the other hand, it is most unlikely that Arab states would either wish or be able to make the kind of bold gestures that would enable the Israeli government to push for what the US administration is currently demanding it do.

On the assumption that the most important issue for most Israelis is their long-term security, what could have an impact on Israeli society and Israeli governments are CBMs in this domain. Strangely enough, these CBMs could be offered by two different groups of players other than the Arab League. The first is Iran and its proxies, Hizballah and Hamas; the other is the international community and primarily the US. Obviously, it is most unlikely that Iran and its regional allies would be willing to participate in such an exchange of CBMs.

This is not the case with the US. In 2004, in advance of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel obtained certain assurances about American positions regarding final status issues. A similar idea could now be pursued in matters relating to Israel's long-term security. This could relate to a clearer bilateral understanding on how to deal with Iran (regardless whether there is or is not a US-Iranian dialogue), long-term US assurances regarding military supplies that would be formalized in congressional legislation, and administration reaffirmation of President George W. Bush's 2004 letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Other ideas could include US willingness to advocate more publicly Israel's individual association with NATO (and not only in the Mediterranean context) and a commitment to lobby Russia and others not to supply certain weapons to Iran.- Published 23/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oded Eran is director of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He served as Israel's ambassador to Jordan and the EU and is a former negotiator with Egypt and the Palestinians.

The Gulf states already have links with Israel
Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi

Should the Gulf countries maintain contacts with Israel if this would make life easier for Palestinians? Could having such ties propel the Middle East peace process forward?

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr, prime minister and foreign minister of Qatar, spoke on al-Jazeera recently about last winter's Israeli war on Gaza. Noting that the Turks were able to deliver emergency goods to the Palestinians immediately, he said, "I would have been glad if Egypt had done the same," alluding to the fact that both counties have ties to Israel. He then added, "Everyone was asking us to shut the Israeli Commercial Office in Doha and we have done so. Show me now how this will benefit the peace process?" It could be argued that such commercial ties with Israel allowed Qatar in the past to donate $6 million to finance the building of the Sakhnin soccer stadium, which is mostly used by Arab Israelis.

The open secret is that all six Gulf countries maintain contacts with Israel and some have open commercial interests. Officials as senior as the current Israeli president himself have visited Oman and Qatar on various occasions. In fact, not too long ago a Gulf official asked me for contacts in the Israel Foreign Ministry (which I did not have). It was a very casual request, like introducing a potential business partner.

We now know that these ties exist thanks to the internet, the ultimate taboo- and myth-breaker of the Arab world. For instance, I have over the past few years received via email photographs of former and current Gulf foreign ministers with Israeli officials, mostly Shimon Peres during his time as foreign minister of Israel. There is also a popular YouTube video of a Gulf ruler and his foreign minister meeting with then Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni; the Gulf ruler gestures to the TV crew accompanying her to stop filming. As recently as a few years ago such a video would have not been seen at all, now it has thousands of viewers.

Der Spiegel uncovered the clearest example of Israeli rapprochement with the Arab Gulf states in early July when it reported that Israel voted for the UAE to host the International Renewable Energy Agency headquarters. The German journal attributed this to Israel wanting to build closer relations with the Gulf States. That strategy could be working: recently, five Bahraini citizens who were caught by Israel on board a ship were promptly handed over to an official visiting delegation from the island kingdom.

The Gulf States' boldest step to normalize ties with Israel came from none other than Saudi Arabia: King Abdullah's peace plan promises full normalization rather than a cold Egypt-style peace with Israel if an agreement with the Palestinians is reached. Additionally, Bahrain's foreign minister last year suggested that the Middle East countries form a regional organization that includes Israel and Iran. In recent months, the United Arab Emirates allowed an Israeli tennis player, Andy Ram, to play in a WTP tournament held in the country. Previously, Israel Central Bank Governor David Klein visited the UAE in 2003 for World Bank and IMF meetings. Even conservative Kuwait recently witnessed a call by a candidate for the country's parliament to establish relations with Israel.

What ties the Gulf states to Israel are mutual suspicions of the Iranian nuclear program. They also fear that a potential Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear installations could have serious repercussions for the Gulf states in economic, environmental and security terms. In contradiction to western media reports that the Gulf states have acquiesced in an Israeli strike, it is more likely that they would employ their contacts with Israel (and the US) to highlight the serious fallout of such a move. After all, the two Gulf countries with the closest links to Israel (via its former commercial representative offices there), Oman and Qatar, also happen to have the closest relations with Iran among all six Gulf states.

It is naive to think that simply having relations with Israel would make a difference to the peace process; some say it is counterproductive to reward the current hard-line Israeli government whose latest blunder is to insist that Arabic place names in Israel be rendered so as to present the Hebrew language equivalent (e.g., al-Quds becomes Yerushalayim, rendered in Arabic). However, it is equally naive to think that such ties don't already exist, no matter how vehemently the Gulf states deny it.

Bahrain's progressive crown prince recently highlighted the importance of communicating with Israel in an op-ed in the Washington Post. Clearly, the Gulf states can no longer be involved passively in perpetual peace processes that fail. One step they can take is to appoint a high-level peace envoy whose sole duty is to monitor and encourage, diplomatically and financially, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. What are needed now are practical steps that can finally improve the prospects for peace and dignified living for the Palestinians. If having ties with Israel can achieve that then few Gulf citizens will condemn their governments.- Published 23/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi is a non-resident fellow at the Dubai School of Government.



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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.

Iran's Tragic Joke - Roger Cohen, New York Times

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/opinion/21iht-edcohen.html?_r=2&ref=opinion


Iran's Tragic Joke
- Roger Cohen, New York Times

Why No More Suicide Bombers? - Christopher Hitchens, The Australian

Why No More Suicide Bombers?
- Christopher Hitchens, The Australian

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/20/what_happened_to_palestines_suicide_bombers.html

Assassination: A Brief History - George Jonas, Foreign Policy

Assassination: A Brief History
- George Jonas, Foreign Policy

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/20/assassination_a_brief_history

Never Again in North Korea? Think Again - Jonah Goldberg, LA Times

Never Again in North Korea? Think Again
- Jonah Goldberg, LA Times

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-goldberg21-2009jul21,0,3198788.column

Rising China as Transformed China: A Problem for Strategic Analysis From the July 20, 2009 Asia Chronicle

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=6366

Rising China as Transformed China: A Problem for Strategic Analysis

From the July 20, 2009 Asia Chronicle

Clinton's Tough Message to India - Brookings Institution

Clinton's Tough Message to India - Brookings Institution

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0716_india_talbott.aspx?rssid=LatestFromBrookings

The UNSC's responsibility for Middle East peace

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1101703.html

The UNSC's responsibility for Middle East peace

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/images/0.gif

21/07/2009

By Henry Siegman

The international community may finally be beginning to register the utter futility of decades-long expectations that an Israeli government would agree to a fair and workable peace agreement, one that would end the four-decade subjugation and denial of the Palestinian people's national and individual rights.

One hopes that is the significance of the proposal by European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana, who suggested that the UN Security Council assume responsibility for establishing a Palestinian state by a certain deadline if the parties have not reached an agreement. The Security Council would then set the borders of Israel and a new Palestinian state, and formulate parameters to resolve the other permanent status issues - Jerusalem, refugees and security.

Of course, this cannot happen without U.S. assent and leadership, which is unlikely if such a proposal is incorrectly seen as punishment for non-performance, rather than understood as the original intent of resolutions 242 and 338, which called for Israel's return to the 1967 borders.
As I have written previously, the Security Council's responsibility for resolving the consequences of the Six-Day War if the parties were unable to do so was implicit in the resolutions' language, which stressed the inadmissibility of acquiring territory through war. Israel's occupation policy and its vast settlement enterprise have been based on the contrary assumption - if no peace agreement is reached with the Palestinians, the resolutions' "default" is the indefinite continuation of the occupation of Palestinian lands and people.

If this reading were correct, the Security Council resolutions would have served as an irresistible invitation to Israel - and to all other occupiers - to avoid peace talks in order to preserve the status quo, which of course is exactly what Israel has been doing, in clear violation of Resolution 242's declaration that territory cannot be acquired by war.

Israel's contention has long been that since no Palestinian state existed before the 1967 war, there is no recognized border to withdraw to, because the pre-1967 border was merely an armistice line. Moreover, since Resolution 242 calls for a "just and lasting peace" that will allow "every state in the area [to] live in security," Israel holds that it must be allowed to change the armistice line, either bilaterally or unilaterally, to make it secure before it ends the occupation.

These are specious arguments for many reasons, but principally because UN General Assembly Partition Resolution 181 of 1947, which established the Jewish state's international legitimacy, also recognized the remaining Palestinian territory outside the Jewish state's borders as - at the very least - the equally legitimate patrimony of Palestine's Arab population, on which they were entitled to establish their own state, and it precisely mapped the borders of that territory. Resolution 181's affirmation of the right of Palestine's Arab population to national self-determination was based on normative law and the democratic principle that grants statehood to the majority population. (At the time, Arabs constituted two-thirds of the population in Palestine.) This right does not evaporate because of delays in implementation.

I have argued in my writings over the years that the international community has failed to reject Israel's notion that the occupation and the creation of "facts on the ground" can go on indefinitely, so long as there is no agreement acceptable to Israel. This failure has defeated all previous peace initiatives and peace envoys. Current efforts will meet the same fate if this fundamental issue is not finally addressed. The U.S. and the international community must finally act on the resolutions' plain logic that the default is a return to the status quo ante, the pre-1967 border - without territorial and other changes that negotiations and a peace agreement might have produced.

What is required, as proposed by Solana, is a Security Council resolution affirming that changes to the pre-1967 situation can be made only by agreement between the parties, and that unilateral measures will not receive international recognition; the default of Resolution 242 is a return of Israel's occupying forces to the pre-1967 border; and that if the parties do not reach an agreement within a defined period, the default setting of the 1967 and 1973 resolutions will be invoked by the Security Council. The Security Council will then adopt its own terms for an end to the conflict, and will arrange for an international force to enter the occupied territories to help establish the rule of law, assist Palestinians in building their institutions, assure Israel's security by preventing cross-border violence, and oversee the implementation of its terms for an end to the conflict.

President Obama has indicated he intends to present Israel and the Palestinian Authority with a framework for a permanent status agreement. His aim of Middle East peace before the two-state solution disappears would be best served if such a framework were to become the basis of a Security Council resolution establishing a Palestinian state.

The writer is the director of the U.S./Middle East Project, and a former national director of the American Jewish Congress. He also serves as a visiting associate professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Israel Turns on Itself

FOREIGN POLICY

7/20/09

Israel Turns on Itself

In last week's ultra-Orthodox riots, the world watched the Jewish state, exhausted by conflict, slowing tearing itself apart.

Noah Efron

On their own terms, the recent riots in Jerusalem make no sense.

Doctors discover that a woman from a small, anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox sect, probably suffering from Münchausen by proxy syndrome, has been starving her 3-year-old, who has dwindled down to an emaciated 15 pounds. Social workers scoop up the kid and place him in intensive care at Hadassah hospital, and police scoop up the mother and put her in jail.

And then all hell breaks loose. A rabbi of the sect declares the event a blood libel, comparing the police to Cossacks. Immediately, young men in black robes and fur hats take to the streets, setting bus stops and dumpsters ablaze, pelting police with stones, and decrying the doctors of Hadassah as latter-day Josef Mengeles. Someone sets aflame the government welfare and social services building in the ultra-Orthodox neighborhood of Me’ah Shearim; others enter the building, smashing computer screens as they go. In the first three days after the toddler is taken for treatment, dozens more are sent to the hospital with wounds from stones and broken glass, and hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of city property are burned or smashed.

In response, the new, secular mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barkat, announces that he will suspend all social services to ultra-orthodox neighborhoods that, being among the poorest in the city, rely on them as a bulwark against Third World kinds of hunger and homelessness. The secular press --Ha’aretz, Yediot Ahronoth, and Ma’ariv -- prints op-eds portraying the ultra-orthodox as child-abusing hooligans. Yediot devotes pages to the story, adding as a sidebar an item about a delegation of ultra-orthodox Jews from the United States visiting Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, offering him moral and political support in his fight against the Zionists.

None of this adds up. Tragedies of mental illness and child abuse are everywhere, and it’s not surprising -- not to social workers and not to rabbis -- to find a case of it among the ultra-Orthodox. There’s no reason to expect it to become a referendum on religious-secular relations in Israel’s capital. Nor, really, is there any reason to expect that ultra-Orthodox street violence would be met by collective punishment, answering thugs by threatening entire neighborhoods with penury. Nor is there any reason to link the riots to the widespread secular suspicion that underneath all the ultra-Orthodox wool and fur are traitors, that the black clothes cover but fail to hide jet-black hearts.

For these events to make any sense, one must put them into broader context. Tensions between ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews in Jerusalem have been mounting for months. November’s municipal election replaced the affable ultra-Orthodox mayor, Uri Lupolianski, with Barkat, a combative, secular high-tech millionaire. In the spring, Barkat ordered that a municipal parking lot not far from the Old City be opened for business on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, inflaming some ultra-Orthodox leaders who saw it as a violation of the “status quo,” or long-standing modus vivendi concerning religious observance in the city. Protests, sometimes more peaceful, sometimes less, have materialized each Saturday since, as the new mayor-tried to negotiate a compromise involving opening a different lot, farther from the likely path of any ultra-Orthodox Jews. Then in June, Jerusalem hosted its largest ever gay pride march, which further angered rabbis and their flocks. Seen against this backdrop, last week’s riots were about much more than one case of putative child abuse; the starved kid, it becomes clear, only turned a longer-simmering potion of frustration and anger into a boiling rage.

But this broader view still leaves the basic question unanswered. None of what’s happened in Jerusalem since November threatens the lifestyle of the city’s ultra-Orthodox Jews or diminishes their autonomy. Speak to any ultra-Orthodox politician in Jerusalem, and he’ll tell you that the last election was a fluke -- the result of disharmony among ultra-Orthodox factions, each straining for a bigger piece of what they all see as a bigger-than-ever pie, rather than the result of increased secular power in the city -- and that it is unlikely ever to repeat itself. For ultra-Orthodox politicians, as for their constituents, Barkat is an interregnum between God-fearing administrations. Most political scientists agree, basing their views on a cold analysis of population figures: Thanks to their high birthrates and to a slow but steady secular exodus from the city over the past decade, the ultra-Orthodox are well on their way to being the majority of the city’s voters. As a product of this trend, the “status quo,” which has actually been never been static, has over the past years been shifting slowly toward the ultra-Orthodox, who now have greater independence in school curricula, more control of locally allocated funds, and greater say in every aspect of city government, than they could have imagined a decade ago. More immediately, whether the parking garage is open or closed has almost no practical affect on ultra-Orthodox life in Jerusalem. The gay pride march has less impact still, throwing into relief the fact that homosexuality has a public presence in the city for only a single day each year, in stark contrast to Tel Aviv, with its openly gay politicians, clubs, magazines, and celebrities. The significance of the last few months’ conflicts is almost entirely symbolic. So what makes these symbols so important?

To understand that, one has to see the recent riots in a still broader context. Israel’s ultra-Orthodox and secular leaders alike broadcast animal assurance: a full, tempered confidence that their way of seeing the world is singular in its virtue. But behind the bluster, both communities feel themselves as embattled and endangered. Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel are collapsing under the weight of their successes. Dismissed by Israel’s founding generations as the last vestiges of a dying way of life, the ultra-Orthodox have grown enormously in numbers and in political power in Israel over the 61 years since the state was established. They have negotiated for themselves broad exemption from army service, mandatory for everyone else, and a series of entitlements that allow most ultra-Orthodox men to receive a small stipend for studying in religious academies for as long as they wish to do so. As a result, Israeli ultra-Orthodox males probably spend more time in formal study than any other class of humans ever has in the history of the planet. But small stipends do not easily support large families, and over time the ultra-Orthodox have become Israel’s economic underclass, as each generation exceeds the poverty of the last. Families of a dozen live in 600-square-foot apartments, stretching their government handouts with canned goods from charitable food pantries. They have become perpetual objects of scorn for secular Israelis, who resent bankrolling their indolence. For Israel’s ultra-Orthodox, the best of times are the worst of times. Torah study thrives and children go to school in thrice-patched pants with an ache in their belly. Something has to give.

Secular Israelis, for their part, live in perpetual dismay over the fact that their successes have never led them to where they expected to arrive. Their parents’ generation, and that of their parents, expected to be vindicated, that the value and truth of the ideology they embraced would be confirmed by the society they built. After Zionists produced the Good Society, they reasoned, no one could doubt that Zionism itself is a social good. And for some time, it seemed that this formula had proven itself to be Israel’s self-image, broadly, as the country passed through two phases.

In the first phase, Israel saw itself as a model of state-building, the only country in the world in which voluntarist socialist communities -- kibbutzim -- thrived, producing not only a plurality of the country’s food, but providing in extraordinary numbers charismatic leaders in government and the army. Even beyond the green lawns and gates of the kibbutzim (which accounted, after all, for only a bit over 3 percent of the country’s population), economists determined that Israel was the country with the smallest “socioeconomic gap” in the world; the difference in income between the richest and poorest 10 percent was smaller than anywhere else. Israel had undertaken and succeeded in massive development projects. The country had absorbed several times its population in immigrants, many poor, and many refugees arriving from dreadful circumstances. Israel reversed the regional trend towards desertification, reclaiming tens of thousands of acres of arid land for productive agriculture. Israelis became agricultural advisors through much of Africa, helping to spark a short-lived but significant increase in African agricultural production. And of course, Israel had assembled an army and airforce recognized for its effectiveness and creativity. Generals like Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin became international celebrities and found themselves dining at the tables of princes and starlets.

No one holds a heroic view of Israel anymore, not abroad and not here. Today’s kibbutzim are not a source of national pride. In the past decade, dozens of them have “privatized,” dividing up what was common property (it took a Supreme Court ruling to stop kibbutzim from selling to developers valuable government-owned lands that had been lent to them for agriculture). Israel’s social gap is now considered among the greatest in the developed world. The most recent wave of immigrants, from the former Soviet Union, are largely disgruntled, and surveys suggest that a large percentage of them are not even Jews. Several of Israel’s large development projects have caused great harm to the local environment. Israelis are unwelcome in African capitals. They are mostly unwelcome anywhere. And most important of all, Israel’s military excellence has been tested in a 20-year misadventure occupying southern Lebanon, and in laboriously maintaining the peace in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The disastrous last war in Lebanon, and the wrenching recent war in Gaza, won support by most Israelis, and censure by some, but together they have left little doubt that the country’s army is not heroic in the sense that it once was.

For all these reasons, to be a secular Israeli in 2009 is a demoralizing and demoralized affair. We are tired: tired of the Palestinians, tired of the bombs, tired of U.N. and EU condemnations, tired of having so much of our daily wages taxed to buy guns and missiles, tired of the army reserves, tired of being hated, tired of going to bed and waking up to reports of kids -- Jewish kids, Palestinian kids -- watching their parents die or dying in their parents’ arms. We are tired of our lives and tired of ourselves.

For two communities in crisis, riots like those that set Jerusalem aflame last week are a welcome relief. Many ultra-Orthodox find in their city’s secular government -- its social services, police, and mayor -- an external source of their malaise. Locating the cause of their suffering outside their own unsustainable way of life, and attributing it to the malevolence of Jewish Cossacks or Jewish Nazis, ultra-Orthodox leaders defer reflection about the real causes of their distress.

Something similar accounts for the harsh and totalizing reaction that so many secular Israelis have had to the past week’s events, finding all ultra-Orthodox guilty, first of heartless acceptance of child abuse, and then of wild hooliganism, adding up to a cultural identity of primitive and traitorous barbarism. For such a view of the ultra-Orthodox does wonders for the self-image of secular Israelis. Now more than before, we need the ultra-Orthodox torching bus shelters and shattering computers. These sorts of ultra-Orthodox, and they alone, serve as a token of the continued relevance of the secular Zionist program, at a time when this claim to relevance is no longer evident, certainly in Europe and the United States, but also increasingly within the borders of Israel itself. Nir Barkat, a mayor with little charisma who has failed to distinguish himself in his first year in office, appears principled and virtuous only when he is staring down a rabble of rabbis.

The riots will pass. As I write, the child remains under constant attention at Hadassah hospital, where he has gained one third again of his body weight. Under court order, his mother was released from jail to house arrest, and will receive immediate psychiatric care. Both will drop from the headlines.

Still, it won’t be long before new headlines come, in the ultra-Orthodox press screaming of cruel and godless authorities goosestepping into Meah Shearim to brutishly break up yiddershe families, and in the secular press of religious zombies slavishly following their rabbis’ orders to torture their kids into mindless obedience. These headlines will come, and rocks will be thrown and trash bins will be set ablaze, because ultra-Orthodox and secular Israelis are locked in a macabre pas de deux that serves each group as it tries to negotiate its own depressing reality. For ultra-Orthodox and secular Israelis, decrying loudly the vicious vice of the other is one of the few ways each can still locate virtue in themselves.

The End of Karaoke Diplomacy? The short, tragic history of ASEAN's silliest tradition. BY BRIAN FUNG

The End of Karaoke Diplomacy?

The short, tragic history of ASEAN's silliest tradition.
BY BRIAN FUNG | JULY 21, 200

The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is held to coordinate action on such weighty topics as democracy, economic integration, and climate change. But since 1995, every diplomat worth his or her salt has known that the real reason everyone attends ASEAN is for the infamous skit in which the pan-Pacific power elite get to ham it up, summer-camp style. But don't think it's all fun and games. When national pride and diplomatic standing are at stake, skits are serious business. Here's a brief history of the tasteless tradition.

1995: The skit's origins are shrouded in mystery, but the earliest press reports come from 14 years ago in Brunei when the U.S. delegation, led by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher, sang a parody of "This Land Is Your Land" with the lyrics altered to "reflect Asia's political and economic peculiarities," according to Reuters. The event was closed to the press, but reporters caught a glimpse of Under Secretary of State Joan Spero on her way to the banquet "wearing a pink silk outfit and carrying a ukulele, and other U.S. officials wore grass skirts."

1997: Madeleine Albright made her debut at the ASEAN farewell dinner in Malaysia with "Don't Cry for Me, ASEANies," complete with a black dress and what Agence France-Presse (AFP) described as "blood-red" lipstick. "Some countries might sue me for libel," the U.S. secretary of state crooned. "In others I'd risk house arrest/But I confess to having said that/ASEAN men are Asia's sexiest!" Meanwhile, the Australians karaoked the Men at Work classic "Down Under," and the Burmese foreign minister performed a traditional dance with his wife and daughter. The Europeans -- seeming a bit out of their element -- stumbled through "Frère Jacques."

1998: Russia and the United States stole the show in the Philippines with a "West Side Story" spoof, reported the Associated Press (AP). Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov joined Albright in a duet (sample lyrics: "I just met a girl named Madeleine Albright/And suddenly I find, she thinks she'll change my mind/For free"), and members of both delegations appeared onstage dressed as the Jets and the Sharks. The Indians, meanwhile, attempted to downplay their country's recent nuclear tests. "Why such fuss over a few crackers in the Thar?/They weren't as loud as Nevada."

1999: Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura knocked 'em dead with a martial-arts display costarring two aides, reported the AP. The minister limped offstage faking pain when one aide kicked his boss in the shin. The Philippine and Thai ministers channeled Frank Sinatra with a rendition of "My Way." Russia performed alone with a "patriotic jingle." And though Albright was a no-show, she prerecorded an apology and had a male "clone" stand in for her. The cross-dressing clone, and six other U.S. officials, poked fun at host Singapore's draconian litter laws with a reworked "Home on the Range": "So we're meeting once more/Here in old Singapore/Where they said that I couldn't chew gum."

2000: European representatives riffed on Abba with "Knowing Me, Knowing EU," while Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer rocked out to "Mambo No. 5" in a hot-pink shirt and gave a not-so-subtle nod to Albright, reported AFP: "Downer ... had the assembled diplomats in stitches as he lewdly air-groped Albright ... singing, 'A little bit of Madeleine in my hand.'" Albright herself arrived in a tuxedo jacket and submitted her final performance as ASEAN's sweetheart with a rendition of American entertainer Bob Hope's "Thanks for the Memories."

2001: Jaswant Singh, external affairs minister of India, parodied the Eagles with "Hotel California," reported the Japan Economic Newswire: "There's plenty of room in the Hotel Aseana, but only for Korea-Japan-China." New U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made a risqué ASEAN debut by teaming up with Japanese Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka for the country-western classic "El Paso." Vietnam vet Powell played a cowboy who falls in love -- and shared an onstage smooch -- with a Vietnamese woman played by Tanaka.

2002: Seeking to top his previous performance, which failed to go over too well with his wife, Powell went meta by spoofing himself and even brought U.S. President George W. Bush into the act by video. "Onstage in Brunei, Powell convened a mock staff meeting in which he shuns discussion of the Middle East and South Asia to talk about 'something even more important' -- the upcoming ASEAN dinner skit," the AFP reported. In the skit, Powell's wife appeared by telephone. "Do not embarrass the family again that way and definitely no rolling on the floor with any foreign ministers," she said. By video, Bush claimed the Russian delegation had been practicing their skit for the past 12 months, telling Powell, "I want you and your staff to be better than the Russians this year. Got it?"

2004: Powell raised the bar again by dressing up as a construction worker and performing "YMCA." Unfortunately for him, video of the performance leaked to the press, about which the retired general was said to be livid. Welcome to the YouTube era, Mr. Secretary.

2005: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov donned a Darth Vader suit and waved a plastic lightsaber in a fit of tackiness while singing to Andrew Lloyd Webber's "Jesus Christ Superstar" in front of a map showing the United States as "East Asia." Then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (filling in for his apparently skit-averse boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) chose the now-tired cowboy routine as his aides stood "stiffly by," reported AFP.

2006: Japanese Foreign Minister (and future Prime Minister) Taro Aso, broke out his Humphrey Bogart impression, the Chinese delegation formed a choir, and South Korea's then foreign minister Ban Ki-moon "strutted the stage in green sequins," according to the New York Times. Rice played a solemn Brahms piece, and the Canadians reenacted that year's Zinedine Zidane World Cup head butt during a mock ASEAN-Canada soccer match. To complement Aso's Bogart, the Japanese delegation arrived dressed as frogs, fish, Power Rangers, and "mutant lobsters."

2007: Aso returned as a samurai leading "a group exercise. As he gyrated on stage, ASEAN's name appeared on a huge screen in the backdrop," the AP reported. Lavrov lampooned ASEAN's image as a talking shop when his skit had him asking why it was necessary to fly halfway around the world for some "blah blah blah."

2008: Notorious killjoy Singapore cut out the skits at ASEAN amid suggestions, including by ASEAN's secretary-general, that the song-and-dance numbers were getting too competitive. Sadly, the world won't get to see if Hillary Clinton can top her predecessors.
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Commentary: How many Gitmo prisoners return to fight? Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann

CNN

7/20/09

Commentary: How many Gitmo prisoners return to fight?

Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann

(CNN) -- As President Obama awaits formal recommendations this month on issues surrounding the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it is crucial that policymakers and the public have an accurate picture of the threat to the United States posed by those detainees already released.

Contrary to recent assertions that one in seven, or 14 percent, of the former prisoners had "returned to the battlefield," our analysis of Pentagon reports, news stories and other public records indicates that the number who were confirmed or suspected to be involved in anti-U.S. violence is closer to one in 25, or 4 percent.

During his first week in office, Obama signed an executive order directing that the Guantanamo prison be closed by January 22, 2010, and suspending the system of military commissions that existed to deal with detainees in what the Bush administration termed the war on terror.

The president also set up interagency task forces to develop recommendations about what steps should be taken to hold, try or release theGuantanamo prisoners and what policies should be implemented for handling captured suspected militants in the future. Some of those reports are due this week.

As of July 1, there were about 230 prisoners left at Guantanamo, although over the past eight years a total of nearly 800 men have been held in the camp, mostly without charge or trial. Of the total, 544 have been released, repatriated or otherwise transferred to one of about 40 countries, including at least 194 to Afghanistan and 120 to Saudi Arabia.

In May, a Pentagon fact sheet on former Guantanamo detainee "terrorism trends" was made available to news organizations. What dominated coverage of the report was the claim that 74 of those released from Guantanamo, or one in seven, were linked to terrorist activities. These former detainees were popularly characterized as having "returned to the battlefield."

The New York Times story about the report, published May 21 in the lead position on the front page, ran under the headline "1 in 7 Detainees Rejoined Jihad, Pentagon Finds."

An "editors' note," published in the paper more than two weeks later, noted that the article had conflated those "confirmed" by the Pentagon of having engaged in terrorism and a larger group "suspected" of such activity, but the media splash surrounding the report overwhelmed the later correction.

On the same day that the Times story appeared in print, Obama and former Vice President Dick Cheney both gave major policy speeches in Washington that addressed Guantanamo.

Unsurprisingly, Cheney seized on the new report, saying of the released detainees, "One in seven cut a straight path back to their prior line of work and have conducted murderous attacks in the Middle East."

However, our analysis -- based on previously released Pentagon reports, news stories and other publicly available documents -- indicates that when threats to the United States are considered, the true rate for those who either have taken up arms, or may have, is barely 4 percent, or 1 in 25.

The claim that one in seven "returned to the fight," as some represent it, is seriously flawed in several ways, primarily because the Pentagon's list of supposed recidivists included not only those "confirmed" of "re-engaging in terrorist activity" but also those "suspected" of terrorism or militant activities anywhere in the world, whether or not those actions were directed against the United States.

The Pentagon stated that of the more than 530 men who had been released or transferred from Guantanamo as of mid-March, 27 were confirmed and 47 were suspected of "re-engaging in terrorist activity."

This would indicate a total recidivism rate of 14 percent. However, the report listed only 29 of these individuals by name, 15 "confirmed" and 14 "suspected." Citing national security concerns, the Pentagon did not list the names of the 45 others.

Pentagon spokesman Cmdr. Jeffrey D. Gordon told CNN that the Pentagon continues to stand by its findings that one in seven of the released detainees "are confirmed or suspected of having returned to terrorism."

Gordon explained the Department of Defense decided not to release the additional 45 names of confirmed or suspected terrorists because "listing them may compromise sources and methods of intelligence collection, while possibly jeopardizing the lives of operatives in the field."

There is surely some merit to this, although as we have learned to our detriment in recent years, merely because information is classified doesn't mean that it is accurate. And the Pentagon has had a long history of describing the Guantanamo prisoners as "the worst of the worst," as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously described them in 2002.

We conducted our own investigation to determine how many Guantanamo ex-prisoners have engaged in what could be construed as any form of militant activity, covering the spectrum from murderous acts of terrorism to simple speech, such as giving an anti-American media interview.

Using The New York Times Guantanamo docket database and previously released Pentagon reports, news stories and other public records, we examined the cases of the 544 prisoners transferred out of Guantanamo and have been able to identify by name 64 individuals who could possibly fall into the category of recidivist.

We divided the 64 individuals into three categories. In the first category are those, such as Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul who can pose a real risk to U.S. interests. Rasoul, who was transferred under the Bush administration to Afghanistan in 2007 and then released by the Kabul government, is now reported to be the commander of operations for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.

In the second are those who have targeted or attempted to target non-U.S. interests. And in the third category are those former detainees, such as the British "Tipton Three" and Muslim Uyghurs from China who were sent to Albania, who have criticized the U.S. government or military.

(When an individual fit into more than one category, we placed him in the highest category, and in cases where we could not independently verify the Pentagon's assessment of a named individual's confirmed or suspected involvement in any form of militant activity, we took the Pentagon's assessment at face value.)

Our analysis found 21 former detainees who either subsequently engaged or may have engaged in anti-American terrorist or insurgent activities, representing 3.9 per cent of the men transferred from Guantanamo. Among them are Said Al-Shihri, sent back to his native Saudi Arabia in 2007, who is now a leader of al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen.

Al-Shihri seems to have been a career terrorist. But Abdullah Salih al Ajmi appears to be another matter. Ajmi, a Kuwaiti held in Guantanamo until November 2005, following his release conducted a suicide attack on April 26, 2008, in the Iraqi city of Mosul, killing 13 Iraqi soldiers. According to Thomas Wilner, his American lawyer, Ajmi became more radicalized while he was jailed in Guantanamo. Wilner observed: "Guantanamo took a kid -- a kid who wasn't all that bad -- and it turned him into a hostile, hardened individual."

In the second category, we counted 20 ex-detainees, or 3.7 percent, as having engaged in alleged terrorism or anti-government activities somewhere in the world, but not directed against the United States or its immediate allies in the current U.S.-led wars -- the governments of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this category is a group of 11 Saudis who were put on a "most wanted" list issued by the Saudi government in February.

While two former Guantanamo detainees in this group had clearly taken up the fight against the United States as al Qaeda commanders in Yemen, the nine others stand accused of fomenting resistance only to the Saudi monarchy. According to Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a top American expert on the Saudi program for the rehabilitation of terrorists, "None of these guys has engaged in violence."

This group also includes men such as Timur Ishmurat and Ravil Gumarov, who were convicted of blowing up a gas pipeline in Russia three years ago, while Almasm Sharipov, also a Russian, made the Pentagon's list for "association" with Hizb ut-Tahrir, a pan-Islamist group that the United States does not consider a terrorist organization.

The individuals in category two are all accused of being part of a militant group of one form or another, while some are engaged in violence against legitimate governments. We do not condone the latter but rather make the point that the militants in this category do not attack American interests and in, any event, many are accused only of the vague charge of association with a terrorist or militant group.

In the final category, there are 23 men who have written critical op-eds, given negative interviews or appeared in films about their experiences at Guantanamo. The Tipton Three are three Britons who were the focus of the 2006 film "The Road to Guantanamo," which recounted their experiences in the prison camp after they were captured in Afghanistan.

None of the three has been arrested since their release. And as far as we can discern from publicly available documents and press reports, none of the Uyghurs in Albania has done anything more threatening than criticizing U.S. policy in media interviews -- not an unnatural reaction after being locked up for years without trial.

The Tipton Three and theUyghurs in Albania are examples of former Guantanamo detainees who might be considered recidivists by some observers because they have been critical of the United States since their release: Of the 544 men released so far, 4.2 percent are in this category. Gordon, the Pentagon spokesman, however, says, "Mere propaganda efforts have never counted for consideration into the return to terrorism list."

Because the Pentagon's reporting of the perceived overall threat lacks detail -- specifically, names -- in many individual cases, there could be additional ex-detainees who might fit into one of our categories. However, they did not surface in our review of the publicly available information.

And because al Qaeda and the Taliban consider the recruitment of former Guantanamo prisoners to be a major propaganda victory, which they promote by having the ex-detainees give interviews to journalists or appear in their own propaganda videos, it seems unlikely that significant numbers of additional former detainees now involved with these groups would have gone unheralded.

Even if the first two categories in our analysis are combined -- ex-detainees who have or may have taken up arms against U.S. or against any foreign interests anywhere in the world -- the number is 7.5 percent, or about half of the Pentagon's recent figure of 14 percent.

Some may argue that even if 1 percent of the men released from Guantanamo go on to commit violence against the United States or U.S. interests, the number would be too high. Others may observe that, in comparison, recidivism rates among convicted criminals in the United States are much higher than any of the Pentagon estimates or tallies concerning the former detainees.

We make a different point: That the Pentagon should be as precise and transparent as possible in ascertaining how many of those released from Guantanamo have posed any kind of threat to the United States and U.S. interests. Whether it is 14 percent, as the Pentagon fact sheet would indicate, or more like 4 percent, as our analysis suggests, the number has implications for how legislators and other policy makers address the problems and challenges posed by the proposed closure of the prison.

[Available here is the list of the 64 former Guantanamo detainees Bergen and Tiedemann identified from publicly available documents and news sources as fitting into one of the three categories outlined above and here is a link to a more detailed paper on this issue.]

Editor's note: Peter Bergen, CNN's national security analyst, is a fellow at the New America Foundation, a Washington-based think tank that promotes innovative thought from across the ideological spectrum,and at New York University's Center on Law and Security. He's the author of "The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader." Katherine Tiedemann is a policy analyst at the New America Foundation. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann.

Stratfor THIRD QUARTER FORECAST 2009 (PART 1): GLOBAL TRENDS

THIRD QUARTER FORECAST 2009 (PART 1): GLOBAL TRENDS

Editor's Note: Our third quarter forecast is intended to be a supplement to our
annual forecast and second quarter forecast. Here we have extracted the critical
global trends identified in our previous forecasts and indicated what is coming
in the next three months.

Introduction

The most important geopolitical issue continues to be the global economy and how
the recession is reshaping the global economic system. From the beginning of the
subprime crisis, STRATFOR has held the view that while the financial havoc will
be substantial, the recession that results from it will be fairly routine in
terms of post-war recessions. It might last a bit longer, go down a bit more,
but it would not shift the cycles that have been in place since World War II.

We are comfortable with our prediction for the United States. Since World War
II, a variety of models have succeeded each other within the dominant general
paradigm of growth and rapid technological innovation. There have been
sub-cycles of expansion and recession ending in 1948, 1970, 1982 and 2000. Each
of these had very different patterns, but all of them had far more in common
than any had with pre-war models. Our view is that the newest sequence of this
post-war pattern is emerging, but that the post-war paradigm itself has not
changed.

In this sense, we are comfortable that the United States is beginning to emerge
from its recession, but that deleveraging -- what economists have taken to
calling paying off debts -- will continue to retard economic growth. There is a
huge distinction between this and the catastrophic busts prior to World War II.
As we once put it at the beginning of this crisis, this isn't the big one. This
quarter will begin showing that.

However, what is true for the United States is not necessarily so for the rest
of the world. Europe is trying to come to grips with the fact that its
multi-national institutions seized up, and that each nation-state had to sort
things out for itself. They will grope for a way to deal with these challenges
this quarter. The Chinese are facing the uncomfortable fact that being the
ultimate exporter of goods makes them the ultimate candidate for unemployment
when other economies decline. And in the Russian participation in the Opel
bailout, we see the Russians pulling together assets from their own battered
economy to tie the Germans even closer to them.

This is part of a broader Russian effort to roll back U.S. influence by
increasing its power all along its periphery -- from Central Asia and the
Caucasus to Germany and the Baltic states. Most of Russia's tools in this effort
have not been weakened in the slightest by the economic downturn, even though by
most measures the recession has been far more crushing in Russia than in the
United States or even Europe. While Moscow still has some damage control to take
care of on the economic front, it also has a busy foreign policy agenda. Left
with a bad taste in its mouth from its recent negotiations with U.S. President
Barack Obama, Russia will focus its attention in the next quarter on
complicating U.S. relations with key countries -- namely Poland, Germany, Turkey
and Iran. Russia's relationship with Iran, in particular, bears close watching
in the coming weeks and months. Washington is already hitting a dead end in its
negotiations with Iran and a surge of Russian influence in Iran will only
exacerbate Washington's ongoing struggle in the Islamic world.

These dynamics aside, the name of the global game remains the economy. We expect
this to be the quarter in which the United States at least begins its long climb
out of the hole it has been in -- the time when things stop getting worse --
while for other countries, good times will be long in coming.

Primary Forecast

Global trend: The economy

The trajectory of the global economy depends largely on how well -- and how soon
-- the United States recovers from recession. East Asian manufacturing- and
export-oriented economies are paying particularly eager attention to American
developments, while the more diversified economies of Europe are actually likely
to be left behind somewhat. Meanwhile, oil-exporting Middle Eastern states like
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are putting their large cash reserves to use while
looking for solid evidence of a U.S. recovery that can sustain the price of oil.
There might not be irrefutable evidence of a recovery yet, but the U.S. economy
is displaying some positive signs.

When evaluating the condition of the U.S. economy, STRATFOR considers four
factors: the presence of any systemic shocks, the stock markets (a leading
indicator), new unemployment benefits claims (a lagging indicator) and the
balance between retail sales and inventories (a mixed lagging/leading
indicator). In the second quarter, these measures were positive.

The biggest shock to the U.S. economy we saw was the failure of two of the three
major U.S. automakers. The glory days of the American automotive sector are
firmly in the past, and liquidation is probably an economic necessity in the
long run. But an immediate liquidation would trigger so many job losses that
talk of any economic recovery in 2009 would end. The government-brokered
bankruptcy/bailout packages, while starting the industry down the road to
liquidation, will defer most of the pain to another day. In essence, what is
left of the sector is being put on a sort of government-funded life support.
This will cost the United States in economic efficiency overall, but should
delay the pain sufficiently so that the automakers' eventual liquidation will
not unduly hamper what STRATFOR sees as a building recovery in the latter half
of 2009.

The S&P 500 Index is now up more than 30 percent since its low in March, in
sharp contrast to the volatile and distressing performance of the previous six
months. As stock market performance tends to be a leading indicator, this is
very positive news.

New unemployment claims in the United States -- after a year of tracking higher
-- have stabilized, and have now fallen considerably from their March highs.
While still uncomfortably high at 565,000 -- anything over 400,000 indicates a
weak labor market -- unemployment claims are moving in the right direction and
are a lagging indicator, one of the last things that improves as the economy
mends.



Against all odds, retail sales have held relatively steady -- almost all of the
drops of the past year were limited to gasoline and automobile sales --
indicating that while American consumers have been rattled, they have not been
fundamentally damaged. With inventories continuing to drop and retail sales
holding steady, we are coming closer to the point where retailers will have to
initiate orders to fill their shelves -- a development which would stimulate
production and with it employment. Moreover, we are already seeing positive
movement in various manufacturing indices. In fact, in both May and June, even
automobile sales were positive for the first time since the recession began.

Considering these factors together, STRATFOR is cautiously optimistic for
American economic growth in the third quarter. But this does not mean we expect
strong growth. Data from the U.S. Federal Reserve indicates that growth in bank
lending has yet to return to pre-recession levels. Until private credit is
flowing again, the economy will find healing difficult.

(click image to enlarge)



In the broader international picture, there are signs that the credit
environment is loosening, and while it is an overstatement to say that this is
fixing everything, the increasing availability of credit is certainly mitigating
the recession's effects.

At the height of the panic in September 2008, money from all over the world
flooded into short-term U.S. government bonds, widely considered the safest and
most liquid asset in the world (next to simply holding cash). In the second
quarter of 2009, that flow began reversing. Confidence is rising somewhat and it
is leading investors to begin -- tentatively -- to seek out opportunities. Such
action is how global recessions usually begin easing.



And there is more than private investment at work. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has used two programs to stabilize a broad array of emerging
economies. The IMF has allotted $48 billion to help reform mismanaged economies
in need of major surgery, and has earmarked another $52 billion for credit lines
for states whose management has been sound but simply got caught up in the
global recession.

Taken together, these factors tell us that not only has the U.S. economy
experienced a substantial improvement since the first quarter, but that there is
now reason to begin feeling some cautious optimism about the rest of the global
economy.

But not everything is cause for cautious optimism. In fact, Europe -- after four
consecutive quarters of negative growth more than twice as harsh as what the
United States has suffered -- is just now beginning its recession. The European
banking system faces far more numerous and far more severe problems than its
U.S. counterpart, and is only beginning to notice that its problems existed long
before the American-triggered credit crunch. If the third quarter proves to be
less distressing for the Europeans than the first half of the year, it will only
be because rising demand in the United States is assisting their export markets.
STRATFOR expects European demand to remain weak, largely due to the faltering
local banking system.

Global trend: The Russian resurgence

In STRATFOR's 2009 annual forecast, we outlined how one of the year's dominant
issues would be Russia's effort to force the United States to make a strategic
bargain: Russia would grant U.S. forces a northern supply route into Afghanistan
in exchange for an expunging of Western influence from former Soviet territory.
At the start of the second quarter, Russia made a tentative offer on the supply
route issue but was quickly rebuffed during a meeting with Obama, and both
countries slid back into their confrontational stances. When this occurred,
STRATFOR forecasted that Russia would redouble its efforts and consolidate its
position in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan -- which Moscow
accomplished masterfully.

Like clockwork, another chance for Russia to bargain with the United States came
at the start of the third quarter, during Obama's visit to Moscow. As before,
Russia tentatively gave in on supply routes to Afghanistan and was rebuffed by
the United States on the issues Moscow considered vital: a public repudiation of
NATO expansion, abandonment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Poland and
Washington's general refusal to admit to Russia a sphere of influence in the
former Soviet space.

Since this is the second time this year Moscow has been in this situation, it
knows it cannot allow Washington to continue dismissing it. Russia has been in
such a position before -- in the aftermath of Kosovar independence. Moscow's
response to Washington's moves then was to invade Georgia in August 2008 and
prove that the United States would not be able to rescue its ally in the
Caucasus.

This time around, Russia has laid the groundwork for some more interesting moves
against U.S. interests.

Russia's moves in the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan will continue, with Russia already holding the upper hand in each
state. Moscow is prepared for new elections in Ukraine -- whenever Kiev finally
holds them -- and has ties to, or outright controls, every major candidate
running but one. Russia has destabilized Georgia on many fronts by increasing
its military presence on Georgia's northern and southern borders and funding the
opposition to sustain chaos in the capital. Russia has also maneuvered its way
into the middle of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the secessionist
region of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as talks between Armenia and Turkey over the
restoration of diplomatic ties between the two. Currently, Moscow holds the
reins in both situations -- demonstrating its total control over Armenia and its
rising influence over Azerbaijan.

Russia has also laid the groundwork to counter U.S. influence in the former
Soviet areas of the Baltics and Central Asia. The Baltics are particularly
significant since they are both NATO and EU members, and vehemently
anti-Russian. But they are also in a tailspin due to the global financial crisis
and resulting political turmoil. Russia is more actively funding -- and
manipulating -- Russia-friendly political parties in the Baltics and leveraging
the resulting social tension this generates. In Central Asia, each state except
Uzbekistan has increased its ties to Russia in the last quarter, in essence
giving Moscow control of the routes that the United States wants to use to
supply its forces in Afghanistan.

It is relatively easy for Russia to meddle in former Soviet states, but there
are four other countries -- Turkey, Germany, Poland and Iran -- that are vital
to the United States' global strategy and are places where Russia aims to exert
influence.

Russia wants to ensure that Turkey's newfound confidence (see the Middle Eastern
section in this report) does not lead it to join the Americans in challenging
Moscow, and so it is dangling the prospect of better relations with Armenia and
preferential access to Russian energy in front of Ankara. It is not so much of a
zero-sum game -- a rare thing in Russian strategy -- as it is Moscow offering
itself to Ankara as a lever in other relations. The two are experimenting with
using each other against third parties -- Turkey using Russia to push forward
its EU membership bid, Russia using Turkey to increase its energy leverage over
Europe -- to achieve unrelated goals. Further developments in this relationship
will be seen when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin travels to Ankara in
August.

The other influential NATO ally, Germany, has also been growing very close to
Russia as a rift has developed between Berlin and Washington. Germany feels that
the United States has abandoned it during the economic crisis, and so Russia has
stepped in by offering investments into key industries. Add in Germany's
existing dependence on Russian energy, and Germany's willingness to challenge
Russia seems to be shrinking. And with Germany the central EU power and a major
player in NATO, the unity of both organizations is coming into question --
something Russia has been after for decades. The biggest saving grace for the
Western institutions in the third quarter is that Germany is too distracted to
do anything overly bold -- it is election season.

Poland is an odd state for Putin to visit -- he will be doing so Sept. 1 --
considering how Poland fears Russia, and until now Russia only dealt with the
Poles through the Americans. But now Putin is addressing Poland directly to see
if he can make any progress in loosening the American-Polish alliance. Sticks
will be in abundance. What one must watch for is the carrots.

Iran is one of the easiest -- and most effective -- cards for Russia to play.
Moscow has already blocked discussion of U.N. sanctions against Iran, and it is
almost certain to continue doing so. But if Russia wants to up the ante, it
could cause trouble for Washington directly and quite easily by furthering its
support for Tehran's nuclear program or delivering more military hardware, such
as the S-300 strategic air defense system, to Iran. This would do more than
disturb bilateral U.S.-Iranian relations; it would ripple through domestic U.S.
politics and security efforts in Iraq. Iran is an a vulnerable issue for the
United States. Russia has been wary of using this card, but Moscow might feel
that it is at the point where it must be played.

Russia has a multitude of big and small tools available for use against the
United States. Some moves have already begun, while the groundwork has been laid
for others. But the window of opportunity granted by American deployments to the
Middle East will not be open forever. Russia must act in the next two quarters
to limit American power. Soon, American troops currently stationed in Iraq will
become available for other deployments -- deployments that could potentially
limit Russian options. If not, then the United States will have the opportunity
to prove that it is Russia -- not the United States -- that is overstretched and
past its prime.

Global trend: The U.S.-jihadist war

The United States is steadily shifting focus away from the dwindling war in Iraq
to the next phase of the war in Afghanistan. The extent to which the United
States is able to shift gears from the Middle East to South Asia will depend in
large part on how the Iraqis manage their own security over the next several
months.

Sectarian tensions in Iraq are already rising as political and energy battles
are heating up ahead of the January 2010 parliamentary elections. At the same
time, U.S. forces are withdrawing from Iraqi cities and are thus removing a
crucial buffer between Iraq's feuding sects. Though the United States still has
sufficient forces in Iraq to put out sectarian fires that Iraqi security forces
may prove incapable of handling on their own, any flare-ups will directly affect
the U.S. timetable to pare the 130,000 troops that remain in the country and
free up forces for Afghanistan. Iraq will hold itself together in the coming
months, but the withdrawal process will be difficult and slow.

In Afghanistan, signs of a revised strategy will come to light in the coming
quarter as U.S. forces move away from offensive combat operations to traditional
counterinsurgency doctrine, where success is not measured strictly by territory
reclaimed or the number of Taliban militants killed, but rather by the ability
of U.S. and NATO forces to protect the local population, build institutions from
scratch and provide enough local governance to deprive the enemy of a viable
support base. In essence, this is the long-haul "hearts and minds" campaign that
(thus far) has prevailed in the Washington debate over how to best manage the
war in Afghanistan. The strategy has gone into effect, but definitive results
will not be seen in the third quarter.

As STRATFOR said in our previous quarterly forecast, there are vast tactical
differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, and a divide-and-conquer approach
holds low prospects for success while the Taliban feel little inclination to
negotiate with an occupying force that has a limited attention span for such
resource- and time-intensive wars. One of the most critical flaws in the
counterinsurgency plan is that it assumes the enemy will provide the space and
time for the strategy to yield results. The Taliban may live in caves, but they
understand the U.S. political sensitivities to war casualties.

As a surge of 17,000 troops and some 4,000 police trainers into Afghanistan
wraps up this quarter to boost security for the August national elections, the
media's attention will focus on U.S.-led military offensives in southwestern
Taliban strongholds. The flight of Taliban militants from these areas is not a
clear measure of success, however. The Taliban will not launch their
counteroffensive where U.S. troops are concentrated. In the face of overwhelming
firepower, insurgents will withdraw, disperse and target vulnerable supply
lines, patrols and security outposts that are expected to increase with the new
U.S. strategy. The increasing tempo and spread of attacks by Taliban and their
al Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan suggest that this is an insurgent force that
still has room to mature on the battlefield -- which would mean that the full
extent of the Afghan challenge has yet to be seen.

Elections in Afghanistan could give the Taliban a symbolic opportunity to carry
out attacks and for U.S. and NATO forces to demonstrate some level of public
intolerance of Taliban rule, but the overall effect of the elections will be
minor. Despite his unpopularity, a lack of credible competition is likely to
allow Afghan President Hamid Karzai to retain his position, and the government
that emerges from the election will be no less plagued by internecine rivalry
among feuding tribes and warlords than the current one.

On the other side of the Durand Line, Pakistani forces are going on the
offensive against local Taliban militants in the country's northwest. The irony
of the situation is that this renewed vigor in Pakistan's fight against its
former militant proxies is more likely to hamper than help the U.S.
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

STRATFOR failed to anticipate the Swat offensive that was launched in the early
part of the second quarter, and forecasted instead that Pakistan would stick to
ineffectual deal-making and shy away from military combat to cope with its
jihadist problem. But the collapse of a peace deal (just a few days after our
last quarterly forecast was published), the rapid Taliban spread in Swat and
surrounding areas in the North-West Frontier Province and a wave of deadly
suicide attacks struck a nerve in Islamabad. Taliban activity in the northwest
periphery is one thing, but any sign of Taliban encroachment in the Punjabi
heartland is far too close for comfort in Islamabad's view. Pakistani forces'
ability to hold the territory they have reclaimed in Swat remains in doubt,
especially as the Taliban have proven their ability to disperse, regroup and
then return to areas where local governance and security remain dangerously weak
and vulnerable.

While struggling to hold ground in Swat, Pakistani forces will begin focusing on
an ongoing offensive in South Waziristan. This offensive, however, is vastly
different from the operation in Swat and poses far greater challenges. The
Pakistani objective in this offensive is thus extremely narrow in scope: to
neutralize the network of leading Pakistani Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud,
who has demonstrated a capability to carry out large-scale attacks well beyond
Pakistan's northwest tribal regions. By focusing on Mehsud, the military is
drawing a line in the sand and illustrating the consequences of turning against
the state. But the challenges in Waziristan are already mounting, as Mehsud is
doing an effective job of bribing and intimidating local tribes into cooperating
against the military.

The Waziristan offensive will consume Pakistan's attention in the coming quarter
but will do very little to aid the American war effort in Afghanistan. In
conducting this offensive, Pakistani military commanders are sticking to their
tradition of distinguishing between "good" and "bad" Taliban. Mehsud is on the
hit list, but there are still scores of other jihadist groups operating on
Pakistani soil that Islamabad continues to view as long-term assets to use
against India and to retain influence among Pashtuns in Afghanistan. In
Pakistan's mind, the only way to avoid turning every Pashtun against the state
is to turn a blind eye to, and occasionally facilitate, jihadist movement into
neighboring Afghanistan, thereby further complicating U.S.-NATO operations in
the region.

For the United States, some action by the Pakistani military is better than no
action at all. While Pakistan is engaged in this military offensive, it is more
capable of fending off U.S. pressure. This dynamic makes India especially
nervous and will lead to friction between Washington and New Delhi, even if only
behind closed doors. Pakistan's preservation of militant assets for use against
India is naturally New Delhi's main concern. Although the Indians have preferred
to remain on the sidelines of this conflict and leave it to the Americans to
deal with the Pakistanis, any slackening of U.S. pressure on Islamabad will mean
that Washington will have to spend more time trying to assuage Indian concerns.

While India remains on alert for jihadist spillover from Pakistan, it is also
dealing with other distractions at home. A growing Naxalite insurgency along the
eastern belt of the country is gaining traction and exposing just how unequipped
the state is to deal with internal security threats. And while the ruling
Congress party is in a stronger political position after its recent election
victory, the party's enhanced political clout will do little to improve India's
national security infrastructure or speed up the country's recovery from the
global economic crisis.

Part Two: Third Quarter Forecast 2009: Regional Breakouts


Copyright 2009 Stratfor.

SOME COMMENTARIES, OPINIONS, AND EDITORIALS

COMMENTARIES, OPINIONS, AND EDITORIALS

The War for Afghan Hearts & Minds -- Greg Mills, Mail and Guardian
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-20-a-battle-for-hearts-and-minds

The British Sour on Afghanistan -- Michael Glackin, Daily Star
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=104373

Time to Leave Afghanistan? Not Yet -- Thomas Friedman, New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/opinion/19friedman.html?_r=1

Obama Escalates Afghanistan Quagmire -- Patrick Krey, New American
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/foreign-policy/1450

10 Commandments of U.S. Foreign Policy -- Stephen Walt, Foreign Policy
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/17/the_ten_commandments_for_ambitious_policy_wonks

Clinton's Blueprint for the World -- Thomas P. M. Barnett, WPR
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=4091

Indonesia Is a Model Muslim Democracy -- Paul Wolfowitz, Wall Street Journal opinion
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124779665773055715.html

How to Achieve a Lasting Peace -- Ehud Olmert, Washington Post opinion
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071603584.html

Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis -- Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, Washington Post opinion
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071602737.html

The Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia - M.K. Bhadrakumar, The Hindu
http://www.thehindu.com/2009/07/20/stories/2009072055470800.htm

Kevin Rudd's China Challenge - Michael Danby, Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124802973178862981.html

Like It or Not, China Isn't Going Away -- Tom Plate, Japan Times
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090719tp.html

Why China Foils U.S. Efforts on North Korea -- Cynthia Lee, Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KG22Ad01.html

Taking Aim at Pyongyang's Palace Economy -- Sung-Yoon Lee, FEER
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/20098/july53/Target-Pyongyangs-Palace-Economy

A Charade in Chechnya -- Los Angeles Times editorial
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-chechnya17-2009jul17,0,3160839.story

The Billionaire Who Wants to Change Russia -- Peter Savodnik, Time
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910604,00.html

How to Turn a Recession Into a Depression - Bill Niskanen, Cato Institute

How to Turn a Recession Into a Depression - Bill Niskanen, Cato Institute

http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v31n2/cpr31n2-1.pdf

Playing with fire By Haaretz Editorial

Playing with fire
By Haaretz Editorial

The controversy surrounding the plan to create a Jewish enclave in the heart of the Palestinian neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem is not another routine expression of the U.S.-Israel dispute over the settlements. The timing of the decision to build dozens of housing units in the Shepherd Hotel complex, at the height of efforts to reach an agreement on limited construction in the settlements, casts doubt over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's willingness to enter serious negotiations on a final-status agreement. The support he granted the construction project yesterday, despite the vehement condemnations of America and Britain, show he is prepared to endanger Israel's most essential foreign relations for a provocative initiative led by Irving Moskowitz, the patron of right-wing organizations in East Jerusalem.

U.S. President Barack Obama's opposition should not have surprised Netanyahu. The day after Jerusalem Day, when the prime minister declared the city is "Israel's united capital" and would remain forever under Israeli sovereignty, Washington clarified that authority over East Jerusalem would be resolved only through negotiations on a final-status agreement.

Netanyahu's agreement to hold talks based on the principle of "two states for two peoples" must also include readiness to discuss Sheikh Jarrah. Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Arab states cannot be expected to normalize relations with Israel while the latter embarrasses them with construction projects in East Jerusalem.

Particularly infuriating is the government's claim that Israel is allowing the Arabs of East Jerusalem to settle in Jewish neighborhoods. Unlike Jewish right-wing organizations - which work to settle Jews in, and take control of, the eastern part of the city - Palestinian residents look to the Jewish areas due to a lack of housing and public services in their own neighborhoods. Since 1967 Israel has expropriated 35 percent of East Jerusalem in order to construct 50,000 housing units in neighborhoods intended primarily for Jews. During the same period, fewer than 600 housing units were built for Palestinian residents with government support.

Construction for Jews in East Jerusalem is inflicting tremendous diplomatic damage on Israel. Netanyahu and Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat are playing with fire under the transparent cover of "normal authorization for private construction." Freezing construction at Shepherd Hotel is no less essential than evacuating the outposts and freezing settlement construction beyond the capital's municipal area.

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Who is a self-hating Jew
By Akiva Eldar

Who is to blame for the latest dispute with the United States over the new neighborhood going up in Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah area? Mayor Nir Barkat? Certainly not. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stood behind him? Ridiculous. Any child knows that everything is the fault of other Jews: Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod, two American administration officials who are inciting President Barack Obama against their own people.

This is not the first time that "self-hating Jews" have given us trouble. In negotiations over the separation of forces agreement in the 1970s, U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the scion of a family of Jewish refugees who had escaped from Nazi Germany, earned the anti-Semitic epithet "Jewboy" in Israel. At the end of the 1980s, when president George H.W. Bush dared to argue that the peace process does not jibe with settlement expansion, the Shamir government instigated a campaign against "the 'Jewboy' trio": Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller and Dan Kurtzer. Now it is the turn of Obama's Jewish confidantes to be the scapegoats.

It is easy to imagine what an uproar there would be in Jerusalem if an Arab leader or newspaper dared to claim that an American president was favorable to Israel because of the influence of a Jewish adviser. Netanyahu, who spent many years in the United States, knows very well the extent to which Jewish administration officials in key positions are sensitive to the slightest hint of dual loyalty - to their birthplace and their historic homeland. It turns out that for him, politics bends the iron-clad rule that "all Jews are responsible for one another."

To satisfy the settlers, he permits himself to hurt people whose only sin is that they are trying to promote the goals enshrined in the platform of his senior coalition partner - the Labor Party.

We want our Jews in the administration to be blind to the settlements and deaf to the complaints of the Arabs. Take Elliott Abrams, for example, who was in charge of Middle East affairs in the Bush administration. Abrams, who is identified with the neo-conservative right, made an important contribution to legitimizing a good many dubious Israeli acts. He was an excellent salesman for the "no partner" theory, and the guiding spirit behind the indulgent policy toward the flourishing of settlements. He recently publicly criticized the two-state vision of the president who had hired him, among other things, to promote that vision.

Back during his election campaign Obama made it clear that he did not have to join Likud to be a friend of Israel. Opinion polls in the United States revealed that the views of most Jews are closer to the attitudes of organizations like the Reform movement, American Friends of Peace Now and J Street, which support a two-state solution and eschew Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman's doctrine - and above all, largely object to the settlements.

The conversation Obama held with representatives of the Jewish community last week confirms that Netanyahu is drafting them for the wrong war. Even his oldest supporters did not attack the president's position on the settlements, and made do with a complaint about the high profile given to disputes over the issue of natural growth in the settlements. One of the guests at that meeting said that history showed that exposing the differences between the U.S. and Israel does not help to advance peace.

"This was not my reading of the lessons of the last eight years," Obama responded without flinching. Moreover, he said he would not shy away from a willingness to pressure all parties, including Israel, if that is in the best interests of the United States and Israel. Obama did not hesitate to tell his Jewish interlocutors that beyond the special commitment to Israel's security, his policy would be completely even-handed. If it became necessary, Obama said, he would speak to Israelis, as he had done to the Arab and Muslim world, to help them to achieve some kind of self-reflection.

Obama has internalized what his predecessors refused to understand: the traditional supporters of the Israeli right are growing old, or losing their relevance. They are giving way to younger, liberal forces who identify with Obama's values. In the "best" case, Netanyahu's incitement against the "self-hating Jews" will do to them what his whispered comment in the ear of Rabbi Kaduri "those leftists are not Jews" did to Israelis a decade ago - it turned them against him.

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East Jerusalem / Israeli roulette
By Yossi Sarid

How do we know Benjamin Netanyahu reads Haaretz? Because if he didn't, he would not know that Sayed Kashua lives in West Jerusalem. But Kashua is an Israeli citizen, conceived and born in the Israeli town of Tira, in the Triangle region.

So what is Netanyahu talking about when he refers to a constant flow of residents, in both directions, between the city's eastern and western parts? Where does he live, and where does he think we live? Have we not been here for the last 42 years, and have we not closely followed the deliberate, systematic effort by official Israeli agencies to take over Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem? To take them over, and push out their regular residents - a kind of ethnic cleansing, with the goal of Judaizing all of Jerusalem and leaving the marketplace empty of Arabs, as in Naomi Shemer's song?

What is Netanyahu talking about when he talks about "the right of every Jew to live anywhere in Jerusalem," as if it were a free city with a free market of voluntary buyers and sellers? In a place where the rights of one people are oppressed, the rights of the other people will also be oppressed. Someday, there will be an agreement, and only then will this mutual right exist.

And what is he talking about, this Netanyahu, when he talks about "private land," which - what can you do? - leaves the government powerless? The truth is known to everyone, including in Washington: Had Ariel Sharon not established a residence in the heart of the Old City, and had Israeli governments not pushed the Ateret Cohanim yeshiva into this area, and had governments not built infrastructure for both and provided security for those who expelled and also inherited - had it not been for all this, not a single Jew would be acting in East Jerusalem as if he owned it.

"Private land." Did not settlers move onto lands registered in the Land Registry in Palestinians' names - yes, every Palestinian also has a name - and build outposts on them? When you really want it, the land suddenly becomes private. And when you really don't want it, it changes its status in the blink of a blind eye.

The excuses given by Netanyahu, Ehud Barak and Avigdor Lieberman change in keeping with what is convenient at any given moment: One moment they are stressing "natural growth," the next, they have returned to natural and historic rights. But it is not a natural road that leads to ventures in Jerusalem by American casino moguls, who gamble from afar with our lives. Not a natural road, but the adulterer's road: We demolish and erase and then say, "I have not sinned." America has thus far not sent its emergency rescue forces here to put out the fire, but it has also not spared us all those lunatic Jews who pour oil on the flames.

Just as the settlements on every hill and under every chopped down olive tree were intended from the start to thwart the possibility of an agreement with the Palestinians, the same is true of the new Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem, which have been maliciously thrust like a huge bone down our aching throats. The international community, and many Israelis as well, know the ending without which it will never end: Jerusalem will be divided into two capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods going to the Jews and Arab neighborhoods to the Arabs.

But the gamblers are not interested in an end to the conflict. The Moskowitzes want to continue playing their dice games, playing - always - with fire, and shuffling the cards with their well-known Las Vegas methods: The house wins, and everyone else loses. And Netanyahu is the croupier.

The legal status of East Jerusalem

The legal status of East Jerusalem

Introductory comment by Ilene Cohen, Executive Editor of World Politics, journal of Princeton University's Institute for International and Regional Studies:

What Netanyahu neglects to say (as reported in the Haaretz article, below) is that the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 is not recognized in international law or by the international community. The status of East Jerusalem is subject to UN Security Council resolutions. Hence, Israeli rule over (East) Jerusalem is illegal and therefore very much up for discussion.

Netanyahu (and his new ambassador in Washington, Michael Oren, and the rest of his crowd) continue to believe -- or so it seems -- that if they repeat their falsehoods often enough and assertively enough, they will make them so. But repeating a lie does not make it true. Israel stands in violation of international law on East Jerusalem, on the West Bank, and on the Golan Heights, no less so today than forty years ago.

There is no ambiguity about where the Israelis stand on a just agreement with the Palestinians on every final-status issue: NO to everything. Anyone who has held lingering doubts about Israeli intentions vis-a-vis the Palestinians and the state of Palestine can now know with confidence that those intentions are crystal clear and quite unacceptable: Greater Israel forever.

End introductory comment

Netanyahu: Israel rule over Jerusalem not up for discussion

Sunday, July 19, 2009

By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent (Jerusalem)

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem was not a matter up for discussion. The prime minister's comments came after the U.S. State Department told Israeli envoy Michael Oren that Israel must halt a construction project in East Jerusalem.

Netanyahu told ministers at the weekly cabinet meeting that Jerusalem is the united capital of Israel and that all citizens are allowed to purchase property in any part of the city they choose.

"Imagine what would happen if someone were to suggest Jews could not live in or purchase [property] in certain neighborhoods in London, New York, Paris or Rome," he said.

"The international community would certainly raise protest. Likewise, we cannot accept such a ruling on East Jerusalem," Netanyahu told ministers.

This is the policy of an open city, he said, and Israel would not accept a stance that counters that civil right.

"Israeli Arabs are not forbidden from buying houses in west Jerusalem and Jews must be granted the same right in the eastern part of the city," he added.

Netanyahu said that he had made this stance clear to U.S. President Barack Obama, declaring that the issue of construction in Jerusalem could not be linked to the discussion on settlements.

Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat denounced the Israeli response, saying Netanyahu understands that a peace agreement is impossible unless East Jerusalem is deemed the Palestinian capital.

Peace and settlement activity are diverging paths that can never meet, he said.

Speaking Sunday in New Delhi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the administration was trying to reach an agreement with the Israelis on settlements. "The negotiations are intense. They are ongoing," she said.

'U.S. tells Israel to halt East Jerusalem building'

The State Department summoned Oren over the weekend to advise him that the project developed by American millionaire Irving Moskowitz should not go ahead, according to both Israel Radio and Army Radio.

The State Department summoned Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren over the weekend to advise him that the project developed by American millionaire Irving Moskowitz should not go ahead, according to both Israel Radio and Army Radio.

Moskowitz, an influential supporter of Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem, purchased the Shepherd Hotel in 1985 and plans to tear it down and build housing units in its place. The hotel is located near a government compound that includes several government ministries and the national police headquarters.

The approval, granted by the Jerusalem municipality earlier this month, allows for the construction of 20 apartments plus a three-level underground parking lot.

In response, Oren told the State Department that Israeli construction in East Jerusalem was no different than in any other part of the country.

Jerusalem could not be considered along the same lines as settlements, he said, adding that Israel would not accede to this demand.

The Jerusalem municipality issued a statement following the report, saying the purchase was legal and it had acted with full transparency in granting building permits.

A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy had no immediate comment.

PA fears U.S. will let Israel keep up settlement construction

Meanwhile, Palestinian officials said on Saturday they were worried the U.S. administration was close to an interim agreement with Israel on settlement construction.

According to information that has reached the Palestinian Authority, Israel will not completely halt construction in the settlements but will limit it drastically to the point of almost stopping it. In exchange, Arab countries will implement previously discussed concessions - among them, allowing Israeli planes to cross their airspace and opening diplomatic missions.

The PA will discuss this with U.S. special Middle East envoy George Mitchell in Ramallah this week.

Sources in the PA said that "half-solutions" are unacceptable and that Israel must completely stop construction in the settlements.

The Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam reported on Saturday that Mitchell is to inform PA President Mahmoud Abbas by phone that the U.S. administration has been unable to obtain Israel's consent to stop construction completely.

Senior Palestinian officials have been following ambiguous statements made by Clinton, who has hinted that an agreement with Israel is in the offing.

Senior officials say American assent to even limited Israeli construction in the settlements would once again damage the American position as an honest broker in the Middle East. U.S. President Barack Obama told American Jewish leaders last week that his clear position against settlements has strengthened his position as an honest broker with the Arabs.

Over the past few days, Abbas has reiterated concerns over continued construction in the settlements, saying he would not renew negotiations with Israel as long as such construction persisted. However, senior Palestinian officials said that soon after the Obama administration reaches an agreement with Israel and the Arab countries, it intends to renew negotiations on a final status agreement. If the PA refuses to join, as Abbas apparently articulated, it will appear to be obstructing the peace process.

In any case, the PA will probably seek to postpone talks until after the Sixth Fatah Congress and general elections, scheduled for August 4. Sources in the PA said talks between Hamas and Fatah, which were to resume between July 25-28, would probably be postponed until after the Fatah Congress opens in Bethlehem.

Steve Coll The Al Qaeda Paradox

The New Yorker

July 17, 2009

Steve Coll
The Al Qaeda Paradox

Compared with their position in the period from 2002 to 2004, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, such as Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia (which has been involved in hotel bombings similar to the attack today on the Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta), have become politically marginalized. Opinion polling, election results, and theological discourse all describe an Al Qaeda network that has been rejected by the great majority of Muslims. Al Qaeda has largely brought this outcome upon itself. Unlike Hezbollah and Hamas, it has never developed a political strategy that appealed successfully to the craving among many Muslims for justice and better governance. Al Qaeda runs no schools or hospitals and it competes in no trade-union elections. It operates no semi-legitimate political front, as Hezbollah and Hamas do.

Why has Al Qaeda isolated itself in this way, particularly when there are alternative models, such as Hezbollah, lying in plain sight? There is a strong millenarian streak in the belief systems of Osama bin Laden and some of his colleagues; they believe that God ordained the war they are fighting and that its outcome is in many ways predetermined. Also, bin Laden and his No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, simply lack political skills. They are modern men, but, unlike the leaders of Hezbollah, they lack a vision of modern politics. They have randomly murdered far too many of their own potential followers. Their idea of justice is abstract and distant—it involves the punishment of unbelievers, some of them living far away, and not the righting of wrongs close at hand, whether those wrongs are unemployment, or routine local problems such as grazing, or boundary disputes. Al Qaeda has been up and running formally for twenty-one years now. By this point in the history of the Soviet Communist movement, Lenin had seized control of a great state. By this point in the history of Cuban Communism, Castro was in Havana. And Osama? He’s hunkered down along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a fugitive “guest” with a price on his head, waiting for death, embedded in a political economy that is a cross between Gaza and the New Jersey of “The Sopranos.” By the lights of its own announced ambitions in 2001, then, at least in political terms, Al Qaeda has failed.

And yet the network remains militarily resilient, as the TV screens today remind us. From its safe houses in North Waziristan, or through its underground network from Europe to Jakarta, Al Qaeda can occasionally pull together a group of five or ten people who can organize crude attacks undetected. These operators keep going back to the same soft targets, apparently because they lack the skills to pull off something more impressive. Again, think of Hezbollah—over the years, with Iranian support, it has matured militarily to the point where it was able, in 2006, to fight the Israeli Defense Forces to a standstill in semi-conventional combat over a period of months. By comparison, Al Qaeda and its far-flung, often disconnected gangs look rather incompetent. They did try a September 11th redux in the summer of 2006, in Britain, a plot that showed imagination and daring (liquid explosives dyed to look like sports drinks; camera batteries as detonators), but they failed before launch. Last fall, Mumbai also suggested some new tactical approaches drawn from the Kashmir war and the old secular Palestinian playbook: media-shaped commando raids, hostage-taking, and associated drama. We have seen a few of these media raids recently in Pakistan, such as the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket players in Lahore. But the Jakarta bombings are a true indicator of Al Qaeda’s present military capability, as is observable in its pattern of attacks: low-technology terrorism that is repetitive, limited, politically self-defeating, and yet capable of creating shocks, and still driven by an aspiration—if not any apparent capacity—to pull off another big one every so often. American intelligence officials believe that Al Qaeda’s military capacity is considerably diminished today compared with what it was even a year ago, as a result of the pressure it has come under in Pakistan. Even if that is true, bombings like the ones in Jakarta will recur for an indefinite time.

This, then, is the conundrum facing American counterterrorism policy and the Obama Administration: in a strategic sense, Al Qaeda is contained, and yet it can continue to make enough noise and attract enough media attention to shape political discourse in the United States and elsewhere. The correct response to this paradox is to develop in the United States a posture of strategic patience about terrorism that is durable, vigilant, and proportional to the actual threat. Achieving this, however, would require a much stronger national political consensus about terrorism and American responses to it, so that this subject is no longer a legitimate arena for the manipulative and demagogic politics of the Cheney school.

The United States did find such strategic patience—and such politics, for the most part—during the Cold War. As for terrorism, there are encouraging examples in other democracies. Britain eventually found a politics-proof consensus to outlast the Irish Republican Army. Indian voters just resoundingly returned to office a Congress government that responded to the Mumbai attacks with extraordinary restraint. Indonesia has already rejected the violence of the Jemaah Islamiya, and these bombings will only reinforce that national consensus. If only something similar were afoot in Washington.

Winning the Good War Why Afghanistan is not Obama’s Vietnam. by Peter Bergen

WASHINGTON MONTHLY

7/15/09

Winning the Good War

Why Afghanistan is not Obama’s Vietnam.

Peter Bergen

Throughout his campaign last year, President Barack Obama said repeatedly that the real central front of the war against terrorists was on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. And now he is living up to his campaign promise to roll back the Taliban and al-Qaeda with significant resources. By the end of the year there will be some 70,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan, and the Obama administration is pushing for billions of dollars in additional aid to both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This has caused consternation among some in the Democratic Party. In May, fifty-one House Democrats voted against continued funding for the Afghan war. And David Obey, the chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, which controls federal spending, says the White House must show concrete results in Afghanistan within a year—implying that if it doesn’t do so, he will move to turn off the money spigot. If this is the attitude of Obama’s own party, one can imagine what the Republicans will be saying if his "Af-Pak" strategy doesn’t start yielding results as they gear up for the 2010 midterm elections.

It’s not just politicians who are souring on the Afghan war. A USA Today poll earlier this year found that 42 percent of Americans believe the war is a mistake, up from 6 percent in 2002. The media has only added to the gloom. Newsweek ran a cover story in January speculating that Afghanistan could be Obama’s Vietnam. And the New York Times has run prominent opinion pieces with headlines like "The ‘Good War’ Isn’t Worth Fighting" and "Fearing Another Quagmire in Afghanistan."

But the growing skepticism about Obama’s chances for success in Afghanistan is largely based on deep misreadings of both the country’s history and the views of its people, which are often compounded by facile comparisons to the United States’s misadventures of past decades in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Afghanistan will not be Obama’s Vietnam, nor will it be his Iraq. Rather, the renewed and better resourced American effort in Afghanistan will, in time, produce a relatively stable and prosperous Central Asian state.

Objections to Obama’s ramp-up in Afghanistan begin with the observation that Afghanistan has long been the "graveyard of empires"—as went the disastrous British expedition there in 1842 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, so too the current American occupation is doomed to follow. In fact, any number of empire builders, from Alexander the Great to the Mogul emperor Babur in the sixteenth century to the British in the Second Afghan War three decades after their infamous defeat, have won military victories in Afghanistan. The graveyard of empires metaphor belongs in the graveyard of clichés.

The Soviets, of course, spent almost a decade waging war in Afghanistan, only to retreat ignominiously in 1989, an important factor in their own empire’s consignment to history’s dustbin. But today’s American-led intervention in Afghanistan is quite different from the Communist occupation. The Soviet army killed more than a million Afghans and forced some five million more to flee the country, creating what was then the world’s largest refugee population. The Soviets also sowed millions of mines (including some that resembled toys), making Afghanistan one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. And Soviet soldiers were a largely unprofessional rabble of conscripts who drank heavily, used drugs, and consistently engaged in looting. The Soviets’ strategy, tactics, and behavior were, in short, the exact opposite of those used in successful counterinsurgency campaigns.

Unsurprisingly, the brutal Soviet occupation provoked a countrywide insurrection that drew from a wide array of ethnic groups—Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, and Hazaras—and every class in Afghan society, from mullahs to urban professionals to peasants. By contrast, the insurgents in Afghanistan today are overwhelmingly rural Pashtuns with negligible support in urban areas and among other ethnic groups.

That makes quite a difference to the scale of today’s insurgency. Even the most generous estimates of the size of the Taliban force hold it to be no more than 20,000 men, while authoritative estimates of the numbers of Afghans on the battlefield at any given moment in the war against the Soviets range up to 250,000. The Taliban insurgency today is only around 10 percent the size of what the Soviets faced.

And while today’s Afghan insurgents are well financed, in part by the drug trade, this backing is not on the scale of the financial and military support that the anti-Communist guerrillas enjoyed in the 1980s. The mujahideen were the recipients of billions of dollars of American and Saudi aid, large-scale Pakistani training, and sophisticated U.S. military hardware such as highly effective anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, which ended the Soviets’ command of the air.

A corollary to the argument that Afghanistan is unconquerable is the argument that it is ungovernable—that the country has never been a functioning nation-state, and that its people, mired in a culture of violence not amenable to Western fixes, have no interest in helping to build a more open and peaceful society. Certainly endemic low-level warfare is embedded in Pashtun society—the words for cousin and enemy in Pashtu, for instance, are the same. But the level of violence in Afghanistan is actually far lower than most Americans believe. In 2008 more than 2,000 Afghan civilians died at the hands of the Taliban or coalition forces; this is too many, but it is also less than a quarter of the deaths last year in Iraq, a country that is both more sparsely populated and often assumed to be easier to govern. (At the height of the violence in Iraq, 3,200 civilians were dyingevery month, making the country around twenty times more violent than Afghanistan is today.) Not only are Afghan civilians much safer under American occupation than Iraqis, they are also statistically less likely to be killed in the war than anyone living in the United States during the early 1990s, when the U.S. murder rate peaked at more than 24,000 killings a year.

An assertion that deserves a similarly hard look is the argument that nation building in Afghanistan is doomed because the country isn’t a nation-state, but rather a jury-rigged patchwork of competing tribal groupings. In fact, Afghanistan is a much older nation-state than, say, Italy or Germany, both of which were only unified in the late nineteenth century. Modern Afghanistan is considered to have emerged with the first Afghan empire under Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747, and so has been a nation for decades longer than the United States. Accordingly, Afghans have a strong sense of nationhood.

What they have had just as long, however, is a weak central state. The last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who reigned from 1933 to 1973, presided lightly over a country in a time that Afghans recall with great nostalgia as one of relative peace and prosperity. Today President Hamid Karzai similarly presides over a weak central government. Critics contend that President Karzai is unable or unwilling to fight the epic corruption in his government, and joke that he is only the "mayor of Kabul." This criticism is largely accurate, but misses the fact that Karzai is still a somewhat popular leader in Afghanistan. Fifty-two percent of Afghans say that the president is doing a good job, only 15 percent less than the number of Americans who say the same thing about Obama—and that is eight years after Karzai assumed the leadership of a country in which any honeymoon period has long since evaporated. Afghans are also wildly enthusiastic about participating in real politics. In the 2004 presidential election, more than 80 percent of them turned out to vote, an accomplishment Americans haven’t been able to claim since the late nineteenth century.

So if Afghanistan itself is not necessarily ungovernable, what of the other argument—that as far as the United States is concerned, the war there will be a rerun of Vietnam? Hardly. The similarities between the Taliban and the Vietcong end with their mutual hostility toward the U.S. military. The some 20,000 Taliban fighters are too few to hold even small Afghan towns, let alone mount a Tet-style offensive on Kabul. As a military force, they are armed lightly enough to constitute a tactical problem, not a strategic threat. By contrast, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army at the height of the Vietnam War numbered more than half a million men who were equipped with artillery and tanks, and were well supplied by both the Soviet Union and Mao’s China. And the number of casualties is orders of magnitude smaller: in Afghanistan last year, 154 American soldiers died, the largest number since the fall of the Taliban; in 1968, the deadliest year of the Vietnam conflict, the same number of U.S. servicemen were dying every four days. Estimates of the total civilian death toll in Vietnam are in the low millions, while estimates of the total number of Afghan civilian casualties since the fall of the Taliban are in the thousands.

Nor has the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan been anywhere near as expensive as Vietnam was—in fact, that’s in part why American efforts have not met with as much success as they could have. During the Vietnam War, the United States spent almost 10 percent of its GDP on military spending. Today’s military expenditures are somewhere between 4 and 5 percent of GDP, and of that, Afghanistan last year consumed only 6 percent of the total expenditure, while Iraq sucked up some five times that amount. And unlike the Vietnamese and Iraqis, Afghans have generally embraced international forces. In 2005, four years after the fall of the Taliban, eight out of ten Afghans expressed in a BBC/ABC poll a favorable opinion of the United States, and the same number supported foreign soldiers in their country. Contrast that with Iraq, where a BBC/ABC poll in 2005 found that only one in three Iraqis supported international forces in their country. While the same poll taken in Afghanistan this year reported, for the first time, that just under half of Afghans have a favorable view of the United States, that’s still a higher approval rating than the U.S. gets in any other Muslim-majority country save Lebanon. And a solid majority of Afghans continue to approve of the international forces in their country. What Afghans want is not for American and other foreign soldiers to leave, but for them to deliver on their promises of helping to midwife a more secure and prosperous country.

Skeptics of Obama’s Afghanistan policy say that the right approach is to either reduce American commitments there or just get out entirely. The short explanation of why this won’t work is that the United States has tried this already—twice. In 1989, after the most successful covert program in the history of the CIA helped to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, the George H. W. Bush administration closed the U.S. embassy in Kabul. The Clinton administration subsequently effectively zeroed out aid to the country, one of the poorest in the world. Out of the chaos of the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s emerged the Taliban, who then gave sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2001, the next Bush administration returned to topple the Taliban, but because of its ideological aversion to nation building it ensured that Afghanistan was the least-resourced per capita reconstruction effort the United States has engaged in since World War II. An indication of how desultory those efforts were was the puny size of the Afghan army, which two years after the fall of the Taliban numbered only 5,000 men, around the same size as the police department of an American city like Houston. We got what we paid for with this on-the-cheap approach: since 2001 the Taliban has reemerged, and fused ideologically and tactically with al-Qaeda. The new Taliban has adopted wholesale al-Qaeda’s Iraq playbook of suicide attacks, IED operations, hostage beheadings, and aggressive video-based information campaigns. (The pre-9/11 Taliban had, of course, banned television.)

Why should we believe that the alternative offered by the Obama administration—committing large numbers of boots on the ground and significant sums of money to Afghanistan—has a better chance of success? In part, because the Afghan people themselves, the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency, are rooting for us to win. BBC/ABC polling found that 58 percent of Afghans named the Taliban—who only 7 percent of Afghans view favorably—as the greatest threat to their nation; only 8 percent said it was the United States.

There are other positive indices. Refugees don’t return to places they don’t think have a future, and more than four million Afghan refugees have returned home since the fall of the Taliban. (By contrast, about the same number of Iraqi refugees fled their homes after the American-led invasion of their country in 2003, and few have returned.) There are also more than two million Afghan kids in schools, including, of course, many girls. Music, kites, movies, independent newspapers, and TV stations—all of which were banned under the Taliban—are now ubiquitous. One in six Afghans now has a cell phone, in a country that didn’t have a phone system under the Taliban. And, according to the World Bank, the 2007 GDP growth rate for Afghanistan was 14 percent. Under Taliban rule the country was so poor that the World Bank didn’t even bother to measure its economic indicators.

Today 40 percent of Afghans say their country is going in the right direction (only 17 percent of Americans felt the same way in the waning months of the Bush administration). Considering Afghanistan’s rampant drug trade, pervasive corruption, and rising violence, this may seem counterintuitive—until you recall that no country in the world has ever suffered Afghanistan’s combination of an invasion and occupation by a totalitarian regime followed by a civil war, with subsequent "government" by warlords and then the neo-medieval misrule of the Taliban. In other words, the bar is pretty low. No Afghan is expecting that the country will turn into, say, Belgium, but there is an expectation that Afghanistan can be returned to the somewhat secure condition it enjoyed in the 1970s before the Soviet invasion, and that the country will be able to grow its way out of being simply a subsistence agricultural economy.

Obama’s Afghanistan strategy is well poised to deliver on these expectations because it primarily emphasizes increased security for the Afghan people—the first public good that Afghans want. In the south of Afghanistan, where the insurgency is the most intense, the U.S. is deploying two Marine brigades and a Stryker brigade, 17,000 soldiers in all, to supplement the thinly stretched British, Dutch, and Canadian forces in the region. These are not the kind of units that do peacekeeping; they will go in and clear areas of the Taliban and, most crucially, hold them. This will be a major improvement in a region where NATO forces have often had enough manpower to clear areas but not to hold them. One Western diplomat in Kabul joked grimly to me that every year in the south NATO soldiers have gone in to "mow the lawn." This time the idea is not to let the grass grow back.

One potential objection to Obama’s Afghanistan strategy is that the thousands of additional American soldiers that are now deploying to the country will only be the thin end of the wedge, because the Pentagon will inevitably ask for significantly more troops. This is a reasonable concern, but should be obviated by the fact that dramatically scaling up the size of the Afghan army and police is the best American exit strategy from the country, and that effort is at the heart of Obama’s plan.

Today there are only some 160,000 Afghan soldiers and cops, a quarter of the size of Iraq’s security services, and they are tasked with bringing order to a country that is larger and more populous than Iraq. Obama wants to modestly improve the size and professionalism of Afghanistan’s police force, and almost double the ranks of the Afghan army over the next two years. The latter is especially important because Afghans trust their army more than any other institution, and the army has emerged as a truly national force not riven by ethnic divisions. To help train those Afghan security services, some 4,000 trainers from the 82nd Airborne are deploying to Afghanistan. The administration is also pushing to make salaries in those forces competitive with what the Taliban pays its foot soldiers—often three times what an Afghan policeman makes.

Another possible objection to the introduction of more U.S. soldiers into Afghanistan is that, inevitably, they will kill more civilians, the main issue that angers Afghans about the foreign military presence. In fact, the presence of more boots on the ground is likely to reduce civilian casualties, because historically it has been the overreliance on American air strikes—as a result of too few ground forces—which has been the key cause of civilian deaths. According to the U.S. Air Force, between January and August 2008 there were almost 2,400 air strikes in Afghanistan, fully three times as many as in Iraq. And the United Nations concluded that it was air strikes, rather than action on the ground, which were responsible for the largest percentage—64 percent—of civilian deaths attributed to pro-government forces in 2008.

Cognizant of the importance of the issue of civilian casualties, in his Senate confirmation hearing in June the new commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, testified that their avoidance "may be the critical point" of American military operations, adding, "I cannot overstate my commitment to the importance of this concept." McChrystal, generally regarded as one of the most effective officers of his generation, has now put the avoidance of civilian casualties at the core of his military strategy in Afghanistan, and that message will undoubtedly filter down the chain of command.

These key features of the Obama administration’s Afghan policy are supplemented by several others that merit highlighting and represent a distinct break from the Bush administration’s sputtering efforts. One is a shifting emphasis within the attempt to curtail the opium trade, from poppy eradication to going after the drug lords. This is a no-brainer—poppy eradication penalizes poor Afghan farmers who can’t pay the bribes to ensure their fields are not eradicated, and who are then easy marks for Taliban recruitment. Obama is also seeking to draw in potential regional partners like Iran, which played a vital role in the formation of the first Afghan government that emerged out of the discussions in Bonn in the winter of 2001. And third, the U.S. government plans to regularly host meetings among key Afghan and Pakistani officials, as it did in Washington in February and May. This is important for confidence-building measures between Afghans and Pakistanis, whose relations have varied between icy and openly hostile.

This brings us to the one skunk at this garden party, and it is a rather large one: Afghanistan’s nuclear-armed, al-Qaeda- and Taliban-headquartering neighbor to the east. The Pakistani dimension of Obama’s Af-Pak strategy is his critics’ most reasonable objection to his plans for the region. It is difficult for the United States to have an effective strategy for Pakistan whenPakistan doesn’t have an effective strategy for Pakistan. There is a set of interwoven problems that the country must face if it is to effectively confront the militants in its own territory. If it fails to do this, the regional insurgency that encompasses both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border will continue to gather strength.

The first problem is that Pakistan effectively has two governments. There is a weak, elected civilian one, and a strong, unelected military one. Pakistan’s civilian government knows little about military strategy and is often at odds with the army, which has veto power over all aspects of national security policy. Pakistan’s army, meanwhile, has wavered ineffectually between mounting punitive expeditions against the militants and appeasing them, and is generally unable or unwilling to adopt an effective strategy against the Taliban. (The recent operations in the Swat Valley, characterized by the use of artillery and air power and millions of refugees streaming out of the battle zone, are not the hallmarks of a successful counterinsurgency.) As a result, civilians caught in the middle don’t know which way the wind will blow from day to day. They have reason to be skeptical that the government will protect them from the predations of the Taliban if the former chooses to revisit the various "peace" agreements it has struck with the militants over the past several years. Finally, the Pakistani establishment has done a poor job of persuading the public that the Taliban and other militant groups to which it once gave succor, and which are now attacking the Pakistani state, pose a grave threat to Pakistan itself.

Some have argued that if the U.S. does succeed in Afghanistan, it will only make this situation worse, pushing the Taliban and their allied foreign fighters into Pakistan and further destabilizing the already rickety nuclear-armed state. But this line of reasoning has the equation precisely the wrong way around: al-Qaeda was founded in Pakistan in 1988, and many of the Taliban’s leaders and foot soldiers emerged out of Pakistani madrassas and refugee camps. Following the vacuum created by the Afghan civil war of the early 1990s, the Pakistan-based militants expanded into Afghanistan. The notion of the militants enjoying safe havens in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is a false choice—in truth, they have had a persistent presence in both countries for decades.

That said, there are some hopeful signs that the militants have shot themselves in the feet in Pakistan. There has been no single "9/11 moment," but the cumulative weight of a number of events—the Taliban’s assassination of Benazir Bhutto; al-Qaeda’s bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad; the attacks on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team and the police academy in Lahore; the widely circulated video images of the Taliban flogging a seventeen-year-old girl; and the Taliban’s decision to move from Swat into Buner District, only sixty miles from Islamabad—has accomplished something similar. Each of these incidents has provoked revulsion and fear among the Pakistani public. Indicative of this, the alliance of pro-Taliban religious parties known as the MMA was annihilated in the 2008 election, earning just 2 percent of the vote. And support for suicide bombing among Pakistanis has cratered, from 33 percent in 2002 to 5 percent in 2008.
The United States can neither precipitously withdraw from Afghanistan nor help foster the emergence of a stable Afghan state by doing it on the cheap; the consequence would be the return of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Fortunately, the U.S. is not alone; unlike in Iraq, there is an international coalition of forty-two countries in Afghanistan supporting NATO efforts there, with troops or other assistance. Even Muslim countries are part of this mix. Turkey, for instance, ran the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2005, and the United Arab Emirates and Jordan have both sent small numbers of soldiers.

The United States overthrew the Taliban in the winter of 2001. It has a moral obligation to ensure that when it does leave Afghanistan it does so secure in the knowledge that the country will never again be a launching pad for the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, and that the country is on the way to a measure of stability and prosperity. When that happens, it is not too fanciful to think that Afghanistan’s majestic mountains, verdant valleys, and jasmine-scented gardens may once again draw the tourists that once flocked there.

Peter Bergen is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and a frequent visitor to Afghanistan since 1993.

Obama meets the Lobby by Stephen Walt

FOREIGN POLICY – STEPHEN WALT

7/16/09

Obama meets the Lobby

Stephen Walt

This past Monday, President Obama met with the heads of a number of prominent Jewish groups, to talk about the state of U.S.-Israeli relations and the future direction of U.S. Middle East policy. Virtually all the news reports I've seen suggest that the attendees had a cordial and candid discussion. After reading through various accounts, I have three comments.

First, although a few individuals in the Israel lobby continue to downplay its influence, the very fact that this meeting was held is additional testimony to its important role in shaping U.S. Middle East policy. Why was Barack Obama taking time from his busy schedule to meet with the heads of groups like AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League, J Street, Hadassah, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (among others)? Simple: he knows that these groups have a lot of political power. He also knows that the success of his Middle East policy depends in large part on getting significant support from them. In a political system like ours, where well-organized interest groups routinely wield disproportionate influence over the issues they care about, holding a White House sit-down with these key leaders was smart politics.

Second, the meeting also makes it clear that there have been significant changes within the lobby over the past several years, and that there is an evident rift between those who think the United States should continue to the same "special relationship" with Israel, and those who believe that it would be in Israel and America’s interest if Washington adopted a more candid and nuanced policy toward the Jewish state. It is noteworthy that the invitees included representatives from both J Street and Americans for Peace Now -- groups that openly favor a two-state solution and have been backing Obama's campaign to halt all construction in the settlements. Maybe even more noteworthy, the more hard-line groups were remarkably restrained in defending the settlement enterprise.

What’s going on here? Some of these developments reflect the more open discourse that has begun to emerge on Israeli policy and the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Thankfully, it is no longer taboo to discuss these subjects, as it once was. This shift is occurring in good part because a growing number of American Jews are worried that Israel is on a path to become an apartheid state, and that the United States has been enabling that development by giving Israel generous and unconditional support.

The failed Lebanon war of 2006 and the brutal onslaught against Gaza earlier this year have also raised concerns that Israel has lost its moral and strategic compass. You know a country is in trouble when it routinely attacks respected human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, or when a group of its own soldiers releases damning personal testimony about their own misconduct in Gaza. (The courage and candor of these Israeli dissidents remains a redeeming feature of Israel’s otherwise troubled democracy). And you know the hardliners in the lobby are getting desperate when they have to hire a professional spinmeister to come up with Orwellian talking pointsdefending the occupation, such as the bizarre claim that removing illegal settlers from the West Bank would be a form of "ethnic cleansing." (For more on the latter shenanigans, see Richard Silverstein's valuable commentary here, here, and here.)
Third, it is also clear that the hard-line leadership remains trapped in old-think on a lot of these issues. For example, ADL head Abraham Foxman complained before the meeting that "What troubles me most is a lack of consultation and the need [for the administration] to do things publicly. There's a [U.S.-Israel] relationship of 60 years and all of a sudden they’re treating Israel like everyone else. I find that disturbing." In the same vein, Malcolm Hoenlein of the President's Conference reportedly told Obama at the meeting that differences between the U.S. and Israel should be kept private, and that progress toward peace had only occurred when there was "no daylight" between American and Israeli leaders.

To his credit, Obama immediately pointed out the flaw in that line of argument, saying "For eight years, there was no light between the United States and Israel, and nothing got accomplished." He might have added that there was precious little daylight during the Clinton years either, which is one of the many reasons why the Oslo process came to naught.

What Foxman and Hoenlein still don't understand is that the special relationship is in fact harmful to the United States and Israel alike. It has allowed Israel to pursue foolish policies -- like building settlements -- and implicated the United States in them. Israel would be much better off if the United States did "treat it like everyone else," or at least like other democracies. If it did, the U.S. would back Israel when it acts in ways we deem desirable, but U.S. leaders would criticize and oppose Israel's actions when they are contrary to U.S. interests or values. In the end, a normal relationship between the two countries would be far healthier than the "special relationship" that Hoenlein and Foxman have long defended.

On this point, Obama could have quoted former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, who notes in his excellent book Scars of War, Wounds of Peace that the two presidents who made "meaningful breakthroughs on the way to an Arab-Israeli peace" (Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush) succeeded because they were "ready to confront Israel head on and overlook the sensibilities of her friends in America." Obama is actually employing a smarter approach than these two predecessors. Like Carter and Bush, he appears to be willing "to confront Israel head on," but instead of "overlooking" the sensibilities of pro-Israel groups, as they did, he is doing his best to bring them along. Jeremy Ben-Ami of J Street put the point well after the White House meeting: Obama "knows how to push while he’s hugging."

Obama also made it clear that the Palestinians and the Arab states also need to do more (a point that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton underscored in a major speech yesterday), and that Washington will have to put pressure on all sides. But the United States has lots of experience putting pressure on the Palestinians and the Arabs -- in fact, one attendee at the meeting quoted Obama as saying that U.S. pressure on the Arabs is a "dog bites man" story -- so that will not be hard to do. Pressuring Israel, on the other hand, has been a much rarer occurrence, but it is now necessary if Obama hopes to move toward a two-state solution and foster lasting peace between Israel and the Arab states around it. If he sticks to the positions he's already outlined and follows through -- and if the leaders he met with on Monday have the good sense to back him -- Obama just might succeed.

Who’s in Charge Of Obama’s Foreign Policy?

Who’s in Charge Of Obama’s Foreign Policy?

Mark Weisbrot
The Guardian Unlimited, July 16, 2009
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/whos-in-charge-of-obamas-foreign-policy/

Bin Laden Deputy Warns Pakistan the US Wants to Seize Its Nuclear Arsenal Delcan Walsh, The Guardian

Bin Laden Deputy Warns Pakistan the US Wants to Seize Its Nuclear Arsenal
Delcan Walsh, The Guardian
Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has attempted to halt al-Qaida's plunging popularity in Pakistan by exploiting widely held fears that the US is plotting to seize the country's nuclear bombs.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/15/al-qaida-pakistan-us-nuclear

Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World Melanie Kirkpatrick, The Wall Street Journal

Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World
Melanie Kirkpatrick, The Wall Street Journal
Editor's Note: In an appearance on CNBC's morning show, Senator Sam Nunn responds to the following Wall Street Journal article, in which former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger is quoted as saying that the United States needs a strong deterrent and should keep its nuclear weapons "more or less in perpetuity." Senator Nunn said that while a strong US deterrent and nuclear umbrella are important, he fundamentally disagrees that the US should keep its nuclear weapons forever because "if we do that, you can toss the Non-Proliferation Treaty right out of the window, and you can toss cooperation around the globe out the window, and you will not be able to take the steps necessary to protect America from proliferation and from catastrophic nuclear terrorism."

'Nuclear weapons are used every day." So says former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's explaining -- concepts that were seemingly ignored in this week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124726489588925407.html

* Senator Sam Nunn on CNBC's Squawk Box Morning Show
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23399

Rebutting the Standard Arguments against Disarmament George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Rebutting the Standard Arguments against Disarmament George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

In any debate, there is a tendency to set up and knock down straw men. The emerging debate about whether the United States should work toward abolishing nuclear weapons is no different.

Certainly, there is much room for serious disagreement about whether a nuclear-weapon-free world is achievable or even worthwhile. In fact, such discussion is welcomed. Unfortunately, opponents of abolishing nuclear weapons tend to make their case by rebutting a selection of five weak arguments that the growing bipartisan movement of nuclear zero supporters led by realists such as Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn rarely use.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23398&prog=zgp&proj=znpp

* Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
* Defending U.S. Leadership on Disarmament

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1177

America's legitimacy crisis in Asia

America's legitimacy crisis in Asia - Van Jackson, examiner.com: "President Barack Obama’s charisma and message of change has won over much of the world. His new approach to the Middle East and Afghanistan has helped improve once-strained relationships with longtime allies.

And his vision of a world free from nuclear weapons is at once ambitious and inspiring. But for all the hype about improving America’s image in the world, some of the most strategically important nations still view the United States quite unfavorably. Rather than celebrating President Obama’s success in winning over the hearts and minds of those countries already inclined to add America as a Facebook friend, the Obama administration should focus on making public diplomacy inroads into strategically important countries with a history of enmity toward the United States. … It is time for a soft power offensive. A transformation of U.S. policy toward Asia--and particularly toward North Korea, China, Pakistan, and Russia--would likely have the most dramatic effect in terms of swaying public opinion in these countries (acknowledged, North Korean public opinion is largely irrelevant under the current regime). Still, substantive policy changes are not the only way to improve perception of the United States. Symbolic diplomatic visits, increased development aid, and expanded track II diplomacy can all contribute to improved perceptions of the United States and, subsequently, improved relations with historically hostile nations."

http://www.examiner.com/x-16317-DC-Asia-Policy-Examiner~y2009m7d16-Americas-legitimacy-crisis-in-Asia

Two Articles on Health Care in the US Affecting All of You

CBO Chief: Health Bills To Increase Federal Costs
http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003168293&parm1=5&cpage=2


Why We Must Ration Health Care
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine...wanted=1&em

Iran and Her Similes by Leon T. Hadar

Iran and Her Similes

by Leon T. Hadar

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10359

Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East.

Added to cato.org on July 15, 2009

This article appeared in the August 2009 issue of Chronicles.

In the aftermath of the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the "liberation" of Iraq by U.S. forces, Bush-administration officials who had earlier compared Saddam to Hitler extended that analogy and suggested that postwar Iraq was like post-World War II Germany and Japan and Italy, where the U.S. military occupation helped replace totalitarian regimes with thriving democratic systems. Hence, after freeing Iraq from the yoke of Ba'athism, there was no reason why the Americans would not be successful in producing a rerun of the Western-oriented political and economic reconstruction of Germany, Japan, and Italy in Iraq — and then in Iran, Syria, Palestine, and parts beyond.

As the neoconservative ideologues were drawing the parallels between "Islamofascism" and Nazism, envisaging the rise of a liberal democracy on the banks of the Euphrates, and debating whether Ahmed Chalabi should be marketed as the Adenauer or the De Gaulle of the New Iraq, a friend forwarded me a brief survey he had just completed: "One-Hundred Reasons Why Iraq Is Not Germany and Japan." In it he explained why the neoconservative historical analogy was so silly, mostly because it was, well, ahistorical and failed to take into account the many differences among, say, Iraq, Germany, and Japan — or for that matter, between Germany and Japan, or Iraq and Iran — with regard to geographic location, demographic makeup, and cultural and religious traditions.

Serious social scientists who try to apply such all-encompassing models as "modernization" to explain political and economic change around the world recognize that they need to take into consideration the unique historical context of the region or country that they are studying. But when it comes to pop sociologists and American journalists parachuting to this or that international "hot spot," not to mention the global crusaders managing U.S. foreign policy, everything seems to fall into very neat Manichean categories.

Indeed, according to this interpretation, the Good Guys are usually referred to as "Westernized," "modernized," "reformist," "secular," and "democratic," which also means that they are "pro-American" — not unlike the demonstrators in the streets of Tehran protesting the designation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as winner of Iran's recent presidential elections.

They are usually under attack by Evil, represented by those who can be identified by the antonyms of the aforementioned adjectives, like the "anti-American" and "anti-Western" ayatollahs ruling Iran.

Manicheanism was one of the major Gnostic religions of Iran, originating in Sassanid Persia. But the philosophical dualism that seems to dominate the current debate on the U.S. response to the political upheaval in Iran is very secular and American in nature. Its grand narrative of an America standing up to ideological monsters abroad by supporting people "like us" evolved during the 20th century under the influence of Wilsonian fantasies and against the backdrop of World War II and the Cold War.

In fact, when it came to the actual foreign- policy decisions that were made by U.S. presidents and their advisors, Machiavelli, not Mani, was the main influence on American policymakers. It was the cunning Realpolitik of Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau — and not Wilson's idealism — that determined the political outcome of the Great War. In World War II, the United States and Great Britain had no choice but to ally with Stalin, a ruthless dictator, in order to achieve a military victory against the Axis Powers, while during the Cold War, President Richard Nixon launched the opening to China in the midst of the bloody Cultural Revolution as part of a strategy to checkmate the Soviet Union.

Whenever U.S. policymakers and pundits were guided strictly by their Manichean vision, their decisions only spelled disaster for U.S. national interests. Treating North Vietnam as an integral part of the Soviet Bloc and failing to identify the powerful nationalist component in Ho Chi Minh's strategy made the extraction of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia more difficult. Much of the intellectual basis for the "War on Terror" and the ensuing Iraq war reflected the fallacy of an existing monolithic Islamofascist bloc — disregarding the secular, if not anti-Islamic fundamentalist orientation of the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'ath regimes or dismissing the historical conflict between the Sunnis and the Shiites in the Middle East. Moreover, the U.S.-led campaign to promote democracy in the former Soviet Bloc after the collapse of communism, and our encouragement of the "color" or "velvet" revolutions in such places as Ukraine, Georgia, or Lebanon, were based on the assumption that the drive by individuals and groups in these nations and societies to oust their ruling elites was motivated primarily by universal ideals of democracy and liberalism and by the appeal of joining the West. But the American narrative seemed to disregard a critical element in these developments. These revolutions were impelled by powerful nationalist, ethnic, and religious forces, like the anti- Russian sentiments found in Poland, Hungary, and Georgia or among the Ukrainian majority in Ukraine; not surprisingly, members of the Russian minority in Ukraine opposed the Orange Revolution. Similarly, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon pitted Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims against Shiites backed by Iran, while the political changes in Iraq in the aftermath of Saddam's ouster empowered the Arab Shiites and the Kurds while weakening the former Sunni controlled elites. To make the story line even more complex, what many Americans see as a linear process of democratization and liberalization could be seen as the playing out of intra-elite rivalries — which is part of what happened in Russia and Rumania after the fall of the Communist Party.

The political crisis in Iran seems to combine all of these elements and more. There is no doubt that some of the demonstrators in the streets are members of a more urban and Westernized elite. But these Iranians are not necessarily "pro-American" — any more than the Chinese protesters in Tiananmen Square were. In fact, many of the former Chinese student activists have become part of a rising Chinese nationalist movement that recognizes the deep tensions between U.S. and Chinese interests. Hence, one shouldn't be surprised if the secular democrats protesting against the ayatollahs today transform into fervent Iranian nationalists — and press for nuclear weapons — if and when they come to power.

The fact that the protests in Tehran have the potential to challenge the ruling religious elite has less to do with the enthusiasm of the young and cool demonstrators and more with the power exerted by two of the former leaders of the Iranian revolution and members of the ruling elite: former prime minister and presidential contender Mir-Hossein Mousavi and former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In the past, both were involved in directing anti-American terrorist activities and in managing Iran's nuclear manufacturing, and it is doubtful that they will reorient Iranian domestic and foreign policies if they succeed in their campaign to deny the presidency to Ahmadinejad. In fact, they could prove to be more assertive and more effective in managing Tehran's relationship with Washington.

Iran is not like China in 1989 or Russia in 1991, but like . . . Iran in 2009. She may or may not be undergoing major political changes. Even under the best-case scenario — a gradual erosion in the power of the ayatollahs — Iran, with her strong sense of national identity, religious vitality, talented people, huge oil resources, and links to Shiite communities in the Middle East, will remain a self confident and forceful regional power whose interests are more likely to collide than to coincide with those of the United States, the only global power with a massive military and a diplomatic presence in the Middle East. Taking into consideration the long history of conflict between the United States and Iran, any attempt on the part of Washington to intervene in Iran's changing politics would only make it more difficult for the United States to engage Tehran on a range of policy issues that affect U.S. strategic (nuclear weapons) and economic (oil) interests. History teaches us that Iranians are not necessarily like us — and that they do not necessarily like or hate us. The most effective way to create the conditions necessary for improving U.S. relations with Iran is to recognize that historical reality.

Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institut