Obama Realism May Not Play Well in Cairo Streets - James Traub, New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/weekinreview/31traub.html
This Thursday, when President Obama delivers a much-anticipated speech in Cairo, he will be addressing so many audiences, and seeking to advance so many agendas, that even his oratorical gifts are likely to be taxed. He will surely express his respect for Islam and the Islamic world, as he has before; articulate his broad policy goals in the Middle East; and offer proposals to increase the prospects, now quite dim, for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. But the president has chosen to deliver this speech in Cairo, and so he must also address the Egyptian people, who live — like the citizens of virtually all Arab countries — in an authoritarian state, and who have grown increasingly restive as President Hosni Mubarak has snuffed out flickering hopes for change.
Sunday, May 31, 2009
The Egypt Speech: Obama's Watershed Moment - J. Scott Carpenter, PolicyWatch
The Egypt Speech: Obama's Watershed Moment - J. Scott Carpenter, PolicyWatch #1522, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: By traveling to Cairo, Obama risks signaling a return to the era when the United States ignored human rights and democracy as an element of national security. Moreover, should Obama fail to deliver peace on their terms, the same undemocratic Arab regimes will blame him for the failure, providing Iran and others another stick with which to beat the United States for being on the wrong side of history. By seeking peace at the expense of democracy and long-term stability, the president risks achieving none of these regional objectives.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3059
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3059
OPEC is Criminal Cartel Run by Saudis and Linked to Terrorism - J. Michael Waller, Palluxo
OPEC is Criminal Cartel Run by Saudis and Linked to Terrorism - J. Michael Waller, Palluxo: "[T]his, American strategists say, is the time for the United States to finish off OPEC once and for all. … Options worth considering include … [p]romot [ing] freedom and justice in the rest of the Middle East. …
http://www.palluxo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=428:opec-is-criminal-cartel-run-by-saudis-and-linked-to-terrorism&catid=90:blogs&Itemid=284
http://www.palluxo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=428:opec-is-criminal-cartel-run-by-saudis-and-linked-to-terrorism&catid=90:blogs&Itemid=284
What Will Obama Say in Cairo? - William Pfaff
What Will Obama Say in Cairo? - William Pfaff, Truthdig: The possibility that scarcely seems worth mentioning is that Obama declares in Cairo that he wishes to withdraw all American forces from Muslim countries, and seeks the support of all Muslim governments to make this possible. Now that would make headlines, and history
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20090529_what_will_obama_say_in_cairo/
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20090529_what_will_obama_say_in_cairo/
Can Timmy Tackle China? by Leslie H. Gelb
Can Timmy Tackle China?
by Leslie H. Gelb
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-05-31/can-timmy-tackle-china/?cid=hp:mainpromo1
Forget the GM’s protracted death spiral. The only economic story that matters this week is Secretary Geithner’s definitive trip to China, writes Leslie H. Gelb.
Even on a weekend largely devoid of news, save for the trials of Judge Sonia Sotomayor and pretend war dances on the Korean peninsula, the story that will largely determine the fate of the American and global economies goes strikingly unattended: Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is in China. He’s there to meet with its leaders to begin figuring out policy puzzles whose resolution will shape the future far more than the mesmerizing crises of Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. He’s there to talk about the value of the dollar and the yuan, trade and investment decisions, and how best to pump life into a listless world economy. By these eye-crossing threads does our future hang.
Once deadly Cold War enemies, the economies of China and America have become inseparable. The United States is China’s biggest export market by far. China is America’s biggest investor by far. If one sneezes, the other catches a cold. Their markets are so intertwined that if one side tries to gain advantage over the other, it hurts itself as well. The United States remains the biggest economy in the world by far, and China has been the fastest-growing one by far for decades now. One of America’s leading international economists, C. Fred Bergsten, recently called for downplaying the G-20 group of industrial powers and focusing instead on what he termed the “G-2,” namely China and the United States.
Once deadly Cold War enemies, the economies of China and America have become inseparable.
Here’s the agenda for the Geithner talks, the policy puzzles, and the stakes.
On economic stimulus, both countries are basically on the same page and accepting of their responsibilities for the global economy. Depending on how it’s counted, the U.S. stimulus and salvation package ranges somewhere around $2 trillion. China’s reaches almost $600 billion, second largest to Washington’s. But for this, Beijing gets much more bang for its buck. The Chinese, for example, have more infrastructure projects underway in Beijing than the Obama administration does in all of the United States. Low labor costs give Beijing a tremendous advantage here, which will continue to give it a big competitive advantage.
Nonetheless, the Obama team wants Beijing to spend much more to stimulate its own internal economy. The Chinese economic miracle has been built mainly on exports, especially to America. This has resulted in enormous trade surpluses for China and deficits for the United States. Washington wants to export more to China, far more than its already upward trend in recent years. But that’s a hard decision for Beijing. To begin with, the Chinese people are savers, including for things like medical costs that are scanted by the Chinese government. Also, that conservative-minded government is loathe to pump out yuan even to its own economy if the result is deficit-spending.
The trade relationship hangs in good part on the relative value of the dollar against China’s reminbi or yuan. Washington has long accused Beijing of keeping the worth of the yuan artificially low against the dollar in order to make its exports cheaper to the United States. Beijing says the situation is more complicated than that. In any event, if Beijing were to let the yuan fall against the dollar by about one-third, the figure often bandied about in Washington, its losses would be catastrophic. China holds about $1.5 trillion in treasury bonds, equities and the like. A one-third decline would mean the loss of $500 billion.
On the other hand (and there’s always another hand in these subjects), Washington can’t afford to let the value of the dollar drop in America’s interests. In the first place, if its worth falls, American securities will become less attractive to investors, especially foreign ones, especially China, which already has such large investments. And without those foreign investments, especially from China, the Obama administration has no hope of financing its vast deficit-spending stimulus package. Less investment money from China, more printing of depreciated money in America, more inflation, and more undercutting of Obama’s stimulus package.
Declining investments from China would also mean a jump in interest rates in America in order to attract more Chinese and other foreign investors. But the higher the interest rates, the slower the economic recovery in America because more expensive loans would further slow growth as well. Mortgages for the housing markets, in particular, would fly skywards and grind down the recovery of the housing market. And of course if all these bad things came to pass, China itself would be the second biggest loser after America, given its investment in dollars.
All of these cold calculations revolve around cash and the money balance sheets. But the talks between Geithner and the top Chinese leaders have another, still more confounding dimension—the economic power relationship. The vast majority of international economic transactions are denominated in dollars. In other words, the American economy is the touchstone that all nations have to honor and its currency the one that requires the most protecting in the common interest. Now feeling its power oats after decades of economic growth and diplomatic deference by others, Beijing wants more of a say in the global economy and the prestige aspects of currencies. Some of its leaders have been talking about replacing the dollar with a new “international reserve currency,” over which Beijing would have its rightful influence.
But as with so many dimensions of its new great power role, Chinese leaders have not thought through what they want and what they’re demanding. Who would take the weaker dollars China would unload onto this reserve currency? How happy would they be holding onto these devalued dollars, while China profited? Global leadership requires sacrifices on the part of the leader, a fact not yet chewed, let alone digested by Beijing’s bosses. With prestige comes costs and responsibilities, which the United States alone among great powers remains willing to shoulder.
As if all this weren’t complicated enough, the Geithner visit in the next days takes place against the backdrop of North Korea’s flexing of its nuclear and missile power. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be looking to China for help in taming this latest outburst by Pyongyang. China is North Korea’s lifeline for food and fuel and China has more influence over Pyongyang than any other country. It has resisted pressure for fear of a collapse of the North Vietnamese government, causing a flood of refugees and instability on China’s border.
Geithner is charged with sorting out the economic layers of the new Chinese-American relationship. But until he and his Chinese counterparts figure out how the pieces of the puzzle fit together, and how critically interlocked common interests can be advanced without damaging separate interests, they should observe the central maxim of international medical practice: Do No Harm.
Leslie H. Gelb, a former New York Times columnist and senior government official, is author of Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy (HarperCollins 2009), a book that shows how to think about and use power in the 21st century. He is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.
by Leslie H. Gelb
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-05-31/can-timmy-tackle-china/?cid=hp:mainpromo1
Forget the GM’s protracted death spiral. The only economic story that matters this week is Secretary Geithner’s definitive trip to China, writes Leslie H. Gelb.
Even on a weekend largely devoid of news, save for the trials of Judge Sonia Sotomayor and pretend war dances on the Korean peninsula, the story that will largely determine the fate of the American and global economies goes strikingly unattended: Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is in China. He’s there to meet with its leaders to begin figuring out policy puzzles whose resolution will shape the future far more than the mesmerizing crises of Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. He’s there to talk about the value of the dollar and the yuan, trade and investment decisions, and how best to pump life into a listless world economy. By these eye-crossing threads does our future hang.
Once deadly Cold War enemies, the economies of China and America have become inseparable. The United States is China’s biggest export market by far. China is America’s biggest investor by far. If one sneezes, the other catches a cold. Their markets are so intertwined that if one side tries to gain advantage over the other, it hurts itself as well. The United States remains the biggest economy in the world by far, and China has been the fastest-growing one by far for decades now. One of America’s leading international economists, C. Fred Bergsten, recently called for downplaying the G-20 group of industrial powers and focusing instead on what he termed the “G-2,” namely China and the United States.
Once deadly Cold War enemies, the economies of China and America have become inseparable.
Here’s the agenda for the Geithner talks, the policy puzzles, and the stakes.
On economic stimulus, both countries are basically on the same page and accepting of their responsibilities for the global economy. Depending on how it’s counted, the U.S. stimulus and salvation package ranges somewhere around $2 trillion. China’s reaches almost $600 billion, second largest to Washington’s. But for this, Beijing gets much more bang for its buck. The Chinese, for example, have more infrastructure projects underway in Beijing than the Obama administration does in all of the United States. Low labor costs give Beijing a tremendous advantage here, which will continue to give it a big competitive advantage.
Nonetheless, the Obama team wants Beijing to spend much more to stimulate its own internal economy. The Chinese economic miracle has been built mainly on exports, especially to America. This has resulted in enormous trade surpluses for China and deficits for the United States. Washington wants to export more to China, far more than its already upward trend in recent years. But that’s a hard decision for Beijing. To begin with, the Chinese people are savers, including for things like medical costs that are scanted by the Chinese government. Also, that conservative-minded government is loathe to pump out yuan even to its own economy if the result is deficit-spending.
The trade relationship hangs in good part on the relative value of the dollar against China’s reminbi or yuan. Washington has long accused Beijing of keeping the worth of the yuan artificially low against the dollar in order to make its exports cheaper to the United States. Beijing says the situation is more complicated than that. In any event, if Beijing were to let the yuan fall against the dollar by about one-third, the figure often bandied about in Washington, its losses would be catastrophic. China holds about $1.5 trillion in treasury bonds, equities and the like. A one-third decline would mean the loss of $500 billion.
On the other hand (and there’s always another hand in these subjects), Washington can’t afford to let the value of the dollar drop in America’s interests. In the first place, if its worth falls, American securities will become less attractive to investors, especially foreign ones, especially China, which already has such large investments. And without those foreign investments, especially from China, the Obama administration has no hope of financing its vast deficit-spending stimulus package. Less investment money from China, more printing of depreciated money in America, more inflation, and more undercutting of Obama’s stimulus package.
Declining investments from China would also mean a jump in interest rates in America in order to attract more Chinese and other foreign investors. But the higher the interest rates, the slower the economic recovery in America because more expensive loans would further slow growth as well. Mortgages for the housing markets, in particular, would fly skywards and grind down the recovery of the housing market. And of course if all these bad things came to pass, China itself would be the second biggest loser after America, given its investment in dollars.
All of these cold calculations revolve around cash and the money balance sheets. But the talks between Geithner and the top Chinese leaders have another, still more confounding dimension—the economic power relationship. The vast majority of international economic transactions are denominated in dollars. In other words, the American economy is the touchstone that all nations have to honor and its currency the one that requires the most protecting in the common interest. Now feeling its power oats after decades of economic growth and diplomatic deference by others, Beijing wants more of a say in the global economy and the prestige aspects of currencies. Some of its leaders have been talking about replacing the dollar with a new “international reserve currency,” over which Beijing would have its rightful influence.
But as with so many dimensions of its new great power role, Chinese leaders have not thought through what they want and what they’re demanding. Who would take the weaker dollars China would unload onto this reserve currency? How happy would they be holding onto these devalued dollars, while China profited? Global leadership requires sacrifices on the part of the leader, a fact not yet chewed, let alone digested by Beijing’s bosses. With prestige comes costs and responsibilities, which the United States alone among great powers remains willing to shoulder.
As if all this weren’t complicated enough, the Geithner visit in the next days takes place against the backdrop of North Korea’s flexing of its nuclear and missile power. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be looking to China for help in taming this latest outburst by Pyongyang. China is North Korea’s lifeline for food and fuel and China has more influence over Pyongyang than any other country. It has resisted pressure for fear of a collapse of the North Vietnamese government, causing a flood of refugees and instability on China’s border.
Geithner is charged with sorting out the economic layers of the new Chinese-American relationship. But until he and his Chinese counterparts figure out how the pieces of the puzzle fit together, and how critically interlocked common interests can be advanced without damaging separate interests, they should observe the central maxim of international medical practice: Do No Harm.
Leslie H. Gelb, a former New York Times columnist and senior government official, is author of Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy (HarperCollins 2009), a book that shows how to think about and use power in the 21st century. He is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.
The End of National Currency
The End of National Currency
Benn Steil May/June 2007
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/626...tional-currency
Benn Steil May/June 2007
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/626...tional-currency
US Won't Accept North Korea as a Nuclear State
US Won't Accept North Korea as a Nuclear State
http://news.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/us-wont...-nuclear-state/
Gates: North Korea Nuke Progress Sign of 'Dark Future'
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/gates-nkorea-nuke-progress-sign-of-dark-future-2/
Border Calm as Tensions Rise on Korean Peninsula
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/border-...rean-peninsula/
Analysis: NKorea nuke test won't break China ties
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090530/ap_on_re_as/as_china_nkorea_analysis
A Look at North Korea's Missile Arsenal
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/a-look-...sile-arsenal-7/
http://news.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/us-wont...-nuclear-state/
Gates: North Korea Nuke Progress Sign of 'Dark Future'
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/gates-nkorea-nuke-progress-sign-of-dark-future-2/
Border Calm as Tensions Rise on Korean Peninsula
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/border-...rean-peninsula/
Analysis: NKorea nuke test won't break China ties
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090530/ap_on_re_as/as_china_nkorea_analysis
A Look at North Korea's Missile Arsenal
http://wire.antiwar.com/2009/05/30/a-look-...sile-arsenal-7/
The Nuclear Arms Race Between Pakistan And India
The Nuclear Arms Race Between Pakistan And India
A nuclear-capable missile is displayed during
National Day celebrations in Pakistan — APP photo.
Pakistan Enhances Second Strike N-Capability: US Report -- Dawn.com
WASHINGTON: Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conflict through second strike capability, says a US congressional report.
The first part of the report, published on Friday, deals with Islamabad’s efforts to develop new weapons, while the second part studies its strategy for surviving a nuclear war.
According to the report, Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.
It also has built road-mobile missiles, air defences around strategic sites, and concealment measures.
Read more ....http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/11-pakistan-enhances-second-strike-n-capability--us-report--il--12
More News On The Nuclear Arms Race Between Pakistan And India
Pakistan-India tensions spur nuclear race -- Dawn.com
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/13+pakistan-india+tensions+spur+nuclear+race-za-09
Pak develops second strike capability: US report -- SIfy
http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?a=jf4mkbfcfgf&title=Pak_develops_second_strike_capability_in_probable_nuclear_conflict_US_report&?vsv=TopHP1
Army chief expresses concern over Pak nuke arsenal -- Times Of India
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Army-chief-expresses-concern-over-Pak-nuke-arsenal/articleshow/4594926.cms
India army chief calls for Pakistan nuclear cap -- Reuters
http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-39973920090529
Pak has 60 nukes & counting... -- Economic Times of India
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/PoliticsNation/Pak-has-60-nukes--counting/articleshow/4591176.cms
South Asia nuclear upgrades worry United States -- Daily Times
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\29\story_29-5-2009_pg7_13
Pakistan and the Bomb -- Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203658504574191842820382548.html
A nuclear-capable missile is displayed during
National Day celebrations in Pakistan — APP photo.
Pakistan Enhances Second Strike N-Capability: US Report -- Dawn.com
WASHINGTON: Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conflict through second strike capability, says a US congressional report.
The first part of the report, published on Friday, deals with Islamabad’s efforts to develop new weapons, while the second part studies its strategy for surviving a nuclear war.
According to the report, Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.
It also has built road-mobile missiles, air defences around strategic sites, and concealment measures.
Read more ....http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/11-pakistan-enhances-second-strike-n-capability--us-report--il--12
More News On The Nuclear Arms Race Between Pakistan And India
Pakistan-India tensions spur nuclear race -- Dawn.com
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/13+pakistan-india+tensions+spur+nuclear+race-za-09
Pak develops second strike capability: US report -- SIfy
http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?a=jf4mkbfcfgf&title=Pak_develops_second_strike_capability_in_probable_nuclear_conflict_US_report&?vsv=TopHP1
Army chief expresses concern over Pak nuke arsenal -- Times Of India
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Army-chief-expresses-concern-over-Pak-nuke-arsenal/articleshow/4594926.cms
India army chief calls for Pakistan nuclear cap -- Reuters
http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-39973920090529
Pak has 60 nukes & counting... -- Economic Times of India
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/PoliticsNation/Pak-has-60-nukes--counting/articleshow/4591176.cms
South Asia nuclear upgrades worry United States -- Daily Times
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\29\story_29-5-2009_pg7_13
Pakistan and the Bomb -- Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203658504574191842820382548.html
5 Reasons Why this North Korean Crisis is No Groundhog's Day - Dan Twining, FP's Shadow Government.
5 Reasons Why this North Korean Crisis is No Groundhog's Day - Dan Twining, FP's Shadow Government.
North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, new threats of war against its declared enemies, and the predictable results of these developments -- expressions of concern at the UN Security Council, U.S. offers of more unconditional talks, China’s ambivalent response - suggest that we remain in the “Groundhog Day” cycle of crisis and response that has characterized U.S. policy towards Pyongyang since 1994. In fact, new dynamics on the peninsula and in the region, and the fresh opportunity provided by what can now clearly be judged to be years of failed policy on denuclearization and disarmament, present an opportunity for a creative rethink about U.S. policy options. To clarify a way forward, it’s worth considering how the playing field has shifted (I see five ways that it has), and how this may create a different set of possibilities for the United States and our allies vis-à-vis the North Korean regime -- one that breaks decisively from the past and offers real hope for change.
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/27/the_north_korean_crisis_groundhog_day_or_a_new_strategic_moment
North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, new threats of war against its declared enemies, and the predictable results of these developments -- expressions of concern at the UN Security Council, U.S. offers of more unconditional talks, China’s ambivalent response - suggest that we remain in the “Groundhog Day” cycle of crisis and response that has characterized U.S. policy towards Pyongyang since 1994. In fact, new dynamics on the peninsula and in the region, and the fresh opportunity provided by what can now clearly be judged to be years of failed policy on denuclearization and disarmament, present an opportunity for a creative rethink about U.S. policy options. To clarify a way forward, it’s worth considering how the playing field has shifted (I see five ways that it has), and how this may create a different set of possibilities for the United States and our allies vis-à-vis the North Korean regime -- one that breaks decisively from the past and offers real hope for change.
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/27/the_north_korean_crisis_groundhog_day_or_a_new_strategic_moment
A Perpetual Missile Crisis - Victor Davis Hanson, Washington Times
A Perpetual Missile Crisis - Victor Davis Hanson, Washington Times opinion. Why would the Iranian government spend billions of dollars on trying to develop a few first-generation nuclear bombs (as nearly everyone believes is the case) when the country is so poor it has to ration gasoline? A lot of reasons have been offered by various experts. Upon developing a nuclear weapon, states win instant prestige and attention beyond what they otherwise might have earned. Take away its bomb, and North Korea would be in the news about as much as Chad. Nuclear weapons also can change the nature of conventional warfare.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/31/a-perpetual-missile-crisis/
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/31/a-perpetual-missile-crisis/
Gates Calls on Asian Partners for Help in Afghanistan - Fred W. Baker III, American Forces Press Service.
Gates Calls on Asian Partners for Help in Afghanistan - Fred W. Baker III, American Forces Press Service.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today called on US allies in Asia to render more aid to bolster the fight in Afghanistan. In his opening remarks at the “Shangri-La Dialogue” Asia security summit here, Gates said terrorist groups rooted in training camps along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have international reach, even to the Asia-Pacific region. “I know some in Asia have concluded that Afghanistan does not represent a strategic threat to their countries, owing in part to Afghanistan’s geographic location,” he said. “But the threat from failed or failing states is international in scope, whether in the security, economic or ideological realm.” The secretary cited examples of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, and said some are inspired and supported by terrorist groups operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54567
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today called on US allies in Asia to render more aid to bolster the fight in Afghanistan. In his opening remarks at the “Shangri-La Dialogue” Asia security summit here, Gates said terrorist groups rooted in training camps along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have international reach, even to the Asia-Pacific region. “I know some in Asia have concluded that Afghanistan does not represent a strategic threat to their countries, owing in part to Afghanistan’s geographic location,” he said. “But the threat from failed or failing states is international in scope, whether in the security, economic or ideological realm.” The secretary cited examples of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, and said some are inspired and supported by terrorist groups operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54567
A Nation Up for Grabs - Thomas H. Henriksen, Washington Times
A Nation Up for Grabs - Thomas H. Henriksen, Washington Times opinion.
Pakistan is in political and military play. And the stakes in its struggle against Islamic extremism could not be higher for the South Asian country or the United States. Until the past few weeks, Pakistan was viewed by President Obama as a sideshow to the main event in the stiffening Taliban insurgency within neighboring Afghanistan. Now the outcome of the US-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan hinges on the fate of Pakistan's conflict with Islamic militants. The Taliban and the allied terrorist network al Qaeda have proved themselves more adept practitioners of a quickly executed strategy than the Obama administration.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/31/a-nation-up-for-grabs/
Pakistan is in political and military play. And the stakes in its struggle against Islamic extremism could not be higher for the South Asian country or the United States. Until the past few weeks, Pakistan was viewed by President Obama as a sideshow to the main event in the stiffening Taliban insurgency within neighboring Afghanistan. Now the outcome of the US-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan hinges on the fate of Pakistan's conflict with Islamic militants. The Taliban and the allied terrorist network al Qaeda have proved themselves more adept practitioners of a quickly executed strategy than the Obama administration.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/31/a-nation-up-for-grabs/
Israel to U.S.: 'Stop favoring Palestinians' By Barak Ravid
web haaretz.com
Israel to U.S.: 'Stop favoring Palestinians'
By Barak Ravid
Tensions between Washington and Jerusalem are growing after the U.S. administration's demand that Israel completely freeze construction in all West Bank settlements. Israeli political officials expressed disappointment after Tuesday's round of meetings in London with George Mitchell, U.S. President Barack Obama's envoy to the Middle East.
"We're disappointed," said one senior official. "All of the understandings reached during the [George W.] Bush administration are worth nothing." Another official said the U.S. administration is refusing every Israeli attempt to reach new agreements on settlement construction. "The United States is taking a line of granting concessions to the Palestinians that is not fair toward Israel," he said.
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The Israeli officials attributed the unyielding U.S. stance to the speech Obama will make in Cairo this Thursday, in which he is expected to deliver a message of reconciliation to the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Mitchell was joined at the London talks by his deputy David Hale, Daniel B. Shapiro (the head of the National Security Council's Middle East desk), and State Department deputy legal adviser Jonathan Schwartz.
The Israeli delegation consisted of National Security Adviser Uzi Arad, Netanyahu diplomatic envoy Yitzhak Molcho, Defense Ministry chief of staff Mike Herzog and deputy prime minister Dan Meridor.
Herzog spoke to Mitchell and his staff about understandings reached by former prime ministers Ehud Olmert and Ariel Sharon with the Bush administration on allowing continued building in the large West Bank settlement blocs. He asked that a similar agreement be reached with the Obama government.
Meridor spoke of the complexities characterizing the coalition headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and said Washington's demands of a complete construction freeze would lead to the dissolution of the Netanyahu government.
The Israeli delegates were stunned by the uncompromising U.S. stance, and by statements from Mitchell and his staff that agreements reached with the Bush administration were unacceptable. An Israeli official privy to the talks said that "the Americans took something that had been agreed on for many years and just stopped everything."
"What about the Tenet Report, which demanded that the Palestinians dismantle the terror infrastructure?" said the official, referring to former CIA director George Tenet. "It's unfair, and there is no reciprocity shown toward the Palestinians."
The Israeli envoys said the demand for a total settlement freeze was not only unworkable, but would not receive High Court sanction. Tensions reportedly reached a peak when, speaking of the Gaza disengagement, the Israelis told their interlocutors, "We evacuated 8,000 settlers on our own initiative," to which Mitchell responded simply, "We've noted that here."
Defense Minister Ehud Barak will travel to Washington today in an attempt to put further pressure on the Obama administration.
"We want to reach an agreement with the United States on ways to advance the peace process," said a senior Jerusalem official. The U.S. stance, he said, "will stall the process and bring about tension and stagnation, which will hurt both Israel and the United States."
Israel to U.S.: 'Stop favoring Palestinians'
By Barak Ravid
Tensions between Washington and Jerusalem are growing after the U.S. administration's demand that Israel completely freeze construction in all West Bank settlements. Israeli political officials expressed disappointment after Tuesday's round of meetings in London with George Mitchell, U.S. President Barack Obama's envoy to the Middle East.
"We're disappointed," said one senior official. "All of the understandings reached during the [George W.] Bush administration are worth nothing." Another official said the U.S. administration is refusing every Israeli attempt to reach new agreements on settlement construction. "The United States is taking a line of granting concessions to the Palestinians that is not fair toward Israel," he said.
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The Israeli officials attributed the unyielding U.S. stance to the speech Obama will make in Cairo this Thursday, in which he is expected to deliver a message of reconciliation to the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Mitchell was joined at the London talks by his deputy David Hale, Daniel B. Shapiro (the head of the National Security Council's Middle East desk), and State Department deputy legal adviser Jonathan Schwartz.
The Israeli delegation consisted of National Security Adviser Uzi Arad, Netanyahu diplomatic envoy Yitzhak Molcho, Defense Ministry chief of staff Mike Herzog and deputy prime minister Dan Meridor.
Herzog spoke to Mitchell and his staff about understandings reached by former prime ministers Ehud Olmert and Ariel Sharon with the Bush administration on allowing continued building in the large West Bank settlement blocs. He asked that a similar agreement be reached with the Obama government.
Meridor spoke of the complexities characterizing the coalition headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and said Washington's demands of a complete construction freeze would lead to the dissolution of the Netanyahu government.
The Israeli delegates were stunned by the uncompromising U.S. stance, and by statements from Mitchell and his staff that agreements reached with the Bush administration were unacceptable. An Israeli official privy to the talks said that "the Americans took something that had been agreed on for many years and just stopped everything."
"What about the Tenet Report, which demanded that the Palestinians dismantle the terror infrastructure?" said the official, referring to former CIA director George Tenet. "It's unfair, and there is no reciprocity shown toward the Palestinians."
The Israeli envoys said the demand for a total settlement freeze was not only unworkable, but would not receive High Court sanction. Tensions reportedly reached a peak when, speaking of the Gaza disengagement, the Israelis told their interlocutors, "We evacuated 8,000 settlers on our own initiative," to which Mitchell responded simply, "We've noted that here."
Defense Minister Ehud Barak will travel to Washington today in an attempt to put further pressure on the Obama administration.
"We want to reach an agreement with the United States on ways to advance the peace process," said a senior Jerusalem official. The U.S. stance, he said, "will stall the process and bring about tension and stagnation, which will hurt both Israel and the United States."
Saturday, May 30, 2009
American capitalism gone with a whimper
American capitalism gone with a whimper
http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/107459-0/
http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/107459-0/
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-rendition-trial19-2009may19,1,2718096.story
From the Los Angeles Times
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work
Testimony about the alleged 'rendition' of Egyptian Abu Omar features feuds and rogue conduct in a case that has apparently made and crushed careers.
By Sebastian Rotella
May 19, 2009
Reporting from Milan, Italy — The two spies were allies and kindred spirits.
Robert Seldon Lady, the CIA station chief in Milan, and Col. Stefano D'Ambrosio, the local head of the SISMI, Italy's intelligence agency, shared pride in their fight against terrorism and disdain for self-serving bosses.
On a fall day in 2002, the American made an explosive revelation. He told D'Ambrosio that, over his objections, a CIA team was in Milan doing reconnaissance for the "rendition" of an Egyptian extremist ideologue. The American was worried that the risky operation would ruin his carefully built alliances, D'Ambrosio testified years later, and could even lead to a shootout between the Americans and the Italians if things went awry on the street.
With an urgent look, spy to spy, Lady said: "Talk to your people."
D'Ambrosio recalled that he got the unspoken message: "In other words, he says . . . 'This whole thing is so crazy that if . . . two operational chiefs in the field, who know the area, who work in this territory, say that an action is completely crazy, probably they will back off.' "
Four months after the conversation in Milan, the CIA allegedly abducted the cleric and flew him to Egypt, where he was tortured for months. An international scandal ensued: The accused abductors left a sloppy trail of phone activity, credit card charges and photo IDs that allowed Milan authorities to prosecute 26 Americans (in absentia), including the now-retired Lady, and seven Italian officials.
The brazen nature of the alleged rendition has gotten much attention. But the trial has also revealed how the Bush administration's drastic tactics shook up the secret world of U.S. intelligence work overseas. Testimony has featured remarkable allegations about feuds and rogue conduct. The case apparently made and crushed careers and spread betrayal and suspicion among U.S. and Italian anti-terrorism officials.
On the witness stand in October, D'Ambrosio summed it up: "We were between the tragic and the ridiculous."
The case arose from an extrajudicial practice known as "extraordinary rendition," in which U.S. intelligence officials have secretly abducted terrorism suspects and transported them to secret detention facilities or to countries that subject the suspects to harsh interrogation and, sometimes, torture.
Unless otherwise noted, the following account is based on testimony during the trial, which has slogged on almost two years.
Tragic figure
Lady seems a rather tragic figure at the heart of the case: a veteran spy who, after the Sept. 11 attacks, established himself as a point man in the shadows of the battle against the Islamic extremist underworld. Although he took risks to try to stop the abduction, in the end he allegedly became one of its dutiful architects.
The bearded, curly-haired Lady, now 55, spoke excellent Italian. He thrived in the convivial culture of Italian law enforcement, doing business over espresso and long lunches, hosting barbecues. He cultivated bonds with anti-terrorism units of agencies that are wary of one another: the SISMI spy service, the paramilitary Carabinieri and the national police. He passed along valuable leads from U.S. intercepts and offered cash and high-tech equipment for costly stakeouts.
"We all had excellent relationships with him because this was a very affable and professionally accessible person," testified Luciano Pironi, a Carabinieri lieutenant who confessed to a hands-on role in the abduction. "I think he had given CIA souvenirs to half of Milan."
Lady also developed his own agents at a mosque that was a European hub for Al Qaeda, targeting a network suspected of sending militants to training camps in northern Iraq. He helped Milan anti-terrorism police build a case against the rendition target, Abu Omar, regarded as a vehement ideologue in the group.
At a discreet sit-down with D'Ambrosio in October 2002, however, Lady said that his CIA bosses had decided to circumvent the police and abduct Abu Omar, supposedly hoping to force him to become an informant. As a result, Lady was embroiled in a feud in his own agency. The American told D'Ambrosio that he had an "awful" relationship with the CIA's Rome station chief, who resented Lady's criticisms of the planned rendition and had sent a tough deputy to Milan to make sure he followed orders.
D'Ambrosio was dumbfounded. When Lady told him that the SISMI had dispatched Italian agents to help a team from the CIA's paramilitary "special operations group" stalk the Egyptian, D'Ambrosio realized that his own bosses were keeping him in the dark about the plan.
Warning issued
Lady said he warned higher-ups that the idea was a colossal mistake.
He said "it would eliminate from the area a subject who was known to counter-terrorism forces," D'Ambrosio said. "We knew what [Abu Omar] did, who he met, where he met them. . . . It would cause grave harm, because at the moment Abu Omar was substituted in his post, we would have to start all over again, with the risk that terrorist projects perhaps in the initial stage could be executed. . . . The subject they wanted to abduct was not certainly a subject who posed an imminent danger. Abu Omar did not go around with an AK-47 ready to shoot children."
CIA bosses dismissed objections and got clearance from top officials in Washington. D'Ambrosio testified: "I'll tell you my impression. . . . The only motive was career advancement. That is, to show Washington that [the Rome station chief] was a tough enough and skilled enough person to pull it off."
D'Ambrosio said he hurried to Bologna to urge his boss, Marco Mancini, to abort "an action in my territory . . . [that] was not only wrong but extremely dangerous. I expressed complete dissent."
Mancini seemed surprised only that the American had confided in D'Ambrosio. A few weeks later, Mancini ordered D'Ambrosio's transfer to Rome. Commiserating in Milan, Lady told his friend that the CIA chief in Rome had demanded D'Ambrosio's head. And Lady made a startling disclosure about Mancini, who soon became the No. 2 chief of the Italian spy agency.
"He told me that Mancini had offered himself to the CIA as a double agent," D'Ambrosio recalled. "And he said the CIA had made a negative response to the offer. . . . An analysis done by CIA psychologists based on conversations with Mancini had revealed according to them that Mancini had an extremely venal character."
Mancini and other Italian officials deny that allegation. In addition to the Abu Omar case, Mancini has been charged with criminal conspiracy in a corruption scandal involving illegal wiretaps and an Italian telephone company.
Despite Lady's initial objections, he is accused of setting up the abduction on Feb. 17, 2003. He allegedly recruited Pironi, the Carabinieri lieutenant, who confessed to using his badge to stop Abu Omar before masked men dragged him into a van. Pironi testified that Lady rewarded him with a paid six-day trip to the United States featuring a visit to CIA headquarters, where two top officials for European operations thanked him.
Meanwhile, the CIA's former Rome station chief -- a defendant in the Milan trial -- was promoted after the rendition, Italian investigators said.
American and Italian spymasters have been accused of efforts at a cover-up. Two weeks after the disappearance, the CIA allegedly sent Italian agencies a false report indicating that Abu Omar had gone to the Balkans.
It took a year until Abu Omar was freed from prison in Egypt and resurfaced. The official story began to unravel. But Lady's hard-won alliances and friendships with Italian police had already fallen apart amid suspicion and silence.
The U.S. government has refused to comment. The Italian government has tried to scuttle the prosecution in the name of state secrecy laws. Responding to a high court decision on a government appeal, the judge here will decide Wednesday whether the trial can continue and what evidence can be used.
rotella@latimes.com
Rotella was recently on assignment in Milan.
From the Los Angeles Times
Trial of CIA, Italian agents provides rare look at intelligence work
Testimony about the alleged 'rendition' of Egyptian Abu Omar features feuds and rogue conduct in a case that has apparently made and crushed careers.
By Sebastian Rotella
May 19, 2009
Reporting from Milan, Italy — The two spies were allies and kindred spirits.
Robert Seldon Lady, the CIA station chief in Milan, and Col. Stefano D'Ambrosio, the local head of the SISMI, Italy's intelligence agency, shared pride in their fight against terrorism and disdain for self-serving bosses.
On a fall day in 2002, the American made an explosive revelation. He told D'Ambrosio that, over his objections, a CIA team was in Milan doing reconnaissance for the "rendition" of an Egyptian extremist ideologue. The American was worried that the risky operation would ruin his carefully built alliances, D'Ambrosio testified years later, and could even lead to a shootout between the Americans and the Italians if things went awry on the street.
With an urgent look, spy to spy, Lady said: "Talk to your people."
D'Ambrosio recalled that he got the unspoken message: "In other words, he says . . . 'This whole thing is so crazy that if . . . two operational chiefs in the field, who know the area, who work in this territory, say that an action is completely crazy, probably they will back off.' "
Four months after the conversation in Milan, the CIA allegedly abducted the cleric and flew him to Egypt, where he was tortured for months. An international scandal ensued: The accused abductors left a sloppy trail of phone activity, credit card charges and photo IDs that allowed Milan authorities to prosecute 26 Americans (in absentia), including the now-retired Lady, and seven Italian officials.
The brazen nature of the alleged rendition has gotten much attention. But the trial has also revealed how the Bush administration's drastic tactics shook up the secret world of U.S. intelligence work overseas. Testimony has featured remarkable allegations about feuds and rogue conduct. The case apparently made and crushed careers and spread betrayal and suspicion among U.S. and Italian anti-terrorism officials.
On the witness stand in October, D'Ambrosio summed it up: "We were between the tragic and the ridiculous."
The case arose from an extrajudicial practice known as "extraordinary rendition," in which U.S. intelligence officials have secretly abducted terrorism suspects and transported them to secret detention facilities or to countries that subject the suspects to harsh interrogation and, sometimes, torture.
Unless otherwise noted, the following account is based on testimony during the trial, which has slogged on almost two years.
Tragic figure
Lady seems a rather tragic figure at the heart of the case: a veteran spy who, after the Sept. 11 attacks, established himself as a point man in the shadows of the battle against the Islamic extremist underworld. Although he took risks to try to stop the abduction, in the end he allegedly became one of its dutiful architects.
The bearded, curly-haired Lady, now 55, spoke excellent Italian. He thrived in the convivial culture of Italian law enforcement, doing business over espresso and long lunches, hosting barbecues. He cultivated bonds with anti-terrorism units of agencies that are wary of one another: the SISMI spy service, the paramilitary Carabinieri and the national police. He passed along valuable leads from U.S. intercepts and offered cash and high-tech equipment for costly stakeouts.
"We all had excellent relationships with him because this was a very affable and professionally accessible person," testified Luciano Pironi, a Carabinieri lieutenant who confessed to a hands-on role in the abduction. "I think he had given CIA souvenirs to half of Milan."
Lady also developed his own agents at a mosque that was a European hub for Al Qaeda, targeting a network suspected of sending militants to training camps in northern Iraq. He helped Milan anti-terrorism police build a case against the rendition target, Abu Omar, regarded as a vehement ideologue in the group.
At a discreet sit-down with D'Ambrosio in October 2002, however, Lady said that his CIA bosses had decided to circumvent the police and abduct Abu Omar, supposedly hoping to force him to become an informant. As a result, Lady was embroiled in a feud in his own agency. The American told D'Ambrosio that he had an "awful" relationship with the CIA's Rome station chief, who resented Lady's criticisms of the planned rendition and had sent a tough deputy to Milan to make sure he followed orders.
D'Ambrosio was dumbfounded. When Lady told him that the SISMI had dispatched Italian agents to help a team from the CIA's paramilitary "special operations group" stalk the Egyptian, D'Ambrosio realized that his own bosses were keeping him in the dark about the plan.
Warning issued
Lady said he warned higher-ups that the idea was a colossal mistake.
He said "it would eliminate from the area a subject who was known to counter-terrorism forces," D'Ambrosio said. "We knew what [Abu Omar] did, who he met, where he met them. . . . It would cause grave harm, because at the moment Abu Omar was substituted in his post, we would have to start all over again, with the risk that terrorist projects perhaps in the initial stage could be executed. . . . The subject they wanted to abduct was not certainly a subject who posed an imminent danger. Abu Omar did not go around with an AK-47 ready to shoot children."
CIA bosses dismissed objections and got clearance from top officials in Washington. D'Ambrosio testified: "I'll tell you my impression. . . . The only motive was career advancement. That is, to show Washington that [the Rome station chief] was a tough enough and skilled enough person to pull it off."
D'Ambrosio said he hurried to Bologna to urge his boss, Marco Mancini, to abort "an action in my territory . . . [that] was not only wrong but extremely dangerous. I expressed complete dissent."
Mancini seemed surprised only that the American had confided in D'Ambrosio. A few weeks later, Mancini ordered D'Ambrosio's transfer to Rome. Commiserating in Milan, Lady told his friend that the CIA chief in Rome had demanded D'Ambrosio's head. And Lady made a startling disclosure about Mancini, who soon became the No. 2 chief of the Italian spy agency.
"He told me that Mancini had offered himself to the CIA as a double agent," D'Ambrosio recalled. "And he said the CIA had made a negative response to the offer. . . . An analysis done by CIA psychologists based on conversations with Mancini had revealed according to them that Mancini had an extremely venal character."
Mancini and other Italian officials deny that allegation. In addition to the Abu Omar case, Mancini has been charged with criminal conspiracy in a corruption scandal involving illegal wiretaps and an Italian telephone company.
Despite Lady's initial objections, he is accused of setting up the abduction on Feb. 17, 2003. He allegedly recruited Pironi, the Carabinieri lieutenant, who confessed to using his badge to stop Abu Omar before masked men dragged him into a van. Pironi testified that Lady rewarded him with a paid six-day trip to the United States featuring a visit to CIA headquarters, where two top officials for European operations thanked him.
Meanwhile, the CIA's former Rome station chief -- a defendant in the Milan trial -- was promoted after the rendition, Italian investigators said.
American and Italian spymasters have been accused of efforts at a cover-up. Two weeks after the disappearance, the CIA allegedly sent Italian agencies a false report indicating that Abu Omar had gone to the Balkans.
It took a year until Abu Omar was freed from prison in Egypt and resurfaced. The official story began to unravel. But Lady's hard-won alliances and friendships with Italian police had already fallen apart amid suspicion and silence.
The U.S. government has refused to comment. The Italian government has tried to scuttle the prosecution in the name of state secrecy laws. Responding to a high court decision on a government appeal, the judge here will decide Wednesday whether the trial can continue and what evidence can be used.
rotella@latimes.com
Rotella was recently on assignment in Milan.
Friday, May 29, 2009
Commentary: Loose nukes terrorism by By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, UPI Editor at Large
Commentary: Loose nukes terrorism
By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, UPI Editor at Large
Published: May 29, 2009
WASHINGTON, May 28 (UPI) -- Is the world more dangerous today than it was at the height of the Cold War? Anyone who's still anyone in the field of nuclear arms control has weighed in with a resounding "yes." North Korea's second nuclear test, followed by a renunciation of the 1953 armistice agreements and more missile firings, is the latest red flag on a dark nuclear horizon. Nuclear terrorism, unthinkable during the Cold War, is now the most immediate fear of the experts.
Whether this is an ailing petulant North Korean toddler throwing his nuclear teddy bear out the stroller to gain the attention he craves, or a sick, paranoid dictator currying favor with his aging, bemedaled generals to ensure a smooth succession to the hermit throne for one of his sons, may never be known. The only power that has any influence over Kim Jong Il is China. But their leaders are reluctant to wield it lest they provoke the total collapse of the Dear Leader's gulag.
That is also South Korea's main concern. A sudden power vacuum -- or a bloody struggle for power -- would make the bill for German reunification -- $1 trillion over 10 years -- seem like chump change next to Korean reunification. East Germany had an industrial and social infrastructure; North Korea wouldhave to build from the ground up in every field of human endeavor.
Korea is just one of the nuclear nightmares now haunting the world stage. Pakistan, in the throes of near-civil war, is feverishly adding to its nuclear arsenal of between 80 and 100 weapons. Former head of the Pakistani civil service turned pundit Roedad Khan wrote:
"These are critical days in Pakistan. There is no steady hand on the tiller of government. The survival of the country, its sovereignty, its stunted democracy, its hard-won independent judiciary, all are on the line. In these dangerous times, anything is possible. I shall not be surprised at any event that may happen. The country is gripped by fear and uncertainty. … The ship of state is decrepit and leaky. The sea is turbulent. The captain has … no compass. The crew is inexperienced. If the nation doesn't wake up, we will all go down like the Titanic. History will remember both that (President) Zardari failed to hear the warning bells and the politicians failed to ring them loud enough."
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen says he is satisfied that Pakistan's nukes are under a goof-proof, fail-safe system and that warheads and their missile delivery vehicles are stored in separate places in different parts of a country of 175 million Muslims. But no U.S. officer has been allowed to see any of the storage sites. Pakistani officers ask, "You haven't let us see how yours are stored and safeguarded, so why should we let you see ours?"
More worrisome for Western intelligence services is the Pakistani nuclear establishment in Kahuta, 36 miles from Islamabad. Created by How-I-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan, the super-secret Khan Research Laboratories and missile-building facility employs some 7,000 nuclear engineers and scientists, and enriches enough plutonium to produce about six nuclear weapons a year.
Dr. "Strangelove" Khan peddled nuclear secrets to America's enemies -- North Korea (in exchange for missile technology) and Iran (for big bucks) -- and is idolized as a national hero. Presented with the CIA's evidence against A.Q. Khan, former President Pervez Musharraf placed him under house arrest after he made a groveling public confession on television -- in English, not in Urdu. But Musharraf never allowed any contact with American intelligence officials.
Recently exonerated, with apologies, by the Supreme Court, the former metallurgist still has a huge following as a national hero second only to the nation's founder, Ali Jinnah. In Kahuta, many of the buildings are named after him. And the CIA and MI6 have a hard time keeping tabs on possible leakage of nuclear materials to al-Qaida, still based in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and their Taliban insurgent allies, now active in Pakistan's four provinces and over most of Afghanistan.
That leaves Iran's nuclear ambitions as another red flag on a troubled geopolitical horizon that makes the world far less safe than it ever was during the Cold War. A.Q. Khan began helping the mullahs with nuclear know-how almost 30 years ago. Shortly after the clerics kicked out the late Shah's pro-Western monarchy in early 1979, the supreme leader, Ayatollah ("Sign of God") Ruhollah Khomeini, gave his benediction to a nuclear weapons future. The Shah told this reporter Iran would one day be a full-fledged nuclear power, and when he went into exile, Iran had 10 nuclear reactors on order -- five from the United States and five from Western Europe.
Iran's nukes are also pulling Israel's new Netanyahu government and the Obama administration apart. For the first time since 1956, when President Eisenhower ordered Israel, France and Britain out of their occupation of the Suez Canal, U.S. and Israeli strategic interests are no longer seen as one and the same.
For Israel, Jewish settlements in the West Bank have nothing to do with Iran's secret nuclear weapons program. A majority of Israelis say Iran's coming nuclear attractions constitute an existential crisis for the survival of a Jewish state. For President Obama, Israel's creeping annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem is making a Palestinian state impossible, which, in turn, leads to what Jordan's King Abdullah predicts will be another war in 2010.
Israel's new strategic affairs minister, Moshe Ya'alon, minced no words: "Settlement construction will not be halted," and "Israel will not allow the U.S. to dictate its policy." Binyamin Netanyahu's new team is also confident the U.S. Congress would never allow Obama to make aid to Israel conditional on a settlement freeze, let alone dismantling 160 major colonies that house some 300,000 Jews.
_______________________________________________
By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, UPI Editor at Large
Published: May 29, 2009
WASHINGTON, May 28 (UPI) -- Is the world more dangerous today than it was at the height of the Cold War? Anyone who's still anyone in the field of nuclear arms control has weighed in with a resounding "yes." North Korea's second nuclear test, followed by a renunciation of the 1953 armistice agreements and more missile firings, is the latest red flag on a dark nuclear horizon. Nuclear terrorism, unthinkable during the Cold War, is now the most immediate fear of the experts.
Whether this is an ailing petulant North Korean toddler throwing his nuclear teddy bear out the stroller to gain the attention he craves, or a sick, paranoid dictator currying favor with his aging, bemedaled generals to ensure a smooth succession to the hermit throne for one of his sons, may never be known. The only power that has any influence over Kim Jong Il is China. But their leaders are reluctant to wield it lest they provoke the total collapse of the Dear Leader's gulag.
That is also South Korea's main concern. A sudden power vacuum -- or a bloody struggle for power -- would make the bill for German reunification -- $1 trillion over 10 years -- seem like chump change next to Korean reunification. East Germany had an industrial and social infrastructure; North Korea wouldhave to build from the ground up in every field of human endeavor.
Korea is just one of the nuclear nightmares now haunting the world stage. Pakistan, in the throes of near-civil war, is feverishly adding to its nuclear arsenal of between 80 and 100 weapons. Former head of the Pakistani civil service turned pundit Roedad Khan wrote:
"These are critical days in Pakistan. There is no steady hand on the tiller of government. The survival of the country, its sovereignty, its stunted democracy, its hard-won independent judiciary, all are on the line. In these dangerous times, anything is possible. I shall not be surprised at any event that may happen. The country is gripped by fear and uncertainty. … The ship of state is decrepit and leaky. The sea is turbulent. The captain has … no compass. The crew is inexperienced. If the nation doesn't wake up, we will all go down like the Titanic. History will remember both that (President) Zardari failed to hear the warning bells and the politicians failed to ring them loud enough."
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen says he is satisfied that Pakistan's nukes are under a goof-proof, fail-safe system and that warheads and their missile delivery vehicles are stored in separate places in different parts of a country of 175 million Muslims. But no U.S. officer has been allowed to see any of the storage sites. Pakistani officers ask, "You haven't let us see how yours are stored and safeguarded, so why should we let you see ours?"
More worrisome for Western intelligence services is the Pakistani nuclear establishment in Kahuta, 36 miles from Islamabad. Created by How-I-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan, the super-secret Khan Research Laboratories and missile-building facility employs some 7,000 nuclear engineers and scientists, and enriches enough plutonium to produce about six nuclear weapons a year.
Dr. "Strangelove" Khan peddled nuclear secrets to America's enemies -- North Korea (in exchange for missile technology) and Iran (for big bucks) -- and is idolized as a national hero. Presented with the CIA's evidence against A.Q. Khan, former President Pervez Musharraf placed him under house arrest after he made a groveling public confession on television -- in English, not in Urdu. But Musharraf never allowed any contact with American intelligence officials.
Recently exonerated, with apologies, by the Supreme Court, the former metallurgist still has a huge following as a national hero second only to the nation's founder, Ali Jinnah. In Kahuta, many of the buildings are named after him. And the CIA and MI6 have a hard time keeping tabs on possible leakage of nuclear materials to al-Qaida, still based in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and their Taliban insurgent allies, now active in Pakistan's four provinces and over most of Afghanistan.
That leaves Iran's nuclear ambitions as another red flag on a troubled geopolitical horizon that makes the world far less safe than it ever was during the Cold War. A.Q. Khan began helping the mullahs with nuclear know-how almost 30 years ago. Shortly after the clerics kicked out the late Shah's pro-Western monarchy in early 1979, the supreme leader, Ayatollah ("Sign of God") Ruhollah Khomeini, gave his benediction to a nuclear weapons future. The Shah told this reporter Iran would one day be a full-fledged nuclear power, and when he went into exile, Iran had 10 nuclear reactors on order -- five from the United States and five from Western Europe.
Iran's nukes are also pulling Israel's new Netanyahu government and the Obama administration apart. For the first time since 1956, when President Eisenhower ordered Israel, France and Britain out of their occupation of the Suez Canal, U.S. and Israeli strategic interests are no longer seen as one and the same.
For Israel, Jewish settlements in the West Bank have nothing to do with Iran's secret nuclear weapons program. A majority of Israelis say Iran's coming nuclear attractions constitute an existential crisis for the survival of a Jewish state. For President Obama, Israel's creeping annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem is making a Palestinian state impossible, which, in turn, leads to what Jordan's King Abdullah predicts will be another war in 2010.
Israel's new strategic affairs minister, Moshe Ya'alon, minced no words: "Settlement construction will not be halted," and "Israel will not allow the U.S. to dictate its policy." Binyamin Netanyahu's new team is also confident the U.S. Congress would never allow Obama to make aid to Israel conditional on a settlement freeze, let alone dismantling 160 major colonies that house some 300,000 Jews.
_______________________________________________
Why Treat Russia as an Enemy? William Pfaff
Why Treat Russia as an Enemy?
William Pfaff
Paris, May 26, 2009 – The failure last week of Russian talks
with the European Union on the security of energy supplies to Europe
is one more occasion for Russian-Western tension. This has sent
Europeans on a search for more reliable energy sources, but these are
proving expensive and awkward.
Last week’s talks, provocatively held in the Russian Far East, in
Kahabarovsk near the Chinese frontier (no doubt to make a point about
Russia’s vast resources and wide choice of collaborators and
customers) took place at the same time that a rather pathetic NATO
exercise was being ended in Georgia. It was meant presumably as a
“warning” to Russia, but a warning of what?
The actual warning has been to NATO, which by violating its own
rules contributed to last August’s short war between Georgia and
Russia. NATO’s rules preclude membership for nations with unsettled
territorial disputes or unresolved ethnic national claims, of which
Georgia has both.
Under pressure from Americans apparently eager to humiliate
Russia, the NATO governments were persuaded to offer Georgia eventual
membership in the alliance, which Georgia’s reckless president
Mikheil Saakashvili took as authority to attack and try to seize
autonomous South Ossetia, provoking a short and sharp war with Russia
last August, which Saakashvili lost. (Ukraine, which also has a
profound internal division on cultural and historical lines, was at
the same time also offered eventual alliance membership, which has
already made trouble, and can be expected to make more in the future.)
Russian-American as well as Russia-NATO relations have been
chilly since, unsurprisingly. An excellent and clarifying brief
article on U.S. policy towards Russia appears in the current National
Interest bi-monthly, by the magazine’s publisher, Dimitri K. Simes,
and Gary Hart, the former senator and co-chairman (with Chuck Hagel)
of the Nixon Center and Harvard Kennedy School’s recent bi-partisan
commission on relations with Russia, whose report was recently
published.
The authors place part of the blame for existing Russian-U.S.
tensions with those in the United States who resent the fact that
post-Soviet Russia did not immediately remake itself on the model of
the United States, and petition to become an American protégé.
Instead, Russia today has a highly imperfect parliamentary and
presidential system with an unreliable legal system, media
suppression, and rigged elections. Its dual leadership, by the
seemingly interchangeable President Dmitri A. Medvedev and Prime
Minister and former President Vladimir Putin, seems to exercise
arbitrary power.
The authors ask if this is reason enough for the United States
to resist cooperation with Russia on matters that are of strong
mutual interest. Their answer clearly is “no.” You have to take
Russian governments as you find them, if you need to get along with
them.
Since Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council,
possesses nuclear weapons with competitive delivery systems, plus a
very great deal of oil and natural gas, and it does or could dominate
the ex-Soviet space in Central Asia as well as the Caucasus, and
borders the Caspian and Black seas, with access to Iran, it cannot be
ignored. Yet Washington has tended to behave towards it in an
antagonistic manner while demanding cooperation (which it has often
received) on matters of concern to the United States.
The authors ask a further question: “Are we holding the
Russians to a higher standard of performance than we do other nations
with whom we deal? And if so, why?” The answer is that we are --
notably by continuing to withhold trade benefits from it under the
Jackson-Vanik amendment (passed in American law many years ago to
force the Soviet Union to make democratic concessions, and to allow
Jewish emigration). The Jackson-Vanik restrictions are no longer
imposed on China or Vietnam, or Georgia or Ukraine. Why on Russia,
which is no more undemocratic than China or Vietnam?
Hart and Simes blame “the dangerous triumphalism that has
shaped U.S. international strategy since 1993.” This is a problem
among “a majority of America’s political leaders and its wider
foreign-policy elite” who hold “the arrogant yet naïve view that the
United States could shape the world order without the consent of the
other major powers and without creating a backlash against America
and American leadership.” They have treated Russia as a “defeated
country.”
An answer to this criticism has come from John R. Bolton, one
of the most belligerent of the Bush administration neo-conservatives
and a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, a body he
indicated would better be dismantled with NATO taking its place.
Bolton says that the U.S. under Barack Obama is anxious to give
away America’s strategic assets to the Russians, in a desire to
please its liberal friends and get a new Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty before Christmas, at the cost of imposing on the U.S. a
“dangerously low” level of nuclear warheads, and abandoning the
“defense system intended for Poland and the Czech Republic.” (It
formerly was described in the U.S. as a defense system intended for
Americans.)
The basic question is whether the United States wishes to treat
Russia as a permanent enemy, if it is not. The result of treating
states as enemies is that sooner or later they become one. One might
think the United States already has enough enemies.
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights
Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=402
William Pfaff
Paris, May 26, 2009 – The failure last week of Russian talks
with the European Union on the security of energy supplies to Europe
is one more occasion for Russian-Western tension. This has sent
Europeans on a search for more reliable energy sources, but these are
proving expensive and awkward.
Last week’s talks, provocatively held in the Russian Far East, in
Kahabarovsk near the Chinese frontier (no doubt to make a point about
Russia’s vast resources and wide choice of collaborators and
customers) took place at the same time that a rather pathetic NATO
exercise was being ended in Georgia. It was meant presumably as a
“warning” to Russia, but a warning of what?
The actual warning has been to NATO, which by violating its own
rules contributed to last August’s short war between Georgia and
Russia. NATO’s rules preclude membership for nations with unsettled
territorial disputes or unresolved ethnic national claims, of which
Georgia has both.
Under pressure from Americans apparently eager to humiliate
Russia, the NATO governments were persuaded to offer Georgia eventual
membership in the alliance, which Georgia’s reckless president
Mikheil Saakashvili took as authority to attack and try to seize
autonomous South Ossetia, provoking a short and sharp war with Russia
last August, which Saakashvili lost. (Ukraine, which also has a
profound internal division on cultural and historical lines, was at
the same time also offered eventual alliance membership, which has
already made trouble, and can be expected to make more in the future.)
Russian-American as well as Russia-NATO relations have been
chilly since, unsurprisingly. An excellent and clarifying brief
article on U.S. policy towards Russia appears in the current National
Interest bi-monthly, by the magazine’s publisher, Dimitri K. Simes,
and Gary Hart, the former senator and co-chairman (with Chuck Hagel)
of the Nixon Center and Harvard Kennedy School’s recent bi-partisan
commission on relations with Russia, whose report was recently
published.
The authors place part of the blame for existing Russian-U.S.
tensions with those in the United States who resent the fact that
post-Soviet Russia did not immediately remake itself on the model of
the United States, and petition to become an American protégé.
Instead, Russia today has a highly imperfect parliamentary and
presidential system with an unreliable legal system, media
suppression, and rigged elections. Its dual leadership, by the
seemingly interchangeable President Dmitri A. Medvedev and Prime
Minister and former President Vladimir Putin, seems to exercise
arbitrary power.
The authors ask if this is reason enough for the United States
to resist cooperation with Russia on matters that are of strong
mutual interest. Their answer clearly is “no.” You have to take
Russian governments as you find them, if you need to get along with
them.
Since Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council,
possesses nuclear weapons with competitive delivery systems, plus a
very great deal of oil and natural gas, and it does or could dominate
the ex-Soviet space in Central Asia as well as the Caucasus, and
borders the Caspian and Black seas, with access to Iran, it cannot be
ignored. Yet Washington has tended to behave towards it in an
antagonistic manner while demanding cooperation (which it has often
received) on matters of concern to the United States.
The authors ask a further question: “Are we holding the
Russians to a higher standard of performance than we do other nations
with whom we deal? And if so, why?” The answer is that we are --
notably by continuing to withhold trade benefits from it under the
Jackson-Vanik amendment (passed in American law many years ago to
force the Soviet Union to make democratic concessions, and to allow
Jewish emigration). The Jackson-Vanik restrictions are no longer
imposed on China or Vietnam, or Georgia or Ukraine. Why on Russia,
which is no more undemocratic than China or Vietnam?
Hart and Simes blame “the dangerous triumphalism that has
shaped U.S. international strategy since 1993.” This is a problem
among “a majority of America’s political leaders and its wider
foreign-policy elite” who hold “the arrogant yet naïve view that the
United States could shape the world order without the consent of the
other major powers and without creating a backlash against America
and American leadership.” They have treated Russia as a “defeated
country.”
An answer to this criticism has come from John R. Bolton, one
of the most belligerent of the Bush administration neo-conservatives
and a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, a body he
indicated would better be dismantled with NATO taking its place.
Bolton says that the U.S. under Barack Obama is anxious to give
away America’s strategic assets to the Russians, in a desire to
please its liberal friends and get a new Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty before Christmas, at the cost of imposing on the U.S. a
“dangerously low” level of nuclear warheads, and abandoning the
“defense system intended for Poland and the Czech Republic.” (It
formerly was described in the U.S. as a defense system intended for
Americans.)
The basic question is whether the United States wishes to treat
Russia as a permanent enemy, if it is not. The result of treating
states as enemies is that sooner or later they become one. One might
think the United States already has enough enemies.
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights
Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=402
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut by SWJ Editors
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut
by SWJ Editors
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut
by Clint Watts, Small Wars Journal
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/countering-terrorism-from-the/
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/247-watts.pdf
Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, which ended in early 1989, created a glut of foreign fighters, who found themselves unwanted by their home/source countries and restless for another Jihadi campaign. This “First Foreign Fighter Glut” spawned al-Qa’ida (AQ) and a decade of increasingly lethal terrorist attacks leading up to September 11, 2001.
Today, Western nations face a smaller, more lethal threat resulting from the “Second Foreign Fighter Glut.” As major conflicts in Iraq and later Afghanistan diminish in scale, a new generation of former foreign fighters will sit idle in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The future success of AQ hinges on its recruitment process in which former foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan guide the recruitment and production of future foreign fighters who will conduct regional and global terrorist attacks. Left unchecked, the Second Foreign Fighter Glut will produce the next generation of terrorist organizations and attacks much as the First Foreign Fighter Glut fueled AQ.
Current Western counterterrorism (CT) strategies, largely overshadowed by counterinsurgencies (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan, place great emphasis on eliminating the supply of foreign fighters at their intended targets. These strategies fail to adequately mitigate the demand for jihad by young recruits in foreign fighter source countries.
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)
Continue reading "Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut" »
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/247-watts.pdf
by SWJ Editors
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut
by Clint Watts, Small Wars Journal
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/countering-terrorism-from-the/
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/247-watts.pdf
Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, which ended in early 1989, created a glut of foreign fighters, who found themselves unwanted by their home/source countries and restless for another Jihadi campaign. This “First Foreign Fighter Glut” spawned al-Qa’ida (AQ) and a decade of increasingly lethal terrorist attacks leading up to September 11, 2001.
Today, Western nations face a smaller, more lethal threat resulting from the “Second Foreign Fighter Glut.” As major conflicts in Iraq and later Afghanistan diminish in scale, a new generation of former foreign fighters will sit idle in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The future success of AQ hinges on its recruitment process in which former foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan guide the recruitment and production of future foreign fighters who will conduct regional and global terrorist attacks. Left unchecked, the Second Foreign Fighter Glut will produce the next generation of terrorist organizations and attacks much as the First Foreign Fighter Glut fueled AQ.
Current Western counterterrorism (CT) strategies, largely overshadowed by counterinsurgencies (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan, place great emphasis on eliminating the supply of foreign fighters at their intended targets. These strategies fail to adequately mitigate the demand for jihad by young recruits in foreign fighter source countries.
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)
Continue reading "Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut" »
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/247-watts.pdf
Nuclear Aims by Pakistan, India Prompt U.S. Concern
Nuclear Aims by Pakistan, India Prompt U.S. Concern
R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, The Washington Post
Sometime next year, at a tightly guarded site south of its capital, Pakistan will be ready to start churning out a new stream of plutonium for its nuclear arsenal, which will eventually include warheads for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of being launched from ships, submarines or aircraft.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/27/AR2009052703706.html
R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, The Washington Post
Sometime next year, at a tightly guarded site south of its capital, Pakistan will be ready to start churning out a new stream of plutonium for its nuclear arsenal, which will eventually include warheads for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of being launched from ships, submarines or aircraft.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/27/AR2009052703706.html
The North Korean Nuclear Test: The Japanese Reaction Masako Toki, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The North Korean Nuclear Test: The Japanese Reaction
Masako Toki, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Only 50 days ago, Japan called on the U.N. Security Council to condemn North Korea's long-range missile launch. On May 25, Tokyo once again appealed to the Security Council for an emergency meeting to condemn Pyongyang--this time for its second nuclear test and its subsequent launch of three short-range missiles.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-north-korean-nuclear-test-the-japanese-reaction
Masako Toki, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Only 50 days ago, Japan called on the U.N. Security Council to condemn North Korea's long-range missile launch. On May 25, Tokyo once again appealed to the Security Council for an emergency meeting to condemn Pyongyang--this time for its second nuclear test and its subsequent launch of three short-range missiles.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-north-korean-nuclear-test-the-japanese-reaction
North Korea Threatens Attack Amid Escalating Nuclear Dispute by Christian Oliver and Daniel Dombey, Financial Times
North Korea Threatens Attack Amid Escalating Nuclear Dispute
by Christian Oliver and Daniel Dombey, Financial Times
North Korea threatened yesterday to attack the South if Seoul intercepted any of Pyongyang's ships to check for weapons shipments - further raising tensions on the peninsula after a nuclear warhead test on Monday.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df2388f2-4b1f-11de-87c2-00144feabdc0.html
* Commercial Satellite Imagery of 2009 Nuclear Test Site in North Korea (PDF)
http://isis-online.org/publications/dprk/NorthKoreaTest_27May2009.pdf
by Christian Oliver and Daniel Dombey, Financial Times
North Korea threatened yesterday to attack the South if Seoul intercepted any of Pyongyang's ships to check for weapons shipments - further raising tensions on the peninsula after a nuclear warhead test on Monday.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df2388f2-4b1f-11de-87c2-00144feabdc0.html
* Commercial Satellite Imagery of 2009 Nuclear Test Site in North Korea (PDF)
http://isis-online.org/publications/dprk/NorthKoreaTest_27May2009.pdf
How to Reduce the Nuclear Threat
How to Reduce the Nuclear Threat
William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft and Charles D. Ferguson, The Wall Street Journal
Jong-ilMonday's North Korean nuclear test was a dramatic reminder of the challenges to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. President Barack Obama has stated that he intends to pursue this goal while maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. But achieving nuclear abolition will likely require many years.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision the necessary geopolitical conditions that would permit even approaching that goal. Unless the U.S. and its partners re-energize international efforts to lessen the present dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124338405214956695.html
William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft and Charles D. Ferguson, The Wall Street Journal
Jong-ilMonday's North Korean nuclear test was a dramatic reminder of the challenges to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. President Barack Obama has stated that he intends to pursue this goal while maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. But achieving nuclear abolition will likely require many years.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision the necessary geopolitical conditions that would permit even approaching that goal. Unless the U.S. and its partners re-energize international efforts to lessen the present dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124338405214956695.html
Little leaps forward? By Geoff Dyer
Little leaps forward?
By Geoff Dyer
The Financial Times: May 27 2009
Children playing in front of portrait of late Chairman Mao Zedong
Faded supremacy: Shanghai children beneath a mural depicting Mao Zedong. Since his time, decisions are made more by consensus among party leaders
Ever since China’s leaders sent in tanks and soldiers to mow down pro-democracy protesters in Beijing 20 years ago, the Chinese Communist party has faced a constant stream of predictions about its imminent demise. American President Bill Clinton was one of the most pointed critics, telling Jiang Zemin, Chinese president, in 1997 that China’s authoritarian system “was on the wrong side of history”.
This year has been no different. The global economic crisis has led to at least 20m factory workers losing their jobs, and would, according to some forecasts, undermine the legitimacy of the Communist party.
Yet 20 years after the Beijing massacre, the Communist leaders remain firmly in control. There is no coherent challenge to their rule and, although grassroots protests are widespread, the simmering discontent of 1989 is less evident today, especially in the main cities. Even the economy appears to have begun to recover more quickly than that of any other major country.
Opinion polls have to be viewed cautiously as respondents might be afraid to criticise the government openly, but they generally show a level of optimism that few nations can match.
“There is a lot of unhappiness, but surveys tend to show that hope is rising and people generally think the country is going in the right direction,” says Cheng Li, a Chinese politics expert at the Brookings Institution.
The apologetic tone that leaders once adopted on political issues has gradually been replaced by more confident claims about the benefits of a “China model”. Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the central bank, recently said indications China was recovering from the crisis demonstrated “its superior system” when it came to making important decisions.
From Russia to Venezuela, other countries have trumpeted a more authoritarian, statist approach in recent years, but it is China with its steamroller economy and rising international influence that poses the biggest challenge to the postwar march of democracy. Indeed, the fate of the Communist party – whether it maintains its tight grip on power or is forced to give way to more democratic forms of government – will be one of the defining stories of the century.
Just how has China managed to disarm the democracy movement? The basic outline of the approach is well understood – a mixture of wealth from a dynamic economy and repression. The state clamps down on signs of organised opposition and boasts an increasingly sophisticated propaganda machine, skilled at fanning the flames of nationalist sentiment.
Yet there are other explanations for the durability of the one-party state. Beneath its Leninist surface, the CCP has introduced a string of reforms aimed at boosting its ability to govern and adapt to a changing society.
Training for officials has been improved, including the opening of MBA-style colleges for party members. The CCP’s all-powerful personnel department has imposed rotation of officials to reduce scope for corruption and broaden experience, as well as enforcing retirement for older officials. In 2007 alone, about 200,000 local government officials changed positions.
Since 2002, private entrepreneurs – a potential source of opposition – have been allowed to join the party; in one recent list of the country’s richest people, one-third were CCP members. Although public debate on sensitive topics is still closely curtailed, the CCP has established stronger ties with intellectuals and professionals to solicit expert advice. New labour laws to strengthen workers’ rights, for example, were drafted with the help of academics. Some intellectuals were motivated to advise the Tiananmen protesters by their anger at being ignored: now, their successors give regular private briefings to top leaders.
While a small group of scholars openly supports democracy, other academics are trying to find ways to gauge public opinion without elections. Experiments are being conducted with focus groups, opinion polls and public hearings. The objective is not to pave the way slowly towards a more democratic system but to make the one-party state more effective and durable.
The CCP also seems to have established a more stable process for leadership transitions – the Achilles heel of so many authoritarian regimes. Hu Jintao was anointed the next leader a decade before he took over in 2002, which helped avoid a destabilising power struggle when he took office. For the next generation, the leadership has been selected five years ahead of time, with Xi Jinping expected to become president and CCP boss in 2012, with Li Keqiang as premier. Most importantly, these decisions were the result of consensus among senior party members, not the word of one dominant figure such as Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.
In his book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, David Shambaugh of George Washington University described the 10-year effort by the CCP to study the decline of the Soviet Union and learn survival lessons. Some conclusions were obvious, such as the need to avoid economic stagnation and military adventures overseas. But the CCP also decided to make its officials more professional and allow for dissent and debate within the party. “The lesson [from the Soviet experience] is clear: adapt and change or atrophy and die,” Mr Shambaugh concluded. “The CCP has clearly chosen the former option.”
None of this is to deny that there are clear limits on political discussion and activity – the CCP does not allow debate about its own legitimacy or any potential challengers. But the capacity for flexibility helps explain how the party has avoided becoming an ossified oligarchy in the eyes of many Chinese.
If the CCP has stifled calls for democracy by adapting, the other reason for its resilience has been the important changes in peoples’ lives that go well beyond the expansion in incomes.
Society can still seem highly controlled to many westerners, but petty interference by the state has diminished dramatically – especially for the urban middle class. The young have grown up hearing about how the authorities decided the length of hair and clothes to be worn. Even in the 1980s, getting married required the approval of officials from the “work unit”, the employer-based bureaucracy that controlled many aspects of private life. Getting tickets to the theatre or to travel often required official stamps. Large parts of that supervision, one of the underlying complaints of the Tiananmen generation, have disappeared.
Academic debate in elite circles has become much more open. The internet is another important part of that sense of liberation. Whether it really does allow a wide discussion of sensitive issues or whether, actually, the government’s extensive censorship efforts restrict discussions to safer topics is open to question. But young internet-savvy people genuinely believe their access to information has been greatly enhanced.
Foxshuo, a 22-year-old blogger from Wuhan in central China, says the government’s propaganda tactics – which range from blocking sites to paying students to make pro-CCP comments in chatrooms – are often fruitless. “Even though we have to use proxies or encryption tools, which can be a complicated process, we eventually get to find out what we want,” he says. “The internet environment is harsher than in many western countries, but westerners would be wrong to think that China has no freedom at all.” In other words, whatever the reality, the flow of information feels free to the young.
As a result of the effective combination of governance reforms and co-opting the rich and the middle class, few analysts believe the party will face a serious threat over the next decade.
Yet there are also plenty of reasons for thinking that the party will come under greater pressure to introduce deeper political reforms. For all the resilience the party has shown, its support at the level of ideas is shallow.
When asked if they support multiparty elections, the young will often sound sceptical but they are also quite likely to express strong support for much greater freedom for media and for civil society organisations. Opinion surveys bear some of this out. A study of youth attitudes prepared by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found 61 per cent said they identified with “liberalism”. Surveys also indicate that most of the bright young people who apply for membership are mostly interested in the job opportunities that party membership might bring.
The youth are gradually shedding their image as an apolitical, materialistic “me generation”. The Sichuan earthquake last year exposed a deep vein of idealism that is not otherwise being channelled. On the campuses of the leading universities, environmental protection is becoming as important an issue as it is in the west.
Chart comparing China GDP and freedom criteria to other Bric countriesThe sense that the CCP has yet to win the political argument is reinforced by the frequency with which leaders use the word “democracy”. In his speech to the National Peoples’ Congress this year, Premier Wen Jiabao said: “We need to improve democratic institutions, enrich the forms of democracy, expand its channels, and carry out democratic elections.”
What they mean by “democracy” is different from what reformers seek or how it is practised elsewhere – usually some modest form of inner-party vote on specific CCP posts. But the fact that leaders feel the need to couch their words in the language of democratic reform is not indicative of a regime with solid intellectual foundations.
The country is a long way from creating the sort of institution that can channel legitimate complaints from citizens and counterbalance unaccountable political power. Important court decisions are still referred to party officials and the centuries-old petitioning system, where people lodge complaints to the authorities, is known for corruption and abuse.
For all the party’s success in blunting any challenge from the new middle class, it has been helped by the fact that the number of people whose income makes them genuinely comfortable is still relatively small. Car ownership in China – an important badge of middle-class status – is only 2-3 per cent. One popular idea among political scientists is that pressure for democracy really starts to build when gross domestic product per capita reaches $5,000-$6,000. Based on purchasing power parity China has reached this, although in nominal terms it is still barely half that level. This means the theory that a flourishing middle class will challenge the CCP is only just starting to be tested in China.
Moreover, the very flexibility that has helped the party survive means that the status quo is unlikely to hold. “If the CCP really is so resilient, it will have to adapt into something fundamentally different as society changes,” says Cheng Li at Brookings. China’s dissidents hope social changes will eventually propel political reform. “For now, the attempts to protect individual rights are dissipated and fractured,” says Bao Tong, a former senior official whose reformist views led him to be imprisoned after Tiananmen. “But if all those pieces can be gathered together, they will create a power that will influence China’s leaders.”
Additional reporting by Yang Jie
......................................................
June 4 1989: The day the tanks moved in
Tanks in Tiananmen Square 1989
On the night of June 3 1989, soldiers arrived at the scene of protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. By the next day they had cleared it and the army was in control.
Independent estimates of deaths range from 500 to several thousand. The government claimed no one was killed on the square itself, although this has been contradicted by witnesses. However, most deaths did occur elsewhere in the city, in particular around Muxidi to the west, where residents tried to block the soldiers.
Recently leaked documents say that in the days after the massacre, anti-government protests occurred in 181 places around the country.
PROTEST 20 YEARS ON
From jail time to a ‘cup of tea’ with the police
Liu Xiaobo is China’s latest democracy martyr. Late last year, he helped write Charter 08, a pro-democracy manifesto that organisers say has been signed by 8,000 people. He has been in jail since December 8, write Geoff Dyer and Jamil Anderlini.
The fate of Charter 08 illustrates the way China smothers its democracy movement to avoid any repetition of the Tiananmen protests. Promoting democracy is not illegal, at least within a circle of approved academics. Beijing University’s Yu Keping, an occasional adviser to President Hu Jintao, published Democracy is a Good Thing last year. But the state cracks down on sensitive discussions outside its control. Mr Liu was charged with “inciting subversion of state power”.
“There can never be harmony when there is a constant crackdown under way,” says Bao Tong, a prominent dissident. “China is stable but turbulent at all times under this government.”
Repression can be subtle. Tang Xiaozhao, a blogger, describes how after signing the charter she was invited to “have a cup of tea” by the police, who told her off for being naive. “What can you change by signing a document? It’s no use. It could only bring you trouble. I think you are not mature enough in politics,” she says she was told. A blocked promotion or a word with relatives are other methods of marginalising persistent critics.
Charter 08 has an impressive number of signatories given the risks. But some liberal academics declined to sign it because they thought it too foreign, modelled as it was on Charter 77, the anti-Soviet manifesto issued in what was Czechoslovakia by intellectuals such as Vaclav Havel.
Qin Hui, a historian at Tsinghua University in Beijing, says he approved of a lot of the ideas in the document but it did not “suit the characteristics of China’s special situation”. The implication is that future reformers must present their ideas as continuous with Chinese traditions and history rather than adopting an occidental blueprint.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
By Geoff Dyer
The Financial Times: May 27 2009
Children playing in front of portrait of late Chairman Mao Zedong
Faded supremacy: Shanghai children beneath a mural depicting Mao Zedong. Since his time, decisions are made more by consensus among party leaders
Ever since China’s leaders sent in tanks and soldiers to mow down pro-democracy protesters in Beijing 20 years ago, the Chinese Communist party has faced a constant stream of predictions about its imminent demise. American President Bill Clinton was one of the most pointed critics, telling Jiang Zemin, Chinese president, in 1997 that China’s authoritarian system “was on the wrong side of history”.
This year has been no different. The global economic crisis has led to at least 20m factory workers losing their jobs, and would, according to some forecasts, undermine the legitimacy of the Communist party.
Yet 20 years after the Beijing massacre, the Communist leaders remain firmly in control. There is no coherent challenge to their rule and, although grassroots protests are widespread, the simmering discontent of 1989 is less evident today, especially in the main cities. Even the economy appears to have begun to recover more quickly than that of any other major country.
Opinion polls have to be viewed cautiously as respondents might be afraid to criticise the government openly, but they generally show a level of optimism that few nations can match.
“There is a lot of unhappiness, but surveys tend to show that hope is rising and people generally think the country is going in the right direction,” says Cheng Li, a Chinese politics expert at the Brookings Institution.
The apologetic tone that leaders once adopted on political issues has gradually been replaced by more confident claims about the benefits of a “China model”. Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the central bank, recently said indications China was recovering from the crisis demonstrated “its superior system” when it came to making important decisions.
From Russia to Venezuela, other countries have trumpeted a more authoritarian, statist approach in recent years, but it is China with its steamroller economy and rising international influence that poses the biggest challenge to the postwar march of democracy. Indeed, the fate of the Communist party – whether it maintains its tight grip on power or is forced to give way to more democratic forms of government – will be one of the defining stories of the century.
Just how has China managed to disarm the democracy movement? The basic outline of the approach is well understood – a mixture of wealth from a dynamic economy and repression. The state clamps down on signs of organised opposition and boasts an increasingly sophisticated propaganda machine, skilled at fanning the flames of nationalist sentiment.
Yet there are other explanations for the durability of the one-party state. Beneath its Leninist surface, the CCP has introduced a string of reforms aimed at boosting its ability to govern and adapt to a changing society.
Training for officials has been improved, including the opening of MBA-style colleges for party members. The CCP’s all-powerful personnel department has imposed rotation of officials to reduce scope for corruption and broaden experience, as well as enforcing retirement for older officials. In 2007 alone, about 200,000 local government officials changed positions.
Since 2002, private entrepreneurs – a potential source of opposition – have been allowed to join the party; in one recent list of the country’s richest people, one-third were CCP members. Although public debate on sensitive topics is still closely curtailed, the CCP has established stronger ties with intellectuals and professionals to solicit expert advice. New labour laws to strengthen workers’ rights, for example, were drafted with the help of academics. Some intellectuals were motivated to advise the Tiananmen protesters by their anger at being ignored: now, their successors give regular private briefings to top leaders.
While a small group of scholars openly supports democracy, other academics are trying to find ways to gauge public opinion without elections. Experiments are being conducted with focus groups, opinion polls and public hearings. The objective is not to pave the way slowly towards a more democratic system but to make the one-party state more effective and durable.
The CCP also seems to have established a more stable process for leadership transitions – the Achilles heel of so many authoritarian regimes. Hu Jintao was anointed the next leader a decade before he took over in 2002, which helped avoid a destabilising power struggle when he took office. For the next generation, the leadership has been selected five years ahead of time, with Xi Jinping expected to become president and CCP boss in 2012, with Li Keqiang as premier. Most importantly, these decisions were the result of consensus among senior party members, not the word of one dominant figure such as Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.
In his book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, David Shambaugh of George Washington University described the 10-year effort by the CCP to study the decline of the Soviet Union and learn survival lessons. Some conclusions were obvious, such as the need to avoid economic stagnation and military adventures overseas. But the CCP also decided to make its officials more professional and allow for dissent and debate within the party. “The lesson [from the Soviet experience] is clear: adapt and change or atrophy and die,” Mr Shambaugh concluded. “The CCP has clearly chosen the former option.”
None of this is to deny that there are clear limits on political discussion and activity – the CCP does not allow debate about its own legitimacy or any potential challengers. But the capacity for flexibility helps explain how the party has avoided becoming an ossified oligarchy in the eyes of many Chinese.
If the CCP has stifled calls for democracy by adapting, the other reason for its resilience has been the important changes in peoples’ lives that go well beyond the expansion in incomes.
Society can still seem highly controlled to many westerners, but petty interference by the state has diminished dramatically – especially for the urban middle class. The young have grown up hearing about how the authorities decided the length of hair and clothes to be worn. Even in the 1980s, getting married required the approval of officials from the “work unit”, the employer-based bureaucracy that controlled many aspects of private life. Getting tickets to the theatre or to travel often required official stamps. Large parts of that supervision, one of the underlying complaints of the Tiananmen generation, have disappeared.
Academic debate in elite circles has become much more open. The internet is another important part of that sense of liberation. Whether it really does allow a wide discussion of sensitive issues or whether, actually, the government’s extensive censorship efforts restrict discussions to safer topics is open to question. But young internet-savvy people genuinely believe their access to information has been greatly enhanced.
Foxshuo, a 22-year-old blogger from Wuhan in central China, says the government’s propaganda tactics – which range from blocking sites to paying students to make pro-CCP comments in chatrooms – are often fruitless. “Even though we have to use proxies or encryption tools, which can be a complicated process, we eventually get to find out what we want,” he says. “The internet environment is harsher than in many western countries, but westerners would be wrong to think that China has no freedom at all.” In other words, whatever the reality, the flow of information feels free to the young.
As a result of the effective combination of governance reforms and co-opting the rich and the middle class, few analysts believe the party will face a serious threat over the next decade.
Yet there are also plenty of reasons for thinking that the party will come under greater pressure to introduce deeper political reforms. For all the resilience the party has shown, its support at the level of ideas is shallow.
When asked if they support multiparty elections, the young will often sound sceptical but they are also quite likely to express strong support for much greater freedom for media and for civil society organisations. Opinion surveys bear some of this out. A study of youth attitudes prepared by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found 61 per cent said they identified with “liberalism”. Surveys also indicate that most of the bright young people who apply for membership are mostly interested in the job opportunities that party membership might bring.
The youth are gradually shedding their image as an apolitical, materialistic “me generation”. The Sichuan earthquake last year exposed a deep vein of idealism that is not otherwise being channelled. On the campuses of the leading universities, environmental protection is becoming as important an issue as it is in the west.
Chart comparing China GDP and freedom criteria to other Bric countriesThe sense that the CCP has yet to win the political argument is reinforced by the frequency with which leaders use the word “democracy”. In his speech to the National Peoples’ Congress this year, Premier Wen Jiabao said: “We need to improve democratic institutions, enrich the forms of democracy, expand its channels, and carry out democratic elections.”
What they mean by “democracy” is different from what reformers seek or how it is practised elsewhere – usually some modest form of inner-party vote on specific CCP posts. But the fact that leaders feel the need to couch their words in the language of democratic reform is not indicative of a regime with solid intellectual foundations.
The country is a long way from creating the sort of institution that can channel legitimate complaints from citizens and counterbalance unaccountable political power. Important court decisions are still referred to party officials and the centuries-old petitioning system, where people lodge complaints to the authorities, is known for corruption and abuse.
For all the party’s success in blunting any challenge from the new middle class, it has been helped by the fact that the number of people whose income makes them genuinely comfortable is still relatively small. Car ownership in China – an important badge of middle-class status – is only 2-3 per cent. One popular idea among political scientists is that pressure for democracy really starts to build when gross domestic product per capita reaches $5,000-$6,000. Based on purchasing power parity China has reached this, although in nominal terms it is still barely half that level. This means the theory that a flourishing middle class will challenge the CCP is only just starting to be tested in China.
Moreover, the very flexibility that has helped the party survive means that the status quo is unlikely to hold. “If the CCP really is so resilient, it will have to adapt into something fundamentally different as society changes,” says Cheng Li at Brookings. China’s dissidents hope social changes will eventually propel political reform. “For now, the attempts to protect individual rights are dissipated and fractured,” says Bao Tong, a former senior official whose reformist views led him to be imprisoned after Tiananmen. “But if all those pieces can be gathered together, they will create a power that will influence China’s leaders.”
Additional reporting by Yang Jie
......................................................
June 4 1989: The day the tanks moved in
Tanks in Tiananmen Square 1989
On the night of June 3 1989, soldiers arrived at the scene of protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. By the next day they had cleared it and the army was in control.
Independent estimates of deaths range from 500 to several thousand. The government claimed no one was killed on the square itself, although this has been contradicted by witnesses. However, most deaths did occur elsewhere in the city, in particular around Muxidi to the west, where residents tried to block the soldiers.
Recently leaked documents say that in the days after the massacre, anti-government protests occurred in 181 places around the country.
PROTEST 20 YEARS ON
From jail time to a ‘cup of tea’ with the police
Liu Xiaobo is China’s latest democracy martyr. Late last year, he helped write Charter 08, a pro-democracy manifesto that organisers say has been signed by 8,000 people. He has been in jail since December 8, write Geoff Dyer and Jamil Anderlini.
The fate of Charter 08 illustrates the way China smothers its democracy movement to avoid any repetition of the Tiananmen protests. Promoting democracy is not illegal, at least within a circle of approved academics. Beijing University’s Yu Keping, an occasional adviser to President Hu Jintao, published Democracy is a Good Thing last year. But the state cracks down on sensitive discussions outside its control. Mr Liu was charged with “inciting subversion of state power”.
“There can never be harmony when there is a constant crackdown under way,” says Bao Tong, a prominent dissident. “China is stable but turbulent at all times under this government.”
Repression can be subtle. Tang Xiaozhao, a blogger, describes how after signing the charter she was invited to “have a cup of tea” by the police, who told her off for being naive. “What can you change by signing a document? It’s no use. It could only bring you trouble. I think you are not mature enough in politics,” she says she was told. A blocked promotion or a word with relatives are other methods of marginalising persistent critics.
Charter 08 has an impressive number of signatories given the risks. But some liberal academics declined to sign it because they thought it too foreign, modelled as it was on Charter 77, the anti-Soviet manifesto issued in what was Czechoslovakia by intellectuals such as Vaclav Havel.
Qin Hui, a historian at Tsinghua University in Beijing, says he approved of a lot of the ideas in the document but it did not “suit the characteristics of China’s special situation”. The implication is that future reformers must present their ideas as continuous with Chinese traditions and history rather than adopting an occidental blueprint.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
Putin Is Snookering Obama - Daniel Kimmage, Foreign Policy
Putin Is Snookering Obama
- Daniel Kimmage, Foreign Policy
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4948
- Daniel Kimmage, Foreign Policy
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4948
Russia’s first Persian Gulf naval presence coordinated with Tehran DEBKAfile Exclusive Report
Russia’s first Persian Gulf naval presence coordinated with Tehran
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report
May 26, 2009, 6:47 PM (GMT+02:00)
Russian warships are due to call Wednesday, May 27, at the Bahrain port of Manama, seat of the US Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, DEBKAfile’s military sources reveal. They will be following in the wake of the Russian vessels already docked at the Omani port of Salalah, the first to avail themselves of facilities at Gulf ports.
Their arrival is fully coordinated between the Russian and Iranian naval commands.
According to our sources, this is the first time a Russian flotilla will have taken on provisions and fuel at the same Gulf ports which hitherto serviced only the US Navy. Moscow has thus gained its first maritime foothold in the Persian Gulf.
The flotilla consists of four vessels from Russia’s Pacific Fleet: The submarine fighter Admiral Panteleyev is due at Manama Wednesday, escorted by the refueling-supply ship Izhorai, The supply-battleship Irkut and the rescue craft BM-37 are already docked in Salalah.
DEBKAfile’s military sources report that the Russians, like the Iranians, cover their stealthy advance into new waters by apparent movements for joining the international task force combating Somali pirates. While Iranian warships have taken up positions in the Gulf of Aden, the Russians are moving naval units southeast into the Persian Gulf.
Monday, May 25, the Iranian naval chief, Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, announced that six Iranian warships had been dispatched to "the international waters" of the Gulf of Aden in a "historically unprecedented move… to show its ability to confront any foreign threats." He did not bother to mention the pirates.
More… http://www.debka.com/headline_print.php?hid=6095
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report
May 26, 2009, 6:47 PM (GMT+02:00)
Russian warships are due to call Wednesday, May 27, at the Bahrain port of Manama, seat of the US Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, DEBKAfile’s military sources reveal. They will be following in the wake of the Russian vessels already docked at the Omani port of Salalah, the first to avail themselves of facilities at Gulf ports.
Their arrival is fully coordinated between the Russian and Iranian naval commands.
According to our sources, this is the first time a Russian flotilla will have taken on provisions and fuel at the same Gulf ports which hitherto serviced only the US Navy. Moscow has thus gained its first maritime foothold in the Persian Gulf.
The flotilla consists of four vessels from Russia’s Pacific Fleet: The submarine fighter Admiral Panteleyev is due at Manama Wednesday, escorted by the refueling-supply ship Izhorai, The supply-battleship Irkut and the rescue craft BM-37 are already docked in Salalah.
DEBKAfile’s military sources report that the Russians, like the Iranians, cover their stealthy advance into new waters by apparent movements for joining the international task force combating Somali pirates. While Iranian warships have taken up positions in the Gulf of Aden, the Russians are moving naval units southeast into the Persian Gulf.
Monday, May 25, the Iranian naval chief, Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, announced that six Iranian warships had been dispatched to "the international waters" of the Gulf of Aden in a "historically unprecedented move… to show its ability to confront any foreign threats." He did not bother to mention the pirates.
More… http://www.debka.com/headline_print.php?hid=6095
U.S. undertakes Iraq-scale embassy project in Pakistan By SAEED SHAH AND WARREN P. STROBEL
U.S. undertakes Iraq-scale embassy project in Pakistan
By SAEED SHAH AND WARREN P. STROBEL
McClatchy Newspapers
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- The U.S. is embarking on a $1 billion crash program to expand its diplomatic presence in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan, another sign that the Obama administration is making a costly, long-term commitment to war-torn South Asia, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/AP/story/1068872.html
By SAEED SHAH AND WARREN P. STROBEL
McClatchy Newspapers
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- The U.S. is embarking on a $1 billion crash program to expand its diplomatic presence in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan, another sign that the Obama administration is making a costly, long-term commitment to war-torn South Asia, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/AP/story/1068872.html
The Global Economic Crisis and Iraq's Future By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
The Global Economic Crisis and Iraq's Future
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
My colleague Josh Goodman and I have an article in the new issue of inFocus examining the impact that the global economic crisis will have on the future of Iraq. An excerpt:
Last summer, when oil prices reached all-time highs virtually every day, it seemed that one of the few silver linings was a more stable future for Iraq. Surging oil prices appeared to give Iraq a windfall; experts forecast an improving economy that could diminish support for the insurgency and increase resources for Iraq's nascent security forces. But now that the collapse in the world's economy has caused oil prices to plummet, what does the future hold for Iraq?
While estimates of Iraq's dependence on oil revenues vary wildly, oil clearly lies at the heart of the country's economy. Indeed, median estimates hold that oil accounts for more than 80 percent of its revenues. Iraq now faces several challenges spawned by the global recession. These challenges come just as the U.S.—pursuant to agreements with Iraq's government—is due to cease its patrols of cities. While a spiral into chaos is not inevitable, there is a clear opening for insurgent factions.
The decline in oil prices has left Iraq short of revenues. Speaking at a London-based think tank in early May, Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Saleh said that the economic crisis "has had a serious impact" on Iraq's economy, with "plummeting oil prices" forcing the country "to constrain our government spending."
Accordingly, Iraq's government slashed its 2009 budget by about 25 percent, from $80 billion to nearly $60 billion. Yet, despite this reduction in expenditures, around $20 billion of that figure will be deficit spending. This is made possible in part by the fact that a budgetary surplus of around $35 billion remains from the 2008 oil boom.
Jim Durso, who served in the transportation ministry of the Coalition Provisional Authority, predicts that Iraq will try to "make that money last as long as they can, spend it on essential services, and hope that foreign investment can pay for infrastructure."
However, budgetary shortfalls will likely directly impact Iraq's ability to maintain security. Over the past two years, the size of the Iraqi security forces has almost tripled—from 250,000 uniformed personnel to 609,000. With less money in its coffers for salaries, Iraq must curtail the expansion of these forces.
To read the entire article, click here. I also wrote about oil prices and Iraq for the Middle East Times last summer, when the price of oil was around $125 a barrel. To see what I had to say then, click here.
May 27, 2009 09:43 PM Link http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/05/the_global_economic_crisis_and.php
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
My colleague Josh Goodman and I have an article in the new issue of inFocus examining the impact that the global economic crisis will have on the future of Iraq. An excerpt:
Last summer, when oil prices reached all-time highs virtually every day, it seemed that one of the few silver linings was a more stable future for Iraq. Surging oil prices appeared to give Iraq a windfall; experts forecast an improving economy that could diminish support for the insurgency and increase resources for Iraq's nascent security forces. But now that the collapse in the world's economy has caused oil prices to plummet, what does the future hold for Iraq?
While estimates of Iraq's dependence on oil revenues vary wildly, oil clearly lies at the heart of the country's economy. Indeed, median estimates hold that oil accounts for more than 80 percent of its revenues. Iraq now faces several challenges spawned by the global recession. These challenges come just as the U.S.—pursuant to agreements with Iraq's government—is due to cease its patrols of cities. While a spiral into chaos is not inevitable, there is a clear opening for insurgent factions.
The decline in oil prices has left Iraq short of revenues. Speaking at a London-based think tank in early May, Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Saleh said that the economic crisis "has had a serious impact" on Iraq's economy, with "plummeting oil prices" forcing the country "to constrain our government spending."
Accordingly, Iraq's government slashed its 2009 budget by about 25 percent, from $80 billion to nearly $60 billion. Yet, despite this reduction in expenditures, around $20 billion of that figure will be deficit spending. This is made possible in part by the fact that a budgetary surplus of around $35 billion remains from the 2008 oil boom.
Jim Durso, who served in the transportation ministry of the Coalition Provisional Authority, predicts that Iraq will try to "make that money last as long as they can, spend it on essential services, and hope that foreign investment can pay for infrastructure."
However, budgetary shortfalls will likely directly impact Iraq's ability to maintain security. Over the past two years, the size of the Iraqi security forces has almost tripled—from 250,000 uniformed personnel to 609,000. With less money in its coffers for salaries, Iraq must curtail the expansion of these forces.
To read the entire article, click here. I also wrote about oil prices and Iraq for the Middle East Times last summer, when the price of oil was around $125 a barrel. To see what I had to say then, click here.
May 27, 2009 09:43 PM Link http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/05/the_global_economic_crisis_and.php
bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable: If Iran gets nuclear weapons May 25, 2009
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 20 Volume 7 - May 28, 2009
IF Iran gets nuclear weapons
• Regional arms race, eventual Arab A-bomb - Riad Kahwaji
High ethno-sectarian tension between Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbors would likely increase.
• International failure and regional high alert - Emily B. Landau
The primary effect of nuclear weapons is psychological deterrence.
• The psychological significance of the Iranian nuclear program - Sadegh Zibakalam
The eight-year war with Iraq taught Iranians that in this world they are on their own.
• Nuclear and political policy toward Iran - Mahjoob Zweiri
A military campaign will first and foremost be aimed at ending Iran's influence with non-state actors in the region.
Regional arms race, eventual Arab A-bomb
Riad Kahwaji
Many officials and others in Arab Gulf states believe that it is only a matter of time before Iran is capable of producing its own nuclear weapons. Very few believe the United States, Israel or the international community can do anything--politically or militarily--to prevent this anticipated new reality. Even fewer believe sanctions would deter Tehran from becoming the next nuclear state. However, like the rest of the world, they do not seem to have a clear idea how to deal with a nuclear Iran. Still, numerous options are out there. They comprise many steps, including military defensive measures and a western nuclear umbrella to deter possible future Iranian threats. Seeking an Arab nuclear bomb could also be an option in the long run.
The possibility of Iran possessing nuclear weapons has already started to impact Arab Gulf states. Almost all of them have announced an intention to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful use. Four of them, notably the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have gone on a shopping spree signing deals that would bolster their air and naval capabilities. The Saudis have purchased about 72 Typhoon Eurofighter jets and upgraded their AWACS early-warning planes and their Patriot anti-ballistic missile batteries. The UAE, in turn, has ordered the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD) along with the Patriot PAC-3 and other complimentary systems to establish a fully integrated multi-layered ballistic missile defense shield. The UAE has started negotiations with France to acquire 60 Rafael jetfighters, and is about to start receiving the first of six multirole Baynounah-class corvettes and other systems related to combating underwater threats and improving naval information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
In this way, mounting tension resulting from Iran's controversial nuclear program has sparked an arms race in the Arabian Gulf region and an increased interest in acquiring nuclear capabilities. At the same time, the Arab Gulf states have kept channels of communication with Iran wide open in an attempt to reduce tensions between the two sides, especially Sunni-Shi'ite tension resulting from the internal power struggle in Iraq and Lebanon and the recent quarrel between Cairo and Hizballah over the latter's role in smuggling weapons via Egyptian territory to the Gaza Strip.
High ethno-sectarian tension between Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbors would likely increase if Tehran builds nuclear weapons. The Arab side would be worried about both Iranian hegemony and a deal between Washington and Tehran at the expense of Arab interests. Many Arab officials and analysts believe that Washington's inability to check the Iranian nuclear program would possibly prompt the United States to go for a political deal with Iran according to the latter's terms--better known as the "grand bargain." Tehran has thus far refused to discuss the nuclear file separately from other issues such as Iraq, Lebanon, the peace process and its role as a regional power. Iranian leaders have long insisted on one big deal with Washington that includes all outstanding matters between the two.
Heightened anxiety and reduced trust in their main strategic ally, the United States, might drive Arab Gulf states toward greater self-reliance in defending themselves by seeking a deterrent to Iran's nuclear capabilities. Or they might be encouraged to seek new strategic allies that back the US or if need be replace it. One example of this trend was the opening of a new French naval base in Abu Dhabi on May 26. This was the first non-US base in the Gulf region. Additional non-American bases might be opened in the region.
The impact of Iran's strong rhetoric about its support for resistance and fighting Israel has been considerable in the Arab street, including the Gulf. If Tehran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the Arabs would feel embarrassed for having failed to achieve a balance of nuclear power with Israel while Iran had done precisely this. This would create a sense of weakness and vulnerability among many Arab leaders, who would likely seek to right the balance of power with non-Arab states in the region. The lack of any progress in the peace process would also encourage many Arabs to call on their leaders to copy the Iranian rejectionist and confrontational approach. It seems to have succeeded to a great extent, while the Arabs' peaceful and moderate approach has failed to achieve what they regard as a "peaceful and just solution" to the Palestinian cause in particular and the Arab-Israel struggle in general.
If the US and the international community learn to live with a nuclear Iran, the general Arab assumption would be that the world should be able to coexist with an Arab nuclear bomb as well. This may not happen in a year or two, but regional geopolitics and simple logic lead to this conclusion. Hence future military conflicts, especially if based on ethno-sectarian differences in the Middle East region, would likely turn into devastating nuclear wars.- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Riad Kahwaji is CEO, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), Dubai.
International failure and regional high alert
Emily B. Landau
The first implication of Iran becoming a nuclear state will be to drive home the extreme helplessness of the international community in the face of a determined nuclear proliferator. This scenario will mark the failure to present a united and determined international front against Iran's defiance in the nuclear realm, a responsibility shared by all the actors that have faced Iran over the past seven years. The inability to secure the necessary international cooperation to implement painful economic sanctions as a prelude to more effective negotiations with Iran will be a particularly troubling aspect of that failure.
The ramifications of Iran attaining nuclear weapons will reverberate strongly both regionally and globally, especially if Iran decides to become an overt (rather than ambiguous) nuclear state, with proven missile capabilities to deliver nuclear warheads. Within the Middle East, a nuclear Iran means an even stronger regional presence that will gain an immediate and significant advantage over all of its non-nuclear neighbors. Due to Iran's already apparent hegemonic ambitions, the added status and potential for mass destruction will cast a heavy shadow over all.
But while Iran will seek to capitalize on this to impose its will on the region, the primary effect of nuclear weapons is psychological deterrence, which is a function of how other states react to their presence. It will take time before we see the real effect on inter-state dynamics and are able to appraise the full implications of Iran's enhanced regional potential.
In the meantime, however, fears among the non-nuclear states in the region are likely to push them more determinedly in the direction of attaining or developing their own nuclear capabilities. In a sense, this process is already under way: many regional states have expressed interest over the past three years in developing civilian nuclear programs. The UAE has moved particularly quickly to conclude nuclear deals with France and the US, but there are other serious contenders, not least Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The scenario of a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation is a dangerous one, although for most states this will mean a long and arduous process; these states are all parties to the NPT, and will thus have to proceed clandestinely. The sad reality is that the international community is unlikely to be better equipped to deal with these countries' nuclear ambitions than it was with Iran's--so if they are determined, they will probably get there.
Although the long, drawn-out process of seven or eight years of failed attempts to stop Iran through diplomacy will have left Israelis with no illusions as to the real prospects of their success, the news of a nuclear Iran will still be received in Israel with a degree of shock. It will be earth-shattering in the sense that it will eliminate a long-standing pillar of Israel's security and nuclear policy; and the frequent references to Iran as an existential threat will continue to ring in the ears of Israelis, eliciting fears that the fate of the country is now on the line. Surely the very fact that Iran is nuclear will introduce an unavoidable additional layer of caution whenever Israel contemplates action to confront threats to its security.
But because the stakes are so high, it is to be expected that both in the direct Israeli-Iranian context and with regard to broader regional dynamics, some kind of stability will ultimately begin to be established. The principles of the process will probably be similar to the US-Soviet experience--namely, mutual deterrent threats, then realization that nuclear exchange could result, beefed up missile defenses and finally some kind of tension-reduction process--but it remains to be seen what the specific path will be. A central question is just how dangerous it will get before new rules of the game for managing inter-state relations in the Middle East are put in place. The explosiveness of the region, especially due to Iran's ability to stir up tension and violence through Hamas and Hizballah, does not bode well for the interim period.
At this advanced stage of Iran's nuclear activities, it is difficult to assess the implications of Iran going nuclear in isolation from the last effort to stop it. Will that be only a failed US negotiation effort or military action as well? As the US has signaled its distaste for military force and has given Israel a clear red light in this regard, the likely scenario at present is that this will come in the wake of a long, drawn-out and failed US attempt to engage Iran. After assuming the role of the major external player facing Iran, then abandoning both economic and military pressure, it will be primarily US President Barack Obama's failure when Iran ultimately goes nuclear. The US will be exposed globally as weak and ineffective, with an unsophisticated approach to negotiations.
And Obama's probable reaction once it is clear that Iran has become a nuclear state? Additional attempts to negotiate, no doubt--with Iran poised to get the best deal yet, at the expense of all.- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Emily B. Landau is senior research associate and director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. She teaches nuclear arms control at Tel Aviv and Haifa universities.
The psychological significance of the Iranian nuclear program
Sadegh Zibakalam
Ever since the Iranian nuclear program was disclosed in 2003, numerous articles, reports and analyses have explored various aspects of it. There is, however, one important aspect that has not been fully understood. This concerns the psychological significance of the nuclear program for many Iranians, including much of the country's leadership.
The nuclear program has meant for many Iranians a sense of security: an assurance against being attacked by the Islamic regimes' powerful enemies. Some analysts may dismiss this proposition and blame the Islamic regime's own behavior for creating real or perceived enemies. And while it is true that Iran's behavior internationally, particularly under its current hard-line president, does not leave it with many friends, the threat perception many Iranians feel is much more complicated than that implied by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's behavior and goes much deeper than the last four years during which Ahmadinezhad has been in power. The fact that the nuclear program was started in the late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrates that the underlying reasons for it were cultivated during the 1980s.
In the course of the struggle against the late Shah of Iran in 1978 and 1979 the Islamic leaders, including the late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, felt that the outside world, including the western powers, was not against them. The feeling of self-righteous and self-confidence prevailed and was intensified after the revolution. The world media broadly treated the Iranian revolutionary leaders as heroes who had managed to overthrow a ruthless and despotic ruler. The Islamic regime was welcomed by the major world powers and was immediately recognized by them. There were of course some hesitations on the part of the Carter administration to establish full diplomatic contact with the newly-formed Islamic regime, but the rest of the world was ready to establish ties with Tehran.
In short, the Islamic leaders had no cause to fear the outside world. They went so far as to cancel some of the advanced military weapons the Shah had ordered from the US. The list included long-range missiles, advanced jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, submarines, warships and other offensive military hardware. Rightly or wrongly, the first generation of Islamic revolutionary leaders felt Iran had no enemy, had no quarrel with any of its neighbors and was not contemplating fighting any other state. It therefore didn't need the huge arms stockpile the Shah had gathered and was still receiving from the US at the time of his downfall. Indeed, the Shah's policy to play the role of so-called "gendarme of the Persian Gulf" was always criticized by his opponents, including the Islamists who were now themselves in power. To convert the country's tanks into tractors was ironically a slogan mentioned many years earlier by Ayatollah Khomeini in one of his attacks against the Shah.
The war with Iraq, however, changed much of that early euphoria. To begin with, Iranians never imagined that Iraq would invade their territory. As a just, popular, revolutionary and Islamic regime that enjoyed the support of 98.5 percent of its people, it was inconceivable for the Iranian leaders and public-at-large to imagine that another country would attack them. Even more incomprehensible was that the world would simply stand by and not even condemn Saddam's invasion of their territory. To Iranians' astonishment and horror, neither the West nor the East, neither the Islamic states nor the Arab world, indeed no one at all was prepared to condemn Saddam's invasion of Iran, let alone support Iran in defending itself against the might of the Iraqi army. On the contrary everyone--the European Union, the UN Security Council, Iran's Arab neighbors and Muslim leaders repeatedly urged Iran to restrain itself and "try to resolve the dispute peacefully."
The new Iranian leaders learned their first bitter diplomatic lesson: if you want to remain independent of both the West and the East (one of the cardinal slogans of the Islamic Revolution), then neither will support you even if you are the victim of the most blatant violations of international rules and norms. Iranians learned that rather than waiting for the international community to take action to force the Iraqis to leave their country, they must rely on themselves.
There were more bitter lessons for the Iranians to learn. Having pushed back the Iraqis with huge sacrifices, thereby winning the world's admiration, Iran was once again advised to accept a ceasefire and negotiate with the Iraqi regime. Even opponents of the regime replied to the world, "What about justice, should those who invaded another country go unpunished?" The world showed a similar reaction when the Iraqis, in violation of international sanctions, used chemical weapons. To Iranians' horror, the world once again turned a blind eye on Saddam's atrocities when thousands of Iranians were killed by these weapons.
The eight-year war with Iraq taught Iranians that in this world they are on their own. Ironically, during the war many Iranians experienced the same feeling of loneliness and abandonment by the outside world that perhaps many Jews felt in the concentration camps during the Holocaust. Hence it was no accident that, immediately after the war, it became a top priority for the Iranian leadership to turn the country into a nuclear power.
In a further irony, the West's response to Iran's nuclear program has proved to Iranians that they indeed embarked on the right course. During the past three decades, the only issue regarding which the West has taken Iran seriously is its nuclear program. The West has, inadvertently, taught Iranian leaders that you are taken seriously only when you present the world your "nuclear credit card".- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of Iranian Studies at Tehran University.
Nuclear and political policy toward Iran
Mahjoob Zweiri
The problem with Iran is not whether its nuclear plans are for military or civilian use but the nature or perception of the Iranian regime and its role in the Middle East. The current animosity between Israel and Iran precedes any development of nuclear weapons and rests instead on Iran's ambitions and actions in spreading its influence throughout the region.
The international strategy surrounding Iran's nuclear policy suffers from two shortcomings, however. Firstly, there remains a dispute as to the nature of Iran's nuclear program and secondly, regional players have differing priorities toward Iran.
The US and Israel have maintained that for Iran even to have the capability to build a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. This view is not accepted by other members of the UN Security Council, including Russia and China, who have endeavored to allow Iran the use of civil nuclear power as long as safeguards and checks are adhered to.
But the ambiguity over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, increased by Tehran's stance toward international inspection teams, has made it difficult for the US, Israel and other states to devise a firm policy position. The obstruction and expulsions of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have only increased the lack of certainty. The US National Intelligence Council report of December 2007 stated that, "we judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." The report's last paragraph however noted that; "we assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." Independently assessing Iran's nuclear program's scope and nature is still very difficult and this problem is central to the ongoing debate. Without a firm grasp of Iran's current intentions, an atmosphere of mistrust will continue.
Secondly, the United States, Israel and moderate Arab states have varying priorities as to the threats posed by Iran. These differing priorities make a coherent strategy difficult. For Israel, the knowledge that a military nuclear program would seemingly be aimed at their country keeps that concern a top priority. The more immediate threat to Israel, however, is the continued Iranian support of armed militants, namely Hamas and Hizballah, on Israel's borders.
For the US too, this concern takes top priority. In addition, the US is also uneasy over Iran's potential aspirations for regional hegemony. That is the concern Arab states are mostly worried about. They fear a powerful Iran with strong influence over their domestic affairs via non-state actors. These states do not prioritize the nuclear program per se. In fact, with the international community's failure to control Iran's nuclear progress, they themselves have been encouraged to develop nuclear power.
Such lack of unity on what is the most pressing threat Iran poses causes difficulty in creating a coherent policy on Iran's nuclear program. In addition, the lack of agreement over the nature of Iran's nuclear program presents a challenge to stipulating scenarios for what would happen should Iran become a nuclear power. An awareness of the priorities of the US, Israel and Arab states, however, would allow us to hypothesize the future direction these countries' policies toward Iran might take.
The new US administration's approach of using smart power and positive engagement may seem to make a military option less likely. The option, however, will always be on the table due to the sense in Israeli and US security circles that Iran represents the "mother of all threats" to the existence of Israel. Previous experience shows us that this may well be enough to coax decision-makers in Israel to attack Iran. Moreover, the approach of the international community in dealing with Iran on this matter does not indicate a peaceful end to the crisis. The whole issue is being dealt with under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. No previous issue in the region dealt with under Chapter 7 was ever solved through diplomacy. Furthermore, since 2005, Iran has already faced five Security Council resolutions, 1696, 1737, 1747, 1801 and in September 2008, 1835. These can be seen as an acceleration toward more drastic measures and are in fact viewed as acts of aggression in Tehran.
But a military campaign will first and foremost be aimed at ending Iran's influence with non-state actors in the region. Worldwide concern over the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran might then be used to justify this aim.
As we enter a period of electoral change in the Middle East--with Israeli elections already held and Lebanese and Iranian elections imminent--and with a new policy of smart power exerted from the White House, what are the potential scenarios?
Scenario 1 sees the new Iranian president, whether Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad or one of his opponents, continuing to defy international opinion and proceed with Iran's nuclear program. This, coupled with a failure to make progress in the burgeoning Iran-US dialogue, could lead to increased international sanctions. This package of sanctions could include a ban on the export of fuel to Iran that subsequently would be deemed another act of war by Tehran.
Scenario 2 sees a new Iranian president committing to a policy of engagement with the 5+1 group and progress with a US-Iran dialogue that may lead to the granting of security guarantees that would rehabilitate the image and economy of Iran.
Scenario 3 sees Israel attacking Iran on the basis of preempting Iran's accession to full nuclear power status. It may be important to note that it would not appear possible for Israel to attack Iran without first negating the potential threat of Hizballah on its border. An attack on Hizballah by Israel may then be seen as the opening salvo of a military campaign in Iran. However, once Israel becomes involved in a campaign on the border with Lebanon there is no guarantee that this would be a quick and easy war. Regardless, the regional consequences would be considerable.
There is also no evidence that an Israeli air strike could successfully end Iran's nuclear threat due to the disparate locations of the facilities. Some are believed to be buried very deep underground. This may lead Israeli military planners to also target secondary infrastructure assets such as government buildings. Should there be a wider set of military targets, we may also witness a wider response from the Middle East. As sentiments against Israel, America and other western allied countries increase, we may not just witness the beginning of a new stage of conflict but the end of President Obama's smart power diplomacy.- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr Mahjoob Zweiri is an Iran specialist with Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies. He is a former director of the Centre for Iranian Studies at the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 20 Volume 7 - May 28, 2009
IF Iran gets nuclear weapons
• Regional arms race, eventual Arab A-bomb - Riad Kahwaji
High ethno-sectarian tension between Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbors would likely increase.
• International failure and regional high alert - Emily B. Landau
The primary effect of nuclear weapons is psychological deterrence.
• The psychological significance of the Iranian nuclear program - Sadegh Zibakalam
The eight-year war with Iraq taught Iranians that in this world they are on their own.
• Nuclear and political policy toward Iran - Mahjoob Zweiri
A military campaign will first and foremost be aimed at ending Iran's influence with non-state actors in the region.
Regional arms race, eventual Arab A-bomb
Riad Kahwaji
Many officials and others in Arab Gulf states believe that it is only a matter of time before Iran is capable of producing its own nuclear weapons. Very few believe the United States, Israel or the international community can do anything--politically or militarily--to prevent this anticipated new reality. Even fewer believe sanctions would deter Tehran from becoming the next nuclear state. However, like the rest of the world, they do not seem to have a clear idea how to deal with a nuclear Iran. Still, numerous options are out there. They comprise many steps, including military defensive measures and a western nuclear umbrella to deter possible future Iranian threats. Seeking an Arab nuclear bomb could also be an option in the long run.
The possibility of Iran possessing nuclear weapons has already started to impact Arab Gulf states. Almost all of them have announced an intention to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful use. Four of them, notably the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have gone on a shopping spree signing deals that would bolster their air and naval capabilities. The Saudis have purchased about 72 Typhoon Eurofighter jets and upgraded their AWACS early-warning planes and their Patriot anti-ballistic missile batteries. The UAE, in turn, has ordered the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD) along with the Patriot PAC-3 and other complimentary systems to establish a fully integrated multi-layered ballistic missile defense shield. The UAE has started negotiations with France to acquire 60 Rafael jetfighters, and is about to start receiving the first of six multirole Baynounah-class corvettes and other systems related to combating underwater threats and improving naval information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
In this way, mounting tension resulting from Iran's controversial nuclear program has sparked an arms race in the Arabian Gulf region and an increased interest in acquiring nuclear capabilities. At the same time, the Arab Gulf states have kept channels of communication with Iran wide open in an attempt to reduce tensions between the two sides, especially Sunni-Shi'ite tension resulting from the internal power struggle in Iraq and Lebanon and the recent quarrel between Cairo and Hizballah over the latter's role in smuggling weapons via Egyptian territory to the Gaza Strip.
High ethno-sectarian tension between Iran and its Arab Gulf neighbors would likely increase if Tehran builds nuclear weapons. The Arab side would be worried about both Iranian hegemony and a deal between Washington and Tehran at the expense of Arab interests. Many Arab officials and analysts believe that Washington's inability to check the Iranian nuclear program would possibly prompt the United States to go for a political deal with Iran according to the latter's terms--better known as the "grand bargain." Tehran has thus far refused to discuss the nuclear file separately from other issues such as Iraq, Lebanon, the peace process and its role as a regional power. Iranian leaders have long insisted on one big deal with Washington that includes all outstanding matters between the two.
Heightened anxiety and reduced trust in their main strategic ally, the United States, might drive Arab Gulf states toward greater self-reliance in defending themselves by seeking a deterrent to Iran's nuclear capabilities. Or they might be encouraged to seek new strategic allies that back the US or if need be replace it. One example of this trend was the opening of a new French naval base in Abu Dhabi on May 26. This was the first non-US base in the Gulf region. Additional non-American bases might be opened in the region.
The impact of Iran's strong rhetoric about its support for resistance and fighting Israel has been considerable in the Arab street, including the Gulf. If Tehran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the Arabs would feel embarrassed for having failed to achieve a balance of nuclear power with Israel while Iran had done precisely this. This would create a sense of weakness and vulnerability among many Arab leaders, who would likely seek to right the balance of power with non-Arab states in the region. The lack of any progress in the peace process would also encourage many Arabs to call on their leaders to copy the Iranian rejectionist and confrontational approach. It seems to have succeeded to a great extent, while the Arabs' peaceful and moderate approach has failed to achieve what they regard as a "peaceful and just solution" to the Palestinian cause in particular and the Arab-Israel struggle in general.
If the US and the international community learn to live with a nuclear Iran, the general Arab assumption would be that the world should be able to coexist with an Arab nuclear bomb as well. This may not happen in a year or two, but regional geopolitics and simple logic lead to this conclusion. Hence future military conflicts, especially if based on ethno-sectarian differences in the Middle East region, would likely turn into devastating nuclear wars.- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Riad Kahwaji is CEO, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), Dubai.
International failure and regional high alert
Emily B. Landau
The first implication of Iran becoming a nuclear state will be to drive home the extreme helplessness of the international community in the face of a determined nuclear proliferator. This scenario will mark the failure to present a united and determined international front against Iran's defiance in the nuclear realm, a responsibility shared by all the actors that have faced Iran over the past seven years. The inability to secure the necessary international cooperation to implement painful economic sanctions as a prelude to more effective negotiations with Iran will be a particularly troubling aspect of that failure.
The ramifications of Iran attaining nuclear weapons will reverberate strongly both regionally and globally, especially if Iran decides to become an overt (rather than ambiguous) nuclear state, with proven missile capabilities to deliver nuclear warheads. Within the Middle East, a nuclear Iran means an even stronger regional presence that will gain an immediate and significant advantage over all of its non-nuclear neighbors. Due to Iran's already apparent hegemonic ambitions, the added status and potential for mass destruction will cast a heavy shadow over all.
But while Iran will seek to capitalize on this to impose its will on the region, the primary effect of nuclear weapons is psychological deterrence, which is a function of how other states react to their presence. It will take time before we see the real effect on inter-state dynamics and are able to appraise the full implications of Iran's enhanced regional potential.
In the meantime, however, fears among the non-nuclear states in the region are likely to push them more determinedly in the direction of attaining or developing their own nuclear capabilities. In a sense, this process is already under way: many regional states have expressed interest over the past three years in developing civilian nuclear programs. The UAE has moved particularly quickly to conclude nuclear deals with France and the US, but there are other serious contenders, not least Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The scenario of a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation is a dangerous one, although for most states this will mean a long and arduous process; these states are all parties to the NPT, and will thus have to proceed clandestinely. The sad reality is that the international community is unlikely to be better equipped to deal with these countries' nuclear ambitions than it was with Iran's--so if they are determined, they will probably get there.
Although the long, drawn-out process of seven or eight years of failed attempts to stop Iran through diplomacy will have left Israelis with no illusions as to the real prospects of their success, the news of a nuclear Iran will still be received in Israel with a degree of shock. It will be earth-shattering in the sense that it will eliminate a long-standing pillar of Israel's security and nuclear policy; and the frequent references to Iran as an existential threat will continue to ring in the ears of Israelis, eliciting fears that the fate of the country is now on the line. Surely the very fact that Iran is nuclear will introduce an unavoidable additional layer of caution whenever Israel contemplates action to confront threats to its security.
But because the stakes are so high, it is to be expected that both in the direct Israeli-Iranian context and with regard to broader regional dynamics, some kind of stability will ultimately begin to be established. The principles of the process will probably be similar to the US-Soviet experience--namely, mutual deterrent threats, then realization that nuclear exchange could result, beefed up missile defenses and finally some kind of tension-reduction process--but it remains to be seen what the specific path will be. A central question is just how dangerous it will get before new rules of the game for managing inter-state relations in the Middle East are put in place. The explosiveness of the region, especially due to Iran's ability to stir up tension and violence through Hamas and Hizballah, does not bode well for the interim period.
At this advanced stage of Iran's nuclear activities, it is difficult to assess the implications of Iran going nuclear in isolation from the last effort to stop it. Will that be only a failed US negotiation effort or military action as well? As the US has signaled its distaste for military force and has given Israel a clear red light in this regard, the likely scenario at present is that this will come in the wake of a long, drawn-out and failed US attempt to engage Iran. After assuming the role of the major external player facing Iran, then abandoning both economic and military pressure, it will be primarily US President Barack Obama's failure when Iran ultimately goes nuclear. The US will be exposed globally as weak and ineffective, with an unsophisticated approach to negotiations.
And Obama's probable reaction once it is clear that Iran has become a nuclear state? Additional attempts to negotiate, no doubt--with Iran poised to get the best deal yet, at the expense of all.- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Emily B. Landau is senior research associate and director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. She teaches nuclear arms control at Tel Aviv and Haifa universities.
The psychological significance of the Iranian nuclear program
Sadegh Zibakalam
Ever since the Iranian nuclear program was disclosed in 2003, numerous articles, reports and analyses have explored various aspects of it. There is, however, one important aspect that has not been fully understood. This concerns the psychological significance of the nuclear program for many Iranians, including much of the country's leadership.
The nuclear program has meant for many Iranians a sense of security: an assurance against being attacked by the Islamic regimes' powerful enemies. Some analysts may dismiss this proposition and blame the Islamic regime's own behavior for creating real or perceived enemies. And while it is true that Iran's behavior internationally, particularly under its current hard-line president, does not leave it with many friends, the threat perception many Iranians feel is much more complicated than that implied by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's behavior and goes much deeper than the last four years during which Ahmadinezhad has been in power. The fact that the nuclear program was started in the late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrates that the underlying reasons for it were cultivated during the 1980s.
In the course of the struggle against the late Shah of Iran in 1978 and 1979 the Islamic leaders, including the late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, felt that the outside world, including the western powers, was not against them. The feeling of self-righteous and self-confidence prevailed and was intensified after the revolution. The world media broadly treated the Iranian revolutionary leaders as heroes who had managed to overthrow a ruthless and despotic ruler. The Islamic regime was welcomed by the major world powers and was immediately recognized by them. There were of course some hesitations on the part of the Carter administration to establish full diplomatic contact with the newly-formed Islamic regime, but the rest of the world was ready to establish ties with Tehran.
In short, the Islamic leaders had no cause to fear the outside world. They went so far as to cancel some of the advanced military weapons the Shah had ordered from the US. The list included long-range missiles, advanced jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, submarines, warships and other offensive military hardware. Rightly or wrongly, the first generation of Islamic revolutionary leaders felt Iran had no enemy, had no quarrel with any of its neighbors and was not contemplating fighting any other state. It therefore didn't need the huge arms stockpile the Shah had gathered and was still receiving from the US at the time of his downfall. Indeed, the Shah's policy to play the role of so-called "gendarme of the Persian Gulf" was always criticized by his opponents, including the Islamists who were now themselves in power. To convert the country's tanks into tractors was ironically a slogan mentioned many years earlier by Ayatollah Khomeini in one of his attacks against the Shah.
The war with Iraq, however, changed much of that early euphoria. To begin with, Iranians never imagined that Iraq would invade their territory. As a just, popular, revolutionary and Islamic regime that enjoyed the support of 98.5 percent of its people, it was inconceivable for the Iranian leaders and public-at-large to imagine that another country would attack them. Even more incomprehensible was that the world would simply stand by and not even condemn Saddam's invasion of their territory. To Iranians' astonishment and horror, neither the West nor the East, neither the Islamic states nor the Arab world, indeed no one at all was prepared to condemn Saddam's invasion of Iran, let alone support Iran in defending itself against the might of the Iraqi army. On the contrary everyone--the European Union, the UN Security Council, Iran's Arab neighbors and Muslim leaders repeatedly urged Iran to restrain itself and "try to resolve the dispute peacefully."
The new Iranian leaders learned their first bitter diplomatic lesson: if you want to remain independent of both the West and the East (one of the cardinal slogans of the Islamic Revolution), then neither will support you even if you are the victim of the most blatant violations of international rules and norms. Iranians learned that rather than waiting for the international community to take action to force the Iraqis to leave their country, they must rely on themselves.
There were more bitter lessons for the Iranians to learn. Having pushed back the Iraqis with huge sacrifices, thereby winning the world's admiration, Iran was once again advised to accept a ceasefire and negotiate with the Iraqi regime. Even opponents of the regime replied to the world, "What about justice, should those who invaded another country go unpunished?" The world showed a similar reaction when the Iraqis, in violation of international sanctions, used chemical weapons. To Iranians' horror, the world once again turned a blind eye on Saddam's atrocities when thousands of Iranians were killed by these weapons.
The eight-year war with Iraq taught Iranians that in this world they are on their own. Ironically, during the war many Iranians experienced the same feeling of loneliness and abandonment by the outside world that perhaps many Jews felt in the concentration camps during the Holocaust. Hence it was no accident that, immediately after the war, it became a top priority for the Iranian leadership to turn the country into a nuclear power.
In a further irony, the West's response to Iran's nuclear program has proved to Iranians that they indeed embarked on the right course. During the past three decades, the only issue regarding which the West has taken Iran seriously is its nuclear program. The West has, inadvertently, taught Iranian leaders that you are taken seriously only when you present the world your "nuclear credit card".- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of Iranian Studies at Tehran University.
Nuclear and political policy toward Iran
Mahjoob Zweiri
The problem with Iran is not whether its nuclear plans are for military or civilian use but the nature or perception of the Iranian regime and its role in the Middle East. The current animosity between Israel and Iran precedes any development of nuclear weapons and rests instead on Iran's ambitions and actions in spreading its influence throughout the region.
The international strategy surrounding Iran's nuclear policy suffers from two shortcomings, however. Firstly, there remains a dispute as to the nature of Iran's nuclear program and secondly, regional players have differing priorities toward Iran.
The US and Israel have maintained that for Iran even to have the capability to build a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. This view is not accepted by other members of the UN Security Council, including Russia and China, who have endeavored to allow Iran the use of civil nuclear power as long as safeguards and checks are adhered to.
But the ambiguity over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, increased by Tehran's stance toward international inspection teams, has made it difficult for the US, Israel and other states to devise a firm policy position. The obstruction and expulsions of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have only increased the lack of certainty. The US National Intelligence Council report of December 2007 stated that, "we judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." The report's last paragraph however noted that; "we assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." Independently assessing Iran's nuclear program's scope and nature is still very difficult and this problem is central to the ongoing debate. Without a firm grasp of Iran's current intentions, an atmosphere of mistrust will continue.
Secondly, the United States, Israel and moderate Arab states have varying priorities as to the threats posed by Iran. These differing priorities make a coherent strategy difficult. For Israel, the knowledge that a military nuclear program would seemingly be aimed at their country keeps that concern a top priority. The more immediate threat to Israel, however, is the continued Iranian support of armed militants, namely Hamas and Hizballah, on Israel's borders.
For the US too, this concern takes top priority. In addition, the US is also uneasy over Iran's potential aspirations for regional hegemony. That is the concern Arab states are mostly worried about. They fear a powerful Iran with strong influence over their domestic affairs via non-state actors. These states do not prioritize the nuclear program per se. In fact, with the international community's failure to control Iran's nuclear progress, they themselves have been encouraged to develop nuclear power.
Such lack of unity on what is the most pressing threat Iran poses causes difficulty in creating a coherent policy on Iran's nuclear program. In addition, the lack of agreement over the nature of Iran's nuclear program presents a challenge to stipulating scenarios for what would happen should Iran become a nuclear power. An awareness of the priorities of the US, Israel and Arab states, however, would allow us to hypothesize the future direction these countries' policies toward Iran might take.
The new US administration's approach of using smart power and positive engagement may seem to make a military option less likely. The option, however, will always be on the table due to the sense in Israeli and US security circles that Iran represents the "mother of all threats" to the existence of Israel. Previous experience shows us that this may well be enough to coax decision-makers in Israel to attack Iran. Moreover, the approach of the international community in dealing with Iran on this matter does not indicate a peaceful end to the crisis. The whole issue is being dealt with under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. No previous issue in the region dealt with under Chapter 7 was ever solved through diplomacy. Furthermore, since 2005, Iran has already faced five Security Council resolutions, 1696, 1737, 1747, 1801 and in September 2008, 1835. These can be seen as an acceleration toward more drastic measures and are in fact viewed as acts of aggression in Tehran.
But a military campaign will first and foremost be aimed at ending Iran's influence with non-state actors in the region. Worldwide concern over the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran might then be used to justify this aim.
As we enter a period of electoral change in the Middle East--with Israeli elections already held and Lebanese and Iranian elections imminent--and with a new policy of smart power exerted from the White House, what are the potential scenarios?
Scenario 1 sees the new Iranian president, whether Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad or one of his opponents, continuing to defy international opinion and proceed with Iran's nuclear program. This, coupled with a failure to make progress in the burgeoning Iran-US dialogue, could lead to increased international sanctions. This package of sanctions could include a ban on the export of fuel to Iran that subsequently would be deemed another act of war by Tehran.
Scenario 2 sees a new Iranian president committing to a policy of engagement with the 5+1 group and progress with a US-Iran dialogue that may lead to the granting of security guarantees that would rehabilitate the image and economy of Iran.
Scenario 3 sees Israel attacking Iran on the basis of preempting Iran's accession to full nuclear power status. It may be important to note that it would not appear possible for Israel to attack Iran without first negating the potential threat of Hizballah on its border. An attack on Hizballah by Israel may then be seen as the opening salvo of a military campaign in Iran. However, once Israel becomes involved in a campaign on the border with Lebanon there is no guarantee that this would be a quick and easy war. Regardless, the regional consequences would be considerable.
There is also no evidence that an Israeli air strike could successfully end Iran's nuclear threat due to the disparate locations of the facilities. Some are believed to be buried very deep underground. This may lead Israeli military planners to also target secondary infrastructure assets such as government buildings. Should there be a wider set of military targets, we may also witness a wider response from the Middle East. As sentiments against Israel, America and other western allied countries increase, we may not just witness the beginning of a new stage of conflict but the end of President Obama's smart power diplomacy.- Published 28/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr Mahjoob Zweiri is an Iran specialist with Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies. He is a former director of the Centre for Iranian Studies at the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham University.
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Israeli legislation raises issue of loyalty by Richard Boudreaux
LOS ANGELES TIMES
5/26/09
Israeli legislation raises issue of loyalty
An ultranationalist party introduces a bill requiring an oath of allegiance to Israel, and another barring the traditional Arab day of mourning over the Jewish state's birth.
Richard Boudreaux
Reporting from Jerusalem — The ultranationalist party led by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has unveiled two bills targeting Israel's Arab minority, one that would outlaw the Arabs' traditional day of mourning over the birth of Israel and another that would require an oath of allegiance to the Jewish state.
Both bills face opposition within Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governing coalition and uncertain prospects for approval in the Knesset, Israel's parliament.
But in the meantime, they are provoking vigorous debate over free expression, internal security and Israel's sense of international isolation.
Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel after its independence and their descendants make up about one-fifth of the citizenry. Hundreds of thousands of other Arabs fled or were driven into exile in the war surrounding Israel's founding in 1948. Each May 15, Arabs inside and outside Israel gather for public expressions of grief over what they call the Nakba, or catastrophe.
A bill approved by a Cabinet committee Sunday would end Israel's tolerance for these annual demonstrations on its soil, making participation in them punishable by up to three years in prison.
Lieberman's party, Israel Is Our Home, announced Monday that it had prepared a separate bill requiring an oath of allegiance from anyone applying for a national identity card, a document essential for almost any transaction with the state, the school system or financial institutions. The oath would profess loyalty to Israel as "a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state."
The bill does not explicitly target Arab citizens but stems from Lieberman's campaign message that they pose an internal security threat. It would allow the government to revoke the citizenship of anyone who refuses to perform some kind of military or national service.
Parliament defeated a similar initiative by Lieberman's party in 2007, but its campaign on the loyalty issue propelled Israel Is Our Home to a strong third-place finish in this year's election.
Unlike Palestinians in the neighboring West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel's Arabs hold full citizenship rights. But they complain of discrimination and have little identification with a country that defines itself as Jewish.
Arab citizens are exempt from military service, which is compulsory for Jews, and few volunteer for it.
Arabs, a small minority in the parliament, reacted with fury to both pieces of legislation.
Jamal Zahalka, head of the Balad party, called the attempt to outlaw Nakba demonstrations "a crazy bill by a crazy government." He said the Jews "drove away our people and now they want to deny us even our cry of pain. This is record-breaking Israeli chutzpah."
Alex Miller, a member of Lieberman's party, said it would be inconceivable for Americans to hold protests against their country's independence. "It's time for us to be proud of our country," he said.
Dissent within the right-leaning governing coalition could trip up the Nakba bill, which faces several hurdles in parliament.
After it cleared a Cabinet committee, 8 votes to 3, three lawmakers from Netanyahu's conservative Likud party asked the Justice Ministry to overturn the decision. One of them, Michael Eitan, said Israel must combat security threats "not by limiting freedom of expression, but rather through belief in the justice of our path."
"This is the last thing this government should be sending out as a message to the democratic world," declared Avishai Braverman of the left-leaning Labor Party, a junior partner in the coalition. He said Israel was isolated enough by Netanyahu's refusal to endorse the goal of an independent Palestinian state.
Netanyahu has taken no position on either bill. In assembling his coalition, his party rejected Lieberman's demand to make a loyalty oath requirement part of the government program. Instead, a written agreement by the two parties said the judiciary should be given power to withdraw government assistance from anyone found to have engaged in terrorism or espionage.
Ultra-Orthodox Jewish members of the ruling coalition might also oppose a loyalty oath because some of their constituents object to the establishment of a Jewish state before the arrival of the Messiah.
5/26/09
Israeli legislation raises issue of loyalty
An ultranationalist party introduces a bill requiring an oath of allegiance to Israel, and another barring the traditional Arab day of mourning over the Jewish state's birth.
Richard Boudreaux
Reporting from Jerusalem — The ultranationalist party led by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has unveiled two bills targeting Israel's Arab minority, one that would outlaw the Arabs' traditional day of mourning over the birth of Israel and another that would require an oath of allegiance to the Jewish state.
Both bills face opposition within Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governing coalition and uncertain prospects for approval in the Knesset, Israel's parliament.
But in the meantime, they are provoking vigorous debate over free expression, internal security and Israel's sense of international isolation.
Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel after its independence and their descendants make up about one-fifth of the citizenry. Hundreds of thousands of other Arabs fled or were driven into exile in the war surrounding Israel's founding in 1948. Each May 15, Arabs inside and outside Israel gather for public expressions of grief over what they call the Nakba, or catastrophe.
A bill approved by a Cabinet committee Sunday would end Israel's tolerance for these annual demonstrations on its soil, making participation in them punishable by up to three years in prison.
Lieberman's party, Israel Is Our Home, announced Monday that it had prepared a separate bill requiring an oath of allegiance from anyone applying for a national identity card, a document essential for almost any transaction with the state, the school system or financial institutions. The oath would profess loyalty to Israel as "a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state."
The bill does not explicitly target Arab citizens but stems from Lieberman's campaign message that they pose an internal security threat. It would allow the government to revoke the citizenship of anyone who refuses to perform some kind of military or national service.
Parliament defeated a similar initiative by Lieberman's party in 2007, but its campaign on the loyalty issue propelled Israel Is Our Home to a strong third-place finish in this year's election.
Unlike Palestinians in the neighboring West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel's Arabs hold full citizenship rights. But they complain of discrimination and have little identification with a country that defines itself as Jewish.
Arab citizens are exempt from military service, which is compulsory for Jews, and few volunteer for it.
Arabs, a small minority in the parliament, reacted with fury to both pieces of legislation.
Jamal Zahalka, head of the Balad party, called the attempt to outlaw Nakba demonstrations "a crazy bill by a crazy government." He said the Jews "drove away our people and now they want to deny us even our cry of pain. This is record-breaking Israeli chutzpah."
Alex Miller, a member of Lieberman's party, said it would be inconceivable for Americans to hold protests against their country's independence. "It's time for us to be proud of our country," he said.
Dissent within the right-leaning governing coalition could trip up the Nakba bill, which faces several hurdles in parliament.
After it cleared a Cabinet committee, 8 votes to 3, three lawmakers from Netanyahu's conservative Likud party asked the Justice Ministry to overturn the decision. One of them, Michael Eitan, said Israel must combat security threats "not by limiting freedom of expression, but rather through belief in the justice of our path."
"This is the last thing this government should be sending out as a message to the democratic world," declared Avishai Braverman of the left-leaning Labor Party, a junior partner in the coalition. He said Israel was isolated enough by Netanyahu's refusal to endorse the goal of an independent Palestinian state.
Netanyahu has taken no position on either bill. In assembling his coalition, his party rejected Lieberman's demand to make a loyalty oath requirement part of the government program. Instead, a written agreement by the two parties said the judiciary should be given power to withdraw government assistance from anyone found to have engaged in terrorism or espionage.
Ultra-Orthodox Jewish members of the ruling coalition might also oppose a loyalty oath because some of their constituents object to the establishment of a Jewish state before the arrival of the Messiah.
Analysis: Russia wins Mongol uranium right
Analysis: Russia wins Mongol uranium right
Washington (UPI) May 18, 2009 - While the Western press has largely fixated on the intense international struggle over the Caspian's hydrocarbon riches, farther east in Mongolia another rivalry is brewing between Russia and competitors for another valuable energy source - uranium. Moscow has established a commanding lead to develop the country's energy reserves, and its dominance seems likely only to grow with time. ... more
http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Analysis_Russia_wins_Mongol_uranium_right_999.html
Washington (UPI) May 18, 2009 - While the Western press has largely fixated on the intense international struggle over the Caspian's hydrocarbon riches, farther east in Mongolia another rivalry is brewing between Russia and competitors for another valuable energy source - uranium. Moscow has established a commanding lead to develop the country's energy reserves, and its dominance seems likely only to grow with time. ... more
http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Analysis_Russia_wins_Mongol_uranium_right_999.html
Russia, US agree first joint uranium export deals
Russia, US agree first joint uranium export deals
Moscow (AFP) May 26, 2009 - Russia said Tuesday it has signed contracts worth one billion dollars to supply uranium for US nuclear reactors, the first such deals between the two countries. Techsnabexport, the export arm of the Russia's Federal Nuclear Energy Agency (Rosatom), signed the contracts in Moscow with three US companies grouped together in the firm Fuelco, Rosatom spokesman Sergei Novikov told AFP. ... more http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Russia_US_agree_first_joint_uranium_export_deals_999.html
Moscow (AFP) May 26, 2009 - Russia said Tuesday it has signed contracts worth one billion dollars to supply uranium for US nuclear reactors, the first such deals between the two countries. Techsnabexport, the export arm of the Russia's Federal Nuclear Energy Agency (Rosatom), signed the contracts in Moscow with three US companies grouped together in the firm Fuelco, Rosatom spokesman Sergei Novikov told AFP. ... more http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Russia_US_agree_first_joint_uranium_export_deals_999.html
North Korea Threatens Military Strikes on South
\
North Korea Threatens Military Strikes on South - Choe Sang-Han, New York Times. North Korea on Wednesday threatened to launch military strikes against South Korea if any of its ships were stopped or searched as part of an American-led operation to intercept vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction. South Korea agreed to join the global interdiction program after North Korea tested a nuclear device on Monday. The North had earlier warned the South not to participate in the effort, known as the Proliferation Security Initiative. “We consider this a declaration of war against us,” an unidentified North Korean military spokesman said Wednesday in a statement carried by the North’s official news agency KCNA. “Any hostile act against our peaceful vessels including search and seizure will be considered an unpardonable infringement on our sovereignty and we will immediately respond with a powerful military strike.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/world/asia/28korea.html?ref=world
North Korea Issues Heated Warning to South - Blaine Harden, Washington Post. North Korea announced Wednesday that it is no longer bound by the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War, the latest and most profound diplomatic aftershock from the country's latest nuclear test two days earlier. North Korea also warned that it would respond "with a powerful military strike" should its ships be stopped by international forces trying to stop the export of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The twin declarations, delivered by the country's state news agency, followed South Korea's announcement Tuesday that it would join the navies that will stop and inspect suspicious ships at sea. North Korea has repeatedly said that such participation would be a "declaration of war." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052600555.html
North Korea Warns on Ship Searches - Evan Ramstad, Wall Street Journal. North Korea's military said in a statement Wednesday that it would respond with "immediate, strong military measures" if South Korea actually stops and searches any of the North's ships under a US-led effort to halt nuclear-weapons trafficking. In the new statement, North Korea reiterated an earlier one in which it said the South's active participation in the effort would be a declaration of war and went on to add that it no longer considers itself bound by the armistice that ended the Korean War of the 1950s. The new statement was issued by the North's Korean Central News Agency. South Korea on Tuesday had lashed back at the North's latest weapons tests by announcing full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. After South Korea's move, North Korea test-fired three short-range missiles, a spokesman for the South Korean military's Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Wednesday. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124330920945753575.html
Analysts Worry Threatening N. Korea with Sanctions Could Create Escalation - Andre de Nesnera, Voice of America. North Korea detonated an underground nuclear explosion in the northeast of the country - its second nuclear test since 2006. David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, has been following North Korea's nuclear program for many years. "In 2006, it [North Korea] was trying to achieve an explosion of four kilotons and it only got about half a kiloton - so it was generally viewed as not very successful. This time, it looks to be anywhere from one to five kilotons and if North Korea was trying to get four kilotons, then you'd have to judge the test a success," he said. Albright says as a comparison, the bomb the United States detonated over Nagasaki at the end of World War II had a yield of 20 kilotons. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-26-voa51.cfm
Verifying North Korean Nuke Test Will Take Time, Official Says - Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service. It will take time before US and international officials can know with some certitude whether North Korea conducted an underground nuclear-device test yesterday, a senior Defense Department official said here today. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters that it’s too early to have definitive knowledge regarding yesterday’s purported North Korean underground nuclear test. “I suspect that some of the details that you’re looking for that more tightly define the characteristics of the event will come out like they did a couple of years ago, but that takes some time,” Whitman said. “If you go back to 2006, I think the [Director of National Intelligence] did something after there was sufficient time to collect the necessary evidence to be able to make a definitive statement.” North Korea’s nuclear device and ballistic-missile activities “pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action,” President Barack Obama told reporters yesterday at the White House. The United States and international organizations are working together to construct an assessment of North Korea’s most-recent purported nuclear test, Whitman said. It’s believed that North Korea carried out its first underground nuclear test in October 2006. North Korea also has conducted several missile and rocket tests over the past decade; the most-recent was a long-range rocket shot conducted in April. Whitman didn’t comment on news reports saying North Korea conducted short-range missile tests today. North Korea has conducted several missile tests over the past decade. In a highly publicized incident, North Korea fired a missile that passed over Japan in August 1998. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54510
Report: North Korea Fires Another Short-Range Missile - Voice of America. A South Korean news report says North Korea has fired yet another short-range missile off its eastern coast. The Yonhap news agency reports that Pyongyang launched the missile into the sea late Tuesday. Earlier in the day, North Korea fired two short-range missiles. Yonhap says those followed three missile launches on Monday after what North Korea said was a nuclear test. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, said the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus South Korea and Japan, met Tuesday for discussions on how to deal with the North Korean actions. She said they held "very serious, concrete talks" on a possible resolution to impose additional sanctions on North Korea. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-26-voa5.cfm
North Korea Said to Test More Missiles - John M. Glionna, Los Angeles Times. Tensions on the Korean peninsula rose further Tuesday as Seoul announced that it would join a US-led initiative to curb nuclear trade, and North Korea reportedly test-launched three more short-range missiles. At the United Nations, representatives of the five permanent Security Council members, plus South Korea and Japan, began meetings that could lead to new sanctions against North Korea. North Korea said Monday that it had conducted a nuclear test and several short-range missile launches, drawing sharp criticism from world capitals and a warning that it had violated a Security Council resolution. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-korea-tensions27-2009may27,0,2320407.story
Washington Says North Korea Will 'Pay a Price' - David Gollust , Voice of America. The United States said Tuesday it is working for quick action in the UN Security Council to make North Korea "pay a price" for its nuclear test Monday. But officials say they still hope to get Pyongyang to return to Chinese-sponsored disarmament talks. State Department officials say the United States wants the Security Council to impose tangible costs on North Korea for defying a 2006 resolution and conducting its second nuclear test. But they also say they want to keep the door open for Pyongyang to come back to the negotiating table, where in 2007 it agreed in principle to scrap its nuclear program for energy aid and diplomatic benefits. The Obama administration is pleased with the early response from the United Nations, where Russia and China, which have resisted tough action on North Korea, joined in a strong statement condemning the nuclear test. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-26-voa37.cfm
China Debates Its Bond with North Korea - Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times. When is it time to dump an old friend who insists on behaving badly? The debate is raging in China. North Korea's latest nuclear test raises the question of just how long the bonds forged between old communist allies will endure. The test was conducted barely 50 miles from the Chinese border. The ground rumbled in northeast China, and some schools were evacuated because of fears of an earthquake. "It was quite shocking. The location where they did this test was a lot closer to China than to where [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il is living in Pyongyang," said Zhang Liangui, a Korea expert with Beijing's Central Party School, where Communist Party officials are trained. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-china-korea27-2009may27,0,4095573.story
Leadership Mystery Amid N. Korea’s Nuclear Work - Mark Landler, New York Times. In dealing with North Korea, American officials are reduced to studying two-month-old photographs of its reclusive leader, Kim Jong-il, to calculate how long he is likely to live. The new administration’s North Korea team includes a special emissary who works part time as an academic dean and a State Department official who has yet to be confirmed by Congress. And as President Obama tries to find a way to punish North Korea for its latest nuclear test and missile launchings, his senior aides acknowledge that every policy option employed by previous presidents over the past dozen years - whether hard or soft, political or economic - has been fruitless in stopping North Korea from building a nuclear weapon. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27nuke.html?ref=world
North Korea Tests Obama - Washington Times editorial. While President Obama pushes soft power, the North Korean dictator plays hardball. North Korea's underground nuclear test and missile trials show that the regime is probing Mr. Obama's resolve. Pyongyang apparently has concluded that the president's rhetoric of conciliation and understanding betrays serious weakness as a global leader. Like all tyrants, Kim Jong-il sees an open hand as a weak one. North Korea is determined to be a nuclear power. Pyongyang has vowed to continue missile tests and uranium enrichment. The Korean Central News Agency, the communist regime's mouthpiece, declared the regime's goal: to "further [increase] the power of nuclear weapons and steadily [develop] nuclear technology." http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/north-korea-tests-obama/
How to Reduce the Nuclear Threat - William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft and Charles D. Ferguson, Wall Street Journal opinion. Monday's North Korean nuclear test was a dramatic reminder of the challenges to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. President Barack Obama has stated that he intends to pursue this goal while maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. But achieving nuclear abolition will likely require many years. Indeed, it is difficult to envision the necessary geopolitical conditions that would permit even approaching that goal. Unless the US and its partners re-energize international efforts to lessen the present dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, they will never have the hope of reaching this long-term objective. An effective strategy to reduce nuclear dangers must build on five pillars: revitalizing strategic dialogue with nuclear-armed powers, particularly Russia and China; strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; reaffirming the protection of the US nuclear umbrella to our allies; maintaining the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent; and implementing best security practices for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124338405214956695.html
A Shrinking Deterrent - Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Washington Times. North Korea celebrated Memorial Day with an underground test of a nuclear weapon reportedly the size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. With that and a series of missile launches that day and subsequently, the regime in Pyongyang has sent an unmis- takable signal: The Hermit Kingdom has nothing but contempt for the so-called "international community" and the empty rhetoric and diplomatic posturing that usually precede new rewards for the North's bad behavior. The seismic waves from the latest detonation seem likely to rattle more than the windows and members of the UN Security Council. Even as that body huffs and puffs about Kim Jong-il's belligerence, Japan and South Korea are coming to grips with an unhappy reality: They increasingly are on their own in contending with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/a-shrinking-deterrent/
North Korea Threatens Military Strikes on South - Choe Sang-Han, New York Times. North Korea on Wednesday threatened to launch military strikes against South Korea if any of its ships were stopped or searched as part of an American-led operation to intercept vessels suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction. South Korea agreed to join the global interdiction program after North Korea tested a nuclear device on Monday. The North had earlier warned the South not to participate in the effort, known as the Proliferation Security Initiative. “We consider this a declaration of war against us,” an unidentified North Korean military spokesman said Wednesday in a statement carried by the North’s official news agency KCNA. “Any hostile act against our peaceful vessels including search and seizure will be considered an unpardonable infringement on our sovereignty and we will immediately respond with a powerful military strike.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/world/asia/28korea.html?ref=world
North Korea Issues Heated Warning to South - Blaine Harden, Washington Post. North Korea announced Wednesday that it is no longer bound by the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War, the latest and most profound diplomatic aftershock from the country's latest nuclear test two days earlier. North Korea also warned that it would respond "with a powerful military strike" should its ships be stopped by international forces trying to stop the export of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The twin declarations, delivered by the country's state news agency, followed South Korea's announcement Tuesday that it would join the navies that will stop and inspect suspicious ships at sea. North Korea has repeatedly said that such participation would be a "declaration of war." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052600555.html
North Korea Warns on Ship Searches - Evan Ramstad, Wall Street Journal. North Korea's military said in a statement Wednesday that it would respond with "immediate, strong military measures" if South Korea actually stops and searches any of the North's ships under a US-led effort to halt nuclear-weapons trafficking. In the new statement, North Korea reiterated an earlier one in which it said the South's active participation in the effort would be a declaration of war and went on to add that it no longer considers itself bound by the armistice that ended the Korean War of the 1950s. The new statement was issued by the North's Korean Central News Agency. South Korea on Tuesday had lashed back at the North's latest weapons tests by announcing full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. After South Korea's move, North Korea test-fired three short-range missiles, a spokesman for the South Korean military's Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Wednesday. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124330920945753575.html
Analysts Worry Threatening N. Korea with Sanctions Could Create Escalation - Andre de Nesnera, Voice of America. North Korea detonated an underground nuclear explosion in the northeast of the country - its second nuclear test since 2006. David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, has been following North Korea's nuclear program for many years. "In 2006, it [North Korea] was trying to achieve an explosion of four kilotons and it only got about half a kiloton - so it was generally viewed as not very successful. This time, it looks to be anywhere from one to five kilotons and if North Korea was trying to get four kilotons, then you'd have to judge the test a success," he said. Albright says as a comparison, the bomb the United States detonated over Nagasaki at the end of World War II had a yield of 20 kilotons. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-26-voa51.cfm
Verifying North Korean Nuke Test Will Take Time, Official Says - Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service. It will take time before US and international officials can know with some certitude whether North Korea conducted an underground nuclear-device test yesterday, a senior Defense Department official said here today. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters that it’s too early to have definitive knowledge regarding yesterday’s purported North Korean underground nuclear test. “I suspect that some of the details that you’re looking for that more tightly define the characteristics of the event will come out like they did a couple of years ago, but that takes some time,” Whitman said. “If you go back to 2006, I think the [Director of National Intelligence] did something after there was sufficient time to collect the necessary evidence to be able to make a definitive statement.” North Korea’s nuclear device and ballistic-missile activities “pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action,” President Barack Obama told reporters yesterday at the White House. The United States and international organizations are working together to construct an assessment of North Korea’s most-recent purported nuclear test, Whitman said. It’s believed that North Korea carried out its first underground nuclear test in October 2006. North Korea also has conducted several missile and rocket tests over the past decade; the most-recent was a long-range rocket shot conducted in April. Whitman didn’t comment on news reports saying North Korea conducted short-range missile tests today. North Korea has conducted several missile tests over the past decade. In a highly publicized incident, North Korea fired a missile that passed over Japan in August 1998. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54510
Report: North Korea Fires Another Short-Range Missile - Voice of America. A South Korean news report says North Korea has fired yet another short-range missile off its eastern coast. The Yonhap news agency reports that Pyongyang launched the missile into the sea late Tuesday. Earlier in the day, North Korea fired two short-range missiles. Yonhap says those followed three missile launches on Monday after what North Korea said was a nuclear test. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, said the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus South Korea and Japan, met Tuesday for discussions on how to deal with the North Korean actions. She said they held "very serious, concrete talks" on a possible resolution to impose additional sanctions on North Korea. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-26-voa5.cfm
North Korea Said to Test More Missiles - John M. Glionna, Los Angeles Times. Tensions on the Korean peninsula rose further Tuesday as Seoul announced that it would join a US-led initiative to curb nuclear trade, and North Korea reportedly test-launched three more short-range missiles. At the United Nations, representatives of the five permanent Security Council members, plus South Korea and Japan, began meetings that could lead to new sanctions against North Korea. North Korea said Monday that it had conducted a nuclear test and several short-range missile launches, drawing sharp criticism from world capitals and a warning that it had violated a Security Council resolution. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-korea-tensions27-2009may27,0,2320407.story
Washington Says North Korea Will 'Pay a Price' - David Gollust , Voice of America. The United States said Tuesday it is working for quick action in the UN Security Council to make North Korea "pay a price" for its nuclear test Monday. But officials say they still hope to get Pyongyang to return to Chinese-sponsored disarmament talks. State Department officials say the United States wants the Security Council to impose tangible costs on North Korea for defying a 2006 resolution and conducting its second nuclear test. But they also say they want to keep the door open for Pyongyang to come back to the negotiating table, where in 2007 it agreed in principle to scrap its nuclear program for energy aid and diplomatic benefits. The Obama administration is pleased with the early response from the United Nations, where Russia and China, which have resisted tough action on North Korea, joined in a strong statement condemning the nuclear test. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-26-voa37.cfm
China Debates Its Bond with North Korea - Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times. When is it time to dump an old friend who insists on behaving badly? The debate is raging in China. North Korea's latest nuclear test raises the question of just how long the bonds forged between old communist allies will endure. The test was conducted barely 50 miles from the Chinese border. The ground rumbled in northeast China, and some schools were evacuated because of fears of an earthquake. "It was quite shocking. The location where they did this test was a lot closer to China than to where [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il is living in Pyongyang," said Zhang Liangui, a Korea expert with Beijing's Central Party School, where Communist Party officials are trained. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-china-korea27-2009may27,0,4095573.story
Leadership Mystery Amid N. Korea’s Nuclear Work - Mark Landler, New York Times. In dealing with North Korea, American officials are reduced to studying two-month-old photographs of its reclusive leader, Kim Jong-il, to calculate how long he is likely to live. The new administration’s North Korea team includes a special emissary who works part time as an academic dean and a State Department official who has yet to be confirmed by Congress. And as President Obama tries to find a way to punish North Korea for its latest nuclear test and missile launchings, his senior aides acknowledge that every policy option employed by previous presidents over the past dozen years - whether hard or soft, political or economic - has been fruitless in stopping North Korea from building a nuclear weapon. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27nuke.html?ref=world
North Korea Tests Obama - Washington Times editorial. While President Obama pushes soft power, the North Korean dictator plays hardball. North Korea's underground nuclear test and missile trials show that the regime is probing Mr. Obama's resolve. Pyongyang apparently has concluded that the president's rhetoric of conciliation and understanding betrays serious weakness as a global leader. Like all tyrants, Kim Jong-il sees an open hand as a weak one. North Korea is determined to be a nuclear power. Pyongyang has vowed to continue missile tests and uranium enrichment. The Korean Central News Agency, the communist regime's mouthpiece, declared the regime's goal: to "further [increase] the power of nuclear weapons and steadily [develop] nuclear technology." http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/north-korea-tests-obama/
How to Reduce the Nuclear Threat - William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft and Charles D. Ferguson, Wall Street Journal opinion. Monday's North Korean nuclear test was a dramatic reminder of the challenges to eliminating nuclear weapons world-wide. President Barack Obama has stated that he intends to pursue this goal while maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. But achieving nuclear abolition will likely require many years. Indeed, it is difficult to envision the necessary geopolitical conditions that would permit even approaching that goal. Unless the US and its partners re-energize international efforts to lessen the present dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, they will never have the hope of reaching this long-term objective. An effective strategy to reduce nuclear dangers must build on five pillars: revitalizing strategic dialogue with nuclear-armed powers, particularly Russia and China; strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; reaffirming the protection of the US nuclear umbrella to our allies; maintaining the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent; and implementing best security practices for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124338405214956695.html
A Shrinking Deterrent - Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Washington Times. North Korea celebrated Memorial Day with an underground test of a nuclear weapon reportedly the size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. With that and a series of missile launches that day and subsequently, the regime in Pyongyang has sent an unmis- takable signal: The Hermit Kingdom has nothing but contempt for the so-called "international community" and the empty rhetoric and diplomatic posturing that usually precede new rewards for the North's bad behavior. The seismic waves from the latest detonation seem likely to rattle more than the windows and members of the UN Security Council. Even as that body huffs and puffs about Kim Jong-il's belligerence, Japan and South Korea are coming to grips with an unhappy reality: They increasingly are on their own in contending with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/a-shrinking-deterrent/
N Korea 'not bound by armistice'
N Korea 'not bound by armistice'
North Korea has threatened the South with "unimaginable merciless punishment" [AFP]
North Korea has declared an end to its half-century-old armistice with the South, saying that it sees Seoul's move to join a US-led anti-proliferation initiative as a "declaration of war".
The warning carried on state media on Wednesday comes two days after North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and also follows a series of missile launches.
The announcement also came amid reports in South Korean media that the North had restarted its main plutonium producing nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
The reactor had previously been mothballed under a six-nation aid for disarmament deal, but in April the North said it had scrapped the agreement and would resume work on building nuclear weapons.
In depth
North Korea: A state of war
Timeline: N Korea's bomb
N Korea conducts nuclear test
Obama condemns 'reckless' N Korea
N Korea nuclear test angers China
Seoul joins US anti-WMD drive
Markets rattled by N Korea test
World reaction: N Korea bomb test
Videos
South Korea's nuclear fears
China's troublesome ally
N Korea test sparks alarm
UN 'should expel N Korea'
N Korea's 'nuclear gamble'
Riz Khan: Diplomatic fallout
Following the Monday's nuclear test South Korea announced it would become a full member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a US-led drive to curb trade in weapons of mass destruction.
It said the decision had already been taken following the North's controversial April 2 rocket launch, although the formal announcement was brought forward following the nuclear test.
But the move has provoked an angry reaction from the North which warned on Wednesday that any interception of its ships would constitute an "unpardonable infringement" on its sovereignty which would be met with "merciless punishment".
"Any tiny hostile acts against our republic, including the stopping and searching of our peaceful vessels... will face an immediate and strong military strike in response," it said in a statement by the state-run Korean Central News Agency.
Saying that the US had drawn South Korea into the PSI, the North Korean statement said it would also "no longer be bound" by the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War.
Without a binding ceasefire "the Korean peninsula will go back to a state of war", a North Korean military representative was quoted as saying, adding that the North's troops would take "corresponding military action".
Icy ties
Pyongyang's nuclear test and series of missile launches has sparked a global outcry [EPA]
"The US imperialists and the traitor Lee Myung-Bak's group have driven the situation on the Korean peninsula into a state of war," the statement added
Cross-border ties have been icy since Lee, the South Korean president, took office in Seoul in February 2008 and declared Seoul would take a tougher stance with the North.
The warning from the North came as South Korea's largest newspaper reported that the North had re-started its nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
The Chosun Ilbo said US spy satellites had spotted activity at the plant in Yongbyon, indicating that operations to produce weapons-grade plutonium had resumed.
"There are various indications that reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon resumed operation [and] have been detected by US surveillance satellite, and these include steam coming out of the facility," it quoted an unnamed government source as saying.
The North had previously agreed to dismantle Yongbyon under a breakthrough deal in 2007, but the follow-up agreements fell apart and the six-party talks that concluded the agreement have since stalled.
Al Jazeera's Tony Cheng, reporting from Seoul, said the report of fresh activity at Yongbyon was credible given the North's angry threat in April that it would resume work at the plant.
That came after North Korea fired a rocket that it said had placed a satellite into orbit in April, although the US said it believed the launch was a cover for a test of long-range missile technology.
Sanctions
"The US hostile policy towards us is like beating a rock with a rotten egg"
Minju Joson, North Korean cabinet official newspaper
On Tuesday diplomats at the UN Security Council continued talks on possible action in response to the North's latest test but said they would need time to agree on a new resolution for further sanctions.
Susan Rice, the US envoy to the UN, said members wanted a "strong resolution with teeth", and that sanctions "could take very different forms" and might include "economic levers", she told CNN without elaborating.
The international community, including the North's main ally China, has strongly condemned the latest nuclear test but it is unclear how far China and Russia, two of the council's five permanent members, would go.
Both had last month blocked a new resolution to punish the North for its April 5 rocket launch.
Reacting to the council deliberations, North Korea's state media poured scorn on efforts to implement new sanctions.
"It is a ludicrous idea for the US to think that it can defeat us by sanctions," Minju Joson, the North's official cabinet newspaper, said.
"We have been living under US sanctions for decades. The US hostile policy towards us is like beating a rock with a rotten egg."
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/05/200952744911711974.html
North Korea has threatened the South with "unimaginable merciless punishment" [AFP]
North Korea has declared an end to its half-century-old armistice with the South, saying that it sees Seoul's move to join a US-led anti-proliferation initiative as a "declaration of war".
The warning carried on state media on Wednesday comes two days after North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and also follows a series of missile launches.
The announcement also came amid reports in South Korean media that the North had restarted its main plutonium producing nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
The reactor had previously been mothballed under a six-nation aid for disarmament deal, but in April the North said it had scrapped the agreement and would resume work on building nuclear weapons.
In depth
North Korea: A state of war
Timeline: N Korea's bomb
N Korea conducts nuclear test
Obama condemns 'reckless' N Korea
N Korea nuclear test angers China
Seoul joins US anti-WMD drive
Markets rattled by N Korea test
World reaction: N Korea bomb test
Videos
South Korea's nuclear fears
China's troublesome ally
N Korea test sparks alarm
UN 'should expel N Korea'
N Korea's 'nuclear gamble'
Riz Khan: Diplomatic fallout
Following the Monday's nuclear test South Korea announced it would become a full member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a US-led drive to curb trade in weapons of mass destruction.
It said the decision had already been taken following the North's controversial April 2 rocket launch, although the formal announcement was brought forward following the nuclear test.
But the move has provoked an angry reaction from the North which warned on Wednesday that any interception of its ships would constitute an "unpardonable infringement" on its sovereignty which would be met with "merciless punishment".
"Any tiny hostile acts against our republic, including the stopping and searching of our peaceful vessels... will face an immediate and strong military strike in response," it said in a statement by the state-run Korean Central News Agency.
Saying that the US had drawn South Korea into the PSI, the North Korean statement said it would also "no longer be bound" by the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War.
Without a binding ceasefire "the Korean peninsula will go back to a state of war", a North Korean military representative was quoted as saying, adding that the North's troops would take "corresponding military action".
Icy ties
Pyongyang's nuclear test and series of missile launches has sparked a global outcry [EPA]
"The US imperialists and the traitor Lee Myung-Bak's group have driven the situation on the Korean peninsula into a state of war," the statement added
Cross-border ties have been icy since Lee, the South Korean president, took office in Seoul in February 2008 and declared Seoul would take a tougher stance with the North.
The warning from the North came as South Korea's largest newspaper reported that the North had re-started its nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
The Chosun Ilbo said US spy satellites had spotted activity at the plant in Yongbyon, indicating that operations to produce weapons-grade plutonium had resumed.
"There are various indications that reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon resumed operation [and] have been detected by US surveillance satellite, and these include steam coming out of the facility," it quoted an unnamed government source as saying.
The North had previously agreed to dismantle Yongbyon under a breakthrough deal in 2007, but the follow-up agreements fell apart and the six-party talks that concluded the agreement have since stalled.
Al Jazeera's Tony Cheng, reporting from Seoul, said the report of fresh activity at Yongbyon was credible given the North's angry threat in April that it would resume work at the plant.
That came after North Korea fired a rocket that it said had placed a satellite into orbit in April, although the US said it believed the launch was a cover for a test of long-range missile technology.
Sanctions
"The US hostile policy towards us is like beating a rock with a rotten egg"
Minju Joson, North Korean cabinet official newspaper
On Tuesday diplomats at the UN Security Council continued talks on possible action in response to the North's latest test but said they would need time to agree on a new resolution for further sanctions.
Susan Rice, the US envoy to the UN, said members wanted a "strong resolution with teeth", and that sanctions "could take very different forms" and might include "economic levers", she told CNN without elaborating.
The international community, including the North's main ally China, has strongly condemned the latest nuclear test but it is unclear how far China and Russia, two of the council's five permanent members, would go.
Both had last month blocked a new resolution to punish the North for its April 5 rocket launch.
Reacting to the council deliberations, North Korea's state media poured scorn on efforts to implement new sanctions.
"It is a ludicrous idea for the US to think that it can defeat us by sanctions," Minju Joson, the North's official cabinet newspaper, said.
"We have been living under US sanctions for decades. The US hostile policy towards us is like beating a rock with a rotten egg."
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/05/200952744911711974.html
The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts By Chalmers Johnson
The Bases of Empire:
The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts
By Chalmers Johnson
There has been no public discussion by the Obama administration over starting to liquidate our overseas bases or beginning to scale back our imperialist presence in the rest of the world. Continue
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22712.htm
The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts
By Chalmers Johnson
There has been no public discussion by the Obama administration over starting to liquidate our overseas bases or beginning to scale back our imperialist presence in the rest of the world. Continue
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22712.htm
Netanyahu: If Israel Doesn't Take out Iranian "Threat", No One Will By Haaretz Staff
Netanyahu: If Israel Doesn't Take out Iranian "Threat", No One Will
By Haaretz Staff
"Israel is not like other countries," Netanyahu told his Likud faction in a meeting which came one week after his meeting with President Barack Obama at the White House. "We are faced with security challenges that no other country faces, and our need to provide a response to these is critical, and we are answering the call." Continue
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22707.htm
By Haaretz Staff
"Israel is not like other countries," Netanyahu told his Likud faction in a meeting which came one week after his meeting with President Barack Obama at the White House. "We are faced with security challenges that no other country faces, and our need to provide a response to these is critical, and we are answering the call." Continue
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article22707.htm
Beyond Obama’s Rhetoric by Kim Petersen
Beyond Obama’s Rhetoric
by Kim Petersen / May 26th, 2009 (10)
With each passing day, president Barack Obama provides more and more evidence that the line distinguishing him from his predecessor George W. Bush is one of style rather than of substance. This is revealed by Obama’s recent statement about the explosion of a nuclear device by North Korea.
Obama said, “North Korea’s nuclear ballistic missile programs pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action.”
If indeed what Obama says is true, then what of the US’s nuclear ballistic missiles? They must also “pose a great threat to the peace and …
(Full article …) http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/05/parsing-obama/
by Kim Petersen / May 26th, 2009 (10)
With each passing day, president Barack Obama provides more and more evidence that the line distinguishing him from his predecessor George W. Bush is one of style rather than of substance. This is revealed by Obama’s recent statement about the explosion of a nuclear device by North Korea.
Obama said, “North Korea’s nuclear ballistic missile programs pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action.”
If indeed what Obama says is true, then what of the US’s nuclear ballistic missiles? They must also “pose a great threat to the peace and …
(Full article …) http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/05/parsing-obama/
Who Will Stand Up to America and Israel? Doublespeak on North Korea By PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
Who Will Stand Up to America and Israel?
Doublespeak on North Korea
By PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
"Obama Calls on World to ‘Stand Up To’ North Korea” read the headline. The United States, Obama said, was determined to protect “the peace and security of the world.”
Shades of doublespeak, doublethink, 1984.
North Korea is a small place. China alone could snuff it out in a few minutes. Yet, the president of the US thinks that nothing less than the entire world is a match for North Korea.
We are witnessing the Washington gangsters construct yet another threat like Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, John Walker Lindh, Hamdi, Padilla, Sami Al-Arian, Hamas, Mahkmoud Ahmadinejad, and the hapless detainees demonized by the US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld as “the 700 most dangerous terrorists on the face of the earth,” who were tortured for six years at Gitmo only to be quietly released. Just another mistake, sorry.
The military/security complex that rules America, together with the Israel Lobby and the financial banksters, needs a long list of dangerous enemies to keep the taxpayers’ money flowing into its coffers.
The Homeland Security lobby is dependent on endless threats to convince Americans that they must forego civil liberty in order to be safe and secure.
The real question is who is going to stand up to the American and Israeli governments?
Who is going to protect Americans’ and Israelis’ civil liberties, especially those of Israeli dissenters and Israel’s Arab citizens?
Who is going to protect Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghans, Lebanese, Iranians, and Syrians from Americans and Israelis?
Not Obama, and not the right-wing brownshirts that today rule Israel.
Obama’s notion that it takes the entire world to stand up to N. Korea is mind-boggling, but this mind-boggling idea pales in comparison to Obama’s guarantee that America will protect “the peace and security of the world.”
Is this the same America that bombed Serbia, including Chinese diplomatic offices and civilian passenger trains, and pried Kosovo loose from Serbia and gave it to a gang of Muslim drug lords, lending them NATO troops to protect their operation?
Is this the same America that is responsible for the deaths of approximately one million Iraqis, leaving orphans and widows everywhere and making refugees out of one-firth of the Iraqi population?
Is this the same America that blocked the rest of the world from condemning Israel for its murderous attack on Lebanese civilians in 2006 and on Gazans most recently, the same America that has covered up for Israel’s theft of Palestine over the past 60 years, a theft that has produced four million Palestinian refugees driven by Israeli violence and terror from their homes and villages?
Is this the same America that is conducting military exercises in former constituent parts of Russia and ringing Russia with missile bases?
Is this the same America that has bombed Afghanistan into rubble with massive civilian casualties?
Is this the same America that has started a horrific new war in Pakistan, a war that in its first few days has produced one million refugees?
“The peace and security of the world”? Whose world?
On his return from his consultation with Obama in Washington, the brownshirted Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that it was Israel’s responsibility to “eliminate” the “nuclear threat” from Iran.
What nuclear threat? The US intelligence agencies are unanimous in their conclusion that Iran has had no nuclear weapons program since 2003. The inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency report that there is no sign of a nuclear weapons program in Iran.
Who is Iran bombing? How many refugees is Iran sending fleeing for their lives?
Who is North Korea bombing?
The two great murderous, refugee-producing countries are the US and Israel. Between them, they have murdered and dislocated millions of people who were a threat to no one.
No countries on earth rival the US and Israel for barbaric murderous violence.
But Obama gives assurances that the US will protect “the peace and security of the world.” And the brownshirt Netanyahu assures the world that Israel will save it from the “Iranian threat.”
Where are the media?
Why aren’t people laughing their heads off?
Paul Craig Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He is coauthor of The Tyranny of Good Intentions.He can be reached at: PaulCraigRoberts@yahoo.com
http://www.counterpunch.org/roberts05272009.html
Doublespeak on North Korea
By PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
"Obama Calls on World to ‘Stand Up To’ North Korea” read the headline. The United States, Obama said, was determined to protect “the peace and security of the world.”
Shades of doublespeak, doublethink, 1984.
North Korea is a small place. China alone could snuff it out in a few minutes. Yet, the president of the US thinks that nothing less than the entire world is a match for North Korea.
We are witnessing the Washington gangsters construct yet another threat like Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, John Walker Lindh, Hamdi, Padilla, Sami Al-Arian, Hamas, Mahkmoud Ahmadinejad, and the hapless detainees demonized by the US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld as “the 700 most dangerous terrorists on the face of the earth,” who were tortured for six years at Gitmo only to be quietly released. Just another mistake, sorry.
The military/security complex that rules America, together with the Israel Lobby and the financial banksters, needs a long list of dangerous enemies to keep the taxpayers’ money flowing into its coffers.
The Homeland Security lobby is dependent on endless threats to convince Americans that they must forego civil liberty in order to be safe and secure.
The real question is who is going to stand up to the American and Israeli governments?
Who is going to protect Americans’ and Israelis’ civil liberties, especially those of Israeli dissenters and Israel’s Arab citizens?
Who is going to protect Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghans, Lebanese, Iranians, and Syrians from Americans and Israelis?
Not Obama, and not the right-wing brownshirts that today rule Israel.
Obama’s notion that it takes the entire world to stand up to N. Korea is mind-boggling, but this mind-boggling idea pales in comparison to Obama’s guarantee that America will protect “the peace and security of the world.”
Is this the same America that bombed Serbia, including Chinese diplomatic offices and civilian passenger trains, and pried Kosovo loose from Serbia and gave it to a gang of Muslim drug lords, lending them NATO troops to protect their operation?
Is this the same America that is responsible for the deaths of approximately one million Iraqis, leaving orphans and widows everywhere and making refugees out of one-firth of the Iraqi population?
Is this the same America that blocked the rest of the world from condemning Israel for its murderous attack on Lebanese civilians in 2006 and on Gazans most recently, the same America that has covered up for Israel’s theft of Palestine over the past 60 years, a theft that has produced four million Palestinian refugees driven by Israeli violence and terror from their homes and villages?
Is this the same America that is conducting military exercises in former constituent parts of Russia and ringing Russia with missile bases?
Is this the same America that has bombed Afghanistan into rubble with massive civilian casualties?
Is this the same America that has started a horrific new war in Pakistan, a war that in its first few days has produced one million refugees?
“The peace and security of the world”? Whose world?
On his return from his consultation with Obama in Washington, the brownshirted Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that it was Israel’s responsibility to “eliminate” the “nuclear threat” from Iran.
What nuclear threat? The US intelligence agencies are unanimous in their conclusion that Iran has had no nuclear weapons program since 2003. The inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency report that there is no sign of a nuclear weapons program in Iran.
Who is Iran bombing? How many refugees is Iran sending fleeing for their lives?
Who is North Korea bombing?
The two great murderous, refugee-producing countries are the US and Israel. Between them, they have murdered and dislocated millions of people who were a threat to no one.
No countries on earth rival the US and Israel for barbaric murderous violence.
But Obama gives assurances that the US will protect “the peace and security of the world.” And the brownshirt Netanyahu assures the world that Israel will save it from the “Iranian threat.”
Where are the media?
Why aren’t people laughing their heads off?
Paul Craig Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He is coauthor of The Tyranny of Good Intentions.He can be reached at: PaulCraigRoberts@yahoo.com
http://www.counterpunch.org/roberts05272009.html
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
NORTH KOREA
NORTH KOREA
N. Korea Conducts 'Successful' Underground Nuclear Test - Blaine Harden - Washington Post. North Korea exploded a nuclear device Monday morning, startling the world with its second underground test in three years and vexing the Obama administration, which has said it wants to solve the nuclear impasse with North Korea. The test, described as "successful" by the communist state's official Korean Central News Agency, escalates a pattern of provocation that this spring has included a long-range missile launch, detention of two US journalists, kicking out UN nuclear inspectors, restarting a plutonium factory and halting six-nation nuclear negotiations. On Monday afternoon, North Korea fired three surface-to-air missiles into the sea, according to South Korea's defense minister, Lee Sang-hee. It was an apparent effort to chase off US spy planes monitoring the nuclear test site, according to Yonhap, the South Korean news agency, which quoted an unnamed South Korean official. The missiles, with a range of about 80 miles, were launched from near a coastal base where last month North Korea launched a long-range missile. In Washington, President Obama accused North Korea of "recklessly challenging the international community" with its nuclear and missiles tests. He added in an early morning statement that "the danger posed by North Korea's threatening activities warrants action by the international community." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/05/25/ST2009052501053.html?hpid=topnews
North Korean Nuclear Claim Draws Global Criticism - Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times. North Korea’s announcement that it had successfully conducted its second nuclear test on Monday drew condemnation and criticism around the world, including the United Nations Security Council. The dimensions of the test were not immediately verifiable, but estimates ranged upwards of the nearly one kiloton of the North’s first nuclear test, in 2006. President Obama said: “North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose a grave threat to the peace and security of the world, and I strongly condemn their reckless action.” “The United States and the international community must take action in response,” he added. China, by far North Korea’s largest trading partner, said it was “resolutely opposed” to the test, according to a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/asia/26nuke.html?_r=2&hp
UN Condemns North Korea Over Nuclear Test - Tim Reid, The Times. The UN Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea last night for carrying out a powerful underground nuclear test. It appeared paralysed on whether to impose further sanctions on the communist regime. President Obama said that the test was a threat to world peace. The atomic bomb - up to 20 times more powerful than the previous one detonated by North Korea in 2006 - was comparable with the one that flattened Hiroshima. It put the world on notice that Pyongyang is accelerating quickly towards a military nuclear capability. Three short-range missiles were also tested, prompting South Korea to put its army on alert. The provocative test sparked global condemnation, even from China, the reclusive state’s only ally. It was clear, however, that the West was increasingly powerless to halt the nuclear programme.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6361069.ece
Ignoring Criticism, N. Korea Is Said to Test More Missiles - Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times. One day after a surprise nuclear test drew angry and widespread condemnation, North Korea continued its defiance of the international community on Tuesday by test-firing two more short-range missiles, according to the South Korean news agency Yonhap, which cited unidentified government sources in Seoul. The reported missile firings came just hours after South Korea said it would join an American-led operation to stop the global trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, an action bound to further damage the South’s already deteriorating relationship with North Korea. The missiles launched Tuesday were surface-to-ship and surface-to-air projectiles, each with a range of 80 miles, according to the Yonhap sources. They were apparently launched from a base on the central eastern coast into the sea opposite Japan, further rattling nerves in the region.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27korea.html?ref=world
UN Security Council Condemns North Korea Nuclear Test - Toby Harnden and Malcolm Moore, The Times. The United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea’s latest nuclear test at an emergency session in New York last night after Pyongyang tested a nuclear device as powerful as the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki. Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, said it represented "a clear violation" of a 2006 resolution that followed the country's first nuclear test. The blast, which caused a 5.3 magnitude earthquake, demonstrated that Pyongyang had continued to develop its weapons programme despite economic sanctions, aid promises and international outrage. North Korea had been threatening to carry out a second nuclear test since the UN Security Council tightened economic sanctions after a test missile launch in April. Monday night's meeting included the US, Britain, Russia, China and France, the five permanent veto-wielding countries, as part of the full 15-member council. President Barack Obama called the test a "matter of grave concern", accusing North Korea of "directly and recklessly challenging the international community". http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5384699/UN-Security-Council-condemns-North-Korea-nuclear-test.html
President Obama Condemns North Korean Nuclear Test - Paula Wolfson, Voice of America. US President Barack Obama has condemned North Korea's latest nuclear test, saying the international community must stand up to Pyongyang. Mr. Obama says North Korea's actions endanger its neighbors, and are a blatant violation of international law. President Obama appeared before television cameras at the White House to deliver a blunt message to North Korea's leaders. "North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose a grave threat to the peace and security of the world, and I strongly condemn their reckless action," he said. Speaking just hours before the UN Security Council was due to meet in emergency session on North Korea, the president stressed the need for international solidarity.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-25-voa36.cfm
North Korean Nuclear Blast Draws Global Condemnation - Blaine Harden, Washington Post. North Korea's detonation of a nuclear device Monday appears not to have been a significant technical advance over its first underground test three years ago. But it has triggered a swifter, stronger and more uniform wave of international condemnation, most notably from the isolated nation's historical allies, China and Russia. The UN Security Council moved quickly in an emergency meeting Monday to condemn the test, saying it constituted a clear violation of a 2006 UN resolution barring the communist state from exploding a nuclear weapon. The council's speedy response contrasted with protracted discussions that followed North Korea's April 5 launch of a long-range missile and reflected what analysts called deep displeasure by Russia and China. Earlier, the Chinese government, North Korea's main economic patron, said it was "resolutely opposed" to the test and told Pyongyang to avoid actions that heighten tensions and return to multi-nation talks focused on dismantling its nuclear program. China's response Monday was significantly more pointed than it was to North Korea's first nuclear test, in October 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501672.html?hpid=topnews
Tested Early by North Korea, Obama Has Few Options - David E. Sanger, New York Times. Facing the first direct challenge to his administration by an emerging nuclear weapons state, President Obama declared Monday that the United States and its allies would “stand up” to North Korea, hours after that country defied international sanctions and conducted what appeared to be its second nuclear test. Mr. Obama reacted to the underground blast as White House officials scrambled to coordinate an international response to a North Korean nuclear capacity that none of his predecessors had proved able to reverse. Acutely aware that their response to the explosion in the mountains of Kilju, not far from the Chinese border, would be seen as an early test of a new administration, Mr. Obama’s aides said they were determined to organize a significantly stronger response than the Bush administration had managed after the North’s first nuclear test, in October 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/asia/26nuke.html?_r=1&hp
President, Top US Military Denounce North Korean Nuclear Test - Fred W. Baker III, American Forces Press Service. The president and the nation’s top military officer today denounced North Korea's claim that it carried out a powerful underground nuclear test, much larger than previous such tests, to “bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defense." "North Korea's nuclear ballistic missile programs pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action," Obama told reporters this morning in the White House Rose Garden. North Korea's actions they are a blatant violation of international law, and they contradict North Korea's own prior commitments, he said.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54491
From Washington to Beijing, World Leaders Denounce Test - Colum Lynch and Joby Warrick, Washington Post. North Korea's announcement of its second nuclear detonation triggered a wave of international condemnation today and sent diplomats scrambling to coordinate a response that could include new sanctions. "By acting in blatant defiance of the United Nations Security Council, North Korea is directly and recklessly challenging the international community," Obama said in a brief statement outside the White House. "North Korea's behavior increases tensions and undermines stability in Northeast Asia. Such provocations will only serve to deepen North Korea's isolation." washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501672.html?hpid=topnews
S.Korea to Seek Security Council Response to North's Test - Kurt Achin, Voice of America. South Korea says it wants a strong UN Security Council response to North Korea's latest nuclear test, which the United States has characterized as a direct and reckless challenge to the international community. Meantime, President Barack Obama has condemned North Korea's nuclear test, saying the international community must stand up to North Korea on the nuclear issue. A White House statement is calling North Korea's nuclear test "a matter of grave concern" that "warrants action by the international community." http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-25-voa10.cfm
China Opposes N. Korean Nuclear Test - Stephanie Ho, Voice of America. China said it opposes the North Korean nuclear test, but refrained from any harsh language in its statement issued late Monday. Meanwhile, the visiting head of the US Senate's Foreign Relations committee said the North Korean nuclear test is a reckless act that further isolates the Asian nation. The Chinese government issued a statement saying it resolutely opposes North Korea's nuclear test. The statement voiced a "strong demand" that Pyongyang live up to its commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and refrain from taking any actions that could worsen the situation. The Chinese statement also called for a "calm response" from all parties concerned and expressed hope the issue would be resolved through dialogue and consultation.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-25-voa33.cfm
Japan Poised to Ease its Ban Again on Export of Weapons - Peter Alford, The Australian. The Japanese Government is about to ease its universal embargo on weapons exports in a move that may foreshadow Japan joining the US-controlled F-35 joint strike fighter project. The decision is another whittling-away of Japan's long-standing policy of standing apart from foreign military engagements and co-operation. It would allow Japanese companies to join international weapons development programs, such as the F-35 program, by removing the ban on exporting components to other participants. Tokyo has already lifted one corner of the 33-year-old embargo to participate in the US's Pacific ballistic missile defence program - Japan is developing an advanced nose-cone for the SM-3 high-altitude interceptor missile. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25530939-31477,00.html
Test Delivers a Message for Domestic Consumption - Martin Fackler, New York Times. When North Korea suddenly announced Monday that it had conducted a second nuclear test, the initial view across the region was that this had been yet another defiant gambit by the North to extract more concessions from Washington. That has been the oft-repeated pattern in the past, and is likely to be one motivation now as well, say North Korea watchers. But this time around, North Korea’s succession crisis is the primary impetus, many experts believe, suggesting that the audience for the test is its own population as much as the United States. Monday’s test is the culmination of a shift toward a more assertive foreign policy, which some analysts say seems to have begun not long after the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, is believed to have suffered a stroke in August. Speculation about a successor has focused on his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, which would continue the family dynasty to the third generation - one unique among Communist nations. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/asia/26northk.html?adxnnl=1&ref=world&adxnnlx=1243328497-vJGg4L32vnXTShaTOGNJxA
An Early Test for Obama's Engagement Policy - Glenn Kessler, Washington Post. President Obama came into office saying he wanted to demonstrate that engagement with hostile nations is more effective than antagonism, but North Korea's nuclear test now leaves the young administration with critical choices about its response. Does it ramp up the pressure with new and tougher sanctions? Does it not overreact and essentially stand pat? Or will it, like the Bush administration after North Korea's first test in 2006, shift course and redouble efforts at engagement and diplomacy? A key variable is an assessment of what North Korea is hoping to gain. Is it ratcheting up the pressure to win new concessions from the United States and nations in the region? Or should the United States take its rhetoric at face value - that it is aiming to become a full-fledged nuclear power, no matter what the cost in diplomatic isolation? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501961.html
No Crisis for North Korea - Washington Post editorial. North Korea's detonation of a nuclear warhead in an underground test yesterday is, of course, cause for serious concern -- particularly as the blast appears to have been considerably larger than the regime's first test nearly three years ago. It is certainly cause for swift action by the UN Security Council, which issued a statement condemning Pyongyang's blatant violations of previous council resolutions, and promised to prepare yet another resolution - though, as always, the prospect that truly tough sanctions will be adopted is not bright. What Kim Jong Il's latest provocation should not cause, however, is the response he is seeking: a rush by the Obama administration to lavish attention on his regime and offer it economic and political favors.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501505.html
What to Do About North Korea - Dan Blumenthal and Robert Kagan, Washington Post opinion. The North Korean launch of its Taeopodong-2 missile and its second nuclear test have laid bare the paucity of President Obama's policy options. They have exposed the futility of the six-party talks and, in particular, the much-hyped myth of China's value as a partner on strategic matters. The Obama administration claims that it wants to break with the policies of its predecessor. This is one area where it ought to. After decades of diplomacy and "probing" Pyongyang's intentions, one thing is clear: Kim Jong Il and his cronies want nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. What will dissuade them? Isolation and more punitive sanctions would make sense if China and Russia would go along. But they haven't, and they won't.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501391.html
N. Korea Conducts 'Successful' Underground Nuclear Test - Blaine Harden - Washington Post. North Korea exploded a nuclear device Monday morning, startling the world with its second underground test in three years and vexing the Obama administration, which has said it wants to solve the nuclear impasse with North Korea. The test, described as "successful" by the communist state's official Korean Central News Agency, escalates a pattern of provocation that this spring has included a long-range missile launch, detention of two US journalists, kicking out UN nuclear inspectors, restarting a plutonium factory and halting six-nation nuclear negotiations. On Monday afternoon, North Korea fired three surface-to-air missiles into the sea, according to South Korea's defense minister, Lee Sang-hee. It was an apparent effort to chase off US spy planes monitoring the nuclear test site, according to Yonhap, the South Korean news agency, which quoted an unnamed South Korean official. The missiles, with a range of about 80 miles, were launched from near a coastal base where last month North Korea launched a long-range missile. In Washington, President Obama accused North Korea of "recklessly challenging the international community" with its nuclear and missiles tests. He added in an early morning statement that "the danger posed by North Korea's threatening activities warrants action by the international community." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/05/25/ST2009052501053.html?hpid=topnews
North Korean Nuclear Claim Draws Global Criticism - Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times. North Korea’s announcement that it had successfully conducted its second nuclear test on Monday drew condemnation and criticism around the world, including the United Nations Security Council. The dimensions of the test were not immediately verifiable, but estimates ranged upwards of the nearly one kiloton of the North’s first nuclear test, in 2006. President Obama said: “North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose a grave threat to the peace and security of the world, and I strongly condemn their reckless action.” “The United States and the international community must take action in response,” he added. China, by far North Korea’s largest trading partner, said it was “resolutely opposed” to the test, according to a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/asia/26nuke.html?_r=2&hp
UN Condemns North Korea Over Nuclear Test - Tim Reid, The Times. The UN Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea last night for carrying out a powerful underground nuclear test. It appeared paralysed on whether to impose further sanctions on the communist regime. President Obama said that the test was a threat to world peace. The atomic bomb - up to 20 times more powerful than the previous one detonated by North Korea in 2006 - was comparable with the one that flattened Hiroshima. It put the world on notice that Pyongyang is accelerating quickly towards a military nuclear capability. Three short-range missiles were also tested, prompting South Korea to put its army on alert. The provocative test sparked global condemnation, even from China, the reclusive state’s only ally. It was clear, however, that the West was increasingly powerless to halt the nuclear programme.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6361069.ece
Ignoring Criticism, N. Korea Is Said to Test More Missiles - Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times. One day after a surprise nuclear test drew angry and widespread condemnation, North Korea continued its defiance of the international community on Tuesday by test-firing two more short-range missiles, according to the South Korean news agency Yonhap, which cited unidentified government sources in Seoul. The reported missile firings came just hours after South Korea said it would join an American-led operation to stop the global trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, an action bound to further damage the South’s already deteriorating relationship with North Korea. The missiles launched Tuesday were surface-to-ship and surface-to-air projectiles, each with a range of 80 miles, according to the Yonhap sources. They were apparently launched from a base on the central eastern coast into the sea opposite Japan, further rattling nerves in the region.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/world/asia/27korea.html?ref=world
UN Security Council Condemns North Korea Nuclear Test - Toby Harnden and Malcolm Moore, The Times. The United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea’s latest nuclear test at an emergency session in New York last night after Pyongyang tested a nuclear device as powerful as the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki. Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, said it represented "a clear violation" of a 2006 resolution that followed the country's first nuclear test. The blast, which caused a 5.3 magnitude earthquake, demonstrated that Pyongyang had continued to develop its weapons programme despite economic sanctions, aid promises and international outrage. North Korea had been threatening to carry out a second nuclear test since the UN Security Council tightened economic sanctions after a test missile launch in April. Monday night's meeting included the US, Britain, Russia, China and France, the five permanent veto-wielding countries, as part of the full 15-member council. President Barack Obama called the test a "matter of grave concern", accusing North Korea of "directly and recklessly challenging the international community". http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5384699/UN-Security-Council-condemns-North-Korea-nuclear-test.html
President Obama Condemns North Korean Nuclear Test - Paula Wolfson, Voice of America. US President Barack Obama has condemned North Korea's latest nuclear test, saying the international community must stand up to Pyongyang. Mr. Obama says North Korea's actions endanger its neighbors, and are a blatant violation of international law. President Obama appeared before television cameras at the White House to deliver a blunt message to North Korea's leaders. "North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose a grave threat to the peace and security of the world, and I strongly condemn their reckless action," he said. Speaking just hours before the UN Security Council was due to meet in emergency session on North Korea, the president stressed the need for international solidarity.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-25-voa36.cfm
North Korean Nuclear Blast Draws Global Condemnation - Blaine Harden, Washington Post. North Korea's detonation of a nuclear device Monday appears not to have been a significant technical advance over its first underground test three years ago. But it has triggered a swifter, stronger and more uniform wave of international condemnation, most notably from the isolated nation's historical allies, China and Russia. The UN Security Council moved quickly in an emergency meeting Monday to condemn the test, saying it constituted a clear violation of a 2006 UN resolution barring the communist state from exploding a nuclear weapon. The council's speedy response contrasted with protracted discussions that followed North Korea's April 5 launch of a long-range missile and reflected what analysts called deep displeasure by Russia and China. Earlier, the Chinese government, North Korea's main economic patron, said it was "resolutely opposed" to the test and told Pyongyang to avoid actions that heighten tensions and return to multi-nation talks focused on dismantling its nuclear program. China's response Monday was significantly more pointed than it was to North Korea's first nuclear test, in October 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501672.html?hpid=topnews
Tested Early by North Korea, Obama Has Few Options - David E. Sanger, New York Times. Facing the first direct challenge to his administration by an emerging nuclear weapons state, President Obama declared Monday that the United States and its allies would “stand up” to North Korea, hours after that country defied international sanctions and conducted what appeared to be its second nuclear test. Mr. Obama reacted to the underground blast as White House officials scrambled to coordinate an international response to a North Korean nuclear capacity that none of his predecessors had proved able to reverse. Acutely aware that their response to the explosion in the mountains of Kilju, not far from the Chinese border, would be seen as an early test of a new administration, Mr. Obama’s aides said they were determined to organize a significantly stronger response than the Bush administration had managed after the North’s first nuclear test, in October 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/asia/26nuke.html?_r=1&hp
President, Top US Military Denounce North Korean Nuclear Test - Fred W. Baker III, American Forces Press Service. The president and the nation’s top military officer today denounced North Korea's claim that it carried out a powerful underground nuclear test, much larger than previous such tests, to “bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defense." "North Korea's nuclear ballistic missile programs pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly condemn their reckless action," Obama told reporters this morning in the White House Rose Garden. North Korea's actions they are a blatant violation of international law, and they contradict North Korea's own prior commitments, he said.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54491
From Washington to Beijing, World Leaders Denounce Test - Colum Lynch and Joby Warrick, Washington Post. North Korea's announcement of its second nuclear detonation triggered a wave of international condemnation today and sent diplomats scrambling to coordinate a response that could include new sanctions. "By acting in blatant defiance of the United Nations Security Council, North Korea is directly and recklessly challenging the international community," Obama said in a brief statement outside the White House. "North Korea's behavior increases tensions and undermines stability in Northeast Asia. Such provocations will only serve to deepen North Korea's isolation." washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501672.html?hpid=topnews
S.Korea to Seek Security Council Response to North's Test - Kurt Achin, Voice of America. South Korea says it wants a strong UN Security Council response to North Korea's latest nuclear test, which the United States has characterized as a direct and reckless challenge to the international community. Meantime, President Barack Obama has condemned North Korea's nuclear test, saying the international community must stand up to North Korea on the nuclear issue. A White House statement is calling North Korea's nuclear test "a matter of grave concern" that "warrants action by the international community." http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-25-voa10.cfm
China Opposes N. Korean Nuclear Test - Stephanie Ho, Voice of America. China said it opposes the North Korean nuclear test, but refrained from any harsh language in its statement issued late Monday. Meanwhile, the visiting head of the US Senate's Foreign Relations committee said the North Korean nuclear test is a reckless act that further isolates the Asian nation. The Chinese government issued a statement saying it resolutely opposes North Korea's nuclear test. The statement voiced a "strong demand" that Pyongyang live up to its commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and refrain from taking any actions that could worsen the situation. The Chinese statement also called for a "calm response" from all parties concerned and expressed hope the issue would be resolved through dialogue and consultation.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-25-voa33.cfm
Japan Poised to Ease its Ban Again on Export of Weapons - Peter Alford, The Australian. The Japanese Government is about to ease its universal embargo on weapons exports in a move that may foreshadow Japan joining the US-controlled F-35 joint strike fighter project. The decision is another whittling-away of Japan's long-standing policy of standing apart from foreign military engagements and co-operation. It would allow Japanese companies to join international weapons development programs, such as the F-35 program, by removing the ban on exporting components to other participants. Tokyo has already lifted one corner of the 33-year-old embargo to participate in the US's Pacific ballistic missile defence program - Japan is developing an advanced nose-cone for the SM-3 high-altitude interceptor missile. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25530939-31477,00.html
Test Delivers a Message for Domestic Consumption - Martin Fackler, New York Times. When North Korea suddenly announced Monday that it had conducted a second nuclear test, the initial view across the region was that this had been yet another defiant gambit by the North to extract more concessions from Washington. That has been the oft-repeated pattern in the past, and is likely to be one motivation now as well, say North Korea watchers. But this time around, North Korea’s succession crisis is the primary impetus, many experts believe, suggesting that the audience for the test is its own population as much as the United States. Monday’s test is the culmination of a shift toward a more assertive foreign policy, which some analysts say seems to have begun not long after the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, is believed to have suffered a stroke in August. Speculation about a successor has focused on his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, which would continue the family dynasty to the third generation - one unique among Communist nations. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/asia/26northk.html?adxnnl=1&ref=world&adxnnlx=1243328497-vJGg4L32vnXTShaTOGNJxA
An Early Test for Obama's Engagement Policy - Glenn Kessler, Washington Post. President Obama came into office saying he wanted to demonstrate that engagement with hostile nations is more effective than antagonism, but North Korea's nuclear test now leaves the young administration with critical choices about its response. Does it ramp up the pressure with new and tougher sanctions? Does it not overreact and essentially stand pat? Or will it, like the Bush administration after North Korea's first test in 2006, shift course and redouble efforts at engagement and diplomacy? A key variable is an assessment of what North Korea is hoping to gain. Is it ratcheting up the pressure to win new concessions from the United States and nations in the region? Or should the United States take its rhetoric at face value - that it is aiming to become a full-fledged nuclear power, no matter what the cost in diplomatic isolation? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501961.html
No Crisis for North Korea - Washington Post editorial. North Korea's detonation of a nuclear warhead in an underground test yesterday is, of course, cause for serious concern -- particularly as the blast appears to have been considerably larger than the regime's first test nearly three years ago. It is certainly cause for swift action by the UN Security Council, which issued a statement condemning Pyongyang's blatant violations of previous council resolutions, and promised to prepare yet another resolution - though, as always, the prospect that truly tough sanctions will be adopted is not bright. What Kim Jong Il's latest provocation should not cause, however, is the response he is seeking: a rush by the Obama administration to lavish attention on his regime and offer it economic and political favors.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501505.html
What to Do About North Korea - Dan Blumenthal and Robert Kagan, Washington Post opinion. The North Korean launch of its Taeopodong-2 missile and its second nuclear test have laid bare the paucity of President Obama's policy options. They have exposed the futility of the six-party talks and, in particular, the much-hyped myth of China's value as a partner on strategic matters. The Obama administration claims that it wants to break with the policies of its predecessor. This is one area where it ought to. After decades of diplomacy and "probing" Pyongyang's intentions, one thing is clear: Kim Jong Il and his cronies want nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. What will dissuade them? Isolation and more punitive sanctions would make sense if China and Russia would go along. But they haven't, and they won't.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501391.html
Free Trade, Not Aid, Likely to Help Pakistan by Stephen M. Walt
Free Trade, Not Aid, Likely to Help Pakistan by Stephen M. Walt
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/26/your_tax_dollars_at_work
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/26/your_tax_dollars_at_work
The West's Reckless Approach to Russia by William Pfaff
The West's Reckless Approach to Russia by William Pfaff
http://original.antiwar.com/pfaff/2009/05/26/the-wests-reckless-approach-to-russia/
http://original.antiwar.com/pfaff/2009/05/26/the-wests-reckless-approach-to-russia/
WaPo: US pressure to freeze settlements "complicated" by Bush "secret agreement"
AMERICAN FOOTPRINTS
5/24/09
WaPo: US pressure to freeze settlements "complicated" by Bush "secret agreement"
Goodness, gracious me! Glenn Kessler and Howard Schneider just posted
a doozy on the WaPo site, which will put the cat among the pigeons!
And why am I not surprised to find the fingerprints of our dear old
friend and pardoned Iran-Contra criminal, Eliott Abrams, on this one.
The story begins when Nentanyahu came to meet Obama a week or so ago
and got an earful wherever he went in DC, especially about halting the
expansion of settlements. It wasn't just at the White House and State
Department. He also got a rude welcome on Capitol Hill among all those
Congresscritters Bibi thought were his old buddies.
You know you're on shaky ground when Rep. Robert Wexler (D-Fla) tells
you, ""The Palestinians have enormous responsibilities, but the notion
that Israel can continue to expand settlements, whether it be through
natural growth or otherwise, without diminishing the capacity of a
two-state solution is both unrealistic, and, I would respectfully
suggest, hypocritical." Ah, hum.
But! Not to be discouraged by such a cool reception in DC, the
Israelis are trying to push back, restating boldly that they haveno
plan to freeze settlements. You see, according to Bibi's spokesman,
until there are "final status arrangements," of which settlements are
one, "it would not be fair to kill normal life inside existing
communities."
Hmmm. Not fair to kill normal life. Let's stop and think about that
for a moment. Might there be some other folks in the neighborhood who
share a similar sentiment that it's unfair to kill normal life inside
existing communities? Especially given that Israel undertook in Phase
I of the Road Map to "take all necessary steps to help normalise
Palestinian life...[and] also freeze[s] all settlement activity,
consistent with the Mitchell report."
But, but... say the Israelis. George Bush gave Sharon a letter in 2004
that had caveats. And indeed Bush did. Here's what the Wikipedia
article on the Road Map for peace describes about the letter. [Note:
this is a stable part of the Wikipedia Road Map article, so there
seems to be consensus about its accuracy.]
On April 14, 2004, President George W. Bush wrote a letter to Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon seeming to herald two significant changes
or increased specifications to longstanding but ambiguous U.S. policy
which had most recently been embodied in the road map. For the first
time during the road map process, Bush indicated his expectations as
to the outcome of the final status negotiations. The letter was widely
seen as a triumph for Sharon, since Bush's expectations seemed to
favor Israel on two highly contentious issues. Regarding final
borders, the letter stated: "In light of new realities on the ground,
including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is
unrealistic that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a
full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all
previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the
same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status
agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed
changes that reflect these realities...". Second, regarding the
Palestinian refugees' right of return, Bush also stated: "It seems
clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a
solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status
agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a
Palestinian state and the settling of Palestinian refugees there
rather than Israel."
So far, Bush's 2004 letter, though supremely irritating and
disappointing to the Palestinians, nonethless tracks with what most
observers had expected the Road Map process to eventually lead to.
True, the letter may appear to prejudge certain "final status
arrangements." However, the points in the letter don't appear to be
inconsistent with Israel's obligations under the Road Map.
But wait! There's more! Here's the kicker, from Kessler and Schneider:
In an interview with The Washington Post last year, Sharon aide Dov
Weissglas said that in 2005, when Sharon was poised to remove settlers
from Gaza, the Bush administration arrived at a secret agreement --
not disclosed to the Palestinians -- that Israel could add homes in
settlements it expected to keep, as long as the construction was
dictated by market demand, not subsidies.
Elliott Abrams, a former deputy national security adviser who
negotiated the arrangement with Weissglas,confirmed the deal in an
interview last week. "At the time of the Gaza withdrawal, there were
lengthy discussions about how settlement activity might be
constrained, and in fact it was constrainedin the later part of the
Sharon years and the Olmert years in accordance with the ideas that
were discussed," he said. "There was something of an understanding
realized on these questions, but it was never a written agreement."
Regev said Israeli and U.S. negotiators are discussing the degree to
which the terms of the 2004 letter will apply under the new
administration, but U.S. officials indicated that Obama wants to move
beyond the 2004 letter and hold Israel to its commitments under the
road map. "The bottom line is we expect all the parties in the region
to honor their commitments, and for the Israelis, that means a stop to
settlements, as the president said," a senior administration official
said.
So let me get this straight. The WaPo has since 2008 been sitting on
the knowledge of "something of an unwritten understanding" or "secret
agreement" -- which was not disclosed to the Palestinians -- that
exempted Israel from commonly understood expectations of Israel's Road
Map obligations.
Just curious. Was this agreement shared with the Quartet? With Middle
East envoys like James Wolfensohn, who had the unenviable task of
trying to get the Israelis to deal with the Gaza withdrawal about the
same time Eliot was negotiating that "unwritten understanding"? Was it
disclosed to other branches of the US government?It certainly wasn't
shared with with the US public, either by the Bush Administration or
the WaPo, even though the issue of Israeli settlements has become the
focus of increasing public disapproval of Israeli actions, and even
though it has even been a factor in US electoral politics. Just how
many folks were in on this little private understanding. Maybe Eliott
shared that tidbit with his friends who hired him at theCouncil on
Foreign Relations
. Who knows!
Still, it seems that the previously undisclosed "understanding" is
rapidly becoming NOL (no longer operative). The last statement quoted
by Gessler and Schneider from a "senior administration official"
doesn't sound like much of a "discussion" is happening between US and
Israeli officials. Let's just review it one more time.
"The bottom line is we expect all the parties in the region to honor
their commitments, and for the Israelis, that means a stop to
settlements, as the president said".
That message is going to elicit howls of outrage and betrayal from Tel
Aviv. One assumes that news of the "unwritten understanding" will also
produce howls from Ramallah, though somewhat offset by Obama's
apparent seriousness to hold the Israelis to their commitments. But it
appears that any Israelii howls aren't going to be met with much
sympathy from the Obama Administration, or even on Capitol Hill.
By the way, tell me again, who got suckered when Bibi met Obama?
Cross-posted at Attackerman
UPDATE: My cynicism about the WaPo's Middle East coverage is high, but
I'm still astonished at how completely they've buried this story. This
story not only isn't on the home page. You have to scroll down six
articles in the "More News" column on the "World" front to find it.
And even on the "Middle East" front, two other articles are showcased,
and this is only one of a number of headlines at the top of "More
News". Maybe they're hoping it stays buried until the Sunday shows are
over.
_______________________________________________
5/24/09
WaPo: US pressure to freeze settlements "complicated" by Bush "secret agreement"
Goodness, gracious me! Glenn Kessler and Howard Schneider just posted
a doozy on the WaPo site, which will put the cat among the pigeons!
And why am I not surprised to find the fingerprints of our dear old
friend and pardoned Iran-Contra criminal, Eliott Abrams, on this one.
The story begins when Nentanyahu came to meet Obama a week or so ago
and got an earful wherever he went in DC, especially about halting the
expansion of settlements. It wasn't just at the White House and State
Department. He also got a rude welcome on Capitol Hill among all those
Congresscritters Bibi thought were his old buddies.
You know you're on shaky ground when Rep. Robert Wexler (D-Fla) tells
you, ""The Palestinians have enormous responsibilities, but the notion
that Israel can continue to expand settlements, whether it be through
natural growth or otherwise, without diminishing the capacity of a
two-state solution is both unrealistic, and, I would respectfully
suggest, hypocritical." Ah, hum.
But! Not to be discouraged by such a cool reception in DC, the
Israelis are trying to push back, restating boldly that they haveno
plan to freeze settlements. You see, according to Bibi's spokesman,
until there are "final status arrangements," of which settlements are
one, "it would not be fair to kill normal life inside existing
communities."
Hmmm. Not fair to kill normal life. Let's stop and think about that
for a moment. Might there be some other folks in the neighborhood who
share a similar sentiment that it's unfair to kill normal life inside
existing communities? Especially given that Israel undertook in Phase
I of the Road Map to "take all necessary steps to help normalise
Palestinian life...[and] also freeze[s] all settlement activity,
consistent with the Mitchell report."
But, but... say the Israelis. George Bush gave Sharon a letter in 2004
that had caveats. And indeed Bush did. Here's what the Wikipedia
article on the Road Map for peace describes about the letter. [Note:
this is a stable part of the Wikipedia Road Map article, so there
seems to be consensus about its accuracy.]
On April 14, 2004, President George W. Bush wrote a letter to Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon seeming to herald two significant changes
or increased specifications to longstanding but ambiguous U.S. policy
which had most recently been embodied in the road map. For the first
time during the road map process, Bush indicated his expectations as
to the outcome of the final status negotiations. The letter was widely
seen as a triumph for Sharon, since Bush's expectations seemed to
favor Israel on two highly contentious issues. Regarding final
borders, the letter stated: "In light of new realities on the ground,
including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is
unrealistic that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a
full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all
previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the
same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status
agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed
changes that reflect these realities...". Second, regarding the
Palestinian refugees' right of return, Bush also stated: "It seems
clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a
solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status
agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a
Palestinian state and the settling of Palestinian refugees there
rather than Israel."
So far, Bush's 2004 letter, though supremely irritating and
disappointing to the Palestinians, nonethless tracks with what most
observers had expected the Road Map process to eventually lead to.
True, the letter may appear to prejudge certain "final status
arrangements." However, the points in the letter don't appear to be
inconsistent with Israel's obligations under the Road Map.
But wait! There's more! Here's the kicker, from Kessler and Schneider:
In an interview with The Washington Post last year, Sharon aide Dov
Weissglas said that in 2005, when Sharon was poised to remove settlers
from Gaza, the Bush administration arrived at a secret agreement --
not disclosed to the Palestinians -- that Israel could add homes in
settlements it expected to keep, as long as the construction was
dictated by market demand, not subsidies.
Elliott Abrams, a former deputy national security adviser who
negotiated the arrangement with Weissglas,confirmed the deal in an
interview last week. "At the time of the Gaza withdrawal, there were
lengthy discussions about how settlement activity might be
constrained, and in fact it was constrainedin the later part of the
Sharon years and the Olmert years in accordance with the ideas that
were discussed," he said. "There was something of an understanding
realized on these questions, but it was never a written agreement."
Regev said Israeli and U.S. negotiators are discussing the degree to
which the terms of the 2004 letter will apply under the new
administration, but U.S. officials indicated that Obama wants to move
beyond the 2004 letter and hold Israel to its commitments under the
road map. "The bottom line is we expect all the parties in the region
to honor their commitments, and for the Israelis, that means a stop to
settlements, as the president said," a senior administration official
said.
So let me get this straight. The WaPo has since 2008 been sitting on
the knowledge of "something of an unwritten understanding" or "secret
agreement" -- which was not disclosed to the Palestinians -- that
exempted Israel from commonly understood expectations of Israel's Road
Map obligations.
Just curious. Was this agreement shared with the Quartet? With Middle
East envoys like James Wolfensohn, who had the unenviable task of
trying to get the Israelis to deal with the Gaza withdrawal about the
same time Eliot was negotiating that "unwritten understanding"? Was it
disclosed to other branches of the US government?It certainly wasn't
shared with with the US public, either by the Bush Administration or
the WaPo, even though the issue of Israeli settlements has become the
focus of increasing public disapproval of Israeli actions, and even
though it has even been a factor in US electoral politics. Just how
many folks were in on this little private understanding. Maybe Eliott
shared that tidbit with his friends who hired him at theCouncil on
Foreign Relations
. Who knows!
Still, it seems that the previously undisclosed "understanding" is
rapidly becoming NOL (no longer operative). The last statement quoted
by Gessler and Schneider from a "senior administration official"
doesn't sound like much of a "discussion" is happening between US and
Israeli officials. Let's just review it one more time.
"The bottom line is we expect all the parties in the region to honor
their commitments, and for the Israelis, that means a stop to
settlements, as the president said".
That message is going to elicit howls of outrage and betrayal from Tel
Aviv. One assumes that news of the "unwritten understanding" will also
produce howls from Ramallah, though somewhat offset by Obama's
apparent seriousness to hold the Israelis to their commitments. But it
appears that any Israelii howls aren't going to be met with much
sympathy from the Obama Administration, or even on Capitol Hill.
By the way, tell me again, who got suckered when Bibi met Obama?
Cross-posted at Attackerman
UPDATE: My cynicism about the WaPo's Middle East coverage is high, but
I'm still astonished at how completely they've buried this story. This
story not only isn't on the home page. You have to scroll down six
articles in the "More News" column on the "World" front to find it.
And even on the "Middle East" front, two other articles are showcased,
and this is only one of a number of headlines at the top of "More
News". Maybe they're hoping it stays buried until the Sunday shows are
over.
_______________________________________________
Mike Whitney The Next Leg Down: When Deflation Becomes Entrenched
Mike Whitney
The Next Leg Down: When Deflation Becomes Entrenched
http://www.counterpunch.org/whitney05262009.html
The Next Leg Down: When Deflation Becomes Entrenched
http://www.counterpunch.org/whitney05262009.html
North Korea's Second Nuclear Test Fearful Pride
North Korea's Second Nuclear Test
Fearful Pride
http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia05262009.html
By MANUEL GARCIA, Jr.
The US Geological Survey detected a 4.7 magnitude seismic event at 00:54 GMT on the 25th of May at Hwaderi, near Kilju City in North Harnkyung province in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK = "North Korea") at 10 km (6 miles) below the surface. The nature of the seismic signals indicated this to be the second nuclear test carried out by the DPRK, and the yield of the device was between 10 kT and 20 kT (kT = kilo-tons of TNT explosive power, 1 kT = 4.184 x 10-to-12th-power Joules). The Hiroshima bomb was 13 kT, and the Nagasaki bomb was 21 kT. The DPRK also conducted three short-range missile tests on the same day, a few hours after their nuclear detonation.
The last paragraph summarizes the publicly available facts about the DPRK's nuclear test #2 (see notes 1 and 2 for news accounts). Commentary on the meaning of this test was actually written three years ago, on the occasion of the DPRK's nuclear test #1 of 9 October 2006 (see notes 3 and 4).
My commentary of 2006 still applies because neither the policy goals of the United States and Security Council Nuclear Powers, nor the fears of the DPRK leadership have changed since 2006. In the simplest terms, world capitalism under the direction of the United States wants the North Koreans to dismantle their DPRK state and to integrate their economy and workforce into that of an expanded Republic of Korea (South Korea) in a manner similar to the dissolution of the East German communist state (Democratic Republic of Germany, 7 October 1949 to 3 October 1990). The foreign policy of the DPRK, of which its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are a part, is aimed at combatting the existential threat to the DPRK governing elite.
First, let us consider some of the physical aspects of DPRK test #2.
A yield up to 20 kT is clearly a "success" and indicates the verification of one design of an implosion system (discounting the possibility of a gun-type assembly as in the Hiroshima bomb). I presume, but do not know, that this bomb is an experimental device that is neither compact and light-weight enough, nor ruggedized enough to fit within the payload mass and space limitations of a slim missile body, and to withstand the forces of acceleration required of a ballistic missile nuclear warhead. Any program aimed at that goal will require another test (in perhaps three years?) of a militarized packaging of the "pit" (nuclear core and its surrounding blanket of high explosives) tested today.
The amazingly deep burial at 10 km will probably assure full containment of radioactivity from the DPRK test. US underground tests were often 0.3 km to 0.5 km down. Because of the rapid attenuation of the high frequency parts of an electrical signal with its travel distance along a cable, the US nuclear program engineered its underground tests with the minimum burial depth necessary to assure containment, so as to have the highest fidelity possible for the detection and recording systems relaying and storing experimental data from sensors near the device. Optimizing the burial depth for signal fidelity required a sophisticated arrangement of plugs and backfill to seal the emplacement shaft or tunnel. I wonder if the DPRK test program is satisfied with simple low-fidelity data (the simplest being the sensation of an artificial earthquake), or if they have an underground alcove with high-fidelity recording equipment in a cavern near the detonation point. It may be that the DPRK wished to avoid snooping by US intelligence satellites, so it buried the entire test operation. It is also possible to partially decouple the force of a buried explosion from the surrounding earth by placing the bomb in the center of a larger cavity; this will transmit a weaker seismic signal, and could spoof seismic measurements of yield by foreign powers.
Clearly, the DPRK nuclear program scientists evaluated the data from their test of October 2006, made new calculations, undoubtedly built new assemblies for hydrodynamic testing (perfecting the dynamics of the heavy-metal implosion driven by chemical high explosives), and settled on a design that produced sizable yield. It is equally clear that their nuclear materials program was able to produce sufficient weapons-grade fissile material for at least one new device since 2006 (perhaps 10 kg), and probably several times that amount.
All in all, it is evident they are now a full-fledged member of the nuclear weapons club. The most honest reaction the Security Council of the UN, and the leading world powers could offer would be: "congratulations!"
Now, let us speculate on the political fallout.
The DPRK has made the clearest possible statement that the best defense against domination by superior powers is nuclear weaponry. The greater care with which the U.S. and Security Council Nuclear Powers approach the DPRK confirms this argument. When observing the situations of Palestine, Iraq and Iran, most of the rest of the world would concede the validity of the argument.
The policy of the U.S. is to encourage other nations to abide by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- and renounce nuclear weapons -- while exempting itself from it; essentially "disarm that we may more easily rule." The DPRK posture is a rejection of the US policy, and a pointed example of rebellion calling out to the rest of the world.
Another aspect of the DPRK's nuclear weapons politics is to put its near neighbors on notice not to think of colonizing it. This message is particularly aimed at South Korea, seen as an extension of US capitalism, and to Japan. There are still Koreans living who remember being brutally enslaved by Imperial Japan, which forcibly annexed Korea during 1910 to 1945. Even more Koreans remember the 1950-1953 war between China and the U.S., on their peninsula. The casualties of that war, for the US-led anti-communist forces, were 474,000; the combined casualties for the communist Chinese and North Korean forces were between 1.19 million and 1.58 million; and the total number of Korean civilians killed or wounded is estimated at 2 million (5).
Today, Japan fustigates that it may have to build its own nuclear weapons (within one year!) to counter those of the DPRK, and South Korea issued similar statements to assuage domestic concerns about the nuclear developments in the North. There is little reason to fear aggression by the DPRK. While it may soon be true that it could launch a few nuclear warheads into South Korea, Japan and toward US bases and fleets in the Pacific, such attacks would ensure the swift destruction of the DPRK elite by retaliatory actions of the most modern military forces on this planet. Nuclear weapons would not be needed for this; waves of GPS-guided missile strikes with conventional high explosive warheads, followed by similarly guided airborne bombing would eradicate the DPRK nomenklatura and its entire military infrastructure. Also, it is very likely that missiles launched by North Korea would be immediately detected by US and allied nations' radars and satellites, and countered by anti-missile missiles (today's equivalent to the flak thrown up in WW2). Such defenses are more likely to be effective against long-range missiles since there is more time to react. The DPRK leadership knows from its own history that US-led military action has no regard for Korean loss-of-life, so they are fully aware that their nuclear arsenal is only a stratagem strictly limited to diplomatic gamesmanship short of actual war.
So, what does the DPRK leadership hope to gain by brandishing nuclear arms? The DPRK leadership's deepest desire is that of all elites everywhere: a long-term guarantee of its privileged position within the undisturbed extent of its domain. The DPRK wants to interact with the rest of the world in a way that sustains the physical and economic existence of their state but without introducing any ideas or social forces that weaken the control of the DPRK leadership, and the fealty of the population to that leadership. Clearly, the present DPRK regime is skeptical it can follow the Chinese example of introducing a state-directed form of capitalism while maintaining ideological control and sufficient popular obedience, so it is resistant to allowing the population wider exposure to foreign influences. The DPRK nuclear arsenal is the equivalent of a 10 foot (3.3 m) high wall topped with glass shards surrounding an estate with Pit Bulls and Doberman Pinschers running loose. It is a shield built with pride and motivated by fear.
Unfortunately, urging the DPRK leadership to engage in nuclear disarmament is equivalent to urging it to dissolve; the nature of their brittle power structure could not withstand the corrosive effects of the psychological, cultural and economic forces within world capitalism. They know this, hence the obsessive defensiveness. The most humane policy toward the DPRK would be to leave it alone. Over the long term, if it is neither harassed nor provoked, it will slowly relax many of its fears. Once the apprehensions of the DPRK are reasonably lowered because it is no longer being pressured and hurried to fit into a foreign capitalist agenda, then it is likely the society of the DPRK will evolve into greater harmony with the world consensus on many issues. Such a policy would be one of respecting the integrity of another society, and of non-interference. It is definitely not the policy with the highest expected return on investment (ROI), nor the earliest expected payoff, but it is the policy with the least likelihood of harming the Korean people and their neighbors. One has to imagine the possibility of arriving at nuclear disarmament as the inevitable consequence of the disuse of nuclear weapons: they are no longer maintained and rust away because their owners have moved on to other activities.
Internationally, patient respect will ultimately soften the fearful pride of an otherwise unaggressive state. The real solution to nuclear proliferation is the expansion of social and economic justice within our own nations, because nuclear arms are primarily a symptom of economic class warfare coupled with racism. Let the people of North Korea deal with their economic elite, and let us reform ours; and in that way we can eliminate the nuclear weapons squeezed out of the world's popular collective labor by our various ambitious and parasitic ruling classes.
Manuel Garcia, Jr., a former physicist at Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Laboratory, can be reached at mango@idiom.com
Notes
[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8066615.stm
[2] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8067438.stm
[3] http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia10172006.html
[4] http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia10192006.html
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
Fearful Pride
http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia05262009.html
By MANUEL GARCIA, Jr.
The US Geological Survey detected a 4.7 magnitude seismic event at 00:54 GMT on the 25th of May at Hwaderi, near Kilju City in North Harnkyung province in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK = "North Korea") at 10 km (6 miles) below the surface. The nature of the seismic signals indicated this to be the second nuclear test carried out by the DPRK, and the yield of the device was between 10 kT and 20 kT (kT = kilo-tons of TNT explosive power, 1 kT = 4.184 x 10-to-12th-power Joules). The Hiroshima bomb was 13 kT, and the Nagasaki bomb was 21 kT. The DPRK also conducted three short-range missile tests on the same day, a few hours after their nuclear detonation.
The last paragraph summarizes the publicly available facts about the DPRK's nuclear test #2 (see notes 1 and 2 for news accounts). Commentary on the meaning of this test was actually written three years ago, on the occasion of the DPRK's nuclear test #1 of 9 October 2006 (see notes 3 and 4).
My commentary of 2006 still applies because neither the policy goals of the United States and Security Council Nuclear Powers, nor the fears of the DPRK leadership have changed since 2006. In the simplest terms, world capitalism under the direction of the United States wants the North Koreans to dismantle their DPRK state and to integrate their economy and workforce into that of an expanded Republic of Korea (South Korea) in a manner similar to the dissolution of the East German communist state (Democratic Republic of Germany, 7 October 1949 to 3 October 1990). The foreign policy of the DPRK, of which its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are a part, is aimed at combatting the existential threat to the DPRK governing elite.
First, let us consider some of the physical aspects of DPRK test #2.
A yield up to 20 kT is clearly a "success" and indicates the verification of one design of an implosion system (discounting the possibility of a gun-type assembly as in the Hiroshima bomb). I presume, but do not know, that this bomb is an experimental device that is neither compact and light-weight enough, nor ruggedized enough to fit within the payload mass and space limitations of a slim missile body, and to withstand the forces of acceleration required of a ballistic missile nuclear warhead. Any program aimed at that goal will require another test (in perhaps three years?) of a militarized packaging of the "pit" (nuclear core and its surrounding blanket of high explosives) tested today.
The amazingly deep burial at 10 km will probably assure full containment of radioactivity from the DPRK test. US underground tests were often 0.3 km to 0.5 km down. Because of the rapid attenuation of the high frequency parts of an electrical signal with its travel distance along a cable, the US nuclear program engineered its underground tests with the minimum burial depth necessary to assure containment, so as to have the highest fidelity possible for the detection and recording systems relaying and storing experimental data from sensors near the device. Optimizing the burial depth for signal fidelity required a sophisticated arrangement of plugs and backfill to seal the emplacement shaft or tunnel. I wonder if the DPRK test program is satisfied with simple low-fidelity data (the simplest being the sensation of an artificial earthquake), or if they have an underground alcove with high-fidelity recording equipment in a cavern near the detonation point. It may be that the DPRK wished to avoid snooping by US intelligence satellites, so it buried the entire test operation. It is also possible to partially decouple the force of a buried explosion from the surrounding earth by placing the bomb in the center of a larger cavity; this will transmit a weaker seismic signal, and could spoof seismic measurements of yield by foreign powers.
Clearly, the DPRK nuclear program scientists evaluated the data from their test of October 2006, made new calculations, undoubtedly built new assemblies for hydrodynamic testing (perfecting the dynamics of the heavy-metal implosion driven by chemical high explosives), and settled on a design that produced sizable yield. It is equally clear that their nuclear materials program was able to produce sufficient weapons-grade fissile material for at least one new device since 2006 (perhaps 10 kg), and probably several times that amount.
All in all, it is evident they are now a full-fledged member of the nuclear weapons club. The most honest reaction the Security Council of the UN, and the leading world powers could offer would be: "congratulations!"
Now, let us speculate on the political fallout.
The DPRK has made the clearest possible statement that the best defense against domination by superior powers is nuclear weaponry. The greater care with which the U.S. and Security Council Nuclear Powers approach the DPRK confirms this argument. When observing the situations of Palestine, Iraq and Iran, most of the rest of the world would concede the validity of the argument.
The policy of the U.S. is to encourage other nations to abide by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- and renounce nuclear weapons -- while exempting itself from it; essentially "disarm that we may more easily rule." The DPRK posture is a rejection of the US policy, and a pointed example of rebellion calling out to the rest of the world.
Another aspect of the DPRK's nuclear weapons politics is to put its near neighbors on notice not to think of colonizing it. This message is particularly aimed at South Korea, seen as an extension of US capitalism, and to Japan. There are still Koreans living who remember being brutally enslaved by Imperial Japan, which forcibly annexed Korea during 1910 to 1945. Even more Koreans remember the 1950-1953 war between China and the U.S., on their peninsula. The casualties of that war, for the US-led anti-communist forces, were 474,000; the combined casualties for the communist Chinese and North Korean forces were between 1.19 million and 1.58 million; and the total number of Korean civilians killed or wounded is estimated at 2 million (5).
Today, Japan fustigates that it may have to build its own nuclear weapons (within one year!) to counter those of the DPRK, and South Korea issued similar statements to assuage domestic concerns about the nuclear developments in the North. There is little reason to fear aggression by the DPRK. While it may soon be true that it could launch a few nuclear warheads into South Korea, Japan and toward US bases and fleets in the Pacific, such attacks would ensure the swift destruction of the DPRK elite by retaliatory actions of the most modern military forces on this planet. Nuclear weapons would not be needed for this; waves of GPS-guided missile strikes with conventional high explosive warheads, followed by similarly guided airborne bombing would eradicate the DPRK nomenklatura and its entire military infrastructure. Also, it is very likely that missiles launched by North Korea would be immediately detected by US and allied nations' radars and satellites, and countered by anti-missile missiles (today's equivalent to the flak thrown up in WW2). Such defenses are more likely to be effective against long-range missiles since there is more time to react. The DPRK leadership knows from its own history that US-led military action has no regard for Korean loss-of-life, so they are fully aware that their nuclear arsenal is only a stratagem strictly limited to diplomatic gamesmanship short of actual war.
So, what does the DPRK leadership hope to gain by brandishing nuclear arms? The DPRK leadership's deepest desire is that of all elites everywhere: a long-term guarantee of its privileged position within the undisturbed extent of its domain. The DPRK wants to interact with the rest of the world in a way that sustains the physical and economic existence of their state but without introducing any ideas or social forces that weaken the control of the DPRK leadership, and the fealty of the population to that leadership. Clearly, the present DPRK regime is skeptical it can follow the Chinese example of introducing a state-directed form of capitalism while maintaining ideological control and sufficient popular obedience, so it is resistant to allowing the population wider exposure to foreign influences. The DPRK nuclear arsenal is the equivalent of a 10 foot (3.3 m) high wall topped with glass shards surrounding an estate with Pit Bulls and Doberman Pinschers running loose. It is a shield built with pride and motivated by fear.
Unfortunately, urging the DPRK leadership to engage in nuclear disarmament is equivalent to urging it to dissolve; the nature of their brittle power structure could not withstand the corrosive effects of the psychological, cultural and economic forces within world capitalism. They know this, hence the obsessive defensiveness. The most humane policy toward the DPRK would be to leave it alone. Over the long term, if it is neither harassed nor provoked, it will slowly relax many of its fears. Once the apprehensions of the DPRK are reasonably lowered because it is no longer being pressured and hurried to fit into a foreign capitalist agenda, then it is likely the society of the DPRK will evolve into greater harmony with the world consensus on many issues. Such a policy would be one of respecting the integrity of another society, and of non-interference. It is definitely not the policy with the highest expected return on investment (ROI), nor the earliest expected payoff, but it is the policy with the least likelihood of harming the Korean people and their neighbors. One has to imagine the possibility of arriving at nuclear disarmament as the inevitable consequence of the disuse of nuclear weapons: they are no longer maintained and rust away because their owners have moved on to other activities.
Internationally, patient respect will ultimately soften the fearful pride of an otherwise unaggressive state. The real solution to nuclear proliferation is the expansion of social and economic justice within our own nations, because nuclear arms are primarily a symptom of economic class warfare coupled with racism. Let the people of North Korea deal with their economic elite, and let us reform ours; and in that way we can eliminate the nuclear weapons squeezed out of the world's popular collective labor by our various ambitious and parasitic ruling classes.
Manuel Garcia, Jr., a former physicist at Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Laboratory, can be reached at mango@idiom.com
Notes
[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8066615.stm
[2] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8067438.stm
[3] http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia10172006.html
[4] http://www.counterpunch.org/garcia10192006.html
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
Pattern Recognition: Why Israel's favorite rhetorical device is no longer effective by Liel Leibovitz
TPM CAFÉ
5/24/09
Pattern Recognition: Why Israel's favorite rhetorical device is no longer effective
Liel Leibovitz
As a former pawn in Israel's foreign ministry, stationed in New York, the one thing I miss most is not the diplomatic visa, the corner office overlooking the United Nations, or the ability to park anywhere in Manhattan with impunity. What I find myself yearning for is something far more ephemeral and wonderful: the official state visit.
Every few months, when a government official made his way to our golden shores, my colleagues and I would take a few days off from our numbing desk-bound routine, and accompany the visiting dignitary to meetings with other dignitaries. There, facing each other, would sit two grown men in muted charcoal suits who, for an hour or two, would speak voluminously yet somehow, like communication magi, avoid saying anything at all. When the official would return to Israel, I'd be expected to write a report summing up the meeting. Unable to make sense of the hailstorm of drivel I'd witnessed, I would resort to the following beautifully ambiguous sentence: "the discussion revolved around the challenges and opportunities lying ahead in the future." It worked every time.
I thought about these heady days this week, as I watched Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, arrive at the first visit of his current term and meet with President Barack Obama. The meeting, as could be expected, was widely covered. Yet most reporters seemed to have missed Netanyahu's most important locution, a sentence so slippery it could only be captured by a highly trained former Israeli press officer.
"Mr. Netanyahu," reported The New York Times, "told Mr. Obama that he was ready to resume peace talks with the Palestinians immediately, but they would only succeed if the Palestinians recognized Israel as a Jewish state."
Behold the beauty of the prime minister's words. Peace, he insists, could only be viable were the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the home of the Jews. This, of course, implies that they do not, which in turn suggests that the Palestinians belong in the historical pantheon of Jew-hating villains, slightly to the right of Haman, the biblical genocidal maniac, and just to the left of Hitler.
But Netanyahu's words are sinister not just rhetorically, but politically first and foremost. His strange plea for recognition neatly packs within it a wilderness of bad intentions. To understand them, and the potential threats they pose for the struggling peace process, a brief detour is necessary.
For decades, Israeli leaders reluctant to engage in serious discussions with the Palestinians, needed only to look up to the Palestinian National Charter, the 1964 document that birthed the Palestinian Liberation Organization, for proof of the futility of negotiations. The charter describes Israel as an "entirely illegal" state, and therefore does not recognize its right to exist. And how, clucked Israeli politicians from 1967 onwards, are we expected to sit at the table with foes who won't even grant us the most primal privilege, that of existence?
Sensing, perhaps, that the charter was a bit too odious for western ears, the PLO's perennially pragmatic leader, Yasser Arafat, sprang into action. In a speech in 1988, Arafat announced that he recognized "the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security... including the state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbors." A few months later, he went even further, telling a French journalist that the Palestinian charter was, essentially, null and void.
Neither statement impressed Israel much. Arafat, went the line out of Jerusalem, could say whatever he wanted, but it was the charter itself that spoke volumes, and the charter needed to change before peace was ever possible.
It was the charter, then, that was high on prime minister Yitzhak Rabin's list of priorities when he launched the Oslo peace process in 1993. Israel, he said, would only consider territorial concessions if the offensive document was amended to recognize the Jewish state's right to exist. Arafat was easily convinced, promised to submit the changes to the Palestinian National Council, and did so a few years later. The council was overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed changes, with 504 members voting in favor, 54 against, and 14 abstaining.
Rabin, however, was assassinated, and his successor, the very same Benjamin Netanyahu, focused on the charter like a hound on a wounded fox. The changes Arafat made, he claimed, were too legalistic, too murky, not sufficiently clear. The Palestinians, he declared, had to speak unequivocally and state their good intentions. Again, Arafat did just that, writing a letter to President Bill Clinton and assuring him that all of the anti-Israel clauses had been removed from the charter. In 1998, Clinton travelled to Gaza, and in a speech to the gathered Palestinian leadership put the matter to its final rest.
"I thank you for your rejection--fully, finally and forever--of the passages in the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel," Clinton said. "For they were the ideological underpinnings of a struggle renounced at Oslo. By revoking them once and for all, you have sent, I say again, a powerful message not to the government, but to the people of Israel. You will touch people on the street there. You will reach their hearts there."
And while the hearts of Israel's leaders may not have been touched, their minds had no choice but to admit that the Palestinians did recognize - fully, finally, and forever - Israel's right to exist.
Which bring us back to this week in Washington. The newly elected Netanyahu, presiding over a precarious coalition that seats the centrist Labor party with the right-wing zealots of Avigdor Lieberman's Israel Beytenu party, needed some ploy to stall re-engaging the Palestinians, an untenable prospect considering his hawkish campaign promises and the unstable alliance that is his cabinet. Looking back in time, he found the same canard he touted a decade ago, that of demanding some sort of recognition as a precondition to negotiations.
But whereas the old demand - recognizing Israel's right to exist - was understandable, the new one - recognizing Israel as a Jewish state - is ludicrous. Writing in Ha'aretz, Israeli columnist Gideon Levy captured the demand's idiocy in full glory when he suggested mockingly that Netanyahu might as well have thrown in a demand for the Palestinians to recognize the Sabbath as the Jewish people's day of rest, or recognize the religious laws that prohibit Jews from eating leaven during Passover.
As funny as Netanyahu's new demand may sound, however, its implications are dead serious. In reverting back to the recognition game, the Israeli leader is saying, much more clearly than any of his official statements ever could, that he has no intention of seriously committing himself to resolving the conflict with the Palestinians, ending the occupation and heralding peace.
Americans - in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere - should take Netanyahu at his word. While Clinton indulged Netanyahu's rhetorical romps and travelled to Gaza to bring about resolution to the spectacularly unimportant matter of the Palestinian National Charter, Obama needn't display as much patience and goodwill. Instead, the president would do much better if he was to avoid such distractions and tell Netanyahu, when they next meet, that if the Israeli prime minister is to find any sympathy in the White House, he has a few recognitions of his own to make, namely that empty political maneuvers will not be tolerated and that actions, not words, are the key to remaining on the administration's sunny side.
The alternative is to continue holding such empty, ceremonious meetings, in which both sides do little save for discussing, to paraphrase my favorite phrase from my years in the foreign ministry, the challenges and opportunities lying ahead in the future. It doesn't take a former diplomat to know that that's not nearly enough.
5/24/09
Pattern Recognition: Why Israel's favorite rhetorical device is no longer effective
Liel Leibovitz
As a former pawn in Israel's foreign ministry, stationed in New York, the one thing I miss most is not the diplomatic visa, the corner office overlooking the United Nations, or the ability to park anywhere in Manhattan with impunity. What I find myself yearning for is something far more ephemeral and wonderful: the official state visit.
Every few months, when a government official made his way to our golden shores, my colleagues and I would take a few days off from our numbing desk-bound routine, and accompany the visiting dignitary to meetings with other dignitaries. There, facing each other, would sit two grown men in muted charcoal suits who, for an hour or two, would speak voluminously yet somehow, like communication magi, avoid saying anything at all. When the official would return to Israel, I'd be expected to write a report summing up the meeting. Unable to make sense of the hailstorm of drivel I'd witnessed, I would resort to the following beautifully ambiguous sentence: "the discussion revolved around the challenges and opportunities lying ahead in the future." It worked every time.
I thought about these heady days this week, as I watched Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, arrive at the first visit of his current term and meet with President Barack Obama. The meeting, as could be expected, was widely covered. Yet most reporters seemed to have missed Netanyahu's most important locution, a sentence so slippery it could only be captured by a highly trained former Israeli press officer.
"Mr. Netanyahu," reported The New York Times, "told Mr. Obama that he was ready to resume peace talks with the Palestinians immediately, but they would only succeed if the Palestinians recognized Israel as a Jewish state."
Behold the beauty of the prime minister's words. Peace, he insists, could only be viable were the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the home of the Jews. This, of course, implies that they do not, which in turn suggests that the Palestinians belong in the historical pantheon of Jew-hating villains, slightly to the right of Haman, the biblical genocidal maniac, and just to the left of Hitler.
But Netanyahu's words are sinister not just rhetorically, but politically first and foremost. His strange plea for recognition neatly packs within it a wilderness of bad intentions. To understand them, and the potential threats they pose for the struggling peace process, a brief detour is necessary.
For decades, Israeli leaders reluctant to engage in serious discussions with the Palestinians, needed only to look up to the Palestinian National Charter, the 1964 document that birthed the Palestinian Liberation Organization, for proof of the futility of negotiations. The charter describes Israel as an "entirely illegal" state, and therefore does not recognize its right to exist. And how, clucked Israeli politicians from 1967 onwards, are we expected to sit at the table with foes who won't even grant us the most primal privilege, that of existence?
Sensing, perhaps, that the charter was a bit too odious for western ears, the PLO's perennially pragmatic leader, Yasser Arafat, sprang into action. In a speech in 1988, Arafat announced that he recognized "the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security... including the state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbors." A few months later, he went even further, telling a French journalist that the Palestinian charter was, essentially, null and void.
Neither statement impressed Israel much. Arafat, went the line out of Jerusalem, could say whatever he wanted, but it was the charter itself that spoke volumes, and the charter needed to change before peace was ever possible.
It was the charter, then, that was high on prime minister Yitzhak Rabin's list of priorities when he launched the Oslo peace process in 1993. Israel, he said, would only consider territorial concessions if the offensive document was amended to recognize the Jewish state's right to exist. Arafat was easily convinced, promised to submit the changes to the Palestinian National Council, and did so a few years later. The council was overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed changes, with 504 members voting in favor, 54 against, and 14 abstaining.
Rabin, however, was assassinated, and his successor, the very same Benjamin Netanyahu, focused on the charter like a hound on a wounded fox. The changes Arafat made, he claimed, were too legalistic, too murky, not sufficiently clear. The Palestinians, he declared, had to speak unequivocally and state their good intentions. Again, Arafat did just that, writing a letter to President Bill Clinton and assuring him that all of the anti-Israel clauses had been removed from the charter. In 1998, Clinton travelled to Gaza, and in a speech to the gathered Palestinian leadership put the matter to its final rest.
"I thank you for your rejection--fully, finally and forever--of the passages in the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel," Clinton said. "For they were the ideological underpinnings of a struggle renounced at Oslo. By revoking them once and for all, you have sent, I say again, a powerful message not to the government, but to the people of Israel. You will touch people on the street there. You will reach their hearts there."
And while the hearts of Israel's leaders may not have been touched, their minds had no choice but to admit that the Palestinians did recognize - fully, finally, and forever - Israel's right to exist.
Which bring us back to this week in Washington. The newly elected Netanyahu, presiding over a precarious coalition that seats the centrist Labor party with the right-wing zealots of Avigdor Lieberman's Israel Beytenu party, needed some ploy to stall re-engaging the Palestinians, an untenable prospect considering his hawkish campaign promises and the unstable alliance that is his cabinet. Looking back in time, he found the same canard he touted a decade ago, that of demanding some sort of recognition as a precondition to negotiations.
But whereas the old demand - recognizing Israel's right to exist - was understandable, the new one - recognizing Israel as a Jewish state - is ludicrous. Writing in Ha'aretz, Israeli columnist Gideon Levy captured the demand's idiocy in full glory when he suggested mockingly that Netanyahu might as well have thrown in a demand for the Palestinians to recognize the Sabbath as the Jewish people's day of rest, or recognize the religious laws that prohibit Jews from eating leaven during Passover.
As funny as Netanyahu's new demand may sound, however, its implications are dead serious. In reverting back to the recognition game, the Israeli leader is saying, much more clearly than any of his official statements ever could, that he has no intention of seriously committing himself to resolving the conflict with the Palestinians, ending the occupation and heralding peace.
Americans - in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere - should take Netanyahu at his word. While Clinton indulged Netanyahu's rhetorical romps and travelled to Gaza to bring about resolution to the spectacularly unimportant matter of the Palestinian National Charter, Obama needn't display as much patience and goodwill. Instead, the president would do much better if he was to avoid such distractions and tell Netanyahu, when they next meet, that if the Israeli prime minister is to find any sympathy in the White House, he has a few recognitions of his own to make, namely that empty political maneuvers will not be tolerated and that actions, not words, are the key to remaining on the administration's sunny side.
The alternative is to continue holding such empty, ceremonious meetings, in which both sides do little save for discussing, to paraphrase my favorite phrase from my years in the foreign ministry, the challenges and opportunities lying ahead in the future. It doesn't take a former diplomat to know that that's not nearly enough.
Brzezinksi and Yazdi, Three Decades Later Two diplomats pick up a discourse put on hold for 30 years.
NEWSWEEK
5/25/09
Brzezinksi and Yazdi, Three Decades Later
Two diplomats pick up a discourse put on hold for 30 years.
Christopher Dickey
In late October, 1979, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski met with Iran's Foreign Minister, Ebrahim Yazdi in Algiers to discuss how to improve relations between their countries. The Iranians wanted the U.S. to extradite Iran's monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who had been overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in February and was in exile in New York while being treated for cancer. Under the Shah, Iran was a chief ally and oil supplier to the United States, but many Iranians regarded him as a corrupt dictator and pawn of the West. At that meeting, according to notes taken by Robert Gates, now the Secretary of Defense, Brzezinski offered to recognize the revolutionary Islamic government and restore normal relations if Iran would abandon its demands for the U.S. to extradite the Shah. But a week later, revolutionaries stormed the American Embassy in Tehran, initiating the 444-day hostage crisis that severed Iranian-American relations for three decades. Brzezinski and Yazdi spoke to Newsweek's Christopher Dickey via conference call earlier this month to address the current state of Iranian-American relations:
Ebrahim Yazdi: Hi. Dr. Brzezinski.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: Hello Dr. Yazdi. How are you?
Yazdi: Oh, I'm just fine.
Brzezinski: It's been a long time.
Yazdi: Thirty years …
Christopher Dickey: Did either of you think when you met in Algiers that it would be 30 years until the next time you talked?
Brzezinski: Probably not... You know there may be some conflicting historical memories that are at work. Also some painful events that still have a burdening impact on popular attitudes. But I think the important thing to remember these days is that if there's going to be any serious dialogue between Iran and America, we mustn't linger too much on past historical analogies because that in itself is only fit to stimulate bitter memories.
Yazdi: I agree that there are two historical events that still linger. One is the military coup of 1953 against the nationalist government of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh. Many Iranians considered that incident to have suffocated democracy in Iran in a very embryonic stage. The second event--a very painful event--is the hostage taking.However, I believe that we should not emphasize the past. We should look forward. There are many common interests that the United States and Iran can cooperate [on] to resolve some of the regional conflict s .
Dickey: Is there a point where it would help for either or both sides to say they're sorry?
Brzezinski: I don't think it's productive to start a discussion that way. The issue is what are the common interests, what are the dangers we ought to avoid, how can we best proceed to engage in serious discussions ? Discussions of who is going to apologize for what and how the apologies are going to be worded and what they're supposed to convey is a prescription for getting sidetracked, bogged down and producing more antagonism.
Yazdi: Yes. The major point here is whether there is a will on both sides to overcome these obstacles and problems. In recent events, like when Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan in overthrowing the Taliban regime and bringing all the Afghan factions together, the former American administration failed to grab the opportunity to get closer to Iran. That was an indication that there was a lack of will to reconcile.My own feeling is that President Obama is honest in trying to overcome these problems. In Iran, there is a will to come and negotiate with American authorities in order to resolve the problems. These are signs of hope for the future.
Brzezinski: That's all good and well and I agree very much with it, but even in this very reasonable packaging that you, Dr. Yazdi, just produced, you referred to American apologies specifically. You referred to American failures to pick up Iranian offers of a willingness to negotiate seriously, but you said nothing about the Iranian side expressing apologies for, for example, the hostage-taking or some actions that themselves were not contributory to a negotiating relationship. So I would suggest that we really do avoid focusing so much on the question of the past, I think that you are right in saying that President Obama has shown a willingness to open up. It would be nice to have also some very explicit and equally eloquent statements to that effect from our Iranian interlocutors.
Yazdi: In the meantime, in order to prepare ground for negotiation on both sides, I suggest that the United States government take steps via a U.S. Interests Section in the Swiss embassy in Tehran and process visa applications right here. There are thousands of Iranians every year who want to go and visit their relatives in the United States, and there is a very strong hardship imposed on them. They have to go to various countries, spend time and money and sometimes their approach is not effective. This practical step could pave the way for more meaningful negotiation on all the issues that both sides are concerned with.
Brzezinski: I agree with that. However, let me come back again to the issue of how we proceed. Since we basically agree that there is a list of issues to be considered, one way to begin is for the sides to start drawing up a set of issues that could be discussed in different working groups. Hopefully movement in some groups would facilitate movement on other issues, which may prove more resistant to progress. On the nuclear issue, it would probably be easier to deal with if there is progress in mutual understanding of common security interests in the region. The United States has obvious security concerns because we're engaged. Iran has very obvious security interests because it's right there. If there's progress on these issues I think some of the concerns on the nuclear issue could also be resolved. I think it is a positive fact that Iran proclaims officially that it is not seeking nuclear weapons, and its religion forbids it from having nuclear weapons. Given the Iranian position on this issue, it's easier for us to say to the Iranians, that's very reassuring, but international affairs being what they are, let's see if we can find a formula whereby it would be easier for us to accept at face value these assurances. With patience and some goodwill on both sides, this very difficult issue could be constructively addressed.
Dickey: Different parties are going to try and disrupt this delicate process of talks or preliminary talks, precisely the kind of arrangements that you're suggesting.
Brzezinski: That's quite true. We have to be aware of the fact that there will be great difficulties, sometimes from the inside of both countries. .
Yazdi: Speaking about pressure groups who are against the improvement of relations, I would like to ask Dr. Brzezinski's views on how powerful the Israeli lobby is in the United States, in preventing the initiation of a negotiation between the two countries.
Brzezinski: I would say that we shouldn't overestimate that. The President had overwhelming support in the American-Jewish community, even though he was campaigning on the notion that he wants to explore negotiations with a variety of countries with which the United States has had disagreements, Iran included. There is also a large majority of American Jews who want a peace settlement in the Middle East. Right now the President enjoys considerable support in the country and has a degree of leeway that gives him the opportunity to explore constructively the possibility of a mutual accommodation with Iran.
Dickey: Isn't it a problem, Dr. Yazdi, that when you have the kind of rhetoric that we've heard from President (Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad about the Israeli state, certainly it's fair for the Israelis to take that very seriously and to feel that this is not a government that can be negotiated with.
Yazdi: We should not give too much attention to this rhetoric. Even in the height of real negotiation, one may observe such rhetoric in order to influence the path of negotiation. But many Iranians are seriously concerned about what is going on in the Middle East. .
Brzezinski: I think it's important not to interject too many issues into the American/Iranian dialogue . But since the issue of Israel has come up, I think it has to be noted that the rhetoric used by President Ahmadinejad has been destructive, negative and, I sense, profoundly embarrassing to many Iranians. It flies directly into conflict with well-known historical fact, that what happened in World War II was a crime beyond parallel in history.
Dickey: Is there anything that ordinary Americans and ordinary Iranians can do to push this process forward, Dr. Yazdi? Would it be wise for more Americans to visit Iran?
Yazdi: Well maybe not at the moment, but for sure if negotiations could be initiated then there are many other practical steps to take,not only for Americans to come and visit Iran, but also for many Iranian scientists, and scholarsto come and visit the United States. As you may know, during the former administration, there were a lot of restrictions on travel for Iranian scientists.
Dickey: Iran is always saying it wants respect. What else do they want from the United States?
Yazdi: Of course they want respect. But President Obama has said that one cannot assess whether there is respect or not unless you get involved in the negotiation. Many Iranians feel that as far as dealing with other countries like Iran, the United States has sort of a "big brother" attitude. People are very sensitive to that to the extent that sometimes they are hesitant to participate. I carefully read Dr. Brzezinski's book on global leadership and global domination.Global leadership must come in a very natural way through global cooperation and participation. In the global village, peace and tranquility and progress for all parties , whether it is the United States or a small country , require cooperation.
Brzezinski: I think we have to realize that we are in this world together. We have to live it in together by cooperation and mutual respect. Dr. Yazdi, it's been a pleasure to talk to you.
5/25/09
Brzezinksi and Yazdi, Three Decades Later
Two diplomats pick up a discourse put on hold for 30 years.
Christopher Dickey
In late October, 1979, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski met with Iran's Foreign Minister, Ebrahim Yazdi in Algiers to discuss how to improve relations between their countries. The Iranians wanted the U.S. to extradite Iran's monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who had been overthrown by the Islamic Revolution in February and was in exile in New York while being treated for cancer. Under the Shah, Iran was a chief ally and oil supplier to the United States, but many Iranians regarded him as a corrupt dictator and pawn of the West. At that meeting, according to notes taken by Robert Gates, now the Secretary of Defense, Brzezinski offered to recognize the revolutionary Islamic government and restore normal relations if Iran would abandon its demands for the U.S. to extradite the Shah. But a week later, revolutionaries stormed the American Embassy in Tehran, initiating the 444-day hostage crisis that severed Iranian-American relations for three decades. Brzezinski and Yazdi spoke to Newsweek's Christopher Dickey via conference call earlier this month to address the current state of Iranian-American relations:
Ebrahim Yazdi: Hi. Dr. Brzezinski.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: Hello Dr. Yazdi. How are you?
Yazdi: Oh, I'm just fine.
Brzezinski: It's been a long time.
Yazdi: Thirty years …
Christopher Dickey: Did either of you think when you met in Algiers that it would be 30 years until the next time you talked?
Brzezinski: Probably not... You know there may be some conflicting historical memories that are at work. Also some painful events that still have a burdening impact on popular attitudes. But I think the important thing to remember these days is that if there's going to be any serious dialogue between Iran and America, we mustn't linger too much on past historical analogies because that in itself is only fit to stimulate bitter memories.
Yazdi: I agree that there are two historical events that still linger. One is the military coup of 1953 against the nationalist government of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh. Many Iranians considered that incident to have suffocated democracy in Iran in a very embryonic stage. The second event--a very painful event--is the hostage taking.However, I believe that we should not emphasize the past. We should look forward. There are many common interests that the United States and Iran can cooperate [on] to resolve some of the regional conflict s .
Dickey: Is there a point where it would help for either or both sides to say they're sorry?
Brzezinski: I don't think it's productive to start a discussion that way. The issue is what are the common interests, what are the dangers we ought to avoid, how can we best proceed to engage in serious discussions ? Discussions of who is going to apologize for what and how the apologies are going to be worded and what they're supposed to convey is a prescription for getting sidetracked, bogged down and producing more antagonism.
Yazdi: Yes. The major point here is whether there is a will on both sides to overcome these obstacles and problems. In recent events, like when Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan in overthrowing the Taliban regime and bringing all the Afghan factions together, the former American administration failed to grab the opportunity to get closer to Iran. That was an indication that there was a lack of will to reconcile.My own feeling is that President Obama is honest in trying to overcome these problems. In Iran, there is a will to come and negotiate with American authorities in order to resolve the problems. These are signs of hope for the future.
Brzezinski: That's all good and well and I agree very much with it, but even in this very reasonable packaging that you, Dr. Yazdi, just produced, you referred to American apologies specifically. You referred to American failures to pick up Iranian offers of a willingness to negotiate seriously, but you said nothing about the Iranian side expressing apologies for, for example, the hostage-taking or some actions that themselves were not contributory to a negotiating relationship. So I would suggest that we really do avoid focusing so much on the question of the past, I think that you are right in saying that President Obama has shown a willingness to open up. It would be nice to have also some very explicit and equally eloquent statements to that effect from our Iranian interlocutors.
Yazdi: In the meantime, in order to prepare ground for negotiation on both sides, I suggest that the United States government take steps via a U.S. Interests Section in the Swiss embassy in Tehran and process visa applications right here. There are thousands of Iranians every year who want to go and visit their relatives in the United States, and there is a very strong hardship imposed on them. They have to go to various countries, spend time and money and sometimes their approach is not effective. This practical step could pave the way for more meaningful negotiation on all the issues that both sides are concerned with.
Brzezinski: I agree with that. However, let me come back again to the issue of how we proceed. Since we basically agree that there is a list of issues to be considered, one way to begin is for the sides to start drawing up a set of issues that could be discussed in different working groups. Hopefully movement in some groups would facilitate movement on other issues, which may prove more resistant to progress. On the nuclear issue, it would probably be easier to deal with if there is progress in mutual understanding of common security interests in the region. The United States has obvious security concerns because we're engaged. Iran has very obvious security interests because it's right there. If there's progress on these issues I think some of the concerns on the nuclear issue could also be resolved. I think it is a positive fact that Iran proclaims officially that it is not seeking nuclear weapons, and its religion forbids it from having nuclear weapons. Given the Iranian position on this issue, it's easier for us to say to the Iranians, that's very reassuring, but international affairs being what they are, let's see if we can find a formula whereby it would be easier for us to accept at face value these assurances. With patience and some goodwill on both sides, this very difficult issue could be constructively addressed.
Dickey: Different parties are going to try and disrupt this delicate process of talks or preliminary talks, precisely the kind of arrangements that you're suggesting.
Brzezinski: That's quite true. We have to be aware of the fact that there will be great difficulties, sometimes from the inside of both countries. .
Yazdi: Speaking about pressure groups who are against the improvement of relations, I would like to ask Dr. Brzezinski's views on how powerful the Israeli lobby is in the United States, in preventing the initiation of a negotiation between the two countries.
Brzezinski: I would say that we shouldn't overestimate that. The President had overwhelming support in the American-Jewish community, even though he was campaigning on the notion that he wants to explore negotiations with a variety of countries with which the United States has had disagreements, Iran included. There is also a large majority of American Jews who want a peace settlement in the Middle East. Right now the President enjoys considerable support in the country and has a degree of leeway that gives him the opportunity to explore constructively the possibility of a mutual accommodation with Iran.
Dickey: Isn't it a problem, Dr. Yazdi, that when you have the kind of rhetoric that we've heard from President (Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad about the Israeli state, certainly it's fair for the Israelis to take that very seriously and to feel that this is not a government that can be negotiated with.
Yazdi: We should not give too much attention to this rhetoric. Even in the height of real negotiation, one may observe such rhetoric in order to influence the path of negotiation. But many Iranians are seriously concerned about what is going on in the Middle East. .
Brzezinski: I think it's important not to interject too many issues into the American/Iranian dialogue . But since the issue of Israel has come up, I think it has to be noted that the rhetoric used by President Ahmadinejad has been destructive, negative and, I sense, profoundly embarrassing to many Iranians. It flies directly into conflict with well-known historical fact, that what happened in World War II was a crime beyond parallel in history.
Dickey: Is there anything that ordinary Americans and ordinary Iranians can do to push this process forward, Dr. Yazdi? Would it be wise for more Americans to visit Iran?
Yazdi: Well maybe not at the moment, but for sure if negotiations could be initiated then there are many other practical steps to take,not only for Americans to come and visit Iran, but also for many Iranian scientists, and scholarsto come and visit the United States. As you may know, during the former administration, there were a lot of restrictions on travel for Iranian scientists.
Dickey: Iran is always saying it wants respect. What else do they want from the United States?
Yazdi: Of course they want respect. But President Obama has said that one cannot assess whether there is respect or not unless you get involved in the negotiation. Many Iranians feel that as far as dealing with other countries like Iran, the United States has sort of a "big brother" attitude. People are very sensitive to that to the extent that sometimes they are hesitant to participate. I carefully read Dr. Brzezinski's book on global leadership and global domination.Global leadership must come in a very natural way through global cooperation and participation. In the global village, peace and tranquility and progress for all parties , whether it is the United States or a small country , require cooperation.
Brzezinski: I think we have to realize that we are in this world together. We have to live it in together by cooperation and mutual respect. Dr. Yazdi, it's been a pleasure to talk to you.
Monday, May 25, 2009
The Crisis and How to Deal with It Nouriel Roubini | May 24, 2009 From The New York Review of Books By Bill Bradley, Niall Ferguson, Paul Krugman, No
The Crisis and How to Deal with It
Nouriel Roubini | May 24, 2009
From The New York Review of Books:
By Bill Bradley, Niall Ferguson, Paul Krugman, Nouriel Roubini, George Soros, Robin Wells et al.
Following are excerpts from a symposium on the economic crisis presented by The New York Review of Books and PEN World Voices at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on April 30. The participants were former senator Bill Bradley, Niall Ferguson, Paul Krugman, Nouriel Roubini, George Soros, and Robin Wells, with Jeff Madrick as moderator.
—The Editors
Jeff Madrick: It was six months ago now that the Lehman debacle occurred, that AIG was rescued, that Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch; it was about six months ago that the TARP funds started being distributed. The economy was doing fairly poorly in much of 2008, and then fell off a cliff in the last quarter of 2008 and into 2009, shrinking at a 6 percent annual rate—an extraordinary drop in our national income. It is now by some very important measures the worst economic recession in the post–World War II era. Employment has dropped faster than ever before in this space of time.
We have a three-front problem: a housing market that went crazy as the housing bubble burst; a credit crisis, the most severe we've known since the early 1930s; and now a sharp drop in demand for goods and services and capital investment, leading to a severe recession. What gives us the jitters is that all of these are related. We have seen some deceleration in the rate of economic decline, and many people are saying that "green shoots" are showing. What is the actual state of the economy, and do we need a serious mid-course correction on the part of the Obama administration?
Bill Bradley: How far are we along in a recovery? When the market price of Citicorp drops from 60 to 1, and then comes back to 3, I don't think that's a recovery. Warren Buffett buys Goldman Sachs, and after he buys, the price drops 45 to 50 percent, and if he's going to break even on the investment he's got to earn 9 percent for the next twelve years, I don't think that's a recovery. The administration has put in place measures that, if they were to work, could offer some hope.
What I'd like to suggest is that if they don't work, there's an alternative. The national government has now made about $12.7 trillion in guarantees and commitments to the US financial sector, and we've already spent a little over $4 trillion in this crisis. Some institutions such as Citicorp, for example, received about $60 billion in direct assistance, and $340 billion in guarantees. So US taxpayers are into Citicorp for around $400 billion. If we look out to June, July, and if we see that the PPIP [Public-Private Investment Program, created by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner] is not succeeding, that the bank assets aren't being bought at levels that they should be bought from the books of banks, then there is an alternative.
Think back to Citicorp. I looked at the ticker today: the market capitalization of Citicorp is $17 billion. So the government could buy Citicorp for a fraction of what we've already obligated the taxpayer for. And in buying Citicorp, as an example—there could be one or two others—the government would announce in four to six months that it is going to sell the good assets of the bank back to the public. If the government bought Citicorp for, let's say, $20 billion, what would it be worth if the government sold the good assets back to the public? Surely, several times what it paid for it.
I don't mean selling these assets to hedge funds, although they can participate; but I would propose offering them to any American who wants to invest in this good bank the opportunity to do so.
The prospect of that happening would bring very strong, positive influence on the development of the whole economy. And what would the government then be left with? The bad bank—that is, the bad assets that we're going through hoops now to try to get off the bank books. Instead the government would have those assets and it could take fifteen to twenty years to clean them up. So I say I would like to see the existing program work. But if it doesn't work, there is an alternative, and it's an alternative in the long run in which the average guy in America could participate.
Niall Ferguson: This is the end of the age of leverage, which began, I guess, in the late 1970s, and saw an explosive rise in the ratio of debt to gross domestic product, not only in this country, but in many, many other countries. Once you end up with public and private debts in excess of three and a half times the size of your annual output, you are Argentina. You know, it's funny that people refer all the time back to the collapse of Lehman last September. Let's remember that this crisis actually began in June 2007. It fully became clear in August of 2007 that major financial institutions were almost certainly on the brink of insolvency to anybody who bothered to think about the impact of subprime mortgage defaults on their balance sheets.
But we were in denial. And we stayed in denial until September, more than a year later, of last year. Then we had the breakdown. Notice how psychological terms are very helpful when economics fails as a discipline. After the breakdown, we came out of denial and we realized that probably more than one major bank was insolvent. Then in September and October the world went into shock. It was deeply traumatic.
Now we're in the therapy phase. And what therapy are we using? Well, it's very interesting because we're using two quite contradictory courses of therapy. One is the prescription of Dr. Friedman—Milton Friedman, that is —which is being administered by the Federal Reserve: massive injections of liquidity to avert the kind of banking crisis that caused the Great Depression of the early 1930s. I'm fine with that. That's the right thing to do. But there is another course of therapy that is simultaneously being administered, which is the therapy prescribed by Dr. Keynes—John Maynard Keynes—and that therapy involves the running of massive fiscal deficits in excess of 12 percent of gross domestic product this year, and the issuance therefore of vast quantities of freshly minted bonds.
There is a clear contradiction between these two policies, and we're trying to have it both ways. You can't be a monetarist and a Keynesian simultaneously—at least I can't see how you can, because if the aim of the monetarist policy is to keep interest rates down, to keep liquidity high, the effect of the Keynesian policy must be to drive interest rates up.
After all, $1.75 trillion is an awful lot of freshly minted treasuries to land on the bond market at a time of recession, and I still don't quite know who is going to buy them. It's certainly not going to be the Chinese. That worked fine in the good times, but what I call "Chimerica," the marriage between China and America, is coming to an end. Maybe it's going to end in a messy divorce.
No, the problem is that only the Fed can buy these freshly minted treasuries, and there is going to be, I predict, in the weeks and months ahead, a very painful tug-of-war between our monetary policy and our fiscal policy as the markets realize just what a vast quantity of bonds are going to have to be absorbed by the financial system this year. That will tend to drive the price of the bonds down, and drive up interest rates, which will also have an effect on mortgage rates—the precise opposite of what Ben Bernanke is trying to achieve at the Fed.
One final thought: Let's not think of this as a purely American phenomenon. This is a crisis of the global economy. I'd go so far as to say it's a crisis of globalization itself. The US economy is not going to contract the most this year, even if the worst projections at the International Monetary Fund turn out to be right; a 2.6 percent contraction is far, far less than the shock already being inflicted on Japan, on South Korea, on Taiwan, to say nothing of the shock being inflicted on Europe. Germany is contracting at something close to 5 or 6 percent. So we are faced not just with a problem to be dealt with by American policy, we are faced with a crisis of global proportions, and it's far from clear to me that the prescriptions of Dr. Friedman and Dr. Keynes together can solve that massive global crisis.
Paul Krugman: Let me respond to that a bit. Let's think about what is actually happening to the global economy right now. On the one side there has been an abrupt realization by many people that they have too much debt, that they are not as rich as they thought. US households have seen their net worth decline abruptly by $13 trillion, and there are similar blows occurring around the world. So the people, individual households, want to save again. The United States has gone from approximately a zero savings rate two years ago up to about 4 percent right now, which is still below historical norms; but suddenly saving is occurring.
That saving ought to be translated into investment, but the investment demand is not there. Housing is flat on its back because it was overbuilt; housing bubbles collapsed not only in the United States, but across much of Europe. Many businesses cannot get access to capital because of the breakdown of the financial system. But even those that do have access to capital don't want to invest because consumer demand is not there. Between the housing bust and the sudden decision of consumers to save, after all, we have a world with lots of excess capacity. The GDP report that just came out says that business-fixed investment, non-residential fixed investment, essentially business investment, is falling at a 40 percent annual rate.
This causes a problem. There are lots of people who want to save, creating a vast increase in savings, not only in the US but around the world, combined with a sharp decline in the amount that the private sector is willing to invest, even at a zero interest rate, or rather even at a zero interest rate for US government debt, which is what the Federal Reserve has the most direct impact on.
One way to think about the global crisis is a vast excess of desired savings over willing investment. We have a global savings glut. Another way to say it is we have a global shortage of demand. Those are equivalent ways of saying the same thing. So we have this global savings glut, which is why there is, in fact, no upward pressure on interest rates. There are more savings than we know what to do with. If we ask the question "Where will the savings come from to finance the large US government deficits?," the answer is "From ourselves." The Chinese are not contributing at all.
Those extra savings are, in effect, the savings that America has wanted to make anyway, but that US business is not willing to invest under current conditions. That is the way Keynesian policy works in the short run. It takes excess desired savings and translates them into some kind of spending. If the private sector won't do it, the government will. There is actually no contradiction between the Federal Reserve's actions and the actions of the US government with a fiscal stimulus. It's very much necessary to do both. By buying a lot of private securities, the Federal Reserve is essentially going out there and playing the role that the private banking system is no longer playing properly; by engaging in investment, the federal government is playing the role that businesses are not now willing to play. All that debt-financed spending on infrastructure by the Obama administration is basically filling the hole left by the collapse in business investment in the United States. There is not an excess demand for savings that is going to drive up interest rates. The only thing that might drive up interest rates—and this is a real concern—is that people may grow dubious about the financial solvency of governments.
Now, the great concern I have is that although we understand these things fairly well, there are thirty-eight Republican senators who say that the answer for the crisis is another round of Bush-style tax cuts that will reduce revenues by $3 trillion over the next decade.
This crisis has been so large and the political process has been so sluggish that the difficulties have been greater than expected. And yes, there are some green shoots. Things are getting worse more slowly, but we have not managed to head off a crisis that could turn out to be self-reinforcing, and leave us in this trap for many, many years.
Nouriel Roubini: It's pretty clear by now that this is the worst financial crisis, economic crisis and recession since the Great Depression. A number of us were worrying about it a while ago. At this point it's becoming conventional wisdom.
The good news is probably that six months ago there was a risk of a near depression, but we have seen very aggressive actions by US policymakers, and around the world. I think the policymakers finally looked into the abyss: they saw that the economy was contracting at a rate of 6 percent–plus in the US and around the world, and decided to use almost all of the weapons in their arsenals. Because of that I think that the risk of a near depression has been somewhat reduced. I don't think that there is zero probability, but most likely we are not going to end up in a near depression.
However, the consensus is now becoming optimistic again and says that we are going to go from minus 6 percent growth to positive growth in the second half of this year, meaning that the recession is going to be over by June. By the fourth quarter of 2009, the consensus estimates that growth is going to be positive, by 2 percent, and next year more than 2 percent. Now, compared to that new consensus among macro forecasters, who got it wrong in the past, my views are much more bearish.
I would agree that the rate of economic contraction is slowing down. But we're still contracting at a pretty fast rate. I see the economy contracting all the way through the end of the year, going from minus 6 to minus 2, not plus 2. And next year the growth of the economy is going to be very slow, 0.5 percent as opposed to the 2 percent–plus predicted by the consensus. Also, the unemployment rate this year is going to be above 10 percent, and is likely to be close to 11 percent next year. Thus, next year is still going to feel like a recession, even if we're technically out of the recession.
The outlook for Europe and Japan, both this year and next year, is even worse. Most of the advanced economies are going to do worse than the United States for a number of reasons, including structural factors in Japan and weak policy response in the case of the Euro zone.
The problems of the financial system are severe. Many banks are still insolvent. If you don't want to end up like Japan with zombie banks, it's better, as Bill Bradley suggested, to do what Sweden did: take over the insolvent banks, clean them up, separate good and bad assets, and sell them back in short order to the private sector.
Now, on the question of policy responses, there is no inconsistency between monetary easing and fiscal easing. Both of them should be stimulating demand, and the monetary easing should be leading also to restoration of credit. Of course, in a situation in which the economy is suffering not just from a lack of liquidity but also problems of solvency and a lack of credit, traditional monetary policy doesn't work as well. You also have to take unconventional monetary actions, and you have to fix the banks. And we need a fiscal stimulus because every component of our economy is sharply falling: consumption, residential investment, nonresidential construction, capital spending, inventories, exports. The only thing that can go up and sustain the economy for the time being is the fiscal spending of the government.
However, fiscal policy cannot resolve problems of credit, and it is not without cost. Over the next few years it's going to add about $9 trillion to the US public debt. Niall Ferguson said it's the end of the age of leverage. It's not really. There is not deleveraging. We have all the liabilities of the household sector, of the banks and financial institutions, of the corporate sectors; and now we've decided to socialize these bad debts and to put them on the balance sheet of the government. That's why the public debt is rising. Instead, when you have an excessive debt problem, you have to convert such debt into equity. That's what you do with corporate restructuring—it converts unsecured debt into equity. That's what you should do with the banks: induce the unsecured creditors to convert their claims into equity. You could do the same thing with the housing market. But we're not doing the debt-into-equity conversion. What we're doing is piling public debt on top of private debt to socialize the losses; and at some point the back of some governments' balance sheet is going to break, and if that happens, it's going to be a disaster. So we need fiscal stimulus in the short run, but we have to worry about the long-run fiscal sustainability, too.
George Soros: There are two features that I think deserve to be pointed out. One is that the financial system as we know it actually collapsed. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, the financial system really ceased to function. It had to be put on artificial life support. At the same time, the financial shock had a tremendous effect on the real economy, and the real economy went into a free fall, and that was global.
The other feature is that the financial system collapsed of its own weight. That contradicted the prevailing view about financial markets, namely that they tend toward equilibrium, and that equilibrium is disturbed by extraneous forces, outside shocks. Those disturbances were supposed to occur in a random fashion. Markets were seen basically as self-correcting. That paradigm has proven to be false. So we are dealing not only with the collapse of a financial system, but also with the collapse of a worldview.
That's the situation that President Obama inherited. He's faced with two objectives. One, he must arrest the collapse and, if possible, reverse it. Second, he has to reconstruct the financial system because it cannot be restored to what it was. This is a new situation. When people see this crisis as being the same as previous financial crises, they're making a mistake.
The interesting thing is that what needs to be done in the short term is almost exactly the opposite of what needs to be done in the long term. Obviously the problem was excessive leverage. But when you have a collapse of credit there's only one source of credit that is still credible, and that's the state: the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. Then you have actually to inject a lot more leverage and money into the economy; you have to print money as fast as you can, expand the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, increase the national debt. And that is, in fact, what has been done, which is the right thing to do. But then once this policy is successful, you have to rein in the money supply as fast as you can.
I would say that policy has generally lagged behind events. We were behind the curve. Now that the free fall is moderating, and the collapse has more or less occurred, I think there is hope that policy will, in fact, catch up with events. The outcome of the stress test of the banks will be important, because that's basically where the policy has been lagging behind—in recapitalizing the banks. And that's where most of the confusion comes from.
Robin Wells: I want to go back to what Paul said about the global savings glut. The global savings glut is what drove interest rates down to historically low levels. Housing is very sensitive to the interest rate, and therefore a housing bubble was practically foreordained by an extended period of low interest rates. But you'll also notice that the bubble in housing hasn't occurred just in the United States, it's also occurred in Spain, Eastern Europe, and the UK; it's been in Ireland, it's been in Iceland. In order to prevent us from reexperiencing this catastrophe in another, say, ten years, we need to look at the origins of the global savings glut. Yes, there are some differences in how the bubbles were actually manifested in the different countries, and those manifestations are important; but let's look for a moment at the global savings glut in its entirety.
I think this story starts really in the Eighties. During the Reagan years, we experienced chronic fiscal deficits, and we began to abdicate our responsibility to raise tax revenue that could sustainably finance government. In order to do that, we had to borrow, and who did we borrow from? We borrowed from countries that were running persistent trade surpluses. And as we continued to run these deficits with these countries, there grew to be a symbiotic relationship, as Niall Ferguson says, this Chimerica.
But it was on several different fronts. There were the net exporters, such as China, Japan, and Germany, and the net importers of capital, the largest, of course, being the United States. This import of capital allowed us to consistently live beyond our means, first by running fiscal deficits, not raising enough tax revenue to finance the government, and then also through, ultimately, the leverage that we used in housing, and in commercial real estate, and in leverage buyouts. And this continued; it grew because there was no point anywhere along the line at which anyone would say "halt."
The persistent imbalances led us to pretend that we could keep borrowing without having sufficient tax revenue to pay for the government. And if your house prices are rising, if the stock market is going up—which of course is going to happen if you have cheap money—it puffs up the value of the assets, and disguises a lot of other structural problems such as rising inequality and corruption.
With this inflow of capital from abroad, the financial sector in the United States also became larger and larger relative to the rest of the economy, with GDP tilted disproportionately toward the financial sector.
How do we start to get out of this? In many ways we're almost adverse to bringing up the situation in which we find ourselves with the net exporting countries. I thought it was quite interesting a few weeks ago when many Chinese officials were saying that it was proper, and it was good economically, that the US continue to run persistent trade imbalances with China, that the Chinese yuan did not need to be appreciated, that we should continue doing the things we always have, and that the US should make sure that the value of Chinese assets were not diminished by any change in the value of the dollar. It should have been clear that this was not a sustainable relationship, but no one was willing to say that.
So I think we're going to have to address these chronic global trade imbalances. You might very well see a shift toward more protectionism. We're going to have to actually do something about raising taxes so that we can sustain government from our own resources rather than depending upon borrowing abroad. And we're going to have to start stepping back into our former role, one that we abdicated, as managers and guardians in the global economy.
J.M.: I think most people think the US government did what it had to in adopting a serious stimulus, despite the debt. Niall, why don't you respond to the comments, and then we'll have a little discussion on that.
N.F.: Well, if you listened carefully to what Paul Krugman said, he actually agreed with me. Because what he said was that everything is just fine as long as the financial credibility of the United States isn't called into question, but my point is that it will be called into question. Of course it will. According to the administration's crazily optimistic forecast for a recovery, it's going to be a 3 percent growth rate next year, 4 percent the year after that, 4.6 percent the year after that. If you believe those numbers, you'll believe absolutely anything, but they are there in the administration's budget document. Even if those numbers turn out to be true, the federal debt will rise over the next five to ten years to around 100 percent of gross domestic product.
But since those numbers are clearly wrong, and the trend growth rate of the US will be much closer to 1 percent than to 4, it seems reasonable to anticipate a much more rapid explosion of federal debt to somewhere in the region of 140 or 150 percent of gross domestic product. Even if the private savings rate rebounded to its highest point in the postwar period, it would still account for no more than 5 percent of gross domestic product. But this year's deficit, as I said earlier, is likely to be north of 12 percent of gross domestic product. So it doesn't quite add up.
The Fed has committed itself to buying $300 billion worth of treasuries this year, but clearly it will have to buy a great many more than that. Remember, $1.7 trillion or so are coming onto the market. And you assume that the credibility of the United States in the eyes of Americans, as well as foreign investors, is going to withstand this? At some point the United States does start to look like a Latin American economy, not only to people abroad but maybe to people at home. If the Fed's balance sheet explodes to up to $3 or $4 trillion, who knows how big it could get. At what point do people stop believing in the US dollar as a reserve currency, or even as a store of value for their own savings?
J.M.: Let's allow Paul and others to respond.
P.K.: The essence of this kind of recession is precisely that the amount that collectively we want to save is greater than the amount that collectively we want to invest. That is the problem. You can't get around that.
There is a very different question, which is the long-run solvency of the US government, and I do worry about that. I would disagree very much with Niall about those numbers, but this is a factor that should be taken into account. We are currently in debt about 60 percent of GDP. We have in the past been as high as 100 percent of GDP at the end of World War II without having a crisis, but your ability to go that high does depend upon people's belief that you will behave responsibly, and that is somewhat in question. I hope it is less in question than it was in the past, now that we've had some regime changes, but it is a problem.
N.R.: I think that the debate here is about what needs to be done in the short term versus the long term. The lesson of the Great Depression is pretty clear: it started with the stock market crash of 1929, and it actually became the Great Depression by 1933 for four reasons. One, we didn't believe in a counter-cyclical monetary policy. The money supply contracted rather than being eased. Interest rates were not falling, and that made the credit crunch worse. Two, nobody believed in counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The general theory of Keynes was written only in 1936; in the early 1930s, the government was raising taxes and cutting spending in order to maintain a balanced budget. That made the recession even more severe.
Three, there was a belief that banks should be allowed to collapse. Thousands of them collapsed, the credit crunch became even worse. And four, by 1933, 75 percent of households had defaulted on their mortgages; they couldn't pay them. So a stock market crash became a Great Depression. Then you add currency wars internationally, trade wars, protectionism, and capital controls; then you had default by countries and the rise of totalitarian regimens in Germany and in Italy, in Japan, and Spain, and we ended up in World War II. So those are the consequences of not taking the right policy actions in the short run.
I agree, however, that we have to worry about the long run. If we're going to finance budget deficits by printing money, we may have high inflation, even risk of hyperinflation in some countries. That's what happened in Germany in the 1920s during the Weimar Republic. We are having large budget deficits and increasing the public debt, we don't know whether it's going to be $5 trillion or $10 trillion of more debt. But there are only a few ways of resolving that debt problem: either you default on it as countries like Argentina did; or you use the inflation tax to wipe out the real value of the debt; or you have to raise taxes and cut government spending. And given the size of the deficits, over time that's going to be a painful political choice to make. So we need the stimulus in the short run, but we need to restore medium-term fiscal sustainability.
G.S.: Let's face it, for twenty-five years we have been consuming more than we have been producing. This living beyond our means accumulated mainly in the housing sector and the financial sector, and now those liabilities are being nationalized. It's a bit unfortunate that so far we have only nationalized the liabilities of the banks, and not their assets. I think it's right that we are extending a government credit to replace the collapsing credit, and we are currently in a deflationary situation. When the flow of credit restarts, suddenly there will be a flip-flop where the fear of deflation will be replaced by the fear of inflation. The pressure for interest rates to rise will be very, very strong, and the rise in interest rates could choke off the recovery. And so we are facing a period of stop-go, or stagflation similar to but more severe than what we faced in the Seventies. But that is a favorable outcome compared to what would have happened if we hadn't done what we are doing.
About regulation, we have to start by recognizing that the prevailing view is false, that markets actually are bubble-prone. They create bubbles. Therefore, they have to be regulated. The authorities have to accept responsibility for preventing asset bubbles from growing too big. They've expressly rejected that, saying that if the markets don't know, how can the regulators know? And, of course, they can't. They're bound to be wrong, but they get feedback from the market, and then they can make adjustments. Now, it is not enough to regulate the money supply. You have to regulate credit. And that means using tools that have largely fallen into disuse. Of course you have margin requirements, minimum capital requirements; but you actually have to vary them to counteract the prevailing mood of the market, because markets do have moods. It should be recognized that exuberance actually is quite rational. When I see a bubble beginning, forming, I jump on it because that's how I make money. So it's perfectly rational.
It's the job of the regulators to regulate. However, we should try not to go overboard. While markets are imperfect, regulators are even more imperfect: not only are they human, they're also bureaucratic and subject to political influences. So we want to keep regulation to a minimum, but we have to recognize that markets are inherently unstable.
N.R.: On this question of regulation, of course, we go into cycles, you know. We had the Great Depression, and then we imposed many actually useful regulations, both on the financial system and on the real economy. Some of them became excessive, and even before Reagan and Thatcher, Jimmy Carter started deregulating some parts of the economy. Eventually policy makers started believing that self-regulation is best; but that means no regulation. We believed in market discipline; but there is no discipline when there is irrational exuberance. We relied on internal risk management models; but nobody listened to risk managers when the risk takers were making all the profits in the banks; and we relied on rating agencies which had massive conflicts of interest since they were being paid by those that they were supposed to be rating. So the entire model of self-regulation and market discipline now has collapsed.
We have to go to a world where there is greater prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system. I think the challenge for the US economy is, can we grow without excessive credit and leverage? Can we grow in a more sustainable way? And what are going to be the sectors of the economy that give us sustainable, long-term growth? I think that's an open question.
P.K.: I think there are two big structural changes that we'd want to see. One is we need to reduce the role of the financial sector in the economy. We went from an economy in which about 4 percent of GDP came from the financial sector to an economy in which 8 percent of GDP come from the financial sector, and in which at its peak 41 percent of profits were being earned by the financial sector. And there is no reason to believe that anything productive happened as a result of all of that. These extremely highly compensated bankers were essentially just finding new ways to offload risks on to other people.
As I've written, we need a boring banking sector again. All of this high finance has turned out to be just destructive, and that's partly a matter of regulation. But in the political economy there was also a vicious circle. Because as the financial sector got increasingly bloated its political clout also grew. So, in fact, deregulation bred bloated finance, which bred more deregulation, which bred this monster that ate the world economy.
The other thing not to miss is the importance of a strong social safety net. By most accounts, most projections say that the European Union is going to have a somewhat deeper recession this year than the United States. So in terms of macromanagement, they're actually doing a poor job, and there are various reasons for that: the European Central Bank is too conservative, Europeans have been too slow to do fiscal stimulus. But the human suffering is going to be much greater on this side of the Atlantic because Europeans don't lose their health care when they lose their jobs. They don't find themselves with essentially no support once their trivial unemployment check has fallen off. We have nothing underneath. When Americans lose their jobs, they fall into the abyss. That does not happen in other advanced countries, it does not happen, I want to say, in civilized countries.
And there are people who say we should not be worrying about things like universal health care in the crisis, we need to solve the crisis. But this is exactly the time when the importance of having a decent social safety net is driven home to everybody, which makes it a very good time to actually move ahead on these other things.
N.F.: Well, I tell you what, I feel depressed after what I've heard tonight. We are now contemplating a massive expansion of the state to substitute for the private sector because that's the only thing Paul thinks will deliver growth. We're going to reregulate the markets, we're going to go back to those good old days. Where were you in the 1970s when all these wonderful regulations were in place? I don't remember that going too smoothly. But what else are we going to do? We're going to print money. Almost limitlessly we'll print money. That's going to be fine, too. And when we're done with that, we're going to raise taxes. What a fabulous package we have in store for us. You know, back in late 2007, I was asked what my big concern was, and I said, "My concern is that we're going to get the 1970s for fear of the 1930s." It's very easy to forget, in your iron indignation at the failure of the market, where the true mainsprings of economic growth lie. The lesson of economic history is very clear. Economic growth does not come from state-led infrastructure investment. It comes from technological innovation, and gains in productivity, and these things come from the private sector, not from the state.
B.B.: As we look at the future, we also have to look at the mistakes policymakers made in the last ten years. It's not news that people are greedy. But we made conscious decisions not to put limits on that natural human impulse. What were the mistakes? In 1999, we allowed investment banks, banks, insurance companies to combine: we eliminated the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited commercial banks from operating as investment banks. Why was Glass-Steagall put into law? Because the last time we didn't limit greed we got into trouble, the Great Depression.
The second mistake was in 1999, the explicit decision by the Clinton administration and Congress not to regulate derivatives, in particular credit default swaps. In 2002 they were worth $1 trillion and today they're worth $33 trillion, and that decision not to regulate derivatives created the following sequence: you have mortgages; then a thousand mortgages are packaged and sold as a mortgage-backed security; a thousand mortgage-backed securities are packaged and sold as a collateral debt obligation [CDOs]; then a thousand collateral debt obligations are packaged and sold as a CDO squared; and insuring each one of those bundles are credit default swaps, which are a part of that $33 trillion. And our government deliberately decided not to regulate this chain of investments.
One result was that the 374 people in the London office of AIG who were responsible for AIG derivatives destroyed a company that had 116,000 employees in 120 countries. Why? Because there was no regulation at all.
The third decision was in 2004. The SEC allowed banks to go from 10 to 1 leverage to 30 to 1 leverage. And guess what? Once they were allowed to do it, they did it. So if we're going to look at the future, we might think of undoing those three mistakes.
Finally, we might want to remember that the chairman of the Federal Reserve is supposed to remove the punch bowl from the party when the party gets out of control. And that did not happen in the Greenspan years. The opposite happened.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini
Nouriel Roubini | May 24, 2009
From The New York Review of Books:
By Bill Bradley, Niall Ferguson, Paul Krugman, Nouriel Roubini, George Soros, Robin Wells et al.
Following are excerpts from a symposium on the economic crisis presented by The New York Review of Books and PEN World Voices at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on April 30. The participants were former senator Bill Bradley, Niall Ferguson, Paul Krugman, Nouriel Roubini, George Soros, and Robin Wells, with Jeff Madrick as moderator.
—The Editors
Jeff Madrick: It was six months ago now that the Lehman debacle occurred, that AIG was rescued, that Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch; it was about six months ago that the TARP funds started being distributed. The economy was doing fairly poorly in much of 2008, and then fell off a cliff in the last quarter of 2008 and into 2009, shrinking at a 6 percent annual rate—an extraordinary drop in our national income. It is now by some very important measures the worst economic recession in the post–World War II era. Employment has dropped faster than ever before in this space of time.
We have a three-front problem: a housing market that went crazy as the housing bubble burst; a credit crisis, the most severe we've known since the early 1930s; and now a sharp drop in demand for goods and services and capital investment, leading to a severe recession. What gives us the jitters is that all of these are related. We have seen some deceleration in the rate of economic decline, and many people are saying that "green shoots" are showing. What is the actual state of the economy, and do we need a serious mid-course correction on the part of the Obama administration?
Bill Bradley: How far are we along in a recovery? When the market price of Citicorp drops from 60 to 1, and then comes back to 3, I don't think that's a recovery. Warren Buffett buys Goldman Sachs, and after he buys, the price drops 45 to 50 percent, and if he's going to break even on the investment he's got to earn 9 percent for the next twelve years, I don't think that's a recovery. The administration has put in place measures that, if they were to work, could offer some hope.
What I'd like to suggest is that if they don't work, there's an alternative. The national government has now made about $12.7 trillion in guarantees and commitments to the US financial sector, and we've already spent a little over $4 trillion in this crisis. Some institutions such as Citicorp, for example, received about $60 billion in direct assistance, and $340 billion in guarantees. So US taxpayers are into Citicorp for around $400 billion. If we look out to June, July, and if we see that the PPIP [Public-Private Investment Program, created by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner] is not succeeding, that the bank assets aren't being bought at levels that they should be bought from the books of banks, then there is an alternative.
Think back to Citicorp. I looked at the ticker today: the market capitalization of Citicorp is $17 billion. So the government could buy Citicorp for a fraction of what we've already obligated the taxpayer for. And in buying Citicorp, as an example—there could be one or two others—the government would announce in four to six months that it is going to sell the good assets of the bank back to the public. If the government bought Citicorp for, let's say, $20 billion, what would it be worth if the government sold the good assets back to the public? Surely, several times what it paid for it.
I don't mean selling these assets to hedge funds, although they can participate; but I would propose offering them to any American who wants to invest in this good bank the opportunity to do so.
The prospect of that happening would bring very strong, positive influence on the development of the whole economy. And what would the government then be left with? The bad bank—that is, the bad assets that we're going through hoops now to try to get off the bank books. Instead the government would have those assets and it could take fifteen to twenty years to clean them up. So I say I would like to see the existing program work. But if it doesn't work, there is an alternative, and it's an alternative in the long run in which the average guy in America could participate.
Niall Ferguson: This is the end of the age of leverage, which began, I guess, in the late 1970s, and saw an explosive rise in the ratio of debt to gross domestic product, not only in this country, but in many, many other countries. Once you end up with public and private debts in excess of three and a half times the size of your annual output, you are Argentina. You know, it's funny that people refer all the time back to the collapse of Lehman last September. Let's remember that this crisis actually began in June 2007. It fully became clear in August of 2007 that major financial institutions were almost certainly on the brink of insolvency to anybody who bothered to think about the impact of subprime mortgage defaults on their balance sheets.
But we were in denial. And we stayed in denial until September, more than a year later, of last year. Then we had the breakdown. Notice how psychological terms are very helpful when economics fails as a discipline. After the breakdown, we came out of denial and we realized that probably more than one major bank was insolvent. Then in September and October the world went into shock. It was deeply traumatic.
Now we're in the therapy phase. And what therapy are we using? Well, it's very interesting because we're using two quite contradictory courses of therapy. One is the prescription of Dr. Friedman—Milton Friedman, that is —which is being administered by the Federal Reserve: massive injections of liquidity to avert the kind of banking crisis that caused the Great Depression of the early 1930s. I'm fine with that. That's the right thing to do. But there is another course of therapy that is simultaneously being administered, which is the therapy prescribed by Dr. Keynes—John Maynard Keynes—and that therapy involves the running of massive fiscal deficits in excess of 12 percent of gross domestic product this year, and the issuance therefore of vast quantities of freshly minted bonds.
There is a clear contradiction between these two policies, and we're trying to have it both ways. You can't be a monetarist and a Keynesian simultaneously—at least I can't see how you can, because if the aim of the monetarist policy is to keep interest rates down, to keep liquidity high, the effect of the Keynesian policy must be to drive interest rates up.
After all, $1.75 trillion is an awful lot of freshly minted treasuries to land on the bond market at a time of recession, and I still don't quite know who is going to buy them. It's certainly not going to be the Chinese. That worked fine in the good times, but what I call "Chimerica," the marriage between China and America, is coming to an end. Maybe it's going to end in a messy divorce.
No, the problem is that only the Fed can buy these freshly minted treasuries, and there is going to be, I predict, in the weeks and months ahead, a very painful tug-of-war between our monetary policy and our fiscal policy as the markets realize just what a vast quantity of bonds are going to have to be absorbed by the financial system this year. That will tend to drive the price of the bonds down, and drive up interest rates, which will also have an effect on mortgage rates—the precise opposite of what Ben Bernanke is trying to achieve at the Fed.
One final thought: Let's not think of this as a purely American phenomenon. This is a crisis of the global economy. I'd go so far as to say it's a crisis of globalization itself. The US economy is not going to contract the most this year, even if the worst projections at the International Monetary Fund turn out to be right; a 2.6 percent contraction is far, far less than the shock already being inflicted on Japan, on South Korea, on Taiwan, to say nothing of the shock being inflicted on Europe. Germany is contracting at something close to 5 or 6 percent. So we are faced not just with a problem to be dealt with by American policy, we are faced with a crisis of global proportions, and it's far from clear to me that the prescriptions of Dr. Friedman and Dr. Keynes together can solve that massive global crisis.
Paul Krugman: Let me respond to that a bit. Let's think about what is actually happening to the global economy right now. On the one side there has been an abrupt realization by many people that they have too much debt, that they are not as rich as they thought. US households have seen their net worth decline abruptly by $13 trillion, and there are similar blows occurring around the world. So the people, individual households, want to save again. The United States has gone from approximately a zero savings rate two years ago up to about 4 percent right now, which is still below historical norms; but suddenly saving is occurring.
That saving ought to be translated into investment, but the investment demand is not there. Housing is flat on its back because it was overbuilt; housing bubbles collapsed not only in the United States, but across much of Europe. Many businesses cannot get access to capital because of the breakdown of the financial system. But even those that do have access to capital don't want to invest because consumer demand is not there. Between the housing bust and the sudden decision of consumers to save, after all, we have a world with lots of excess capacity. The GDP report that just came out says that business-fixed investment, non-residential fixed investment, essentially business investment, is falling at a 40 percent annual rate.
This causes a problem. There are lots of people who want to save, creating a vast increase in savings, not only in the US but around the world, combined with a sharp decline in the amount that the private sector is willing to invest, even at a zero interest rate, or rather even at a zero interest rate for US government debt, which is what the Federal Reserve has the most direct impact on.
One way to think about the global crisis is a vast excess of desired savings over willing investment. We have a global savings glut. Another way to say it is we have a global shortage of demand. Those are equivalent ways of saying the same thing. So we have this global savings glut, which is why there is, in fact, no upward pressure on interest rates. There are more savings than we know what to do with. If we ask the question "Where will the savings come from to finance the large US government deficits?," the answer is "From ourselves." The Chinese are not contributing at all.
Those extra savings are, in effect, the savings that America has wanted to make anyway, but that US business is not willing to invest under current conditions. That is the way Keynesian policy works in the short run. It takes excess desired savings and translates them into some kind of spending. If the private sector won't do it, the government will. There is actually no contradiction between the Federal Reserve's actions and the actions of the US government with a fiscal stimulus. It's very much necessary to do both. By buying a lot of private securities, the Federal Reserve is essentially going out there and playing the role that the private banking system is no longer playing properly; by engaging in investment, the federal government is playing the role that businesses are not now willing to play. All that debt-financed spending on infrastructure by the Obama administration is basically filling the hole left by the collapse in business investment in the United States. There is not an excess demand for savings that is going to drive up interest rates. The only thing that might drive up interest rates—and this is a real concern—is that people may grow dubious about the financial solvency of governments.
Now, the great concern I have is that although we understand these things fairly well, there are thirty-eight Republican senators who say that the answer for the crisis is another round of Bush-style tax cuts that will reduce revenues by $3 trillion over the next decade.
This crisis has been so large and the political process has been so sluggish that the difficulties have been greater than expected. And yes, there are some green shoots. Things are getting worse more slowly, but we have not managed to head off a crisis that could turn out to be self-reinforcing, and leave us in this trap for many, many years.
Nouriel Roubini: It's pretty clear by now that this is the worst financial crisis, economic crisis and recession since the Great Depression. A number of us were worrying about it a while ago. At this point it's becoming conventional wisdom.
The good news is probably that six months ago there was a risk of a near depression, but we have seen very aggressive actions by US policymakers, and around the world. I think the policymakers finally looked into the abyss: they saw that the economy was contracting at a rate of 6 percent–plus in the US and around the world, and decided to use almost all of the weapons in their arsenals. Because of that I think that the risk of a near depression has been somewhat reduced. I don't think that there is zero probability, but most likely we are not going to end up in a near depression.
However, the consensus is now becoming optimistic again and says that we are going to go from minus 6 percent growth to positive growth in the second half of this year, meaning that the recession is going to be over by June. By the fourth quarter of 2009, the consensus estimates that growth is going to be positive, by 2 percent, and next year more than 2 percent. Now, compared to that new consensus among macro forecasters, who got it wrong in the past, my views are much more bearish.
I would agree that the rate of economic contraction is slowing down. But we're still contracting at a pretty fast rate. I see the economy contracting all the way through the end of the year, going from minus 6 to minus 2, not plus 2. And next year the growth of the economy is going to be very slow, 0.5 percent as opposed to the 2 percent–plus predicted by the consensus. Also, the unemployment rate this year is going to be above 10 percent, and is likely to be close to 11 percent next year. Thus, next year is still going to feel like a recession, even if we're technically out of the recession.
The outlook for Europe and Japan, both this year and next year, is even worse. Most of the advanced economies are going to do worse than the United States for a number of reasons, including structural factors in Japan and weak policy response in the case of the Euro zone.
The problems of the financial system are severe. Many banks are still insolvent. If you don't want to end up like Japan with zombie banks, it's better, as Bill Bradley suggested, to do what Sweden did: take over the insolvent banks, clean them up, separate good and bad assets, and sell them back in short order to the private sector.
Now, on the question of policy responses, there is no inconsistency between monetary easing and fiscal easing. Both of them should be stimulating demand, and the monetary easing should be leading also to restoration of credit. Of course, in a situation in which the economy is suffering not just from a lack of liquidity but also problems of solvency and a lack of credit, traditional monetary policy doesn't work as well. You also have to take unconventional monetary actions, and you have to fix the banks. And we need a fiscal stimulus because every component of our economy is sharply falling: consumption, residential investment, nonresidential construction, capital spending, inventories, exports. The only thing that can go up and sustain the economy for the time being is the fiscal spending of the government.
However, fiscal policy cannot resolve problems of credit, and it is not without cost. Over the next few years it's going to add about $9 trillion to the US public debt. Niall Ferguson said it's the end of the age of leverage. It's not really. There is not deleveraging. We have all the liabilities of the household sector, of the banks and financial institutions, of the corporate sectors; and now we've decided to socialize these bad debts and to put them on the balance sheet of the government. That's why the public debt is rising. Instead, when you have an excessive debt problem, you have to convert such debt into equity. That's what you do with corporate restructuring—it converts unsecured debt into equity. That's what you should do with the banks: induce the unsecured creditors to convert their claims into equity. You could do the same thing with the housing market. But we're not doing the debt-into-equity conversion. What we're doing is piling public debt on top of private debt to socialize the losses; and at some point the back of some governments' balance sheet is going to break, and if that happens, it's going to be a disaster. So we need fiscal stimulus in the short run, but we have to worry about the long-run fiscal sustainability, too.
George Soros: There are two features that I think deserve to be pointed out. One is that the financial system as we know it actually collapsed. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, the financial system really ceased to function. It had to be put on artificial life support. At the same time, the financial shock had a tremendous effect on the real economy, and the real economy went into a free fall, and that was global.
The other feature is that the financial system collapsed of its own weight. That contradicted the prevailing view about financial markets, namely that they tend toward equilibrium, and that equilibrium is disturbed by extraneous forces, outside shocks. Those disturbances were supposed to occur in a random fashion. Markets were seen basically as self-correcting. That paradigm has proven to be false. So we are dealing not only with the collapse of a financial system, but also with the collapse of a worldview.
That's the situation that President Obama inherited. He's faced with two objectives. One, he must arrest the collapse and, if possible, reverse it. Second, he has to reconstruct the financial system because it cannot be restored to what it was. This is a new situation. When people see this crisis as being the same as previous financial crises, they're making a mistake.
The interesting thing is that what needs to be done in the short term is almost exactly the opposite of what needs to be done in the long term. Obviously the problem was excessive leverage. But when you have a collapse of credit there's only one source of credit that is still credible, and that's the state: the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. Then you have actually to inject a lot more leverage and money into the economy; you have to print money as fast as you can, expand the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, increase the national debt. And that is, in fact, what has been done, which is the right thing to do. But then once this policy is successful, you have to rein in the money supply as fast as you can.
I would say that policy has generally lagged behind events. We were behind the curve. Now that the free fall is moderating, and the collapse has more or less occurred, I think there is hope that policy will, in fact, catch up with events. The outcome of the stress test of the banks will be important, because that's basically where the policy has been lagging behind—in recapitalizing the banks. And that's where most of the confusion comes from.
Robin Wells: I want to go back to what Paul said about the global savings glut. The global savings glut is what drove interest rates down to historically low levels. Housing is very sensitive to the interest rate, and therefore a housing bubble was practically foreordained by an extended period of low interest rates. But you'll also notice that the bubble in housing hasn't occurred just in the United States, it's also occurred in Spain, Eastern Europe, and the UK; it's been in Ireland, it's been in Iceland. In order to prevent us from reexperiencing this catastrophe in another, say, ten years, we need to look at the origins of the global savings glut. Yes, there are some differences in how the bubbles were actually manifested in the different countries, and those manifestations are important; but let's look for a moment at the global savings glut in its entirety.
I think this story starts really in the Eighties. During the Reagan years, we experienced chronic fiscal deficits, and we began to abdicate our responsibility to raise tax revenue that could sustainably finance government. In order to do that, we had to borrow, and who did we borrow from? We borrowed from countries that were running persistent trade surpluses. And as we continued to run these deficits with these countries, there grew to be a symbiotic relationship, as Niall Ferguson says, this Chimerica.
But it was on several different fronts. There were the net exporters, such as China, Japan, and Germany, and the net importers of capital, the largest, of course, being the United States. This import of capital allowed us to consistently live beyond our means, first by running fiscal deficits, not raising enough tax revenue to finance the government, and then also through, ultimately, the leverage that we used in housing, and in commercial real estate, and in leverage buyouts. And this continued; it grew because there was no point anywhere along the line at which anyone would say "halt."
The persistent imbalances led us to pretend that we could keep borrowing without having sufficient tax revenue to pay for the government. And if your house prices are rising, if the stock market is going up—which of course is going to happen if you have cheap money—it puffs up the value of the assets, and disguises a lot of other structural problems such as rising inequality and corruption.
With this inflow of capital from abroad, the financial sector in the United States also became larger and larger relative to the rest of the economy, with GDP tilted disproportionately toward the financial sector.
How do we start to get out of this? In many ways we're almost adverse to bringing up the situation in which we find ourselves with the net exporting countries. I thought it was quite interesting a few weeks ago when many Chinese officials were saying that it was proper, and it was good economically, that the US continue to run persistent trade imbalances with China, that the Chinese yuan did not need to be appreciated, that we should continue doing the things we always have, and that the US should make sure that the value of Chinese assets were not diminished by any change in the value of the dollar. It should have been clear that this was not a sustainable relationship, but no one was willing to say that.
So I think we're going to have to address these chronic global trade imbalances. You might very well see a shift toward more protectionism. We're going to have to actually do something about raising taxes so that we can sustain government from our own resources rather than depending upon borrowing abroad. And we're going to have to start stepping back into our former role, one that we abdicated, as managers and guardians in the global economy.
J.M.: I think most people think the US government did what it had to in adopting a serious stimulus, despite the debt. Niall, why don't you respond to the comments, and then we'll have a little discussion on that.
N.F.: Well, if you listened carefully to what Paul Krugman said, he actually agreed with me. Because what he said was that everything is just fine as long as the financial credibility of the United States isn't called into question, but my point is that it will be called into question. Of course it will. According to the administration's crazily optimistic forecast for a recovery, it's going to be a 3 percent growth rate next year, 4 percent the year after that, 4.6 percent the year after that. If you believe those numbers, you'll believe absolutely anything, but they are there in the administration's budget document. Even if those numbers turn out to be true, the federal debt will rise over the next five to ten years to around 100 percent of gross domestic product.
But since those numbers are clearly wrong, and the trend growth rate of the US will be much closer to 1 percent than to 4, it seems reasonable to anticipate a much more rapid explosion of federal debt to somewhere in the region of 140 or 150 percent of gross domestic product. Even if the private savings rate rebounded to its highest point in the postwar period, it would still account for no more than 5 percent of gross domestic product. But this year's deficit, as I said earlier, is likely to be north of 12 percent of gross domestic product. So it doesn't quite add up.
The Fed has committed itself to buying $300 billion worth of treasuries this year, but clearly it will have to buy a great many more than that. Remember, $1.7 trillion or so are coming onto the market. And you assume that the credibility of the United States in the eyes of Americans, as well as foreign investors, is going to withstand this? At some point the United States does start to look like a Latin American economy, not only to people abroad but maybe to people at home. If the Fed's balance sheet explodes to up to $3 or $4 trillion, who knows how big it could get. At what point do people stop believing in the US dollar as a reserve currency, or even as a store of value for their own savings?
J.M.: Let's allow Paul and others to respond.
P.K.: The essence of this kind of recession is precisely that the amount that collectively we want to save is greater than the amount that collectively we want to invest. That is the problem. You can't get around that.
There is a very different question, which is the long-run solvency of the US government, and I do worry about that. I would disagree very much with Niall about those numbers, but this is a factor that should be taken into account. We are currently in debt about 60 percent of GDP. We have in the past been as high as 100 percent of GDP at the end of World War II without having a crisis, but your ability to go that high does depend upon people's belief that you will behave responsibly, and that is somewhat in question. I hope it is less in question than it was in the past, now that we've had some regime changes, but it is a problem.
N.R.: I think that the debate here is about what needs to be done in the short term versus the long term. The lesson of the Great Depression is pretty clear: it started with the stock market crash of 1929, and it actually became the Great Depression by 1933 for four reasons. One, we didn't believe in a counter-cyclical monetary policy. The money supply contracted rather than being eased. Interest rates were not falling, and that made the credit crunch worse. Two, nobody believed in counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The general theory of Keynes was written only in 1936; in the early 1930s, the government was raising taxes and cutting spending in order to maintain a balanced budget. That made the recession even more severe.
Three, there was a belief that banks should be allowed to collapse. Thousands of them collapsed, the credit crunch became even worse. And four, by 1933, 75 percent of households had defaulted on their mortgages; they couldn't pay them. So a stock market crash became a Great Depression. Then you add currency wars internationally, trade wars, protectionism, and capital controls; then you had default by countries and the rise of totalitarian regimens in Germany and in Italy, in Japan, and Spain, and we ended up in World War II. So those are the consequences of not taking the right policy actions in the short run.
I agree, however, that we have to worry about the long run. If we're going to finance budget deficits by printing money, we may have high inflation, even risk of hyperinflation in some countries. That's what happened in Germany in the 1920s during the Weimar Republic. We are having large budget deficits and increasing the public debt, we don't know whether it's going to be $5 trillion or $10 trillion of more debt. But there are only a few ways of resolving that debt problem: either you default on it as countries like Argentina did; or you use the inflation tax to wipe out the real value of the debt; or you have to raise taxes and cut government spending. And given the size of the deficits, over time that's going to be a painful political choice to make. So we need the stimulus in the short run, but we need to restore medium-term fiscal sustainability.
G.S.: Let's face it, for twenty-five years we have been consuming more than we have been producing. This living beyond our means accumulated mainly in the housing sector and the financial sector, and now those liabilities are being nationalized. It's a bit unfortunate that so far we have only nationalized the liabilities of the banks, and not their assets. I think it's right that we are extending a government credit to replace the collapsing credit, and we are currently in a deflationary situation. When the flow of credit restarts, suddenly there will be a flip-flop where the fear of deflation will be replaced by the fear of inflation. The pressure for interest rates to rise will be very, very strong, and the rise in interest rates could choke off the recovery. And so we are facing a period of stop-go, or stagflation similar to but more severe than what we faced in the Seventies. But that is a favorable outcome compared to what would have happened if we hadn't done what we are doing.
About regulation, we have to start by recognizing that the prevailing view is false, that markets actually are bubble-prone. They create bubbles. Therefore, they have to be regulated. The authorities have to accept responsibility for preventing asset bubbles from growing too big. They've expressly rejected that, saying that if the markets don't know, how can the regulators know? And, of course, they can't. They're bound to be wrong, but they get feedback from the market, and then they can make adjustments. Now, it is not enough to regulate the money supply. You have to regulate credit. And that means using tools that have largely fallen into disuse. Of course you have margin requirements, minimum capital requirements; but you actually have to vary them to counteract the prevailing mood of the market, because markets do have moods. It should be recognized that exuberance actually is quite rational. When I see a bubble beginning, forming, I jump on it because that's how I make money. So it's perfectly rational.
It's the job of the regulators to regulate. However, we should try not to go overboard. While markets are imperfect, regulators are even more imperfect: not only are they human, they're also bureaucratic and subject to political influences. So we want to keep regulation to a minimum, but we have to recognize that markets are inherently unstable.
N.R.: On this question of regulation, of course, we go into cycles, you know. We had the Great Depression, and then we imposed many actually useful regulations, both on the financial system and on the real economy. Some of them became excessive, and even before Reagan and Thatcher, Jimmy Carter started deregulating some parts of the economy. Eventually policy makers started believing that self-regulation is best; but that means no regulation. We believed in market discipline; but there is no discipline when there is irrational exuberance. We relied on internal risk management models; but nobody listened to risk managers when the risk takers were making all the profits in the banks; and we relied on rating agencies which had massive conflicts of interest since they were being paid by those that they were supposed to be rating. So the entire model of self-regulation and market discipline now has collapsed.
We have to go to a world where there is greater prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system. I think the challenge for the US economy is, can we grow without excessive credit and leverage? Can we grow in a more sustainable way? And what are going to be the sectors of the economy that give us sustainable, long-term growth? I think that's an open question.
P.K.: I think there are two big structural changes that we'd want to see. One is we need to reduce the role of the financial sector in the economy. We went from an economy in which about 4 percent of GDP came from the financial sector to an economy in which 8 percent of GDP come from the financial sector, and in which at its peak 41 percent of profits were being earned by the financial sector. And there is no reason to believe that anything productive happened as a result of all of that. These extremely highly compensated bankers were essentially just finding new ways to offload risks on to other people.
As I've written, we need a boring banking sector again. All of this high finance has turned out to be just destructive, and that's partly a matter of regulation. But in the political economy there was also a vicious circle. Because as the financial sector got increasingly bloated its political clout also grew. So, in fact, deregulation bred bloated finance, which bred more deregulation, which bred this monster that ate the world economy.
The other thing not to miss is the importance of a strong social safety net. By most accounts, most projections say that the European Union is going to have a somewhat deeper recession this year than the United States. So in terms of macromanagement, they're actually doing a poor job, and there are various reasons for that: the European Central Bank is too conservative, Europeans have been too slow to do fiscal stimulus. But the human suffering is going to be much greater on this side of the Atlantic because Europeans don't lose their health care when they lose their jobs. They don't find themselves with essentially no support once their trivial unemployment check has fallen off. We have nothing underneath. When Americans lose their jobs, they fall into the abyss. That does not happen in other advanced countries, it does not happen, I want to say, in civilized countries.
And there are people who say we should not be worrying about things like universal health care in the crisis, we need to solve the crisis. But this is exactly the time when the importance of having a decent social safety net is driven home to everybody, which makes it a very good time to actually move ahead on these other things.
N.F.: Well, I tell you what, I feel depressed after what I've heard tonight. We are now contemplating a massive expansion of the state to substitute for the private sector because that's the only thing Paul thinks will deliver growth. We're going to reregulate the markets, we're going to go back to those good old days. Where were you in the 1970s when all these wonderful regulations were in place? I don't remember that going too smoothly. But what else are we going to do? We're going to print money. Almost limitlessly we'll print money. That's going to be fine, too. And when we're done with that, we're going to raise taxes. What a fabulous package we have in store for us. You know, back in late 2007, I was asked what my big concern was, and I said, "My concern is that we're going to get the 1970s for fear of the 1930s." It's very easy to forget, in your iron indignation at the failure of the market, where the true mainsprings of economic growth lie. The lesson of economic history is very clear. Economic growth does not come from state-led infrastructure investment. It comes from technological innovation, and gains in productivity, and these things come from the private sector, not from the state.
B.B.: As we look at the future, we also have to look at the mistakes policymakers made in the last ten years. It's not news that people are greedy. But we made conscious decisions not to put limits on that natural human impulse. What were the mistakes? In 1999, we allowed investment banks, banks, insurance companies to combine: we eliminated the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited commercial banks from operating as investment banks. Why was Glass-Steagall put into law? Because the last time we didn't limit greed we got into trouble, the Great Depression.
The second mistake was in 1999, the explicit decision by the Clinton administration and Congress not to regulate derivatives, in particular credit default swaps. In 2002 they were worth $1 trillion and today they're worth $33 trillion, and that decision not to regulate derivatives created the following sequence: you have mortgages; then a thousand mortgages are packaged and sold as a mortgage-backed security; a thousand mortgage-backed securities are packaged and sold as a collateral debt obligation [CDOs]; then a thousand collateral debt obligations are packaged and sold as a CDO squared; and insuring each one of those bundles are credit default swaps, which are a part of that $33 trillion. And our government deliberately decided not to regulate this chain of investments.
One result was that the 374 people in the London office of AIG who were responsible for AIG derivatives destroyed a company that had 116,000 employees in 120 countries. Why? Because there was no regulation at all.
The third decision was in 2004. The SEC allowed banks to go from 10 to 1 leverage to 30 to 1 leverage. And guess what? Once they were allowed to do it, they did it. So if we're going to look at the future, we might think of undoing those three mistakes.
Finally, we might want to remember that the chairman of the Federal Reserve is supposed to remove the punch bowl from the party when the party gets out of control. And that did not happen in the Greenspan years. The opposite happened.
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini
Sunday, May 24, 2009
Calm Voice, Big Stick Uri Avnery
Calm Voice, Big Stick
Uri Avnery
23/05/09
BARACK OBAMA is often compared to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but it is from the book of another Roosevelt that he has taken a leaf: President Theodore Roosevelt, who, 108 years ago, advised his successors: “Speak softly and carry a big stick!”
This week, the whole world saw how this is done. Obama sat in the Oval Office side by side with Binyamin Netanyahu and spoke to the journalists. He was earnest, but relaxed. The body language spoke clearly: while Netanyahu leaned forward assiduously, like a traveling salesman peddling his merchandise, Obama leaned back, tranquil and self-assured.
He spoke softly, very softly. But leaning against the wall behind him, hidden by the flag, was a very big stick indeed.
THE WORLD wanted, of course, to know what went on between the two when they met alone.
Coming home, Netanyahu strenuously tried to present the meeting as a great success. But after the spotlights turned off and the red carpet rolled up, we can examine what we have really seen and heard.
Among his great achievements, Netanyahu emphasized the Iranian issue. “We have reached complete agreement,” he proudly announced time and again.
Agreement on what? On the need to prevent Iran from getting a “military nuclear capability”.
Just a moment. What is that we hear, “military”? Where did this word creep up from? Until now, all Israeli governments have insisted that Iran must be prevented from acquiring any nuclear capability at all. The new formula means that the Netanyahu government now accepts Iran having a “non-military”– which is never very far from a “military” - nuclear capability.
This is not Netanyahu’s only defeat on the Iranian issue. Before his trip, he demanded that Obama give Iran just three months, “until October”, and that after this “all the options would be on the table”. An ultimatum that included a military threat.
Nothing of this remains. Obama said that he would conduct a dialogue with Iran until the end of the year, and that he would then assess what had been achieved and consider what to do next. If he came to the conclusion that there had been no progress, he would take further steps, including the imposition of more stringent sanctions. The military option has disappeared. True, before the meeting Obama told a newspaper that “all the options are on the table”, but the fact that he did not repeat this in Netanyahu’s presence speaks volumes.
No doubt Netanyahu asked for permission to attack Iran, or – at the very least – to threaten such an attack. The answer was a flat No. Obama is resolved to prevent an Israeli attack. He has warned the Israeli government unequivocally. Just to make sure that the message has been properly absorbed, he sent the CIA chief to Israel to deliver the message personally to every Israeli leader.
The Israeli plan for a military attack on Iran has been taken off the table – if it was ever lying there.
Netanyahu wanted to connect Iran with the Palestinian issue, in a negative way: as long as the Iranian danger exists, the Palestinian matter cannot be dealt with. Obama has turned the formula upside down and made a positive connection: progress on the Palestinian issue is a precondition to progress on the Iranian one. That makes sense: the unsolved conflict is fuelling Iran, provides it with a reason to menace Israel and weakens the opposition of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to Iran’s ambitions.
OBAMA’S MAIN message concerned one issue that returned to center stage this week: settlements.
This word almost disappeared during the reign of Bush the Younger. True, all US administrations have opposed the enlargement of the settlements, but since the failed attempt by James Baker, the Secretary of State of Bush the Elder, to impose sanctions on Israel, no one has dared to do anything about them. In Washington they mumbled, on the ground they built. In Jerusalem they dissimulated, and on the ground they built.
As a senior Palestinian put it: “We are negotiating about dividing the pizza, and in the meantime Israel is eating it.”
It has to be repeated again and again: the settlements are a disaster for the Palestinians, a disaster for peace and a double and triple disaster for Israel. First, because their main aim is to make the establishment of a Palestinian state impossible, and thus prevent peace forever. Second, because they suck the marrow out of the Israeli economy and swallow resources that should be used to help the poor. Third: because the settlements undermine the rule of law in Israel, they spread the cancer of fascism and push the whole political system to the right.
Therefore Obama is right when he puts the settlement issue ahead of everything else, even ahead of the peace negotiations. A total cessation of building in the settlements comes before anything else. When a body is bleeding, the flow has to be stopped before the disease can be treated. Otherwise the patient will die of loss of blood and there won’t be anybody left to treat. This is precisely the aim of Netanyahu.
This is why Netanyahu has refused to accede to the request. Otherwise his coalition would have fallen apart and he would be compelled to resign or set up an alternative coalition with Kadima. The hapless Tzipi Livni, who has not found a role in opposition, would probably jump at the opportunity.
Netanyahu will try to use Barak against Barack. With the help of Ehud Barak he is putting on a performance of “demolishing outposts”, in order to divert attention from the ongoing building in the settlements. We shall see whether this ploy succeeds and whether the settlers’ leadership will play their part in this charade. The day after Netanyahu’s return, Barak demolished for the seventh time (!) Maoz Esther, an outpost consisting of seven wooden huts. Within hours, the settlers returned to the place.
(The Israeli army has built an entire Arab village in the Negev for training purposes. Somebody joked this week that the army has also built this outpost and manned it with soldiers disguised as settlers, so it can be demolished every time there is pressure from America. Afterwards the soldiers build it up again, ready for use the next time pressure is exerted.)
REFUSAL TO freeze the settlements means refusal to accept the two-state solution. Instead, Netanyahu juggled with empty slogans. He spoke about “two peoples living together in peace”, but refused to speak about a Palestinian state. One of his aides called the demand for two states a “childish game”.
But this is not a childish game at all. It has already been proven that negotiations, the aim of which has not been defined in advance, do not lead anywhere. The Oslo agreement collapsed for precisely this reason. Netanyahu hopes that the next round of negotiations will also founder because of this.
He has not presented a plan of his own. Not because he has no plan, but because he knows that nobody would accept it.
Netanyahu’s plan is: total Israeli control over all the country between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Unlimited Jewish settlement everywhere. Limited self-government for a number of Palestinian enclaves with a dense Palestinian population, which will be surrounded by settlements. All of Jerusalem to remain part of Israel. Not a single Palestinian refugee to return to the territory of Israel.
This merchandise will find no buyers in the whole wide world. So Netanyahu, a professional salesman, tries to wrap it in an attractive package.
For example: the Palestinians will “govern themselves”. Where exactly? Where will the borders run? He has already pronounced that the Palestinians cannot have control over “their airspace or their border crossings”. A state without a military and without control over its airspace and border crossings – that looks suspiciously like the Bantustans of the late racist apartheid regime in South Africa.
I would not be surprised if at some point in the future Netanyahu starts to call these native reservations “a Palestinian state”.
In the meanwhile he tries to gain time and postpone the negotiations as long as possible. He demands that the Palestinians recognize Israel as ‘the state of the Jewish people”, expecting and hoping that they will reject this with both hands. And indeed, accepting it would mean giving up in advance their main card – the refugee issue – and also sticking a knife in the back of the 1.5 million Palestinians who are citizens of Israel.
Netanyahu is ready to accept Obama’s proposal to involve the Arab and other Muslim states in the peace process – an idea that has always been rigorously rejected by all Israel governments. But that is just one more of the rabbits that he will pull out of his hat from time to time in order to delay everything. Before dozens of Arab and perhaps more than fifty Muslim states decide whether to join the process, months, perhaps years, will pass. And in the meantime, Netanyahu demands from them an advance payment in the form of normalization – which means that the entire Arab and Muslim world would give up their only card without getting anything in return. Pure baksheesh.
That is Netanyahu’s working plan.
DOES OBAMA have a peace plan of his own? If one puts all his statements of the last few days together, it seems that he has.
When he speaks about “two states for two peoples”, he practically accepts the peace plan that has by now become a world-wide consensus: as the “parameters” put forward by Bill Clinton in his last days in office, as the core of the Saudi peace proposal and as the peace plans of the Israeli peace movement (the draft peace agreement of Gush Shalom, the Geneva initiative, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh statement and more.)
In short: a sovereign and viable State of Palestine side by side with Israel, the pre-1967 borders with minor and agreed exchanges of territory, the dismantling of all the settlements that will not be joined to Israel in the territory exchanges, East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, a mutually acceptable solution to the refugee problem, a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, mutual security arrangements.
IN THE MEANTIME, throughout the world there is a growing consensus that the only way to get the wheels of peace moving again is for Obama to publish his peace plan and call upon both sides to accept it. If need be, in popular referendums.
He could do this in the speech he is due to deliver in two weeks time in Cairo, during his first presidential trip to the Middle East. Not by accident, he will not come to Israel during this trip, something that is almost unprecedented for a US president.
To do this, he must be ready to take on the powerful Israeli lobby. It seems that he is ready for that. The last president who dared to do this was Dwight D. Eisenhower, who compelled Israel to give back the Sinai straight after the 1956 war. “Ike” was so popular that he was not afraid of the lobby. Obama is no less popular, and perhaps he will dare, too.
As ”Teddy” Roosevelt indicated: when you have a big stick, you don’t have to wave it. You can afford to speak softly.
I hope Obama will indeed speak softly – but clearly and unambiguously.
Uri Avnery
23/05/09
BARACK OBAMA is often compared to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but it is from the book of another Roosevelt that he has taken a leaf: President Theodore Roosevelt, who, 108 years ago, advised his successors: “Speak softly and carry a big stick!”
This week, the whole world saw how this is done. Obama sat in the Oval Office side by side with Binyamin Netanyahu and spoke to the journalists. He was earnest, but relaxed. The body language spoke clearly: while Netanyahu leaned forward assiduously, like a traveling salesman peddling his merchandise, Obama leaned back, tranquil and self-assured.
He spoke softly, very softly. But leaning against the wall behind him, hidden by the flag, was a very big stick indeed.
THE WORLD wanted, of course, to know what went on between the two when they met alone.
Coming home, Netanyahu strenuously tried to present the meeting as a great success. But after the spotlights turned off and the red carpet rolled up, we can examine what we have really seen and heard.
Among his great achievements, Netanyahu emphasized the Iranian issue. “We have reached complete agreement,” he proudly announced time and again.
Agreement on what? On the need to prevent Iran from getting a “military nuclear capability”.
Just a moment. What is that we hear, “military”? Where did this word creep up from? Until now, all Israeli governments have insisted that Iran must be prevented from acquiring any nuclear capability at all. The new formula means that the Netanyahu government now accepts Iran having a “non-military”– which is never very far from a “military” - nuclear capability.
This is not Netanyahu’s only defeat on the Iranian issue. Before his trip, he demanded that Obama give Iran just three months, “until October”, and that after this “all the options would be on the table”. An ultimatum that included a military threat.
Nothing of this remains. Obama said that he would conduct a dialogue with Iran until the end of the year, and that he would then assess what had been achieved and consider what to do next. If he came to the conclusion that there had been no progress, he would take further steps, including the imposition of more stringent sanctions. The military option has disappeared. True, before the meeting Obama told a newspaper that “all the options are on the table”, but the fact that he did not repeat this in Netanyahu’s presence speaks volumes.
No doubt Netanyahu asked for permission to attack Iran, or – at the very least – to threaten such an attack. The answer was a flat No. Obama is resolved to prevent an Israeli attack. He has warned the Israeli government unequivocally. Just to make sure that the message has been properly absorbed, he sent the CIA chief to Israel to deliver the message personally to every Israeli leader.
The Israeli plan for a military attack on Iran has been taken off the table – if it was ever lying there.
Netanyahu wanted to connect Iran with the Palestinian issue, in a negative way: as long as the Iranian danger exists, the Palestinian matter cannot be dealt with. Obama has turned the formula upside down and made a positive connection: progress on the Palestinian issue is a precondition to progress on the Iranian one. That makes sense: the unsolved conflict is fuelling Iran, provides it with a reason to menace Israel and weakens the opposition of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to Iran’s ambitions.
OBAMA’S MAIN message concerned one issue that returned to center stage this week: settlements.
This word almost disappeared during the reign of Bush the Younger. True, all US administrations have opposed the enlargement of the settlements, but since the failed attempt by James Baker, the Secretary of State of Bush the Elder, to impose sanctions on Israel, no one has dared to do anything about them. In Washington they mumbled, on the ground they built. In Jerusalem they dissimulated, and on the ground they built.
As a senior Palestinian put it: “We are negotiating about dividing the pizza, and in the meantime Israel is eating it.”
It has to be repeated again and again: the settlements are a disaster for the Palestinians, a disaster for peace and a double and triple disaster for Israel. First, because their main aim is to make the establishment of a Palestinian state impossible, and thus prevent peace forever. Second, because they suck the marrow out of the Israeli economy and swallow resources that should be used to help the poor. Third: because the settlements undermine the rule of law in Israel, they spread the cancer of fascism and push the whole political system to the right.
Therefore Obama is right when he puts the settlement issue ahead of everything else, even ahead of the peace negotiations. A total cessation of building in the settlements comes before anything else. When a body is bleeding, the flow has to be stopped before the disease can be treated. Otherwise the patient will die of loss of blood and there won’t be anybody left to treat. This is precisely the aim of Netanyahu.
This is why Netanyahu has refused to accede to the request. Otherwise his coalition would have fallen apart and he would be compelled to resign or set up an alternative coalition with Kadima. The hapless Tzipi Livni, who has not found a role in opposition, would probably jump at the opportunity.
Netanyahu will try to use Barak against Barack. With the help of Ehud Barak he is putting on a performance of “demolishing outposts”, in order to divert attention from the ongoing building in the settlements. We shall see whether this ploy succeeds and whether the settlers’ leadership will play their part in this charade. The day after Netanyahu’s return, Barak demolished for the seventh time (!) Maoz Esther, an outpost consisting of seven wooden huts. Within hours, the settlers returned to the place.
(The Israeli army has built an entire Arab village in the Negev for training purposes. Somebody joked this week that the army has also built this outpost and manned it with soldiers disguised as settlers, so it can be demolished every time there is pressure from America. Afterwards the soldiers build it up again, ready for use the next time pressure is exerted.)
REFUSAL TO freeze the settlements means refusal to accept the two-state solution. Instead, Netanyahu juggled with empty slogans. He spoke about “two peoples living together in peace”, but refused to speak about a Palestinian state. One of his aides called the demand for two states a “childish game”.
But this is not a childish game at all. It has already been proven that negotiations, the aim of which has not been defined in advance, do not lead anywhere. The Oslo agreement collapsed for precisely this reason. Netanyahu hopes that the next round of negotiations will also founder because of this.
He has not presented a plan of his own. Not because he has no plan, but because he knows that nobody would accept it.
Netanyahu’s plan is: total Israeli control over all the country between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Unlimited Jewish settlement everywhere. Limited self-government for a number of Palestinian enclaves with a dense Palestinian population, which will be surrounded by settlements. All of Jerusalem to remain part of Israel. Not a single Palestinian refugee to return to the territory of Israel.
This merchandise will find no buyers in the whole wide world. So Netanyahu, a professional salesman, tries to wrap it in an attractive package.
For example: the Palestinians will “govern themselves”. Where exactly? Where will the borders run? He has already pronounced that the Palestinians cannot have control over “their airspace or their border crossings”. A state without a military and without control over its airspace and border crossings – that looks suspiciously like the Bantustans of the late racist apartheid regime in South Africa.
I would not be surprised if at some point in the future Netanyahu starts to call these native reservations “a Palestinian state”.
In the meanwhile he tries to gain time and postpone the negotiations as long as possible. He demands that the Palestinians recognize Israel as ‘the state of the Jewish people”, expecting and hoping that they will reject this with both hands. And indeed, accepting it would mean giving up in advance their main card – the refugee issue – and also sticking a knife in the back of the 1.5 million Palestinians who are citizens of Israel.
Netanyahu is ready to accept Obama’s proposal to involve the Arab and other Muslim states in the peace process – an idea that has always been rigorously rejected by all Israel governments. But that is just one more of the rabbits that he will pull out of his hat from time to time in order to delay everything. Before dozens of Arab and perhaps more than fifty Muslim states decide whether to join the process, months, perhaps years, will pass. And in the meantime, Netanyahu demands from them an advance payment in the form of normalization – which means that the entire Arab and Muslim world would give up their only card without getting anything in return. Pure baksheesh.
That is Netanyahu’s working plan.
DOES OBAMA have a peace plan of his own? If one puts all his statements of the last few days together, it seems that he has.
When he speaks about “two states for two peoples”, he practically accepts the peace plan that has by now become a world-wide consensus: as the “parameters” put forward by Bill Clinton in his last days in office, as the core of the Saudi peace proposal and as the peace plans of the Israeli peace movement (the draft peace agreement of Gush Shalom, the Geneva initiative, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh statement and more.)
In short: a sovereign and viable State of Palestine side by side with Israel, the pre-1967 borders with minor and agreed exchanges of territory, the dismantling of all the settlements that will not be joined to Israel in the territory exchanges, East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, a mutually acceptable solution to the refugee problem, a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, mutual security arrangements.
IN THE MEANTIME, throughout the world there is a growing consensus that the only way to get the wheels of peace moving again is for Obama to publish his peace plan and call upon both sides to accept it. If need be, in popular referendums.
He could do this in the speech he is due to deliver in two weeks time in Cairo, during his first presidential trip to the Middle East. Not by accident, he will not come to Israel during this trip, something that is almost unprecedented for a US president.
To do this, he must be ready to take on the powerful Israeli lobby. It seems that he is ready for that. The last president who dared to do this was Dwight D. Eisenhower, who compelled Israel to give back the Sinai straight after the 1956 war. “Ike” was so popular that he was not afraid of the lobby. Obama is no less popular, and perhaps he will dare, too.
As ”Teddy” Roosevelt indicated: when you have a big stick, you don’t have to wave it. You can afford to speak softly.
I hope Obama will indeed speak softly – but clearly and unambiguously.
University of Maryland/Zogby International: 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
5/19/09
University of Maryland/Zogby International: 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey
Shibley Telhami
Summary of Key Findings:
Attitudes Toward the President of the United States
Overall, 45% of Arabs polled have a favorable view of President Obama (50% outside Egypt), 28% are neutral, 24% have negative views. Remarkably, 79% of Saudis have a favorable view of President Obama and only 14% have negative views. Consistently, in all six countries, the negative views of the President are remarkably low.
These favorable views of President Obama, while remarkable in comparison to previous American presidents, do not yet indicate enthusiasm. Those whose opinion of the President are “very positive” are only 11%. When asked in an open question about leaders they admire most in the world, few choose President Obama as one of those leaders.
Views of President Obama appear to be at least in part personal, and not simply a reflection of “thank God it’s not Bush” attitudes. To be sure, President George W. Bush still shows up as the leader of the list of the two most disliked leaders, with 61%. But when asked about attitudes toward Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, more Arabs have negative views of her than positive views. Overall, 45% have negative views, 24% are neutral, and 22% have positive views.
Attitudes Toward the United States
The most important consequence of their favorable views of President Obama appears to be expressed hope for American foreign policy in the Middle East. After a few weeks of the Obama administration, a majority in all countries, 51% (59% outside Egypt) expressed hopefulness about US Middle East policy, 28% were neutral, while only 14% were discouraged.
Expressed hopeful views, however, did not translate into immediate significant reevaluation of attitudes toward the US. 77% of Arabs still identify the United States as one of the two biggest threats they face (the other being Israel). But this is an improvement over 2008, when 88% of Arabs polled so identified the United States. Favorable views of the United States have not changed much since 2008, with the most important change being the decline of the number of people who have “very unfavorable views” of the US, from 64% in 2008 to 46% in 2009.
Among the issues that are central to their assessment of Obama administration foreign policy, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli issue lead the list. What is striking, however, is that the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is considerably lower on the list, with only 3% identifying it as the most central issue. It is also noteworthy that third on the list, with 16%, is the expressed American attitude toward the Arab-Muslim world, followed by human rights, which is particularly strong in Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates.
Attitudes Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Unlike the case of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war, when most Arabs believed Israel lost the war and Hezbollah won, most Arabs polled believe that Israel was the biggest winner of the Gaza war in 2008-2009, and that the Palestinian people were the biggest losers.
Yet, in their assessment of Israeli power, after the Gaza war, only 11% think Israel is stronger (compared with 16% in 2008) while 44% believe it is weaker and another 44% are neutral.
In the division among the Palestinians, 49% (39% outside Egypt) say they sympathize with both Fatah and Hamas to some extent. 22% sympathize with Hamas (33% outside Egypt) and 12% sympathize with Fatah (14% outside of Egypt). It is noteworthy that while in every one of the six counties polled Hamas receives more sympathy than Fatah. There is particularly strong sympathy for Hamas in Jordan (68%), in Saudi Arabia (46%), and in Lebanon (43%).
74% of Arabs polled (61% outside Egypt) prefer to see a Palestinian national unity government, 12% (22% outside Egypt) prefer a Hamas government, and 7% (11% outside Egypt) prefer a Fatah government.
73% of those polled continue to be in principal supportive of a two state solution based on the 1967 borders. But the number of those opposed increased from 19% in 2008 to 25% in 2009. A majority (60%) believe that if the two state solution collapses, there would be an intense conflict for years to come.
Pessimism about the prospects of Israeli-Palestinian peace continued with 50% saying it will never happen. At the same time, there was an increase in the number of people who expressed the belief that peace was inevitable, but will take more than five years (from 27% in 2008 to 40% in 2009).
Attitudes on Iraq
65% of Arabs polled (compared with 61% in 2008) believe that if the US withdraws its forces from Iraq as planned by the end of 2011, Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences. 72% believe Iraqis are worse off than they were before the Iraq war, but this is a decrease from 82% in 2008.
Attitudes Toward Iran
There are indications the criticism of Iran, particularly in Morocco and Egypt, is having some impact. 13% identify Iran as one of their two biggest threats (compared with 7% in 2008), and outside Egypt, 20% see Iran as one of the two biggest threats to them, compared with 11% in 2008.
58% believe Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, compared with 39% in 2008. Still, 53% believe that Iran has the right to pursue its nuclear program, while 40% believe Iran should be pressured to stop its program. But this marks a significant change from 2008, when only 22% supported international pressure to stop Iran’s nuclear program.
If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, 46% believe that the outcome for the Middle East would be more negative, while 29% believe it would be more positive. Only 29% said the outcome would be negative in 2008, while 44% said it would be more positive.
Attitudes on Global Leadership
The attacks on Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah, especially in Egypt and Morocco, appear to be having an impact. In an open question to identify the leader they admire most outside their own countries, only 6% identify Nasrallah (in contrast with 2008, when he led with 26%). However, he maintains solid popularity in Jordan (21%). The net winner is Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, who was identified as the most admired leader with 24% of those polled (compared with only 4% in 2008).
In a world where there is only one superpower, the preferred country to play that role remains France, 23% (31% outside Egypt). The United States remained far behind with 8% (same as last year). The big surprise is the rise of Germany as a preferred leader, with 23% preferring it (but only 18% outside of Egypt), which constituted nearly doubling of its percentages from 2008. While Israel and the United States remained at the top of the list of the two states that are perceived to be most threatening, and Iran remained in third place, it was notable that China was identified by 9% as one of the two most threatening states.
Media Trends
The use of the internet continued to grow with 36% stating that they use the internet at least several times a week and only 38% stating that they never use the internet (compared with 52% in 2008). Overall, al-Jazeera TV maintains its lead as the first choice for international news, with 55% of those polled (compared with 53% in 2008) while al-Arabiyya TV also roughly maintained its share. However, the picture varied dramatically from country to country, with al-Jazeera losing share (from 49% in 2008 to 39% in 2009) outside of Egypt, and Moroccan TV increasingly viewed in Morocco.
NOTE: To view the PowerPoint presentation containing the data of this survey, please click HERE. It may take a moment to load. Survey conducted April-May 2009 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf
5/19/09
University of Maryland/Zogby International: 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey
Shibley Telhami
Summary of Key Findings:
Attitudes Toward the President of the United States
Overall, 45% of Arabs polled have a favorable view of President Obama (50% outside Egypt), 28% are neutral, 24% have negative views. Remarkably, 79% of Saudis have a favorable view of President Obama and only 14% have negative views. Consistently, in all six countries, the negative views of the President are remarkably low.
These favorable views of President Obama, while remarkable in comparison to previous American presidents, do not yet indicate enthusiasm. Those whose opinion of the President are “very positive” are only 11%. When asked in an open question about leaders they admire most in the world, few choose President Obama as one of those leaders.
Views of President Obama appear to be at least in part personal, and not simply a reflection of “thank God it’s not Bush” attitudes. To be sure, President George W. Bush still shows up as the leader of the list of the two most disliked leaders, with 61%. But when asked about attitudes toward Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, more Arabs have negative views of her than positive views. Overall, 45% have negative views, 24% are neutral, and 22% have positive views.
Attitudes Toward the United States
The most important consequence of their favorable views of President Obama appears to be expressed hope for American foreign policy in the Middle East. After a few weeks of the Obama administration, a majority in all countries, 51% (59% outside Egypt) expressed hopefulness about US Middle East policy, 28% were neutral, while only 14% were discouraged.
Expressed hopeful views, however, did not translate into immediate significant reevaluation of attitudes toward the US. 77% of Arabs still identify the United States as one of the two biggest threats they face (the other being Israel). But this is an improvement over 2008, when 88% of Arabs polled so identified the United States. Favorable views of the United States have not changed much since 2008, with the most important change being the decline of the number of people who have “very unfavorable views” of the US, from 64% in 2008 to 46% in 2009.
Among the issues that are central to their assessment of Obama administration foreign policy, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli issue lead the list. What is striking, however, is that the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is considerably lower on the list, with only 3% identifying it as the most central issue. It is also noteworthy that third on the list, with 16%, is the expressed American attitude toward the Arab-Muslim world, followed by human rights, which is particularly strong in Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates.
Attitudes Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Unlike the case of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war, when most Arabs believed Israel lost the war and Hezbollah won, most Arabs polled believe that Israel was the biggest winner of the Gaza war in 2008-2009, and that the Palestinian people were the biggest losers.
Yet, in their assessment of Israeli power, after the Gaza war, only 11% think Israel is stronger (compared with 16% in 2008) while 44% believe it is weaker and another 44% are neutral.
In the division among the Palestinians, 49% (39% outside Egypt) say they sympathize with both Fatah and Hamas to some extent. 22% sympathize with Hamas (33% outside Egypt) and 12% sympathize with Fatah (14% outside of Egypt). It is noteworthy that while in every one of the six counties polled Hamas receives more sympathy than Fatah. There is particularly strong sympathy for Hamas in Jordan (68%), in Saudi Arabia (46%), and in Lebanon (43%).
74% of Arabs polled (61% outside Egypt) prefer to see a Palestinian national unity government, 12% (22% outside Egypt) prefer a Hamas government, and 7% (11% outside Egypt) prefer a Fatah government.
73% of those polled continue to be in principal supportive of a two state solution based on the 1967 borders. But the number of those opposed increased from 19% in 2008 to 25% in 2009. A majority (60%) believe that if the two state solution collapses, there would be an intense conflict for years to come.
Pessimism about the prospects of Israeli-Palestinian peace continued with 50% saying it will never happen. At the same time, there was an increase in the number of people who expressed the belief that peace was inevitable, but will take more than five years (from 27% in 2008 to 40% in 2009).
Attitudes on Iraq
65% of Arabs polled (compared with 61% in 2008) believe that if the US withdraws its forces from Iraq as planned by the end of 2011, Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences. 72% believe Iraqis are worse off than they were before the Iraq war, but this is a decrease from 82% in 2008.
Attitudes Toward Iran
There are indications the criticism of Iran, particularly in Morocco and Egypt, is having some impact. 13% identify Iran as one of their two biggest threats (compared with 7% in 2008), and outside Egypt, 20% see Iran as one of the two biggest threats to them, compared with 11% in 2008.
58% believe Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, compared with 39% in 2008. Still, 53% believe that Iran has the right to pursue its nuclear program, while 40% believe Iran should be pressured to stop its program. But this marks a significant change from 2008, when only 22% supported international pressure to stop Iran’s nuclear program.
If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, 46% believe that the outcome for the Middle East would be more negative, while 29% believe it would be more positive. Only 29% said the outcome would be negative in 2008, while 44% said it would be more positive.
Attitudes on Global Leadership
The attacks on Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah, especially in Egypt and Morocco, appear to be having an impact. In an open question to identify the leader they admire most outside their own countries, only 6% identify Nasrallah (in contrast with 2008, when he led with 26%). However, he maintains solid popularity in Jordan (21%). The net winner is Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, who was identified as the most admired leader with 24% of those polled (compared with only 4% in 2008).
In a world where there is only one superpower, the preferred country to play that role remains France, 23% (31% outside Egypt). The United States remained far behind with 8% (same as last year). The big surprise is the rise of Germany as a preferred leader, with 23% preferring it (but only 18% outside of Egypt), which constituted nearly doubling of its percentages from 2008. While Israel and the United States remained at the top of the list of the two states that are perceived to be most threatening, and Iran remained in third place, it was notable that China was identified by 9% as one of the two most threatening states.
Media Trends
The use of the internet continued to grow with 36% stating that they use the internet at least several times a week and only 38% stating that they never use the internet (compared with 52% in 2008). Overall, al-Jazeera TV maintains its lead as the first choice for international news, with 55% of those polled (compared with 53% in 2008) while al-Arabiyya TV also roughly maintained its share. However, the picture varied dramatically from country to country, with al-Jazeera losing share (from 49% in 2008 to 39% in 2009) outside of Egypt, and Moroccan TV increasingly viewed in Morocco.
NOTE: To view the PowerPoint presentation containing the data of this survey, please click HERE. It may take a moment to load. Survey conducted April-May 2009 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf
Have We Already Lost Iran? by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
New York Times --- Sunday, 24 May 2009
Have We Already Lost Iran?
by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S Iran policy has, in all likelihood, already failed. On its present course, the White House’s approach will not stop Tehran’s development of a nuclear fuel program — or, as Iran’s successful test of a medium-range, solid-fuel missile last week underscored, military capacities of other sorts. It will also not provide an alternative to continued antagonism between the United States and Iran — a posture that for 30 years has proved increasingly damaging to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.
This judgment may seem both premature and overly severe. We do not make it happily. We voted for Barack Obama in 2008, and we still want him to succeed in reversing the deterioration in America’s strategic position. But we also believe that successful diplomacy with Iran is essential to that end. Unless President Obama and his national security team take a fundamentally different approach to Tehran, they will not achieve a breakthrough.
This is a genuine shame, for President Obama had the potential to do so much better for America’s position in the Middle East. In his greeting to “the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the Persian New Year in March, Mr. Obama included language meant to assuage Iranian skepticism about America’s willingness to end efforts to topple the regime and pursue comprehensive diplomacy.
Iranian diplomats have told us that the president’s professed willingness to deal with Iran on the “basis of mutual interest” in an atmosphere of “mutual respect” was particularly well received in Tehran. They say that the quick response of the nation’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — which included the unprecedented statement that “should you change, our behavior will change, too” — was a sincere signal of Iran’s openness to substantive diplomatic proposals from the new American administration.
Unfortunately, Mr. Obama is backing away from the bold steps required to achieve strategic, Nixon-to-China-type rapprochement with Tehran. Administration officials have professed disappointment that Iranian leaders have not responded more warmly to Mr. Obama’s rhetoric. Many say that the detention of the Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi (who was released this month) and Ayatollah Khamenei’s claim last week that America is “fomenting terrorism” inside Iran show that trying to engage Tehran is a fool’s errand.
But this ignores the real reason Iranian leaders have not responded to the new president more enthusiastically: the Obama administration has done nothing to cancel or repudiate an ostensibly covert but well-publicized program, begun in President George W. Bush’s second term, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to destabilize the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, the Iranian government — regardless of who wins the presidential elections on June 12 — will continue to suspect that American intentions toward the Islamic Republic remain, ultimately, hostile.
In this context, the Saberi case should be interpreted not as the work of unspecified “hard-liners” in Tehran out to destroy prospects for improved relations with Washington, but rather as part of the Iranian leadership’s misguided but fundamentally defensive reaction to an American government campaign to bring about regime change. Similarly, Ayatollah Khamenei’s charge that “money, arms and organizations are being used by the Americans directly across our western border to fight the Islamic Republic’s system” reflects legitimate concern about American intentions. Mr. Obama has reinforced this concern by refusing to pursue an American-Iranian “grand bargain” — a comprehensive framework for resolving major bilateral differences and fundamentally realigning relations.
More broadly, President Obama has made several policy and personnel decisions that have undermined the promise of his encouraging rhetoric about Iran. On the personnel front, the problem begins at the top, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As a presidential candidate, then-Senator Clinton ran well to the right of Mr. Obama on Iran, even saying she would “totally obliterate” Iran if it attacked Israel. Since becoming secretary of state, Clinton has told a number of allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf that she is skeptical that diplomacy with Iran will prove fruitful and testified to Congress that negotiations are primarily useful to garner support for “crippling” multilateral sanctions against Iran.
First of all, this posture is feckless, as Secretary Clinton does not have broad international support for sanctions that would come anywhere close to being crippling. More significantly, this posture is cynically counterproductive, for it eviscerates the credibility of any American diplomatic overtures in the eyes of Iranian leaders across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum.
Even more disturbing is President Obama’s willingness to have Dennis Ross become the point person for Iran policy at the State Department. Mr. Ross has long been an advocate of what he describes as an “engagement with pressure” strategy toward Tehran, meaning that the United States should project a willingness to negotiate with Iran largely to elicit broader regional and international support for intensifying economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
In conversations with Mr. Ross before Mr. Obama’s election, we asked him if he really believed that engage-with-pressure would bring concessions from Iran. He forthrightly acknowledged that this was unlikely. Why, then, was he advocating a diplomatic course that, in his judgment, would probably fail? Because, he told us, if Iran continued to expand its nuclear fuel program, at some point in the next couple of years President Bush’s successor would need to order military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets. Citing past “diplomacy” would be necessary for that president to claim any military action was legitimate.
Iranian officials are fully aware of Mr. Ross’s views — and are increasingly suspicious that he is determined that the Obama administration make, as one senior Iranian diplomat said to us, “an offer we can’t accept,” simply to gain international support for coercive action.
Understandably, given that much of Mr. Obama’s national security team doesn’t share his vision of rapprochement with Iran, America’s overall policy is incoherent. For example, while the administration recently completed a much-ballyhooed review of Iran policy, it has made no changes in its approach to the nuclear issue. Administration officials argue, with what seem to be straight faces, that the Iranian leadership should be impressed simply because American representatives will now show up for any nuclear negotiations with Iran that might take place.
Similarly, some officials suggest that the administration might be prepared to accept limited uranium enrichment on Iranian soil as part of a settlement — effectively asking to be given “credit” merely for acknowledging a well-established reality. Based on our own experience negotiating with Iranians, and our frequent discussions with Iranian diplomats and political figures since leaving the government, we think that it will take a lot more to persuade Tehran of America’s new seriousness.
Tehran will certainly not be persuaded of American seriousness if Washington acquiesces to Israeli insistence on a deadline for successful American engagement with Iran. Although the White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, had told reporters that no such deadline would be imposed, President Obama himself said, after his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, that he wants to see “progress” in nuclear negotiations before the end of the year. He also endorsed the creation of a high-level Israeli-American working group to identify more coercive options if Iran does not meet American conditions for limiting its nuclear activities.
More specifically, Secretary Clinton and Mr. Ross have been pushing the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to intensify multilateral sanctions against Iran if Tehran has not agreed to limit the expansion of its nuclear-fuel cycle program by the time the United Nations General Assembly convenes in New York at the end of September.
This diplomatic approach is guaranteed to fail. Having a deadline for successful negotiations will undercut the perceived credibility of American diplomacy in Tehran and serve only to prepare the way for more coercive measures. Mr. Obama’s justification for a deadline — that previous American-Iranian negotiations produced “a lot of talk but not always action and follow-through” — is incorrect as far as Iranian behavior was concerned. For example, during talks over Afghanistan after 9/11 in which one of us (Hillary) took part, Tehran deported hundreds of Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had sought sanctuary in Iran, and also helped establish the new Afghan government. It was Washington, not Tehran, that arbitrarily ended these productive talks.
Beyond the nuclear issue, the administration’s approach to Iran degenerates into an only slightly prettified version of George W. Bush’s approach — that is, an effort to contain a perceived Iranian threat without actually trying to resolve underlying political conflicts. Obama administration officials are buying into a Bush-era delusion: that concern about a rising Iranian threat could unite Israel and moderate Arab states in a grand alliance under Washington’s leadership.
President Obama and his team should not be excused for their failure to learn the lessons of recent history in the Middle East — that the prospect of strategic cooperation with Israel is profoundly unpopular with Arab publics and that even moderate Arab regimes cannot sustain such cooperation. The notion of an Israeli-moderate Arab coalition united to contain Iran is not only delusional, it would leave the Palestinian and Syrian-Lebanese tracks of the Arab-Israeli conflict unresolved and prospects for their resolution in free fall. These tracks cannot be resolved without meaningful American interaction with Iran and its regional allies, Hamas and Hezbollah.
Why has President Obama put himself in a position from which he cannot deliver on his own professed interest in improving relations with the Islamic Republic? Some diplomatic veterans who have spoken with him have told us that the president said that he did not realize, when he came to office, how “hard” the Iran problem would be. But what is hard about the Iran problem is not periodic inflammatory statements from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or episodes like Ms. Saberi’s detention. What is really hard is that getting America’s Iran policy “right” would require a president to take positions that some allies and domestic constituencies won’t like.
To fix our Iran policy, the president would have to commit not to use force to change the borders or the form of government of the Islamic Republic. He would also have to accept that Iran will continue enriching uranium, and that the only realistic potential resolution to the nuclear issue would leave Iran in effect like Japan — a nation with an increasingly sophisticated nuclear fuel-cycle program that is carefully safeguarded to manage proliferation risks. Additionally, the president would have to accept that Iran’s relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah will continue, and be willing to work with Tehran to integrate these groups into lasting settlements of the Middle East’s core political conflicts.
It was not easy for President Richard Nixon to discard a quarter-century of failed policy toward the People’s Republic of China and to reorient America’s posture toward Beijing in ways that have served America’s interests extremely well for more than 30 years. That took strategic vision, political ruthlessness and personal determination. We hope that President Obama — contrary to his record so far — will soon begin to demonstrate those same qualities in forging a new approach toward Iran.
Have We Already Lost Iran?
by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S Iran policy has, in all likelihood, already failed. On its present course, the White House’s approach will not stop Tehran’s development of a nuclear fuel program — or, as Iran’s successful test of a medium-range, solid-fuel missile last week underscored, military capacities of other sorts. It will also not provide an alternative to continued antagonism between the United States and Iran — a posture that for 30 years has proved increasingly damaging to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.
This judgment may seem both premature and overly severe. We do not make it happily. We voted for Barack Obama in 2008, and we still want him to succeed in reversing the deterioration in America’s strategic position. But we also believe that successful diplomacy with Iran is essential to that end. Unless President Obama and his national security team take a fundamentally different approach to Tehran, they will not achieve a breakthrough.
This is a genuine shame, for President Obama had the potential to do so much better for America’s position in the Middle East. In his greeting to “the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the Persian New Year in March, Mr. Obama included language meant to assuage Iranian skepticism about America’s willingness to end efforts to topple the regime and pursue comprehensive diplomacy.
Iranian diplomats have told us that the president’s professed willingness to deal with Iran on the “basis of mutual interest” in an atmosphere of “mutual respect” was particularly well received in Tehran. They say that the quick response of the nation’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — which included the unprecedented statement that “should you change, our behavior will change, too” — was a sincere signal of Iran’s openness to substantive diplomatic proposals from the new American administration.
Unfortunately, Mr. Obama is backing away from the bold steps required to achieve strategic, Nixon-to-China-type rapprochement with Tehran. Administration officials have professed disappointment that Iranian leaders have not responded more warmly to Mr. Obama’s rhetoric. Many say that the detention of the Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi (who was released this month) and Ayatollah Khamenei’s claim last week that America is “fomenting terrorism” inside Iran show that trying to engage Tehran is a fool’s errand.
But this ignores the real reason Iranian leaders have not responded to the new president more enthusiastically: the Obama administration has done nothing to cancel or repudiate an ostensibly covert but well-publicized program, begun in President George W. Bush’s second term, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to destabilize the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, the Iranian government — regardless of who wins the presidential elections on June 12 — will continue to suspect that American intentions toward the Islamic Republic remain, ultimately, hostile.
In this context, the Saberi case should be interpreted not as the work of unspecified “hard-liners” in Tehran out to destroy prospects for improved relations with Washington, but rather as part of the Iranian leadership’s misguided but fundamentally defensive reaction to an American government campaign to bring about regime change. Similarly, Ayatollah Khamenei’s charge that “money, arms and organizations are being used by the Americans directly across our western border to fight the Islamic Republic’s system” reflects legitimate concern about American intentions. Mr. Obama has reinforced this concern by refusing to pursue an American-Iranian “grand bargain” — a comprehensive framework for resolving major bilateral differences and fundamentally realigning relations.
More broadly, President Obama has made several policy and personnel decisions that have undermined the promise of his encouraging rhetoric about Iran. On the personnel front, the problem begins at the top, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As a presidential candidate, then-Senator Clinton ran well to the right of Mr. Obama on Iran, even saying she would “totally obliterate” Iran if it attacked Israel. Since becoming secretary of state, Clinton has told a number of allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf that she is skeptical that diplomacy with Iran will prove fruitful and testified to Congress that negotiations are primarily useful to garner support for “crippling” multilateral sanctions against Iran.
First of all, this posture is feckless, as Secretary Clinton does not have broad international support for sanctions that would come anywhere close to being crippling. More significantly, this posture is cynically counterproductive, for it eviscerates the credibility of any American diplomatic overtures in the eyes of Iranian leaders across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum.
Even more disturbing is President Obama’s willingness to have Dennis Ross become the point person for Iran policy at the State Department. Mr. Ross has long been an advocate of what he describes as an “engagement with pressure” strategy toward Tehran, meaning that the United States should project a willingness to negotiate with Iran largely to elicit broader regional and international support for intensifying economic pressure on the Islamic Republic.
In conversations with Mr. Ross before Mr. Obama’s election, we asked him if he really believed that engage-with-pressure would bring concessions from Iran. He forthrightly acknowledged that this was unlikely. Why, then, was he advocating a diplomatic course that, in his judgment, would probably fail? Because, he told us, if Iran continued to expand its nuclear fuel program, at some point in the next couple of years President Bush’s successor would need to order military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets. Citing past “diplomacy” would be necessary for that president to claim any military action was legitimate.
Iranian officials are fully aware of Mr. Ross’s views — and are increasingly suspicious that he is determined that the Obama administration make, as one senior Iranian diplomat said to us, “an offer we can’t accept,” simply to gain international support for coercive action.
Understandably, given that much of Mr. Obama’s national security team doesn’t share his vision of rapprochement with Iran, America’s overall policy is incoherent. For example, while the administration recently completed a much-ballyhooed review of Iran policy, it has made no changes in its approach to the nuclear issue. Administration officials argue, with what seem to be straight faces, that the Iranian leadership should be impressed simply because American representatives will now show up for any nuclear negotiations with Iran that might take place.
Similarly, some officials suggest that the administration might be prepared to accept limited uranium enrichment on Iranian soil as part of a settlement — effectively asking to be given “credit” merely for acknowledging a well-established reality. Based on our own experience negotiating with Iranians, and our frequent discussions with Iranian diplomats and political figures since leaving the government, we think that it will take a lot more to persuade Tehran of America’s new seriousness.
Tehran will certainly not be persuaded of American seriousness if Washington acquiesces to Israeli insistence on a deadline for successful American engagement with Iran. Although the White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, had told reporters that no such deadline would be imposed, President Obama himself said, after his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, that he wants to see “progress” in nuclear negotiations before the end of the year. He also endorsed the creation of a high-level Israeli-American working group to identify more coercive options if Iran does not meet American conditions for limiting its nuclear activities.
More specifically, Secretary Clinton and Mr. Ross have been pushing the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to intensify multilateral sanctions against Iran if Tehran has not agreed to limit the expansion of its nuclear-fuel cycle program by the time the United Nations General Assembly convenes in New York at the end of September.
This diplomatic approach is guaranteed to fail. Having a deadline for successful negotiations will undercut the perceived credibility of American diplomacy in Tehran and serve only to prepare the way for more coercive measures. Mr. Obama’s justification for a deadline — that previous American-Iranian negotiations produced “a lot of talk but not always action and follow-through” — is incorrect as far as Iranian behavior was concerned. For example, during talks over Afghanistan after 9/11 in which one of us (Hillary) took part, Tehran deported hundreds of Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had sought sanctuary in Iran, and also helped establish the new Afghan government. It was Washington, not Tehran, that arbitrarily ended these productive talks.
Beyond the nuclear issue, the administration’s approach to Iran degenerates into an only slightly prettified version of George W. Bush’s approach — that is, an effort to contain a perceived Iranian threat without actually trying to resolve underlying political conflicts. Obama administration officials are buying into a Bush-era delusion: that concern about a rising Iranian threat could unite Israel and moderate Arab states in a grand alliance under Washington’s leadership.
President Obama and his team should not be excused for their failure to learn the lessons of recent history in the Middle East — that the prospect of strategic cooperation with Israel is profoundly unpopular with Arab publics and that even moderate Arab regimes cannot sustain such cooperation. The notion of an Israeli-moderate Arab coalition united to contain Iran is not only delusional, it would leave the Palestinian and Syrian-Lebanese tracks of the Arab-Israeli conflict unresolved and prospects for their resolution in free fall. These tracks cannot be resolved without meaningful American interaction with Iran and its regional allies, Hamas and Hezbollah.
Why has President Obama put himself in a position from which he cannot deliver on his own professed interest in improving relations with the Islamic Republic? Some diplomatic veterans who have spoken with him have told us that the president said that he did not realize, when he came to office, how “hard” the Iran problem would be. But what is hard about the Iran problem is not periodic inflammatory statements from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or episodes like Ms. Saberi’s detention. What is really hard is that getting America’s Iran policy “right” would require a president to take positions that some allies and domestic constituencies won’t like.
To fix our Iran policy, the president would have to commit not to use force to change the borders or the form of government of the Islamic Republic. He would also have to accept that Iran will continue enriching uranium, and that the only realistic potential resolution to the nuclear issue would leave Iran in effect like Japan — a nation with an increasingly sophisticated nuclear fuel-cycle program that is carefully safeguarded to manage proliferation risks. Additionally, the president would have to accept that Iran’s relationships with Hamas and Hezbollah will continue, and be willing to work with Tehran to integrate these groups into lasting settlements of the Middle East’s core political conflicts.
It was not easy for President Richard Nixon to discard a quarter-century of failed policy toward the People’s Republic of China and to reorient America’s posture toward Beijing in ways that have served America’s interests extremely well for more than 30 years. That took strategic vision, political ruthlessness and personal determination. We hope that President Obama — contrary to his record so far — will soon begin to demonstrate those same qualities in forging a new approach toward Iran.
The Empire Is Bankrupting America by Jacob G. Hornberger
The Empire Is Bankrupting America
by Jacob G. Hornberger
While Barack Obama was delivering his flowery speech justifying the indefinite imprisonment without trial of people suspected of violating laws against terrorism, the New York Times and Bloomberg were reporting on the financial consequences of out-of-control federal spending.
You’ll recall that the Bush administration, which was insistent on continuing the brutal embargo against Cuba, borrowed enormous sums of money from the communist regime in China to finance the U.S. Empire, especially the invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the 8 years of the Bush administration, China became one of the U.S. government’s principal creditors. According to an article by Mark Gilbert in Bloomberg entitled “Dollar Is Dirt, Treasuries Are Toast, AAA Is Gone,” “China owns about $744 billion of U.S. Treasury bonds in its $2 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves.”
Guess what China is now doing. According to the New York Times article, while China continues to lend massive amounts of money to the U.S. government, it is shifting the mix of its investment portfolio by lowering its holdings of long-term U.S. debt and replacing it with short-term U.S. securities.
Why is it doing that? Chinese officials are obviously convinced that the out-of-control federal spending and rapidly growing U.S. debt will bring about a massive debasement of the dollar, which will crunch the value of long-term debt securities. As Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister put it earlier this year, “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S. Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets.”
According to the Times, China has also been stepping up its purchase of commodities, such as iron ore, crude oil, grain, gasoline, diesel, and sugar. Also, “after six years of silence, China unexpectedly disclosed last month that it has been gradually buying gold from domestic producers. The country’s reserves had climbed 600 tons in 2003 to 1,054 tons, worth $31.8 billion at prices late Wednesday.”
Meanwhile, the U.S. government just keeps spending and spending and spending, with no end in sight, especially given the ever-increasing military needs in Iraq and Afghanistan and ever-increasing welfare needs in the United States. According to Bloomberg, “President Barack Obama’s administration has pushed the nation’s marketable debt to an unprecedented $6.36 trillion. It raised on May 11 its estimate for the deficit this year to a record $1.84 trillion, up 5 percent from the February estimate, and equal to about 13 percent of the nation’s GDP.”
Standard and Poor is now threatening to downgrade the U.S. government’s AAA credit rating on its debt instruments, which it has just done to Great Britain’s credit rating. Bill Gross, the co-chief investment officer of Pacific Management Co., told Bloomberg, “The markets are beginning to anticipate the possibility” of a downgrade though “it’s certainly nothing that’s going to happen overnight.”
No wonder the Chinese are now talking about the Chinese renminbi replacing the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
While it is imperative that libertarians continue focusing on the fundamental immorality of U.S. foreign policy — that is, the assassinations, invasions, occupations, bombings, torture, indefinite imprisonments, denial of due process, denial of trial by jury, cancellation of habeas corpus, and other infringements on civil liberties — it is also imperative that we continue reminding our fellow Americans what these people are doing to the financial and economic well-being of our country. Empires bankrupt nations. And that’s precisely what the U.S. Empire is doing to America.
P.S. The debate on Afghanistan in which I recently participated is now online. It was sponsored by the Donald and Paula Smith Foundation in New York City. The debaters were Max Boot (Council on Foreign Relations), Chris Prebble (Cato Institute), Larry Goodson (Army War College), and Jacob Hornberger (president of The Future of Freedom Foundation). I think you’ll really enjoy this heated debate. One lady said that it was the best debate she had witnessed in the Smith Foundation debate series.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
http://fff.org/blog/index.asp
by Jacob G. Hornberger
While Barack Obama was delivering his flowery speech justifying the indefinite imprisonment without trial of people suspected of violating laws against terrorism, the New York Times and Bloomberg were reporting on the financial consequences of out-of-control federal spending.
You’ll recall that the Bush administration, which was insistent on continuing the brutal embargo against Cuba, borrowed enormous sums of money from the communist regime in China to finance the U.S. Empire, especially the invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the 8 years of the Bush administration, China became one of the U.S. government’s principal creditors. According to an article by Mark Gilbert in Bloomberg entitled “Dollar Is Dirt, Treasuries Are Toast, AAA Is Gone,” “China owns about $744 billion of U.S. Treasury bonds in its $2 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves.”
Guess what China is now doing. According to the New York Times article, while China continues to lend massive amounts of money to the U.S. government, it is shifting the mix of its investment portfolio by lowering its holdings of long-term U.S. debt and replacing it with short-term U.S. securities.
Why is it doing that? Chinese officials are obviously convinced that the out-of-control federal spending and rapidly growing U.S. debt will bring about a massive debasement of the dollar, which will crunch the value of long-term debt securities. As Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister put it earlier this year, “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S. Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets.”
According to the Times, China has also been stepping up its purchase of commodities, such as iron ore, crude oil, grain, gasoline, diesel, and sugar. Also, “after six years of silence, China unexpectedly disclosed last month that it has been gradually buying gold from domestic producers. The country’s reserves had climbed 600 tons in 2003 to 1,054 tons, worth $31.8 billion at prices late Wednesday.”
Meanwhile, the U.S. government just keeps spending and spending and spending, with no end in sight, especially given the ever-increasing military needs in Iraq and Afghanistan and ever-increasing welfare needs in the United States. According to Bloomberg, “President Barack Obama’s administration has pushed the nation’s marketable debt to an unprecedented $6.36 trillion. It raised on May 11 its estimate for the deficit this year to a record $1.84 trillion, up 5 percent from the February estimate, and equal to about 13 percent of the nation’s GDP.”
Standard and Poor is now threatening to downgrade the U.S. government’s AAA credit rating on its debt instruments, which it has just done to Great Britain’s credit rating. Bill Gross, the co-chief investment officer of Pacific Management Co., told Bloomberg, “The markets are beginning to anticipate the possibility” of a downgrade though “it’s certainly nothing that’s going to happen overnight.”
No wonder the Chinese are now talking about the Chinese renminbi replacing the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
While it is imperative that libertarians continue focusing on the fundamental immorality of U.S. foreign policy — that is, the assassinations, invasions, occupations, bombings, torture, indefinite imprisonments, denial of due process, denial of trial by jury, cancellation of habeas corpus, and other infringements on civil liberties — it is also imperative that we continue reminding our fellow Americans what these people are doing to the financial and economic well-being of our country. Empires bankrupt nations. And that’s precisely what the U.S. Empire is doing to America.
P.S. The debate on Afghanistan in which I recently participated is now online. It was sponsored by the Donald and Paula Smith Foundation in New York City. The debaters were Max Boot (Council on Foreign Relations), Chris Prebble (Cato Institute), Larry Goodson (Army War College), and Jacob Hornberger (president of The Future of Freedom Foundation). I think you’ll really enjoy this heated debate. One lady said that it was the best debate she had witnessed in the Smith Foundation debate series.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
http://fff.org/blog/index.asp
Memorial Day 2009
HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868
I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.
We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.
If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.
Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.
II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.
III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.
By order of
JOHN A. LOGAN,
Commander-in-Chief
N.P. CHIPMAN,
Adjutant General
Official:
WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.
Commander-in-Chief Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute to US Military Old Army Buddies - Michael Auslin, Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/22/AR2009052202023.html
Those Who Make Us Say 'Oh!' - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124293579117244481.html
They Died for You - Rick Atkinson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09144/972099-109.stm
Remembering Bataan - Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/24/remembering-bataan/
Roots of Memorial Day Run Back to the 1860s - Hayley Peterson, Washington Examiner
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/Roots-of-Memorial-Day-run-back-to-the-1860s-45876847.html
What are the Origins of Memorial Day? - Seattle Post Intelligencer
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/Roots-of-Memorial-Day-run-back-to-the-1860s-45876847.html
Observing Memorial Day - Larry Abeldt, Abilene Recorder Chronicle
http://www.abilene-rc.com/index.cfm?event=news.view&id=6BB71226-19B9-E2F5-46DD93CFB4FC4B5E
What Does Memorial Day Mean to You? - Tabatha Hunter, Benton County Daily Record
http://nwanews.com/bcdr/News/73695/
What Patriotism Means to an American Citizen on Memorial Day - Johnnie Godwin, The Tennessean
http://www.tennessean.com/article/20090524/OPINION03/905240339/1008/OPINION01/What+patriotism+means+to+an+American+citizen+on+Memorial+Day
Let Us Honor the Best and Noblest of Us All - Spartanburg Herald Journal
http://www.goupstate.com/article/20090524/NEWS/905241054/1132/OPINION?Title=Memorial-Day-2009-Let-us-honor-the-best-and-noblest-of-us-all
Honor Their Sacrifice - Doug Chapin, Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/opinion/commentary/
Memorial Day Roll Call Salutes 148,000 Veterans - Gillian Flaccus, Associated Press
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hQEwwRNmHfk8RKa9tebzDjynz4ngD98CC1VG1
Obama Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute to US Military - Kent Klein, Voice of America
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-23-voa13.cfm
Memorial Day 2009 - McQ, Blackfive
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2009/05/memorial-day-2009.html
A Word of Caution - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/032071.html
How Not to Celebrate Memorial Day - Uncle Jimbo, Blackfive
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2009/05/how-not-to-celebrate-memorial-day.html
Tibor Rubin - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/003596.html
Memorial Day 2008
Memorial Day 2008
Band of Brothers
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/memorial-day-2009/
I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.
We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.
If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.
Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.
II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.
III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.
By order of
JOHN A. LOGAN,
Commander-in-Chief
N.P. CHIPMAN,
Adjutant General
Official:
WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.
Commander-in-Chief Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute to US Military Old Army Buddies - Michael Auslin, Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/22/AR2009052202023.html
Those Who Make Us Say 'Oh!' - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124293579117244481.html
They Died for You - Rick Atkinson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09144/972099-109.stm
Remembering Bataan - Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/24/remembering-bataan/
Roots of Memorial Day Run Back to the 1860s - Hayley Peterson, Washington Examiner
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/Roots-of-Memorial-Day-run-back-to-the-1860s-45876847.html
What are the Origins of Memorial Day? - Seattle Post Intelligencer
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/local/Roots-of-Memorial-Day-run-back-to-the-1860s-45876847.html
Observing Memorial Day - Larry Abeldt, Abilene Recorder Chronicle
http://www.abilene-rc.com/index.cfm?event=news.view&id=6BB71226-19B9-E2F5-46DD93CFB4FC4B5E
What Does Memorial Day Mean to You? - Tabatha Hunter, Benton County Daily Record
http://nwanews.com/bcdr/News/73695/
What Patriotism Means to an American Citizen on Memorial Day - Johnnie Godwin, The Tennessean
http://www.tennessean.com/article/20090524/OPINION03/905240339/1008/OPINION01/What+patriotism+means+to+an+American+citizen+on+Memorial+Day
Let Us Honor the Best and Noblest of Us All - Spartanburg Herald Journal
http://www.goupstate.com/article/20090524/NEWS/905241054/1132/OPINION?Title=Memorial-Day-2009-Let-us-honor-the-best-and-noblest-of-us-all
Honor Their Sacrifice - Doug Chapin, Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/opinion/commentary/
Memorial Day Roll Call Salutes 148,000 Veterans - Gillian Flaccus, Associated Press
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hQEwwRNmHfk8RKa9tebzDjynz4ngD98CC1VG1
Obama Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute to US Military - Kent Klein, Voice of America
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-23-voa13.cfm
Memorial Day 2009 - McQ, Blackfive
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2009/05/memorial-day-2009.html
A Word of Caution - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/032071.html
How Not to Celebrate Memorial Day - Uncle Jimbo, Blackfive
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2009/05/how-not-to-celebrate-memorial-day.html
Tibor Rubin - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/003596.html
Memorial Day 2008
Memorial Day 2008
Band of Brothers
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/memorial-day-2009/
Transforming the National Security Culture A Report of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Defense Leadership Project
Transforming the National Security Culture
A Report of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Defense Leadership Project
Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)
From the Preface
General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, has compared our best leaders to diamonds. Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. We at the Harvard Kennedy School seek to foster an environment in which our student leaders can develop their character, expand their knowledge, and launch into promising career trajectories through the application of newly polished skills for the benefit of our nation’s security. The Harvard Kennedy School Defense Leadership Project is a proud example of the work that can be produced in this environment.
As we seek to generate and promote more effective leadership in national security policy, we are deeply committed to bridging the gap between leadership theory and practice. Supporting collabora¬tive thinking among experts in the field is critical to this objective. The student-generated Defense Leadership Project aptly sought to address a critical shortfall in national security leadership through its collaborative endeavor. As this report attests, the Defense Leadership Project specifically created unprecedented opportunities for reflection and discovery for students and prominent practitioners from different disciplines, sectors, and cultures to elicit proactive solutions to tomorrow’s challenges.
Well-trained and equipped leaders sharing collaborative mentalities are paramount for successfully preserving our national security. The combined support of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Center for Public Leadership speaks to the shared belief in the importance of this initiative, and the associated recommendations. We applaud the students involved in the Defense Leadership Project and the energy this team put into organizing guest speakers and writing this report. We hope our nation’s leaders might draw from their informed and insightful findings.
From the Introduction
In late winter 2007, a small group of veterans attending Harvard University decided to challenge the status quo. Frustrated by their experiences overseas and what they perceived as a lack of innovative leadership within their own organizations, they sought to develop new ideas. They wanted to create something the business world would call a skunk works, an autonomous group of creative thinkers, charged with working on advanced projects. Enlisting the help of three separate research centers at Harvard—the Center for Public Leadership, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy (which also had played a role in the publication of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual), and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs—the students took their proposal to the larger student body.
At a special reception for all Harvard graduate students who had served (or were serving) within the national security community, the students announced open applications for an initiative they called the Defense Leadership Project sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leadership. The response from the crowd—which had been full of veterans returned from combat tours, homeland security officials, intelligence analysts, private security consultants, and others—was overwhelming. Applications poured in, and after selecting the most talented, experienced, and creative individuals, the panel set to work defining its mission.
The students almost immediately came to realize that most of their frustrations were rooted in leader¬ship and organizational culture. In their eyes, the national security establishment was facing a major crisis: leaders at all levels were routinely ill-equipped to understand, visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment. The problem was one of adaptation: decades of Cold War doctrine and thinking had left behind a sense of unassailable institutional inertia. Despite the undeniable rise of asymmetric threats such as insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other nonstate actors, the defense establishment had continued to invest overwhelmingly in preparations for traditional, conventional warfare.
While many blue ribbon panels and study groups have been convened since 9/11 to develop recommendations for the security establishment, few have focused on the role of the individual leader. New organizational models and next-generation technologies may improve our nation’s readiness, but—in the humble opinion of the students—success or failure would be defined by the ability of individual leaders to operate effectively with minimal guidance, adapt, and collaborate across traditional institutional stovepipes. In other words, victory will not be gained by overwhelming our enemies with brute force, but by empowering our leaders to innovate faster than the enemy can respond.
The panel’s methodology would be simple: Invite senior level defense leaders to Harvard for closed door, nonattribution, and brutally honest discussions. Combine the enthusiasm and “on the ground” perspective of the students with the strategic outlook of decision makers and experts. Develop bluesky solutions, record notes for every session, and eventually, write the proposals into a report intended for senior policy makers. This booklet is the end result of our efforts. We respectfully submit these recommendations for your consideration, in the hope that a few of the ideas might prove useful or inspire further inquiry.
From the Foreword
When the Center for Public Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School brings together graduate students and national security students at Harvard—military veterans, homeland security officials, intelligence officers, private security contractors, and others—in a Defense Leadership Project, one expects powerful results as they work with distinguished guest panelists. After all, it’s Harvard, the Kennedy School, David Gergen’s Center for Public Leadership, and our own country’s security leaders. We have great expectations.
Rarely do results of such an intellectual engagement provide the call to action that this report delivers. Not an academic treatise, this is a tough report by people on the ground, across the sectors, examining every aspect of the defense community, and this is the powerful result. And it’s all about leadership, the leaders of the future required right across the national security community, to lead, respond, mobilize, inspire, build the alliances and partnerships an uncertain future demands in the emerging security environment.
The formal recommendations the panel makes in this report are sobering and illuminating and fall into four categories:
• Finding critical talent
• Transforming talent into institutional capability
• Reforming the existing organization to promote balance and interoperability
• Accelerating generational change.
Three powerful messages flow through the recommendations, the rationale, and the call to action in this report:
• A massive need for change in the national security organizations and community to prepare our leaders to meet future threats
• Emerging leaders, the new generation of national security professional workers, will generate the change essential to meet evolving challenges
• The inspiring ideas will come from bright young minds committed to our security establishment who know change is the leadership imperative of our time.
Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/nationalsecurityculture.pdf
A Report of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Defense Leadership Project
Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)
From the Preface
General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, has compared our best leaders to diamonds. Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. We at the Harvard Kennedy School seek to foster an environment in which our student leaders can develop their character, expand their knowledge, and launch into promising career trajectories through the application of newly polished skills for the benefit of our nation’s security. The Harvard Kennedy School Defense Leadership Project is a proud example of the work that can be produced in this environment.
As we seek to generate and promote more effective leadership in national security policy, we are deeply committed to bridging the gap between leadership theory and practice. Supporting collabora¬tive thinking among experts in the field is critical to this objective. The student-generated Defense Leadership Project aptly sought to address a critical shortfall in national security leadership through its collaborative endeavor. As this report attests, the Defense Leadership Project specifically created unprecedented opportunities for reflection and discovery for students and prominent practitioners from different disciplines, sectors, and cultures to elicit proactive solutions to tomorrow’s challenges.
Well-trained and equipped leaders sharing collaborative mentalities are paramount for successfully preserving our national security. The combined support of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Center for Public Leadership speaks to the shared belief in the importance of this initiative, and the associated recommendations. We applaud the students involved in the Defense Leadership Project and the energy this team put into organizing guest speakers and writing this report. We hope our nation’s leaders might draw from their informed and insightful findings.
From the Introduction
In late winter 2007, a small group of veterans attending Harvard University decided to challenge the status quo. Frustrated by their experiences overseas and what they perceived as a lack of innovative leadership within their own organizations, they sought to develop new ideas. They wanted to create something the business world would call a skunk works, an autonomous group of creative thinkers, charged with working on advanced projects. Enlisting the help of three separate research centers at Harvard—the Center for Public Leadership, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy (which also had played a role in the publication of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual), and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs—the students took their proposal to the larger student body.
At a special reception for all Harvard graduate students who had served (or were serving) within the national security community, the students announced open applications for an initiative they called the Defense Leadership Project sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leadership. The response from the crowd—which had been full of veterans returned from combat tours, homeland security officials, intelligence analysts, private security consultants, and others—was overwhelming. Applications poured in, and after selecting the most talented, experienced, and creative individuals, the panel set to work defining its mission.
The students almost immediately came to realize that most of their frustrations were rooted in leader¬ship and organizational culture. In their eyes, the national security establishment was facing a major crisis: leaders at all levels were routinely ill-equipped to understand, visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment. The problem was one of adaptation: decades of Cold War doctrine and thinking had left behind a sense of unassailable institutional inertia. Despite the undeniable rise of asymmetric threats such as insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other nonstate actors, the defense establishment had continued to invest overwhelmingly in preparations for traditional, conventional warfare.
While many blue ribbon panels and study groups have been convened since 9/11 to develop recommendations for the security establishment, few have focused on the role of the individual leader. New organizational models and next-generation technologies may improve our nation’s readiness, but—in the humble opinion of the students—success or failure would be defined by the ability of individual leaders to operate effectively with minimal guidance, adapt, and collaborate across traditional institutional stovepipes. In other words, victory will not be gained by overwhelming our enemies with brute force, but by empowering our leaders to innovate faster than the enemy can respond.
The panel’s methodology would be simple: Invite senior level defense leaders to Harvard for closed door, nonattribution, and brutally honest discussions. Combine the enthusiasm and “on the ground” perspective of the students with the strategic outlook of decision makers and experts. Develop bluesky solutions, record notes for every session, and eventually, write the proposals into a report intended for senior policy makers. This booklet is the end result of our efforts. We respectfully submit these recommendations for your consideration, in the hope that a few of the ideas might prove useful or inspire further inquiry.
From the Foreword
When the Center for Public Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School brings together graduate students and national security students at Harvard—military veterans, homeland security officials, intelligence officers, private security contractors, and others—in a Defense Leadership Project, one expects powerful results as they work with distinguished guest panelists. After all, it’s Harvard, the Kennedy School, David Gergen’s Center for Public Leadership, and our own country’s security leaders. We have great expectations.
Rarely do results of such an intellectual engagement provide the call to action that this report delivers. Not an academic treatise, this is a tough report by people on the ground, across the sectors, examining every aspect of the defense community, and this is the powerful result. And it’s all about leadership, the leaders of the future required right across the national security community, to lead, respond, mobilize, inspire, build the alliances and partnerships an uncertain future demands in the emerging security environment.
The formal recommendations the panel makes in this report are sobering and illuminating and fall into four categories:
• Finding critical talent
• Transforming talent into institutional capability
• Reforming the existing organization to promote balance and interoperability
• Accelerating generational change.
Three powerful messages flow through the recommendations, the rationale, and the call to action in this report:
• A massive need for change in the national security organizations and community to prepare our leaders to meet future threats
• Emerging leaders, the new generation of national security professional workers, will generate the change essential to meet evolving challenges
• The inspiring ideas will come from bright young minds committed to our security establishment who know change is the leadership imperative of our time.
Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/nationalsecurityculture.pdf
Thursday, May 21, 2009
U.S. Pullout a Condition in Afghan Peace Talks
U.S. Pullout a Condition in Afghan Peace Talks
United States Army soldiers firing mortar shells last week at Taliban positions from a base in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province. David Guttenfelder/Associated Press
From The New York Times:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Leaders of the Taliban and other armed groups battling the Afghan government are talking to intermediaries about a potential peace agreement, with initial demands focused on a timetable for a withdrawal of American troops, according to Afghan leaders here and in Pakistan.
The talks, if not the withdrawal proposals, are being supported by the Afghan government. The Obama administration, which has publicly declared its desire to coax “moderate” Taliban fighters away from armed struggle, says it is not involved in the discussions and will not be until the Taliban agree to lay down their arms. But nor is it trying to stop the talks, and Afghan officials believe they have tacit support from the Americans.
Read more ....
My Comment: I am very skeptical on these talks. The Soviet Union had the same discussions with the same groups during the height of their war in the 1980s .... and it brought about the mess that we are living through right now.
The bottom line is that (from the Taliban point of view) they are fighting the infidels and invaders, and that they will ultimately win this battle or go to God trying.
This is the face of the enemy. Discussions with the enemy (us) is one of the many tools that they have used in the past and are using today .... with the ultimate goal of positioning themselves to eventually wear out and defeat the enemy.
United States Army soldiers firing mortar shells last week at Taliban positions from a base in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province. David Guttenfelder/Associated Press
From The New York Times:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Leaders of the Taliban and other armed groups battling the Afghan government are talking to intermediaries about a potential peace agreement, with initial demands focused on a timetable for a withdrawal of American troops, according to Afghan leaders here and in Pakistan.
The talks, if not the withdrawal proposals, are being supported by the Afghan government. The Obama administration, which has publicly declared its desire to coax “moderate” Taliban fighters away from armed struggle, says it is not involved in the discussions and will not be until the Taliban agree to lay down their arms. But nor is it trying to stop the talks, and Afghan officials believe they have tacit support from the Americans.
Read more ....
My Comment: I am very skeptical on these talks. The Soviet Union had the same discussions with the same groups during the height of their war in the 1980s .... and it brought about the mess that we are living through right now.
The bottom line is that (from the Taliban point of view) they are fighting the infidels and invaders, and that they will ultimately win this battle or go to God trying.
This is the face of the enemy. Discussions with the enemy (us) is one of the many tools that they have used in the past and are using today .... with the ultimate goal of positioning themselves to eventually wear out and defeat the enemy.
The essence of Obama and Cheney by Philip Zelikow
The essence of Obama and Cheney
Thu, 05/21/2009 - 5:05pm
By Philip Zelikow
The two speeches on counterterrorism today by President Obama and former Vice President Cheney were each, in their way, exceptionally well-crafted addresses showcasing each man's rhetorical gifts. The two addresses repay careful study and comparison. But everything I could say to contrast the style and substance of the two speeches can be gleaned from this pair of quotations from them:
Mr. Cheney:
Behind the overwrought reaction to enhanced interrogations is a broader misconception about the threats that still face our country. You can sense the problem in the emergence of euphemisms that strive to put an imaginary distance between the American people and the terrorist enemy. Apparently using the term 'war' where terrorists are concerned is starting to feel a bit dated. So henceforth we're advised by the administration to think of the fight against terrorists as, quote, 'Overseas contingency operations.'
President Obama:
After 9/11, we knew that we had entered a new era -- that enemies who did not abide by any law of war would present new challenges to the application of the law; that our government would need new tools to protect the American people, and that these tools would have to allow us to prevent attacks instead of simply prosecuting those who try to carry them out....
Now let me be clear: we are indeed at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. We do need to update our institutions to deal with this threat. But we must do so with an abiding confidence in the rule of law and due process; in checks and balances and accountability.
Philip Zelikow
Thu, 05/21/2009 - 5:05pm
By Philip Zelikow
The two speeches on counterterrorism today by President Obama and former Vice President Cheney were each, in their way, exceptionally well-crafted addresses showcasing each man's rhetorical gifts. The two addresses repay careful study and comparison. But everything I could say to contrast the style and substance of the two speeches can be gleaned from this pair of quotations from them:
Mr. Cheney:
Behind the overwrought reaction to enhanced interrogations is a broader misconception about the threats that still face our country. You can sense the problem in the emergence of euphemisms that strive to put an imaginary distance between the American people and the terrorist enemy. Apparently using the term 'war' where terrorists are concerned is starting to feel a bit dated. So henceforth we're advised by the administration to think of the fight against terrorists as, quote, 'Overseas contingency operations.'
President Obama:
After 9/11, we knew that we had entered a new era -- that enemies who did not abide by any law of war would present new challenges to the application of the law; that our government would need new tools to protect the American people, and that these tools would have to allow us to prevent attacks instead of simply prosecuting those who try to carry them out....
Now let me be clear: we are indeed at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. We do need to update our institutions to deal with this threat. But we must do so with an abiding confidence in the rule of law and due process; in checks and balances and accountability.
Philip Zelikow
Fear, facts, and the terror debate by Christian Brose
Fear, facts, and the terror debate
Thu, 05/21/2009 - 9:27pm
By Christian Brose
Say what you will about Vice President Cheney's decision to come out swinging so soon after leaving office, or President Obama's decision to launch a preemptive strike against him today, the speech that each man gave this morning was smart, serious, sober, and civil. Here we had one of the hardest national security issues of our time debated head to head in front of the entire country by the two best advocates for their respective sides. It was a fascinating occasion. And yet I am left thinking, now even more than before, that this is an argument that will never end, for two reasons: facts and fear.
One thing that rubbed me the wrong way about Obama's speech was how dismissive he was of fear and the people who rightly felt it (and still do). The decisions made after 9/11, he said, were "based upon fear rather than foresight," as if that alone discredits them. Cheney and others are "fear-mongering" by reminding the voting public that there are people out there who want to kill us, and that Americans differ over how to prevent that from happening. The truth is, fear is a human emotion, and thus an inherently political issue. Obama and company are perfectly willing to play on people's fears when it comes to jobs, or health care, or the environment. People are legitimately afraid for those things, just as they are for their security. And one purpose of policymaking is to assuage those fears.
Everyone was afraid after 9/11, for one good reason: a lack of facts -- about whether more attacks were coming, and if so, how, and when, and from where, and by whom. Uncertainty is the greatest fear of all, and like it or not, in the weeks after 9/11, that was the climate in which new policies had to be made on a host of hard problems for which there were few precedents, legal or historical. Cheney and others contend that those policies worked. They generated facts, and those facts saved lives. And if only Obama would release the CIA memos that supposedly lay out what was learned, the American people could see those facts for themselves and draw their own conclusions about "enhanced" interrogation.
Would that settle things once and for all? Somehow I doubt it. For when it comes to intelligence, facts are strange things.
Cheney himself acknowledged today that some people who have reviewed the CIA memos think they are "inconclusive." Others agree. In time, it's easy to imagine there will be other memos, if there aren't already, that look at the same record of "enhanced" interrogations and the same resulting intelligence and yet draw the opposite conclusion from the CIA, which is after all justifying a CIA program. I'm not sure we will ever be able to say with absolute certainty that one specific "enhanced" interrogation led to the disruption of a specific terrorist plot that definitely would have killed Americans. With any luck, the Senate Intelligence Committee's comprehensive investigation of this issue will reach firm conclusions. But I'm just not sure intelligence works this way, that it's this conclusive. It's like pulling one strand of a tightly knit sweater and saying it is the decisive thread holding the whole thing together. And of course, even if you were able to corroborate that judgment, you still wouldn't be able to prove the negative -- that this piece of intelligence could not have been gained through other, less harsh means.
This is what I mean by an argument without end. For all of the facts we now have, and those that may still emerge, I doubt they will convince the American public decisively to side either with Obama or Cheney. And where there is uncertainty there will continue to be fear. This helps to explain the recent paradoxical findings from a major Gallup poll that a slight majority of Americans believe both that "enhanced" interrogations were justified and that past instances of their use should be investigated for misconduct.
Fear isn't going anywhere. The question is, how best to manage and assuage it while not exploiting it.
I don't fear for America because of the policies Obama laid out today, because I agree with Jack Goldsmith that most of these policies are largely similar in their substance to where the Bush administration ended up, often as a result of shifts in its approach during the second term based on new facts that emerged and new perspectives that were gained. This is the irony of Cheney's current position: Many of the policies he is arguing for now were in recent years rolled back by President Bush himself, or overturned by the Supreme Court. Closing Guantanamo is an exception, but it was Bush's stated goal to do so, and people like Secretary Rice and John Bellinger and Matt Waxman worked tirelessly to do it. Closing it now, though difficult, is both right and necessary. So in all these ways, Cheney's argument is with Bush as much as it is with Obama.
What does make me fearful, though, is the way the White house has handled this entire thing -- deciding to release the Justice Department memos, but saying there would be no prosecutions, but then reversing and saying, actually, there may be some prosecutions after all. Obama said he released those memos because the information they contained was already widely known. Well, that works just as well as an argument for not releasing them, because nothing would be gained by doing so. We already knew that senior Al-Qaeda terrorists had been waterboarded; how many times it was done is just a detail, gory though it is. What the release of those memos did accomplish, though, was to greatly exacerbate the fear on the part of our national security professionals. And here, I think, Cheney gets it right:
[A]t the CIA, operatives are left to wonder if they can depend on the White House or Congress to back them up when the going gets tough. Why should any agency employee take on a difficult assignment when, even though they act lawfully and in good faith, years down the road the press and Congress will treat everything they do with suspicion, outright hostility, and second-guessing?
I would add that this applies to the military as well.
The debate over "enhanced" interrogation, the rule of law, and national security will never end. But I fear the tragedy is just beginning. Before 9/11, America's counter-terrorism policies suffered from excessive caution and risk-aversion. After 9/11, that pendulum swung too far in the other direction, toward what Cheney once called "the dark side." Now that pendulum is swinging right back toward the other extreme again -- not because Obama wants it to, or believes it should, or mandated that it must in his policies, but because of unnecessary actions he took without adequate "foresight," and the manner in which he took them. The professionals entrusted to keep America safe now work in fear of taking the risks that their jobs entail. And the people they're charged with protecting still don't have the facts to reach a political consensus on this issue (and likely never will, even if Cheney were to get his way).
This debate may reduce to a low boil, but it won't go away. And when the next attack comes, as everyone believes it inevitably will, we will be right back in the teeth of this thing. It is a fight without end, and I fear it will only get nastier.
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/
Thu, 05/21/2009 - 9:27pm
By Christian Brose
Say what you will about Vice President Cheney's decision to come out swinging so soon after leaving office, or President Obama's decision to launch a preemptive strike against him today, the speech that each man gave this morning was smart, serious, sober, and civil. Here we had one of the hardest national security issues of our time debated head to head in front of the entire country by the two best advocates for their respective sides. It was a fascinating occasion. And yet I am left thinking, now even more than before, that this is an argument that will never end, for two reasons: facts and fear.
One thing that rubbed me the wrong way about Obama's speech was how dismissive he was of fear and the people who rightly felt it (and still do). The decisions made after 9/11, he said, were "based upon fear rather than foresight," as if that alone discredits them. Cheney and others are "fear-mongering" by reminding the voting public that there are people out there who want to kill us, and that Americans differ over how to prevent that from happening. The truth is, fear is a human emotion, and thus an inherently political issue. Obama and company are perfectly willing to play on people's fears when it comes to jobs, or health care, or the environment. People are legitimately afraid for those things, just as they are for their security. And one purpose of policymaking is to assuage those fears.
Everyone was afraid after 9/11, for one good reason: a lack of facts -- about whether more attacks were coming, and if so, how, and when, and from where, and by whom. Uncertainty is the greatest fear of all, and like it or not, in the weeks after 9/11, that was the climate in which new policies had to be made on a host of hard problems for which there were few precedents, legal or historical. Cheney and others contend that those policies worked. They generated facts, and those facts saved lives. And if only Obama would release the CIA memos that supposedly lay out what was learned, the American people could see those facts for themselves and draw their own conclusions about "enhanced" interrogation.
Would that settle things once and for all? Somehow I doubt it. For when it comes to intelligence, facts are strange things.
Cheney himself acknowledged today that some people who have reviewed the CIA memos think they are "inconclusive." Others agree. In time, it's easy to imagine there will be other memos, if there aren't already, that look at the same record of "enhanced" interrogations and the same resulting intelligence and yet draw the opposite conclusion from the CIA, which is after all justifying a CIA program. I'm not sure we will ever be able to say with absolute certainty that one specific "enhanced" interrogation led to the disruption of a specific terrorist plot that definitely would have killed Americans. With any luck, the Senate Intelligence Committee's comprehensive investigation of this issue will reach firm conclusions. But I'm just not sure intelligence works this way, that it's this conclusive. It's like pulling one strand of a tightly knit sweater and saying it is the decisive thread holding the whole thing together. And of course, even if you were able to corroborate that judgment, you still wouldn't be able to prove the negative -- that this piece of intelligence could not have been gained through other, less harsh means.
This is what I mean by an argument without end. For all of the facts we now have, and those that may still emerge, I doubt they will convince the American public decisively to side either with Obama or Cheney. And where there is uncertainty there will continue to be fear. This helps to explain the recent paradoxical findings from a major Gallup poll that a slight majority of Americans believe both that "enhanced" interrogations were justified and that past instances of their use should be investigated for misconduct.
Fear isn't going anywhere. The question is, how best to manage and assuage it while not exploiting it.
I don't fear for America because of the policies Obama laid out today, because I agree with Jack Goldsmith that most of these policies are largely similar in their substance to where the Bush administration ended up, often as a result of shifts in its approach during the second term based on new facts that emerged and new perspectives that were gained. This is the irony of Cheney's current position: Many of the policies he is arguing for now were in recent years rolled back by President Bush himself, or overturned by the Supreme Court. Closing Guantanamo is an exception, but it was Bush's stated goal to do so, and people like Secretary Rice and John Bellinger and Matt Waxman worked tirelessly to do it. Closing it now, though difficult, is both right and necessary. So in all these ways, Cheney's argument is with Bush as much as it is with Obama.
What does make me fearful, though, is the way the White house has handled this entire thing -- deciding to release the Justice Department memos, but saying there would be no prosecutions, but then reversing and saying, actually, there may be some prosecutions after all. Obama said he released those memos because the information they contained was already widely known. Well, that works just as well as an argument for not releasing them, because nothing would be gained by doing so. We already knew that senior Al-Qaeda terrorists had been waterboarded; how many times it was done is just a detail, gory though it is. What the release of those memos did accomplish, though, was to greatly exacerbate the fear on the part of our national security professionals. And here, I think, Cheney gets it right:
[A]t the CIA, operatives are left to wonder if they can depend on the White House or Congress to back them up when the going gets tough. Why should any agency employee take on a difficult assignment when, even though they act lawfully and in good faith, years down the road the press and Congress will treat everything they do with suspicion, outright hostility, and second-guessing?
I would add that this applies to the military as well.
The debate over "enhanced" interrogation, the rule of law, and national security will never end. But I fear the tragedy is just beginning. Before 9/11, America's counter-terrorism policies suffered from excessive caution and risk-aversion. After 9/11, that pendulum swung too far in the other direction, toward what Cheney once called "the dark side." Now that pendulum is swinging right back toward the other extreme again -- not because Obama wants it to, or believes it should, or mandated that it must in his policies, but because of unnecessary actions he took without adequate "foresight," and the manner in which he took them. The professionals entrusted to keep America safe now work in fear of taking the risks that their jobs entail. And the people they're charged with protecting still don't have the facts to reach a political consensus on this issue (and likely never will, even if Cheney were to get his way).
This debate may reduce to a low boil, but it won't go away. And when the next attack comes, as everyone believes it inevitably will, we will be right back in the teeth of this thing. It is a fight without end, and I fear it will only get nastier.
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/
Treading on Hallowed Ground Counterinsurgency in Sacred Places reviewed by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal
Treading on Hallowed Ground
Counterinsurgency in Sacred Places
reviewed by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal
Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)
C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, eds. Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York: 2008.
A common tactic used by Shi’ite militias and rogue elements during Operation Iraqi Freedom has been the use of holy shrines for sanctuary and logistics. In 2004, for example, the US military fought members of Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia in Najaf, one of Shi’ia Islam holiest cities. On two occasions that year, followers of al-Sadr used the grounds of the most sacred Iman Ali shrine to conduct military operations and terrorist attacks. These operations posed particularly thorny issues for responding forces who were very sensitive to possible repercussions resulting from any damage to the shrine.
Obviously, the use of force against holy sites can antagonize and deeply affect religious communities. Any desecration, whether perceived or real, can generate a back-lash of local sentiment against the counterinsurgency force. The potential for a positive outcome in the eyes of the insurgent forces means that we can expect them in future security environments to continue to use this tactic. Thanks to this book, however, we can now identify some valuable lessons learned that warrant our attention. When responding to insurgents using sacred sites, counterinsurgent forces often failed to achieve desired outcomes due to several critical shortcomings: poor or faulty intelligence, the absence of a “deft public relations strategy” and a lack of restraint on the use of force.
Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/246-anderson.pdf
Counterinsurgency in Sacred Places
reviewed by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal
Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)
C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, eds. Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York: 2008.
A common tactic used by Shi’ite militias and rogue elements during Operation Iraqi Freedom has been the use of holy shrines for sanctuary and logistics. In 2004, for example, the US military fought members of Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia in Najaf, one of Shi’ia Islam holiest cities. On two occasions that year, followers of al-Sadr used the grounds of the most sacred Iman Ali shrine to conduct military operations and terrorist attacks. These operations posed particularly thorny issues for responding forces who were very sensitive to possible repercussions resulting from any damage to the shrine.
Obviously, the use of force against holy sites can antagonize and deeply affect religious communities. Any desecration, whether perceived or real, can generate a back-lash of local sentiment against the counterinsurgency force. The potential for a positive outcome in the eyes of the insurgent forces means that we can expect them in future security environments to continue to use this tactic. Thanks to this book, however, we can now identify some valuable lessons learned that warrant our attention. When responding to insurgents using sacred sites, counterinsurgent forces often failed to achieve desired outcomes due to several critical shortcomings: poor or faulty intelligence, the absence of a “deft public relations strategy” and a lack of restraint on the use of force.
Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/246-anderson.pdf
A friend of Israel By Gideon Levy
Haaretz 21/05/2009
A friend of Israel
By Gideon Levy
It's already clear: the U.S. president is a great friend of Israel. If
Barack Obama continues what he started this week, he might prove to be
the friendliest president to Israel ever. Richard Nixon saved Israel
from the Arab states in 1973, and Obama is about to save Israel from
itself. Nixon sent us arms and ammunition at a critical time, and
Obama is sending us, at a time no less critical, the substance of a
complete peace plan, a plan that would save Israel.
All that remains is whether Obama stays determined and decisive, as he
was earlier this week. In one move he changed Washington's madness and
the attitude toward the Israeli occupation. Now we will see if he
succeeds in altering the same madness in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It's
a long road, and Obama began well.
In a single move he shrank the fearmongering of Benjamin Netanyahu and
his mouthpieces on Iran to its proper size. In a single move he put
the centrifuges of occupation, the real existential threat to Israel,
at the top of the agenda. He fended off Netanyahu's attempts to divert
attention from substantial issues, and blocked all efforts to waste
more precious time on Iran and impose ridiculous preconditions on the
Palestinians. He also blocked all efforts to distract us with
committees, promises for negotiations, formulas, declarations and
empty words. These are Israel's best tricks and games; anything to
evade responsibility for the main issue - the end of the occupation.
Advertisement
Obama understands that now is the time for an end to petty words,
impotent negotiations and a hollow peace process; ow is the time for
big deeds and a courageous leap over the abyss.
Suddenly all of Israel's "friends" in Washington have shed their skin.
They, too, sense a rare opportunity in the Middle East. They, too, are
tired of what Netanyahu has tried to peddle. They, too, understand
that the Yitzhar settlement in the West Bank must precede Iran's
nuclear reactor in Bushehr. How pathetic and heartrending was the
sight of the Israeli prime minister, sitting tense and sweaty, next to
the new American president, confident, stylish, and impressive,
without all the jokes and back-patting of Ehud Olmert and George W.
Bush. The latter was in fact the least friendly president to Israel -
one who allowed it to carry out all its violent madness.
How pathetic was the sight, yet how encouraging; perhaps Netanyahu
learned something during his short and dramatic visit. The visit has
already made one contribution: Obama tore off the mask of so-called
peace-loving Israel. If Netanyahu really feared for the fate of the
country he would have immediately agreed, in the Oval Office, to all
the ideas put forth by this fantastic president. If Israel does not
respond, we, the Israelis, will know, the U.S. president will know and
the entire world will know that Israel does not want peace.
An Israeli refusal of Obama's efforts will reveal that there is no
peace partner in the Middle East. The absent partner is Israel. No to
peace with 57 countries, no to a move that will neutralize the threat
of the Iranian bomb, and no to two states now. This is not only a no
to peace but also a no to a chance to end the war over Israel's
establishment with a major victory. This would mean that Israel's
greatest strategic asset ever, its alliance with the United States,
would be destroyed. Netanyahu may now endanger Israel even more than
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
We must be thankful to Obama. Four months after taking office, he is
trying to rescue Israel, the Middle East, and basically the entire
world, whose most dangerous conflict is this one. The threats are
many; first and foremost refusals by Israel, a loss of interest by
Obama, and Palestinian divisions. The ball is in Netanyahu's court. If
he ends the occupation, he'll get peace and security; if he doesn't,
he won't. It's not about another minor deal, but about the future of
the Zionist enterprise. Such an opportunity will not return. Yes, we
can. Obama has proved it; now it's our turn.
A friend of Israel
By Gideon Levy
It's already clear: the U.S. president is a great friend of Israel. If
Barack Obama continues what he started this week, he might prove to be
the friendliest president to Israel ever. Richard Nixon saved Israel
from the Arab states in 1973, and Obama is about to save Israel from
itself. Nixon sent us arms and ammunition at a critical time, and
Obama is sending us, at a time no less critical, the substance of a
complete peace plan, a plan that would save Israel.
All that remains is whether Obama stays determined and decisive, as he
was earlier this week. In one move he changed Washington's madness and
the attitude toward the Israeli occupation. Now we will see if he
succeeds in altering the same madness in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It's
a long road, and Obama began well.
In a single move he shrank the fearmongering of Benjamin Netanyahu and
his mouthpieces on Iran to its proper size. In a single move he put
the centrifuges of occupation, the real existential threat to Israel,
at the top of the agenda. He fended off Netanyahu's attempts to divert
attention from substantial issues, and blocked all efforts to waste
more precious time on Iran and impose ridiculous preconditions on the
Palestinians. He also blocked all efforts to distract us with
committees, promises for negotiations, formulas, declarations and
empty words. These are Israel's best tricks and games; anything to
evade responsibility for the main issue - the end of the occupation.
Advertisement
Obama understands that now is the time for an end to petty words,
impotent negotiations and a hollow peace process; ow is the time for
big deeds and a courageous leap over the abyss.
Suddenly all of Israel's "friends" in Washington have shed their skin.
They, too, sense a rare opportunity in the Middle East. They, too, are
tired of what Netanyahu has tried to peddle. They, too, understand
that the Yitzhar settlement in the West Bank must precede Iran's
nuclear reactor in Bushehr. How pathetic and heartrending was the
sight of the Israeli prime minister, sitting tense and sweaty, next to
the new American president, confident, stylish, and impressive,
without all the jokes and back-patting of Ehud Olmert and George W.
Bush. The latter was in fact the least friendly president to Israel -
one who allowed it to carry out all its violent madness.
How pathetic was the sight, yet how encouraging; perhaps Netanyahu
learned something during his short and dramatic visit. The visit has
already made one contribution: Obama tore off the mask of so-called
peace-loving Israel. If Netanyahu really feared for the fate of the
country he would have immediately agreed, in the Oval Office, to all
the ideas put forth by this fantastic president. If Israel does not
respond, we, the Israelis, will know, the U.S. president will know and
the entire world will know that Israel does not want peace.
An Israeli refusal of Obama's efforts will reveal that there is no
peace partner in the Middle East. The absent partner is Israel. No to
peace with 57 countries, no to a move that will neutralize the threat
of the Iranian bomb, and no to two states now. This is not only a no
to peace but also a no to a chance to end the war over Israel's
establishment with a major victory. This would mean that Israel's
greatest strategic asset ever, its alliance with the United States,
would be destroyed. Netanyahu may now endanger Israel even more than
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
We must be thankful to Obama. Four months after taking office, he is
trying to rescue Israel, the Middle East, and basically the entire
world, whose most dangerous conflict is this one. The threats are
many; first and foremost refusals by Israel, a loss of interest by
Obama, and Palestinian divisions. The ball is in Netanyahu's court. If
he ends the occupation, he'll get peace and security; if he doesn't,
he won't. It's not about another minor deal, but about the future of
the Zionist enterprise. Such an opportunity will not return. Yes, we
can. Obama has proved it; now it's our turn.
Ex-AIPACer Weissman comes out hard against military action in Iran By Daniel Luban
http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/?p=252
Ex-AIPACer Weissman comes out hard against military action in Iran
By Daniel Luban
In March, former AIPAC chief lobbyist Douglas Bloomfield wrote a very interesting piece for the New Jersey Jewish News. In it, he revealed that although AIPAC publicly professed support for the Oslo peace process in the 1990s, it was secretly coordinating with then-opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu and working behind the scenes to sabotage the process. By illustrating AIPAC’s willingness to work against the policies of both U.S. and Israeli governments when they proved insufficiently hawkish, Bloomfield noted, this information could “not only validate AIPAC’s critics, who accuse it of being a branch of the Likud, but also lead to an investigation of violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.”
Bloomfield had another interesting piece in Tuesday’s Jerusalem Post, in which he interviewed AIPAC’s former top Iran analyst Keith Weissman. Weissman, of course, is best known for his role in the recently-dropped “AIPAC Two” espionage case, which revolved around accusations that he and AIPAC political director Steve Rosen received classified information from Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin and passed it to reporters and Israeli embassy officials. Franklin pled guilty in 2006 and was sentenced to over 12 year in prison, but this month government prosecutors decided to drop charges against Rosen and Weissman after concluding that they would be unlikely to win convictions.
Now that he is out from under the espionage charges, Weissman is free to speak his mind, and in his interview with Bloomfield he attacks the Iran hawks (including, implicitly, his former bosses at AIPAC) in startlingly blunt terms. The whole thing is worth reading, but I’ve included a few excerpts below the fold.
First, Weissman attacks the hawks’ premise that military action would be effective:
There’s no assurance an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities - even if all of them could be located - would be anything more than a temporary setback, Weissman told me. Instead, a military strike would unify Iranians behind an unpopular regime, ignite a wave of retaliation that would leave thousands dead from Teheran to Tel Aviv, block oil exports from the Persian Gulf and probably necessitate a ground war, he said.
He also attacks the idea, propagated by Netanyahu among others, that Iran’s rulers are a “messianic apocalyptic cult” and therefore undeterrable:
Weissman said Israel’s worries about Iran getting a nuclear weapon are understandable, but despite some of the rhetoric coming out of Teheran, the Iranian leaders “are not fanatics and they’re not suicidal. They know that Israel could make Iran glow for many years.”
He endorses the Obama administration’s argument that progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front is necessary for progress on the Iranian front, and attacks Netanyahu’s claim that the Iranian threat is sufficient to unite Israel with the so-called “moderate Arab states”:
Trying to separate the issues, even refusing to endorse the two-state approach, “is part of the sophistry of people like [Binyamin] Netanyahu who want to avoid confronting the peace process,” he said. “Iran’s ability to screw around in the Israel-Arab arena would be severely impaired by pressing ahead on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks instead of looking for excuses not to.”
Finally, he argues that the U.S. and Israel will “have to end up accepting some kind of peaceful Iranian nuclear energy program - and they actually need it; it’s already too late to stop it entirely.”
Weissman’s apostasy on the Iran issue puts him much closer to the likes of Roger Cohen than to his former compatriots at AIPAC. It will be interesting to see whether the neoconservatives who rallied to his defense during the AIPAC Two affair will now try to bury him the same way they have tried to bury Cohen.
Ex-AIPACer Weissman comes out hard against military action in Iran
By Daniel Luban
In March, former AIPAC chief lobbyist Douglas Bloomfield wrote a very interesting piece for the New Jersey Jewish News. In it, he revealed that although AIPAC publicly professed support for the Oslo peace process in the 1990s, it was secretly coordinating with then-opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu and working behind the scenes to sabotage the process. By illustrating AIPAC’s willingness to work against the policies of both U.S. and Israeli governments when they proved insufficiently hawkish, Bloomfield noted, this information could “not only validate AIPAC’s critics, who accuse it of being a branch of the Likud, but also lead to an investigation of violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.”
Bloomfield had another interesting piece in Tuesday’s Jerusalem Post, in which he interviewed AIPAC’s former top Iran analyst Keith Weissman. Weissman, of course, is best known for his role in the recently-dropped “AIPAC Two” espionage case, which revolved around accusations that he and AIPAC political director Steve Rosen received classified information from Pentagon analyst Lawrence Franklin and passed it to reporters and Israeli embassy officials. Franklin pled guilty in 2006 and was sentenced to over 12 year in prison, but this month government prosecutors decided to drop charges against Rosen and Weissman after concluding that they would be unlikely to win convictions.
Now that he is out from under the espionage charges, Weissman is free to speak his mind, and in his interview with Bloomfield he attacks the Iran hawks (including, implicitly, his former bosses at AIPAC) in startlingly blunt terms. The whole thing is worth reading, but I’ve included a few excerpts below the fold.
First, Weissman attacks the hawks’ premise that military action would be effective:
There’s no assurance an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities - even if all of them could be located - would be anything more than a temporary setback, Weissman told me. Instead, a military strike would unify Iranians behind an unpopular regime, ignite a wave of retaliation that would leave thousands dead from Teheran to Tel Aviv, block oil exports from the Persian Gulf and probably necessitate a ground war, he said.
He also attacks the idea, propagated by Netanyahu among others, that Iran’s rulers are a “messianic apocalyptic cult” and therefore undeterrable:
Weissman said Israel’s worries about Iran getting a nuclear weapon are understandable, but despite some of the rhetoric coming out of Teheran, the Iranian leaders “are not fanatics and they’re not suicidal. They know that Israel could make Iran glow for many years.”
He endorses the Obama administration’s argument that progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front is necessary for progress on the Iranian front, and attacks Netanyahu’s claim that the Iranian threat is sufficient to unite Israel with the so-called “moderate Arab states”:
Trying to separate the issues, even refusing to endorse the two-state approach, “is part of the sophistry of people like [Binyamin] Netanyahu who want to avoid confronting the peace process,” he said. “Iran’s ability to screw around in the Israel-Arab arena would be severely impaired by pressing ahead on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks instead of looking for excuses not to.”
Finally, he argues that the U.S. and Israel will “have to end up accepting some kind of peaceful Iranian nuclear energy program - and they actually need it; it’s already too late to stop it entirely.”
Weissman’s apostasy on the Iran issue puts him much closer to the likes of Roger Cohen than to his former compatriots at AIPAC. It will be interesting to see whether the neoconservatives who rallied to his defense during the AIPAC Two affair will now try to bury him the same way they have tried to bury Cohen.
New York Times Falsifies Obama-Netanyahu Meeting by David Bromwich, Professor of Literature at Yale
New York Times Falsifies Obama-Netanyahu Meeting
by David Bromwich, Professor of Literature at Yale
May 19, 2009
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/inew-york-timesi-falsifie_b_205201.html
The New York Times assigned to the story a campaign-trail reporter, Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, whose political perceptions are bland and whose knowledge of
Israeli-American relations is an antiseptic zero. At the newspaper of
record, a thing like that does not happen by accident. They took the most
anxiously awaited meeting with a foreign leader of President Obama's term
thus far, and buried it on page 12. The news coverage of a major event, which
the same newspaper had greeted only the day before by running an oversize
attack-Iran op-ed by Jeffrey Goldberg, has officially now shrunk to the
scale of a smaller op-ed.
What is more disturbing and far more consequential is that the Times made
this meeting into a story about Iran. They read into Obama's careful and
measured remarks exactly the hostile intention toward Iran and the explicit
deadline for results from his negotiations with Iran that Obama had taken
great pains to avoid stating. Obama's relevant remark was this:
My expectation would be that if we can begin discussions soon, shortly
after the Iranian elections, we should have a fairly good sense by the end
of the year as to whether they are moving in the right direction and
whether the parties involved are making progress and that there's a good
faith effort to resolve differences. That doesn't mean every issue would be
resolved by that point, but it does mean that we'll probably be able to
gauge and do a reassessment by the end of the year of this approach.
"Shortly after," "fairly good sense," "the right direction," "good faith
effort," "probably," "by the end of the year." This was a language chosen
deliberately to cool the fever of Netanyahu and his far-right War Coalition
in Israel. But Stolberg, writing for the Times, converts these hedged and
vague suggestions into a revelation that Obama for the first time seemed
"willing to set even a general timetable for progress in talks with Iran."
In fact, as any reader of the transcript may judge, President Obama sounded
a more urgent note about the progress Israel ought to make in yielding what
it long has promised to the Palestinian people. Palestine was the proper
name that dominated Obama's side of the news conference. In the Times
story, by contrast, the word Iran occurs three times before the first
mention of "Palestinians." Iran is mentioned twice more before the words
West Bank are uttered once.
Regarding the necessity of a Palestinian state, President Obama was
explicit:
We have seen progress stalled on this front, and I suggested to the
Prime Minister that he has an historic opportunity to get a serious
movement on this issue during his tenure.
And when Netanyahu said the Israeli attitude toward Palestine would
completely depend on the details of progress toward securing Iran against
the acquisition of a single nuclear weapon, Obama replied that his view was
almost the reverse. In a leader as averse as Barack Obama to the slightest
public hint of personal conflict, this was a critical moment in the
exchange; how far, a reporter asked Obama, did he assent to the Netanyahu
concept of "linkage" -- the idea that first the U.S. must deal with Iran,
and a more obliging Israeli approach to Palestine will surely follow. Obama
answered:
I recognize Israel's legitimate concerns about the possibility of Iran
obtaining a nuclear weapon when they have a president who has in the past
said that Israel should not exist. That would give any leader of any
country pause. Having said that, if there is a linkage between Iran and the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, I personally believe it actually runs
the other way. To the extent that we can make peace with the Palestinians
-- between the Palestinians and the Israelis -- then I actually think it
strengthens our hand in the international community in dealing with a
potential Iranian threat.
This was a reluctantly formulated but direct and inescapable inversion of
the Netanyahu doctrine on linkage. Not a trace of it appears in the Times
account.
Finally, Gaza was much in President Obama's mind and on his conscience at
this meeting; so much so that he broke decorum and stepped out of his way
to mention it:
The fact is, is that if the people of Gaza have no hope, if they can't
even get clean water at this point, if the border closures are so tight
that it is impossible for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts to take
place, then that is not going to be a recipe for Israel's long-term
security or a constructive peace track to move forward.
And yet not a word from Stolberg and the Times about these words of Obama's
on Gaza. Nor was any analytic piece offered as a supplement -- the usual
procedure in assessing an event of this importance.
To sum up, what happened at the meeting can be judged plainly enough by the
news conference that followed. Binyamin Netanyahu tried to make it all
about Iran. Obama declined, and spoke again and again about the importance
of peace in the entire region, and the crucial role that Israel would have
to play by freezing the West Bank settlements and negotiating in good faith
to achieve a Palestinian state.
Let us end where we began, with Barack Obama on the good of peaceable
relations with Iran, and the New York Times on the importance of thinking
such relations are close to impossible.
President Obama: "You know, I don't want to set an artificial deadline."
Now the Times headline: "Obama Tells Netanyahu He Has a Timetable on Iran."
And the Times front-page teaser for their A12 story: "Obama's Iran
Timetable."
The decision-makers at the New York Times are acting again as if their
readers had no other means of checking the facts they report. They are
saying the thing that is not, without remembering that the record which
refutes them has become easily and quickly available. A great newspaper is
dying. And on the subject of Israel, it is doing its best to earn its
death-warrant.
--
by David Bromwich, Professor of Literature at Yale
May 19, 2009
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/inew-york-timesi-falsifie_b_205201.html
The New York Times assigned to the story a campaign-trail reporter, Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, whose political perceptions are bland and whose knowledge of
Israeli-American relations is an antiseptic zero. At the newspaper of
record, a thing like that does not happen by accident. They took the most
anxiously awaited meeting with a foreign leader of President Obama's term
thus far, and buried it on page 12. The news coverage of a major event, which
the same newspaper had greeted only the day before by running an oversize
attack-Iran op-ed by Jeffrey Goldberg, has officially now shrunk to the
scale of a smaller op-ed.
What is more disturbing and far more consequential is that the Times made
this meeting into a story about Iran. They read into Obama's careful and
measured remarks exactly the hostile intention toward Iran and the explicit
deadline for results from his negotiations with Iran that Obama had taken
great pains to avoid stating. Obama's relevant remark was this:
My expectation would be that if we can begin discussions soon, shortly
after the Iranian elections, we should have a fairly good sense by the end
of the year as to whether they are moving in the right direction and
whether the parties involved are making progress and that there's a good
faith effort to resolve differences. That doesn't mean every issue would be
resolved by that point, but it does mean that we'll probably be able to
gauge and do a reassessment by the end of the year of this approach.
"Shortly after," "fairly good sense," "the right direction," "good faith
effort," "probably," "by the end of the year." This was a language chosen
deliberately to cool the fever of Netanyahu and his far-right War Coalition
in Israel. But Stolberg, writing for the Times, converts these hedged and
vague suggestions into a revelation that Obama for the first time seemed
"willing to set even a general timetable for progress in talks with Iran."
In fact, as any reader of the transcript may judge, President Obama sounded
a more urgent note about the progress Israel ought to make in yielding what
it long has promised to the Palestinian people. Palestine was the proper
name that dominated Obama's side of the news conference. In the Times
story, by contrast, the word Iran occurs three times before the first
mention of "Palestinians." Iran is mentioned twice more before the words
West Bank are uttered once.
Regarding the necessity of a Palestinian state, President Obama was
explicit:
We have seen progress stalled on this front, and I suggested to the
Prime Minister that he has an historic opportunity to get a serious
movement on this issue during his tenure.
And when Netanyahu said the Israeli attitude toward Palestine would
completely depend on the details of progress toward securing Iran against
the acquisition of a single nuclear weapon, Obama replied that his view was
almost the reverse. In a leader as averse as Barack Obama to the slightest
public hint of personal conflict, this was a critical moment in the
exchange; how far, a reporter asked Obama, did he assent to the Netanyahu
concept of "linkage" -- the idea that first the U.S. must deal with Iran,
and a more obliging Israeli approach to Palestine will surely follow. Obama
answered:
I recognize Israel's legitimate concerns about the possibility of Iran
obtaining a nuclear weapon when they have a president who has in the past
said that Israel should not exist. That would give any leader of any
country pause. Having said that, if there is a linkage between Iran and the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, I personally believe it actually runs
the other way. To the extent that we can make peace with the Palestinians
-- between the Palestinians and the Israelis -- then I actually think it
strengthens our hand in the international community in dealing with a
potential Iranian threat.
This was a reluctantly formulated but direct and inescapable inversion of
the Netanyahu doctrine on linkage. Not a trace of it appears in the Times
account.
Finally, Gaza was much in President Obama's mind and on his conscience at
this meeting; so much so that he broke decorum and stepped out of his way
to mention it:
The fact is, is that if the people of Gaza have no hope, if they can't
even get clean water at this point, if the border closures are so tight
that it is impossible for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts to take
place, then that is not going to be a recipe for Israel's long-term
security or a constructive peace track to move forward.
And yet not a word from Stolberg and the Times about these words of Obama's
on Gaza. Nor was any analytic piece offered as a supplement -- the usual
procedure in assessing an event of this importance.
To sum up, what happened at the meeting can be judged plainly enough by the
news conference that followed. Binyamin Netanyahu tried to make it all
about Iran. Obama declined, and spoke again and again about the importance
of peace in the entire region, and the crucial role that Israel would have
to play by freezing the West Bank settlements and negotiating in good faith
to achieve a Palestinian state.
Let us end where we began, with Barack Obama on the good of peaceable
relations with Iran, and the New York Times on the importance of thinking
such relations are close to impossible.
President Obama: "You know, I don't want to set an artificial deadline."
Now the Times headline: "Obama Tells Netanyahu He Has a Timetable on Iran."
And the Times front-page teaser for their A12 story: "Obama's Iran
Timetable."
The decision-makers at the New York Times are acting again as if their
readers had no other means of checking the facts they report. They are
saying the thing that is not, without remembering that the record which
refutes them has become easily and quickly available. A great newspaper is
dying. And on the subject of Israel, it is doing its best to earn its
death-warrant.
--
Obama and the Middle East By Hussein Agha, Robert Malley
The New York Review of Books
Volume 56, Number 10 · June 11, 2009
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22731
Obama and the Middle East
By Hussein Agha, Robert Malley
1.
By virtually every measure—name, race, origins, and upbringing—Barack Hussein Obama was a revolutionary presidential candidate. In Mideast policy at least, there is little reason to imagine that he will be a revolutionary president. The radical break with traditional US policy came with the Bush administration, during which the US invaded and then occupied Iraq, shunned Syria, and engaged in an effort, at once ambitious and irresponsible, to reshape the region. Bush's presidency represented an upheaval because it was both guided and blinded by a rigid ideological outlook and because of its uncommon proclivity to choose military over diplomatic means. Obama's first step will be to close that stormy parenthesis. It will be no small achievement.
His own agenda for the Middle East is at the center of greater speculation, and at the heart of that speculation is the question of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. There are signs—the fact that they are taking their time, reviewing their policies, consulting broadly—that the President and his team are committed to pragmatism and patience, qualities they found wanting in Bush's rash attempt to impose a new order on the Middle East but also in Bill Clinton's impetuous efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement. Their focus, at the outset at least, likely will be on improving conditions on the ground, including the West Bank economy, curbing if not halting Israeli settlement construction, pursuing reform of Palestinian security forces, and improving relations between Israel and Arab countries.
But there also are hints of a grand ambition biding its time. Obama has not staked his presidency on resolving the conflict, but he has not shied away from the challenge either. Judging by what the new president and his colleagues have suggested, attending to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a matter of US national interest. The administration seems prepared to devote considerable diplomatic, economic, and, perhaps, political capital to that end. And the goal, once the ground has been settled, will be to achieve a comprehensive, two-state solution.
At first glance, there's more reason to be confounded than convinced. If such is the President's objective, it will be pursued under unusually inauspicious circumstances. In Israel, a prime minister, Ehud Olmert, who never tired of reiterating his commitment to a Palestinian state has been replaced by one, Benjamin Netanyahu, who can barely bring himself to utter the words. His coalition partners—a mix of right-wing, xenophobic, and religious parties—make matters worse. Even the participation of Ehud Barak and his Labor party in the coalition is of scant comfort. Barak was prime minister when Israeli–Palestinian negotiations collapsed at the Camp David summit in 2000; the principal lesson he seems to have drawn is to distrust all things Palestinian. As defense minister under Olmert, he barely concealed his disdain for the talks the Palestinians conducted with his own government, dismissing them as an "academic seminar." It is hard to imagine this new coalition going further than its predecessor, which, in Palestinian eyes, didn't go far enough.
On the Palestinian side, intense Egyptian-mediated reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah have so far failed to stitch the national movement together. The price of their divisions, costly under any circumstances, has inflated several-fold as a result of the war in Gaza in December and January between Israel and Hamas. The conflict proved, if proof were still needed, that President Mahmoud Abbas cannot continue to talk peace with Israel when Israel is at war with Palestinians and that Palestinians cannot make peace with Israel when they are at war with themselves. Hamas possesses the power to spoil any progress and will use it. It can act as an implacable opponent against any potential Palestinian compromise. Bilateral negotiations that failed when Olmert was prime minister and Hamas was a mere Palestinian faction are unlikely to succeed with Netanyahu at the helm and Hamas having grown into a regional reality.
If, despite this desolate landscape, the Obama administration nonetheless is determined to push for a final agreement, it could be because the President has something else in mind. At some point, he might intend to bypass negotiations between the parties and, with support from a broad international coalition including Arab countries, Russia, and the European Union, present them with a detailed two-state agreement they will be hard-pressed to reject. The concept stems from the notion that, left to their own devices, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are incapable of reaching an accord and that they will need all the pressure and persuasion the world can muster to take the last, fateful steps.
It is one option. But before jumping toward it, basic issues should be explored. Getting the leaders to endorse a peace deal will be no mean feat, but it is not the only and perhaps not the most substantial challenge. The other question is how in the current climate the Israeli and Palestinian people would welcome a two-state solution. Would they view it as authentic or illegitimate? Would they see it as ending their conflict or merely opening its next round? Would it be more effective at mobilizing supporters or at galvanizing opponents? What, in short, would a two-state solution actually solve?
2.
The challenge of ending the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has, of late, almost entirely revolved around tinkering with the details of a two-state agreement. Efforts toward a settlement, whether official or unofficial, focused on adjusting percentages of territorial annexation and land exchange; dividing and defining forms of sovereignty over Jerusalem; describing the attributes of a Palestinian state; and, more often as afterthought than central concern, finding technical ways to resettle and compensate the refugees. Successive failures and the repeated inability to satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian needs have been vexing. So far at least, these difficulties have not called into question the assumption that an equilibrium of interests exists or that it can be fully found within a two-state agreement. It's just been seen as a matter of trying harder.
That President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert were incapable of reaching a settlement in 2008 following the goals set at the Annapolis conference might not be conclusive. But it gives reason to doubt the premise that more of the same can yield something different. Abbas is widely hailed as among the Palestinians' most pragmatic leaders. Olmert took a more circuitous route to the peace camp, but he exhibited the faith of the late convert, intense and profound. After months of talks, Abbas declined a far more concessive Israeli proposal—on the size of the territory for Palestinians, for example—than the one Yasser Arafat turned down eight years ago and for which the then Palestinian leader was excoriated as an implacable enemy of peace. There is little reason to believe that more tweaking of the accord would have made a difference.
A workable two-state agreement would address a large share of the two sides' aspirations. It would preserve Israel's Jewish character and majority, provide it with final and recognized borders, and maintain its ties to Jewish holy sites. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would live free of Israeli occupation, they would govern Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and refugees would have the opportunity to choose normal lives through resettlement and compensation. If meeting those goals were sufficient, why have the parties proved incapable of settling the dispute?
Aspirations reflect historical experience. For Israel's Jewish population, this includes displacement, persecution, the life of the ghetto, and the horrors of the Holocaust; and the long, frustrated quest for a normal, recognized, and accepted homeland. There is a craving for a future that will not echo the past and for the kind of ordinary security—the unquestioned acceptance of a Jewish presence in the region—that even overwhelming military superiority cannot guarantee. There is, too, at least among a significant, active segment of the Israeli population, a deep-seated attachment to the land, all of it, that constitutes Eretz Israel.
For Palestinians, the most primal demands relate to addressing and redressing a historical experience of dispossession, expulsion, dispersal, massacres, occupation, discrimination, denial of dignity, persistent killing off of their leaders, and the relentless fracturing of their national polity.
These Israeli and Palestinian yearnings are of a sort that, no matter how precisely fine-tuned, a two-state deal will find it hard to fulfill. Over the years, the goal gradually has shifted from reaching peace to achieving a two-state agreement. Those aims might sound the same, but they are not: peace may be possible without such an agreement just as such an agreement need not necessarily lead to peace. Partitioning the land can, and most probably will, be an important means of achieving a viable, lasting, peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. But it is not the end.
3.
The idea of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel has an unusually interesting, troubled, and—from the British plan of the 1930s to the United Nations partition plan of 1947—mainly foreign pedigree. What it is not and, save for a brief period in the recent past, has not been is an indigenous Palestinian demand. Partition meant accepting less than the whole of the area of the British Mandate of Palestine; it also came to mean barring the return of refugees who were expelled or fled in 1948. For most of its history, the Palestinian national movement would have nothing to do with it. Israelis were no more enthralled. It took them even longer to warm up to the concept of Palestinian statehood, which they saw as both artificial, insofar as no such entity had existed in the past, and dangerous, because most Arabs and Palestinians denied Israelis the reciprocal right to a Jewish homeland.
Palestinians came to accept the two-state solution by the late 1980s, though that acceptance was always somewhat grudging. Statehood acquired the trappings of a national cause but it never truly matched national aspirations. For most, it appealed more to the head than to the heart; it was an arguably useful way of achieving greater goals but never the objective in and of itself. Unlike Zionism, for whom statehood was the central objective, the Palestinian fight was primarily about other matters. The absence of a state was not the cause of all their misfortune. Its creation would not be the full solution either.
Palestinian embrace of the idea of statehood essentially was the handiwork of a single man. With time, cunning, and shrewd politics, and because few dared challenge his militant credentials, Yasser Arafat fundamentally altered his movement's position. His efforts were not without ambiguity. He toyed with Palestinians and worried Israelis by presenting a Palestinian state both as a solution and as a way station toward one. He made compromise—the acceptance of an Israeli state within the 1967 borders—feel like conquest and he managed to pack into partition feelings of historical vindication, dignity, and honor. When it came to persuading the West and Israel that he genuinely believed in a two-state solution, his past record of militancy was a burden. But when it came to selling a two-state solution to his people, that record was his greatest asset.
Among Palestinians, the concept of statehood has not aged well. It has suffered several punishing blows, mainly at the hands of those who purported to buttress it. This is not chiefly related to its substance, which, through a series of formal and informal Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, has not varied much and, if anything, has come closer to mirroring what the Palestinians could live with. It has everything to do with who is promoting it, for what reason, in what way, and in what domestic and regional context. Palestinians do not judge the idea of a state on its merits. They judge it by the company it keeps.
4.
The new millennium began with the near-universal acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state, which is precisely when its support among Palestinians began to slip. President Bush, the first US president to have ardently endorsed it, framed it as the answer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and then hurriedly narrowed the challenge to the mundane task of building state institutions. Gone was the revolutionary aura with which Arafat imbued the idea; the struggle, no longer about freedom and the end of occupation, became about erecting responsible structures of government.
One of Bush's least noticed but most profound and pernicious legacies in the region might well turn out to have been this transformation of the concept of Palestinian statehood from among the more revolutionary to the more conservative, from inspiring to humdrum. A small fraction of Palestinians, mainly members of the Palestinian Authority's elite, saw the point of building state institutions, had an interest in doing so, and went to work. For the majority, this kind of project could not have strayed further from their original political concerns.
Today, the idea of Palestinian statehood is alive, but mainly outside of Palestine. Establishing a state has become a matter of utmost priority for Europeans, who see it as crucial to stabilizing the region and curbing the growth of extremism; for Americans, who hail it as a centerpiece in efforts to contain Iran as well as radical Islamists and to forge a coalition between so-called moderate Arab states and Israel; and even for a large number of Israelis who have come to believe it is the sole effective answer to the threat to Israel's existence posed by Arab demographics. Those might all be good reasons, though none is of particular relevance to Palestinians; and each only further alienates them from the vision of statehood, the purported object of their struggle.
Universal endorsement has its downside. The more the two-state solution looks like an American or Western, not to mention Israeli, interest, the less it appeals to Palestinians. It is hard to generate excitement among Palestinians for a project explicitly aimed at protecting the interests of their historic foe (Israel), defeating one of their political organizations (Hamas), or rescuing pro-Western Arab regimes for which they evince little sympathy. Many Palestinians feel that the notion of statehood has been hijacked by their historic detractors who rejected it when it was briefly a Palestinian idea only to endorse it when they made it their own. The process of legitimizing a state in international eyes has helped discredit it in those of its intended beneficiaries.
The two-state concept has been further tarnished by what has become of its Palestinian promoters. Today, many Palestinians no longer see their leaders as carrying out a national project but rather as instruments of foreign designs aimed at bolstering one faction of Palestinians against another. When the Palestinian Authority seeks guidance, it appears to look outward: to the US to judge whether the program of a putative national unity government would pass muster or to help devise a security plan; to Israel for assistance coping with the Islamist challenge; to Egypt and the rest of the world for how to deal with Gaza.
In all this, the PA's policy choices pose less of a problem than the method through which they seem to be reached—based not on an indigenous Palestinian notion of national self-interest, but rather on a foreign concept of what it ought to be. On their own, Palestinian leaders might opt for confrontation with Hamas, for unity, or for something else. The decision might work or it might backfire. At least it would be theirs. Instead, they currently speak and act as if they are at the head of some Palestinians—the more respectable ones—while leaving it to others to handle the more troublesome lot. All of which diminishes the PA's standing, even in the eyes of many otherwise most prone to support its program, and inflates its opposition, even among many who share nothing in common with the Islamists' agenda.
None of this was preordained. Abbas came to power in 2005 with the historic legitimacy of forty years of arduous struggle; with authority that neither Fatah nor Hamas dared to challenge; and with a then-credible vision, the two-state solution, which had long formed the core of his beliefs. These could have been put to good use to fulfill his original plan, which was to moderate Hamas's policies by gaining the cooperation of the Islamist movement and turning the Palestinian president into the necessary intermediary between Palestinians—all of them—and the international community for the achievement of a peace agreement with Israel. That was not to be.
Abbas's legitimacy was eroded by the West's suffocating embrace—a bear hug made worse for its being American, and worse yet for coming from President Bush. His authority was blunted by intrusive US meddling as Palestinians questioned whether decisions were made by their president or imposed by others. And his vision was blurred by the two-state solution's metamorphosis from a national idea to a foreign one.
Abbas's predicament stems from the help he has been denied as well as from the support he has been ill-advisedly given by those who claim to wish him well, the US and Europeans in particular. Time and again, they have pushed him in directions his instincts initially resisted but to which, bereft of a support team and the instruments of power needed to stand firm, he ultimately succumbed—away from national unity and toward greater reliance on foreign benefactors. Condescendingly justifying their actions by alleging that he was powerless, the US and the Europeans only made him appear more so. Abbas is an opportunity that has never ceased to be missed.
5.
Statehood was and could at some point again be a Palestinian achievement, but for now it has become somebody else's prize. That is not necessarily fatal. Obama has what no US president before him had and, one could venture, few following him will possess: an ability to speak to a foreign audience and, without in any way diminishing America's dignity, elevate theirs. His apparent determination to broaden Israeli– Palestinian talks so as to involve in one way or another tens of Arab and Muslim states might give American diplomacy a further, notable lift. With time and tenacity, a strategy predicated on building an international coalition, pressing the two sides to make necessary compromises, and presenting them with a final two-state solution might succeed. A state packaged by Bush is one thing. Wrapped up by Obama, it would be something else altogether.
Then again, it would be a gamble. Should a significant number of Palestinians or Israelis construe such a solution as promoted by the wrong people for the wrong reasons in the wrong way, they will not see it as a solution at all. They will object and seek to mobilize those without whose support a deal would stand on tenuous grounds. For some time at least, the benefits of a deal will be less evident than the concessions it requires. For opponents, that time will be precious. An agreement that is not implemented or that does not last would produce a radicalizing effect that no absence of agreement could ever accomplish.
There may be another way. Its starting point would be less of an immediate effort to achieve a two-state agreement or propose US ideas to that effect. Rather, it would be an attempt to transform the political atmosphere and reformulate the diplomatic process. This would entail, first, identifying and recognizing fundamental Israeli and Palestinian concerns and aspirations and then placing them at the core of the process. In turn, this would involve altering how a US-supported solution is conceived and presented to both sides so that Palestinians see it as the outcome of their national struggle and Israelis as the culmination of their historic quest rather than as the byproduct of others' strategic pursuits. The end result might well be the same—two states, living side by side. But the journey would be more authentic and its destination more acceptable.
The task, in other words, would not be to polish up answers to questions of borders, security, Jerusalem, or how to compensate refugees. That approach increasingly is becoming a sideshow, chiefly of interest to official negotiators. Nor would talk center on creating Palestinian institutions or extolling a two-state solution's value in combating extremism or reshaping the region. When Israel's foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, calls for dropping timeworn slogans—land for peace, two-state solution—he has a political purpose. He also has a point. Endless repetition has not brought realization of these goals closer, and it has chipped away at their credibility. America's discourse can reconnect with both sides' hopes and needs if it addresses them and reverts to basics—namely, acknowledging and redressing injustices suffered by Palestinians and providing Israelis with the recognition and normalcy historically denied them.
A new language would help; so too would a broader audience. Peace camps on both sides have long been sold on the two-state idea. They cannot sell it any longer. The more they are identified with the proposal, the less appealing it will be. The US should reach out to skeptical constituencies that would make a difference but are left indifferent by current talk of a two-state agreement. One example is the settlers, an active and dynamic Israeli group yet one that the outside world typically treats as modern-day lepers. A more inclusive political process could recognize their views and concerns, consider their interests, and invite them to take part in discussions.
Another such case, certainly, is the Palestinian diaspora, whose opinions have defined national aspirations from the outset and will shape the collective response into the future. Walter Russell Mead puts it well in a recent article: "Any deal," he writes, "must address the issues of greatest concern to the dispossessed refugees, who best embody Palestinian nationalism and remain the ultimate source of political legitimacy in Palestinian politics."[*]
President Obama will give a speech in Cairo, though in view of the state of Arab polarization, it carries equal risk of dividing as of uniting public opinion; he also likely will make the traditional pilgrimage to Ramallah. But why not consider a speech that will make even the most cynical pause—one that addresses the Palestinian refugees' concerns, is delivered to refugees, and given in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon? President Obama, flanked by President Abbas, surrounded by refugee leaders, speaking to a cheering crowd of thousands hailing from camps across Lebanon and, through them, to millions of Palestinians scattered across the globe: the sight, powerful and stirring, could do more than any US plan to change the mood, minds, and emotions.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict will have to be tackled within the 1967 boundaries. But it can be resolved only if it deals candidly with its 1948 genesis. In fact, the more the refugees' plight is openly acknowledged by the US, the easier it will become to end the indecent prolongation of their current misery on the dubious pretext that if their lives could be improved, this would eradicate their cause and obliterate their rights.
It will be equally important for the United States to modify its dealings with domestic Palestinian politics and, in particular, the Palestinian president. Abbas is a man in desperate need of being left alone. If his actions are to be seen as legitimate and his endorsement of an agreement is to carry weight, he cannot appear as the president of only some Palestinians but must appear as the president of all; he cannot hand over, under pressure, critical decisions to outside parties but must assume them himself. He must be allowed to do what he considers right. Washington need not openly promote Palestinian unity. But it could stop standing in the way by signaling its acceptance of any reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah to which the Palestinian president lent his name. The US should continue to support Abbas. But it could stop placing him in that politically confining and damaging position where the fate of his people seems to be decided by others. If the goal is to strengthen Abbas, there is no better way.
How a peace initiative is received also will be a function of the regional climate. The more it is polarized between so-called moderates and radicals and the more the purpose appears to be to bolster the former while harming the latter, the more opposition will be energized. Militancy will find sympathetic ears. Among Palestinians, the sense will grow that the US is waging a battle in their name but not for their sake.
6.
From the first day of his presidency, which began as the Gaza war that traumatized the region and radicalized it further came to an end, Obama's Middle East challenge has been plain. He must win over the large pool of disaffected Arabs and Muslims who have ceased believing in the United States.
The climb will be steep. His election was a beginning, raising questions where not long before had reigned near-undivided, and negative, conviction. The new president can rely on more stirring rhetoric; he will enjoy a more receptive audience and will be looked at in a fresh light. That will take him only so far. He will be given the benefit of the doubt, but the doubt will remain colossal.
For the new president, the starting point should be recognition of some uncomfortable, brutal realities. These include the depth of inherited anti-American animus; of cynicism toward old plans and tired formulas; of popular estrangement from the regional leaders on whom Washington has come to depend; and of popular attraction to militant activists, militant behavior, and a radical worldview.
The consequence is that some well-worn recipes cannot work. Claiming eagerness to end the Arab–Israeli conflict or reach a two-state solution has become stale by dint of sterile repetition. President Bush did so, possibly more passionately and fervently than any predecessor. Yet few listened because few believed in what he said, least of all the Palestinians who were his supposed audience. Relying upon and bestowing aid to traditional Arab allies or seeking to improve their ties with Israel will not help much either. It would be preaching to the choir, burdening the Obama administration with the weight of unpopular figures and entrenching the notion that, at least in this respect, America is content with prolonging the past.
The time will come for the US to unfurl a grand diplomatic initiative. Not now. The most urgent task is to prepare the way for that day by countering the skepticism that has greeted and torpedoed every recent American idea, good or bad—from Secretary of State William Rogers' 1969 plan to the road map. The time is for a clean break, in words, style, and approach.
For many in the US, the notion of such radical change often is reduced to the question of whether or not to talk to Hamas. That is a diversion. The challenge is whether Obama can speak to those for whom Hamas speaks. They are the people who have lost faith in America, its motivations, and every proposal it promotes.
The broader point is this: a window exists, short and subject to abrupt closure, during which President Obama can radically upset Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim preconceptions and make it possible for his future plan, whatever and whenever it might be, to get a fair hearing—for American professions of seriousness to be taken seriously. It won't be done by repackaging the peace process of years past. It won't be done by seeking to strengthen those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak, incompetent, and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless, and reckless. It won't be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region's most relevant actors.
It won't be done by trying to perform better what was performed before. President Bush's legacy was, in this sense, doubly harmful: he did the wrong things poorly, which now risks creating the false expectation that, somehow, they can be done well.
—May 14, 2009
Notes
[*]Walter Russell Mead, "Change They Can Believe In," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.
Volume 56, Number 10 · June 11, 2009
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22731
Obama and the Middle East
By Hussein Agha, Robert Malley
1.
By virtually every measure—name, race, origins, and upbringing—Barack Hussein Obama was a revolutionary presidential candidate. In Mideast policy at least, there is little reason to imagine that he will be a revolutionary president. The radical break with traditional US policy came with the Bush administration, during which the US invaded and then occupied Iraq, shunned Syria, and engaged in an effort, at once ambitious and irresponsible, to reshape the region. Bush's presidency represented an upheaval because it was both guided and blinded by a rigid ideological outlook and because of its uncommon proclivity to choose military over diplomatic means. Obama's first step will be to close that stormy parenthesis. It will be no small achievement.
His own agenda for the Middle East is at the center of greater speculation, and at the heart of that speculation is the question of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. There are signs—the fact that they are taking their time, reviewing their policies, consulting broadly—that the President and his team are committed to pragmatism and patience, qualities they found wanting in Bush's rash attempt to impose a new order on the Middle East but also in Bill Clinton's impetuous efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement. Their focus, at the outset at least, likely will be on improving conditions on the ground, including the West Bank economy, curbing if not halting Israeli settlement construction, pursuing reform of Palestinian security forces, and improving relations between Israel and Arab countries.
But there also are hints of a grand ambition biding its time. Obama has not staked his presidency on resolving the conflict, but he has not shied away from the challenge either. Judging by what the new president and his colleagues have suggested, attending to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a matter of US national interest. The administration seems prepared to devote considerable diplomatic, economic, and, perhaps, political capital to that end. And the goal, once the ground has been settled, will be to achieve a comprehensive, two-state solution.
At first glance, there's more reason to be confounded than convinced. If such is the President's objective, it will be pursued under unusually inauspicious circumstances. In Israel, a prime minister, Ehud Olmert, who never tired of reiterating his commitment to a Palestinian state has been replaced by one, Benjamin Netanyahu, who can barely bring himself to utter the words. His coalition partners—a mix of right-wing, xenophobic, and religious parties—make matters worse. Even the participation of Ehud Barak and his Labor party in the coalition is of scant comfort. Barak was prime minister when Israeli–Palestinian negotiations collapsed at the Camp David summit in 2000; the principal lesson he seems to have drawn is to distrust all things Palestinian. As defense minister under Olmert, he barely concealed his disdain for the talks the Palestinians conducted with his own government, dismissing them as an "academic seminar." It is hard to imagine this new coalition going further than its predecessor, which, in Palestinian eyes, didn't go far enough.
On the Palestinian side, intense Egyptian-mediated reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah have so far failed to stitch the national movement together. The price of their divisions, costly under any circumstances, has inflated several-fold as a result of the war in Gaza in December and January between Israel and Hamas. The conflict proved, if proof were still needed, that President Mahmoud Abbas cannot continue to talk peace with Israel when Israel is at war with Palestinians and that Palestinians cannot make peace with Israel when they are at war with themselves. Hamas possesses the power to spoil any progress and will use it. It can act as an implacable opponent against any potential Palestinian compromise. Bilateral negotiations that failed when Olmert was prime minister and Hamas was a mere Palestinian faction are unlikely to succeed with Netanyahu at the helm and Hamas having grown into a regional reality.
If, despite this desolate landscape, the Obama administration nonetheless is determined to push for a final agreement, it could be because the President has something else in mind. At some point, he might intend to bypass negotiations between the parties and, with support from a broad international coalition including Arab countries, Russia, and the European Union, present them with a detailed two-state agreement they will be hard-pressed to reject. The concept stems from the notion that, left to their own devices, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are incapable of reaching an accord and that they will need all the pressure and persuasion the world can muster to take the last, fateful steps.
It is one option. But before jumping toward it, basic issues should be explored. Getting the leaders to endorse a peace deal will be no mean feat, but it is not the only and perhaps not the most substantial challenge. The other question is how in the current climate the Israeli and Palestinian people would welcome a two-state solution. Would they view it as authentic or illegitimate? Would they see it as ending their conflict or merely opening its next round? Would it be more effective at mobilizing supporters or at galvanizing opponents? What, in short, would a two-state solution actually solve?
2.
The challenge of ending the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has, of late, almost entirely revolved around tinkering with the details of a two-state agreement. Efforts toward a settlement, whether official or unofficial, focused on adjusting percentages of territorial annexation and land exchange; dividing and defining forms of sovereignty over Jerusalem; describing the attributes of a Palestinian state; and, more often as afterthought than central concern, finding technical ways to resettle and compensate the refugees. Successive failures and the repeated inability to satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian needs have been vexing. So far at least, these difficulties have not called into question the assumption that an equilibrium of interests exists or that it can be fully found within a two-state agreement. It's just been seen as a matter of trying harder.
That President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert were incapable of reaching a settlement in 2008 following the goals set at the Annapolis conference might not be conclusive. But it gives reason to doubt the premise that more of the same can yield something different. Abbas is widely hailed as among the Palestinians' most pragmatic leaders. Olmert took a more circuitous route to the peace camp, but he exhibited the faith of the late convert, intense and profound. After months of talks, Abbas declined a far more concessive Israeli proposal—on the size of the territory for Palestinians, for example—than the one Yasser Arafat turned down eight years ago and for which the then Palestinian leader was excoriated as an implacable enemy of peace. There is little reason to believe that more tweaking of the accord would have made a difference.
A workable two-state agreement would address a large share of the two sides' aspirations. It would preserve Israel's Jewish character and majority, provide it with final and recognized borders, and maintain its ties to Jewish holy sites. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would live free of Israeli occupation, they would govern Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and refugees would have the opportunity to choose normal lives through resettlement and compensation. If meeting those goals were sufficient, why have the parties proved incapable of settling the dispute?
Aspirations reflect historical experience. For Israel's Jewish population, this includes displacement, persecution, the life of the ghetto, and the horrors of the Holocaust; and the long, frustrated quest for a normal, recognized, and accepted homeland. There is a craving for a future that will not echo the past and for the kind of ordinary security—the unquestioned acceptance of a Jewish presence in the region—that even overwhelming military superiority cannot guarantee. There is, too, at least among a significant, active segment of the Israeli population, a deep-seated attachment to the land, all of it, that constitutes Eretz Israel.
For Palestinians, the most primal demands relate to addressing and redressing a historical experience of dispossession, expulsion, dispersal, massacres, occupation, discrimination, denial of dignity, persistent killing off of their leaders, and the relentless fracturing of their national polity.
These Israeli and Palestinian yearnings are of a sort that, no matter how precisely fine-tuned, a two-state deal will find it hard to fulfill. Over the years, the goal gradually has shifted from reaching peace to achieving a two-state agreement. Those aims might sound the same, but they are not: peace may be possible without such an agreement just as such an agreement need not necessarily lead to peace. Partitioning the land can, and most probably will, be an important means of achieving a viable, lasting, peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. But it is not the end.
3.
The idea of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel has an unusually interesting, troubled, and—from the British plan of the 1930s to the United Nations partition plan of 1947—mainly foreign pedigree. What it is not and, save for a brief period in the recent past, has not been is an indigenous Palestinian demand. Partition meant accepting less than the whole of the area of the British Mandate of Palestine; it also came to mean barring the return of refugees who were expelled or fled in 1948. For most of its history, the Palestinian national movement would have nothing to do with it. Israelis were no more enthralled. It took them even longer to warm up to the concept of Palestinian statehood, which they saw as both artificial, insofar as no such entity had existed in the past, and dangerous, because most Arabs and Palestinians denied Israelis the reciprocal right to a Jewish homeland.
Palestinians came to accept the two-state solution by the late 1980s, though that acceptance was always somewhat grudging. Statehood acquired the trappings of a national cause but it never truly matched national aspirations. For most, it appealed more to the head than to the heart; it was an arguably useful way of achieving greater goals but never the objective in and of itself. Unlike Zionism, for whom statehood was the central objective, the Palestinian fight was primarily about other matters. The absence of a state was not the cause of all their misfortune. Its creation would not be the full solution either.
Palestinian embrace of the idea of statehood essentially was the handiwork of a single man. With time, cunning, and shrewd politics, and because few dared challenge his militant credentials, Yasser Arafat fundamentally altered his movement's position. His efforts were not without ambiguity. He toyed with Palestinians and worried Israelis by presenting a Palestinian state both as a solution and as a way station toward one. He made compromise—the acceptance of an Israeli state within the 1967 borders—feel like conquest and he managed to pack into partition feelings of historical vindication, dignity, and honor. When it came to persuading the West and Israel that he genuinely believed in a two-state solution, his past record of militancy was a burden. But when it came to selling a two-state solution to his people, that record was his greatest asset.
Among Palestinians, the concept of statehood has not aged well. It has suffered several punishing blows, mainly at the hands of those who purported to buttress it. This is not chiefly related to its substance, which, through a series of formal and informal Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, has not varied much and, if anything, has come closer to mirroring what the Palestinians could live with. It has everything to do with who is promoting it, for what reason, in what way, and in what domestic and regional context. Palestinians do not judge the idea of a state on its merits. They judge it by the company it keeps.
4.
The new millennium began with the near-universal acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state, which is precisely when its support among Palestinians began to slip. President Bush, the first US president to have ardently endorsed it, framed it as the answer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and then hurriedly narrowed the challenge to the mundane task of building state institutions. Gone was the revolutionary aura with which Arafat imbued the idea; the struggle, no longer about freedom and the end of occupation, became about erecting responsible structures of government.
One of Bush's least noticed but most profound and pernicious legacies in the region might well turn out to have been this transformation of the concept of Palestinian statehood from among the more revolutionary to the more conservative, from inspiring to humdrum. A small fraction of Palestinians, mainly members of the Palestinian Authority's elite, saw the point of building state institutions, had an interest in doing so, and went to work. For the majority, this kind of project could not have strayed further from their original political concerns.
Today, the idea of Palestinian statehood is alive, but mainly outside of Palestine. Establishing a state has become a matter of utmost priority for Europeans, who see it as crucial to stabilizing the region and curbing the growth of extremism; for Americans, who hail it as a centerpiece in efforts to contain Iran as well as radical Islamists and to forge a coalition between so-called moderate Arab states and Israel; and even for a large number of Israelis who have come to believe it is the sole effective answer to the threat to Israel's existence posed by Arab demographics. Those might all be good reasons, though none is of particular relevance to Palestinians; and each only further alienates them from the vision of statehood, the purported object of their struggle.
Universal endorsement has its downside. The more the two-state solution looks like an American or Western, not to mention Israeli, interest, the less it appeals to Palestinians. It is hard to generate excitement among Palestinians for a project explicitly aimed at protecting the interests of their historic foe (Israel), defeating one of their political organizations (Hamas), or rescuing pro-Western Arab regimes for which they evince little sympathy. Many Palestinians feel that the notion of statehood has been hijacked by their historic detractors who rejected it when it was briefly a Palestinian idea only to endorse it when they made it their own. The process of legitimizing a state in international eyes has helped discredit it in those of its intended beneficiaries.
The two-state concept has been further tarnished by what has become of its Palestinian promoters. Today, many Palestinians no longer see their leaders as carrying out a national project but rather as instruments of foreign designs aimed at bolstering one faction of Palestinians against another. When the Palestinian Authority seeks guidance, it appears to look outward: to the US to judge whether the program of a putative national unity government would pass muster or to help devise a security plan; to Israel for assistance coping with the Islamist challenge; to Egypt and the rest of the world for how to deal with Gaza.
In all this, the PA's policy choices pose less of a problem than the method through which they seem to be reached—based not on an indigenous Palestinian notion of national self-interest, but rather on a foreign concept of what it ought to be. On their own, Palestinian leaders might opt for confrontation with Hamas, for unity, or for something else. The decision might work or it might backfire. At least it would be theirs. Instead, they currently speak and act as if they are at the head of some Palestinians—the more respectable ones—while leaving it to others to handle the more troublesome lot. All of which diminishes the PA's standing, even in the eyes of many otherwise most prone to support its program, and inflates its opposition, even among many who share nothing in common with the Islamists' agenda.
None of this was preordained. Abbas came to power in 2005 with the historic legitimacy of forty years of arduous struggle; with authority that neither Fatah nor Hamas dared to challenge; and with a then-credible vision, the two-state solution, which had long formed the core of his beliefs. These could have been put to good use to fulfill his original plan, which was to moderate Hamas's policies by gaining the cooperation of the Islamist movement and turning the Palestinian president into the necessary intermediary between Palestinians—all of them—and the international community for the achievement of a peace agreement with Israel. That was not to be.
Abbas's legitimacy was eroded by the West's suffocating embrace—a bear hug made worse for its being American, and worse yet for coming from President Bush. His authority was blunted by intrusive US meddling as Palestinians questioned whether decisions were made by their president or imposed by others. And his vision was blurred by the two-state solution's metamorphosis from a national idea to a foreign one.
Abbas's predicament stems from the help he has been denied as well as from the support he has been ill-advisedly given by those who claim to wish him well, the US and Europeans in particular. Time and again, they have pushed him in directions his instincts initially resisted but to which, bereft of a support team and the instruments of power needed to stand firm, he ultimately succumbed—away from national unity and toward greater reliance on foreign benefactors. Condescendingly justifying their actions by alleging that he was powerless, the US and the Europeans only made him appear more so. Abbas is an opportunity that has never ceased to be missed.
5.
Statehood was and could at some point again be a Palestinian achievement, but for now it has become somebody else's prize. That is not necessarily fatal. Obama has what no US president before him had and, one could venture, few following him will possess: an ability to speak to a foreign audience and, without in any way diminishing America's dignity, elevate theirs. His apparent determination to broaden Israeli– Palestinian talks so as to involve in one way or another tens of Arab and Muslim states might give American diplomacy a further, notable lift. With time and tenacity, a strategy predicated on building an international coalition, pressing the two sides to make necessary compromises, and presenting them with a final two-state solution might succeed. A state packaged by Bush is one thing. Wrapped up by Obama, it would be something else altogether.
Then again, it would be a gamble. Should a significant number of Palestinians or Israelis construe such a solution as promoted by the wrong people for the wrong reasons in the wrong way, they will not see it as a solution at all. They will object and seek to mobilize those without whose support a deal would stand on tenuous grounds. For some time at least, the benefits of a deal will be less evident than the concessions it requires. For opponents, that time will be precious. An agreement that is not implemented or that does not last would produce a radicalizing effect that no absence of agreement could ever accomplish.
There may be another way. Its starting point would be less of an immediate effort to achieve a two-state agreement or propose US ideas to that effect. Rather, it would be an attempt to transform the political atmosphere and reformulate the diplomatic process. This would entail, first, identifying and recognizing fundamental Israeli and Palestinian concerns and aspirations and then placing them at the core of the process. In turn, this would involve altering how a US-supported solution is conceived and presented to both sides so that Palestinians see it as the outcome of their national struggle and Israelis as the culmination of their historic quest rather than as the byproduct of others' strategic pursuits. The end result might well be the same—two states, living side by side. But the journey would be more authentic and its destination more acceptable.
The task, in other words, would not be to polish up answers to questions of borders, security, Jerusalem, or how to compensate refugees. That approach increasingly is becoming a sideshow, chiefly of interest to official negotiators. Nor would talk center on creating Palestinian institutions or extolling a two-state solution's value in combating extremism or reshaping the region. When Israel's foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, calls for dropping timeworn slogans—land for peace, two-state solution—he has a political purpose. He also has a point. Endless repetition has not brought realization of these goals closer, and it has chipped away at their credibility. America's discourse can reconnect with both sides' hopes and needs if it addresses them and reverts to basics—namely, acknowledging and redressing injustices suffered by Palestinians and providing Israelis with the recognition and normalcy historically denied them.
A new language would help; so too would a broader audience. Peace camps on both sides have long been sold on the two-state idea. They cannot sell it any longer. The more they are identified with the proposal, the less appealing it will be. The US should reach out to skeptical constituencies that would make a difference but are left indifferent by current talk of a two-state agreement. One example is the settlers, an active and dynamic Israeli group yet one that the outside world typically treats as modern-day lepers. A more inclusive political process could recognize their views and concerns, consider their interests, and invite them to take part in discussions.
Another such case, certainly, is the Palestinian diaspora, whose opinions have defined national aspirations from the outset and will shape the collective response into the future. Walter Russell Mead puts it well in a recent article: "Any deal," he writes, "must address the issues of greatest concern to the dispossessed refugees, who best embody Palestinian nationalism and remain the ultimate source of political legitimacy in Palestinian politics."[*]
President Obama will give a speech in Cairo, though in view of the state of Arab polarization, it carries equal risk of dividing as of uniting public opinion; he also likely will make the traditional pilgrimage to Ramallah. But why not consider a speech that will make even the most cynical pause—one that addresses the Palestinian refugees' concerns, is delivered to refugees, and given in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon? President Obama, flanked by President Abbas, surrounded by refugee leaders, speaking to a cheering crowd of thousands hailing from camps across Lebanon and, through them, to millions of Palestinians scattered across the globe: the sight, powerful and stirring, could do more than any US plan to change the mood, minds, and emotions.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict will have to be tackled within the 1967 boundaries. But it can be resolved only if it deals candidly with its 1948 genesis. In fact, the more the refugees' plight is openly acknowledged by the US, the easier it will become to end the indecent prolongation of their current misery on the dubious pretext that if their lives could be improved, this would eradicate their cause and obliterate their rights.
It will be equally important for the United States to modify its dealings with domestic Palestinian politics and, in particular, the Palestinian president. Abbas is a man in desperate need of being left alone. If his actions are to be seen as legitimate and his endorsement of an agreement is to carry weight, he cannot appear as the president of only some Palestinians but must appear as the president of all; he cannot hand over, under pressure, critical decisions to outside parties but must assume them himself. He must be allowed to do what he considers right. Washington need not openly promote Palestinian unity. But it could stop standing in the way by signaling its acceptance of any reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah to which the Palestinian president lent his name. The US should continue to support Abbas. But it could stop placing him in that politically confining and damaging position where the fate of his people seems to be decided by others. If the goal is to strengthen Abbas, there is no better way.
How a peace initiative is received also will be a function of the regional climate. The more it is polarized between so-called moderates and radicals and the more the purpose appears to be to bolster the former while harming the latter, the more opposition will be energized. Militancy will find sympathetic ears. Among Palestinians, the sense will grow that the US is waging a battle in their name but not for their sake.
6.
From the first day of his presidency, which began as the Gaza war that traumatized the region and radicalized it further came to an end, Obama's Middle East challenge has been plain. He must win over the large pool of disaffected Arabs and Muslims who have ceased believing in the United States.
The climb will be steep. His election was a beginning, raising questions where not long before had reigned near-undivided, and negative, conviction. The new president can rely on more stirring rhetoric; he will enjoy a more receptive audience and will be looked at in a fresh light. That will take him only so far. He will be given the benefit of the doubt, but the doubt will remain colossal.
For the new president, the starting point should be recognition of some uncomfortable, brutal realities. These include the depth of inherited anti-American animus; of cynicism toward old plans and tired formulas; of popular estrangement from the regional leaders on whom Washington has come to depend; and of popular attraction to militant activists, militant behavior, and a radical worldview.
The consequence is that some well-worn recipes cannot work. Claiming eagerness to end the Arab–Israeli conflict or reach a two-state solution has become stale by dint of sterile repetition. President Bush did so, possibly more passionately and fervently than any predecessor. Yet few listened because few believed in what he said, least of all the Palestinians who were his supposed audience. Relying upon and bestowing aid to traditional Arab allies or seeking to improve their ties with Israel will not help much either. It would be preaching to the choir, burdening the Obama administration with the weight of unpopular figures and entrenching the notion that, at least in this respect, America is content with prolonging the past.
The time will come for the US to unfurl a grand diplomatic initiative. Not now. The most urgent task is to prepare the way for that day by countering the skepticism that has greeted and torpedoed every recent American idea, good or bad—from Secretary of State William Rogers' 1969 plan to the road map. The time is for a clean break, in words, style, and approach.
For many in the US, the notion of such radical change often is reduced to the question of whether or not to talk to Hamas. That is a diversion. The challenge is whether Obama can speak to those for whom Hamas speaks. They are the people who have lost faith in America, its motivations, and every proposal it promotes.
The broader point is this: a window exists, short and subject to abrupt closure, during which President Obama can radically upset Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim preconceptions and make it possible for his future plan, whatever and whenever it might be, to get a fair hearing—for American professions of seriousness to be taken seriously. It won't be done by repackaging the peace process of years past. It won't be done by seeking to strengthen those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak, incompetent, and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless, and reckless. It won't be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region's most relevant actors.
It won't be done by trying to perform better what was performed before. President Bush's legacy was, in this sense, doubly harmful: he did the wrong things poorly, which now risks creating the false expectation that, somehow, they can be done well.
—May 14, 2009
Notes
[*]Walter Russell Mead, "Change They Can Believe In," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009.
US Colonel Advocates US 'Military Attacks' on 'Partisan Media' in Essay for Neocon, Pro-Israel Group JINSA
US Colonel Advocates US 'Military Attacks' on 'Partisan Media' in Essay for Neocon, Pro-Israel Group JINSA
“The point of all this is simple: Win,” writes Col. Ralph Peters. “In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win.”
By Jeremy Scahill
In the era of embedded media, independent journalists have become the eyes and ears of the world. Without those un-embedded journalists willing to risk their lives to place themselves on the other side of the barrel of the tank or the gun or under the airstrikes, history would be written almost entirely from the vantage point of powerful militaries, or—at the very least—it would be told from the perspective of the troops doing the shooting, rather than the civilians who always pay the highest price.
In the case of the Iraq invasion and occupation, the journalists who have placed themselves in danger most often are local Iraqi journalists. Some 116 Iraqi journalists and media workers have been killed in the line of duty since March 2003. In all, 189 journalists have been killed in Iraq. At least 16 of these journalists were killed by the US military, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. The network that has most often found itself under US attack is Al Jazeera. As I wrote a few years ago in The Nation:
The United States bombed its offices in Afghanistan in 2001, shelled the Basra hotel where Al Jazeera journalists were the only guests in April 2003, killed Iraq correspondent Tareq Ayoub a few days later in Baghdad and imprisoned several Al Jazeera reporters (including at Guantánamo), some of whom say they were tortured. In addition to the military attacks, the US-backed Iraqi government banned the network from reporting in Iraq.
A new report for a leading neoconservative group which pushes a belligerent “Israel first” agenda of conquest in the Middle East suggests that in future wars the US should make censorship of media official policy and advocates “military attacks on the partisan media.” (H/T MuzzleWatch) The report for JINSA, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, was authored by retired US Army Colonel Ralph Peters. It appears in JINSA’s “flagship publication,” The Journal of International Security Affairs. “Today, the United States and its allies will never face a lone enemy on the battlefield. There will always be a hostile third party in the fight,” Peters writes, calling the media, “The killers without guns:”
Of course, the media have shaped the outcome of conflicts for centuries, from the European wars of religion through Vietnam. More recently, though, the media have determined the outcomes of conflicts. While journalists and editors ultimately failed to defeat the U.S. government in Iraq, video cameras and biased reporting guaranteed that Hezbollah would survive the 2006 war with Israel and, as of this writing, they appear to have saved Hamas from destruction in Gaza.
[…]
Although it seems unthinkable now, future wars may require censorship, news blackouts and, ultimately, military attacks on the partisan media. Perceiving themselves as superior beings, journalists have positioned themselves as protected-species combatants. But freedom of the press stops when its abuse kills our soldiers and strengthens our enemies. Such a view arouses disdain today, but a media establishment that has forgotten any sense of sober patriotism may find that it has become tomorrow’s conventional wisdom.
The point of all this is simple: Win. In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win. Our victories are ultimately in humanity’s interests, while our failures nourish monsters.
It is, of course, very appropriate that such a despicable battle cry for murdering media workers appears in a JINSA publication. The organization has long boasted an all-star cast of criminal “advisors.” Among them: Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, James Woolsey, John Bolton, Douglas Feith and others. JINSA, along with the Project for a New American Century, was one of the premiere groups in shaping US policy during the Bush years and remains a formidable force with Obama in the White House.
Reading Colonel Peters’s sick and twisted essay reminded me of the report that emerged in late 2005 about an alleged Bush administration plot to bomb Al Jazeera’s international headquarters in Qatar, which I covered for The Nation:
Britain’s Daily Mirror reported that during an April 2004 White House meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, George W. Bush floated the idea of bombing Al Jazeera’s international headquarters in Qatar. This allegation was based on leaked “Top Secret” minutes of the Bush-Blair summit. British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith has activated the Official Secrets Act, threatening any publication that publishes any portion of the memo (he has already brought charges against a former Cabinet staffer and a former parliamentary aide). So while we don’t yet know the contents of the memo, we do know that at the time of Bush’s meeting with Blair, the Administration was in the throes of a very public, high-level temper tantrum directed against Al Jazeera. The meeting took place on April 16, at the peak of the first US siege of Falluja, and Al Jazeera was one of the few news outlets broadcasting from inside the city. Its exclusive footage was being broadcast by every network from CNN to the BBC.
The Falluja offensive, one of the bloodiest assaults of the US occupation, was a turning point. In two weeks that April, thirty marines were killed as local guerrillas resisted US attempts to capture the city. Some 600 Iraqis died, many of them women and children. Al Jazeera broadcast from inside the besieged city, beaming images to the world. On live TV the network gave graphic documentary evidence disproving US denials that it was killing civilians. It was a public relations disaster, and the United States responded by attacking the messenger.
Just a few days before Bush allegedly proposed bombing the network, Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Falluja, Ahmed Mansour, reported live on the air, “Last night we were targeted by some tanks, twice…but we escaped. The US wants us out of Falluja, but we will stay.” On April 9 Washington demanded that Al Jazeera leave the city as a condition for a cease-fire. The network refused. Mansour wrote that the next day “American fighter jets fired around our new location, and they bombed the house where we had spent the night before, causing the death of the house owner Mr. Hussein Samir. Due to the serious threats we had to stop broadcasting for few days because every time we tried to broadcast the fighter jets spotted us we became under their fire.”
On April 11 senior military spokesperson Mark Kimmitt declared, “The stations that are showing Americans intentionally killing women and children are not legitimate news sources. That is propaganda, and that is lies.” On April 15 Donald Rumsfeld echoed those remarks in distinctly undiplomatic terms, calling Al Jazeera’s reporting “vicious, inaccurate and inexcusable…. It’s disgraceful what that station is doing.” It was the very next day, according to the Daily Mirror, that Bush told Blair of his plan. “He made clear he wanted to bomb al-Jazeera in Qatar and elsewhere,” a source told the Mirror. “There’s no doubt what Bush wanted to do—and no doubt Blair didn’t want him to do it.”
Lest people think that the views of people like Col. Ralph Peters and the JINSA/PNAC neocons are relics of the past, remember that the Obama administration includes heavy hitters from this world among its ranks, as well as fierce neocon supporters. While they may no longer be literally calling the shots, as they did under Bush/Cheney, their disproportionate influence on US policy endures.
“The point of all this is simple: Win,” writes Col. Ralph Peters. “In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win.”
By Jeremy Scahill
In the era of embedded media, independent journalists have become the eyes and ears of the world. Without those un-embedded journalists willing to risk their lives to place themselves on the other side of the barrel of the tank or the gun or under the airstrikes, history would be written almost entirely from the vantage point of powerful militaries, or—at the very least—it would be told from the perspective of the troops doing the shooting, rather than the civilians who always pay the highest price.
In the case of the Iraq invasion and occupation, the journalists who have placed themselves in danger most often are local Iraqi journalists. Some 116 Iraqi journalists and media workers have been killed in the line of duty since March 2003. In all, 189 journalists have been killed in Iraq. At least 16 of these journalists were killed by the US military, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. The network that has most often found itself under US attack is Al Jazeera. As I wrote a few years ago in The Nation:
The United States bombed its offices in Afghanistan in 2001, shelled the Basra hotel where Al Jazeera journalists were the only guests in April 2003, killed Iraq correspondent Tareq Ayoub a few days later in Baghdad and imprisoned several Al Jazeera reporters (including at Guantánamo), some of whom say they were tortured. In addition to the military attacks, the US-backed Iraqi government banned the network from reporting in Iraq.
A new report for a leading neoconservative group which pushes a belligerent “Israel first” agenda of conquest in the Middle East suggests that in future wars the US should make censorship of media official policy and advocates “military attacks on the partisan media.” (H/T MuzzleWatch) The report for JINSA, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, was authored by retired US Army Colonel Ralph Peters. It appears in JINSA’s “flagship publication,” The Journal of International Security Affairs. “Today, the United States and its allies will never face a lone enemy on the battlefield. There will always be a hostile third party in the fight,” Peters writes, calling the media, “The killers without guns:”
Of course, the media have shaped the outcome of conflicts for centuries, from the European wars of religion through Vietnam. More recently, though, the media have determined the outcomes of conflicts. While journalists and editors ultimately failed to defeat the U.S. government in Iraq, video cameras and biased reporting guaranteed that Hezbollah would survive the 2006 war with Israel and, as of this writing, they appear to have saved Hamas from destruction in Gaza.
[…]
Although it seems unthinkable now, future wars may require censorship, news blackouts and, ultimately, military attacks on the partisan media. Perceiving themselves as superior beings, journalists have positioned themselves as protected-species combatants. But freedom of the press stops when its abuse kills our soldiers and strengthens our enemies. Such a view arouses disdain today, but a media establishment that has forgotten any sense of sober patriotism may find that it has become tomorrow’s conventional wisdom.
The point of all this is simple: Win. In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win. Our victories are ultimately in humanity’s interests, while our failures nourish monsters.
It is, of course, very appropriate that such a despicable battle cry for murdering media workers appears in a JINSA publication. The organization has long boasted an all-star cast of criminal “advisors.” Among them: Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, James Woolsey, John Bolton, Douglas Feith and others. JINSA, along with the Project for a New American Century, was one of the premiere groups in shaping US policy during the Bush years and remains a formidable force with Obama in the White House.
Reading Colonel Peters’s sick and twisted essay reminded me of the report that emerged in late 2005 about an alleged Bush administration plot to bomb Al Jazeera’s international headquarters in Qatar, which I covered for The Nation:
Britain’s Daily Mirror reported that during an April 2004 White House meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, George W. Bush floated the idea of bombing Al Jazeera’s international headquarters in Qatar. This allegation was based on leaked “Top Secret” minutes of the Bush-Blair summit. British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith has activated the Official Secrets Act, threatening any publication that publishes any portion of the memo (he has already brought charges against a former Cabinet staffer and a former parliamentary aide). So while we don’t yet know the contents of the memo, we do know that at the time of Bush’s meeting with Blair, the Administration was in the throes of a very public, high-level temper tantrum directed against Al Jazeera. The meeting took place on April 16, at the peak of the first US siege of Falluja, and Al Jazeera was one of the few news outlets broadcasting from inside the city. Its exclusive footage was being broadcast by every network from CNN to the BBC.
The Falluja offensive, one of the bloodiest assaults of the US occupation, was a turning point. In two weeks that April, thirty marines were killed as local guerrillas resisted US attempts to capture the city. Some 600 Iraqis died, many of them women and children. Al Jazeera broadcast from inside the besieged city, beaming images to the world. On live TV the network gave graphic documentary evidence disproving US denials that it was killing civilians. It was a public relations disaster, and the United States responded by attacking the messenger.
Just a few days before Bush allegedly proposed bombing the network, Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Falluja, Ahmed Mansour, reported live on the air, “Last night we were targeted by some tanks, twice…but we escaped. The US wants us out of Falluja, but we will stay.” On April 9 Washington demanded that Al Jazeera leave the city as a condition for a cease-fire. The network refused. Mansour wrote that the next day “American fighter jets fired around our new location, and they bombed the house where we had spent the night before, causing the death of the house owner Mr. Hussein Samir. Due to the serious threats we had to stop broadcasting for few days because every time we tried to broadcast the fighter jets spotted us we became under their fire.”
On April 11 senior military spokesperson Mark Kimmitt declared, “The stations that are showing Americans intentionally killing women and children are not legitimate news sources. That is propaganda, and that is lies.” On April 15 Donald Rumsfeld echoed those remarks in distinctly undiplomatic terms, calling Al Jazeera’s reporting “vicious, inaccurate and inexcusable…. It’s disgraceful what that station is doing.” It was the very next day, according to the Daily Mirror, that Bush told Blair of his plan. “He made clear he wanted to bomb al-Jazeera in Qatar and elsewhere,” a source told the Mirror. “There’s no doubt what Bush wanted to do—and no doubt Blair didn’t want him to do it.”
Lest people think that the views of people like Col. Ralph Peters and the JINSA/PNAC neocons are relics of the past, remember that the Obama administration includes heavy hitters from this world among its ranks, as well as fierce neocon supporters. While they may no longer be literally calling the shots, as they did under Bush/Cheney, their disproportionate influence on US policy endures.
Can Obama Change the Game on Middle East Peace? Tony Karon
TIME
5/20/09
Can Obama Change the Game on Middle East Peace?
Tony Karon
No one should have been surprised that there was no meeting of minds between President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at their inaugural summit on Monday. Although the two men proclaimed a shared commitment to having Israelis and Palestinians live in peace, their views on how to get there remain substantially at odds. Now, as Obama puts the finishing touches on a new peace plan to be unveiled shortly — perhaps when he addresses the Muslim world from Cairo next month — the question facing the Administration is how to pursue its strategy with an unenthusiastic Israeli partner.
At the White House, Netanyahu pointedly refused to endorse the principle of Palestinian statehood, a cornerstone both of the peace process and of U.S. Middle East policy. The Israeli leader made clear that he wants the Palestinians to govern themselves but added the caveat that self-governance would be "absent a handful of powers that could endanger the State of Israel." (Netanyahu believes Israel's security cannot tolerate the Palestinians having such typical features of statehood as sovereign control over their own borders, air space and defense and foreign policies.) And while he committed to holding talks with the Palestinian Authority, he added a new precondition for peace, requiring that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a "Jewish state." Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who will visit the White House next week, has thus far rejected that demand both out of concern for Israel's Arab minority and because the rights of Palestinian refugees have remained an issue on the negotiating agenda of the peace process up till now. Obama has relinquished the previous Administration's approach by prioritizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the first year of his first term, by showing a willingness to press the Israelis to live up to their commitments under previous agreements — particularly with respect to building settlements on land captured in 1967 — and by raising regional expectations that the U.S. will commit to pressing for a two-state solution. But how can Obama's resolve to move the process forward be turned into policy?
The approach adopted by the Clinton Administration — bringing Israel and the Palestinians together in bilateral negotiations facilitated and supported by the U.S. — is not likely to produce results today. The moderate Abbas, who really reigns only over the West Bank, now speaks for just a fraction of Palestinian public opinion, and Israel's security chief, Yuval Diskin, warned on Tuesday that Hamas (which controls the other Palestinian enclave, Gaza, outright) would win any Palestinian election held right now.
Meanwhile, Israel's government is built on a right-wing consensus at odds with such fundamentals of the peace process as Palestinian statehood, freezing and evacuating West Bank settlements, and sharing Jerusalem. But even when Israel was led by the centrist Ehud Olmert, Abbas reportedly rejected the best peace deal the Israeli leader was able to offer during last year's talks about talks — an offer that reportedly conceded more territory to the Palestinian state than the deal turned down by Yasser Arafat at Camp David. So the gulf between Israel's best offer and the bottom line of the most moderate Palestinian leadership appears to be too large to resolve in bilateral negotiations in which the Palestinians have no leverage but nothing to lose, while the Israeli public is able to live with the status quo for the foreseeable future.
Cynicism over the two-state solution has grown, meanwhile, on both sides of the divide. Robert Malley, a negotiator on President Clinton's team at Camp David and who later gave advice to candidate Obama, has written a thoughtful assessment of the declining prospects for the two-state solution, along with Palestinian academic Hussein Agha, a longtime adviser to the Palestinian leadership. They point out that right now, the two-state concept has stronger support abroad than it does among Israelis and Palestinians, both of whom have always seen it, even in the best of times, as a bitter compromise that the balance of forces would compel them to accept.
Malley and Agha have some blunt advice for Obama. Achieving success "won't be done by repackaging the peace process of years past. It won't be done by strengthening those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak, incompetent and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless and reckless. It won't be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region's most relevant actors. It won't be done by trying to perform better what was performed before." The mantras of the two-state solution have lost their appeal through endless repetition, most passionately by foreigners often deemed by one side or the other to be hostile to their aspirations.
Rather than finessing what Bush and Clinton started, Obama may be forced to change the game, working with his partners in the Quartet established during the Bush era (including the E.U., the U.N. and Russia) and with the Arab League to forge an international consensus on the parameters for a fair solution to the conflict. That would require outlining the borders between two states (the formula for doing so, based on the 1967 borders, is already enshrined in existing documents such as the "Roadmap"), how to share Jerusalem, the fate of West Bank settlements and of Palestinian refugee families who lost land and homes inside Israel in 1948. In such a scenario, the focus of diplomacy would shift to coaxing, cajoling and nudging both sides toward implementing such a solution.
Obama on Monday didn't press Netanyahu to reverse his position on the two-state solution, but the Administration has begun pushing insistently for Israel to freeze settlement activity in the West Bank. That practical step toward the two-state destination will likely be the focus, for now, but the Administration is hoping to persuade Arab states to help by offering Israel fresh gestures of recognition in exchange for doing so. To that end, Obama will meet with Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, next week. And when the U.S. President meets Abbas, his focus will be both on relieving Israel's chokehold on Gaza and the West Bank, encouraging resolution of the crippling stalemate in Palestinian politics (which is as much of an obstacle to the two-state solution as Israel's settlement expansion) and on helping the Palestinians assume their responsibilities to create security conditions to enable Washington to demand more progress from Israel.
5/20/09
Can Obama Change the Game on Middle East Peace?
Tony Karon
No one should have been surprised that there was no meeting of minds between President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at their inaugural summit on Monday. Although the two men proclaimed a shared commitment to having Israelis and Palestinians live in peace, their views on how to get there remain substantially at odds. Now, as Obama puts the finishing touches on a new peace plan to be unveiled shortly — perhaps when he addresses the Muslim world from Cairo next month — the question facing the Administration is how to pursue its strategy with an unenthusiastic Israeli partner.
At the White House, Netanyahu pointedly refused to endorse the principle of Palestinian statehood, a cornerstone both of the peace process and of U.S. Middle East policy. The Israeli leader made clear that he wants the Palestinians to govern themselves but added the caveat that self-governance would be "absent a handful of powers that could endanger the State of Israel." (Netanyahu believes Israel's security cannot tolerate the Palestinians having such typical features of statehood as sovereign control over their own borders, air space and defense and foreign policies.) And while he committed to holding talks with the Palestinian Authority, he added a new precondition for peace, requiring that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a "Jewish state." Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who will visit the White House next week, has thus far rejected that demand both out of concern for Israel's Arab minority and because the rights of Palestinian refugees have remained an issue on the negotiating agenda of the peace process up till now. Obama has relinquished the previous Administration's approach by prioritizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the first year of his first term, by showing a willingness to press the Israelis to live up to their commitments under previous agreements — particularly with respect to building settlements on land captured in 1967 — and by raising regional expectations that the U.S. will commit to pressing for a two-state solution. But how can Obama's resolve to move the process forward be turned into policy?
The approach adopted by the Clinton Administration — bringing Israel and the Palestinians together in bilateral negotiations facilitated and supported by the U.S. — is not likely to produce results today. The moderate Abbas, who really reigns only over the West Bank, now speaks for just a fraction of Palestinian public opinion, and Israel's security chief, Yuval Diskin, warned on Tuesday that Hamas (which controls the other Palestinian enclave, Gaza, outright) would win any Palestinian election held right now.
Meanwhile, Israel's government is built on a right-wing consensus at odds with such fundamentals of the peace process as Palestinian statehood, freezing and evacuating West Bank settlements, and sharing Jerusalem. But even when Israel was led by the centrist Ehud Olmert, Abbas reportedly rejected the best peace deal the Israeli leader was able to offer during last year's talks about talks — an offer that reportedly conceded more territory to the Palestinian state than the deal turned down by Yasser Arafat at Camp David. So the gulf between Israel's best offer and the bottom line of the most moderate Palestinian leadership appears to be too large to resolve in bilateral negotiations in which the Palestinians have no leverage but nothing to lose, while the Israeli public is able to live with the status quo for the foreseeable future.
Cynicism over the two-state solution has grown, meanwhile, on both sides of the divide. Robert Malley, a negotiator on President Clinton's team at Camp David and who later gave advice to candidate Obama, has written a thoughtful assessment of the declining prospects for the two-state solution, along with Palestinian academic Hussein Agha, a longtime adviser to the Palestinian leadership. They point out that right now, the two-state concept has stronger support abroad than it does among Israelis and Palestinians, both of whom have always seen it, even in the best of times, as a bitter compromise that the balance of forces would compel them to accept.
Malley and Agha have some blunt advice for Obama. Achieving success "won't be done by repackaging the peace process of years past. It won't be done by strengthening those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak, incompetent and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless and reckless. It won't be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region's most relevant actors. It won't be done by trying to perform better what was performed before." The mantras of the two-state solution have lost their appeal through endless repetition, most passionately by foreigners often deemed by one side or the other to be hostile to their aspirations.
Rather than finessing what Bush and Clinton started, Obama may be forced to change the game, working with his partners in the Quartet established during the Bush era (including the E.U., the U.N. and Russia) and with the Arab League to forge an international consensus on the parameters for a fair solution to the conflict. That would require outlining the borders between two states (the formula for doing so, based on the 1967 borders, is already enshrined in existing documents such as the "Roadmap"), how to share Jerusalem, the fate of West Bank settlements and of Palestinian refugee families who lost land and homes inside Israel in 1948. In such a scenario, the focus of diplomacy would shift to coaxing, cajoling and nudging both sides toward implementing such a solution.
Obama on Monday didn't press Netanyahu to reverse his position on the two-state solution, but the Administration has begun pushing insistently for Israel to freeze settlement activity in the West Bank. That practical step toward the two-state destination will likely be the focus, for now, but the Administration is hoping to persuade Arab states to help by offering Israel fresh gestures of recognition in exchange for doing so. To that end, Obama will meet with Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, next week. And when the U.S. President meets Abbas, his focus will be both on relieving Israel's chokehold on Gaza and the West Bank, encouraging resolution of the crippling stalemate in Palestinian politics (which is as much of an obstacle to the two-state solution as Israel's settlement expansion) and on helping the Palestinians assume their responsibilities to create security conditions to enable Washington to demand more progress from Israel.
Americans' Addiction to War by William Pfaff
Americans' Addiction to War
William Pfaff
Paris, May 19, 2009 – There is an important current in conservative U.S. opinion that believes Western Europe to be under something like a siege, or a potential siege, by its large Muslim immigrant population. I should actually say that it’s not just American conservatives, although they write alarmed books about the impending Muslim domination of Europe, and the collapse of European Christianity and identity. They fear the Decline of the West.
They fail to understand that African and Central Asian Muslims are not drowning in the Mediterranean in desperate attempts to reach European shores in order to overturn western civilization. The Muslim sons of immigrants in Paris ghettos don’t riot and burn apartments to overturn democracy but to protest that they can’t find jobs.
Concern over the enormous problem of assimilating or integrating Muslim immigrants is a very serious one, most of all in Britain, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, where the idea has been that these people should be in self-segregated communities in a “rainbow” nation, preserving their native customs, looked after by the welfare state. This has not been a great success, and will change.
The U.S. government, a liberal one, has a different idea about Muslims, whom it sees as a military threat. It is continuing to wage George W. Bush’s war against the Taliban and their fellow-religious radicals in Afghanistan and Pakistan, justified as keeping them from fighting Americans in Peoria or Santa Barbara -- a worthy idea if it were not pure hysteria.
You could (and they do) argue that the Islamist movement has momentum behind it in much of the Middle East and a part of South Asia, and conclude that unless it is “stopped” in Afghanistan and Pakistan it will propagate itself elsewhere in the region, acquire nuclear weapons, and destroy America.
The evidence suggests the contrary: that the more it is fought by foreign troops in military interventions by “Christian” western governments, the more the radical movement will spread, assuming the roles of religious and nationalist resistance to foreign “crusader” invaders. The 9/11 attacks were revenge for American troops in Saudi Arabia.
However the American (and NATO) determination to fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan is much more complicated in motive than national defense. It has been nearly eight years since a group composed mostly of alienated and western-trained Saudi Arabians blew up the trade towers in New York and attacked the Pentagon. In the U.S., nothing of terrorist note has happened since.
The attacks on the London Underground and on Madrid’s rail terminal did not originate in Taliban or Middle Eastern circles, but in European immigrant communities, involving young and westernized Muslim residents of Europe, as has been the case with all the would-be terrorist activity picked up by European police intelligence. “Stopping” the Taliban in the Hindu Kush won’t change that.
All of this is a hangover from the age of imperialism, which provoked nationalism (a western phenomenon) in Asia and radicalized religion by well-meant but naïve attempts to convert the Asian “heathen” to Christianity. (This continues; there are repeated reports of American army chaplains of evangelical Protestant persuasion slipping copies of the New Testament in Arabic into the hands of American soldiers, to be pressed upon their enemies, should the occasion arise – something for them to read at Gitmo or at one of the overseas U.S. prisons, to pass the time between water-boardings.)
The United States has become war-addicted. Since the Korean War, it has been permanently at war, with the Communists in Southeast Asia, with Balkan aggressors, with Central American leftists, with Colombian drug-growers, with Saddam Hussein (twice), with radical Islamists everywhere. I leave out Panama and Grenada.
War has become part of the national identity, as well as the national economy, which turns out more weapons and more military high-technology than all the rest of the world combined.
At present, our newest war has hardly begun. We are sponsoring the Pakistan army’s drive to push the Taliban out of the territory they have occupied in the northwest of their own country.
The push is on in Washington to send into Pakistan a shadow-government of Americans, to show them how to run their country, and their struggle with Islamic radicals. Under Barack Obama, we are also going to expand our civil presence in Afghanistan, and according to the press we have in mind a replacement leadership for Afghanistan. The U.S. clearly intends to be there for a long time.
Back in Iraq, sectarian rivalry is getting out of hand since the U.S. stopped paying the Sunni tribes to keep the peace. We’ll apparently be staying there for quite a while too.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, one of the Russians who knew the most about the U.S., Georgi Arbatov, then head of the Soviet Union’s U.S.A. and Canada Institute, said to an American, “We are about to do something terrible to you. We are going to deprive you of your enemy.” He did not realize how simple it was going to be for us to find replacements.
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=401
William Pfaff
Paris, May 19, 2009 – There is an important current in conservative U.S. opinion that believes Western Europe to be under something like a siege, or a potential siege, by its large Muslim immigrant population. I should actually say that it’s not just American conservatives, although they write alarmed books about the impending Muslim domination of Europe, and the collapse of European Christianity and identity. They fear the Decline of the West.
They fail to understand that African and Central Asian Muslims are not drowning in the Mediterranean in desperate attempts to reach European shores in order to overturn western civilization. The Muslim sons of immigrants in Paris ghettos don’t riot and burn apartments to overturn democracy but to protest that they can’t find jobs.
Concern over the enormous problem of assimilating or integrating Muslim immigrants is a very serious one, most of all in Britain, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, where the idea has been that these people should be in self-segregated communities in a “rainbow” nation, preserving their native customs, looked after by the welfare state. This has not been a great success, and will change.
The U.S. government, a liberal one, has a different idea about Muslims, whom it sees as a military threat. It is continuing to wage George W. Bush’s war against the Taliban and their fellow-religious radicals in Afghanistan and Pakistan, justified as keeping them from fighting Americans in Peoria or Santa Barbara -- a worthy idea if it were not pure hysteria.
You could (and they do) argue that the Islamist movement has momentum behind it in much of the Middle East and a part of South Asia, and conclude that unless it is “stopped” in Afghanistan and Pakistan it will propagate itself elsewhere in the region, acquire nuclear weapons, and destroy America.
The evidence suggests the contrary: that the more it is fought by foreign troops in military interventions by “Christian” western governments, the more the radical movement will spread, assuming the roles of religious and nationalist resistance to foreign “crusader” invaders. The 9/11 attacks were revenge for American troops in Saudi Arabia.
However the American (and NATO) determination to fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan is much more complicated in motive than national defense. It has been nearly eight years since a group composed mostly of alienated and western-trained Saudi Arabians blew up the trade towers in New York and attacked the Pentagon. In the U.S., nothing of terrorist note has happened since.
The attacks on the London Underground and on Madrid’s rail terminal did not originate in Taliban or Middle Eastern circles, but in European immigrant communities, involving young and westernized Muslim residents of Europe, as has been the case with all the would-be terrorist activity picked up by European police intelligence. “Stopping” the Taliban in the Hindu Kush won’t change that.
All of this is a hangover from the age of imperialism, which provoked nationalism (a western phenomenon) in Asia and radicalized religion by well-meant but naïve attempts to convert the Asian “heathen” to Christianity. (This continues; there are repeated reports of American army chaplains of evangelical Protestant persuasion slipping copies of the New Testament in Arabic into the hands of American soldiers, to be pressed upon their enemies, should the occasion arise – something for them to read at Gitmo or at one of the overseas U.S. prisons, to pass the time between water-boardings.)
The United States has become war-addicted. Since the Korean War, it has been permanently at war, with the Communists in Southeast Asia, with Balkan aggressors, with Central American leftists, with Colombian drug-growers, with Saddam Hussein (twice), with radical Islamists everywhere. I leave out Panama and Grenada.
War has become part of the national identity, as well as the national economy, which turns out more weapons and more military high-technology than all the rest of the world combined.
At present, our newest war has hardly begun. We are sponsoring the Pakistan army’s drive to push the Taliban out of the territory they have occupied in the northwest of their own country.
The push is on in Washington to send into Pakistan a shadow-government of Americans, to show them how to run their country, and their struggle with Islamic radicals. Under Barack Obama, we are also going to expand our civil presence in Afghanistan, and according to the press we have in mind a replacement leadership for Afghanistan. The U.S. clearly intends to be there for a long time.
Back in Iraq, sectarian rivalry is getting out of hand since the U.S. stopped paying the Sunni tribes to keep the peace. We’ll apparently be staying there for quite a while too.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, one of the Russians who knew the most about the U.S., Georgi Arbatov, then head of the Soviet Union’s U.S.A. and Canada Institute, said to an American, “We are about to do something terrible to you. We are going to deprive you of your enemy.” He did not realize how simple it was going to be for us to find replacements.
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=401
National Security Debate
Obama Mounts Defense of Detainee Plan
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/22obama.html?_r=1&hp
Read more: "President Obama: U.S. 'went off course' fighting terror - Mike Allen - POLITICO.com" - http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22804.html#ixzz0GAiiMqJI&A
President Obama, Dick Cheney Face Off on National Security Issues
The President and Former Vice President Deliver Dueling Terrorism Speeches
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=7643032&page=1
Protecting Our Security and Our Values
By Barack Obama
National Archives Museum
Washington, D.C.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/21/obama_guantanamo_speech_transcript_96610.html
The United States Has Never Lost Its Moral Bearings
By Dick Cheney
American Enterprise Institute
Washington D.C.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/21/cheney_obama_keeping_america_safe_96615.html
Obama pushes back on torture, terror
http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/2009/05/21/obama_speech/
Fear
John Podhoretz
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/jpodhoretz/66911
The Highs and Lows of Obama's Big Speech
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/white-house-watch/looking-backward/the-highs-ans-lows-of-obamas-b.html
A Middle Ground on Enemy Combatants
By Joe Klein
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1900052,00.html
OBAMA MAKES THE CASE ON GITMO....
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2009_05/018286.php
Obama's Speech Could Only Be Given on a Sunny Spring Day
http://campaignspot.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NDMyMDM4MjBiNzU1YmJlYTQ3NjM4N2Y0Njg0NzVmOTg=
Obama's Speech: Restoring American Values To Keep U.S. Safe
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/politics_nation/2009/05/obamas_speech_restoring_americ.html
Obama Returns To Persuasion Mode
http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/president-obama/obama-returns-to-persuasion-mode-in-big-national-security-speech/
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/22obama.html?_r=1&hp
Read more: "President Obama: U.S. 'went off course' fighting terror - Mike Allen - POLITICO.com" - http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22804.html#ixzz0GAiiMqJI&A
President Obama, Dick Cheney Face Off on National Security Issues
The President and Former Vice President Deliver Dueling Terrorism Speeches
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=7643032&page=1
Protecting Our Security and Our Values
By Barack Obama
National Archives Museum
Washington, D.C.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/21/obama_guantanamo_speech_transcript_96610.html
The United States Has Never Lost Its Moral Bearings
By Dick Cheney
American Enterprise Institute
Washington D.C.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/21/cheney_obama_keeping_america_safe_96615.html
Obama pushes back on torture, terror
http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/2009/05/21/obama_speech/
Fear
John Podhoretz
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/jpodhoretz/66911
The Highs and Lows of Obama's Big Speech
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/white-house-watch/looking-backward/the-highs-ans-lows-of-obamas-b.html
A Middle Ground on Enemy Combatants
By Joe Klein
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1900052,00.html
OBAMA MAKES THE CASE ON GITMO....
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2009_05/018286.php
Obama's Speech Could Only Be Given on a Sunny Spring Day
http://campaignspot.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NDMyMDM4MjBiNzU1YmJlYTQ3NjM4N2Y0Njg0NzVmOTg=
Obama's Speech: Restoring American Values To Keep U.S. Safe
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/politics_nation/2009/05/obamas_speech_restoring_americ.html
Obama Returns To Persuasion Mode
http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/president-obama/obama-returns-to-persuasion-mode-in-big-national-security-speech/
Stratfor: An Israeli Prime Minister Comes to Washington Again
Stratfor Logo
An Israeli Prime Minister Comes to Washington Again
Israeli-Palestinian Geopolitics and the Peace Process
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is visiting Washington for his first official visit with U.S. President Barack Obama. A range of issues — including the future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Israeli-Syrian talks and Iran policy — are on the table. This is one of an endless series of meetings between U.S. presidents and Israeli prime ministers over the years, many of which concerned these same issues. Yet little has changed.
That Israel has a new prime minister and the United States a new president might appear to make this meeting significant. But this is Netanyahu's second time as prime minister, and his government is as diverse and fractious as most recent Israeli governments. Israeli politics are in gridlock, with deep divisions along multiple fault lines and an electoral system designed to magnify disagreements.
Obama is much stronger politically, but he has consistently acted with caution, particularly in the foreign policy arena. Much of his foreign policy follows from the Bush administration. He has made no major breaks in foreign policy beyond rhetoric; his policies on Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and Europe are essentially extensions of pre-existing policy. Obama faces major economic problems in the United States and clearly is not looking for major changes in foreign policy. He understands how quickly public sentiment can change, and he does not plan to take risks he does not have to take right now.
This, then, is the problem: Netanyahu is coming to Washington hoping to get Obama to agree to fundamental redefinitions of the regional dynamic. For example, he wants Obama to re-examine the commitment to a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. (Netanyahu's foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has said Israel is no longer bound by prior commitments to that concept.) Netanyahu also wants the United States to commit itself to a finite time frame for talks with Iran, after which unspecified but ominous-sounding actions are to be taken.
Facing a major test in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama has more than enough to deal with at the moment. Moreover, U.S. presidents who get involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations frequently get sucked into a morass from which they do not return. For Netanyahu to even request that the White House devote attention to the Israeli-Palestinian problem at present is asking a lot. Asking for a complete review of the peace process is even less realistic.
Obstacles to the Two-State Solution
The foundation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for years has been the assumption that there would be a two-state solution. Such a solution has not materialized for a host of reasons. First, at present there are two Palestinian entities, Gaza and the West Bank, which are hostile to each other. Second, the geography and economy of any Palestinian state would be so reliant on Israel that independence would be meaningless; geography simply makes the two-state proposal almost impossible to implement. Third, no Palestinian government would have the power to guarantee that rogue elements would not launch rockets at Israel, potentially striking at the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor, Israel's heartland. And fourth, neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have the domestic political coherence to allow any negotiator to operate from a position of confidence. Whatever the two sides negotiated would be revised and destroyed by their political opponents, and even their friends.
For this reason, the entire peace process — including the two-state solution — is a chimera. Neither side can live with what the other can offer. But if it is a fiction, it is a fiction that serves U.S. purposes. The United States has interests that go well beyond Israeli interests and sometimes go in a different direction altogether. Like Israel, the United States understands that one of the major obstacles to any serious evolution toward a two-state solution is Arab hostility to such an outcome.
The Jordanians have feared and loathed Fatah in the West Bank ever since the Black September uprisings of 1970. The ruling Hashemites are ethnically different from the Palestinians (who constitute an overwhelming majority of the Jordanian population), and they fear that a Palestinian state under Fatah would threaten the Jordanian monarchy. For their part, the Egyptians see Hamas as a descendent of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks the Mubarak government's ouster — meaning Cairo would hate to see a Hamas-led state. Meanwhile, the Saudis and the other Arab states do not wish to see a radical altering of the status quo, which would likely come about with the rise of a Palestinian polity.
At the same time, whatever the basic strategic interests of the Arab regimes, all pay lip service to the principle of Palestinian statehood. This is hardly a unique situation. States frequently claim to favor various things they actually are either indifferent to or have no intention of doing anything about. Complicating matters for the Arab states is the fact that they have substantial populations that do care about the fate of the Palestinians. These states thus are caught between public passion on behalf of Palestinians and the regimes' interests that are threatened by the Palestinian cause. The states' challenge, accordingly, is to appear to be doing something on behalf of the Palestinians while in fact doing nothing.
The United States has a vested interest in the preservation of these states. The futures of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are of vital importance to Washington. The United States must therefore simultaneously publicly demonstrate its sensitivity to pressures from these nations over the Palestinian question while being careful to achieve nothing — an easy enough goal to achieve.
The various Israeli-Palestinian peace processes have thus served U.S. and Arab interests quite well. They provide the illusion of activity, with high-level visits breathlessly reported in the media, succeeded by talks and concessions — all followed by stalemate and new rounds of violence, thus beginning the cycle all over again.
The Palestinian Peace Process as Political Theater
One of the most important proposals Netanyahu is bringing to Obama calls for reshaping the peace process. If Israeli President Shimon Peres is to be believed, Netanyahu will not back away from the two-state formula. Instead, the Israeli prime minister is asking that the various Arab state stakeholders become directly involved in the negotiations. In other words, Netanyahu is proposing that Arab states with very different public and private positions on Palestinian statehood be asked to participate — thereby forcing them to reveal publicly their true positions, ultimately creating internal political crises in the Arab states.
The clever thing about this position is that Netanyahu not only knows his request will not become a reality, but he also does not want it to become a reality. The political stability of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is as much an Israeli interest as an American one. Indeed, Israel even wants a stable Syria, since whatever would come after the Alawite regime in Damascus would be much more dangerous to Israeli security than the current Syrian regime.
Overall, Israel is a conservative power. In terms of nation-states, it does not want upheaval; it is quite content with the current regimes in the Arab world. But Netanyahu would love to see an international conference with the Arab states roundly condemning Israel publicly. This would shore up the justification for Netanyahu's policies domestically while simultaneously creating a framework for reshaping world opinion by showing an Israel isolated among hostile states.
Obama is likely hearing through diplomatic channels from the Arab countries that they do not want to participate directly in the Palestinian peace process. And the United States really does not want them there, either. The peace process normally ends in a train wreck anyway, and Obama is in no hurry to see the wreckage. He will want to insulate other allies from the fallout, putting off the denouement of the peace process as long as possible. Obama has sent George Mitchell as his Middle East special envoy to deal with the issue, and from the U.S. president's point of view, that is quite enough attention to the problem.
Netanyahu, of course, knows all this. Part of his mission is simply convincing his ruling coalition — and particularly Lieberman, whom Netanyahu needs to survive, and who is by far Israel's most aggressive foreign minister ever — that he is committed to redefining the entire Israeli-Palestinian relationship. But in a broader context, Netanyahu is looking for greater freedom of action. By posing a demand the United States will not grant, Israel is positioning itself to ask for something that appears smaller.
Israel and the Appearance of Freedom of Action
What Israel actually would do with greater freedom of action is far less important than simply creating the appearance that the United States has endorsed Israel's ability to act in a new and unpredictable manner. From Israel's point of view, the problem with Israeli-Palestinian relations is that Israel is under severe constraints from the United States, and the Palestinians know it. This means that the Palestinians can even anticipate the application of force by Israel, meaning they can prepare for it and endure it. From Netanyahu's point of view, Israel's primary problem is that the Palestinians are confident they know what the Israelis will do. If Netanyahu can get Obama to introduce a degree of ambiguity into the situation, Israel could regain the advantage of uncertainty.
The problem for Netanyahu is that Washington is not interested in having anything unpredictable happen in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The United States is quite content with the current situation, particularly while Iraq becomes more stable and the Afghan situation remains unstable. Obama does not want a crisis from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush. The fact that Netanyahu has a political coalition to satisfy will not interest the United States, and while Washington at some unspecified point might endorse a peace conference, it will not be until Israel and its foreign minister endorse the two-state formula.
Netanyahu will then shift to another area where freedom of action is relevant — namely, Iran. The Israelis have leaked to the Israeli media that the Obama administration has told them that Israel may not attack Iran without U.S. permission, and that Israel agreed to this requirement. (U.S. President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert went through the same routine not too long ago, using a good cop/bad cop act in a bid to kick-start negotiations with Iran.)
In reality, Israel would have a great deal of difficulty attacking Iranian facilities with non-nuclear forces. A multitarget campaign 1,000 miles away against an enemy with some air defenses could be a long and complex operation. Such a raid would require a long trip through U.S.-controlled airspace for the fairly small Israeli air force. Israel could use cruise missiles, but the tonnage of high explosive delivered by a cruise missile cannot penetrate even moderately hardened structures; the same is true for ICBMs carrying conventional warheads. Israel would have to notify the United States of its intentions because it would be passing through Iraqi airspace — and because U.S. technical intelligence would know what it was up to before Israeli aircraft even took off. The idea that Israel might consider attacking Iran without informing Washington is therefore absurd on the surface. Even so, the story has surfaced yet again in an Israeli newspaper in a virtual carbon copy of stories published more than a year ago.
Netanyahu has promised that the endless stalemate with the Palestinians will not be allowed to continue. He also knows that whatever happens, Israel cannot threaten the stability of Arab states that are by and large uninterested in the Palestinians. He also understands that in the long run, Israel's freedom of action is defined by the United States, not by Israel. His electoral platform and his strategic realities have never aligned. Arguably, it might be in the Israeli interest that the status quo be disrupted, but it is not in the American interest. Netanyahu therefore will get to redefine neither the Palestinian situation nor the Iranian situation. Israel simply lacks the power to impose the reality it wants, the current constellation of Arab regimes it needs, and the strategic relationship with the United States on which Israeli national security rests.
In the end, this is a classic study in the limits of power. Israel can have its freedom of action anytime it is willing to pay the price for it. But Israel can't pay the price. Netanyahu is coming to Washington to see if he can get what he wants without paying the price, and we suspect strongly he knows he won't get it. His problem is the same as that of the Arab states. There are many in Israel, particularly among Netanyahu's supporters, who believe Israel is a great power. It isn't. It is a nation that is strong partly because it lives in a pretty weak neighborhood, and partly because it has very strong friends. Many Israelis don't want to be told that, and Netanyahu came to office playing on the sense of Israeli national power.
So the peace process will continue, no one will expect anything from it, the Palestinians will remain isolated and wars regularly will break out. The only advantage of this situation from the U.S. point of view it is that it is preferable to all other available realities.
An Israeli Prime Minister Comes to Washington Again
Israeli-Palestinian Geopolitics and the Peace Process
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is visiting Washington for his first official visit with U.S. President Barack Obama. A range of issues — including the future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Israeli-Syrian talks and Iran policy — are on the table. This is one of an endless series of meetings between U.S. presidents and Israeli prime ministers over the years, many of which concerned these same issues. Yet little has changed.
That Israel has a new prime minister and the United States a new president might appear to make this meeting significant. But this is Netanyahu's second time as prime minister, and his government is as diverse and fractious as most recent Israeli governments. Israeli politics are in gridlock, with deep divisions along multiple fault lines and an electoral system designed to magnify disagreements.
Obama is much stronger politically, but he has consistently acted with caution, particularly in the foreign policy arena. Much of his foreign policy follows from the Bush administration. He has made no major breaks in foreign policy beyond rhetoric; his policies on Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and Europe are essentially extensions of pre-existing policy. Obama faces major economic problems in the United States and clearly is not looking for major changes in foreign policy. He understands how quickly public sentiment can change, and he does not plan to take risks he does not have to take right now.
This, then, is the problem: Netanyahu is coming to Washington hoping to get Obama to agree to fundamental redefinitions of the regional dynamic. For example, he wants Obama to re-examine the commitment to a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. (Netanyahu's foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has said Israel is no longer bound by prior commitments to that concept.) Netanyahu also wants the United States to commit itself to a finite time frame for talks with Iran, after which unspecified but ominous-sounding actions are to be taken.
Facing a major test in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama has more than enough to deal with at the moment. Moreover, U.S. presidents who get involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations frequently get sucked into a morass from which they do not return. For Netanyahu to even request that the White House devote attention to the Israeli-Palestinian problem at present is asking a lot. Asking for a complete review of the peace process is even less realistic.
Obstacles to the Two-State Solution
The foundation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for years has been the assumption that there would be a two-state solution. Such a solution has not materialized for a host of reasons. First, at present there are two Palestinian entities, Gaza and the West Bank, which are hostile to each other. Second, the geography and economy of any Palestinian state would be so reliant on Israel that independence would be meaningless; geography simply makes the two-state proposal almost impossible to implement. Third, no Palestinian government would have the power to guarantee that rogue elements would not launch rockets at Israel, potentially striking at the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor, Israel's heartland. And fourth, neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have the domestic political coherence to allow any negotiator to operate from a position of confidence. Whatever the two sides negotiated would be revised and destroyed by their political opponents, and even their friends.
For this reason, the entire peace process — including the two-state solution — is a chimera. Neither side can live with what the other can offer. But if it is a fiction, it is a fiction that serves U.S. purposes. The United States has interests that go well beyond Israeli interests and sometimes go in a different direction altogether. Like Israel, the United States understands that one of the major obstacles to any serious evolution toward a two-state solution is Arab hostility to such an outcome.
The Jordanians have feared and loathed Fatah in the West Bank ever since the Black September uprisings of 1970. The ruling Hashemites are ethnically different from the Palestinians (who constitute an overwhelming majority of the Jordanian population), and they fear that a Palestinian state under Fatah would threaten the Jordanian monarchy. For their part, the Egyptians see Hamas as a descendent of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks the Mubarak government's ouster — meaning Cairo would hate to see a Hamas-led state. Meanwhile, the Saudis and the other Arab states do not wish to see a radical altering of the status quo, which would likely come about with the rise of a Palestinian polity.
At the same time, whatever the basic strategic interests of the Arab regimes, all pay lip service to the principle of Palestinian statehood. This is hardly a unique situation. States frequently claim to favor various things they actually are either indifferent to or have no intention of doing anything about. Complicating matters for the Arab states is the fact that they have substantial populations that do care about the fate of the Palestinians. These states thus are caught between public passion on behalf of Palestinians and the regimes' interests that are threatened by the Palestinian cause. The states' challenge, accordingly, is to appear to be doing something on behalf of the Palestinians while in fact doing nothing.
The United States has a vested interest in the preservation of these states. The futures of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are of vital importance to Washington. The United States must therefore simultaneously publicly demonstrate its sensitivity to pressures from these nations over the Palestinian question while being careful to achieve nothing — an easy enough goal to achieve.
The various Israeli-Palestinian peace processes have thus served U.S. and Arab interests quite well. They provide the illusion of activity, with high-level visits breathlessly reported in the media, succeeded by talks and concessions — all followed by stalemate and new rounds of violence, thus beginning the cycle all over again.
The Palestinian Peace Process as Political Theater
One of the most important proposals Netanyahu is bringing to Obama calls for reshaping the peace process. If Israeli President Shimon Peres is to be believed, Netanyahu will not back away from the two-state formula. Instead, the Israeli prime minister is asking that the various Arab state stakeholders become directly involved in the negotiations. In other words, Netanyahu is proposing that Arab states with very different public and private positions on Palestinian statehood be asked to participate — thereby forcing them to reveal publicly their true positions, ultimately creating internal political crises in the Arab states.
The clever thing about this position is that Netanyahu not only knows his request will not become a reality, but he also does not want it to become a reality. The political stability of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is as much an Israeli interest as an American one. Indeed, Israel even wants a stable Syria, since whatever would come after the Alawite regime in Damascus would be much more dangerous to Israeli security than the current Syrian regime.
Overall, Israel is a conservative power. In terms of nation-states, it does not want upheaval; it is quite content with the current regimes in the Arab world. But Netanyahu would love to see an international conference with the Arab states roundly condemning Israel publicly. This would shore up the justification for Netanyahu's policies domestically while simultaneously creating a framework for reshaping world opinion by showing an Israel isolated among hostile states.
Obama is likely hearing through diplomatic channels from the Arab countries that they do not want to participate directly in the Palestinian peace process. And the United States really does not want them there, either. The peace process normally ends in a train wreck anyway, and Obama is in no hurry to see the wreckage. He will want to insulate other allies from the fallout, putting off the denouement of the peace process as long as possible. Obama has sent George Mitchell as his Middle East special envoy to deal with the issue, and from the U.S. president's point of view, that is quite enough attention to the problem.
Netanyahu, of course, knows all this. Part of his mission is simply convincing his ruling coalition — and particularly Lieberman, whom Netanyahu needs to survive, and who is by far Israel's most aggressive foreign minister ever — that he is committed to redefining the entire Israeli-Palestinian relationship. But in a broader context, Netanyahu is looking for greater freedom of action. By posing a demand the United States will not grant, Israel is positioning itself to ask for something that appears smaller.
Israel and the Appearance of Freedom of Action
What Israel actually would do with greater freedom of action is far less important than simply creating the appearance that the United States has endorsed Israel's ability to act in a new and unpredictable manner. From Israel's point of view, the problem with Israeli-Palestinian relations is that Israel is under severe constraints from the United States, and the Palestinians know it. This means that the Palestinians can even anticipate the application of force by Israel, meaning they can prepare for it and endure it. From Netanyahu's point of view, Israel's primary problem is that the Palestinians are confident they know what the Israelis will do. If Netanyahu can get Obama to introduce a degree of ambiguity into the situation, Israel could regain the advantage of uncertainty.
The problem for Netanyahu is that Washington is not interested in having anything unpredictable happen in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The United States is quite content with the current situation, particularly while Iraq becomes more stable and the Afghan situation remains unstable. Obama does not want a crisis from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush. The fact that Netanyahu has a political coalition to satisfy will not interest the United States, and while Washington at some unspecified point might endorse a peace conference, it will not be until Israel and its foreign minister endorse the two-state formula.
Netanyahu will then shift to another area where freedom of action is relevant — namely, Iran. The Israelis have leaked to the Israeli media that the Obama administration has told them that Israel may not attack Iran without U.S. permission, and that Israel agreed to this requirement. (U.S. President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert went through the same routine not too long ago, using a good cop/bad cop act in a bid to kick-start negotiations with Iran.)
In reality, Israel would have a great deal of difficulty attacking Iranian facilities with non-nuclear forces. A multitarget campaign 1,000 miles away against an enemy with some air defenses could be a long and complex operation. Such a raid would require a long trip through U.S.-controlled airspace for the fairly small Israeli air force. Israel could use cruise missiles, but the tonnage of high explosive delivered by a cruise missile cannot penetrate even moderately hardened structures; the same is true for ICBMs carrying conventional warheads. Israel would have to notify the United States of its intentions because it would be passing through Iraqi airspace — and because U.S. technical intelligence would know what it was up to before Israeli aircraft even took off. The idea that Israel might consider attacking Iran without informing Washington is therefore absurd on the surface. Even so, the story has surfaced yet again in an Israeli newspaper in a virtual carbon copy of stories published more than a year ago.
Netanyahu has promised that the endless stalemate with the Palestinians will not be allowed to continue. He also knows that whatever happens, Israel cannot threaten the stability of Arab states that are by and large uninterested in the Palestinians. He also understands that in the long run, Israel's freedom of action is defined by the United States, not by Israel. His electoral platform and his strategic realities have never aligned. Arguably, it might be in the Israeli interest that the status quo be disrupted, but it is not in the American interest. Netanyahu therefore will get to redefine neither the Palestinian situation nor the Iranian situation. Israel simply lacks the power to impose the reality it wants, the current constellation of Arab regimes it needs, and the strategic relationship with the United States on which Israeli national security rests.
In the end, this is a classic study in the limits of power. Israel can have its freedom of action anytime it is willing to pay the price for it. But Israel can't pay the price. Netanyahu is coming to Washington to see if he can get what he wants without paying the price, and we suspect strongly he knows he won't get it. His problem is the same as that of the Arab states. There are many in Israel, particularly among Netanyahu's supporters, who believe Israel is a great power. It isn't. It is a nation that is strong partly because it lives in a pretty weak neighborhood, and partly because it has very strong friends. Many Israelis don't want to be told that, and Netanyahu came to office playing on the sense of Israeli national power.
So the peace process will continue, no one will expect anything from it, the Palestinians will remain isolated and wars regularly will break out. The only advantage of this situation from the U.S. point of view it is that it is preferable to all other available realities.
The Arms-Control Dinosaurs Are Back Marc A. Thiessen, The Wall Street Journal
The Arms-Control Dinosaurs Are Back
Marc A. Thiessen, The Wall Street Journal
When John Bolton served in the State Department during the Bush administration, he often walked the halls of Foggy Bottom wearing his trademark dinosaur ties -- a self-deprecating nod to those who thought his political views somewhat Jurassic. Today other dinosaurs have replaced him.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124268963178032407.html#mod=WSJ_topics_obama?mod=rss_topics_obama
Marc A. Thiessen, The Wall Street Journal
When John Bolton served in the State Department during the Bush administration, he often walked the halls of Foggy Bottom wearing his trademark dinosaur ties -- a self-deprecating nod to those who thought his political views somewhat Jurassic. Today other dinosaurs have replaced him.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124268963178032407.html#mod=WSJ_topics_obama?mod=rss_topics_obama
Obama Meets on Nuclear Weapons Foon Rhee, The Boston Globe
Obama Meets on Nuclear Weapons
Foon Rhee, The Boston Globe
President Obama brought in some old foreign policy hands -- both Democrats and Republicans -- for some counsel today on how to fulfill his long-term vision of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/05/obama_meets_on.html
Foon Rhee, The Boston Globe
President Obama brought in some old foreign policy hands -- both Democrats and Republicans -- for some counsel today on how to fulfill his long-term vision of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/05/obama_meets_on.html
Bringing Iran In From the Cold Nader Mousavizadeh, The Washington Post
Bringing Iran In From the Cold
Nader Mousavizadeh, The Washington Post
A fateful consensus is forming around the proposition that war with Iran is inevitable. The failure of the past eight years' non-diplomacy has resulted in a worst-case scenario whereby Iran, most experts agree, has passed the point of no return in terms of technical nuclear weapons capability without violating its legal obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/20/AR2009052002981.html
Nader Mousavizadeh, The Washington Post
A fateful consensus is forming around the proposition that war with Iran is inevitable. The failure of the past eight years' non-diplomacy has resulted in a worst-case scenario whereby Iran, most experts agree, has passed the point of no return in terms of technical nuclear weapons capability without violating its legal obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/20/AR2009052002981.html
Iranian Missile Launch Confirmed Thomas Erdbrink, The Washington Post
Iranian Missile Launch Confirmed
Thomas Erdbrink, The Washington Post
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced Wednesday that his country had successfully test-fired a medium-range solid-fuel missile apparently capable of striking Israel and U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/20/AR2009052000523.html
Thomas Erdbrink, The Washington Post
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced Wednesday that his country had successfully test-fired a medium-range solid-fuel missile apparently capable of striking Israel and U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/20/AR2009052000523.html
Obama Approves Nuclear Energy Deal with UAE
Obama Approves Nuclear Energy Deal with UAE
Doug Palmer, Reuters
U.S. President Barack Obama on Wednesday approved a nuclear energy deal with the United Arab Emirates worth potentially billions of dollars to U.S. energy companies, setting the stage for Congress to decide whether to block it.
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN2053210320090520
* Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123748.htm
Doug Palmer, Reuters
U.S. President Barack Obama on Wednesday approved a nuclear energy deal with the United Arab Emirates worth potentially billions of dollars to U.S. energy companies, setting the stage for Congress to decide whether to block it.
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN2053210320090520
* Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123748.htm
The Taming of the Great Nuclear Powers Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, Policy Outlook
The Taming of the Great Nuclear Powers
Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, Policy Outlook
Nuclear TestIn this Policy Outlook Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, an eminent Dutch scholar, argues that nuclear weapons have unintended beneficial consequences. They can make the intended development of a more peaceful global and political order possible. The Carnegie Nonproliferation Program presents this paper in hopes of furthering international dialogue and debate on the nuclear order, including the abolition of nuclear weapons.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23152&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, Policy Outlook
Nuclear TestIn this Policy Outlook Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, an eminent Dutch scholar, argues that nuclear weapons have unintended beneficial consequences. They can make the intended development of a more peaceful global and political order possible. The Carnegie Nonproliferation Program presents this paper in hopes of furthering international dialogue and debate on the nuclear order, including the abolition of nuclear weapons.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23152&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Laura Rozen's blog - Obama's power players
Laura Rozen's blog
Obama's power players
THE CABLE
Wed, 05/20/2009 - 7:06pm
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Vice
President Joseph Biden, and national security advisor Gen. James L. Jones,
of course, are the Obama administration's foreign-policy heavyweights. But
beneath the layer of cabinet secretaries, who are the most influential
foreign-policy players on the team? The following is FP's list of the 10
administration officials who, according to existing reporting and with input from
sources, are driving U.S. foreign policy in the Obama era:
Thomas Donilon: As deputy national security advisor, Donilon, 53, is the
lynchpin of the interagency process, in charge of running the deputies
meetings, where the real foreign- policy options get ironed out (Deputies
Committee members do the heavy lifting for their agencies in the interagency
process, and speak for their principals). Donilon is what keeps the government
together, one associate said. "He doesn't have time to talk; he runs the
government when it comes to foreign policy." "Tom is a real pro," the NSC's
director of strategic communications Denis McDonough said. He "runs
agenda-driven meetings, no drama, all facts, careful to make sure everyone with
equities is heard and does not shy away from the hard questions. The president
feels fortunate to have him on the team."
James Steinberg: As a former deputy national security advisor himself,
Steinberg, one of two deputy secretaries of states (along with Jacob Lew), is a
veteran of the interagency process, where he now represents Clinton's
State Department. With a reputation for prodigious intellectual energy (and a
near-photographic memory), and command of a comprehensive range of
national-security issues, Steinberg brings competence as well as longstanding
relationships with other players sitting around the deputies table and in the
wider administration. Lew, a former Clinton-era director of the Office of
Management and Budget, oversees development, staffing, management and budget
issues for Foggy Bottom, and is said to have a closer relationship with
Clinton, for whom he was recently dispatched on a quiet mission to Afghanistan.
But Steinberg, department sources say, spends as much as half his time at
the White House, the nerve center of the interagency process where policies
get hammered out and where the thrust of the national-security action in
the new administration appears to be happening. Sources also caution not to
underestimate Lew's influence on long-term development and staffing issues,
however.
Michèle Flournoy: As under secretary of defense for policy, Flournoy is
technically the Defense Department's No. 3 official. But in the interagency
process, according to many sources, Flournoy functions as the No. 2,
attending the Deputies Committee meetings as the DoD's civilian representative
(Marine Gen. Jim Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
represents the uniformed brass and is "a very influential voice on the Deputies
Committee and with the president," one White House associate said). A former
Clinton-era principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy
and threat reduction who cofounded the Center for a New American Security,
Flournoy shepherded a team of think tank-bred, hard- and soft-power wonks
into her policy shop as lieutenants to work on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and other strategic issues, even before the confirmations of many State and
other DOD officials were formally announced. Obama was able to announce
major policy shifts on Iraq soon after taking office in large part fueled by
thinking out of Flournoy's shop. Next up, she'll take the lead in writing
the Quadrennial Defense Review, the influential blueprint that will help
shape U.S. strategic posture for the future. With conventional wisdom being
that Defense Secretary Gates may not serve out a full term, and Deputy
Secretary William Lynn focused on making the trains run on time, Flournoy's ascent
to even higher echelons of government seems likely.
Anthony Blinken: Dual-hatted as national-security advisor to Vice President
Biden and the deputy representing the Office of the Vice President at
deputies meetings, Blinken is a former Clinton-era NSC senior director for
Europe and a long-time aide to Biden on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Blinken "is important to Biden, and Biden is important," one associate
observed. There has been a concerted effort to integrate Biden and Blinken
into everything done on the foreign policy side. Both men sit in on the
president's daily intelligence briefing in the Oval Office, usually the first
meeting of the day. Both attend the weekly meetings Obama has with Clinton,
Gates, and every other national security meeting the president has. And when
Biden is traveling, Blinken attends such meetings on his own. Blinken is
good friends of long standing with Donilon, Steinberg, and Flournoy, the
other main participants in the Deputies Committee. As another associate notes,
Blinken "has been around forever and everyone likes him." Blinken's wife,
Evan Ryan, also used to work in the Clinton White House and is now Biden's
chief of intergovernmental affairs and public liaison.
Mark Lippert: Once the only foreign-policy aide to then Senator Obama,
Lippert, now the NSC No. 3 and chief of staff overseeing a staff of well over
200 people, maintains a relationship with the president unrivalled by that
of any superior or the many hundred foreign-policy hands now serving in the
administration. He's the "gatekeeper, scheduler, and trip planner," said
one associate. A Stanford grad who worked for Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) on
Capitol Hill, Lippert signed up for the Navy reserves as an intelligence
specialist, and ended up getting deployed
Obama's power players
THE CABLE
Wed, 05/20/2009 - 7:06pm
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Vice
President Joseph Biden, and national security advisor Gen. James L. Jones,
of course, are the Obama administration's foreign-policy heavyweights. But
beneath the layer of cabinet secretaries, who are the most influential
foreign-policy players on the team? The following is FP's list of the 10
administration officials who, according to existing reporting and with input from
sources, are driving U.S. foreign policy in the Obama era:
Thomas Donilon: As deputy national security advisor, Donilon, 53, is the
lynchpin of the interagency process, in charge of running the deputies
meetings, where the real foreign- policy options get ironed out (Deputies
Committee members do the heavy lifting for their agencies in the interagency
process, and speak for their principals). Donilon is what keeps the government
together, one associate said. "He doesn't have time to talk; he runs the
government when it comes to foreign policy." "Tom is a real pro," the NSC's
director of strategic communications Denis McDonough said. He "runs
agenda-driven meetings, no drama, all facts, careful to make sure everyone with
equities is heard and does not shy away from the hard questions. The president
feels fortunate to have him on the team."
James Steinberg: As a former deputy national security advisor himself,
Steinberg, one of two deputy secretaries of states (along with Jacob Lew), is a
veteran of the interagency process, where he now represents Clinton's
State Department. With a reputation for prodigious intellectual energy (and a
near-photographic memory), and command of a comprehensive range of
national-security issues, Steinberg brings competence as well as longstanding
relationships with other players sitting around the deputies table and in the
wider administration. Lew, a former Clinton-era director of the Office of
Management and Budget, oversees development, staffing, management and budget
issues for Foggy Bottom, and is said to have a closer relationship with
Clinton, for whom he was recently dispatched on a quiet mission to Afghanistan.
But Steinberg, department sources say, spends as much as half his time at
the White House, the nerve center of the interagency process where policies
get hammered out and where the thrust of the national-security action in
the new administration appears to be happening. Sources also caution not to
underestimate Lew's influence on long-term development and staffing issues,
however.
Michèle Flournoy: As under secretary of defense for policy, Flournoy is
technically the Defense Department's No. 3 official. But in the interagency
process, according to many sources, Flournoy functions as the No. 2,
attending the Deputies Committee meetings as the DoD's civilian representative
(Marine Gen. Jim Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
represents the uniformed brass and is "a very influential voice on the Deputies
Committee and with the president," one White House associate said). A former
Clinton-era principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy
and threat reduction who cofounded the Center for a New American Security,
Flournoy shepherded a team of think tank-bred, hard- and soft-power wonks
into her policy shop as lieutenants to work on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and other strategic issues, even before the confirmations of many State and
other DOD officials were formally announced. Obama was able to announce
major policy shifts on Iraq soon after taking office in large part fueled by
thinking out of Flournoy's shop. Next up, she'll take the lead in writing
the Quadrennial Defense Review, the influential blueprint that will help
shape U.S. strategic posture for the future. With conventional wisdom being
that Defense Secretary Gates may not serve out a full term, and Deputy
Secretary William Lynn focused on making the trains run on time, Flournoy's ascent
to even higher echelons of government seems likely.
Anthony Blinken: Dual-hatted as national-security advisor to Vice President
Biden and the deputy representing the Office of the Vice President at
deputies meetings, Blinken is a former Clinton-era NSC senior director for
Europe and a long-time aide to Biden on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Blinken "is important to Biden, and Biden is important," one associate
observed. There has been a concerted effort to integrate Biden and Blinken
into everything done on the foreign policy side. Both men sit in on the
president's daily intelligence briefing in the Oval Office, usually the first
meeting of the day. Both attend the weekly meetings Obama has with Clinton,
Gates, and every other national security meeting the president has. And when
Biden is traveling, Blinken attends such meetings on his own. Blinken is
good friends of long standing with Donilon, Steinberg, and Flournoy, the
other main participants in the Deputies Committee. As another associate notes,
Blinken "has been around forever and everyone likes him." Blinken's wife,
Evan Ryan, also used to work in the Clinton White House and is now Biden's
chief of intergovernmental affairs and public liaison.
Mark Lippert: Once the only foreign-policy aide to then Senator Obama,
Lippert, now the NSC No. 3 and chief of staff overseeing a staff of well over
200 people, maintains a relationship with the president unrivalled by that
of any superior or the many hundred foreign-policy hands now serving in the
administration. He's the "gatekeeper, scheduler, and trip planner," said
one associate. A Stanford grad who worked for Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) on
Capitol Hill, Lippert signed up for the Navy reserves as an intelligence
specialist, and ended up getting deployed