The Case For and Against Bank Nationalization
http://www.rgemonitor.com/roubini-monitor/255740/the_case_for_and_against_bank_nationalization
Matthew Richardson | Feb 26, 2009
Secretary Geithner’s financial plan calls for stress tests at the large complex financial institutions (LCFIs). These tests are due to start this week. They will involve estimates on the eventual losses due to default on a wide variety of assets.
Economic analysts have already performed such a test at the aggregate level. It was not a pretty picture. For example, Goldman Sachs looked at the U.S. banking sector’s holdings of the current “toxic” pool of assets, such as option ARM residential mortgages, subprime residential mortgages, Alt-A residential mortgages, credit card debt, second liens/home equity loans, consumer auto loans, and commercial real estate. Expected losses come in at around $900 billion. These losses give the banking sector very little wiggle room. Therefore, there is the real possibility that some LCFIs are bankrupt - the face value of the liabilities exceed the current value of their assets.
I. Insolvent Financial Institutions
If a bank is insolvent, there are three general ways to attack the problem.
The first is unbridled free market capitalism. I am sympathetic to this view. I wish we somehow could figure out a way to let the market work and let these institutions fend for themselves. Shareholders, creditors and counterparties knew the risks they were getting into. After all, why is some debt secured, why do we have collateralized lending, why do riskier assets deserve larger haircuts, etc…? But when Lehman Brothers went down, we looked into the abyss. This would be the equivalent of nuclear armageddon for the financial system.
The second is to provide government aid to the insolvent bank, to in effect throw good money after bad. This is sanctioning private profit taking with socialized risk. Since October of this past year, the government has followed this strategy. Let the banks plod along, throwing money here and there to keep them afloat, at usually way below market prices at a high cost to taxpayers.
It is not a totally crazy solution. There may well be a positive externality to spending taxpayer money to save a few so we can save the entire system. For economists specializing in the field of banking, however, this approach has a familiar ring. In Japan’s lost decade of the 90’s, Japanese banks kept loaning funds to bankrupt firms so as not to writedown their own losses, which resulted in the government supporting zombie banks supporting zombie firms.
As an example, consider the poster child for the “freebie” programs, the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, started in late November of 2008. For a cost of 0.75%, it allows banks to issue bonds backed by the government, i.e., essentially risk free. The banks have accessed this market 97 times for $190 billion!
The biggest pig at the trough - Bank of America 11 times for $35.5 billion. But close behind, JP Morgan at $30 billion, GE Capital $27 billion, Citigroup $24 billion, Morgan Stanley $19 billion, Goldman Sachs $19 billion and Wells Fargo $6 billion. A not so surprising correlation with their respective writedowns (including merged entities), Bank of America $96 billion, JP Morgan $75 billion, Citigroup $88 billion, Morgan Stanley $22 billion, Goldman Sachs $7 billion and Wells Fargo $115 billion.
In terms of helping us move forward out of the financial crisis, this program has many problems. It charges the same amount for each institution, so it hardly separates the solvent from the insolvent institutions. It charges a fee which is grossly below what these institutions could issue in the marketplace given their current balance sheets, distorting the system. Wasn’t this the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac problem? And it makes it less likely to cleanse the system of the toxic assets because these institutions can continue their way out-of-the-money option and hope that the prices of the toxic assets increase. In effect, the access to this capital allows them to continue to make the original bet.
The final way of addressing insolvency is nationalization. Over the past week, there has been debate about whether nationalization is the right word. According to a standard dictionary definition, it is the act of transferring ownership from the private sector to the public sector. Although this is literally what we are talking about here with certain banks, almost everyone agrees that the type of nationalization that would take place would be a temporary one. Thus, if everything went as planned, a better analogy would be of the government acting as a trustee in a receivership of the bank.
That said, I do think a term like nationalization is the appropriate description. It is a misnomer to think, as a number of pundits have suggested, that we have experience at nationalizing banks through the FDIC. For example, the latest bank (and 39th of the current crisis) to be closed by regulators is the Silver Falls Bank of Silverton, Oregon. It has three branches and assets of approximately $131 million.
It goes without saying that Silver Falls Bank is no Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, or JP Morgan, among others. The complexity, size and systemic nature of these institutions deserve deep analysis.
The basic argument for nationalization is that we need an organization to simultaneously facilitate the reorganization of the LCFI and be a trustworthy counterparty to all the current and ongoing transactions. The only one with the balance sheet right now is Uncle Sam. But make no mistake about it. With nationalization of a LCFI, the government is the owner and the ultimate residual claimant. Once we take down the LCFI, we have crossed the Rubicon. The die is cast and there is no turning back.
II. Pros and Cons of Nationalization
It is therefore important to do it right.
* The good bank, bad bank model. Nationalization one-nil.
In order to have a healthy economy, we need a healthy financial system, and for a healthy financial system we need to cleanse the system of the bad assets. Otherwise, creditworthy firms and institutions will not have access to the needed capital, and will prolong the economic downturn.
This is the primary benefit of nationalization of some of the LCFIs. In receivership, it is much easier to separate the bank’s good assets and bad assets – to divest the firm from its toxic assets and troubled loans. This is because insolvent institutions will never take this action. If they did, it would by construction force them under.
The way it would work is that the healthy assets and most of the bank’s operations would go to the good bank as would the deposits. Some of these deposits are insured, others (e.g., businesses and foreign holdings) are not. But the likelihood is that the good bank is now so well capitalized that there would be no threat of a bank run. The net equity, i.e., assets minus deposits, would be a claim held by the other existing creditors of the bank, namely shareholders, preferred shareholders, short-term debtholders and long-term debtholders.
The goal would be to reprivatize the good bank as soon as possible. After all, the point of the exercise is to create health financial institutions which can start lending again to creditworthy institutions. In almost every successful resolution of financial crises in other countries, this was the path.
Of course, the tricky part of nationalization is the handling of the bad assets. The bad assets would be broken into two types – those that need to be managed such as defaulted loans in which the bank would own the underlying asset, and those that could be held such as securities like the AAA- and subordinated tranches of asset-backed securities. With respect to the former, the government could hire outside distressed investors or create partnerships with outside investors as was done with the Resolution Trust Corporation in the S&L crisis.
Along with the equity of the good bank, these assets would be owned by the existing creditors. The proceeds over time would accrue to the various creditors according to the priority of the claims. Most likely, the existing equity and preferred shares would be wiped out in such an arrangement and the debt would effectively have been swapped into equity in the new structure. Under this scenario, it is quite possible, even likely, that taxpayers would end up paying nothing. This is because, for the LCFIs, these creditors cover well over half the liabilities.
* Systemic Risk. Nationalization one-one.
The problem with the above solution is that it shifts all the risk of the insolvent institution onto the creditors of the LCFI. While this is fair to the extent the creditors were accruing the profits in normal times, it may lead to the “Lehman Brothers problem”, that is, this could create runs throughout the system.
Why did Lehman Brothers cause systemic risk?
Was it the counterparty risk, e.g., fear of being on the other side of interest rate swap, credit default swap, or repo transactions? This fear was well founded. Ask any hedge fund whose hypothecated securities disappeared in Lehman’s U.K. prime brokerage operations. It is pretty clear that the government would have to stand behind any counterparty transaction and publicly commit to this rule. Since most of these are margined and collateralized, however, many of the assets would show up in the good bank.
Or was it the short-term debt? The run on money market funds was directly attributable to the Reserve Primary fund’s holdings of a large amount of short-term Lehman commercial paper. One would presume the same thing would happen here as the short-term debt of all questionable LCFIs would come under pressure. It is highly likely that the government might have to step in.
As compared to the standard LCFI, Lehman had very little long-term debt. To understand whether a collapse in the LCFI’s long-term debt value is systemic, one would have to analyze the concentration of this debt throughout the system. If it is widely held, it is unlikely to have systemic consequences. Of course, it would have profound effects on future financing of these firms.
If the government has to cover the creditors, or at least some of them, what has been gained?
On the positive side, the system will have cleansed itself of the assets.
Moreover, to minimize the cost to taxpayers, it is not clear that the government will have to step in. If the government is completely transparent to the market who is solvent and who isn’t, and the reasons why this is, then the type of uncertainty that surrounded Lehman’s failure may be mitigated. Perhaps, the runs on the equity and debt of banks in September and October 2008 occurred because there was no clear message from the regulator.
That said, actions speak louder than words, and, in a dynamic setting where conditions change rapidly, solvent firms can become insolvent very quickly. While the government needs to do a thorough stress analysis, consistent across all the major banks, to find out the trouble spots, the only definitive way they can prevent a bank run on solvent institutions is to backstop all the creditors of these institutions. Maybe the government can provide a haircut, guaranteeing X% of the debt. In any event, in this case, the creditors of the insolvent institutions would not have to be protected.
* The toxic asset problem. Nationalization two-one.
It has been argued that trying to implement nationalization will be near impossible because we won’t be able to price the hard-to-value, socalled toxic assets. It is actually the opposite. The current problem is that banks don‘t want to sell the assets at the price the market is willing to pay for them. If we were banks, we wouldn’t want to sell them either. As long as the government is providing us free money to continue, why not continue the option? Hope is eternal.
But let’s be real. The banks bought illiquid assets with credit risk using short-term liquid funds to borrow against. For taking these types of risk, the banks got paid a hefty spread. And, in normal times, they raked it in. But there is no free lunch in capital markets. In rare bad times, illiquid, defaultable, assets are going to get greatly impaired. There is no mulligan here. It will be easier to resolve this within a receivership.
To make the point using a real economy analogy, this past Christmas, Saks Fifth Avenue sold their designer lines at a 70% discount. Designer labels and boutique shops on Madison Avenue were up in arms. How could they sell $500 Manolo Blahnik shoes for $150? In this economy, they are $150 shoes.
Moreover, receivership allows one to separate out the assets without having to price them.
* Managing a LCFI. Nationalization two-two.
Does the government have the ability to run a LCFI? In a recent conversation, Myron Scholes told me he was also in favor of nationalization, but as long as it lasts just 10 minutes.
With literally tens of thousands of transactions on their books, who is going to manage a LCFI while it is a government institution, good bank or bad bank? Certainly, no one envisions Barney Frank or Christopher Dodd as the Chief Investment Officers of these firms, but there are many concerns. The government can go and hire professionals as they have done with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and A.I.G. But much of the value of a Wall Street firm is in its vast array of intangible, human capital. This labor is incentive driven. How much franchise value will be lost during the nationalization process?
Let’s assume this gets sorted out and the government mirrors employment practices elsewhere at other firms. But then with the government’s protection in receivership, who is to prevent the LCFI from making too many, risky loans. They will have a competitive advantage over solvent, albeit less supported banks. This issue has recently come up with other government supported institutions. Indeed, the argument has been made that A.I.G. and Northern Rock to name just two have undercut their competition by respectively offering overly cheap insurance and mortgages.
* Moral hazard. Nationalization three-two.
There is something unseemly about managed funds buying up the debt of financial institutions under the assumption that these firms are too-big-to-fail. In theory, these funds should be the ones imposing market discipline on the behavior of financial firms, not pushing them to becoming bigger and more unwieldly.
It has been said by many that this is not the time for thinking about moral hazard. I disagree. If we bailout the creditors, then effectively we have guaranteed all debt of future financial institutions. We have implicitly socialized our private financial system.
It is certainly true that we can institute future regulatory reform which tries to quell the behavior of LCFIs. But this will be complex and difficult to implement against the implicit guarantee of too-big-to-fail.
Thus, nationalization resolves the biggest regulatory issue down the road, namely the too-big-too-fail problem of banks that are systemically important. In one fell swoop, because the senior unsecured debtholders of the bank lose when it is nationalized, market discipline comes back to the whole financial sector.
So the large solvent banks will have to change their behavior as well, leading most likely to their own privately and more efficiently run spinoffs and deconsolidation. The reform of systemic risk in the financial system may be easier than we think.
III. Concluding Remark
We are definitely caught between a rock and a hard place. But the question is what can we do if a major bank is insolvent? Sometimes the best way to repair a severely dilapidated house is to knock it down and rebuild it. Ironically, the best hope of maintaining a private banking system may be to nationalize some of its banks. Yes, it is risky. It could go wrong. But it is the surest path to avoid a “lost decade” like Japan.
IV. Case Study: Sweden[1]
Sweden has been cited frequently as a model of “nationalization”. While this is probably an exaggeration, the Swedish model is in many ways a model in terms of the principles it puts forth to handle a financial crisis. Putting aside the obvious fact that Sweden’s economy is much smaller and its financial institutions much less complex, it is a useful exercise to describe some basic facts.
The distribution of assets within the Swedish and U.S. banking system were similar. For example, while Sweden had 500 or so banks, 90% of the assets were concentrated in just six. In the U.S., while there are over 7,500 institutions, the majority of assets are concentrated in the top 15 or so.
Sweden’s credit and real estate boom in the late 1980’s closely mirror the U.S.’s similar boom prior to the current crisis. There was even a similar shadow banking system that developed during these periods – in Sweden, unregulated companies that financed their operations via commercial paper whereas in the U.S., unregulated special purpose vehicles (SPVs) via asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). When the bubble began to burst, there was also sudden collapses in these markets as a few of these companies and SPVs began to fail.[2] Ultimately, the funding came back to the banks, causing them to have large exposure to the real estate market.
As conditions eroded in 1991, the Swedish government forced banks to writedown their losses and required them to raise more capital, otherwise to be restructured by the government. Of the six largest banks, three – Forsta Sparbanken, Nordbanken and Gota Bank - failed the test. One received funding and the other two, Nordbanken and Gota bank, ended up being nationalized.
These latter two banks had their assets separated into good banks and bad banks. The good banks ended up merging a year later and were sold off to the private sector. The poorly performing loans were placed in the bad banks, respectively named Securum and Retrieva. These banks were managed by asset management companies who were hired to divest the assets of these banks in an orderly manner. (It took around four years.)
The main lessons from Sweden are relevant, however, for the current crisis:
1. Decisive action in terms of evaluating the solvency of the financial institutions.
2. Some form of “nationalization” of the insolvent firms.
3. Separation of these insolvent firms into good and bad ones with the idea of reprivatizing them.
4. The management of the process was delegated to professionals, as opposed to government regulators.
The issue of course is whether the complexity of the institutions affect how these principles should be applied in the current crisis. Complexity alone does not nullify these principles.
Professor Richardson is a contributor to the NYU Stern School of Business project, “Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System”, John Wiley & Sons, March, 2009.
[1] Many of the facts here are taken from Tanju Yoralmuzer’s piece, “Lessons from the Resolution of the Swedish Financial Crisis.”
[2] In Sweden, in September 1990, a finance company called Nyckeln went bankrupt, while in the current crisis, in early August 2007, three ABCP funds run by BNP Paribas halted redemptions, leading to a run on the system.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
The Great Gamble by Uri Avnery
Uri Avnery
21.2.09
The Great Gamble
“IACTA ALEA EST” – the die is cast – said Julius Caesar and crossed the River Rubicon on his way to conquer Rome. That was the end of Roman democracy.
We don’t have a Julius Caesar. But we do have an Avigdor Liberman. When he announced his support the other day for the setting up of a government headed by Binyamin Netanyahu, that was the crossing of his Rubicon.
I hope that this is not the beginning of the end of Israeli democracy.
UNTIL THE last moment, Liberman held the Israeli public in suspense. Will he join Netanyahu? Will he join Tzipi Livni?
Those who participated in the guessing game were divided in their view of Liberman.
Some of them said: Liberman is indeed what he pretends to be: an extreme nationalist racist. His aim is really to turn Israel into a Jewish state cleansed of Arabs – Araberrein, in German. He has only contempt for democracy, both in the country and in his own party, which consists of yesmen and yeswomen devoid of any identity of their own. Like similar parties in the past, it is based on a cult of (his) personality, the worship of brute force, contempt for democracy and disdain for the judicial system. In other countries this is called fascism.
Others say: that is all a façade. Liberman is no Israeli Fuehrer, because he is nothing but a cheat and a cynic. The police investigations against him and his business dealings with Palestinians show him to be a corrupt opportunist. He is also a friend of Tzipi. He cultivates a fascist image in order to pave his way to power. He will sell all his slogans for a piece of government.
The first Liberman would support the setting up of an extreme Right government by Netanyahu. The second Liberman could support a Livni government. For a whole week he juggled the balls. Now he has decided: he is indeed an extreme nationalist racist. As the Americans say: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.
For appearances’ sake he told the President that his proposal to entrust Netanyahu with the setting up of a government applies only to a broad-based coalition encompassing Likud, Kadima and his own party. But that is just a gimmick: probably such a government will not come into being, and the next government will be a coalition of Likud, Liberman, the disciples of Meir Kahane and the religious parties.
SOME ON the Left say: Excellent. The voters will get exactly what they deserve. At long last, there will be an exclusively rightist government.
One of the proponents of this attitude is Gideon Levy, a consistent advocate of peace, democracy and civil equality.
He and those who think like him say: Israel simply has to pass through this phase before it can recover. The Right must get unlimited power to realize its program, without the pretext of being hindered by leftist or centrist members of the coalition. Let them try, in full view of the world, to pursue a policy of war, the overthrow of Hamas in Gaza, the avoidance of any peace negotiations, unfettered settlement, spitting in the face of world public opinion and collision with the United States.
In this view, such a government cannot last for long. The new American administration of Barack Obama will not allow it. The world will boycott it. American Jewry will be shocked. And if Netanyahu strays – even slightly – from the Right and narrow path, his government will fall apart. The Kahanists, up to then his full partners, will divorce him on the spot. After all, the last Netanyahu government was overthrown ten years ago by the extreme right after he sat down with Yasser Arafat and signed an agreement that gave (pro forma) a part of Hebron to the Palestinian Authority.
After the fall of the government, according to this prognosis, the public will understand that there is no rightist option, that the slogans of the Right are nothing but nonsense. Only thus will they arrive at the conclusion that there is no alternative to the path of peace. The voters will elect a government that will end the occupation, clear the way for a free Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem and withdraw to the Green Line borders (with slight, mutually acceptable, adjustments).
For the public to accept this, a shock is needed. The fall of the deep-Right government can supply such a shock. According to a saying attributed (mistakenly, it appears) to Lenin: The worse, the better. Or, put in another way: it must become much worse before it can get any better.
THIS IS a seductive theory. But it is also very frightening.
How can we be sure that the Obama administration will indeed put irresistible pressure on Netanyahu? That is possible. Let’s hope that it happens. But it is not certain at all.
Obama has not yet passed a real test on any issue. It is already clear that there is a marked difference between what he promised in the election campaign and what he is doing in practice. In several matters he is continuing the policies of George Bush with slight alterations. That was, of course, to be expected. But Obama has not yet shown how he would act under real pressure. When Netanyahu mobilizes the full might of the pro-Israel lobby, will Obama surrender, like all preceding presidents?
And world public opinion – how united will it be? How much pressure can it exert? When Netanyahu declares that all criticism of his government is “anti-Semitic” and that every boycott call is an echo of the Nazi slogan “Kauft nicht bei Juden” (“Don’t buy from Jews”) – how many of the critics will stand up to the pressure? How much courage will Merkel, Sarkozy, Berlusconi et al be able to muster? And on the other side: will a world-wide boycott not intensify the paranoia in Israel and push all the Israeli public into the arms of the extreme Right, under the time-worn slogan ”All the World is against us?”
IN THE best of circumstances, if all the pressures materialize and have a maximum impact – how long will it take? What disasters can such a government bring about before the pressure starts to take effect? How many human beings will be killed and injured in attacks and acts of revenge by both sides? Such a government would be dominated by the settlers. How many new settlements will spring up? How many existing settlements will be extended at a hectic pace? And in the meantime, won’t the settlers intensify their harassment of the Palestinian population with the aim of bringing about ethnic cleansing?
The components of the Rightist coalition have already declared that they do not agree to a cease-fire in Gaza because it would consolidate the rule of Hamas there. They seek to renew the Gaza War under an even more brutal leadership, to re-conquer the Strip and to return the settlers there.
Netanyahu’s talk about an “economic peace” is complete nonsense, because no economy can develop under an occupation regime and hundreds of roadblocks. Any peace process – real or virtual – will grind to a halt. The result: the Palestinian authority will collapse. Out of desperation, the West Bank population will turn further towards Hamas, or the Fatah movement will become Hamas 2.
Inside Israel, the government will have to confront the deepening depression and perhaps cause economic chaos. All the sections of the government are united in their hatred of the Supreme Court, and the crazy manipulations of Justice Minister Daniel Friedman will give way to even crazier ones. Under the catchy slogan of “regime change”, targeted assaults against the democratic system will take place.
All these things are possible. One or two years of a Bibi-Liberman-Kahane government can cause irreparable damage to Israel’s standing in the world, Israeli-American relations, the judicial system, Israeli democracy, national morale and national sanity.
THE POSITIVE side of this situation is that the Knesset will once again include a large opposition. Perhaps even an effective opposition.
Kadima came into being as a government party. It will not be easy for it to adapt to the role of opposition. That will require an emotional and intellectual transformation. For ten years I myself conducted an uncompromising oppositional struggle in the Knesset, and I know how difficult it is. But if Kadima manages to undergo such a transformation successfully – which is very doubtful – it may become an effective opposition. The necessity to present a clear alternative to the rightist government may lead it to discover unsuspected strengths within itself. Tzipi Livni’s games with the Palestinians may turn into a serious program for a Two-State solution, a program that will be strengthened and deepened by the daily parliamentary struggle vis-à-vis a government with an opposite program.
Labor, too, will have to undergo a profound transformation. Ehud Barak is certainly not the person to wage an oppositional fight – especially as he will not be the “head of the opposition”, a title officially conferred by law on the leader of the largest opposition faction. He will be second fiddle even in opposition. Labor will have to compete, and perhaps-perhaps this will lead to its recovery. The Bible tells us of the miracle of the dry bones (Ezekiel 37).
That is true even more for Meretz. It will have to compete with both Kadima and Labor to justify its place in the struggle for peace and social recovery.
A real optimist can even hope for the narrowing of the gap between the “Jewish Left” and the “Arab parties”, which the Left has until now boycotted and left out of all coalition calculations. The common struggle and the joint votes in the Knesset may bring about a positive development there too.
And beyond the parliamentary arena, the government of the extreme Right may change the atmosphere in the country and stimulate many well-intentioned people to leave the security of their ivory towers and start a process of intellectual rejuvenation in the circles from which a new, open and different Left must spring.
ALL THESE are theoretical possibilities. What will happen in reality? What will be the consequences of a “pure” rightist regime, if Tzipi Livni maintains her determination not to join a Netanyahu government? Will Israel set off down a suicidal road from which there is no return, or will this be a passing phase before the wake-up call?
It is a great gamble, and like every gamble, it arouses both fear and hope.
_______________________________________________
21.2.09
The Great Gamble
“IACTA ALEA EST” – the die is cast – said Julius Caesar and crossed the River Rubicon on his way to conquer Rome. That was the end of Roman democracy.
We don’t have a Julius Caesar. But we do have an Avigdor Liberman. When he announced his support the other day for the setting up of a government headed by Binyamin Netanyahu, that was the crossing of his Rubicon.
I hope that this is not the beginning of the end of Israeli democracy.
UNTIL THE last moment, Liberman held the Israeli public in suspense. Will he join Netanyahu? Will he join Tzipi Livni?
Those who participated in the guessing game were divided in their view of Liberman.
Some of them said: Liberman is indeed what he pretends to be: an extreme nationalist racist. His aim is really to turn Israel into a Jewish state cleansed of Arabs – Araberrein, in German. He has only contempt for democracy, both in the country and in his own party, which consists of yesmen and yeswomen devoid of any identity of their own. Like similar parties in the past, it is based on a cult of (his) personality, the worship of brute force, contempt for democracy and disdain for the judicial system. In other countries this is called fascism.
Others say: that is all a façade. Liberman is no Israeli Fuehrer, because he is nothing but a cheat and a cynic. The police investigations against him and his business dealings with Palestinians show him to be a corrupt opportunist. He is also a friend of Tzipi. He cultivates a fascist image in order to pave his way to power. He will sell all his slogans for a piece of government.
The first Liberman would support the setting up of an extreme Right government by Netanyahu. The second Liberman could support a Livni government. For a whole week he juggled the balls. Now he has decided: he is indeed an extreme nationalist racist. As the Americans say: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is a duck.
For appearances’ sake he told the President that his proposal to entrust Netanyahu with the setting up of a government applies only to a broad-based coalition encompassing Likud, Kadima and his own party. But that is just a gimmick: probably such a government will not come into being, and the next government will be a coalition of Likud, Liberman, the disciples of Meir Kahane and the religious parties.
SOME ON the Left say: Excellent. The voters will get exactly what they deserve. At long last, there will be an exclusively rightist government.
One of the proponents of this attitude is Gideon Levy, a consistent advocate of peace, democracy and civil equality.
He and those who think like him say: Israel simply has to pass through this phase before it can recover. The Right must get unlimited power to realize its program, without the pretext of being hindered by leftist or centrist members of the coalition. Let them try, in full view of the world, to pursue a policy of war, the overthrow of Hamas in Gaza, the avoidance of any peace negotiations, unfettered settlement, spitting in the face of world public opinion and collision with the United States.
In this view, such a government cannot last for long. The new American administration of Barack Obama will not allow it. The world will boycott it. American Jewry will be shocked. And if Netanyahu strays – even slightly – from the Right and narrow path, his government will fall apart. The Kahanists, up to then his full partners, will divorce him on the spot. After all, the last Netanyahu government was overthrown ten years ago by the extreme right after he sat down with Yasser Arafat and signed an agreement that gave (pro forma) a part of Hebron to the Palestinian Authority.
After the fall of the government, according to this prognosis, the public will understand that there is no rightist option, that the slogans of the Right are nothing but nonsense. Only thus will they arrive at the conclusion that there is no alternative to the path of peace. The voters will elect a government that will end the occupation, clear the way for a free Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem and withdraw to the Green Line borders (with slight, mutually acceptable, adjustments).
For the public to accept this, a shock is needed. The fall of the deep-Right government can supply such a shock. According to a saying attributed (mistakenly, it appears) to Lenin: The worse, the better. Or, put in another way: it must become much worse before it can get any better.
THIS IS a seductive theory. But it is also very frightening.
How can we be sure that the Obama administration will indeed put irresistible pressure on Netanyahu? That is possible. Let’s hope that it happens. But it is not certain at all.
Obama has not yet passed a real test on any issue. It is already clear that there is a marked difference between what he promised in the election campaign and what he is doing in practice. In several matters he is continuing the policies of George Bush with slight alterations. That was, of course, to be expected. But Obama has not yet shown how he would act under real pressure. When Netanyahu mobilizes the full might of the pro-Israel lobby, will Obama surrender, like all preceding presidents?
And world public opinion – how united will it be? How much pressure can it exert? When Netanyahu declares that all criticism of his government is “anti-Semitic” and that every boycott call is an echo of the Nazi slogan “Kauft nicht bei Juden” (“Don’t buy from Jews”) – how many of the critics will stand up to the pressure? How much courage will Merkel, Sarkozy, Berlusconi et al be able to muster? And on the other side: will a world-wide boycott not intensify the paranoia in Israel and push all the Israeli public into the arms of the extreme Right, under the time-worn slogan ”All the World is against us?”
IN THE best of circumstances, if all the pressures materialize and have a maximum impact – how long will it take? What disasters can such a government bring about before the pressure starts to take effect? How many human beings will be killed and injured in attacks and acts of revenge by both sides? Such a government would be dominated by the settlers. How many new settlements will spring up? How many existing settlements will be extended at a hectic pace? And in the meantime, won’t the settlers intensify their harassment of the Palestinian population with the aim of bringing about ethnic cleansing?
The components of the Rightist coalition have already declared that they do not agree to a cease-fire in Gaza because it would consolidate the rule of Hamas there. They seek to renew the Gaza War under an even more brutal leadership, to re-conquer the Strip and to return the settlers there.
Netanyahu’s talk about an “economic peace” is complete nonsense, because no economy can develop under an occupation regime and hundreds of roadblocks. Any peace process – real or virtual – will grind to a halt. The result: the Palestinian authority will collapse. Out of desperation, the West Bank population will turn further towards Hamas, or the Fatah movement will become Hamas 2.
Inside Israel, the government will have to confront the deepening depression and perhaps cause economic chaos. All the sections of the government are united in their hatred of the Supreme Court, and the crazy manipulations of Justice Minister Daniel Friedman will give way to even crazier ones. Under the catchy slogan of “regime change”, targeted assaults against the democratic system will take place.
All these things are possible. One or two years of a Bibi-Liberman-Kahane government can cause irreparable damage to Israel’s standing in the world, Israeli-American relations, the judicial system, Israeli democracy, national morale and national sanity.
THE POSITIVE side of this situation is that the Knesset will once again include a large opposition. Perhaps even an effective opposition.
Kadima came into being as a government party. It will not be easy for it to adapt to the role of opposition. That will require an emotional and intellectual transformation. For ten years I myself conducted an uncompromising oppositional struggle in the Knesset, and I know how difficult it is. But if Kadima manages to undergo such a transformation successfully – which is very doubtful – it may become an effective opposition. The necessity to present a clear alternative to the rightist government may lead it to discover unsuspected strengths within itself. Tzipi Livni’s games with the Palestinians may turn into a serious program for a Two-State solution, a program that will be strengthened and deepened by the daily parliamentary struggle vis-à-vis a government with an opposite program.
Labor, too, will have to undergo a profound transformation. Ehud Barak is certainly not the person to wage an oppositional fight – especially as he will not be the “head of the opposition”, a title officially conferred by law on the leader of the largest opposition faction. He will be second fiddle even in opposition. Labor will have to compete, and perhaps-perhaps this will lead to its recovery. The Bible tells us of the miracle of the dry bones (Ezekiel 37).
That is true even more for Meretz. It will have to compete with both Kadima and Labor to justify its place in the struggle for peace and social recovery.
A real optimist can even hope for the narrowing of the gap between the “Jewish Left” and the “Arab parties”, which the Left has until now boycotted and left out of all coalition calculations. The common struggle and the joint votes in the Knesset may bring about a positive development there too.
And beyond the parliamentary arena, the government of the extreme Right may change the atmosphere in the country and stimulate many well-intentioned people to leave the security of their ivory towers and start a process of intellectual rejuvenation in the circles from which a new, open and different Left must spring.
ALL THESE are theoretical possibilities. What will happen in reality? What will be the consequences of a “pure” rightist regime, if Tzipi Livni maintains her determination not to join a Netanyahu government? Will Israel set off down a suicidal road from which there is no return, or will this be a passing phase before the wake-up call?
It is a great gamble, and like every gamble, it arouses both fear and hope.
_______________________________________________
What's Missing in the New Threat Assessments By Douglas Farah
What's Missing in the New Threat Assessments
By Douglas Farah
In recent days two high-level assessments of the threats facing the United States have come out, and both are striking for their stark omissions of the same central theme: the criminal/terrorist nexus that is driving so much of what we see around the world.
The first assessment is the Annual Threat Assessment presented by Dennis Cl Blair, the Director of National Intelligence, presented as Congressional testimony.
The second is FBI Director Robert Mueller to the Council on Foreign Relations.
Both are interesting reading, and is heartening to see the Horn of Africa move far up the priority scale in both discussions. The DNI report also focuses some passing (but more than any other public statement) attention on Latin America, particularly Venezuela.
Director Mueller correctly states that: The world in which we live has changed markedly in recent years, from the integration of global markets and the ease of international travel to the rise and the reach of the Internet. But our perception of the world—and our place in it—also has changed...The universe of crime and terrorism stretches out infinitely before us, and we, too, are working to find what we believe to be out there, but cannot always see.
What has changed less, it seems, is the ability to integrate into out thinking and assessments changes as they occur. My full blog is here.
http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/454/what-is-missing-in-the-terrorist-threat-assessment.com
February 25, 2009 12:42 PM
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/whats_missing_in_the_new_threa.php
By Douglas Farah
In recent days two high-level assessments of the threats facing the United States have come out, and both are striking for their stark omissions of the same central theme: the criminal/terrorist nexus that is driving so much of what we see around the world.
The first assessment is the Annual Threat Assessment presented by Dennis Cl Blair, the Director of National Intelligence, presented as Congressional testimony.
The second is FBI Director Robert Mueller to the Council on Foreign Relations.
Both are interesting reading, and is heartening to see the Horn of Africa move far up the priority scale in both discussions. The DNI report also focuses some passing (but more than any other public statement) attention on Latin America, particularly Venezuela.
Director Mueller correctly states that: The world in which we live has changed markedly in recent years, from the integration of global markets and the ease of international travel to the rise and the reach of the Internet. But our perception of the world—and our place in it—also has changed...The universe of crime and terrorism stretches out infinitely before us, and we, too, are working to find what we believe to be out there, but cannot always see.
What has changed less, it seems, is the ability to integrate into out thinking and assessments changes as they occur. My full blog is here.
http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/454/what-is-missing-in-the-terrorist-threat-assessment.com
February 25, 2009 12:42 PM
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/whats_missing_in_the_new_threa.php
Dangerous Riptide Threatens Financial Institutions
Dangerous Riptide Threatens Financial Institutions
By Dennis Lormel
A riptide or rip current is caused after waves coming in from the ocean hit the beach. The receding water is referred to as a backwash, causing a rip current on the surface. The bigger the waves, the more dangerous the riptide becomes to swimmers. In a strong riptide, swimmers are at greater risk of being caught in the backwash. The ultimate consequence is drowning. Riptides occur on the surface and swimmers trapped in them have a chance to survive by relaxing and swimming across the current, parallel to the shoreline. Unfortunately, the natural tendency is to swim against the current directly toward shore. This places the swimmer at higher risk of tiring and drowning, which could be avoided had the swimmer swam across the current and out of the riptide. More harrowing is an undertow. Undertows are currents along the bottom of the backwash. They pull their victims down beneath the surface. A strong undercurrent can knock a swimmer down and drag that individual out to sea on the bottom of the ocean. This makes the risk of drowning far greater.
What is the relevance of this information to financial institutions?
Many financial institutions are currently treading water in an ocean of economic uncertainty. They are having enough trouble staying afloat without having to worry about riptides, or worse yet undercurrents. Regrettably, the waves hitting the banks attempting to stay afloat are growing larger and more violent making it more difficult for those institutions to tread water. Consequently, the resulting riptides and undercurrents are gaining momentum and becoming extremely dangerous.
As the financial crisis has worsened over the last six months, many thousands of bank employees have lost their jobs. As this situation continues to grow bleaker, the layoffs will continue. In addition to the alarming number of layoffs, financial institutions have had to slash budgets dramatically. These overwhelming resource reductions are placing financial institutions at greater risk for falling prey to dangerous riptides or worse, a fatal undertow.
Although financial institutions are being forced to downsize staff and budget because of the losses they are sustaining, it does not relieve them of their Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance and reporting obligations. Many of the people being let go from financial institutions are compliance professionals. The loss of talent and experience, coupled with likely diminished compliance functionality, could well be the next crippling blow causing one or more financial institutions to drown due to a catastrophic compliance breakdown.
The BSA requires financial institutions to establish and maintain a robust anti-money laundering (AML) program. An AML program has four mandatory requirements:
1. Development of internal policies, procedures and controls
2. Designation of a Compliance Officer
3. Ongoing employee training programs
4. Independent audit function to test programs
Essentially, financial institutions must have the ability to assess and mitigate risk. They must have the ability to monitor their systems for risk and to establish controls to ensure they meet all BSA reporting requirements, the most important of which are suspicious activity reporting and know your customer policies and procedures. The loss of highly qualified compliance professionals and the potential of decreased monitoring make it extremely challenging for financial institutions to adequately meet their reporting requirements. In many institutions, compliance professionals are not considered revenue generators, only cost centers. Therefore, a mindset could easily exist among senior business executives that compliance professionals are more expendable. This rationale is pervasive in the industry and incredibly flawed.
Compliance professionals may not be revenue generators. However, given the opportunity to perform and meet their obligations, they are revenue savers and/or loss preventers. If financial institution business executives follow their natural instinct and opine to cut compliance professionals because they are merely considered cost centers, then they will find themselves swimming against the riptide and will be more likely to drown in unnecessary business risk.
In today’s monetary crisis, many financial institutions are taking responsible steps to reduce unnecessary overhead. There are a number of internal institutional redundancies, where reductions are justified. This is particularly true where fraud, security and/or AML programs overlap by virtue of having been stove piped or having been duplicated as the result of mergers or acquisitions, resulting in redundant functions. In those instances, compliance resource reductions are generally more justifiable. However, compliance staff reductions must be assessed for the potential risk of inability to adequately meet BSA reporting and monitoring requirements.
The two elements of the AML program mandatory requirements that are most susceptible to budget cuts are training and internal controls. Training budgets have probably been sliced to the bone, as one of the easiest places to cut. How can compliance professionals continue to learn about the nuances of money laundering, emerging trends, and to adequately understand terrorist financing, if they do not receive appropriate training? Likewise, internal controls and monitoring capabilities have likely been reduced to more minimal levels. Any reduction in controls and/or monitoring capabilities place financial institutions at greater risk of vulnerability. How much compliance risk are these institutions willing to accept in order to meet budget reduction demands?
A troubling reality exists. Budget cuts have not escaped the attention of fraudsters, money launderers, and most problematic, terrorist financiers. The best of these bad guys know how to identify systemic weaknesses and exploit them for their nefarious purposes. They must be salivating at the opportunity in front of them.
In spite of the massive problems the financial crisis is causing financial institutions, there are two questions they better come to terms with:
1. How far are they willing to cut their compliance programs and risk non-compliance with BSA reporting requirements?
2. Do they have a belief that the regulators will give them a pass from BSA reporting requirements because of the perilous position they are already in?
Before answering these questions, financial institutions should come to the realization that they could be swept up in a dangerous riptide or undertow. Will they swim across the tide and reach safety or will they swim against the tide and drown. It will be interesting to see the choices they make as this unprecedented financial crisis plays out.
February 26, 2009 03:49 PM
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/dangerous_riptide_threatens_fi.php
By Dennis Lormel
A riptide or rip current is caused after waves coming in from the ocean hit the beach. The receding water is referred to as a backwash, causing a rip current on the surface. The bigger the waves, the more dangerous the riptide becomes to swimmers. In a strong riptide, swimmers are at greater risk of being caught in the backwash. The ultimate consequence is drowning. Riptides occur on the surface and swimmers trapped in them have a chance to survive by relaxing and swimming across the current, parallel to the shoreline. Unfortunately, the natural tendency is to swim against the current directly toward shore. This places the swimmer at higher risk of tiring and drowning, which could be avoided had the swimmer swam across the current and out of the riptide. More harrowing is an undertow. Undertows are currents along the bottom of the backwash. They pull their victims down beneath the surface. A strong undercurrent can knock a swimmer down and drag that individual out to sea on the bottom of the ocean. This makes the risk of drowning far greater.
What is the relevance of this information to financial institutions?
Many financial institutions are currently treading water in an ocean of economic uncertainty. They are having enough trouble staying afloat without having to worry about riptides, or worse yet undercurrents. Regrettably, the waves hitting the banks attempting to stay afloat are growing larger and more violent making it more difficult for those institutions to tread water. Consequently, the resulting riptides and undercurrents are gaining momentum and becoming extremely dangerous.
As the financial crisis has worsened over the last six months, many thousands of bank employees have lost their jobs. As this situation continues to grow bleaker, the layoffs will continue. In addition to the alarming number of layoffs, financial institutions have had to slash budgets dramatically. These overwhelming resource reductions are placing financial institutions at greater risk for falling prey to dangerous riptides or worse, a fatal undertow.
Although financial institutions are being forced to downsize staff and budget because of the losses they are sustaining, it does not relieve them of their Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance and reporting obligations. Many of the people being let go from financial institutions are compliance professionals. The loss of talent and experience, coupled with likely diminished compliance functionality, could well be the next crippling blow causing one or more financial institutions to drown due to a catastrophic compliance breakdown.
The BSA requires financial institutions to establish and maintain a robust anti-money laundering (AML) program. An AML program has four mandatory requirements:
1. Development of internal policies, procedures and controls
2. Designation of a Compliance Officer
3. Ongoing employee training programs
4. Independent audit function to test programs
Essentially, financial institutions must have the ability to assess and mitigate risk. They must have the ability to monitor their systems for risk and to establish controls to ensure they meet all BSA reporting requirements, the most important of which are suspicious activity reporting and know your customer policies and procedures. The loss of highly qualified compliance professionals and the potential of decreased monitoring make it extremely challenging for financial institutions to adequately meet their reporting requirements. In many institutions, compliance professionals are not considered revenue generators, only cost centers. Therefore, a mindset could easily exist among senior business executives that compliance professionals are more expendable. This rationale is pervasive in the industry and incredibly flawed.
Compliance professionals may not be revenue generators. However, given the opportunity to perform and meet their obligations, they are revenue savers and/or loss preventers. If financial institution business executives follow their natural instinct and opine to cut compliance professionals because they are merely considered cost centers, then they will find themselves swimming against the riptide and will be more likely to drown in unnecessary business risk.
In today’s monetary crisis, many financial institutions are taking responsible steps to reduce unnecessary overhead. There are a number of internal institutional redundancies, where reductions are justified. This is particularly true where fraud, security and/or AML programs overlap by virtue of having been stove piped or having been duplicated as the result of mergers or acquisitions, resulting in redundant functions. In those instances, compliance resource reductions are generally more justifiable. However, compliance staff reductions must be assessed for the potential risk of inability to adequately meet BSA reporting and monitoring requirements.
The two elements of the AML program mandatory requirements that are most susceptible to budget cuts are training and internal controls. Training budgets have probably been sliced to the bone, as one of the easiest places to cut. How can compliance professionals continue to learn about the nuances of money laundering, emerging trends, and to adequately understand terrorist financing, if they do not receive appropriate training? Likewise, internal controls and monitoring capabilities have likely been reduced to more minimal levels. Any reduction in controls and/or monitoring capabilities place financial institutions at greater risk of vulnerability. How much compliance risk are these institutions willing to accept in order to meet budget reduction demands?
A troubling reality exists. Budget cuts have not escaped the attention of fraudsters, money launderers, and most problematic, terrorist financiers. The best of these bad guys know how to identify systemic weaknesses and exploit them for their nefarious purposes. They must be salivating at the opportunity in front of them.
In spite of the massive problems the financial crisis is causing financial institutions, there are two questions they better come to terms with:
1. How far are they willing to cut their compliance programs and risk non-compliance with BSA reporting requirements?
2. Do they have a belief that the regulators will give them a pass from BSA reporting requirements because of the perilous position they are already in?
Before answering these questions, financial institutions should come to the realization that they could be swept up in a dangerous riptide or undertow. Will they swim across the tide and reach safety or will they swim against the tide and drown. It will be interesting to see the choices they make as this unprecedented financial crisis plays out.
February 26, 2009 03:49 PM
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/dangerous_riptide_threatens_fi.php
The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament: Breaking the Stalemate
The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament: Breaking the Stalemate
Gareth Evans, Yoriko Kawaguchi, Jessica Tuchman Mathews Tuesday, February 17, 2009
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1268&prog=zru
Gareth Evans, Yoriko Kawaguchi, Jessica Tuchman Mathews Tuesday, February 17, 2009
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1268&prog=zru
Nuclear Options
Nuclear Options
Hans Blix, The Guardian Should we be worried? The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that the Iranians' uranium enrichment programme is proceeding, though perhaps at a slower pace. Iran is not answering questions raised by western intelligence. The IAEA cannot exclude the possibility that the Iranian programme has military aspects. So, yes, there should be concern, but there is even more reason to be distressed that this has been going on for years in full view, yet has not been met with effective diplomacy.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/25/iran-nuclear-weapons
Hans Blix, The Guardian Should we be worried? The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that the Iranians' uranium enrichment programme is proceeding, though perhaps at a slower pace. Iran is not answering questions raised by western intelligence. The IAEA cannot exclude the possibility that the Iranian programme has military aspects. So, yes, there should be concern, but there is even more reason to be distressed that this has been going on for years in full view, yet has not been met with effective diplomacy.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/25/iran-nuclear-weapons
EU Trio Targets Tougher List of Iran Sanctions
EU Trio Targets Tougher List of Iran Sanctions
Guy Dinmore, Najmeh Bozorgmehr, and Alex Barker, Financial Times France, Germany and the UK - the so-called EU3 - are proposing a tough list of additional sanctions to be imposed against Iran in order to give the Obama administration more muscle in its expected engagement of the Islamic republic.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd266b06-03a5-11de-b405-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
Guy Dinmore, Najmeh Bozorgmehr, and Alex Barker, Financial Times France, Germany and the UK - the so-called EU3 - are proposing a tough list of additional sanctions to be imposed against Iran in order to give the Obama administration more muscle in its expected engagement of the Islamic republic.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd266b06-03a5-11de-b405-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
Iran Denies Nuclear Slowdown, Sets Big Expansion
Iran Denies Nuclear Slowdown, Sets Big Expansion
Hossein Jaseb, Reuters Iran said on Wednesday it plans a nearly 10-fold expansion of its uranium enrichment capacity in the next five years, denying a U.N. report which said its nuclear activities had slowed.
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSLP63169620090225
Hossein Jaseb, Reuters Iran said on Wednesday it plans a nearly 10-fold expansion of its uranium enrichment capacity in the next five years, denying a U.N. report which said its nuclear activities had slowed.
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSLP63169620090225
Syria Says Disputed Site Has Missiles
Syria Says Disputed Site Has Missiles
David Crawford, The Wall Street Journal A suspected Syrian nuclear site bombed by Israel has been converted to a military installation for firing missiles, a Syrian delegate told diplomats in Vienna at a Tuesday meeting of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123550357624561941.html
David Crawford, The Wall Street Journal A suspected Syrian nuclear site bombed by Israel has been converted to a military installation for firing missiles, a Syrian delegate told diplomats in Vienna at a Tuesday meeting of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123550357624561941.html
The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection in Syria
The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection in Syria
James Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick, and Pierre Goldschmidt, Proliferation Analysis
When the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors meets next week, Syria's case will be high on its agenda. Syria is suspected of building, at a site known as Dair Alzour, an undeclared nuclear reactor that was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in September 2007. The IAEA has found strong evidence to support this accusation but, as yet, no proof. It has repeatedly asked Syria for greater access on a voluntary basis. Syria has repeatedly refused. It is now time for the IAEA to move beyond such voluntary requests and invoke its most powerful inspection provision, the "special inspection," to make its requests for access legally binding. If Syria refuses then the Board should make a formal finding of "non-compliance."
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22791&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
James Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick, and Pierre Goldschmidt, Proliferation Analysis
When the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors meets next week, Syria's case will be high on its agenda. Syria is suspected of building, at a site known as Dair Alzour, an undeclared nuclear reactor that was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in September 2007. The IAEA has found strong evidence to support this accusation but, as yet, no proof. It has repeatedly asked Syria for greater access on a voluntary basis. Syria has repeatedly refused. It is now time for the IAEA to move beyond such voluntary requests and invoke its most powerful inspection provision, the "special inspection," to make its requests for access legally binding. If Syria refuses then the Board should make a formal finding of "non-compliance."
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22791&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink: Framing U.S. Policy Options
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink: Framing U.S. Policy Options - Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, Mark Irvine, Thomas Patterson, and Mehlaqa Samdani; Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both be making tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative.
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).
The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options.
Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both be making tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative.
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).
The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options.
Stalin's Holocaust: World Premier of "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for His Father" is being broadcast at http://Reason.tv
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Jon Basil Utley Freda Utley Foundation E-Mail: jbutley@earthlink.net Thursday, February 26, 2009
World Premier of "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for His Father" is being broadcast at http://Reason.tv
WASHINGTON, DC- Reason.TV ( http:/reason.tv) is featuring "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for his Father" as its film of the week from February 25 to March 2. This is the world premier of the 28-minute documentary, which chronicles the search for one of the millions of men arrested in Russia during Stalin's Reign of Terror in the 1930s.
One can view the film at the home page of Reason.TV, which gets some 1.4 million visitors per month. No special players are necessary to see the broadcast.
" Return to the Gulag" depicts the search for details about the fate of Arcadi Berdichevsky, Jon Utley's father, the chief financial officer of the Soviet Import-Export agency Promexport, who was arrested by secret police at midnight, April 10, 1936. His wife and son never saw him again, and until Jon's trip never knew the reasons for the arrest or the cause of his death.
Arcadi Berdichevsky's experiences serve as a microcosm of the all-engulfing great terror imposed by Stalin "when few were spared ominous fear, paranoia, imprisonment, hard labor, and even death," the film's narrator explains. Arcadi was arrested without cause, tried by a kangaroo court, and sentenced to hard labor in the Gulag, in Vorkuta, Komi, on the Arctic Circle, in northern Russia. This true story was also the fate of some 18-20 million others in the 1930s who were sent to the Soviet Gulag.
Freda Utley, Arcadi's British wife, organized an international campaign for his release which included personal letters to Stalin from prominent international figures. All pleas were ignored. http://www.fredautley.com/
Freda Utley, who was an author, scholar, and British trade union leader, and her son, Jon, went for years not knowing even the charges against Arcadi, nor his whereabouts.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Jon Utley, nearly 70 years later, was able to return to Russia and find original files and government photos of his father -- and learn of his surprising death by firing squad in 1938 for leading a hunger strike in the camps.
The documentary includes news and file footage of the life and times of Soviet Russia in the 1930s in addition to interviews with Ann Applebaum, author of Gulag: A History; Joshua Rubenstein of Amnesty International; and Russian archivists and historians.
It was filmed on-site tracing Jon Utley's journey through former labor camps and cities in northern Russia to find the records. "Return to the Gulag" is a small but revealing window into Russia's turbulent 1930's.
"Return to the Gulag" was directed by John J. Michalczyk, Director of Boston College's Jacques Salmanowitz Program for Moral Courage in Documentary Film ( http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/fnart/fil...tz/default.html) which provided funding for the film along with the Freda Utley Foundation.
An article by Jon Utley, " Vorkuta to Perm: Russia's Concentration Camp Museums and my Father's Story" about the subject of the documentary can be seen at http://www.FredaUtley.com.
A longer film on the Soviet concentration camps, "Confronting Amnesia: Frozen Memories of the Soviet Gulag," has also been produced by Boston College.
DVDs of "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for his Father" are available for purchase from the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation , http://www.victimsofcommunism.org for $15 plus shipping. To order, visit the website or send an email to vocmemorial@aol.com.
Contact: Jon Basil Utley Freda Utley Foundation E-Mail: jbutley@earthlink.net Thursday, February 26, 2009
World Premier of "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for His Father" is being broadcast at http://Reason.tv
WASHINGTON, DC- Reason.TV ( http:/reason.tv) is featuring "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for his Father" as its film of the week from February 25 to March 2. This is the world premier of the 28-minute documentary, which chronicles the search for one of the millions of men arrested in Russia during Stalin's Reign of Terror in the 1930s.
One can view the film at the home page of Reason.TV, which gets some 1.4 million visitors per month. No special players are necessary to see the broadcast.
" Return to the Gulag" depicts the search for details about the fate of Arcadi Berdichevsky, Jon Utley's father, the chief financial officer of the Soviet Import-Export agency Promexport, who was arrested by secret police at midnight, April 10, 1936. His wife and son never saw him again, and until Jon's trip never knew the reasons for the arrest or the cause of his death.
Arcadi Berdichevsky's experiences serve as a microcosm of the all-engulfing great terror imposed by Stalin "when few were spared ominous fear, paranoia, imprisonment, hard labor, and even death," the film's narrator explains. Arcadi was arrested without cause, tried by a kangaroo court, and sentenced to hard labor in the Gulag, in Vorkuta, Komi, on the Arctic Circle, in northern Russia. This true story was also the fate of some 18-20 million others in the 1930s who were sent to the Soviet Gulag.
Freda Utley, Arcadi's British wife, organized an international campaign for his release which included personal letters to Stalin from prominent international figures. All pleas were ignored. http://www.fredautley.com/
Freda Utley, who was an author, scholar, and British trade union leader, and her son, Jon, went for years not knowing even the charges against Arcadi, nor his whereabouts.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Jon Utley, nearly 70 years later, was able to return to Russia and find original files and government photos of his father -- and learn of his surprising death by firing squad in 1938 for leading a hunger strike in the camps.
The documentary includes news and file footage of the life and times of Soviet Russia in the 1930s in addition to interviews with Ann Applebaum, author of Gulag: A History; Joshua Rubenstein of Amnesty International; and Russian archivists and historians.
It was filmed on-site tracing Jon Utley's journey through former labor camps and cities in northern Russia to find the records. "Return to the Gulag" is a small but revealing window into Russia's turbulent 1930's.
"Return to the Gulag" was directed by John J. Michalczyk, Director of Boston College's Jacques Salmanowitz Program for Moral Courage in Documentary Film ( http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/fnart/fil...tz/default.html) which provided funding for the film along with the Freda Utley Foundation.
An article by Jon Utley, " Vorkuta to Perm: Russia's Concentration Camp Museums and my Father's Story" about the subject of the documentary can be seen at http://www.FredaUtley.com.
A longer film on the Soviet concentration camps, "Confronting Amnesia: Frozen Memories of the Soviet Gulag," has also been produced by Boston College.
DVDs of "Return to the Gulag: Jon Utley's Search for his Father" are available for purchase from the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation , http://www.victimsofcommunism.org for $15 plus shipping. To order, visit the website or send an email to vocmemorial@aol.com.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
US To Offer Nearly $1 bn. for Gaza Reconstruction
INFORMED COMMENT
2/24/09
US To Offer Nearly $1 bn. for Gaza Reconstruction
Juan Cole
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will announce at the Gaza donor's conference next week that the US will give $900 million to help rebuild the Gaza Strip. That is about a billion dollars.
It is obvious why Clinton is making this gesture. The United States's name is mud in much of the Muslim world because Washington supported to the hilt Ehud Olmert's brutal assault on the people and civilian infrastructure of the Gaza Strip. Gaza was already a blockaded and abused slum before the war, where 15% of the children were undernourished. Bush urged Olmert on, and Obama has been silent.
So at least the US can spend some money to restore to the Gazans the basic prerequisites for a decent life.
Moreover, the US has increasing competition for influence in the area.The Gulf oil states are planning out the rebuilding of Gaza, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar have already pledged $1.25 billion. Qatar stole thunder in Lebanon last spring when it negotiated a peace deal between Hizbullah and the Lebanese government that brought Hizbullah into the government. The Saudis have been trying to bring Fatah and Hamas together. The US has been irrelevant, because under Bush Washington was just a ventriloquist dummy for the Israeli Rightwing. You can only have leverage as a good faith broker if you aren't completely identified with one side of a dispute.
So people are asking where the US government is going to get a billion dollars to give to the Gazans. That's easy. The US should take it out of the over $3 billion a year it gives to Israel. Israel aggressively launched that war, which it planned out for six months beforehand, even while Olmert was ostensibly indirectly negotiating a truce with Hamas. The war was fruitless and accomplished none of its goals. There is no reason for the US government to be giving the Israelis, who have a per capita income of $17,000 a year, money in the first place. But it certainly makes no sense to reward them for bad behavior, especially given that we are living through the great crash and incipient depression of 2009.
Amnesty International is going further and urging that the UN institute a weapons ban on both Israel and the militant Palestinian factions.
2/24/09
US To Offer Nearly $1 bn. for Gaza Reconstruction
Juan Cole
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will announce at the Gaza donor's conference next week that the US will give $900 million to help rebuild the Gaza Strip. That is about a billion dollars.
It is obvious why Clinton is making this gesture. The United States's name is mud in much of the Muslim world because Washington supported to the hilt Ehud Olmert's brutal assault on the people and civilian infrastructure of the Gaza Strip. Gaza was already a blockaded and abused slum before the war, where 15% of the children were undernourished. Bush urged Olmert on, and Obama has been silent.
So at least the US can spend some money to restore to the Gazans the basic prerequisites for a decent life.
Moreover, the US has increasing competition for influence in the area.The Gulf oil states are planning out the rebuilding of Gaza, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar have already pledged $1.25 billion. Qatar stole thunder in Lebanon last spring when it negotiated a peace deal between Hizbullah and the Lebanese government that brought Hizbullah into the government. The Saudis have been trying to bring Fatah and Hamas together. The US has been irrelevant, because under Bush Washington was just a ventriloquist dummy for the Israeli Rightwing. You can only have leverage as a good faith broker if you aren't completely identified with one side of a dispute.
So people are asking where the US government is going to get a billion dollars to give to the Gazans. That's easy. The US should take it out of the over $3 billion a year it gives to Israel. Israel aggressively launched that war, which it planned out for six months beforehand, even while Olmert was ostensibly indirectly negotiating a truce with Hamas. The war was fruitless and accomplished none of its goals. There is no reason for the US government to be giving the Israelis, who have a per capita income of $17,000 a year, money in the first place. But it certainly makes no sense to reward them for bad behavior, especially given that we are living through the great crash and incipient depression of 2009.
Amnesty International is going further and urging that the UN institute a weapons ban on both Israel and the militant Palestinian factions.
Avigdor Lieberman's Chutzpah: The right to return cannot confer the right to expel.
Avigdor Lieberman's Chutzpah: The right to return cannot confer the right to expel.
Christopher Hitchens Slate February 23, 2009
http://www.slate.com/id/2211915?nav=wp
A reliable friend and colleague swears that he saw the following incident in the Israeli-occupied territories a couple of years ago. A Palestinian physician, in urgent need of permission to travel, was trying to persuade a soldier at a roadblock to allow him to hurry on to the next town. He first tried the stone-faced guard in Hebrew, in which many Arabs are fluent, but he received no response. He then made an attempt in English, which is something of a local lingua franca, yet he fared no better. After an unpleasant interval of mutual noncommunication, it transpired that the only word the Israeli soldier knew was no, and the only language in which he could speak it was Russian.
The words occupation and dispossession are flung around pretty freely, but I invite you to picture a life under occupation in which your unfriendly neighborhood cop did not even speak the language of the state that he served, let alone any tongue known to you. There is, by the way, a fair likelihood that the soldier was not even Jewish; it's an open secret in Israel that tens of thousands of Russian immigrants used forged papers as a means of exiting their country of birth, pretending to exercise the "right of return." So here is yet another insult to heap on those whose great-great-grandparents were born in Palestine yet are treated as if they live there only on sufferance.
Yet if you are a former bouncer born in former Soviet Moldova, like Avigdor Lieberman, you can come to live in the Holy Land as of right and become the leader of a party that proposes to institute a "loyalty oath" not just to the Arab citizens of the state of Israel but to all Jewish members of religious Orthodox sects that do not declare themselves Zionist. And this grotesque party, named Israel Beiteinu or "Israel Is Our Home," is now the power broker, and its leader is the kingmaker in the Israeli electoral process.
In his early days as an immigrant in Israel, Lieberman was briefly a member of Kach, the hysterical group led by Rabbi Meir Kahane that was morbidly obsessed with the sex lives of Arabs and that yelled for their mass expulsion or—to employ the common euphemism—"transfer." He has now somewhat refined his position, calling for an exchange of territories and people that would more nearly approximate partition or even a two-state solution. But as with every such proposal, this still leaves a large number of Arabs under Israeli sovereignty, either on the West Bank or in Israel "proper." I doubt that Lieberman is really serious about any "land for peace" negotiations—he quarreled even with Ariel Sharon about disengagement from Gaza, so if it were up to him, there would presumably still be Israeli settlers in the strip. He has changed the whole tone of the argument by deciding to question the presence of Israeli Arabs who, unlike their cousins under occupation, enjoy the right of citizenship and voting as well as the privilege of living under the Israeli flag.
The best book about this highly interesting and neglected community was written by the Israeli novelist David Grossman in 1993 and is called Sleeping on a Wire. It contains micro-flashes of illumination (such as the probability that more Israeli Arabs than American Jews speak Hebrew) and also some memorable reflections on language and its relationship to literature and culture. We all remember that Maimonides wrote in fluent Arabic, but it's perhaps less well-known that:
The everyday conversation of Palestinian Israelis sparkles with expressions from the Bible and the Talmud, from Bialik and Rabbi Yehuda Halevy and Agnon. Poet Naim Araideh effuses: "Do you know what it means for me to write in Hebrew? Do you know what it's like to write in the language in which the world was created?"
One might not wish to go that far, but it remains the case that the Israeli-Arab Marxist Emile Habibi, author of the classic novel The Pessoptimist (sometimes called The Opsimist) was once awarded the annual Israeli prize for best Hebrew writing.
One might add that the rockets of Hamas and Hezbollah fall upon these people, too, in Jaffa and other towns, just as they fall upon the Israeli Druze and Armenians. The threads and imbrications that bind and layer the discrepant claimants to the land of Palestine are strong as well as subtle, ancient as well as modern. This is why Grossman was so depressed to discover, at the end of his book, that the memory of 1948 was still vivid among even the most successful and prosperous Israeli Arabs and that all of them felt unsafe and secretly feared a renewal of the demand for their expulsion. In 1993, he felt able to some extent to reassure them about this.
Now we have to watch the rise of a thug and a demagogue who has called with relish for the execution of elected Arab members of Israel's parliament if they meet with Hamas, who has demanded the drowning of Palestinian prisoners in the Dead Sea, whose supporters chant "Death to the Arabs" at their rallies, and who has materialized the worst fears of those Arabs who have made the longest-lasting accommodation with the Jewish state. Avigdor Lieberman's essentially totalitarian and Inquisitionist style, though, may be even more manifest in his insistence that non-Zionist haredim, or pious Jews, also either take an oath of loyalty or forfeit their citizenship. This takes the ax to the root of the idea that Jews have a presence in Jerusalem from time immemorial and that their resulting rights are not derived from, or dependent on, any state or any ideology. Shame on Benjamin Netanyahu if he makes even a temporary alliance with Lieberman. As questionable as the "right to return" may already be, it certainly cannot confer the right to expel.
Christopher Hitchens Slate February 23, 2009
http://www.slate.com/id/2211915?nav=wp
A reliable friend and colleague swears that he saw the following incident in the Israeli-occupied territories a couple of years ago. A Palestinian physician, in urgent need of permission to travel, was trying to persuade a soldier at a roadblock to allow him to hurry on to the next town. He first tried the stone-faced guard in Hebrew, in which many Arabs are fluent, but he received no response. He then made an attempt in English, which is something of a local lingua franca, yet he fared no better. After an unpleasant interval of mutual noncommunication, it transpired that the only word the Israeli soldier knew was no, and the only language in which he could speak it was Russian.
The words occupation and dispossession are flung around pretty freely, but I invite you to picture a life under occupation in which your unfriendly neighborhood cop did not even speak the language of the state that he served, let alone any tongue known to you. There is, by the way, a fair likelihood that the soldier was not even Jewish; it's an open secret in Israel that tens of thousands of Russian immigrants used forged papers as a means of exiting their country of birth, pretending to exercise the "right of return." So here is yet another insult to heap on those whose great-great-grandparents were born in Palestine yet are treated as if they live there only on sufferance.
Yet if you are a former bouncer born in former Soviet Moldova, like Avigdor Lieberman, you can come to live in the Holy Land as of right and become the leader of a party that proposes to institute a "loyalty oath" not just to the Arab citizens of the state of Israel but to all Jewish members of religious Orthodox sects that do not declare themselves Zionist. And this grotesque party, named Israel Beiteinu or "Israel Is Our Home," is now the power broker, and its leader is the kingmaker in the Israeli electoral process.
In his early days as an immigrant in Israel, Lieberman was briefly a member of Kach, the hysterical group led by Rabbi Meir Kahane that was morbidly obsessed with the sex lives of Arabs and that yelled for their mass expulsion or—to employ the common euphemism—"transfer." He has now somewhat refined his position, calling for an exchange of territories and people that would more nearly approximate partition or even a two-state solution. But as with every such proposal, this still leaves a large number of Arabs under Israeli sovereignty, either on the West Bank or in Israel "proper." I doubt that Lieberman is really serious about any "land for peace" negotiations—he quarreled even with Ariel Sharon about disengagement from Gaza, so if it were up to him, there would presumably still be Israeli settlers in the strip. He has changed the whole tone of the argument by deciding to question the presence of Israeli Arabs who, unlike their cousins under occupation, enjoy the right of citizenship and voting as well as the privilege of living under the Israeli flag.
The best book about this highly interesting and neglected community was written by the Israeli novelist David Grossman in 1993 and is called Sleeping on a Wire. It contains micro-flashes of illumination (such as the probability that more Israeli Arabs than American Jews speak Hebrew) and also some memorable reflections on language and its relationship to literature and culture. We all remember that Maimonides wrote in fluent Arabic, but it's perhaps less well-known that:
The everyday conversation of Palestinian Israelis sparkles with expressions from the Bible and the Talmud, from Bialik and Rabbi Yehuda Halevy and Agnon. Poet Naim Araideh effuses: "Do you know what it means for me to write in Hebrew? Do you know what it's like to write in the language in which the world was created?"
One might not wish to go that far, but it remains the case that the Israeli-Arab Marxist Emile Habibi, author of the classic novel The Pessoptimist (sometimes called The Opsimist) was once awarded the annual Israeli prize for best Hebrew writing.
One might add that the rockets of Hamas and Hezbollah fall upon these people, too, in Jaffa and other towns, just as they fall upon the Israeli Druze and Armenians. The threads and imbrications that bind and layer the discrepant claimants to the land of Palestine are strong as well as subtle, ancient as well as modern. This is why Grossman was so depressed to discover, at the end of his book, that the memory of 1948 was still vivid among even the most successful and prosperous Israeli Arabs and that all of them felt unsafe and secretly feared a renewal of the demand for their expulsion. In 1993, he felt able to some extent to reassure them about this.
Now we have to watch the rise of a thug and a demagogue who has called with relish for the execution of elected Arab members of Israel's parliament if they meet with Hamas, who has demanded the drowning of Palestinian prisoners in the Dead Sea, whose supporters chant "Death to the Arabs" at their rallies, and who has materialized the worst fears of those Arabs who have made the longest-lasting accommodation with the Jewish state. Avigdor Lieberman's essentially totalitarian and Inquisitionist style, though, may be even more manifest in his insistence that non-Zionist haredim, or pious Jews, also either take an oath of loyalty or forfeit their citizenship. This takes the ax to the root of the idea that Jews have a presence in Jerusalem from time immemorial and that their resulting rights are not derived from, or dependent on, any state or any ideology. Shame on Benjamin Netanyahu if he makes even a temporary alliance with Lieberman. As questionable as the "right to return" may already be, it certainly cannot confer the right to expel.
Obama’s Iran Strategy by Doyle McManus
LOS ANGELES TIMES
2/22/09
Obama’s Iran Strategy
Doyle McManus
President Obama is working against time to untangle 30 years of enmity and prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, but even his own advisors know the chance of success is slim.
So they also have been working on Plan B: What do we do if Iran gets the bomb?
Today, the Obama administration is debating its Iran policy behind closed doors. Last year, however, four of its key appointees wrote about the issue as private citizens, and their writings suggest they are already planning for how to handle a nuclear Iran.
Dennis Ross, the former Middle East peace negotiator who is expected to be named as Obama's top Iran advisor, argued for giving diplomacy a chance to work but suggested that containment might have to be the future course of U.S. policy.
"Maybe, even if we engage the Iranians, we will find that however we do so and whatever we try, the engagement simply does not work," Ross wrote in a September report published by the Center for a New American Security, a think tank that has supplied several appointees to the new administration. "We will need to hedge bets and set the stage for alternative policies either designed to prevent Iran from going nuclear or to blunt the impact if they do."
If diplomacy fails, another Obama advisor wrote in the same report, the alternative "is a strategy of containment and punishment." That was the conclusion of Ashton B. Carter, Obama's reported choice as an undersecretary of Defense, who also warned: "The challenge of containing Iranian ambitions and hubris would be as large as containing its nuclear arsenal."
Most (and maybe all) of Obama's advisors see the costs of attacking Iran as outweighing the benefits. If Iran gets closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, they've warned, military action won't look any more appetizing than it did under George W. Bush.
But that doesn't mean the United States would do nothing. Instead, Obama aides suggested in their writings, the U.S. should pursue a Persian Gulf version of the containment strategy used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
What would that mean? For starters, a nuclear-capable Iran would face continued, serious pressure from the United States and its allies to dismantle whatever it had built. Obama might declare that a nuclear attack on Israel would be treated as an attack on the U.S. homeland. And the U.S. military would act to bolster Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states against conventional-warfare threats from an emboldened Iranian regime.
And there is some optimism among administration officials that a nuclear Iran would practice restraint. Gary Samore, Obama's top advisor on nuclear proliferation, and Bruce Riedel, who is running Obama's review of policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, wrote last year that a nuclear-capable Iran, while undesirable, would not be the end of the world. For example, they argued, it seems unlikely that Tehran would give nuclear weapons to terrorists.
"If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is likely to behave like other nuclear weapons states, trying to intimidate its foes, but not recklessly using its weapons," Samore and Riedel wrote in a report for the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. "As such, Iran will be subject to the same deterrence system that other nuclear weapons states have accommodated themselves to since 1945."
None of this thinking means Obama has abandoned hope in negotiations to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons. At this point, one official said, the administration is focusing on Plan A, not Plan B. But it's welcome evidence that behind the slogan of hope lies a realistic appraisal of the possible outcomes.
During his presidential campaign, Obama called the idea of a nuclear Iran "unacceptable," and offered to meet with the Tehran regime without precondition to persuade it to change course. And his advisors agree that there's still a window for diplomacy.
Samore and Riedel forecast that Iran is "at least two or three years away" from being capable of building a nuclear weapon, and note that there are several stages between capability and deploying a bomb -- stages at which the United States could still work to freeze the program and contain Iran's behavior.
The first step, Ross wrote, would be to gather support from Europe, China and Russia. (Undersecretary of State Bill Burns is working on that already.) Next, Obama would seek direct, comprehensive talks with Tehran -- with a tangible threat of tougher economic sanctions if the Iranians don't cooperate, and the promise of rich rewards if they do.
So what should we expect? The contacts with Iran might start with secret talks in Europe between special envoys on both sides, but they're unlikely to begin before Iran's presidential election in June. To pave the way, Obama and his aides have toned down their rhetoric on Iran and talk mostly of outstretched hands and mutual respect. (They are learning to live without the phrase "carrots and sticks," which Iranians say should be used only when talking about donkeys.)
Negotiations won't be easy, and they won't be fast. It's not even clear whether the faction-ridden Tehran government will be able to agree on a coherent negotiating position.
Still, Obama has two advantages his predecessor didn't. First, he has sent unambiguous signals that he's ready to talk with Iran and recognize its legitimacy. That gives Tehran no clear reason to walk away, and Russia and China no easy excuse for opposing tougher sanctions.
Second, with oil revenues tanking, Iran's mullahs are likely to be feeling more vulnerable -- perhaps the only silver lining in the global financial crisis. Russia, Iran's biggest arms supplier, and China, Iran's biggest nonmilitary trading partner, will have less to lose from joining in sanctions if Iran is cutting back on foreign purchases.
Ross, Carter, Samore and Riedel all declined to talk last week when asked if they wanted to expand on what they wrote last year. But their work on Iran before they joined the government adds up to this forecast: Negotiations with Iran are worth trying, but they're not likely to succeed.
If talks fail and Iran moves closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies will have three options: more sanctions, even though they haven't worked; containment, including a stronger security commitment to Israel; or war.
And of those three unpalatable choices, containment -- with all its uncertainties -- will look like the middle way.
2/22/09
Obama’s Iran Strategy
Doyle McManus
President Obama is working against time to untangle 30 years of enmity and prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, but even his own advisors know the chance of success is slim.
So they also have been working on Plan B: What do we do if Iran gets the bomb?
Today, the Obama administration is debating its Iran policy behind closed doors. Last year, however, four of its key appointees wrote about the issue as private citizens, and their writings suggest they are already planning for how to handle a nuclear Iran.
Dennis Ross, the former Middle East peace negotiator who is expected to be named as Obama's top Iran advisor, argued for giving diplomacy a chance to work but suggested that containment might have to be the future course of U.S. policy.
"Maybe, even if we engage the Iranians, we will find that however we do so and whatever we try, the engagement simply does not work," Ross wrote in a September report published by the Center for a New American Security, a think tank that has supplied several appointees to the new administration. "We will need to hedge bets and set the stage for alternative policies either designed to prevent Iran from going nuclear or to blunt the impact if they do."
If diplomacy fails, another Obama advisor wrote in the same report, the alternative "is a strategy of containment and punishment." That was the conclusion of Ashton B. Carter, Obama's reported choice as an undersecretary of Defense, who also warned: "The challenge of containing Iranian ambitions and hubris would be as large as containing its nuclear arsenal."
Most (and maybe all) of Obama's advisors see the costs of attacking Iran as outweighing the benefits. If Iran gets closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, they've warned, military action won't look any more appetizing than it did under George W. Bush.
But that doesn't mean the United States would do nothing. Instead, Obama aides suggested in their writings, the U.S. should pursue a Persian Gulf version of the containment strategy used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
What would that mean? For starters, a nuclear-capable Iran would face continued, serious pressure from the United States and its allies to dismantle whatever it had built. Obama might declare that a nuclear attack on Israel would be treated as an attack on the U.S. homeland. And the U.S. military would act to bolster Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states against conventional-warfare threats from an emboldened Iranian regime.
And there is some optimism among administration officials that a nuclear Iran would practice restraint. Gary Samore, Obama's top advisor on nuclear proliferation, and Bruce Riedel, who is running Obama's review of policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, wrote last year that a nuclear-capable Iran, while undesirable, would not be the end of the world. For example, they argued, it seems unlikely that Tehran would give nuclear weapons to terrorists.
"If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is likely to behave like other nuclear weapons states, trying to intimidate its foes, but not recklessly using its weapons," Samore and Riedel wrote in a report for the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. "As such, Iran will be subject to the same deterrence system that other nuclear weapons states have accommodated themselves to since 1945."
None of this thinking means Obama has abandoned hope in negotiations to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons. At this point, one official said, the administration is focusing on Plan A, not Plan B. But it's welcome evidence that behind the slogan of hope lies a realistic appraisal of the possible outcomes.
During his presidential campaign, Obama called the idea of a nuclear Iran "unacceptable," and offered to meet with the Tehran regime without precondition to persuade it to change course. And his advisors agree that there's still a window for diplomacy.
Samore and Riedel forecast that Iran is "at least two or three years away" from being capable of building a nuclear weapon, and note that there are several stages between capability and deploying a bomb -- stages at which the United States could still work to freeze the program and contain Iran's behavior.
The first step, Ross wrote, would be to gather support from Europe, China and Russia. (Undersecretary of State Bill Burns is working on that already.) Next, Obama would seek direct, comprehensive talks with Tehran -- with a tangible threat of tougher economic sanctions if the Iranians don't cooperate, and the promise of rich rewards if they do.
So what should we expect? The contacts with Iran might start with secret talks in Europe between special envoys on both sides, but they're unlikely to begin before Iran's presidential election in June. To pave the way, Obama and his aides have toned down their rhetoric on Iran and talk mostly of outstretched hands and mutual respect. (They are learning to live without the phrase "carrots and sticks," which Iranians say should be used only when talking about donkeys.)
Negotiations won't be easy, and they won't be fast. It's not even clear whether the faction-ridden Tehran government will be able to agree on a coherent negotiating position.
Still, Obama has two advantages his predecessor didn't. First, he has sent unambiguous signals that he's ready to talk with Iran and recognize its legitimacy. That gives Tehran no clear reason to walk away, and Russia and China no easy excuse for opposing tougher sanctions.
Second, with oil revenues tanking, Iran's mullahs are likely to be feeling more vulnerable -- perhaps the only silver lining in the global financial crisis. Russia, Iran's biggest arms supplier, and China, Iran's biggest nonmilitary trading partner, will have less to lose from joining in sanctions if Iran is cutting back on foreign purchases.
Ross, Carter, Samore and Riedel all declined to talk last week when asked if they wanted to expand on what they wrote last year. But their work on Iran before they joined the government adds up to this forecast: Negotiations with Iran are worth trying, but they're not likely to succeed.
If talks fail and Iran moves closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies will have three options: more sanctions, even though they haven't worked; containment, including a stronger security commitment to Israel; or war.
And of those three unpalatable choices, containment -- with all its uncertainties -- will look like the middle way.
The Path of Realism or the Path of Failure Laying a foundation for peace in Palestine. by Elliott Abrams
An article by former Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams from the Weekly Standard. Not only does Abrams put the entire burden on the Palestinians shoulders for building institutions, he also asks zero positive moves from the Israelis (absolutely no mention of settlements or Jerusalem), and ends the article by arguing against a Palestinian state, suggesting instead control by Egypt and Jordan. He also takes a swipe at Annapolis and, implicitly, Condi Rice.
The Path of Realism or the Path of Failure
Laying a foundation for peace in Palestine.
by Elliott Abrams
03/02/2009, Volume 014, Issue 23
Repetition of failed experiments is not a sign of mental health or a
path to scientific progress, nor is it a formula for
Israeli-Palestinian peace. Yet that is the road we may again take,
unless the lessons of the Bush years are learned.
As an official of the Bush administration I made three dozen visits to
the Middle East in the last eight years, and in February, as Israelis
voted, I made my first visit as a private citizen in nearly a decade.
After lengthy discussions with Israelis and Palestinians, it seems to
me obvious that it is time to face certain facts, facts that President
Bush actually saw clearly during his first term: We are not on the
verge of Israeli-Palestinian peace; a Palestinian state cannot come
into being in the near future; and the focus should be on building the
institutions that will allow for real Palestinian progress in the
medium or longer term.
In a historic speech on June 24, 2002, President Bush said, "My vision
is two states, living side by side, in peace and security." How were
we to get there? He was specific:
There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight
terror. Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so
that a Palestinian state can be born. I call on the Palestinian people
to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon
them to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.
If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the
world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people
meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and
Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence.
And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and
new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of
America will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose
borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional
until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East. . .
. A Palestinian state will never be created by terror. It will be
built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change or
a veiled attempt to preserve the status quo. True reform will require
entirely new political and economic institutions based on democracy,
market economics and action against terrorism.
This was the announcement that the United States was breaking totally
with Yasser Arafat--the single most frequent foreign visitor to the
Clinton White House--and would henceforth consider him a terrorist
rather than a negotiating partner. Six months later the "Roadmap," a
plan for progress toward these goals, was drafted. Even its formal
name, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," suggested its conformity to
President Bush's speech. Its preamble stated in part, "A two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved
through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people
have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and
able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty."
The Roadmap did not call for leaping directly from the status quo--the
Palestinian Authority, or PA, established after Oslo--to statehood.
Instead it called for an interim phase "focused on the option of
creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and
attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way
station to a permanent status settlement." The text here reiterated
the need for Palestinian leaders "acting decisively against terror,
willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance
and liberty."
After Arafat's death in November 2004, his lieutenant Mahmoud Abbas
became president of the PA, and efforts to achieve some of these
required reforms began. But there began as well a distancing by the
United States and the international "Quartet" that had sponsored the
Roadmap (the United States, United Nations, European Union, and
Russia) from the tough and clear standards that had been set out. It
is as if those standards were meant to record disgust with Arafat, but
with his passing the familiar insistence on rapid progress--and more
Israeli concessions--returned.
More and more speeches, including American speeches, called for rapid
agreement on a Palestinian state, for a final status agreement, for
elimination altogether of that interim phase. Worse yet, at the
Annapolis Conference, announced in July 2007 and convened that
November, the president announced that the goal was a final status
agreement by the end of 2008. This left only 13 months, which was
itself astonishing for a problem as old and complex as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It seemed to ignore the June 2007 Hamas
takeover of Gaza, and, as the end of 2008 coincided with the end of
the president's own term, it seemed to substitute the American
political calendar for a realistic assessment of facts on the ground,
just as the Clinton administration had done.
And it failed. Those of us within the Bush administration who had
protested the Annapolis plan and the announcement of the 2008 goal
were sadly proved right. Historians may puzzle over the causes of the
failure, and perhaps more so over what led the president to turn away
from the tough-minded realism toward this conflict that he showed
during his first term. But the lesson for 2009, for the new
administration, must be that there are actually only two alternatives:
realism and failure.
Judging by the standards set forth in President Bush's still
remarkable 2002 speech, the PA has made some genuine progress. Under
U.S. tutelage, training of Palestinian security forces has begun
largely under the radar, at a training center in Jordan. But it is
working: Sixteen hundred police from the West Bank have gone through
the course, and there are plans to double that number. The newly
trained forces are not exactly crack troops, but they are a far cry
from the divided and ineffective gangs created by Yasser Arafat. Their
success was visible during the recent Gaza war, when they acted in
parallel, and sometimes in concert, with Israeli forces to prevent
Hamas violence and terrorism in the West Bank. Order was maintained.
Much of the credit goes to PA prime minister Salam Fayyad, a
U.S.-trained economist whose integrity, candor, and effective
administration of the PA have made him a favorite of the United States
and all other donors. Fayyad, a former finance minister (who brought
order from chaos in the PA's finances and continues to fight PA
corruption), has presided over continuing economic growth in the West
Bank and maintains a working if unfriendly relationship with Israeli
officials. Fayyad is well aware of the history of his sometime
partner, sometime foe in Jerusalem, the government of Israel, and
indeed of the history of the entire Zionist enterprise: Institutions
were built over long decades to prepare for Israel's independence
despite the uncertainty of when it would arrive. The Zionists
struggled to be ready, hoping thereby also to bring the day closer.
That is Fayyad's task for the Palestinian people, as he appears to see
it.
He gets remarkably little help, from either Arab states or the West.
The willingness of oil-rich Arab leaders to supply Palestinians with
endless amounts of rhetoric and precious little cash is not new,
though the high oil prices of recent years made it all the more
obscene. But Fayyad has also had less help from the West than one
might expect. The shift away from realistic efforts to build
Palestinian institutions and toward international conferences like
Annapolis put President Abbas in the limelight, not the pragmatic work
of Fayyad and his ministers. So Abbas traveled from capital to
capital, as he continues to do, safely removed from the difficult work
of building the basis for an independent Palestine. If the West Bank
had a factory with a thousand jobs for every such trip, for every
photo op with a smiling foreign leader, and for every international
conference, the Palestinians there would be thriving.
What are the chances that such meetings will produce a final status
agreement in 2009? None. Despite the pressures for progress after
Annapolis, little progress was made in 2008, and if anything
conditions are worse now. In 2008, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
were frequent at two levels: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met with
President Abbas, and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Palestinian
chief negotiators Ahmed Qurei ("Abu Ala") and Saeb Erekat. I am
unaware of the achievement of any actual agreement on any important
issue on either track.
On the toughest issues, such as Jerusalem and refugees, there was,
unsurprisingly, no meeting of the minds. It is unlikely negotiators
will do better this year. It has been true for decades that the most
Israel can offer the Palestinians is quite evidently less than any
Palestinian politician is prepared to accept. Those who say "the
outlines of an agreement are well known" and thereby suggest that an
agreement is close are precisely wrong: Is it not evident that to the
extent that such outlines are "well known," they are unacceptable to
both sides or they would have led to a deal long ago? In addition, any
possible deal would take years to implement: Israel would need that
time to remove settlers from lands that would become part of
Palestine, while the Palestinians would need to win the fight against
terrorism. So any deal would be a so-called shelf agreement, where
Palestinian leaders would be compromising on Jerusalem, borders, and
refugee claims in exchange not for a state, but for an Israeli promise
of a state at some indeterminate future date. No Palestinian leader
jumped at that in 2007 or 2008, and none will in 2009.
Meanwhile, whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the PA as an
institution, Fatah as a party is moribund. Its reputation for
incompetence and corruption remains what it was when Arafat was alive,
for there has been no party reform despite endless promises. At one
point in 2008, when Ahmed Qurei--one of Arafat's closest cronies,
famed for permitting corruption, renowned for opposing the rise of any
newer and younger leaders in Fatah--was formally charged with
organizing and implementing party reform, tragedy gave way to farce.
But if democracy is impossible without democratic parties, the
collapse of Fatah is no joke; it suggests that a future independent
Palestine would either be run by Hamas and other extremists and
terrorists or become a one-party "republic" on the model of Tunisia or
Egypt.
There is more. Prime Minister Olmert, who was intent on trying for an
agreement by the end of President Bush's term, will be gone, and his
successor will not be as enthusiastic to make the concessions Olmert
reportedly offered the Palestinians. President Obama has not committed
himself to achieve an agreement in 2009 in the way that President Bush
did in 2007 and 2008. The Palestinian political leadership under
President Abbas and his Fatah party is weak, even increasingly
illegitimate as the presidential election date prescribed in the
Palestinian law was ignored and Abbas's term in office extended. And,
of course, it is impossible to see how a comprehensive final status
agreement between Israel and the PA can be reached when the PA itself
has now lost control of 40 percent of the Palestinian population, the
1.4 million Palestinians living in Gaza.
First, there is the question of who can actually negotiate with Israel
on behalf of the Palestinian people. The Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) is still recognized by the Arab League and the
United Nations as the "sole legitimate voice of the Palestinian
people" though it never won a free election to attain that status.
Israel's past negotiations, in the Oslo Accords of 1993 and ever
since, have all been with the PLO--not formally with the PA, which was
created at Oslo to exercise certain governmental functions in the
Palestinian territories. When Israel negotiates with Abbas, it is in
his capacity as chairman of the PLO, not in his role as president of
the PA. But now the PA governs only one part of Palestinian territory.
Hamas governs the other part--and Hamas is not a member of the PLO. In
the 2006 elections 44 percent of Palestinians voted for Hamas,
moreover, and it maintains a majority in the Palestinian parliament (a
possible problem should that body ever meet). So, for which
Palestinians do Abbas, the PA, and the PLO actually speak? While
Israel rightly refuses to negotiate with a terrorist group like Hamas,
or with the PA or PLO should it include Hamas in its ranks, it remains
true that the PA and PLO no longer have a strong claim to represent
all Palestinians and may now lack the ability to enforce any deal with
Israel they sign.
Second, the lesson of Gaza to Israelis is identical to the lesson of
south Lebanon, and a cautionary tale regarding withdrawal from the
West Bank: "Land for peace" concessions have failed and become "land
for terrorism." Until there is far better security in the West Bank,
few Israelis would risk withdrawing the Israel Defense Forces and Shin
Bet from operating there.
And third, the terrorist groups Israel is dealing with, such as Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, used to be local; now those groups have
the full backing of Iran, both directly and through Syria and
Hezbollah. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now part of a broader
struggle in the region over Iranian extremism and power. Israeli
withdrawals now risk opening the door not only to Palestinian
terrorists but to Iranian proxies. How could Israelis, or Palestinians
for that matter, take such a risk--especially when the new American
administration has not defined its policy toward Iran, except for some
vague and (to Arabs and Israelis alike) worrying phrases about
outreached hands and sitting across negotiating tables, and the U.S.
military option is invisible?
Taken together, these factors suggest that a final status agreement is
not now a real-world goal. What is? A return to the realistic
assessments and policies that marked Bush's first term. In practice,
this suggests an intense concentration on building Palestinian
institutions in the West Bank.
There is much to build on, with security force improvements well under
way, the economy in decent shape, and a reliable and trustworthy
leader in Prime Minister Fayyad. Neither the United States nor Israel
has done nearly as much as it can to promote progress on the ground,
allowing Palestinians in the West Bank freer movement and helping
create more jobs and a better standard of living. After the Gaza war,
Israel appears prepared to do more, and should be asked to do so;
Israel has a strategic interest in the success of the Palestinian
Authority in the West Bank and of moderate forces in Palestinian
society more generally. Arab states should be pressured intensely to
provide the funds needed to meet the PA payroll and undertake sensible
investment projects, for example in housing and agriculture. The
United States and the Quartet should take some time away from endless
meetings and speeches and resolutions calling for immediate
negotiations over final status issues, and turn instead to making real
life in the West Bank better and more secure. If there is ever to be a
Palestinian state, it will be the product of such activities, not of
formulaic pronouncements about the need for Palestinian statehood now.
It is also time to rethink the recent commitment to leaping all at
once to full independence for the Palestinians, and even to break the
taboo and rethink that ultimate goal itself. Immediate and total
independence was not the plan when the Roadmap was written in 2002 and
released in 2003. Then, it was understood that "an independent
Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of
sovereignty" was a necessary way-station. Given Hamas control over
Gaza, which makes a united independent Palestine impossible for now
anyway, a West Bank-only state with provisional borders and only some
of the attributes of sovereignty makes far more sense as a medium-term
goal. It might also allow postponing compromises on Jerusalem and
refugee claims that no Palestinian politician could now make, for
those issues could be left aside for another day, while the delays are
blamed on Hamas and its rebellion in Gaza.
How that episode will end is entirely unclear, given Israel's
reluctance to reoccupy and rule Gaza, and Egypt's reluctance to
enforce strict controls on the smuggling of weapons. One Israeli
official told me that Egypt had agreed to stop the smuggling through
the tunnels. But will they really do it? I asked him. Oh, he replied,
"now you are asking if we can get an agreement to implement the
agreement. That's different." While Iran is able to sustain the Hamas
terrorist regime in Gaza, negotiations over a full final status
agreement are little more than staking territorial claims to a mirage.
But one is free to wonder as well whether Palestinian "statehood" is
the best and most sensible goal for Palestinians. When I served under
Secretary of State George Shultz in the Reagan administration, we were
expressly opposed to that outcome and favored some links to Egypt and
Jordan. On security and economic grounds, such links are no less
reasonable now; indeed, given Hamas control of Gaza and the Iranian
threat to moderate Arab states as well as to Israel, they may be even
more compelling. As we've seen, President Bush in 2002 stated that the
Palestinians should "reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan
on security and other arrangements for independence."
Now, even the mention of Egyptian and Jordanian involvement will evoke
loud protests, not least in Amman and Ramallah, and perhaps U.S.
policymakers should think but not speak about such an outcome. There
are many and varied possible relationships between a Palestinian
entity in the West Bank and the Hashemite monarchy, and if none can be
embraced today, none should be discarded either. One Arab statesman
told me when I asked him about a Jordanian role that there "must
absolutely be an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank--if
only for 15 minutes," and then they could decide on some form of
federation or at least a Jordanian security role for the area. If the
greatest Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian fears are of terrorism,
disorder, and Iranian inroads in a Palestinian West Bank state, a
Jordanian role is a practical means of addressing those fears.
Israel's next government, which Israel's president has asked Benjamin
Netanyahu to form, must soon take up these matters with the
Palestinians, Arab neighbors, the EU, and above all with the United
States. The new Obama administration has not yet worked out a policy
toward Iran or toward the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but that may be
a hopeful sign. Thinking is better than assuming or reacting or
misjudging. As the new team reviews the playing field, it would be
well advised to look not only at what its predecessors did in the
second Bush term, but also at what they did in the first term--when a
gritty realism prevailed over visions, dreams, and endless
conferences. For, again, it seems to me there are at present only two
paths forward--the path of realism and the path of failure.
Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for the Middle East at the Council on
Foreign Relations, was a deputy national security adviser in the Bush
administration.
The Path of Realism or the Path of Failure
Laying a foundation for peace in Palestine.
by Elliott Abrams
03/02/2009, Volume 014, Issue 23
Repetition of failed experiments is not a sign of mental health or a
path to scientific progress, nor is it a formula for
Israeli-Palestinian peace. Yet that is the road we may again take,
unless the lessons of the Bush years are learned.
As an official of the Bush administration I made three dozen visits to
the Middle East in the last eight years, and in February, as Israelis
voted, I made my first visit as a private citizen in nearly a decade.
After lengthy discussions with Israelis and Palestinians, it seems to
me obvious that it is time to face certain facts, facts that President
Bush actually saw clearly during his first term: We are not on the
verge of Israeli-Palestinian peace; a Palestinian state cannot come
into being in the near future; and the focus should be on building the
institutions that will allow for real Palestinian progress in the
medium or longer term.
In a historic speech on June 24, 2002, President Bush said, "My vision
is two states, living side by side, in peace and security." How were
we to get there? He was specific:
There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight
terror. Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so
that a Palestinian state can be born. I call on the Palestinian people
to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon
them to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.
If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the
world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people
meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and
Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence.
And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and
new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of
America will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose
borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional
until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East. . .
. A Palestinian state will never be created by terror. It will be
built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change or
a veiled attempt to preserve the status quo. True reform will require
entirely new political and economic institutions based on democracy,
market economics and action against terrorism.
This was the announcement that the United States was breaking totally
with Yasser Arafat--the single most frequent foreign visitor to the
Clinton White House--and would henceforth consider him a terrorist
rather than a negotiating partner. Six months later the "Roadmap," a
plan for progress toward these goals, was drafted. Even its formal
name, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," suggested its conformity to
President Bush's speech. Its preamble stated in part, "A two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved
through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people
have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and
able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty."
The Roadmap did not call for leaping directly from the status quo--the
Palestinian Authority, or PA, established after Oslo--to statehood.
Instead it called for an interim phase "focused on the option of
creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and
attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way
station to a permanent status settlement." The text here reiterated
the need for Palestinian leaders "acting decisively against terror,
willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance
and liberty."
After Arafat's death in November 2004, his lieutenant Mahmoud Abbas
became president of the PA, and efforts to achieve some of these
required reforms began. But there began as well a distancing by the
United States and the international "Quartet" that had sponsored the
Roadmap (the United States, United Nations, European Union, and
Russia) from the tough and clear standards that had been set out. It
is as if those standards were meant to record disgust with Arafat, but
with his passing the familiar insistence on rapid progress--and more
Israeli concessions--returned.
More and more speeches, including American speeches, called for rapid
agreement on a Palestinian state, for a final status agreement, for
elimination altogether of that interim phase. Worse yet, at the
Annapolis Conference, announced in July 2007 and convened that
November, the president announced that the goal was a final status
agreement by the end of 2008. This left only 13 months, which was
itself astonishing for a problem as old and complex as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It seemed to ignore the June 2007 Hamas
takeover of Gaza, and, as the end of 2008 coincided with the end of
the president's own term, it seemed to substitute the American
political calendar for a realistic assessment of facts on the ground,
just as the Clinton administration had done.
And it failed. Those of us within the Bush administration who had
protested the Annapolis plan and the announcement of the 2008 goal
were sadly proved right. Historians may puzzle over the causes of the
failure, and perhaps more so over what led the president to turn away
from the tough-minded realism toward this conflict that he showed
during his first term. But the lesson for 2009, for the new
administration, must be that there are actually only two alternatives:
realism and failure.
Judging by the standards set forth in President Bush's still
remarkable 2002 speech, the PA has made some genuine progress. Under
U.S. tutelage, training of Palestinian security forces has begun
largely under the radar, at a training center in Jordan. But it is
working: Sixteen hundred police from the West Bank have gone through
the course, and there are plans to double that number. The newly
trained forces are not exactly crack troops, but they are a far cry
from the divided and ineffective gangs created by Yasser Arafat. Their
success was visible during the recent Gaza war, when they acted in
parallel, and sometimes in concert, with Israeli forces to prevent
Hamas violence and terrorism in the West Bank. Order was maintained.
Much of the credit goes to PA prime minister Salam Fayyad, a
U.S.-trained economist whose integrity, candor, and effective
administration of the PA have made him a favorite of the United States
and all other donors. Fayyad, a former finance minister (who brought
order from chaos in the PA's finances and continues to fight PA
corruption), has presided over continuing economic growth in the West
Bank and maintains a working if unfriendly relationship with Israeli
officials. Fayyad is well aware of the history of his sometime
partner, sometime foe in Jerusalem, the government of Israel, and
indeed of the history of the entire Zionist enterprise: Institutions
were built over long decades to prepare for Israel's independence
despite the uncertainty of when it would arrive. The Zionists
struggled to be ready, hoping thereby also to bring the day closer.
That is Fayyad's task for the Palestinian people, as he appears to see
it.
He gets remarkably little help, from either Arab states or the West.
The willingness of oil-rich Arab leaders to supply Palestinians with
endless amounts of rhetoric and precious little cash is not new,
though the high oil prices of recent years made it all the more
obscene. But Fayyad has also had less help from the West than one
might expect. The shift away from realistic efforts to build
Palestinian institutions and toward international conferences like
Annapolis put President Abbas in the limelight, not the pragmatic work
of Fayyad and his ministers. So Abbas traveled from capital to
capital, as he continues to do, safely removed from the difficult work
of building the basis for an independent Palestine. If the West Bank
had a factory with a thousand jobs for every such trip, for every
photo op with a smiling foreign leader, and for every international
conference, the Palestinians there would be thriving.
What are the chances that such meetings will produce a final status
agreement in 2009? None. Despite the pressures for progress after
Annapolis, little progress was made in 2008, and if anything
conditions are worse now. In 2008, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
were frequent at two levels: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met with
President Abbas, and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Palestinian
chief negotiators Ahmed Qurei ("Abu Ala") and Saeb Erekat. I am
unaware of the achievement of any actual agreement on any important
issue on either track.
On the toughest issues, such as Jerusalem and refugees, there was,
unsurprisingly, no meeting of the minds. It is unlikely negotiators
will do better this year. It has been true for decades that the most
Israel can offer the Palestinians is quite evidently less than any
Palestinian politician is prepared to accept. Those who say "the
outlines of an agreement are well known" and thereby suggest that an
agreement is close are precisely wrong: Is it not evident that to the
extent that such outlines are "well known," they are unacceptable to
both sides or they would have led to a deal long ago? In addition, any
possible deal would take years to implement: Israel would need that
time to remove settlers from lands that would become part of
Palestine, while the Palestinians would need to win the fight against
terrorism. So any deal would be a so-called shelf agreement, where
Palestinian leaders would be compromising on Jerusalem, borders, and
refugee claims in exchange not for a state, but for an Israeli promise
of a state at some indeterminate future date. No Palestinian leader
jumped at that in 2007 or 2008, and none will in 2009.
Meanwhile, whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the PA as an
institution, Fatah as a party is moribund. Its reputation for
incompetence and corruption remains what it was when Arafat was alive,
for there has been no party reform despite endless promises. At one
point in 2008, when Ahmed Qurei--one of Arafat's closest cronies,
famed for permitting corruption, renowned for opposing the rise of any
newer and younger leaders in Fatah--was formally charged with
organizing and implementing party reform, tragedy gave way to farce.
But if democracy is impossible without democratic parties, the
collapse of Fatah is no joke; it suggests that a future independent
Palestine would either be run by Hamas and other extremists and
terrorists or become a one-party "republic" on the model of Tunisia or
Egypt.
There is more. Prime Minister Olmert, who was intent on trying for an
agreement by the end of President Bush's term, will be gone, and his
successor will not be as enthusiastic to make the concessions Olmert
reportedly offered the Palestinians. President Obama has not committed
himself to achieve an agreement in 2009 in the way that President Bush
did in 2007 and 2008. The Palestinian political leadership under
President Abbas and his Fatah party is weak, even increasingly
illegitimate as the presidential election date prescribed in the
Palestinian law was ignored and Abbas's term in office extended. And,
of course, it is impossible to see how a comprehensive final status
agreement between Israel and the PA can be reached when the PA itself
has now lost control of 40 percent of the Palestinian population, the
1.4 million Palestinians living in Gaza.
First, there is the question of who can actually negotiate with Israel
on behalf of the Palestinian people. The Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) is still recognized by the Arab League and the
United Nations as the "sole legitimate voice of the Palestinian
people" though it never won a free election to attain that status.
Israel's past negotiations, in the Oslo Accords of 1993 and ever
since, have all been with the PLO--not formally with the PA, which was
created at Oslo to exercise certain governmental functions in the
Palestinian territories. When Israel negotiates with Abbas, it is in
his capacity as chairman of the PLO, not in his role as president of
the PA. But now the PA governs only one part of Palestinian territory.
Hamas governs the other part--and Hamas is not a member of the PLO. In
the 2006 elections 44 percent of Palestinians voted for Hamas,
moreover, and it maintains a majority in the Palestinian parliament (a
possible problem should that body ever meet). So, for which
Palestinians do Abbas, the PA, and the PLO actually speak? While
Israel rightly refuses to negotiate with a terrorist group like Hamas,
or with the PA or PLO should it include Hamas in its ranks, it remains
true that the PA and PLO no longer have a strong claim to represent
all Palestinians and may now lack the ability to enforce any deal with
Israel they sign.
Second, the lesson of Gaza to Israelis is identical to the lesson of
south Lebanon, and a cautionary tale regarding withdrawal from the
West Bank: "Land for peace" concessions have failed and become "land
for terrorism." Until there is far better security in the West Bank,
few Israelis would risk withdrawing the Israel Defense Forces and Shin
Bet from operating there.
And third, the terrorist groups Israel is dealing with, such as Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, used to be local; now those groups have
the full backing of Iran, both directly and through Syria and
Hezbollah. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now part of a broader
struggle in the region over Iranian extremism and power. Israeli
withdrawals now risk opening the door not only to Palestinian
terrorists but to Iranian proxies. How could Israelis, or Palestinians
for that matter, take such a risk--especially when the new American
administration has not defined its policy toward Iran, except for some
vague and (to Arabs and Israelis alike) worrying phrases about
outreached hands and sitting across negotiating tables, and the U.S.
military option is invisible?
Taken together, these factors suggest that a final status agreement is
not now a real-world goal. What is? A return to the realistic
assessments and policies that marked Bush's first term. In practice,
this suggests an intense concentration on building Palestinian
institutions in the West Bank.
There is much to build on, with security force improvements well under
way, the economy in decent shape, and a reliable and trustworthy
leader in Prime Minister Fayyad. Neither the United States nor Israel
has done nearly as much as it can to promote progress on the ground,
allowing Palestinians in the West Bank freer movement and helping
create more jobs and a better standard of living. After the Gaza war,
Israel appears prepared to do more, and should be asked to do so;
Israel has a strategic interest in the success of the Palestinian
Authority in the West Bank and of moderate forces in Palestinian
society more generally. Arab states should be pressured intensely to
provide the funds needed to meet the PA payroll and undertake sensible
investment projects, for example in housing and agriculture. The
United States and the Quartet should take some time away from endless
meetings and speeches and resolutions calling for immediate
negotiations over final status issues, and turn instead to making real
life in the West Bank better and more secure. If there is ever to be a
Palestinian state, it will be the product of such activities, not of
formulaic pronouncements about the need for Palestinian statehood now.
It is also time to rethink the recent commitment to leaping all at
once to full independence for the Palestinians, and even to break the
taboo and rethink that ultimate goal itself. Immediate and total
independence was not the plan when the Roadmap was written in 2002 and
released in 2003. Then, it was understood that "an independent
Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of
sovereignty" was a necessary way-station. Given Hamas control over
Gaza, which makes a united independent Palestine impossible for now
anyway, a West Bank-only state with provisional borders and only some
of the attributes of sovereignty makes far more sense as a medium-term
goal. It might also allow postponing compromises on Jerusalem and
refugee claims that no Palestinian politician could now make, for
those issues could be left aside for another day, while the delays are
blamed on Hamas and its rebellion in Gaza.
How that episode will end is entirely unclear, given Israel's
reluctance to reoccupy and rule Gaza, and Egypt's reluctance to
enforce strict controls on the smuggling of weapons. One Israeli
official told me that Egypt had agreed to stop the smuggling through
the tunnels. But will they really do it? I asked him. Oh, he replied,
"now you are asking if we can get an agreement to implement the
agreement. That's different." While Iran is able to sustain the Hamas
terrorist regime in Gaza, negotiations over a full final status
agreement are little more than staking territorial claims to a mirage.
But one is free to wonder as well whether Palestinian "statehood" is
the best and most sensible goal for Palestinians. When I served under
Secretary of State George Shultz in the Reagan administration, we were
expressly opposed to that outcome and favored some links to Egypt and
Jordan. On security and economic grounds, such links are no less
reasonable now; indeed, given Hamas control of Gaza and the Iranian
threat to moderate Arab states as well as to Israel, they may be even
more compelling. As we've seen, President Bush in 2002 stated that the
Palestinians should "reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan
on security and other arrangements for independence."
Now, even the mention of Egyptian and Jordanian involvement will evoke
loud protests, not least in Amman and Ramallah, and perhaps U.S.
policymakers should think but not speak about such an outcome. There
are many and varied possible relationships between a Palestinian
entity in the West Bank and the Hashemite monarchy, and if none can be
embraced today, none should be discarded either. One Arab statesman
told me when I asked him about a Jordanian role that there "must
absolutely be an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank--if
only for 15 minutes," and then they could decide on some form of
federation or at least a Jordanian security role for the area. If the
greatest Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian fears are of terrorism,
disorder, and Iranian inroads in a Palestinian West Bank state, a
Jordanian role is a practical means of addressing those fears.
Israel's next government, which Israel's president has asked Benjamin
Netanyahu to form, must soon take up these matters with the
Palestinians, Arab neighbors, the EU, and above all with the United
States. The new Obama administration has not yet worked out a policy
toward Iran or toward the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but that may be
a hopeful sign. Thinking is better than assuming or reacting or
misjudging. As the new team reviews the playing field, it would be
well advised to look not only at what its predecessors did in the
second Bush term, but also at what they did in the first term--when a
gritty realism prevailed over visions, dreams, and endless
conferences. For, again, it seems to me there are at present only two
paths forward--the path of realism and the path of failure.
Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for the Middle East at the Council on
Foreign Relations, was a deputy national security adviser in the Bush
administration.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Defence chiefs urge hawk Netanyahu to strike deal with Syria by Uzi Mahnaimi
Defence chiefs urge hawk Netanyahu to strike deal with Syria
Uzi Mahnaimi
The Times
February 22, 2009 - 12:00am
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5780477.ece
ISRAEL'S next prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, will face an early
test when he finally takes office in the next few weeks: should he
ditch an election pledge and follow his defence chiefs' strategic
advice to explore a peace treaty with Syria?
During his campaign Netanyahu, the leader of the conservative Likud
party, had struck a belligerent note and pledged he would never agree
to Syria's main demand that the Golan Heights, seized by Israel in the
1967 war, should be returned.
On reaching office, however, Netanyahu will be presented with reports
compiled by Mossad, the overseas spy agency, and by military
intelligence, that strongly advocate opening negotiations with
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.
According to sources familiar with the documents, both Amos Yadlin,
the head of military intelligence, and Meir Dagan, his Mossad
counterpart, recommend a deal not only to eliminate the risk of war
with Syria but also to create a split between Damascus and Iran,
Israel's arch foe.
A United Nations report last week said Iran had accumulated a
stockpile of more than one ton of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride at
its nuclear facility in Natanz. If highly enriched this would be
enough for a nuclear weapon.
Intelligence analysts say no Israeli government could accept a
nuclear-armed Iran. But if it came to a showdown Israel would want
Syria, which has close ties to Iran, to stay neutral. It also wants
Syria to stop supplying arms to Hezbollah, the Islamic political and
paramilitary group in Lebanon.
Israel has recently violated Syrian sovereignty on three occasions:
with the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, a Hezbollah leader, in
Damascus last February; the killing of a Syrian general, Mohammed
Suleiman, near the Syrian port of Tartous last August; and a raid on
an alleged nuclear facility in September 2007.
The reports argue that Israel is vulnerable to Syria's upgraded
chemical weapons capability, which is being expanded with the help of
North Korean experts. Satellite images that emerged last week showed
new construction work at the heavily protected site of al-Safir.
Netanyahu, who was prime minister from 1996 to 1999, is likely to form
a coalition with religious parties and the Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is
Our Home) party, led by Avigdor Lieberman, the secular rightwinger.
Yesterday Senator John Kerry, the former US Democratic presidential
candidate, visited Assad amid signs that Washington is stepping up
pressure on Israel to negotiate a deal.
As prime minister Netanyahu came close to signing an agreement in 1998
with Hafez al-Assad, the late Syrian president, in which he agreed to
give back the Golan in return for a lasting peace.
"Indeed I did have negotiations with the Syrians," Netanyahu admitted
in an interview in 2007. "I told Assad I'd need Mount Hermon [a
4,000ft Israeli outpost overlooking Damascus] because I need radar to
look towards Iran, and Assad gave up the mountain. I was surprised and
happy."
Aides close to Netanyahu say an agreement with Syria is the surest way
for Netanyahu to make political progress with the new administration,
as they profoundly disagree on other aspects of a Middle East peace
deal.
"If he achieves a real breakthrough with Syria, he expects the
Americans to give him a break with the Palestinians," said a close
aide of Netanyahu.
At least one rocket fired from Lebanon landed in northern Israel
yesterday, wounding three people and prompting Israel to respond with
an artillery attack.
_______________________________________________
Uzi Mahnaimi
The Times
February 22, 2009 - 12:00am
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5780477.ece
ISRAEL'S next prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, will face an early
test when he finally takes office in the next few weeks: should he
ditch an election pledge and follow his defence chiefs' strategic
advice to explore a peace treaty with Syria?
During his campaign Netanyahu, the leader of the conservative Likud
party, had struck a belligerent note and pledged he would never agree
to Syria's main demand that the Golan Heights, seized by Israel in the
1967 war, should be returned.
On reaching office, however, Netanyahu will be presented with reports
compiled by Mossad, the overseas spy agency, and by military
intelligence, that strongly advocate opening negotiations with
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.
According to sources familiar with the documents, both Amos Yadlin,
the head of military intelligence, and Meir Dagan, his Mossad
counterpart, recommend a deal not only to eliminate the risk of war
with Syria but also to create a split between Damascus and Iran,
Israel's arch foe.
A United Nations report last week said Iran had accumulated a
stockpile of more than one ton of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride at
its nuclear facility in Natanz. If highly enriched this would be
enough for a nuclear weapon.
Intelligence analysts say no Israeli government could accept a
nuclear-armed Iran. But if it came to a showdown Israel would want
Syria, which has close ties to Iran, to stay neutral. It also wants
Syria to stop supplying arms to Hezbollah, the Islamic political and
paramilitary group in Lebanon.
Israel has recently violated Syrian sovereignty on three occasions:
with the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, a Hezbollah leader, in
Damascus last February; the killing of a Syrian general, Mohammed
Suleiman, near the Syrian port of Tartous last August; and a raid on
an alleged nuclear facility in September 2007.
The reports argue that Israel is vulnerable to Syria's upgraded
chemical weapons capability, which is being expanded with the help of
North Korean experts. Satellite images that emerged last week showed
new construction work at the heavily protected site of al-Safir.
Netanyahu, who was prime minister from 1996 to 1999, is likely to form
a coalition with religious parties and the Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is
Our Home) party, led by Avigdor Lieberman, the secular rightwinger.
Yesterday Senator John Kerry, the former US Democratic presidential
candidate, visited Assad amid signs that Washington is stepping up
pressure on Israel to negotiate a deal.
As prime minister Netanyahu came close to signing an agreement in 1998
with Hafez al-Assad, the late Syrian president, in which he agreed to
give back the Golan in return for a lasting peace.
"Indeed I did have negotiations with the Syrians," Netanyahu admitted
in an interview in 2007. "I told Assad I'd need Mount Hermon [a
4,000ft Israeli outpost overlooking Damascus] because I need radar to
look towards Iran, and Assad gave up the mountain. I was surprised and
happy."
Aides close to Netanyahu say an agreement with Syria is the surest way
for Netanyahu to make political progress with the new administration,
as they profoundly disagree on other aspects of a Middle East peace
deal.
"If he achieves a real breakthrough with Syria, he expects the
Americans to give him a break with the Palestinians," said a close
aide of Netanyahu.
At least one rocket fired from Lebanon landed in northern Israel
yesterday, wounding three people and prompting Israel to respond with
an artillery attack.
_______________________________________________
Assessing Motives in Tehran
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18588/assessing_motives_in_tehran.html
Assessing Motives in Tehran
Author:
Frank Procida, National Intelligence Fellow
February 23, 2009
Analysts of all political stripes, including, most importantly, members of
the new U.S. president's foreign policy team, seem to agree that Iran is
striving to build the bomb. Why else would a state risk further economic
isolation, or worse, to develop nuclear-related technologies whose output
it could pursue more cheaply and easily on the open market? But as the
foreign policy cognoscenti argue the merits of enhanced sanctions
packages, grand bargains, and military options in changing Tehran's
behavior, it is worth reconsidering the question of whether Iran even
plans to develop nuclear weapons, and how certain anyone outside of
Iranian decision-making circles can be of that answer.
The controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which found that
Iran halted its nuclear weapons program four years earlier, appears to
have been all but forgotten. Regardless, more instructive is the inverse
of that report's central point; in order to halt a program it must first
exist, a fact that suggests the intelligence community has significant
evidence that Tehran, at one point at least, authorized the development of
nuclear weapons.
Beyond the estimate, all that is known publicly is that Iran has a history
of hiding sensitive nuclear sites from the International Atomic Energy
Agency and that Tehran has yet to answer the agency's questions on what
are known as the "alleged studies"--documents said to indicate Iran
attempted to develop a ballistic missile re-entry vehicle capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead. This lack of transparency has fueled the
charges of those who dismiss Tehran's denials of wrongdoing. The IAEA's
latest report is a case in point, revealing that Tehran understated by
about one-third the amount of bomb quality uranium it has enriched,
meaning it could very likely produce a bomb with current stocks if it
chose.
"An unexpected reasoning might exist for Iran¢s seemingly self-destructive
behavior today."
Still, probably more important to most observers than uncertain
intelligence and games of cat and mouse is simple logic; all experts agree
that Iran's desire to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel makes little
sense from an economic or energy perspective. Russia has agreed to provide
enriched uranium for Iran's only existing, and not yet operational, power
plant, and fuel for any future plants could be similarly acquired on the
open market. Indeed, the EU-led overtures to Iran have included such
guarantees. Moreover, Iran's efforts to produce this fuel are not only
premature but are costly and inefficient, wiping away the economic
benefits Tehran supposedly hopes to reap by developing nuclear power
plants in the first place. Adding the negative economic and political
consequences of sanctions to the mix only makes Iran's nuclear policy more
senseless unless the program is meant as a cover or hedge for weapons
development.
As tempting as it may be to accept such wisdom, the West's experience in
assessing the motives behind Iraq's behavior under sanctions should give
pause; sometimes actions that appear irrational--say, enduring crippling
economic sanctions and inviting a war to uphold the veneer of a WMD
capability--have a rationale that is unrecognizable to outsiders. It was
not tales of mobile biological labs and mistaken assessments of aluminum
tubes that led to the Bush administration's excessive confidence in Iraq's
guilt--although these collection and analytic lapses certainly did not
help. Rather, it was a gut feeling that Iraq's intransigence, and its
ensuing costs and risks, only made sense if Baghdad was harboring weapons
it felt it needed to ensure its survival. In reality, Saddam did view such
weapons as vital, so much so that his regime risked everything to maintain
the mirage it still possessed them. While Saddam's calculation was
wrong--in fact the ploy brought on the outcome he hoped it would
prevent--the thinking at least becomes understandable when viewed from the
Iraqi perspective.
Similarly, an unexpected reasoning might exist for Iran's seemingly
self-destructive behavior today. Investing in nuclear technology for
energy production does make some sense for Iran, a country with a growing
population that imports more than 40 percent of its refined petroleum.
Diversifying its energy needs also could, in theory at least, free up
crude oil for Iran to export. After all, no credible analyst is
questioning the United Arab Emirates' motives in seeking nuclear plants,
despite ranking sixth worldwide in proven oil reserves. Citing Iran's
massive reserves to prove the absurdity of an Iranian nuclear energy
program is therefore pointless.
There may even be a legitimate motive behind Iran's dogged pursuit of a
domestic enrichment capability, a much more alarming policy. While it is
true that the West has offered fuel guarantees that would negate the need
for a costly enrichment program, Tehran would have reason to doubt the
sanctity of such promises. The nuclear dispute is but one of many areas of
contention between Iran and the West, and it would not be unreasonable for
Tehran to expect nuclear-related deals to dissipate in the event of future
flare-ups involving Hezbollah. Given how sanctions have crippled other
important industries in Iran, why leave something as essential as energy
production vulnerable to outside suppliers?
"It might be worth spending a bit of time contemplating whether the
unbearable outcome the West is desperately trying to prevent even exists
as an option in the minds of Iranian decision-makers."
Domestic politics also should not be dismissed as a driver of Tehran's
nuclear policy. Iran remains autocratic, but even its recent election
results support the maxim that all politics is local. Although it would be
foolish to grant them too much credibility, most published poll results
show that a large majority of Iranians support the nuclear program and are
opposed to compromise. The issue appears to have become one of national
pride, with the ordinary Iranian, regardless of his or her opinion of the
ruling regime, viewing Western efforts to constrain its nuclear
development as hypocritical at best and malicious at worst. The already
unpopular mullahs could fear further backlash if they were seen as
abandoning technological development because of outside pressure. It would
be short-sighted to expect Iranian leaders to share the West's assumptions
that its promises are reliable, and raw domestic political calculations
could have a greater influence over Iranian policymaking than generic
concerns about the country's overall economic health.
The lack of any serious debate on the question of Iran's intentions is
somewhat stunning, given that the United States remains mired in a war
caused in part by the failure to accurately forecast Iraq's weapons
capabilities. President Bush himself has expressed disappointment at his
administration's failures regarding the Iraqi WMD case, and the U.S.
intelligence community, judging by the tone of the 2007 NIE, appears to be
similarly chastened. All the more surprising then that outside analysts,
even those opposed to the more hawkish options being floated to deal with
the problem, appear willing to assume the worst when it comes to Iran's
intentions.
The consequences of a deepening rift with Iran are unknown but scary--an
unleashed Hezbollah, further Iranian meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan,
potential missile attacks against U.S. allies in the region, and
skyrocketing oil prices. Some observers believe that if Iran acquired a
nuclear "guarantee" it would become even more mischievous than it is today
and for that reason alone the country must not be allowed to cross the
nuclear threshold. Others argue that whatever plans Tehran now has for its
nuclear program are irrelevant, since intentions are subject to change. In
such a view, capabilities are all that matter. But before risking such
costly consequences, it might be worth spending a bit of time
contemplating whether the unbearable outcome the West is desperately
trying to prevent even exists as an option in the minds of Iranian
decision-makers.
The writer is the National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Assessing Motives in Tehran
Author:
Frank Procida, National Intelligence Fellow
February 23, 2009
Analysts of all political stripes, including, most importantly, members of
the new U.S. president's foreign policy team, seem to agree that Iran is
striving to build the bomb. Why else would a state risk further economic
isolation, or worse, to develop nuclear-related technologies whose output
it could pursue more cheaply and easily on the open market? But as the
foreign policy cognoscenti argue the merits of enhanced sanctions
packages, grand bargains, and military options in changing Tehran's
behavior, it is worth reconsidering the question of whether Iran even
plans to develop nuclear weapons, and how certain anyone outside of
Iranian decision-making circles can be of that answer.
The controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which found that
Iran halted its nuclear weapons program four years earlier, appears to
have been all but forgotten. Regardless, more instructive is the inverse
of that report's central point; in order to halt a program it must first
exist, a fact that suggests the intelligence community has significant
evidence that Tehran, at one point at least, authorized the development of
nuclear weapons.
Beyond the estimate, all that is known publicly is that Iran has a history
of hiding sensitive nuclear sites from the International Atomic Energy
Agency and that Tehran has yet to answer the agency's questions on what
are known as the "alleged studies"--documents said to indicate Iran
attempted to develop a ballistic missile re-entry vehicle capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead. This lack of transparency has fueled the
charges of those who dismiss Tehran's denials of wrongdoing. The IAEA's
latest report is a case in point, revealing that Tehran understated by
about one-third the amount of bomb quality uranium it has enriched,
meaning it could very likely produce a bomb with current stocks if it
chose.
"An unexpected reasoning might exist for Iran¢s seemingly self-destructive
behavior today."
Still, probably more important to most observers than uncertain
intelligence and games of cat and mouse is simple logic; all experts agree
that Iran's desire to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel makes little
sense from an economic or energy perspective. Russia has agreed to provide
enriched uranium for Iran's only existing, and not yet operational, power
plant, and fuel for any future plants could be similarly acquired on the
open market. Indeed, the EU-led overtures to Iran have included such
guarantees. Moreover, Iran's efforts to produce this fuel are not only
premature but are costly and inefficient, wiping away the economic
benefits Tehran supposedly hopes to reap by developing nuclear power
plants in the first place. Adding the negative economic and political
consequences of sanctions to the mix only makes Iran's nuclear policy more
senseless unless the program is meant as a cover or hedge for weapons
development.
As tempting as it may be to accept such wisdom, the West's experience in
assessing the motives behind Iraq's behavior under sanctions should give
pause; sometimes actions that appear irrational--say, enduring crippling
economic sanctions and inviting a war to uphold the veneer of a WMD
capability--have a rationale that is unrecognizable to outsiders. It was
not tales of mobile biological labs and mistaken assessments of aluminum
tubes that led to the Bush administration's excessive confidence in Iraq's
guilt--although these collection and analytic lapses certainly did not
help. Rather, it was a gut feeling that Iraq's intransigence, and its
ensuing costs and risks, only made sense if Baghdad was harboring weapons
it felt it needed to ensure its survival. In reality, Saddam did view such
weapons as vital, so much so that his regime risked everything to maintain
the mirage it still possessed them. While Saddam's calculation was
wrong--in fact the ploy brought on the outcome he hoped it would
prevent--the thinking at least becomes understandable when viewed from the
Iraqi perspective.
Similarly, an unexpected reasoning might exist for Iran's seemingly
self-destructive behavior today. Investing in nuclear technology for
energy production does make some sense for Iran, a country with a growing
population that imports more than 40 percent of its refined petroleum.
Diversifying its energy needs also could, in theory at least, free up
crude oil for Iran to export. After all, no credible analyst is
questioning the United Arab Emirates' motives in seeking nuclear plants,
despite ranking sixth worldwide in proven oil reserves. Citing Iran's
massive reserves to prove the absurdity of an Iranian nuclear energy
program is therefore pointless.
There may even be a legitimate motive behind Iran's dogged pursuit of a
domestic enrichment capability, a much more alarming policy. While it is
true that the West has offered fuel guarantees that would negate the need
for a costly enrichment program, Tehran would have reason to doubt the
sanctity of such promises. The nuclear dispute is but one of many areas of
contention between Iran and the West, and it would not be unreasonable for
Tehran to expect nuclear-related deals to dissipate in the event of future
flare-ups involving Hezbollah. Given how sanctions have crippled other
important industries in Iran, why leave something as essential as energy
production vulnerable to outside suppliers?
"It might be worth spending a bit of time contemplating whether the
unbearable outcome the West is desperately trying to prevent even exists
as an option in the minds of Iranian decision-makers."
Domestic politics also should not be dismissed as a driver of Tehran's
nuclear policy. Iran remains autocratic, but even its recent election
results support the maxim that all politics is local. Although it would be
foolish to grant them too much credibility, most published poll results
show that a large majority of Iranians support the nuclear program and are
opposed to compromise. The issue appears to have become one of national
pride, with the ordinary Iranian, regardless of his or her opinion of the
ruling regime, viewing Western efforts to constrain its nuclear
development as hypocritical at best and malicious at worst. The already
unpopular mullahs could fear further backlash if they were seen as
abandoning technological development because of outside pressure. It would
be short-sighted to expect Iranian leaders to share the West's assumptions
that its promises are reliable, and raw domestic political calculations
could have a greater influence over Iranian policymaking than generic
concerns about the country's overall economic health.
The lack of any serious debate on the question of Iran's intentions is
somewhat stunning, given that the United States remains mired in a war
caused in part by the failure to accurately forecast Iraq's weapons
capabilities. President Bush himself has expressed disappointment at his
administration's failures regarding the Iraqi WMD case, and the U.S.
intelligence community, judging by the tone of the 2007 NIE, appears to be
similarly chastened. All the more surprising then that outside analysts,
even those opposed to the more hawkish options being floated to deal with
the problem, appear willing to assume the worst when it comes to Iran's
intentions.
The consequences of a deepening rift with Iran are unknown but scary--an
unleashed Hezbollah, further Iranian meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan,
potential missile attacks against U.S. allies in the region, and
skyrocketing oil prices. Some observers believe that if Iran acquired a
nuclear "guarantee" it would become even more mischievous than it is today
and for that reason alone the country must not be allowed to cross the
nuclear threshold. Others argue that whatever plans Tehran now has for its
nuclear program are irrelevant, since intentions are subject to change. In
such a view, capabilities are all that matter. But before risking such
costly consequences, it might be worth spending a bit of time
contemplating whether the unbearable outcome the West is desperately
trying to prevent even exists as an option in the minds of Iranian
decision-makers.
The writer is the National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations.
A new, uncertain trumpet by Arnaud de Borchgrave
A new, uncertain trumpet
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Monday, February 23, 2009
COMMENTARY:
While President Obama signed orders to deploy 17,000 additional U.S.
troops to Afghanistan, including 8,000 Marines, his thinking on the
Afghan war has changed significantly. It's no longer the gung-ho view
of a surge-type operation routing al Qaeda's terrorists.
The reinforcements also fall shy of the 30,000 troops requested by
Gen. David McKiernan, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
which would have doubled current U.S. force levels in a country of 35
million the size of France. Juggling troop requirements between two
wars leaves one theater shortchanged. "Even with these additional
forces," warned Gen. McKiernan, "I have to tell you that 2009 is going
to be a tough year."
Al Qaeda is in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), those
seven tribal agencies under Pakistani sovereignty on the Afghan
border, not in Afghanistan. But the more the United States keeps
bombing al Qaeda's safe havens in FATA by remote-controlled, unmanned
Predators, the more civilians get killed, and the more Taliban's
politico-religious fanatics boost their stock in Pakistan proper.
Mr. Obama faced his first foreign hurdle on open-ended NATO
commitments in Afghanistan when he made his first foreign visit to
Canada this week. But when the moment of truth arrived, he punted. "I
certainly did not press the prime minister on any additional
commitments beyond the ones that have already been made," he said
later.
The Canadian Parliament had already voted to pull out its 2,800
troops by 2011, and both Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign
Minister Lawrence Cannon made clear only another vote in a hostile
Parliament could change that.
The only other two nations authorized to fight in Afghanistan -
Britain and the Netherlands - are also under parliamentary pressure to
wrap up their kinetic contributions by the end of 2011.
Centcom commander Gen. David H. Petraeus believes the British will
stick it out with the United States as long as it takes. Prime
Minister Gordon Brown's entourage does not share Gen. Petraeus'
confidence.
President Obama is also asking the other NATO allies with kinetically
impaired troops whose parliaments voted to keep them out of harm's
way, to contribute more soldiers. France, Germany and Spain have
declined. Italy, under conservative leader Silvio Berlusconi, has
agreed to boost its Afghan contingent from 2,300 troops to 2,800. They
are based near Herat close to the Iranian border and will only be
allowed to open fire against Taliban if the G-8 summit of major
industrial nations next July, on the island of La Maddalena, between
Corsica and Sardinia, agrees. Not exactly an Italian call to action.
President Obama's main Afghan concern now is to avoid going into
negotiations with "moderate" Taliban elements from a position of
weakness. In an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. prior
to his one-day visit to Ottawa, Mr. Obama indicated a shift in his
Afghan strategy when he made clear diplomacy will now play a bigger
role in U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. "I am absolutely convinced," the
president explained, "that you cannot solve the problem of
Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region
solely through military means. ... We're going to have to use
diplomacy. We're going to have to use development."
An immediate worry is the ability to defend Kabul, the Afghan
capital, with NATO troops that are not authorized to fight. The first
3,000 U.S. reinforcements will be deployed around the city to thwart
Taliban's plans to stage a Tet-type offensive, which was when Viet
Cong guerrillas infiltrated major Vietnamese cities in 1968. Even
though defeated, the Viet Cong scored a major psychological victory
that demoralized America's home front.
President Hamid Karzai keeps complaining about U.S. troops he says
are turning the population against them by breaking into homes looking
for Taliban guns and ammo, and killing any civilian who resists. "They
will get plenty of flowers and gratitude when we send them safely back
home," Mr. Karzai opined sarcastically.
After reading up on Afghan briefing papers, Mr. Obama concluded
Defense Secretary Robert Gates was only partly correct when he said
"there needs to be a three- to five-year plan for re-establishing
control in certain areas, providing security for the population, going
after al Qaeda, preventing establishment of terrorism, better
performance in terms of delivery of services to the people." This
tends to co-mingle Taliban and al Qaeda. For Mr. Obama, they are two
separate entities and the split should be encouraged.
When they take place, negotiations will be with Taliban, not with al
Qaeda. As for the $32 billion in U.S. economic aid to rebuild the
country, there are still major cities with only two hours of
electricity daily. But there are still powerful elements, both
civilian and military, adamantly opposed to negotiations. They say
that we should be prepared to stick it out another 10 years if
necessary.
But are the American people willing to go along? And doesn't the
current financial and economic upheaval put a bit of a crimp on
grandiloquent expressions of open-ended bravura? The next big debate
will be about Taliban "reconcilable."
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large for The Washington Times and
for United Press International.
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Monday, February 23, 2009
COMMENTARY:
While President Obama signed orders to deploy 17,000 additional U.S.
troops to Afghanistan, including 8,000 Marines, his thinking on the
Afghan war has changed significantly. It's no longer the gung-ho view
of a surge-type operation routing al Qaeda's terrorists.
The reinforcements also fall shy of the 30,000 troops requested by
Gen. David McKiernan, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
which would have doubled current U.S. force levels in a country of 35
million the size of France. Juggling troop requirements between two
wars leaves one theater shortchanged. "Even with these additional
forces," warned Gen. McKiernan, "I have to tell you that 2009 is going
to be a tough year."
Al Qaeda is in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), those
seven tribal agencies under Pakistani sovereignty on the Afghan
border, not in Afghanistan. But the more the United States keeps
bombing al Qaeda's safe havens in FATA by remote-controlled, unmanned
Predators, the more civilians get killed, and the more Taliban's
politico-religious fanatics boost their stock in Pakistan proper.
Mr. Obama faced his first foreign hurdle on open-ended NATO
commitments in Afghanistan when he made his first foreign visit to
Canada this week. But when the moment of truth arrived, he punted. "I
certainly did not press the prime minister on any additional
commitments beyond the ones that have already been made," he said
later.
The Canadian Parliament had already voted to pull out its 2,800
troops by 2011, and both Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign
Minister Lawrence Cannon made clear only another vote in a hostile
Parliament could change that.
The only other two nations authorized to fight in Afghanistan -
Britain and the Netherlands - are also under parliamentary pressure to
wrap up their kinetic contributions by the end of 2011.
Centcom commander Gen. David H. Petraeus believes the British will
stick it out with the United States as long as it takes. Prime
Minister Gordon Brown's entourage does not share Gen. Petraeus'
confidence.
President Obama is also asking the other NATO allies with kinetically
impaired troops whose parliaments voted to keep them out of harm's
way, to contribute more soldiers. France, Germany and Spain have
declined. Italy, under conservative leader Silvio Berlusconi, has
agreed to boost its Afghan contingent from 2,300 troops to 2,800. They
are based near Herat close to the Iranian border and will only be
allowed to open fire against Taliban if the G-8 summit of major
industrial nations next July, on the island of La Maddalena, between
Corsica and Sardinia, agrees. Not exactly an Italian call to action.
President Obama's main Afghan concern now is to avoid going into
negotiations with "moderate" Taliban elements from a position of
weakness. In an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. prior
to his one-day visit to Ottawa, Mr. Obama indicated a shift in his
Afghan strategy when he made clear diplomacy will now play a bigger
role in U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. "I am absolutely convinced," the
president explained, "that you cannot solve the problem of
Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region
solely through military means. ... We're going to have to use
diplomacy. We're going to have to use development."
An immediate worry is the ability to defend Kabul, the Afghan
capital, with NATO troops that are not authorized to fight. The first
3,000 U.S. reinforcements will be deployed around the city to thwart
Taliban's plans to stage a Tet-type offensive, which was when Viet
Cong guerrillas infiltrated major Vietnamese cities in 1968. Even
though defeated, the Viet Cong scored a major psychological victory
that demoralized America's home front.
President Hamid Karzai keeps complaining about U.S. troops he says
are turning the population against them by breaking into homes looking
for Taliban guns and ammo, and killing any civilian who resists. "They
will get plenty of flowers and gratitude when we send them safely back
home," Mr. Karzai opined sarcastically.
After reading up on Afghan briefing papers, Mr. Obama concluded
Defense Secretary Robert Gates was only partly correct when he said
"there needs to be a three- to five-year plan for re-establishing
control in certain areas, providing security for the population, going
after al Qaeda, preventing establishment of terrorism, better
performance in terms of delivery of services to the people." This
tends to co-mingle Taliban and al Qaeda. For Mr. Obama, they are two
separate entities and the split should be encouraged.
When they take place, negotiations will be with Taliban, not with al
Qaeda. As for the $32 billion in U.S. economic aid to rebuild the
country, there are still major cities with only two hours of
electricity daily. But there are still powerful elements, both
civilian and military, adamantly opposed to negotiations. They say
that we should be prepared to stick it out another 10 years if
necessary.
But are the American people willing to go along? And doesn't the
current financial and economic upheaval put a bit of a crimp on
grandiloquent expressions of open-ended bravura? The next big debate
will be about Taliban "reconcilable."
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large for The Washington Times and
for United Press International.
Israeli Paralysis Calls for Arab Action by Dr. James J. Zogby
February 23, 2009
Dr. James J. Zogby (c)
President
Arab American Institute
Israeli Paralysis Calls for Arab Action
Some elections serve as clarifying moments in a nation's
history, others resolve little and serve only as a reflection of
internal division. The former provide direction, the latter create
paralysis.
The recently completed Israeli elections and ongoing
deliberations over to the shape of the next government serve to
demonstrate the profound divisions that exist in Israel and the
dysfunctional state of its political system.
As is widely known, the current governing coalition lost
its mandate. The lead party, Kadima led by Tzipi Livni, a centrist
configuration (by Israeli calculations), was comprised of an amalgam
of individuals spun-off from Likud and Labor. They declined from 29 to
28 seats. Kadima's coalition partner, Labor, dropped from 19 seats to
13. And Meretz, a more leftist party (not in the coalition but
supportive of peace efforts), lost support, going from 5 to a mere 3
seats.
This gives the Zionist center-left a total of 44 seats -
far short of the 61 needed to form a government. But this is only part
of the story. Post-election analysis suggests suggested that while
Kadima was initially seen as Likud-lite (after all, its founder was
Ariel Sharon), it was viewed by voters in this election as a horse of
a different color. It is estimated that about 70% of the last-minute
support garnered by Livni's grouping came from Labor and Meretz voters
hoping to block a Netanyahu victory. All this may be academic, but is
still useful in order to understand the constraints that this will
impose on Livni and the strong push that will be made to merge Kadima
and Labor as an opposition bloc.
The right won, to be sure, but not without complications
of their own. Netanyahu's Likud won 27 seats, with some of his party's
most extreme members in leadership roles. Next in line was Avigdor
Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party with 15 seats. Lieberman, a former
Likudnik, launched Yisrael Beiteinu to exploit the resentments of
Israel's sizable Russian immigrant community. Shas, a religious party
of Sephardic Jews garnered 11 seats, followed by a number of smaller
groupings representing hard-line nationalist and religious parties
which will hold a combined 12 seats.
The Arab parties and Hadash - a coalition of communists
and Israeli-Arab leftist groups (the communists once serving as a
substitute nationalist party for Israel's Arabs) garnered 11 seats.
Israel's problem is both political and demographic. The
"Jewish State" isn't just Jewish, nor is it in agreement on what it
means to be Jewish, with deep divisions between the ultra-orthodox and
the nationalists. And demographically speaking, with 20% Arabs, 20%
Russians, and 20% Orthodox, you have the makings of a dysfunctional
brew.
So Netanyahu won, but what exactly did he win? And how
does he govern, given the difficult choices he must face in forming a
coalition.
Since right-wing parties hold 65 seats, it might appear
easy to cobble together a government of the like-minded. But the
religious-secular divide is deep and, at times, ugly. The orthodox
will make demands for special consideration by the state that
Lieberman and other ultra-nationalists will reject.
At the same time, Netanyahu, though a hard-line
nationalist, is a savvy (some say dissembling) political leader,
keenly aware of Israel's international standing and image. He knows
that the Obama Administration has committed itself, as George Mitchell
has recently noted, not to a "process," but to the realization of a
two-state solution, and so will not countenance obstructionist
behavior. Nor will the European Union. Netanyahu, therefore, might
prefer a coalition with Yisrael Beiteinu and Kadima - choosing the
latter for political cover in much the same manner that Ariel Sharon
used Shimon Peres. Such a coalition would do little and be, itself,
dysfunctional (though for different reasons) than the coalition of the
right.
No matter how you add it up, the numbers aren't going to
yield either a majority for a clear direction, or peace.
All of this should move the Arabs to act. Instead of
accepting this Israeli paralysis and dysfunctionality as a
justification for their own, Arab leadership can seize the high ground
and establish themselves as the partners for peace, pushing Israel and
the U.S. to make the next moves.
Given Mitchell's recent indication that the Obama
Administration would, unlike its predecessor, work with a Palestinian
government of national unity, efforts must be made to move in that
direction. Hamas' leadership should be pressed (and shamed) into
joining such a unity effort on its well-known terms - forswearing
violence and accepting agreements already entered into by the
Palestinian Authority.
Such an agreement would put Netanyahu on a difficult
course with Washington over such issues as: ending the blockade of
Gaza, stopping West Bank settlement expansion and land confiscations,
and being asked to make the same commitments to honor past agreements
and forswear violence, while entering into good-faith negotiations on
"land for peace."
Given Netanyahu's penchant for attempting to change the
debate, as in the 90s he worked to shift the discussion he 90s it was
from "land for peace" to "security and combating incitement." now he
intends to substitute "economic growth" for making peace. He will want
to obfuscate and stall Mitchell's efforts - complaining of his own
government's paralysis. And under cover of this obfuscation, he will
continue to take unilateral measures that will solidify Israeli
control over Palestinian lands and lives.
This is a moment Arabs can seize, and an opportunity to
take control of the debate. This opportunity should not be missed.
Dr. James J. Zogby (c)
President
Arab American Institute
Israeli Paralysis Calls for Arab Action
Some elections serve as clarifying moments in a nation's
history, others resolve little and serve only as a reflection of
internal division. The former provide direction, the latter create
paralysis.
The recently completed Israeli elections and ongoing
deliberations over to the shape of the next government serve to
demonstrate the profound divisions that exist in Israel and the
dysfunctional state of its political system.
As is widely known, the current governing coalition lost
its mandate. The lead party, Kadima led by Tzipi Livni, a centrist
configuration (by Israeli calculations), was comprised of an amalgam
of individuals spun-off from Likud and Labor. They declined from 29 to
28 seats. Kadima's coalition partner, Labor, dropped from 19 seats to
13. And Meretz, a more leftist party (not in the coalition but
supportive of peace efforts), lost support, going from 5 to a mere 3
seats.
This gives the Zionist center-left a total of 44 seats -
far short of the 61 needed to form a government. But this is only part
of the story. Post-election analysis suggests suggested that while
Kadima was initially seen as Likud-lite (after all, its founder was
Ariel Sharon), it was viewed by voters in this election as a horse of
a different color. It is estimated that about 70% of the last-minute
support garnered by Livni's grouping came from Labor and Meretz voters
hoping to block a Netanyahu victory. All this may be academic, but is
still useful in order to understand the constraints that this will
impose on Livni and the strong push that will be made to merge Kadima
and Labor as an opposition bloc.
The right won, to be sure, but not without complications
of their own. Netanyahu's Likud won 27 seats, with some of his party's
most extreme members in leadership roles. Next in line was Avigdor
Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party with 15 seats. Lieberman, a former
Likudnik, launched Yisrael Beiteinu to exploit the resentments of
Israel's sizable Russian immigrant community. Shas, a religious party
of Sephardic Jews garnered 11 seats, followed by a number of smaller
groupings representing hard-line nationalist and religious parties
which will hold a combined 12 seats.
The Arab parties and Hadash - a coalition of communists
and Israeli-Arab leftist groups (the communists once serving as a
substitute nationalist party for Israel's Arabs) garnered 11 seats.
Israel's problem is both political and demographic. The
"Jewish State" isn't just Jewish, nor is it in agreement on what it
means to be Jewish, with deep divisions between the ultra-orthodox and
the nationalists. And demographically speaking, with 20% Arabs, 20%
Russians, and 20% Orthodox, you have the makings of a dysfunctional
brew.
So Netanyahu won, but what exactly did he win? And how
does he govern, given the difficult choices he must face in forming a
coalition.
Since right-wing parties hold 65 seats, it might appear
easy to cobble together a government of the like-minded. But the
religious-secular divide is deep and, at times, ugly. The orthodox
will make demands for special consideration by the state that
Lieberman and other ultra-nationalists will reject.
At the same time, Netanyahu, though a hard-line
nationalist, is a savvy (some say dissembling) political leader,
keenly aware of Israel's international standing and image. He knows
that the Obama Administration has committed itself, as George Mitchell
has recently noted, not to a "process," but to the realization of a
two-state solution, and so will not countenance obstructionist
behavior. Nor will the European Union. Netanyahu, therefore, might
prefer a coalition with Yisrael Beiteinu and Kadima - choosing the
latter for political cover in much the same manner that Ariel Sharon
used Shimon Peres. Such a coalition would do little and be, itself,
dysfunctional (though for different reasons) than the coalition of the
right.
No matter how you add it up, the numbers aren't going to
yield either a majority for a clear direction, or peace.
All of this should move the Arabs to act. Instead of
accepting this Israeli paralysis and dysfunctionality as a
justification for their own, Arab leadership can seize the high ground
and establish themselves as the partners for peace, pushing Israel and
the U.S. to make the next moves.
Given Mitchell's recent indication that the Obama
Administration would, unlike its predecessor, work with a Palestinian
government of national unity, efforts must be made to move in that
direction. Hamas' leadership should be pressed (and shamed) into
joining such a unity effort on its well-known terms - forswearing
violence and accepting agreements already entered into by the
Palestinian Authority.
Such an agreement would put Netanyahu on a difficult
course with Washington over such issues as: ending the blockade of
Gaza, stopping West Bank settlement expansion and land confiscations,
and being asked to make the same commitments to honor past agreements
and forswear violence, while entering into good-faith negotiations on
"land for peace."
Given Netanyahu's penchant for attempting to change the
debate, as in the 90s he worked to shift the discussion he 90s it was
from "land for peace" to "security and combating incitement." now he
intends to substitute "economic growth" for making peace. He will want
to obfuscate and stall Mitchell's efforts - complaining of his own
government's paralysis. And under cover of this obfuscation, he will
continue to take unilateral measures that will solidify Israeli
control over Palestinian lands and lives.
This is a moment Arabs can seize, and an opportunity to
take control of the debate. This opportunity should not be missed.
America Defense Meltdown
At a book event last Thursday evening, three authors of the anthology "America's Defense Meltdown" explained some of the fundamental and devastating problems the Pentagon today faces. These presentations are summarized below in an article published in "Defense News" on February 20. TV watchers will also be able to see these presentations in an upcoming airing of C-SPAN's BookTV show.
The presentations are based on the authors' chapters in "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress." This book is newly released by Stanford University Press in Kindle form. Find it at Amazon.com at http://www.amazon.com/Americas-Defense-Meltdown-Pentagon-President/dp/B001TKD4SA/ref=sr_11_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1235152981&sr=11-1
A card cover copy of the book will be available at Amazon.com in late March. Copies of the briefings summarized below will be made available shortly and are also available on request to winslowwheeler@msn.com.
The "Defense News" article follows:
Critics: DoD Spending More, Getting Less
from Defense News, available at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3957052&c=AME&s=AIR
By ANTONIE BOESSENKOOL
Published: 20 Feb 17:37 EST (22:37 GMT)
The U.S. Defense Department is spending more money for less capability and fewer planes, Army divisions and combat ships compared with past years, and spending with the wrong focus, according to defense experts who spoke at an event hosted by the Project on Government Oversight Feb. 19.
DoD now is spending more on defense in inflation-adjusted dollars than at any time since the end of World War II, including periods of spending highs during wars in Korea and Vietnam and the weapon build up under the Reagan administration, said Winslow Wheeler, citing DoD data.
Wheeler is an analyst at the Center for Defense Information and veteran of defense issues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congress.
"The wars that we're fighting, in terms of people deployed, are extremely modest, far fewer than Vietnam, far fewer than Korea," Wheeler said.
While the Army budget is at its highest since 1946, the number of Army division equivalents has fallen from a high point of 28 in 1953 to 11 in 2008, according to data Wheeler presented. The number of active Navy combat ships has fallen from more than 1,000 in 1946 to less than 400 today while the Navy budget has trended upward - although it's currently lower than high points during the Korean War and the Reagan administration.
In the Air Force, spending has varied since 1946, but the number of bomber and fighter aircraft has been at a low point since the end of World War II for the past several years, Wheeler said.
Acquisition costs in DoD have risen dramatically because of flawed assumptions, including that investment budgets will grow at faster rates than the total budget, allowing DoD to begin more programs than it can afford to keep going, said Thomas Christie, a veteran of defense acquisition and weapon testing programs in DoD. Another false assumption is that operation and support budgets will grow more slowly because new, more advanced weapons will be more reliable.
Christie pointed to an analysis by the GAO showing that in fiscal year 2000, research, development, test and evaluation costs had risen 27 percent above initial estimates on selected weapon programs the GAO studied. In fiscal year 2007, those costs had risen 40 percent above initial estimates.
The Air Force bought hundreds of fighter aircraft annually during the Carter and Reagan administrations, but that number dwindled in the last decade while DoD "went on a procurement holiday" because it was counting on the F-22 and F-35 aircraft, which weren't affordable from the outset, Christie said. The average age of aircraft in the service could double from the historical average to 20 years if buying trends continue. .
Steps needed to reform acquisition include demonstrating that technologies are mature before they enter full-scale development, and building prototypes of systems and subsystems, Christie said.
"This is our biggest problem," he said. "We jump into that stage of a program before we should, and we fail to admit that we're going to have problems."
Christie and Wheeler both targeted the F-22 aircraft, and Wheeler said the pending decision by the Obama administration on how many aircraft to buy could help set the tone for acquisition reform.
Wheeler said a likely scenario is that DoD will buy more F-22s than the current 183 that are ordered, plus a few additional F-18 aircraft, and pay for those additional aircraft by taking funds from F-35, making the F-35 more expensive later.
"A compromise on the F-22 that involves these other airplanes will make everything worse," Wheeler said. "If [Obama] instead makes a clean-cut decision on the F-22 . that's a good sign."
A third panelist, Pierre Sprey, a former DoD official and member of the team which helped design the F-16 and A-10 aircraft, said the Air Force has incorrectly focused on bombing capability over other strategies like close air support, even though a focus on bombing has been shown to strengthen an enemy's resolve and increase U.S. casualties. U.S. air power has decayed, and the Air Force has bought aircraft that's insufficient, ineffective and too expensive, he said.
The event focused on the findings from a new book by Christie, Sprey, Wheeler and other DoD insiders on acquisition reform and recommendations for the Obama administration, called "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."
Sprey outlined a plan based on four new airplane designs he said should replace the Air Force's "impossibly expensive wish list." Those four designs are:
? A new close air support airplane, about half the size of the A-10 and more maneuverable and survivable.
? To accompany that, an aircraft that would act as a forward controller plane, land right next to troops and bring in close air support, but be more hardy and maneuverable than a helicopter.
? A 5- to 10-ton airlifter for emergency resupply to troops in isolated areas.
? A "super-agile dogfighter" that would be based on an existing engine and be an improvement on the F-16 with higher acceleration and turn, and passive electronics and weapons that would make it a stealth aircraft.
With these four designs, plus purchases of refueling tankers and other standard support aircraft, current Air Force spending levels in the next 20 years would yield 10,000 new aircraft, overwhelming air superiority and full-force availability at the start of a conflict, Sprey said.
"If we go along with the system as it is . what we're forgoing is something that would really serve the nation far better than what we buy and would certainly serve people in uniform best or better," Sprey said.
_____________________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397
The presentations are based on the authors' chapters in "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress." This book is newly released by Stanford University Press in Kindle form. Find it at Amazon.com at http://www.amazon.com/Americas-Defense-Meltdown-Pentagon-President/dp/B001TKD4SA/ref=sr_11_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1235152981&sr=11-1
A card cover copy of the book will be available at Amazon.com in late March. Copies of the briefings summarized below will be made available shortly and are also available on request to winslowwheeler@msn.com.
The "Defense News" article follows:
Critics: DoD Spending More, Getting Less
from Defense News, available at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3957052&c=AME&s=AIR
By ANTONIE BOESSENKOOL
Published: 20 Feb 17:37 EST (22:37 GMT)
The U.S. Defense Department is spending more money for less capability and fewer planes, Army divisions and combat ships compared with past years, and spending with the wrong focus, according to defense experts who spoke at an event hosted by the Project on Government Oversight Feb. 19.
DoD now is spending more on defense in inflation-adjusted dollars than at any time since the end of World War II, including periods of spending highs during wars in Korea and Vietnam and the weapon build up under the Reagan administration, said Winslow Wheeler, citing DoD data.
Wheeler is an analyst at the Center for Defense Information and veteran of defense issues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congress.
"The wars that we're fighting, in terms of people deployed, are extremely modest, far fewer than Vietnam, far fewer than Korea," Wheeler said.
While the Army budget is at its highest since 1946, the number of Army division equivalents has fallen from a high point of 28 in 1953 to 11 in 2008, according to data Wheeler presented. The number of active Navy combat ships has fallen from more than 1,000 in 1946 to less than 400 today while the Navy budget has trended upward - although it's currently lower than high points during the Korean War and the Reagan administration.
In the Air Force, spending has varied since 1946, but the number of bomber and fighter aircraft has been at a low point since the end of World War II for the past several years, Wheeler said.
Acquisition costs in DoD have risen dramatically because of flawed assumptions, including that investment budgets will grow at faster rates than the total budget, allowing DoD to begin more programs than it can afford to keep going, said Thomas Christie, a veteran of defense acquisition and weapon testing programs in DoD. Another false assumption is that operation and support budgets will grow more slowly because new, more advanced weapons will be more reliable.
Christie pointed to an analysis by the GAO showing that in fiscal year 2000, research, development, test and evaluation costs had risen 27 percent above initial estimates on selected weapon programs the GAO studied. In fiscal year 2007, those costs had risen 40 percent above initial estimates.
The Air Force bought hundreds of fighter aircraft annually during the Carter and Reagan administrations, but that number dwindled in the last decade while DoD "went on a procurement holiday" because it was counting on the F-22 and F-35 aircraft, which weren't affordable from the outset, Christie said. The average age of aircraft in the service could double from the historical average to 20 years if buying trends continue. .
Steps needed to reform acquisition include demonstrating that technologies are mature before they enter full-scale development, and building prototypes of systems and subsystems, Christie said.
"This is our biggest problem," he said. "We jump into that stage of a program before we should, and we fail to admit that we're going to have problems."
Christie and Wheeler both targeted the F-22 aircraft, and Wheeler said the pending decision by the Obama administration on how many aircraft to buy could help set the tone for acquisition reform.
Wheeler said a likely scenario is that DoD will buy more F-22s than the current 183 that are ordered, plus a few additional F-18 aircraft, and pay for those additional aircraft by taking funds from F-35, making the F-35 more expensive later.
"A compromise on the F-22 that involves these other airplanes will make everything worse," Wheeler said. "If [Obama] instead makes a clean-cut decision on the F-22 . that's a good sign."
A third panelist, Pierre Sprey, a former DoD official and member of the team which helped design the F-16 and A-10 aircraft, said the Air Force has incorrectly focused on bombing capability over other strategies like close air support, even though a focus on bombing has been shown to strengthen an enemy's resolve and increase U.S. casualties. U.S. air power has decayed, and the Air Force has bought aircraft that's insufficient, ineffective and too expensive, he said.
The event focused on the findings from a new book by Christie, Sprey, Wheeler and other DoD insiders on acquisition reform and recommendations for the Obama administration, called "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."
Sprey outlined a plan based on four new airplane designs he said should replace the Air Force's "impossibly expensive wish list." Those four designs are:
? A new close air support airplane, about half the size of the A-10 and more maneuverable and survivable.
? To accompany that, an aircraft that would act as a forward controller plane, land right next to troops and bring in close air support, but be more hardy and maneuverable than a helicopter.
? A 5- to 10-ton airlifter for emergency resupply to troops in isolated areas.
? A "super-agile dogfighter" that would be based on an existing engine and be an improvement on the F-16 with higher acceleration and turn, and passive electronics and weapons that would make it a stealth aircraft.
With these four designs, plus purchases of refueling tankers and other standard support aircraft, current Air Force spending levels in the next 20 years would yield 10,000 new aircraft, overwhelming air superiority and full-force availability at the start of a conflict, Sprey said.
"If we go along with the system as it is . what we're forgoing is something that would really serve the nation far better than what we buy and would certainly serve people in uniform best or better," Sprey said.
_____________________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397
Saturday, February 21, 2009
What Kind of War? by William Pfaff
What Kind of War?
William Pfaff
Paris, February 19, 2009 – Except for the brief NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, all of the wars or significant military expeditions fought by the United States since
the cold war have been with Asians, and it has lost nearly all of them (two – Iraq and Afghanistan -- hang in the balance at this moment).
These wars started out with real armies or armed movements struggling over the fate of Europe, industrially destined to be one of the two centers of the postwar world.
The cold war originated in the attempts of Soviet and western intelligence and political agencies at the end of the second world war to control as large a part of Europe as possible (a continuation of the pre-war Comintern effort in Europe, and especially in the Spanish civil war: but that's another age and another subject).
In 1943-45 the Soviet army drove the Germans out of Eastern Europe, and despite the resistance of certain groups in the Baltic states and the clandestine Polish Home Army organized during the war, the Soviets were successful in imposing governments usually composed of pre-war Communists who had taken wartime refuge in Moscow.
The western limits of Soviet military occupation, following the fighting and then as negotiated among the Allies, lay in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and this is where the political struggle mainly took place, together with France and Italy where large pre-war Communist labor and political organizations played a major wartime role as partisans and as auxiliaries of regular Allied armies in the final months.
The Russians and the western Allies divided Germany and Austria into zones. The political struggles in France and Italy continued, but Stalin recognized that the American, British and Free French armies would fight attempted coups in those countries. So that froze the West European cold war.
Stage two of the cold war had both political and military aspects in Eastern and Southern Europe. The U.S. and Britain continued airdrops and other military assistance to anti-Communist partisan groups inside what again had been declared Soviet territory. Communist partisans, supported from Tito's Yugoslavia, fought for control of northwestern Greece.
Allied intelligence initiated an operation to liberate Albania from its Communist-installed government, which seemed an easy target as Tito's Yugoslav forces had blocked the Russian army from both countries, and in 1948 Stalin and Tito quarreled. That cut off the Greek Communists, and the Albanian resistance was betrayed by the British traitor Kim Philby.
Stage three of the cold war opened, ominously, in Asia, but again had to do with ideology. The U.S. tried ineffectually to help Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists, but Chiang was driven to refuge in what then was known as Formosa.
In June 1950, after Soviet Occupation troops had left northern Korea, and only a small detachment of the U.S 24th Infantry Division remained in the South, Stalin apparently authorized the provisional North Korean Communist government to attack the south to unify the country, in which it very nearly succeeded. In the end Korea was left divided, as it remains.
By this time a new war emerged, which we continue to fight today. Nationalist, or national-Communist, movements were attacking, with success, the remaining British, French and Dutch colonial regimes in the region, and by 1947 the Partition of India into Muslim and secular states was agreed. Communism proved a decisive issue only in Vietnam, as Americans have no need of being reminded.
However the cold war now was left behind and needed a replacement. These struggles in Asia exploited Communist sympathy and political and military support in what fundamentally were national liberation struggles. None ended with the Communists in power except Vietnam (and its Laotian satellite), but Indochinese Communism had become a
wholly indigenous affair.
By this time the Soviet Union and China were collapsing as Communist states. Washington's attention, fed by its energy needs and Israel's demand for protection of the Palestine territories it had annexed, was turning to the Middle East.
From that came Palestinian attacks on U.S. forces abroad, U.S. expulsion from Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, and then the first`Gulf War against Iraq, al Qaeda's entrance upon the scene, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the return to Afghanistan, a problem which President Barack Obama is mulling over these very days.
What now is this war about? Territory? Afghanistan is a poor country without resources. Who rules it cannot be of serious consequence to the world's sole superpower. Pakistan has several nuclear weapons, but these are not intended for the U.S. (or Israel, and couldn't reach either if they were); they are reserved for India, in theory).
What do Afghanistan and Pakistan have that so disturbs Americans that Washington will fight a new war because of it? The answer is that they harbor the prophets of a new, politicized religious sect, which says the world can be saved if everyone is converted to Islam, and scrupulously follows its laws, as interpreted by certain Pushtoon tribal groups in Pakistan's North West Frontier Territory.
This seems to be what Washington fears. We have come a long way from Allied and Soviet armies in industrialized Central Europe. But what need drives the United States from one war to the next?
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:http://www.williampfaff.
William Pfaff
Paris, February 19, 2009 – Except for the brief NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, all of the wars or significant military expeditions fought by the United States since
the cold war have been with Asians, and it has lost nearly all of them (two – Iraq and Afghanistan -- hang in the balance at this moment).
These wars started out with real armies or armed movements struggling over the fate of Europe, industrially destined to be one of the two centers of the postwar world.
The cold war originated in the attempts of Soviet and western intelligence and political agencies at the end of the second world war to control as large a part of Europe as possible (a continuation of the pre-war Comintern effort in Europe, and especially in the Spanish civil war: but that's another age and another subject).
In 1943-45 the Soviet army drove the Germans out of Eastern Europe, and despite the resistance of certain groups in the Baltic states and the clandestine Polish Home Army organized during the war, the Soviets were successful in imposing governments usually composed of pre-war Communists who had taken wartime refuge in Moscow.
The western limits of Soviet military occupation, following the fighting and then as negotiated among the Allies, lay in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and this is where the political struggle mainly took place, together with France and Italy where large pre-war Communist labor and political organizations played a major wartime role as partisans and as auxiliaries of regular Allied armies in the final months.
The Russians and the western Allies divided Germany and Austria into zones. The political struggles in France and Italy continued, but Stalin recognized that the American, British and Free French armies would fight attempted coups in those countries. So that froze the West European cold war.
Stage two of the cold war had both political and military aspects in Eastern and Southern Europe. The U.S. and Britain continued airdrops and other military assistance to anti-Communist partisan groups inside what again had been declared Soviet territory. Communist partisans, supported from Tito's Yugoslavia, fought for control of northwestern Greece.
Allied intelligence initiated an operation to liberate Albania from its Communist-installed government, which seemed an easy target as Tito's Yugoslav forces had blocked the Russian army from both countries, and in 1948 Stalin and Tito quarreled. That cut off the Greek Communists, and the Albanian resistance was betrayed by the British traitor Kim Philby.
Stage three of the cold war opened, ominously, in Asia, but again had to do with ideology. The U.S. tried ineffectually to help Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists, but Chiang was driven to refuge in what then was known as Formosa.
In June 1950, after Soviet Occupation troops had left northern Korea, and only a small detachment of the U.S 24th Infantry Division remained in the South, Stalin apparently authorized the provisional North Korean Communist government to attack the south to unify the country, in which it very nearly succeeded. In the end Korea was left divided, as it remains.
By this time a new war emerged, which we continue to fight today. Nationalist, or national-Communist, movements were attacking, with success, the remaining British, French and Dutch colonial regimes in the region, and by 1947 the Partition of India into Muslim and secular states was agreed. Communism proved a decisive issue only in Vietnam, as Americans have no need of being reminded.
However the cold war now was left behind and needed a replacement. These struggles in Asia exploited Communist sympathy and political and military support in what fundamentally were national liberation struggles. None ended with the Communists in power except Vietnam (and its Laotian satellite), but Indochinese Communism had become a
wholly indigenous affair.
By this time the Soviet Union and China were collapsing as Communist states. Washington's attention, fed by its energy needs and Israel's demand for protection of the Palestine territories it had annexed, was turning to the Middle East.
From that came Palestinian attacks on U.S. forces abroad, U.S. expulsion from Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, and then the first`Gulf War against Iraq, al Qaeda's entrance upon the scene, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the return to Afghanistan, a problem which President Barack Obama is mulling over these very days.
What now is this war about? Territory? Afghanistan is a poor country without resources. Who rules it cannot be of serious consequence to the world's sole superpower. Pakistan has several nuclear weapons, but these are not intended for the U.S. (or Israel, and couldn't reach either if they were); they are reserved for India, in theory).
What do Afghanistan and Pakistan have that so disturbs Americans that Washington will fight a new war because of it? The answer is that they harbor the prophets of a new, politicized religious sect, which says the world can be saved if everyone is converted to Islam, and scrupulously follows its laws, as interpreted by certain Pushtoon tribal groups in Pakistan's North West Frontier Territory.
This seems to be what Washington fears. We have come a long way from Allied and Soviet armies in industrialized Central Europe. But what need drives the United States from one war to the next?
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:http://www.williampfaff.
Friday, February 20, 2009
China, taking advantage of global recession, goes on a buying spree China's government is bargain-hunting internationally as the financial crisis push
China, taking advantage of global recession, goes on a buying spree
China's government is bargain-hunting internationally as the financial crisis pushes down prices of energy resources and assets.
By Peter Ford | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the February 21, 2009 edition
Beijing - General Motors is doing it. The world's second-largest mining group is doing it. Russia, Brazil and Venezuela are doing it. And China is loving it.
Squeezed between falling profits and the credit crunch, a growing number of troubled corporations and countries are turning to cash-rich China for a bailout. And with foreign assets cheaper than they have been for years, Beijing is going on an international spending spree.
"The international financial crisis ... is equally a challenge and an opportunity," China's energy czar, Zhang Guobao, wrote recently in the official newspaper People's Daily. "The slowdown ... has reduced the price of international energy resources and assets and favors our search for overseas resources."
So far, the government has concentrated on natural-resource deals, securing supplies of oil and minerals in return for large amounts of cash. But private Chinese firms are also taking advantage of the crisis in other sectors: Diesel-engine giant Weichai Power is expected to buy a French plant that GM is selling off in its struggle to survive.
Though the Chinese economy has also been hit by the crisis, cutting growth by almost half, "what sets China apart is that Chinese banks have not been so badly hurt, and the policy banks still seem ready to lend" in support of key government objectives, says Erika Downs, a China energy specialist at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
The China Development Bank, for example, is financing China's biggest-ever foreign investment – a $19.5 billion bid by the mostly state-owned Aluminum Corp. of China for an 18 percent slice of Rio Tinto. The Australian mining company desperately needs the cash in order to pay off $19 billion in debt over the next two years.
That deal, still to be approved by Australian regulators, is seen here as a pathfinder. "It illustrates Chinese state business's strong capacity ... and gathered experience for state-owned firms to operate abroad in the future," explained an article published earlier this month in People's Daily.
Other recent multibillion-dollar deals include the purchase by China Petrochemical Corp., the country's second-largest oil producer, of Canada's Tanganyika Oil, which works in Syria, and the bid that China Minmetals has made for OZ Minerals, an Australian zinc producer on the verge of bankruptcy.
"The amount of money coming out of Beijing suggests they are confident that we are at the bottom of the market," says Paul Cavey, an analyst with Macquarie Bank. And with China's trade surplus still wide, since imports have fallen even faster than exports, "they still have a lot of money to play with," he adds.
Last week the Chinese government sank $39 billion of that money in three separate deals to secure future oil supplies from Russia, Brazil, and Venezuela.
A $25 billion loan to Russia, whose economy is reeling from plummeting oil prices, won a promise to supply 290,000 barrels per day for the next quarter-century and to build a pipeline into China.
"The slowdown in the Russian economy, declining crude prices, and production and the credit crunch have lent the Chinese far better bargaining power," wrote Gordon Kwan, head of China energy research at CLSA brokerage, in a research note last week.
A $10 billion loan to Brazil, announced during a visit to the country by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, secured a similar pledge to provide up to 160,000 barrels of crude a day, while Mr. Xi also signed a deal with Venezuela for up to 1 million barrels per day by 2015 in return for another $4 billion from China to top up an existing development fund.
"More than anything else, China always wants security of resources going into the future," says Mr. Cavey. The crisis, and falling asset prices, "open up a significant part of the world," he adds. "China will think of investing pretty much anywhere there are resources, not just the places that other countries don't want to go."
Few expect Beijing to invest in the troubled financial sector, however, despite the hopes some foreign banks have harbored of attracting Chinese money. "Natural resources are so strategic for a country, they can justify investments there, but they can't justify another financial sector deal," says Andy Xie, an independent economist.
China's sovereign wealth fund has lost between half and two-thirds of investments it made over the past two years in Morgan Stanley, Blackstone, and Barclays, Mr. Xie points out.
As China begins to move again on the international scene, taking advantage of low prices, it remains to be seen how much political resistance its bids will provoke.
In 2005, political pressure in Washington forced China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) to withdraw its bid for the US oil firm Unocal, even though the Chinese firm offered more money than its rival, Chevron.
"The situation is so bad that there is a desperation now to get money," says Cavey. "But it will still be a difficult political balance to strike" for the state-owned firms that are expected to be most active abroad.
Especially touchy will be the question of state assistance for Chinese firms, potentially giving them an advantage over Western competitors. The China National Petroleum Corp.'s website last week carried a report on the government's yet-unpublished oil and gas development plan, which suggested such assistance is foreseen.
"China will encourage enterprises to develop the exploration and acquisition of overseas resources and will offer low-interest loans and preferential lending rates for major overseas energy investment projects," the report said.
"With low oil prices, we may see Chinese banks playing a bigger role" in funding acquisitions, says Dr. Downs at Brookings. "And if it is known that Chinese companies are getting money from state banks at low interest rates, we will see concern that this support creates a playing field that is not level."
China's government is bargain-hunting internationally as the financial crisis pushes down prices of energy resources and assets.
By Peter Ford | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the February 21, 2009 edition
Beijing - General Motors is doing it. The world's second-largest mining group is doing it. Russia, Brazil and Venezuela are doing it. And China is loving it.
Squeezed between falling profits and the credit crunch, a growing number of troubled corporations and countries are turning to cash-rich China for a bailout. And with foreign assets cheaper than they have been for years, Beijing is going on an international spending spree.
"The international financial crisis ... is equally a challenge and an opportunity," China's energy czar, Zhang Guobao, wrote recently in the official newspaper People's Daily. "The slowdown ... has reduced the price of international energy resources and assets and favors our search for overseas resources."
So far, the government has concentrated on natural-resource deals, securing supplies of oil and minerals in return for large amounts of cash. But private Chinese firms are also taking advantage of the crisis in other sectors: Diesel-engine giant Weichai Power is expected to buy a French plant that GM is selling off in its struggle to survive.
Though the Chinese economy has also been hit by the crisis, cutting growth by almost half, "what sets China apart is that Chinese banks have not been so badly hurt, and the policy banks still seem ready to lend" in support of key government objectives, says Erika Downs, a China energy specialist at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
The China Development Bank, for example, is financing China's biggest-ever foreign investment – a $19.5 billion bid by the mostly state-owned Aluminum Corp. of China for an 18 percent slice of Rio Tinto. The Australian mining company desperately needs the cash in order to pay off $19 billion in debt over the next two years.
That deal, still to be approved by Australian regulators, is seen here as a pathfinder. "It illustrates Chinese state business's strong capacity ... and gathered experience for state-owned firms to operate abroad in the future," explained an article published earlier this month in People's Daily.
Other recent multibillion-dollar deals include the purchase by China Petrochemical Corp., the country's second-largest oil producer, of Canada's Tanganyika Oil, which works in Syria, and the bid that China Minmetals has made for OZ Minerals, an Australian zinc producer on the verge of bankruptcy.
"The amount of money coming out of Beijing suggests they are confident that we are at the bottom of the market," says Paul Cavey, an analyst with Macquarie Bank. And with China's trade surplus still wide, since imports have fallen even faster than exports, "they still have a lot of money to play with," he adds.
Last week the Chinese government sank $39 billion of that money in three separate deals to secure future oil supplies from Russia, Brazil, and Venezuela.
A $25 billion loan to Russia, whose economy is reeling from plummeting oil prices, won a promise to supply 290,000 barrels per day for the next quarter-century and to build a pipeline into China.
"The slowdown in the Russian economy, declining crude prices, and production and the credit crunch have lent the Chinese far better bargaining power," wrote Gordon Kwan, head of China energy research at CLSA brokerage, in a research note last week.
A $10 billion loan to Brazil, announced during a visit to the country by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, secured a similar pledge to provide up to 160,000 barrels of crude a day, while Mr. Xi also signed a deal with Venezuela for up to 1 million barrels per day by 2015 in return for another $4 billion from China to top up an existing development fund.
"More than anything else, China always wants security of resources going into the future," says Mr. Cavey. The crisis, and falling asset prices, "open up a significant part of the world," he adds. "China will think of investing pretty much anywhere there are resources, not just the places that other countries don't want to go."
Few expect Beijing to invest in the troubled financial sector, however, despite the hopes some foreign banks have harbored of attracting Chinese money. "Natural resources are so strategic for a country, they can justify investments there, but they can't justify another financial sector deal," says Andy Xie, an independent economist.
China's sovereign wealth fund has lost between half and two-thirds of investments it made over the past two years in Morgan Stanley, Blackstone, and Barclays, Mr. Xie points out.
As China begins to move again on the international scene, taking advantage of low prices, it remains to be seen how much political resistance its bids will provoke.
In 2005, political pressure in Washington forced China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) to withdraw its bid for the US oil firm Unocal, even though the Chinese firm offered more money than its rival, Chevron.
"The situation is so bad that there is a desperation now to get money," says Cavey. "But it will still be a difficult political balance to strike" for the state-owned firms that are expected to be most active abroad.
Especially touchy will be the question of state assistance for Chinese firms, potentially giving them an advantage over Western competitors. The China National Petroleum Corp.'s website last week carried a report on the government's yet-unpublished oil and gas development plan, which suggested such assistance is foreseen.
"China will encourage enterprises to develop the exploration and acquisition of overseas resources and will offer low-interest loans and preferential lending rates for major overseas energy investment projects," the report said.
"With low oil prices, we may see Chinese banks playing a bigger role" in funding acquisitions, says Dr. Downs at Brookings. "And if it is known that Chinese companies are getting money from state banks at low interest rates, we will see concern that this support creates a playing field that is not level."
Obama Nixed Full Surge After Quizzing Brass Analysis by Gareth Porter*
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45838
Obama Nixed Full Surge After Quizzing Brass
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, Feb 20 (IPS) - President Barack Obama decided to approve only 17,000 of the 30,000 troops requested by Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, and Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, after McKiernan was unable to tell him how they would be used, according to White House sources.
But Obama is likely to be pressured by McKiernan and the Joint Chiefs to approve the remaining 13,000 troops requested after the completion of an Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review next month.
Obama's decision to approve just over half the full troop request for Afghanistan recalls a similar decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson to approve only part of the request for U.S. troop deployments in a parallel situation in the Vietnam War in April 1965 at a comparable stage of that war. Johnson reluctantly went along with the request for additional troops within weeks under pressure from both the field commander and the Joint Chief of Staff.
The request for 30,000 additional troops, which would bring the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan to more than 60,000, had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by Defence Secretary Robert Gates before Obama's inauguration. A front-page story in the Washington Post Jan. 13 reported that Obama was ready to "sign off" on the deployment request.
On Jan. 30 Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said between 20,000 and 30,000 more troops would "probably" be sent to Afghanistan and the figure would "tend toward the higher number of those two".
But on Feb. 9, Mullen indicated that the Pentagon would soon announce that three brigades, or about 16,000 troops, would be deployed to Afghanistan in the coming months.
What had changed in the nine days between those two statements, according to a White House source, was that Obama had called McKiernan directly and asked how he planned to use the 30,000 troops, but got no coherent answer to the question.
It was after that conversation that Obama withdrew his support for the full request.
The unsatisfactory response from McKiernan had been preceded by another military non-answer to an Obama question. At his meeting with Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon Jan. 28, Obama asked the Joint Chiefs, "What is the end game?" in Afghanistan, and was told, "Frankly, we don't have one," according to a Feb. 4 report by NBC News Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski.
Obama had also learned by early February that earlier assurances from Petraeus of an accord with Kyrygistan on use of the base at Manas had been premature, and that the U.S. ability to supply troops in Afghanistan would be dependent on political accommodations with Russia and Iran.
The rationale from the military leadership for doubling the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, even without a strategy or a concept of how the war could end, had been to "buy time" for an effort to build up Afghan security forces, as indicated by Mullen's Jan. 30 remarks.
The 17,000 troops, on the other hand, presented the upper limit of what Obama had pledged to add in Afghanistan during the campaign, according to Lawrence Korb of the Centre for American Progress, who was an adviser to Obama.
Korb told IPS that Obama's decision not to wait until the key strategic questions were clarified before sending any more troops was based on the belief that he had to signal both Afghans and Pakistanis that the United States was not getting out of Afghanistan, according to Korb. "There are a lot of people in both countries hedging their bets," said Korb.
McKiernan reminded reporters Wednesday that the 17,000 troops represent only about two-thirds of the number of troops he has requested. That complaint suggested that he had been given no assurance that the remainder of the troops would be approved after the policy review.
The Wall Street Journal quoted an administration official Wednesday as saying that the troop authorisation addresses the "urgent near-term security needs on the ground," but "does not prejudge or limit the options of what the [Afghanistan] review may recommend when it's completed."
Obama may have become more wary of getting mired down in an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, despite his strong commitment to increasing troops to Afghanistan during the campaign.
Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on whom Obama has reportedly relied for advice on foreign policy, told Sam Stein of the Huffington Post Wednesday, "We have to decide more precisely what is the objective of our involvement. Because we are increasingly running the risk of getting bogged down both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan in pursuit of objectives which we are lacking the power to reach."
Brezinzski said the administration needed "very specific, narrow objectives".
Korb told IPS that the policy review will deal with political-diplomatic as well as military policy issues, including the option of seeking to incorporate at least elements of the insurgents into the government through negotiations. He recalled that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been advocating negotiations with the Taliban for two years.
Both Obama's decision to agree to just over half of his field commander's request for additional troops and the broader strategic situation offer striking parallels with the decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in April 1965 to approve 36,000 out of a 49,000 troop request for Vietnam.
Johnson's decision, like Obama's, was made against a background of rapid deterioration in the security situation, worry that the war would soon be lost if more U.S. troops were not deployed, and an unresolved debate over how the troops would be employed in South Vietnam. Some of Johnson's advisers still favoured a strategy of protecting the key population centres, whereas the field commander, Gen. William Westmoreland, was calling for a more aggressive strategy of seeking out enemy forces.
Another parallel between the two situations is high-level concern that too many U.S. troops would provoke anti-U.S. sentiment. That was the primary worry of some of Johnson's advisers about the effect of deploying three divisions in South Vietnam.
Similarly, Gates said Dec. 14 he would be "very concerned" about deploying more than the 30,000 troops requested by McKiernan, because, "At a certain point, we get such a big footprint, we begin to look like an occupier." Gates repeated that point in Congressional testimony Jan. 27, in which he again stressed the failure of the Soviet Union with 120,000 troops.
McKiernan, on the other hand, said Wednesday, "There's always an inclination to relate what we're doing with previous nations," he said, adding, "I think that's a very unhealthy comparison."
Johnson was worried about sliding into an open-ended commitment to a war that could not be won. But two months later he gave in, against his better judgment, to a request from Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, for "urgent reinforcements". The escalation of the war continued for another two years.
Obama now faces the prospect that the Joint Chiefs will renew their support for McKiernan's request for the remaining 13,000 troops next month. And if the full 30,000 troop increase proves to be insufficient, he is likely to face further requests later on for "urgent reinforcements."
*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.
Obama Nixed Full Surge After Quizzing Brass
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, Feb 20 (IPS) - President Barack Obama decided to approve only 17,000 of the 30,000 troops requested by Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, and Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, after McKiernan was unable to tell him how they would be used, according to White House sources.
But Obama is likely to be pressured by McKiernan and the Joint Chiefs to approve the remaining 13,000 troops requested after the completion of an Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review next month.
Obama's decision to approve just over half the full troop request for Afghanistan recalls a similar decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson to approve only part of the request for U.S. troop deployments in a parallel situation in the Vietnam War in April 1965 at a comparable stage of that war. Johnson reluctantly went along with the request for additional troops within weeks under pressure from both the field commander and the Joint Chief of Staff.
The request for 30,000 additional troops, which would bring the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan to more than 60,000, had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by Defence Secretary Robert Gates before Obama's inauguration. A front-page story in the Washington Post Jan. 13 reported that Obama was ready to "sign off" on the deployment request.
On Jan. 30 Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said between 20,000 and 30,000 more troops would "probably" be sent to Afghanistan and the figure would "tend toward the higher number of those two".
But on Feb. 9, Mullen indicated that the Pentagon would soon announce that three brigades, or about 16,000 troops, would be deployed to Afghanistan in the coming months.
What had changed in the nine days between those two statements, according to a White House source, was that Obama had called McKiernan directly and asked how he planned to use the 30,000 troops, but got no coherent answer to the question.
It was after that conversation that Obama withdrew his support for the full request.
The unsatisfactory response from McKiernan had been preceded by another military non-answer to an Obama question. At his meeting with Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon Jan. 28, Obama asked the Joint Chiefs, "What is the end game?" in Afghanistan, and was told, "Frankly, we don't have one," according to a Feb. 4 report by NBC News Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski.
Obama had also learned by early February that earlier assurances from Petraeus of an accord with Kyrygistan on use of the base at Manas had been premature, and that the U.S. ability to supply troops in Afghanistan would be dependent on political accommodations with Russia and Iran.
The rationale from the military leadership for doubling the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, even without a strategy or a concept of how the war could end, had been to "buy time" for an effort to build up Afghan security forces, as indicated by Mullen's Jan. 30 remarks.
The 17,000 troops, on the other hand, presented the upper limit of what Obama had pledged to add in Afghanistan during the campaign, according to Lawrence Korb of the Centre for American Progress, who was an adviser to Obama.
Korb told IPS that Obama's decision not to wait until the key strategic questions were clarified before sending any more troops was based on the belief that he had to signal both Afghans and Pakistanis that the United States was not getting out of Afghanistan, according to Korb. "There are a lot of people in both countries hedging their bets," said Korb.
McKiernan reminded reporters Wednesday that the 17,000 troops represent only about two-thirds of the number of troops he has requested. That complaint suggested that he had been given no assurance that the remainder of the troops would be approved after the policy review.
The Wall Street Journal quoted an administration official Wednesday as saying that the troop authorisation addresses the "urgent near-term security needs on the ground," but "does not prejudge or limit the options of what the [Afghanistan] review may recommend when it's completed."
Obama may have become more wary of getting mired down in an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, despite his strong commitment to increasing troops to Afghanistan during the campaign.
Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on whom Obama has reportedly relied for advice on foreign policy, told Sam Stein of the Huffington Post Wednesday, "We have to decide more precisely what is the objective of our involvement. Because we are increasingly running the risk of getting bogged down both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan in pursuit of objectives which we are lacking the power to reach."
Brezinzski said the administration needed "very specific, narrow objectives".
Korb told IPS that the policy review will deal with political-diplomatic as well as military policy issues, including the option of seeking to incorporate at least elements of the insurgents into the government through negotiations. He recalled that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been advocating negotiations with the Taliban for two years.
Both Obama's decision to agree to just over half of his field commander's request for additional troops and the broader strategic situation offer striking parallels with the decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in April 1965 to approve 36,000 out of a 49,000 troop request for Vietnam.
Johnson's decision, like Obama's, was made against a background of rapid deterioration in the security situation, worry that the war would soon be lost if more U.S. troops were not deployed, and an unresolved debate over how the troops would be employed in South Vietnam. Some of Johnson's advisers still favoured a strategy of protecting the key population centres, whereas the field commander, Gen. William Westmoreland, was calling for a more aggressive strategy of seeking out enemy forces.
Another parallel between the two situations is high-level concern that too many U.S. troops would provoke anti-U.S. sentiment. That was the primary worry of some of Johnson's advisers about the effect of deploying three divisions in South Vietnam.
Similarly, Gates said Dec. 14 he would be "very concerned" about deploying more than the 30,000 troops requested by McKiernan, because, "At a certain point, we get such a big footprint, we begin to look like an occupier." Gates repeated that point in Congressional testimony Jan. 27, in which he again stressed the failure of the Soviet Union with 120,000 troops.
McKiernan, on the other hand, said Wednesday, "There's always an inclination to relate what we're doing with previous nations," he said, adding, "I think that's a very unhealthy comparison."
Johnson was worried about sliding into an open-ended commitment to a war that could not be won. But two months later he gave in, against his better judgment, to a request from Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, for "urgent reinforcements". The escalation of the war continued for another two years.
Obama now faces the prospect that the Joint Chiefs will renew their support for McKiernan's request for the remaining 13,000 troops next month. And if the full 30,000 troop increase proves to be insufficient, he is likely to face further requests later on for "urgent reinforcements."
*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.
Will Obama Try to Untie the Syrian-Iranian Alliance? Al-Sijill 02/19/09
Will Obama Try to Untie the Syrian-Iranian Alliance?
Al-Sijill 02/19/09
In spring 2002, a US diplomat made a strong, albeit off-the-record case for closer relations between Washington and Damascus. Syria's deeply rooted secularism, she told me, was a strong foundation for a strategic relationship that could greatly enhance Washington's position in the Middle East.
"We shouldn't be antagonizing the Syrian people," the diplomat said. "This country is pluralist in nature. We used to have a saying in Saudi Arabia about how America had shared interests with the Saudis but different values. Here we have shared values but different interests. This society is the one we want to work with."
It was a rhetorical plea, of course. The Second Intifada was less than eight months old and Syrian President Hafez Al Assad had been dead for nearly a year. A week earlier, Colin Powell, the then-US Secretary of State had called for an end to Israel's siege on Palestinian cities and for Palestinian extremists to stop their suicide attacks on Israelis. A few days later, he eased off the Israelis, reaffirming Washington's long-standing support of the Jewish state's right to protect itself.
Today, US-Syrian relations are at an all-time low, just another deficit in Barack Obama's dubious presidential inheritance. The US ambassador to Damascus, recalled after the 2005 killing of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, has yet to be replaced. In the fall, after a US raid on Syrian targets by Iraq-based gunships, Damascus shut down the American School and the US embassy's language center. Repairing the relationship will be as challenging as it is urgent, so it is refreshing to see Democratic leaders in Washington taking tentative steps to do just that.
Last week, the State Department confirmed it would allow Boeing to export spare parts to Syria, a rare exemption to the sanctions regime imposed on the country by the Bush administration. The move follows a recent visit to Damascus by House of Representative Speaker Nancy Pelosi, where she met with President Bashir Al Assad. John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a proponent of closer US-Syrian ties, is due to arrive in Damascus this week. Howard Berman, who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is also expected to visit Syria soon.
This diplomatic pilgrimage, which is being coordinated with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, suggests a revival of the rigorous US-Syria track nurtured by James Baker when he was the top American diplomat under the sage George H.W. Bush. Israel's chilling lurch rightward and the Palestinian Authority's ongoing power struggle will make progress on the Israel-Palestine front all but impossible until the second half the Obama administration. Even if President Obama can establish some breathing room by stabilizing the economy within a year – a big "if" – he'll then have mid-term elections to consider. Already, leading Republicans like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, are firing warning shots across the White House bow about "aiding an unrepentant regime." Yawn.
For anyone prepared to do something about America's hapless position in the Middle East, however, Syria is the key. Six years ago, an isolated Damascus appeared to be on the brink of an economic crisis and Bush administration officials were talking gleefully about Mr. Assad as the next Baathist leader in the Pentagon's cross-hairs. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the end of the United Nations-led oil-for-food program deprived Syria of subsidized Iraqi petroleum. The Hariri killing threatened to deepen Damascus's isolation and its subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon denied it a major source of black market funding.
Now, Syria is an important regional player. Its non-oil gross domestic product has grown by 34 percent since 2004 thanks to aggressive deregulation, and it is growing closer to the European Union commercially. Syrian proxies Hezbollah and Hamas have survived bloody wars with Israel with their prestige intact. With the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the emirates discredited on the Arab street by their initial support of Fatah during Israel's onslaught against Hamas, Mr. Assad has emerged as the authentic Arab voice of resistance against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and its incarceration of Gaza.
Then there is Iran. Having jousted during the Democratic primary about the virtue of talking with Tehran, both Mr. Obama and Ms. Clinton are ready to deal directly with Iran, although not before elections in June. A workmanlike dialogue between the US and Syria will give Iranian voters – perhaps even supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – something to think about. While Mr. Khamenei supports hardline presidential incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, he has done nothing to stop moderate challenger and ex-president Mohammad Khatami. Assuming Mr. Khamenei believes he has something to gain from stable relations with the Great Satan – certainly a lot of Iranian merchants and businessmen do; unlike Syria, the Iranian economy is a mess – he'd have an easier time of it with a reformer like Mr. Khatami at the helm. If Mr. Obama can woo Damascus away from its pas de deux with Tehran while cajoling Russia and China to cooperate as good-faith negotiators, an acceptable compromise over Iran's nuclear ambitions might actually be attainable. (Mrs. Clinton's conciliatory remarks about China prior to her departure for Asia last week were particularly encouraging.)
Mr. Obama, whose energies have been consumed almost exclusively by the economic crisis, has had a tough first month in office. It will take time before the contours of his Middle East strategy are fully formed. Though an opening with Syria appears likely, there are obstacles ahead beyond the predictable attacks from the pro-Israel right wing. He must be sensitive to the concerns of Lebanon that its hard-won independence from Damascus will not become a bargaining chip in talks with Mr. Assad, for example. But the new president clearly has an instinct for putting his adversaries on the defensive – not with military might but with something far more effective: charm.
Al-Sijill 02/19/09
In spring 2002, a US diplomat made a strong, albeit off-the-record case for closer relations between Washington and Damascus. Syria's deeply rooted secularism, she told me, was a strong foundation for a strategic relationship that could greatly enhance Washington's position in the Middle East.
"We shouldn't be antagonizing the Syrian people," the diplomat said. "This country is pluralist in nature. We used to have a saying in Saudi Arabia about how America had shared interests with the Saudis but different values. Here we have shared values but different interests. This society is the one we want to work with."
It was a rhetorical plea, of course. The Second Intifada was less than eight months old and Syrian President Hafez Al Assad had been dead for nearly a year. A week earlier, Colin Powell, the then-US Secretary of State had called for an end to Israel's siege on Palestinian cities and for Palestinian extremists to stop their suicide attacks on Israelis. A few days later, he eased off the Israelis, reaffirming Washington's long-standing support of the Jewish state's right to protect itself.
Today, US-Syrian relations are at an all-time low, just another deficit in Barack Obama's dubious presidential inheritance. The US ambassador to Damascus, recalled after the 2005 killing of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, has yet to be replaced. In the fall, after a US raid on Syrian targets by Iraq-based gunships, Damascus shut down the American School and the US embassy's language center. Repairing the relationship will be as challenging as it is urgent, so it is refreshing to see Democratic leaders in Washington taking tentative steps to do just that.
Last week, the State Department confirmed it would allow Boeing to export spare parts to Syria, a rare exemption to the sanctions regime imposed on the country by the Bush administration. The move follows a recent visit to Damascus by House of Representative Speaker Nancy Pelosi, where she met with President Bashir Al Assad. John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a proponent of closer US-Syrian ties, is due to arrive in Damascus this week. Howard Berman, who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is also expected to visit Syria soon.
This diplomatic pilgrimage, which is being coordinated with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, suggests a revival of the rigorous US-Syria track nurtured by James Baker when he was the top American diplomat under the sage George H.W. Bush. Israel's chilling lurch rightward and the Palestinian Authority's ongoing power struggle will make progress on the Israel-Palestine front all but impossible until the second half the Obama administration. Even if President Obama can establish some breathing room by stabilizing the economy within a year – a big "if" – he'll then have mid-term elections to consider. Already, leading Republicans like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, are firing warning shots across the White House bow about "aiding an unrepentant regime." Yawn.
For anyone prepared to do something about America's hapless position in the Middle East, however, Syria is the key. Six years ago, an isolated Damascus appeared to be on the brink of an economic crisis and Bush administration officials were talking gleefully about Mr. Assad as the next Baathist leader in the Pentagon's cross-hairs. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the end of the United Nations-led oil-for-food program deprived Syria of subsidized Iraqi petroleum. The Hariri killing threatened to deepen Damascus's isolation and its subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon denied it a major source of black market funding.
Now, Syria is an important regional player. Its non-oil gross domestic product has grown by 34 percent since 2004 thanks to aggressive deregulation, and it is growing closer to the European Union commercially. Syrian proxies Hezbollah and Hamas have survived bloody wars with Israel with their prestige intact. With the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the emirates discredited on the Arab street by their initial support of Fatah during Israel's onslaught against Hamas, Mr. Assad has emerged as the authentic Arab voice of resistance against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and its incarceration of Gaza.
Then there is Iran. Having jousted during the Democratic primary about the virtue of talking with Tehran, both Mr. Obama and Ms. Clinton are ready to deal directly with Iran, although not before elections in June. A workmanlike dialogue between the US and Syria will give Iranian voters – perhaps even supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – something to think about. While Mr. Khamenei supports hardline presidential incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, he has done nothing to stop moderate challenger and ex-president Mohammad Khatami. Assuming Mr. Khamenei believes he has something to gain from stable relations with the Great Satan – certainly a lot of Iranian merchants and businessmen do; unlike Syria, the Iranian economy is a mess – he'd have an easier time of it with a reformer like Mr. Khatami at the helm. If Mr. Obama can woo Damascus away from its pas de deux with Tehran while cajoling Russia and China to cooperate as good-faith negotiators, an acceptable compromise over Iran's nuclear ambitions might actually be attainable. (Mrs. Clinton's conciliatory remarks about China prior to her departure for Asia last week were particularly encouraging.)
Mr. Obama, whose energies have been consumed almost exclusively by the economic crisis, has had a tough first month in office. It will take time before the contours of his Middle East strategy are fully formed. Though an opening with Syria appears likely, there are obstacles ahead beyond the predictable attacks from the pro-Israel right wing. He must be sensitive to the concerns of Lebanon that its hard-won independence from Damascus will not become a bargaining chip in talks with Mr. Assad, for example. But the new president clearly has an instinct for putting his adversaries on the defensive – not with military might but with something far more effective: charm.
Analysis: IAEA Candidates a Study in Contrasts George Jahn, Associated Press
Analysis: IAEA Candidates a Study in Contrasts
George Jahn, Associated Press
Key member states plan in the coming weeks to elect a new leader of the U.N. agency charged with probing Iran's nuclear program, pressing Syria to reveal its atomic secrets and thwarting terrorists from getting the bomb.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jiRSE2djCKxpy0LYT6SaecqOfCyQD96E21DO0
George Jahn, Associated Press
Key member states plan in the coming weeks to elect a new leader of the U.N. agency charged with probing Iran's nuclear program, pressing Syria to reveal its atomic secrets and thwarting terrorists from getting the bomb.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jiRSE2djCKxpy0LYT6SaecqOfCyQD96E21DO0
Nuclear: Latin American Revival Sharon Squassoni, Americas Quarterly
Nuclear: Latin American Revival
Sharon Squassoni, Americas Quarterly
Nuclear power, long on the outs, is fashionable again—this time as an antidote to energy insecurity and global climate change. In Latin America, the current plans for nuclear expansion are ambitious. Argentina and Brazil may seek to double or triple existing nuclear capacity. Mexico may build as many as eight more reactors by 2025. Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay are similarly caught up in the enthusiasm for nuclear energy.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22755&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Sharon Squassoni, Americas Quarterly
Nuclear power, long on the outs, is fashionable again—this time as an antidote to energy insecurity and global climate change. In Latin America, the current plans for nuclear expansion are ambitious. Argentina and Brazil may seek to double or triple existing nuclear capacity. Mexico may build as many as eight more reactors by 2025. Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay are similarly caught up in the enthusiasm for nuclear energy.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22755&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
NKorea Running Secret Nuclear Plant: Report Agence France-Presse
NKorea Running Secret Nuclear Plant: Report
Agence France-Presse
North Korea is operating a secret underground plant to make nuclear bombs from highly enriched uranium (HEU) despite denying that such a programme exists, a South Korean newspaper said Wednesday.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iUMkh8pqycilFWddJSqYHe0psvcg
Agence France-Presse
North Korea is operating a secret underground plant to make nuclear bombs from highly enriched uranium (HEU) despite denying that such a programme exists, a South Korean newspaper said Wednesday.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iUMkh8pqycilFWddJSqYHe0psvcg
Learning Not to Love the Bomb Philip Taubman, The New York Times
Learning Not to Love the Bomb
Philip Taubman, The New York Times
The Obama administration seems ready to resuscitate relations with Russia, including by renewing nuclear-arms-reduction talks. Even before the inaugural parade wound down, the White House Web site offered up a list of ambitious nuclear policy goals, with everything from making bomb-making materials more secure to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/opinion/19taubman.html?_r=1
Philip Taubman, The New York Times
The Obama administration seems ready to resuscitate relations with Russia, including by renewing nuclear-arms-reduction talks. Even before the inaugural parade wound down, the White House Web site offered up a list of ambitious nuclear policy goals, with everything from making bomb-making materials more secure to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/opinion/19taubman.html?_r=1
Japan Firms Played into Khan's Nuclear Hands Kyodo News
Japan Firms Played into Khan's Nuclear Hands
Kyodo News
Japanese companies played a key role in supplying equipment used for Pakistan's nuclear arms program, investigations by Kyodo News in Islamabad and Tokyo have revealed in recent days.
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090217a2.html
Kyodo News
Japanese companies played a key role in supplying equipment used for Pakistan's nuclear arms program, investigations by Kyodo News in Islamabad and Tokyo have revealed in recent days.
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090217a2.html
Iran's Power in Context Shahram Chubin, Survival
Iran's Power in Context
Shahram Chubin, Survival
Iran-US relations – strained at the best of times since the 1979 Iranian revolution – have never been worse than during the past six years, due to the much more intense interaction between the two states since the revelations about Iran's nuclear ambitions and the United States' invasion of Iraq.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22762&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Shahram Chubin, Survival
Iran-US relations – strained at the best of times since the 1979 Iranian revolution – have never been worse than during the past six years, due to the much more intense interaction between the two states since the revelations about Iran's nuclear ambitions and the United States' invasion of Iraq.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22762&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Nuclear: Latin American Revival Sharon Squassoni, Americas Quarterly
Nuclear: Latin American Revival
Sharon Squassoni, Americas Quarterly
Nuclear power, long on the outs, is fashionable again—this time as an antidote to energy insecurity and global climate change. In Latin America, the current plans for nuclear expansion are ambitious. Argentina and Brazil may seek to double or triple existing nuclear capacity. Mexico may build as many as eight more reactors by 2025. Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay are similarly caught up in the enthusiasm for nuclear energy.
Sharon Squassoni, Americas Quarterly
Nuclear power, long on the outs, is fashionable again—this time as an antidote to energy insecurity and global climate change. In Latin America, the current plans for nuclear expansion are ambitious. Argentina and Brazil may seek to double or triple existing nuclear capacity. Mexico may build as many as eight more reactors by 2025. Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay are similarly caught up in the enthusiasm for nuclear energy.
Japan, Australia urge U.S. to cut nuclear threats
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/19/japan-australia-urge-us-to-cut-nuclear-threats/
Japan, Australia urge U.S. to cut nuclear threats
Japan, Australia urge U.S. to cut nuclear threats
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate George Perkovich and James Acton, Carnegie Report
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
George Perkovich and James Acton, Carnegie Report
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James Acton was first published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as an Adelphi Paper in September 2008. The paper sought to jump-start a broad international debate about how to achieve the immensely important and equally difficult goal of nuclear disarmament.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22748&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
George Perkovich and James Acton, Carnegie Report
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James Acton was first published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as an Adelphi Paper in September 2008. The paper sought to jump-start a broad international debate about how to achieve the immensely important and equally difficult goal of nuclear disarmament.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22748&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Gaza war changes Middle East equation at Israel's expense Alain Gresh
Gaza war changes Middle East equation at Israel's expense
Alain Gresh
Le Monde Diplomatique
February 19, 2009 - 12:00am
http://mondediplo.com/2009/02/02gazawar
"They're still living in the War of Independence (1948) and the Sinai campaign (1956). With them, it's all about tanks, about controlling territories or controlled territories, holding this or that hill. But these things are worthless. (…) The Lebanon war (2006) will go down in history as the first war in which the military leadership understood that classical warfare has become obsolete" (1).
This view, expressed in September 2008, comes not from an Israeli pacifist but the country's prime minister, Ehud Olmert. It would take a highly sophisticated analyst to fathom the subconscious of this politician, who is responsible both for the catastrophic war in Lebanon in 2006 and the recent offensive in Gaza, and who at the same time claims his country needs to abandon its narrow vision of security.
He and the majority of those who govern Israel probably share the view bluntly expressed in 2002 by Israel's then chief of staff, general Moshe Yaalon: "The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people" (2). With each new war comes the same old refrain from Israel's leaders: the Arabs only understand force; teach them a lesson and peace will at last be possible. "We're going to keep our finger on the trigger" (3) was how foreign minister Tzipi Livni put it. Olmert and his government are in favour of peace in the same way that the US government in the 19th century was in favour of the peace ?they decided to impose on the Native American tribes.
The shelling of Gaza came to a provisional halt on 18 January. The Israeli government wanted its troops out of Gaza before Barack Obama was sworn in and Hamas gave Israel a week to withdraw its soldiers and reopen crossing points with Gaza. Beyond the deliberate destruction of vital infrastructure – which includes ministry buildings and fire stations, the parliament and the university – the human cost shown on TV screens the world over has been overwhelming. Even the French media, which has previously been very timid, hasn't been able to obscure the extent of the catastrophe. Leaving to one side a moral reckoning and the crimes which may mean that Israeli leaders one day face an international tribunal, how has the fighting changed the political landscape at local and regional level?
The prime objective of the Israeli government was to permanently weaken Hamas politically and militarily. It claims to have succeeded in this and taught the "terrorists" a lesson. But is it that simple? The tactic of massive bombardments and avoidance of close combat limited Israeli army losses – the third phase of the operation, which was never put into action, would have been an infantry assault of towns – but hasn't broken up the military core of Hamas, which comprises between three and five thousand fighters. Like Hizbullah in 2006, Hamas was able to keep firing rockets until the very last moment and its arms supply lines held up, albeit at a reduced level.
Whatever the criticisms of Hamas's strategy, including their rocket attacks on civilian targets, the vast majority of the Palestinian population holds the Israeli government responsible for the destruction. As Elena Qleibo, a Gaza-based aid worker from Oxfam and an ex-Costa Rican ambassador to Israel says: "People are extremely angry, and the level of hate against Israel is very high. I have lived and worked in Gaza for many years, and I have never seen such hatred from the population" (4).
The Palestinians also resent the Palestinian Authority's passivity during the war. The internal crisis in Fatah, which was already factionalised, has deepened, in spite of the call for unity and resistance made by Marwan Barghouti from prison. President Mahmoud Abbas, who is himself weakened and marginalised, has called for the creation of a government of national unity. So the Gaza of tomorrow will either remain under Hamas control or will be governed by a national authority in which Hamas plays a central role. Surely not what Israel wanted.
The next phase
The focus of the next phase will be the reconstruction of Gaza, which the Israeli government wants to control tightly. No project will be accepted and not a dollar will reach Gaza without their agreement, according to Israeli officials. In addition, Hamas are to be prevented from claiming this aid. Israel has gained support on this from the EU commissioner for external affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (5), but as there is no other authority in Gaza but Hamas, reconstruction risks being limited to humanitarian aid. All the conditions for renewed hostilities against Israel will once again be met; the Israeli blockade was one of the principal causes for the last escalation.
The war has profoundly altered the regional order, too, though not in the way that Israel wished. First, it has confirmed the isolation of the Palestinian Authority. It has encouraged the consolidation of a resistance front based in Qatar (site of the biggest US base in the region) and Syria. This alliance was made concrete at a meeting in Doha, in which 12 Arab countries took part (among them Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon and Iraq, America's supposed ally) along with Senegal (which holds the presidency of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela and Iran. Mauritania has suspended diplomatic relations with Israel and Qatar has broken off economic links. Venezuela and Bolivia have also severed their diplomatic relations.
A few days later, on 19 and 20 January, the Arab summit in Kuwait brought a fragile reconciliation even if it didn't remove differences of opinion. This was made easier by Israel's refusal to negotiate a ceasefire as proposed by president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Angered by this rebuff and by the signing of a separate US-Israeli agreement to combat arms imports to Gaza (and therefore control the border with Egypt), Mubarak toughened his stance.
Turkey, Israel's traditional ally, has confirmed its growing importance on the regional stage. Like Mubarak, Turkey's prime minister, Recip Erdogan felt humiliated by Olmert, who kept quiet about his intentions regarding Gaza when he saw his Turkish counterpart during a visit to Ankara on 22 and 23 December. The day after the offensive was launched on 27 December, Erdogan said: "This attack, coming while we are making such efforts for peace, is a blow against peace" (6). Not only did Turkey, the mediator which had brought Israel and Syria to the verge of resuming direct negotiations, suspend its efforts, it also called for Israel's suspension from the UN the day after it fired on UN buildings in Gaza.
During the crisis, Turkey has strengthened its relations with Hamas and is hoping to mediate between it and the Palestinian Authority. And Turkish popular opinion has translated into demonstrations in which several million people have taken to the streets in Turkish towns and villages.
Iran has also seen its regional position strengthened. It has extended its alliances in the Arab and Islamic world. Its radical discourse has been increasingly echoed within the region and it is now in a position of strength vis-à-vis the new US administration. However, Tehran has shown restraint in the crisis. Iranian supreme leader ayatollah Ali Khamenei has even declared that "our hands are tied on that terrain" (7). The firing of rockets from Lebanon prompted fears that a second front might open up. Although this didn't happen, the incident can be taken as a warning: Iran has told the Egyptian government through diplomatic channels that it will not allow Hamas to be crushed.
Contempt for Arab opinion
Western governments have nothing but contempt for Arab popular opinion. This was clear when they challenged Hamas's victory in the democratic elections held in Palestine in 2006. They simply shrugged when in a communiqué on 12 January the Saudi government condemned the "racist genocide" in Gaza. They ignore the extent of protest in the Arab and Muslim world, especially in Egypt (despite the state of near-siege in Cairo) and in Afghanistan. Yet which Arab government would now be willing to sit down to peace talks with Israel? The Saudi king has announced that the 2002 Arab initiative for a comprehensive peace between the Arab world and Israel in exchange for the creation of a Palestinian state on territory occupied by Israel in 1967 won't remain on the table for much longer.
Meanwhile, on Sunday 18 January, while Western journalists broadcast images of Gaza's lunar landscape, prime minster Olmert was to be seen expressing his pleasure to six European leaders, including Nicolas Sarkozy, over their "extraordinary support for the state of Israel and their concern about its security". More than in any other conflict since 1967, the European position, especially that of France, has been aligned with the Israeli government's (see "A people abandoned"). In retrospect, the upgrading of relations between the EU and Israel in early December 2008 looks like a green light to the operation in Gaza. In spite of the Israeli offensive, the EU (and France) will strengthen their bilateral relations with Tel Aviv (8).
This Western alliance engaged in the fight against "Islamic terrorism" has more than a hint of the crusades about it. Without going as far as Silvio Berlusconi, who explained in Jerusalem: "When I heard about the rocket fire at Israel, I felt that it was a danger to Italy, and to the entire West" (9), or the director of L'Express, who wrote that the Israeli army was fighting "for our peace" (10) – some on the right used to explain in the 1980s that the apartheid government was fighting "for us" in southern Africa, against communism, the Soviet Union and Cuba – president Sarkozy has explained on many occasions that Hamas bore a heavy responsibility for this war as it had broken the truce, which is untrue (see "Reasons for war: lies, lies and more lies ", opposite).
In spite of Sarkozy's flying around on numerous foreign trips, France has lost a great deal of credit, as demonstrated by the unprecedented attacks on it in the Arab press, including in moderate countries, where it is now bracketed with the US of George Bush. The Saudi daily Al Watan wrote on 11 January "all the great powers have supported Israel's position, including France, which has thus far been the symbol of balance in regional causes". And France's decision to fight against smuggled arms in Gaza can only be construed as an operation to protect an occupying power: no one has called upon Israel to stop re-arming itself.
"A pointless war has led to a moral defeat for Israel" – so ran the headline in the British Sunday paper, the Observer on 18 January. The majority of moral barriers have crumbled in Israel during the Gaza offensive. A phrase sums up this vision: baal habayit histhtageya ("the boss has gone mad"). Its essence is captured by Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security adviser: "If our civilians are attacked by you, we are not going to respond in proportion, but will use all means we have to cause you such damages that you will think twice in the future" (11).
This tactic was used in Lebanon in 2006 and was referred to as the Dahiya doctrine, after the district in south Beirut where Hizbullah was based. The aim is to destroy an entire district or village as soon as it is believed to harbour terrorists who are firing on Israel. It was employed again in Gaza and constitutes what international law recognises as a war crime. Yet it is now openly demanded in Israel. In a letter to prime minster Olmert in 2007, the former Sephardic grand rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu explained "there is absolutely no moral prohibition against indiscriminate killing of civilians during a potential massive military offensive on Gaza aimed at stopping the rocket launching" (12). The longer the occupation, the more it corrupts the occupier. One can only imagine what liberties would have been taken by France in Algeria if the war had gone on for 40 years.
The South African government, showing more determination than most, has condemned Israeli aggression against Gaza. The long experience of fighting the apartheid regime taught ANC leaders all about the hypocrisy of western rhetoric on violence and terrorism. Writing about his negotiations with the white South African government and its demands for the end to violence, Nelson Mandela said: "I responded that the state was responsible for the violence and that it is always the oppressor, not the oppressed, who dictates the form of the struggle. If the oppressor uses violence, the oppressed have no alternative but to respond violently. In our case, it was simply a legitimate form of self-defence" (13).
Alain Gresh
Le Monde Diplomatique
February 19, 2009 - 12:00am
http://mondediplo.com/2009/02/02gazawar
"They're still living in the War of Independence (1948) and the Sinai campaign (1956). With them, it's all about tanks, about controlling territories or controlled territories, holding this or that hill. But these things are worthless. (…) The Lebanon war (2006) will go down in history as the first war in which the military leadership understood that classical warfare has become obsolete" (1).
This view, expressed in September 2008, comes not from an Israeli pacifist but the country's prime minister, Ehud Olmert. It would take a highly sophisticated analyst to fathom the subconscious of this politician, who is responsible both for the catastrophic war in Lebanon in 2006 and the recent offensive in Gaza, and who at the same time claims his country needs to abandon its narrow vision of security.
He and the majority of those who govern Israel probably share the view bluntly expressed in 2002 by Israel's then chief of staff, general Moshe Yaalon: "The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people" (2). With each new war comes the same old refrain from Israel's leaders: the Arabs only understand force; teach them a lesson and peace will at last be possible. "We're going to keep our finger on the trigger" (3) was how foreign minister Tzipi Livni put it. Olmert and his government are in favour of peace in the same way that the US government in the 19th century was in favour of the peace ?they decided to impose on the Native American tribes.
The shelling of Gaza came to a provisional halt on 18 January. The Israeli government wanted its troops out of Gaza before Barack Obama was sworn in and Hamas gave Israel a week to withdraw its soldiers and reopen crossing points with Gaza. Beyond the deliberate destruction of vital infrastructure – which includes ministry buildings and fire stations, the parliament and the university – the human cost shown on TV screens the world over has been overwhelming. Even the French media, which has previously been very timid, hasn't been able to obscure the extent of the catastrophe. Leaving to one side a moral reckoning and the crimes which may mean that Israeli leaders one day face an international tribunal, how has the fighting changed the political landscape at local and regional level?
The prime objective of the Israeli government was to permanently weaken Hamas politically and militarily. It claims to have succeeded in this and taught the "terrorists" a lesson. But is it that simple? The tactic of massive bombardments and avoidance of close combat limited Israeli army losses – the third phase of the operation, which was never put into action, would have been an infantry assault of towns – but hasn't broken up the military core of Hamas, which comprises between three and five thousand fighters. Like Hizbullah in 2006, Hamas was able to keep firing rockets until the very last moment and its arms supply lines held up, albeit at a reduced level.
Whatever the criticisms of Hamas's strategy, including their rocket attacks on civilian targets, the vast majority of the Palestinian population holds the Israeli government responsible for the destruction. As Elena Qleibo, a Gaza-based aid worker from Oxfam and an ex-Costa Rican ambassador to Israel says: "People are extremely angry, and the level of hate against Israel is very high. I have lived and worked in Gaza for many years, and I have never seen such hatred from the population" (4).
The Palestinians also resent the Palestinian Authority's passivity during the war. The internal crisis in Fatah, which was already factionalised, has deepened, in spite of the call for unity and resistance made by Marwan Barghouti from prison. President Mahmoud Abbas, who is himself weakened and marginalised, has called for the creation of a government of national unity. So the Gaza of tomorrow will either remain under Hamas control or will be governed by a national authority in which Hamas plays a central role. Surely not what Israel wanted.
The next phase
The focus of the next phase will be the reconstruction of Gaza, which the Israeli government wants to control tightly. No project will be accepted and not a dollar will reach Gaza without their agreement, according to Israeli officials. In addition, Hamas are to be prevented from claiming this aid. Israel has gained support on this from the EU commissioner for external affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (5), but as there is no other authority in Gaza but Hamas, reconstruction risks being limited to humanitarian aid. All the conditions for renewed hostilities against Israel will once again be met; the Israeli blockade was one of the principal causes for the last escalation.
The war has profoundly altered the regional order, too, though not in the way that Israel wished. First, it has confirmed the isolation of the Palestinian Authority. It has encouraged the consolidation of a resistance front based in Qatar (site of the biggest US base in the region) and Syria. This alliance was made concrete at a meeting in Doha, in which 12 Arab countries took part (among them Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon and Iraq, America's supposed ally) along with Senegal (which holds the presidency of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), Turkey, Indonesia, Venezuela and Iran. Mauritania has suspended diplomatic relations with Israel and Qatar has broken off economic links. Venezuela and Bolivia have also severed their diplomatic relations.
A few days later, on 19 and 20 January, the Arab summit in Kuwait brought a fragile reconciliation even if it didn't remove differences of opinion. This was made easier by Israel's refusal to negotiate a ceasefire as proposed by president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Angered by this rebuff and by the signing of a separate US-Israeli agreement to combat arms imports to Gaza (and therefore control the border with Egypt), Mubarak toughened his stance.
Turkey, Israel's traditional ally, has confirmed its growing importance on the regional stage. Like Mubarak, Turkey's prime minister, Recip Erdogan felt humiliated by Olmert, who kept quiet about his intentions regarding Gaza when he saw his Turkish counterpart during a visit to Ankara on 22 and 23 December. The day after the offensive was launched on 27 December, Erdogan said: "This attack, coming while we are making such efforts for peace, is a blow against peace" (6). Not only did Turkey, the mediator which had brought Israel and Syria to the verge of resuming direct negotiations, suspend its efforts, it also called for Israel's suspension from the UN the day after it fired on UN buildings in Gaza.
During the crisis, Turkey has strengthened its relations with Hamas and is hoping to mediate between it and the Palestinian Authority. And Turkish popular opinion has translated into demonstrations in which several million people have taken to the streets in Turkish towns and villages.
Iran has also seen its regional position strengthened. It has extended its alliances in the Arab and Islamic world. Its radical discourse has been increasingly echoed within the region and it is now in a position of strength vis-à-vis the new US administration. However, Tehran has shown restraint in the crisis. Iranian supreme leader ayatollah Ali Khamenei has even declared that "our hands are tied on that terrain" (7). The firing of rockets from Lebanon prompted fears that a second front might open up. Although this didn't happen, the incident can be taken as a warning: Iran has told the Egyptian government through diplomatic channels that it will not allow Hamas to be crushed.
Contempt for Arab opinion
Western governments have nothing but contempt for Arab popular opinion. This was clear when they challenged Hamas's victory in the democratic elections held in Palestine in 2006. They simply shrugged when in a communiqué on 12 January the Saudi government condemned the "racist genocide" in Gaza. They ignore the extent of protest in the Arab and Muslim world, especially in Egypt (despite the state of near-siege in Cairo) and in Afghanistan. Yet which Arab government would now be willing to sit down to peace talks with Israel? The Saudi king has announced that the 2002 Arab initiative for a comprehensive peace between the Arab world and Israel in exchange for the creation of a Palestinian state on territory occupied by Israel in 1967 won't remain on the table for much longer.
Meanwhile, on Sunday 18 January, while Western journalists broadcast images of Gaza's lunar landscape, prime minster Olmert was to be seen expressing his pleasure to six European leaders, including Nicolas Sarkozy, over their "extraordinary support for the state of Israel and their concern about its security". More than in any other conflict since 1967, the European position, especially that of France, has been aligned with the Israeli government's (see "A people abandoned"). In retrospect, the upgrading of relations between the EU and Israel in early December 2008 looks like a green light to the operation in Gaza. In spite of the Israeli offensive, the EU (and France) will strengthen their bilateral relations with Tel Aviv (8).
This Western alliance engaged in the fight against "Islamic terrorism" has more than a hint of the crusades about it. Without going as far as Silvio Berlusconi, who explained in Jerusalem: "When I heard about the rocket fire at Israel, I felt that it was a danger to Italy, and to the entire West" (9), or the director of L'Express, who wrote that the Israeli army was fighting "for our peace" (10) – some on the right used to explain in the 1980s that the apartheid government was fighting "for us" in southern Africa, against communism, the Soviet Union and Cuba – president Sarkozy has explained on many occasions that Hamas bore a heavy responsibility for this war as it had broken the truce, which is untrue (see "Reasons for war: lies, lies and more lies ", opposite).
In spite of Sarkozy's flying around on numerous foreign trips, France has lost a great deal of credit, as demonstrated by the unprecedented attacks on it in the Arab press, including in moderate countries, where it is now bracketed with the US of George Bush. The Saudi daily Al Watan wrote on 11 January "all the great powers have supported Israel's position, including France, which has thus far been the symbol of balance in regional causes". And France's decision to fight against smuggled arms in Gaza can only be construed as an operation to protect an occupying power: no one has called upon Israel to stop re-arming itself.
"A pointless war has led to a moral defeat for Israel" – so ran the headline in the British Sunday paper, the Observer on 18 January. The majority of moral barriers have crumbled in Israel during the Gaza offensive. A phrase sums up this vision: baal habayit histhtageya ("the boss has gone mad"). Its essence is captured by Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security adviser: "If our civilians are attacked by you, we are not going to respond in proportion, but will use all means we have to cause you such damages that you will think twice in the future" (11).
This tactic was used in Lebanon in 2006 and was referred to as the Dahiya doctrine, after the district in south Beirut where Hizbullah was based. The aim is to destroy an entire district or village as soon as it is believed to harbour terrorists who are firing on Israel. It was employed again in Gaza and constitutes what international law recognises as a war crime. Yet it is now openly demanded in Israel. In a letter to prime minster Olmert in 2007, the former Sephardic grand rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu explained "there is absolutely no moral prohibition against indiscriminate killing of civilians during a potential massive military offensive on Gaza aimed at stopping the rocket launching" (12). The longer the occupation, the more it corrupts the occupier. One can only imagine what liberties would have been taken by France in Algeria if the war had gone on for 40 years.
The South African government, showing more determination than most, has condemned Israeli aggression against Gaza. The long experience of fighting the apartheid regime taught ANC leaders all about the hypocrisy of western rhetoric on violence and terrorism. Writing about his negotiations with the white South African government and its demands for the end to violence, Nelson Mandela said: "I responded that the state was responsible for the violence and that it is always the oppressor, not the oppressed, who dictates the form of the struggle. If the oppressor uses violence, the oppressed have no alternative but to respond violently. In our case, it was simply a legitimate form of self-defence" (13).
Obama's Energy Plan: Trying to Kill 3 Birds With 1 Stone Stratfor Today -- February 17, 2009 | 2039 GMT
Obama's Energy Plan: Trying to Kill 3 Birds With 1 Stone
Stratfor Today -- February 17, 2009 | 2039 GMT
Summary
U.S. President Barack Obama's energy plan would be a $150 billion effort over 10 years to stimulate the economy, cut greenhouse gases and increase energy security, all in one fell swoop. It is an ambitious plan that, unlike the Depression-era recovery effort, could not only create jobs but also firmly establish a new "green building" industry and reinvent the American automotive sector. At this point, however, some of the numbers seem staggering while others appear insufficient, and much debate and lobbying remain — even on the international level.
Analysis
As part of the overall $789 billion U.S. economic stimulus bill agreed upon by House and Senate leaders Feb. 11 (and to be signed by President Barack Obama Feb. 17), approximately $50 billion will be set aside for programs focusing on promoting efficient and renewable energy. This follows Obama's announcement on Jan. 26 that his energy plan would invest a total of $150 billion over the next 10 years on a variety of projects, including vehicle efficiency, electrical efficiency, clean-coal power plants, biofuels and domestic oil and gas production.
Related Links:
* Global Market Brief: Bush's Oil Supply Plan
* The Biofuel Backlash
* The U.S. Energy Debate: Whether to Bet on Future Technology
* Global Market Brief: Biofuels Pushing Energy Firms 'Beyond Petroleum'
Obama's intention, essentially, is to kill three birds with one stone, addressing what his administration perceives as the country's need for economic stimulus, greenhouse-gas reductions and greater energy security. His 10-year plan makes it clear that his administration will work to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent from 1990 levels by 2050, and he will start on that path by reviewing a Bush administration decision to deny California its own climate change-focused law. Obama also announced that he would ask the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review California's stringent emission standards, which were struck down by then-EPA chief Stephen Johnson in December 2007.
The first stated goal of Obama's energy plan is to fuel job growth through the "green" sector to the tune of at least 460,000 new jobs over the next three years. The stimulus package, which includes a short-term $50 billion (roughly) in energy projects, currently provides about $14 billion in loans for renewable energy projects, $4.5 billion for "smart grid" electricity updates, $6.4 billion for cleaning up nuclear weapon production sites, $6.3 billion in state-level energy efficiency grants, $5 billion for home weatherization projects and $4.5 billion for making federal buildings more energy efficient. The stimulus also allows for $18.9 billion in "green transportation," essentially improving public transit and building high-speed rail. These expenses represent only the first step in the $150 billion investment over 10 years to secure energy efficiency and energy independence.
The idea behind these projects is to try and push America's construction industry away from traditional home-building and remodeling (in 2008, residential construction fell a record 27.2 percent from the year before) toward a more green approach, which would include installing solar panels and efficient insulation in homes, schools and government buildings. This effort is similar to that undertaken in the 1930s during the Great Depression, when the government employed out-of-work tradesmen, artists and other workers to build public parks, paint murals in post offices and engage in other public works that were intended mainly to keep people busy. The Obama plan is intended to have the added benefit of creating a fundamentally new business sector — a green building industry — while decreasing the country's energy bill and putting people back to work. The government would be providing a stimulus for private business by creating incentives and a consumer demand for energy-efficient features that otherwise would not exist.
The second stated goal of Obama's long-term energy plan is to eliminate the U.S. dependency on Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil imports by 2019.The United States imported roughly 10 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil in 2007; of this, imports from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela combined to a total of 3.3 million bpd. Removing the need for Middle East and Venezuelan oil would give the United States much greater room for maneuver in both regions.
The 10-year energy plan also contains a climate-change portion. Obama's target (an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050) is softer than Europe's (80 percent from 1990 levels by 2020), but his 25 percent renewable energy goal surpasses Europe's 20-20-20 plan. The European plan seeks to increase the EU's use of renewable fuels to 20 percent of total energy demand and reduce total EU energy demand by 20 percent, all by 2020. It is by decreasing reliance on non-renewable energy that Obama hopes to wean the United States off of Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil.
Cap and Trade Program
One of the most ambitious proposals of the Obama energy plan is a national cap and trade program. Under such a program, the government would set emissions standard for various industries, allowing companies that emit less carbon dioxide than their allotment to trade their excess "credits" to those who are emitting above the cap. The initial allotments of carbon credits will incite one of the more contentious domestic debates in the coming years, as will the steepness of the emissions reduction curve. In addition to a national goal of 80 percent by 2050, there are questions about what the goal will be in 2020 or 2035.
Lobbying efforts are already under way regarding cap and trade. American businesses do not want to see states in charge of setting greenhouse gas emissions standards since that would increase the accounting and legal fees companies would have to incur to deal with the system on a state-by-state basis. Instead, they want to see a single national standard.
Establishing a national standard for a cap and trade system would allow utility companies to factor in future costs of emitting greenhouse gases, which currently is an unknown. Utility companies do not know whether it makes sense to build regular coal plants, clean coal plants, solar or wind installations or natural gas production facilities because the rules of the game are not set. Until that happens, energy expansion in the United States will be at a standstill.
However, the U.S. domestic climate-change policy must be negotiated at the global level, particularly with China. Obama, or any subsequent U.S. president, will be hard-pressed to adopt carbon emission rules without first getting some sort of a deal with China that would guarantee that Beijing would also address its own greenhouse emissions. Otherwise, U.S. greenhouse gas-emitting industries (chemicals, petrochemical, paper and pulp, steel, cement, etc.) could bolt for China and the developing world. Therefore, a conversation with Beijing about climate change is high on Obama's list of priorities; his energy envoy, Todd Stern, is accompanying Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on her current trip to East Asia, primarily to discuss some of Obama's energy ideas with the Chinese.
Improving Automobile Mileage
To reduce consumption of imported oil by approximately a third, Obama plans to force implementation of a congressional decision in 2007 to raise federal fuel economy requirements to 35 miles per gallon for cars by 2020, from their current level of 27.5 miles per gallon. (Today, about 60 percent of U.S. oil demand is used to power the American vehicle fleet.) The 2007 congressional decision was never put on a path for implementation by the Bush administration, which Obama will try to reverse by asking the Department of Transportation to come up with a plan by March to implement the mileage standard.
The problem with increasing the mileage of the current fleet (which has essentially averaged, on a fleet-wide basis, slightly above 20 miles per gallon since the early 1980s) is that it would necessitate replacing a substantial number of America's current fleet of over 250 million cars, small trucks and SUVs. In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Congress allocated $25 billion to "reequipping, expanding, or establishing manufacturing facilities in the United States to produce qualifying advanced technology vehicles or qualifying components." However, all of the $25 billion was subsequently relocated to provide bridge loans to the auto industry as part of their bailout announced on Nov. 20, 2008.
Therefore, it will be up to consumers to replace their old automobiles with hybrid vehicles, and Obama hopes to encourage them to do so by offering $7,000 in tax credits per vehicle for the purchase of an "advanced vehicle" (presumably these would include various types of hybrids) and putting 1 million plug-in hybrid cars on the road by 2015. This tax-credit program would have the U.S. government essentially spending a huge amount of money to buy new cars for people. Currently (figures are from December 2008), U.S. purchases of hybrids average 17,600 per month (down from about 30,000 during the first half of 2008), or approximately 3 percent of total purchases. At that rate, if Obama's $7,000-per-car system were adopted, the U.S. government would have to spend approximately $123 million in tax credits per month, or nearly $1.5 billion a year, just to sustain the current level of hybrid purchases.
Encouraging 'Plug-in' Hybrid Technology
The "plug-in" component of Obama's hybrid-vehicle plan is a direct plug for the domestic manufacturer General Motors Corporation (GM), which has essentially put all of its eggs in one basket with its flagship to-be Chevrolet Volt electric plug-in car. The Volt, which can go 40 miles purely on stored electricity before switching to its onboard gasoline engine, will have a price tag of more than $40,000, which means that even with the $7,000 tax credit for advanced vehicles (which presumably would also go for the cheaper Japanese hybrids), the Volt would cost essentially twice as much as its foreign competition. GM flatly stated in recent congressional hearings that the Volt would not be profitable in its first production run, that total costs of production would be around $750 million and that return on the investment could be expected only after 2016 — a risky strategy for a troubled manufacturer, to say the least.
At the moment, however, there is very little certainty that U.S. consumers would choose a U.S. made plug-in hybrid like the Volt over the (mostly Japanese) competition. Complicating calculations relating to the energy efficiency of the plug-in electric hybrid is the fact that the economics and ecological benefits of these vehicles depend on local electricity costs and the relative "greenness" of the consumer's power source. A traditional gasoline-electric hybrid contributes to less net greenhouse gas emissions than a plug-in hybrid in states that rely on coal for electricity generation. This calculation would change, of course, with changes in the electrical grid (see below).
Investing in Coal
Obama's plan is to "develop and deploy clean coal technology" as part of relying more on domestic energy resources. If there is one non-renewable source of energy that the United States has plenty of it is coal. In 2006, U.S. proven reserves totaled 27.1 percent of total global coal reserves, the highest number in the world. Coal already accounts for roughly 51 percent of U.S. electricity generation (in 2007) and for 22.8 percent of total energy use in the United States.
At the center of the debate over coal in the United States is the question of "clean coal" technology, especially carbon capture and sequestration. As the term implies, this combination of techniques allows for a coal-fired power plant to produce power without spewing carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. Instead, the carbon is captured and sent to deep underground repositories where it is sequestered. The technology could prove to be a panacea (should it ever become cost-effective): The United States has over a quarter of the world's coal; it wants to increase its domestic energy sources; and it needs to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions. The only problem is, while the technology exists, no one has figured out a way to employ it economically.
To retrofit an existing coal plant would cost approximately $1 billion to $2 billion (a 300 megawatt coal plant by itself costs about $1 billion and a 630 megawatt costs around $2.4 billion) and would require a doubling of the actual acreage on which the plant was built. An additional problem is that capture and sequestration would consume 30 percent of the plant output, substantially limiting the total energy output of the plant.
The elephant in the room is the potential cost of a complete overhaul of many of the current coal-burning plants, which would likely be necessary to make them economically viable under a future cap-and-trade system. The price tag for such an overhaul would be monstrous and definitely higher than the $150 billion currently earmarked for the next 10 years for all energy projects. The United States has 1,470 coal-burning plants, and if the cost of retrofitting for subterranean sequestration is factored in, the numbers would be astronomical and could measure in the trillions.
The final problem facing the coal industry is that the authority to regulate the building of new power plants in the United States rests with state governments, not the federal government. Some state governments have come under pressure from environmental groups to delay or cancel the building of coal power plants to avoid exacerbating climate change. In other states, environmental organizations have used lawsuits to tie up proposed coal plants for years. These lawsuits have added to the uncertainty surrounding the economics of building new coal plants. The economic uncertainty, legal uncertainty and litigation have resulted in a situation in which of the 151 coal plants proposed for construction in 2007, 109 were essentially scrapped or tied up in court, with only 28 actually under construction in 2008.
Promoting Ethanol
Encouraging a greater use of ethanol was one of Obama's primary electoral campaign messages, particularly to the corn-producing region in the Midwest where he picked up Iowa — the undisputed corn producing king — by a wide margin (Iowa voted Republican in 2004 and Democratic only by a slim margin in 2000). Derived mainly from corn, ethanol could be produced and mixed with refined petroleum to create enough gasoline to fulfill America's transportation energy needs (which account for 30 percent of total energy usage and over half of oil use in the U.S.). To fulfill Obama's pledge to wean the United States from Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil, U.S. refineries would probably have to use six times as much ethanol in gasoline than they currently do.
The key problem with such a surge in ethanol use is that it would appreciate food prices. According to calculations by the University of Illinois economics department, with oil prices at $50 per barrel it is profitable to convert corn into ethanol if corn prices are lower than $4 per bushel. Corn prices currently stand at approximately $3.67 per bushel. If oil were to climb above $50 per barrel, it would be more profitable for farmers to sell corn to ethanol refineries than to sell it for food. As oil prices climb, the threshold for corn prices rises as well, giving farmers more incentive to convert corn into fuel and thus raise food prices.
One way to avoid raising food prices would be to produce ethanol from cellulosic material (essentially any sort of non-edible plant material, from grass to corn stalks). The problem with cellulosic material is that it requires expensive enzymes to break down the plant material before it can be refined — a recent study found that this process is competitive only with oil prices above $90 a barrel. The process would also require gathering massive amounts of low-value raw materials — itself a very energy-intensive process because these materials have to be transported from the farm to the refinery. Currently, cellulosic materials like chaff are simply ploughed into the soil as fertilizer, burned or used for animal feed. In order to use it as a main source of ethanol production, the material would have to be shipped to refineries from the farm.
The current collection-transportation networks in the Midwest are calibrated for food distribution, not gasoline delivery. Therefore the first problem is how to get the cellulosic material to the refineries. Chaff and agricultural by-products are usually less dense than corn, so it would take more trips to the local refinery to make it worthwhile, increasing transportation costs. Farms would either have to ship their agricultural waste for refinement to a centralized collection point (most likely right next to the grain elevator) or run rudimentary refineries right on their farms.
Either way, once the refining process is complete, the ethanol would have to be shipped to consumers around the country (most of who are on the coasts, far from the Midwest). There is no pipeline network ready to take the fuel-ready ethanol from refineries to the coasts, and such a network (one akin to the natural gas pipeline network in Europe may have to be developed) would be an extremely expensive project. Therefore, a switch to ethanol could work for the Midwest, leading to a bifurcated system where the coasts still use petroleum for transportation while the agricultural producing regions rely on ethanol.
The Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline
To boost domestic production of energy, Obama's plan would "prioritize the construction of the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline," which would tap natural gas deposits in Prudhoe Bay on the banks of the Arctic Ocean. To get the pipeline to reach the U.S. lower 48 it would have to cross more than 1,500 miles, including the imposing Alaskan Brooks Mountain Range. The project is not new. It was proposed in the late 1960s, when the deposits were discovered, and became a popular idea during the oil shocks of the early 1970s. Today there are three competing pipeline projects being considered: ExxonMobil's Mackenzie Valley ($16.3 billion), the TransCanada project ($26 billion) and BP-ConocoPhillips' Denali project (somewhere between $30 billion and $40 billion). All three projects are financially daunting, comparable to the Soviet-style infrastructural development that aims to connect Russian natural gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula with consumers in Europe. As a point of comparison, the Yamal-Europe pipeline that ships natural gas from Russia to Germany via Poland and Belarus traverses over 4,000 miles of flat terrain and cost roughly $45 billion. As such, it is actually cheaper per mile of pipeline than either the TransCanada project or BP-ConocoPhillips's Denali project.
'Use it or Lose it' Lease Strategy
A U.S. congressional report, supported by Democrats on the House Natural Resources Committee, has highlighted 68 million acres "of leased but currently inactive federal land and waters" that could produce "an additional 4.8 million bpd of oil." Intrinsically, this production would decrease U.S. imports by 75 percent and eliminate the need for Middle Eastern and Venezuelan imports. The Obama energy plan would seek to boost domestic oil production by tapping this supposed wealth of untapped domestic wells that energy firms hold leases on but choose not to produce from.
The problem with this plan is that U.S. energy firms hold leases on potential wells and deposits that often require a long period of time to survey. Some underwater deposits are unable to be exploited, at least until technology is improved (which generally takes years and sometimes decades). By forcing energy companies to "use it or lose it," the government will discourage careful surveying and most likely run off the energy firms from the deposits by attempting to force them to develop currently uneconomical fields. Unless the U.S. government develops a state-owned energy company willing to tap and produce from fields for a loss, there is no point in taking leases away from energy firms.
The 'Smart Grid'
Ultimately the most significant change to America's energy usage and efficiency may be the retooling of the entire electricity grid and transforming it into a so-called "smart grid." This is essentially an amalgamation of modern technologies in the distribution and supply of electricity. It uses digital technology (such as digital electricity readers, which would replace manual readers) to coordinate supply and demand of electricity across the nation. It combines more efficient distribution of electricity to consumers with advanced long-distance transmission lines that would be able to take alternative energy sources (such as wind power) to electricity markets far away.
As such, a smart grid would introduce two-way communication between energy suppliers and consumers, allowing utilities to direct power more efficiently away from low-energy users to high-energy users depending on the time of day or need. It would also give consumers more room to create their own usage preferences by actually programming how (and when) their appliances use energy. The smart grid would also regulate electricity use of homes and businesses by being able to turn off appliances that are not being used during peak times.
The concept is simple enough and would update America's electricity infrastructure (currently running on technology not much different from its nascent stages in the 19th century) to a modern digital consumer/provider system. However, such a national grid would necessitate replacing all of America's electricity meters, as well as all transmission lines and all transformer stations, a project with a likely price tag of somewhere near $200 billion. The current stimulus package, however, commits only $4.5 billion to a smart-grid upgrading of some 3,000 miles of transmission lines and equipping about 40 million homes with "smart meters." This funding will not be enough to begin a serious overhaul of America's electricity transmission network. It is more an attempt to kick-start industry and private businesses and move them toward an eventual retooling.
Stratfor Today -- February 17, 2009 | 2039 GMT
Summary
U.S. President Barack Obama's energy plan would be a $150 billion effort over 10 years to stimulate the economy, cut greenhouse gases and increase energy security, all in one fell swoop. It is an ambitious plan that, unlike the Depression-era recovery effort, could not only create jobs but also firmly establish a new "green building" industry and reinvent the American automotive sector. At this point, however, some of the numbers seem staggering while others appear insufficient, and much debate and lobbying remain — even on the international level.
Analysis
As part of the overall $789 billion U.S. economic stimulus bill agreed upon by House and Senate leaders Feb. 11 (and to be signed by President Barack Obama Feb. 17), approximately $50 billion will be set aside for programs focusing on promoting efficient and renewable energy. This follows Obama's announcement on Jan. 26 that his energy plan would invest a total of $150 billion over the next 10 years on a variety of projects, including vehicle efficiency, electrical efficiency, clean-coal power plants, biofuels and domestic oil and gas production.
Related Links:
* Global Market Brief: Bush's Oil Supply Plan
* The Biofuel Backlash
* The U.S. Energy Debate: Whether to Bet on Future Technology
* Global Market Brief: Biofuels Pushing Energy Firms 'Beyond Petroleum'
Obama's intention, essentially, is to kill three birds with one stone, addressing what his administration perceives as the country's need for economic stimulus, greenhouse-gas reductions and greater energy security. His 10-year plan makes it clear that his administration will work to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent from 1990 levels by 2050, and he will start on that path by reviewing a Bush administration decision to deny California its own climate change-focused law. Obama also announced that he would ask the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review California's stringent emission standards, which were struck down by then-EPA chief Stephen Johnson in December 2007.
The first stated goal of Obama's energy plan is to fuel job growth through the "green" sector to the tune of at least 460,000 new jobs over the next three years. The stimulus package, which includes a short-term $50 billion (roughly) in energy projects, currently provides about $14 billion in loans for renewable energy projects, $4.5 billion for "smart grid" electricity updates, $6.4 billion for cleaning up nuclear weapon production sites, $6.3 billion in state-level energy efficiency grants, $5 billion for home weatherization projects and $4.5 billion for making federal buildings more energy efficient. The stimulus also allows for $18.9 billion in "green transportation," essentially improving public transit and building high-speed rail. These expenses represent only the first step in the $150 billion investment over 10 years to secure energy efficiency and energy independence.
The idea behind these projects is to try and push America's construction industry away from traditional home-building and remodeling (in 2008, residential construction fell a record 27.2 percent from the year before) toward a more green approach, which would include installing solar panels and efficient insulation in homes, schools and government buildings. This effort is similar to that undertaken in the 1930s during the Great Depression, when the government employed out-of-work tradesmen, artists and other workers to build public parks, paint murals in post offices and engage in other public works that were intended mainly to keep people busy. The Obama plan is intended to have the added benefit of creating a fundamentally new business sector — a green building industry — while decreasing the country's energy bill and putting people back to work. The government would be providing a stimulus for private business by creating incentives and a consumer demand for energy-efficient features that otherwise would not exist.
The second stated goal of Obama's long-term energy plan is to eliminate the U.S. dependency on Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil imports by 2019.The United States imported roughly 10 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil in 2007; of this, imports from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela combined to a total of 3.3 million bpd. Removing the need for Middle East and Venezuelan oil would give the United States much greater room for maneuver in both regions.
The 10-year energy plan also contains a climate-change portion. Obama's target (an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2050) is softer than Europe's (80 percent from 1990 levels by 2020), but his 25 percent renewable energy goal surpasses Europe's 20-20-20 plan. The European plan seeks to increase the EU's use of renewable fuels to 20 percent of total energy demand and reduce total EU energy demand by 20 percent, all by 2020. It is by decreasing reliance on non-renewable energy that Obama hopes to wean the United States off of Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil.
Cap and Trade Program
One of the most ambitious proposals of the Obama energy plan is a national cap and trade program. Under such a program, the government would set emissions standard for various industries, allowing companies that emit less carbon dioxide than their allotment to trade their excess "credits" to those who are emitting above the cap. The initial allotments of carbon credits will incite one of the more contentious domestic debates in the coming years, as will the steepness of the emissions reduction curve. In addition to a national goal of 80 percent by 2050, there are questions about what the goal will be in 2020 or 2035.
Lobbying efforts are already under way regarding cap and trade. American businesses do not want to see states in charge of setting greenhouse gas emissions standards since that would increase the accounting and legal fees companies would have to incur to deal with the system on a state-by-state basis. Instead, they want to see a single national standard.
Establishing a national standard for a cap and trade system would allow utility companies to factor in future costs of emitting greenhouse gases, which currently is an unknown. Utility companies do not know whether it makes sense to build regular coal plants, clean coal plants, solar or wind installations or natural gas production facilities because the rules of the game are not set. Until that happens, energy expansion in the United States will be at a standstill.
However, the U.S. domestic climate-change policy must be negotiated at the global level, particularly with China. Obama, or any subsequent U.S. president, will be hard-pressed to adopt carbon emission rules without first getting some sort of a deal with China that would guarantee that Beijing would also address its own greenhouse emissions. Otherwise, U.S. greenhouse gas-emitting industries (chemicals, petrochemical, paper and pulp, steel, cement, etc.) could bolt for China and the developing world. Therefore, a conversation with Beijing about climate change is high on Obama's list of priorities; his energy envoy, Todd Stern, is accompanying Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on her current trip to East Asia, primarily to discuss some of Obama's energy ideas with the Chinese.
Improving Automobile Mileage
To reduce consumption of imported oil by approximately a third, Obama plans to force implementation of a congressional decision in 2007 to raise federal fuel economy requirements to 35 miles per gallon for cars by 2020, from their current level of 27.5 miles per gallon. (Today, about 60 percent of U.S. oil demand is used to power the American vehicle fleet.) The 2007 congressional decision was never put on a path for implementation by the Bush administration, which Obama will try to reverse by asking the Department of Transportation to come up with a plan by March to implement the mileage standard.
The problem with increasing the mileage of the current fleet (which has essentially averaged, on a fleet-wide basis, slightly above 20 miles per gallon since the early 1980s) is that it would necessitate replacing a substantial number of America's current fleet of over 250 million cars, small trucks and SUVs. In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Congress allocated $25 billion to "reequipping, expanding, or establishing manufacturing facilities in the United States to produce qualifying advanced technology vehicles or qualifying components." However, all of the $25 billion was subsequently relocated to provide bridge loans to the auto industry as part of their bailout announced on Nov. 20, 2008.
Therefore, it will be up to consumers to replace their old automobiles with hybrid vehicles, and Obama hopes to encourage them to do so by offering $7,000 in tax credits per vehicle for the purchase of an "advanced vehicle" (presumably these would include various types of hybrids) and putting 1 million plug-in hybrid cars on the road by 2015. This tax-credit program would have the U.S. government essentially spending a huge amount of money to buy new cars for people. Currently (figures are from December 2008), U.S. purchases of hybrids average 17,600 per month (down from about 30,000 during the first half of 2008), or approximately 3 percent of total purchases. At that rate, if Obama's $7,000-per-car system were adopted, the U.S. government would have to spend approximately $123 million in tax credits per month, or nearly $1.5 billion a year, just to sustain the current level of hybrid purchases.
Encouraging 'Plug-in' Hybrid Technology
The "plug-in" component of Obama's hybrid-vehicle plan is a direct plug for the domestic manufacturer General Motors Corporation (GM), which has essentially put all of its eggs in one basket with its flagship to-be Chevrolet Volt electric plug-in car. The Volt, which can go 40 miles purely on stored electricity before switching to its onboard gasoline engine, will have a price tag of more than $40,000, which means that even with the $7,000 tax credit for advanced vehicles (which presumably would also go for the cheaper Japanese hybrids), the Volt would cost essentially twice as much as its foreign competition. GM flatly stated in recent congressional hearings that the Volt would not be profitable in its first production run, that total costs of production would be around $750 million and that return on the investment could be expected only after 2016 — a risky strategy for a troubled manufacturer, to say the least.
At the moment, however, there is very little certainty that U.S. consumers would choose a U.S. made plug-in hybrid like the Volt over the (mostly Japanese) competition. Complicating calculations relating to the energy efficiency of the plug-in electric hybrid is the fact that the economics and ecological benefits of these vehicles depend on local electricity costs and the relative "greenness" of the consumer's power source. A traditional gasoline-electric hybrid contributes to less net greenhouse gas emissions than a plug-in hybrid in states that rely on coal for electricity generation. This calculation would change, of course, with changes in the electrical grid (see below).
Investing in Coal
Obama's plan is to "develop and deploy clean coal technology" as part of relying more on domestic energy resources. If there is one non-renewable source of energy that the United States has plenty of it is coal. In 2006, U.S. proven reserves totaled 27.1 percent of total global coal reserves, the highest number in the world. Coal already accounts for roughly 51 percent of U.S. electricity generation (in 2007) and for 22.8 percent of total energy use in the United States.
At the center of the debate over coal in the United States is the question of "clean coal" technology, especially carbon capture and sequestration. As the term implies, this combination of techniques allows for a coal-fired power plant to produce power without spewing carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. Instead, the carbon is captured and sent to deep underground repositories where it is sequestered. The technology could prove to be a panacea (should it ever become cost-effective): The United States has over a quarter of the world's coal; it wants to increase its domestic energy sources; and it needs to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions. The only problem is, while the technology exists, no one has figured out a way to employ it economically.
To retrofit an existing coal plant would cost approximately $1 billion to $2 billion (a 300 megawatt coal plant by itself costs about $1 billion and a 630 megawatt costs around $2.4 billion) and would require a doubling of the actual acreage on which the plant was built. An additional problem is that capture and sequestration would consume 30 percent of the plant output, substantially limiting the total energy output of the plant.
The elephant in the room is the potential cost of a complete overhaul of many of the current coal-burning plants, which would likely be necessary to make them economically viable under a future cap-and-trade system. The price tag for such an overhaul would be monstrous and definitely higher than the $150 billion currently earmarked for the next 10 years for all energy projects. The United States has 1,470 coal-burning plants, and if the cost of retrofitting for subterranean sequestration is factored in, the numbers would be astronomical and could measure in the trillions.
The final problem facing the coal industry is that the authority to regulate the building of new power plants in the United States rests with state governments, not the federal government. Some state governments have come under pressure from environmental groups to delay or cancel the building of coal power plants to avoid exacerbating climate change. In other states, environmental organizations have used lawsuits to tie up proposed coal plants for years. These lawsuits have added to the uncertainty surrounding the economics of building new coal plants. The economic uncertainty, legal uncertainty and litigation have resulted in a situation in which of the 151 coal plants proposed for construction in 2007, 109 were essentially scrapped or tied up in court, with only 28 actually under construction in 2008.
Promoting Ethanol
Encouraging a greater use of ethanol was one of Obama's primary electoral campaign messages, particularly to the corn-producing region in the Midwest where he picked up Iowa — the undisputed corn producing king — by a wide margin (Iowa voted Republican in 2004 and Democratic only by a slim margin in 2000). Derived mainly from corn, ethanol could be produced and mixed with refined petroleum to create enough gasoline to fulfill America's transportation energy needs (which account for 30 percent of total energy usage and over half of oil use in the U.S.). To fulfill Obama's pledge to wean the United States from Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil, U.S. refineries would probably have to use six times as much ethanol in gasoline than they currently do.
The key problem with such a surge in ethanol use is that it would appreciate food prices. According to calculations by the University of Illinois economics department, with oil prices at $50 per barrel it is profitable to convert corn into ethanol if corn prices are lower than $4 per bushel. Corn prices currently stand at approximately $3.67 per bushel. If oil were to climb above $50 per barrel, it would be more profitable for farmers to sell corn to ethanol refineries than to sell it for food. As oil prices climb, the threshold for corn prices rises as well, giving farmers more incentive to convert corn into fuel and thus raise food prices.
One way to avoid raising food prices would be to produce ethanol from cellulosic material (essentially any sort of non-edible plant material, from grass to corn stalks). The problem with cellulosic material is that it requires expensive enzymes to break down the plant material before it can be refined — a recent study found that this process is competitive only with oil prices above $90 a barrel. The process would also require gathering massive amounts of low-value raw materials — itself a very energy-intensive process because these materials have to be transported from the farm to the refinery. Currently, cellulosic materials like chaff are simply ploughed into the soil as fertilizer, burned or used for animal feed. In order to use it as a main source of ethanol production, the material would have to be shipped to refineries from the farm.
The current collection-transportation networks in the Midwest are calibrated for food distribution, not gasoline delivery. Therefore the first problem is how to get the cellulosic material to the refineries. Chaff and agricultural by-products are usually less dense than corn, so it would take more trips to the local refinery to make it worthwhile, increasing transportation costs. Farms would either have to ship their agricultural waste for refinement to a centralized collection point (most likely right next to the grain elevator) or run rudimentary refineries right on their farms.
Either way, once the refining process is complete, the ethanol would have to be shipped to consumers around the country (most of who are on the coasts, far from the Midwest). There is no pipeline network ready to take the fuel-ready ethanol from refineries to the coasts, and such a network (one akin to the natural gas pipeline network in Europe may have to be developed) would be an extremely expensive project. Therefore, a switch to ethanol could work for the Midwest, leading to a bifurcated system where the coasts still use petroleum for transportation while the agricultural producing regions rely on ethanol.
The Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline
To boost domestic production of energy, Obama's plan would "prioritize the construction of the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline," which would tap natural gas deposits in Prudhoe Bay on the banks of the Arctic Ocean. To get the pipeline to reach the U.S. lower 48 it would have to cross more than 1,500 miles, including the imposing Alaskan Brooks Mountain Range. The project is not new. It was proposed in the late 1960s, when the deposits were discovered, and became a popular idea during the oil shocks of the early 1970s. Today there are three competing pipeline projects being considered: ExxonMobil's Mackenzie Valley ($16.3 billion), the TransCanada project ($26 billion) and BP-ConocoPhillips' Denali project (somewhere between $30 billion and $40 billion). All three projects are financially daunting, comparable to the Soviet-style infrastructural development that aims to connect Russian natural gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula with consumers in Europe. As a point of comparison, the Yamal-Europe pipeline that ships natural gas from Russia to Germany via Poland and Belarus traverses over 4,000 miles of flat terrain and cost roughly $45 billion. As such, it is actually cheaper per mile of pipeline than either the TransCanada project or BP-ConocoPhillips's Denali project.
'Use it or Lose it' Lease Strategy
A U.S. congressional report, supported by Democrats on the House Natural Resources Committee, has highlighted 68 million acres "of leased but currently inactive federal land and waters" that could produce "an additional 4.8 million bpd of oil." Intrinsically, this production would decrease U.S. imports by 75 percent and eliminate the need for Middle Eastern and Venezuelan imports. The Obama energy plan would seek to boost domestic oil production by tapping this supposed wealth of untapped domestic wells that energy firms hold leases on but choose not to produce from.
The problem with this plan is that U.S. energy firms hold leases on potential wells and deposits that often require a long period of time to survey. Some underwater deposits are unable to be exploited, at least until technology is improved (which generally takes years and sometimes decades). By forcing energy companies to "use it or lose it," the government will discourage careful surveying and most likely run off the energy firms from the deposits by attempting to force them to develop currently uneconomical fields. Unless the U.S. government develops a state-owned energy company willing to tap and produce from fields for a loss, there is no point in taking leases away from energy firms.
The 'Smart Grid'
Ultimately the most significant change to America's energy usage and efficiency may be the retooling of the entire electricity grid and transforming it into a so-called "smart grid." This is essentially an amalgamation of modern technologies in the distribution and supply of electricity. It uses digital technology (such as digital electricity readers, which would replace manual readers) to coordinate supply and demand of electricity across the nation. It combines more efficient distribution of electricity to consumers with advanced long-distance transmission lines that would be able to take alternative energy sources (such as wind power) to electricity markets far away.
As such, a smart grid would introduce two-way communication between energy suppliers and consumers, allowing utilities to direct power more efficiently away from low-energy users to high-energy users depending on the time of day or need. It would also give consumers more room to create their own usage preferences by actually programming how (and when) their appliances use energy. The smart grid would also regulate electricity use of homes and businesses by being able to turn off appliances that are not being used during peak times.
The concept is simple enough and would update America's electricity infrastructure (currently running on technology not much different from its nascent stages in the 19th century) to a modern digital consumer/provider system. However, such a national grid would necessitate replacing all of America's electricity meters, as well as all transmission lines and all transformer stations, a project with a likely price tag of somewhere near $200 billion. The current stimulus package, however, commits only $4.5 billion to a smart-grid upgrading of some 3,000 miles of transmission lines and equipping about 40 million homes with "smart meters." This funding will not be enough to begin a serious overhaul of America's electricity transmission network. It is more an attempt to kick-start industry and private businesses and move them toward an eventual retooling.
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Bitterlemons-International.org Middle East Roundtable: Gaza: Humanitarian Issues and the International Roce, February 19. 2009
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 7 Volume 7 - February 19, 2009
Gaza: humanitarian issues and the international role
• Access needed to address some of Gaza's health needs - Laila Baker
Even the most resilient individuals and nations require political stability and socio-economic security to thrive.
• A call for a robust international presence - Nomi Bar-Yaacov
What is missing is the political will to appoint a tough mediator with a powerful mandate and international backing.
• A conflict of the third kind - Christian Berger
Humanitarian aid, crossing points...these are important albeit technical points that fail to address the underlying political issues.
• International acrobats around Gaza - Ezzedine Choukri Fishere
Twenty months after Hamas seized power in Gaza, an international role has once again become a policy option.
• IDF humanitarian coordination - an interview with Baruch Spiegel
When IDF ground forces entered Gaza, the humanitarian officers were with them at brigade level.
Access needed to address some of Gaza's health needs
Laila Baker
When emergency strikes, we become obsessed with numbers: 1,300 Palestinians killed, 5,400 injured, 50,000 displaced. Though there is certainly merit to the numbers game in exhibiting the magnitude of a crisis, it is also easy to see how figures can be manipulated and detract from the issues related to breaches of basic human rights. Fortunately, over the last half-century, ideas about the relationship between population and sustainable development have evolved significantly to include human rights.
Critically, countries in crisis face even the greatest obstacles in maintaining the delicate balance between these variables while addressing humanitarian needs. In the particular case of the most recent bombing of Gaza by Israel at the turn of 2008, perhaps nothing illustrates the human rights point better than the case of "Fatima", 34, who was nine months pregnant with her fifth child when the incursion began. She prayed that the shelling would stop before she went into labor, but on day 17 of the offensive, in a particularly aggressive bombardment, her labor pains began.
After calling the emergency medical services several times, her husband secured an ambulance to transfer her to Shifa hospital. Torn between leaving her children behind in such circumstances or risking a home delivery with no trained midwife or doctor, she chose to pile her family into the ambulance alongside with her. Five minutes into the trip and as Fatima had just begun feeling more secure with her family in tow, the ambulance was shelled, killing her, the unborn child and all the other family members traveling with her.
Even for the other estimated 170 women giving birth every day in Gaza whose fate was luckier than Fatima, recent events have resulted in a severe deterioration of already precarious living conditions and have further eroded a weakened health system in the Hamas-controlled territory. With hospital facilities turned quickly into trauma units, maternity wards were not readily available and women delivering normally were put in corridors and sometimes released within half an hour of giving birth.
Among the 3,500 babies who are calculated to have been born during the 23 days of the Israeli offensive, the consequences for maternal and child morbidity and mortality are not yet clear. Shifa Hospital alone, the largest facility in the central Gaza region, has a reported 50 percent increase in neonatal death rates during the crisis, according to a UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) reproductive health study conducted this month.
The state of the health services in Gaza was already precarious before the military offensive. The strict closure of the Gaza Strip since mid-2007 resulted in intermittent shortages of fuel, electricity and water and led to reduced services at both the primary care and hospital levels. Referrals for specialized care outside Gaza are nearly impossible. Materials needed for rehabilitating and building health facilities are still prevented from entering Gaza and access of people and goods remains the main obstacle to provision of any effective, systematic response for rehabilitation and recovery. Coupled with internal political turmoil and extensive health worker strikes, reduced health service delivery and public health programs capacity was inevitable.
Stress and losses, both human and material, in Gaza are also a risk factor for a wide range of mental health and psychosocial problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder. According to World Health Organization figures, the effects on mental health of the recent emergency in Gaza can be roughly estimated. Even with a conservative approach, it is reasonable to assume that 25,000 to 50,000 people will need some form of psychological intervention to address long-term effects of the violence recently witnessed. Staff dealing with psychosocial cases prior to the invasion have also become vulnerable to the same risk factors and cannot cope themselves at times. Difficulties in obtaining Israeli permission for qualified staff to enter Gaza, which requires lengthy and complicated procedures, mean less effective assistance to the most vulnerable population groups including those who have lost family and friends or are among the more than 5,000 injured and left disabled.
Experience shows that human beings are resilient and have a great capacity to cope even when faced with severe adversity. This is not the first crisis for the Palestinians in Gaza, nor is it, unfortunately, likely to be the last. However, even the most resilient individuals and nations require political stability and restoration of socio-economic security to thrive. Young people usually represent a nation's hope and future. What hope and future a damaged, besieged and politically isolated territory can offer the young people in Gaza remains to be seen.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Laila Baker is the United Nations Population Fund's humanitarian liaison specialist and was until recently the UNFPA assistant representative in Jerusalem.
A call for a robust international presence
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
The question of rebuilding Gaza must be linked to a new approach to peace and stability in the region. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that after the Strip is rebuilt it won't be bombed again.
After the war in Gaza and the Israeli election, it appears that a majority of Palestinians and Israelis no longer believe bilateral negotiations will achieve peace. A growing number of Palestinians believe in resistance and a majority of Israelis voted for parties that do not believe in a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. As the promise of a two-state solution looks increasingly remote, some advocate a one-state solution. However, the alternative to two states is not one state; it is regional instability, chaos and bloodshed.
The only way to achieve a two-state solution is to have a robust international presence in Palestine working with a forceful mandate on one clear goal, a sovereign Palestinian state, rather than the removal of a checkpoint here and an outpost there or the much necessary supply of food and nappies. The way to put an end to the occupation is to put an end to incrementalism.
International presence is not an alien idea to this conflict. Indeed, some think there is too much of it. Already present are the Quartet, composed of the United States, European Union, United Nations and Russia, with a mandate to oversee the peace process, and the UN Special Coordinator's Office, which coordinates the UN's multifarious efforts. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs deals with Palestinian welfare in general, UNRWA provides for Palestinian refugees, the US Security Coordinator helps train part of the Palestinian security forces and the EUCOPPS mission works with another part. Then there is the EU-BAM mission (currently suspended) monitoring the Gaza-Egypt crossing, the "Temporary" International Presence in Hebron which has been trying to maintain calm in the city for 15 years, World Bank and IMF missions advising on Palestinian development, economic and legal reform, a slew of international aid agencies and NGOs working on humanitarian, security, civil society and human-rights projects.
Yet all these efforts either focus narrowly on one aspect of the conflict or approach it in an incremental manner. What is missing is the international political will to appoint a tough mediator, with a powerful mandate and broad international backing, who could strike a comprehensive deal and implement it with the help of one robust international mission.
Such a mediator would have a mandate to negotiate the thorniest issues of the conflict--borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees--from the outset. These should not be left for last as in the Oslo process that failed. Nor can peace be negotiated on the West Bank only; it has to include Gaza. Both territories need to be treated as one.
With a new administration in the United States and a seemingly open-minded, well-intentioned and ambitious new president, it would appear that the newly appointed US Middle East envoy is a logical candidate for this broader mandate. But he needs the backing of all parties concerned, a robust mandate and strong mission in order to implement a peace plan. George Mitchell, a Lebanese-American, was instrumental in negotiating the 1998 Good Friday accords that led to the end of the conflict in Northern Ireland.
The Arab peace initiative of 2002 should be used as a vehicle to rally the support of Arab states and form the framework for peace talks, coupled with existing plans on the table. The mediator's mandate should be endorsed by the UN Security Council, and the plan should have a strict timeline for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a strong monitoring, verification and compliance mechanism and a built-in conflict-resolution mechanism, so that when one party accuses the other of violating the plan someone can resolve the dispute and implement a solution. There should be an international force with a Chapter VII mandate (the ability to intervene and separate hostile forces), as then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for during the fighting in the West Bank in April 2002.
This requires a very strong coalition of international actors including the US, EU, Russia and Arab states--a coalition of the willing to help negotiate, mediate and resolve conflicts and implement an agreement. These countries may be reluctant to contribute the extra resources and troops; yet as things stand, the considerable contributions they are already making now are going into a black hole and could continue to do so indefinitely. Scattered confidence-building measures and good-will gestures will not achieve a solution.
The obvious objection to this approach is that neither side is ready to have a solution imposed. Israelis have just voted against a two-state solution, while the Fateh-Hamas conflict means there is no single, unified legitimate Palestinian leadership to negotiate with. There is little or no mutual trust. But these problems are just what a powerful international mediator could overcome by putting on the table an offer that neither side can refuse: a comprehensive solution addressing the entire region, and the muscle to make each side meet its commitments.
This effort, coupled with the promise of the Arab initiative to normalize relations with all Arab states once a Palestinian state is established, offers a huge incentive to Israel. Serious security and economic guarantees will have to be agreed for the removal of settlers and resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. Appropriate security and economic incentives should also be given to Syria and Iran. This approach would offer a new security architecture in the Middle East.
This opportunity should be grabbed as a matter of urgency. It should not be missed, as the alternative is dire.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Nomi Bar-Yaacov is a foreign policy adviser on Middle Eastern affairs. She formerly headed the Middle East Conflict Management Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
A conflict of the third kind
Christian Berger
When comparing the recent fighting in Gaza with other violent conflicts around the world, there is one striking difference: there was no escape for the local civilian population, there was no way out. The sea, the fence and the border to Egypt did not allow civilians to flee from the shelling and shooting. This is quite unique in recent history.
A less unique feature was the ever shrinking humanitarian space. Delivering humanitarian assistance became a daily challenge; it largely still is. Access constraints, a narrow definition of humanitarian aid, the danger of being caught up in the fighting--all drastically reduced the international agencies' capacity to deliver aid. With the international community mainly engaged through humanitarian aid, there are few other conflicts where the need to respect humanitarian space is so acute and probably even fewer where the politicization of aid is so intense.
The international community, including the European Union, kept making these points throughout the fighting and succeeded in setting up, together with the Israeli military, a coordination structure that tried to solve humanitarian problems in real time. This led to the introduction of humanitarian time slots during which the fighting temporarily came to a halt. Paradoxically, it also led to a higher quantity of supplies going into the Gaza Strip than during the 18 months prior to the fighting. However, this was no substitute for the most important goal: an end to the hostilities and the killing.
Today, more than one month after the fighting ended, we are still grappling with the fallout from the crisis. Unemployment levels have risen to be among the highest in the world (46 percent) as a result of the collapse of the private sector, with a corresponding effect on rising poverty and almost 80 percent of the population dependent on some form of humanitarian assistance. The black market is booming with all its adverse consequences, ranging from skyrocketing prices to the lucrative smuggling enterprise at Rafah. This is compounded by a lack of cash permitted into the Gaza Strip that is crippling the banking system and does not allow for regular payment of assistance to vulnerable families and the payment of salaries of employees dependent on the legitimate Palestinian government.
The definition of humanitarian aid remains restrictive: the items allowed in are determined on a day-to-day, case-by-case basis. Needs estimates made after the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 have long been outdated by a prolonged period of import restrictions that has led to a depletion of stocks and lack of spare parts. Also, the demand for building materials and other basic items one takes for granted in daily life has exponentially grown in the wake of the recent fighting.
The international community and Palestinian engineers are now engaged in assessing the damage. They are drawing up a recovery plan to be discussed at a conference in Sharm al-Sheikh in early March. But is all this heightened activity really the answer? Will it lead to a solution? Humanitarian aid, crossing points, lists of items that can or cannot be imported ... these are important albeit technical points that fail to address the underlying political issues.
First among these are efforts to bring about Palestinian unity. The political divisions within Palestinian society make it difficult if not impossible to improve the quality of life of Palestinians. Our efforts will bring only limited benefit if Palestinian unity in pursuit of peace is not achieved.
Second, continuation of the peace process--or, rather, bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion.
Third, Gaza must not overshadow the problems of the West Bank. It must not jeopardize the real achievements that the Palestinian Authority, in partnership with the international community, has made in delivering greater security, greater--albeit modest--prosperity and a better quality of life for the Palestinians of the West Bank.
Fourth, implementation of the 2005 Access and Movement Agreement negotiated by then Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn. This entails the full opening of border crossings for imports and exports, the beginning of construction of a seaport, preparing the reopening of the airport and establishing a transport link with the West Bank.
The people of Gaza do not deserve the imprisonment that hatred, fanaticism and conflict bring in their ugly wake. The people, and in particular the children, of Gaza instead deserve reason, hope and an explanation of what was done to them during the hostilities. They deserve freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from hatred and freedom from the hazardous and irresponsible acts of others.
It is time that Gazans no longer have to worry whether goods that are not deemed strictly humanitarian in nature like macaroni, candy and fruit juice can be imported, let alone fuel, cement, reinforcing steel and glass panes. It is time that Gazans no longer have to worry whether or not their children can go to university abroad and their sick be treated in hospitals abroad, or whether or not they can entertain the outlandish thought of going on vacation abroad. Isn't this the way matters should be?
Gazans have the right not only to mere survival, but to a decent and normal life. The absence of a political breakthrough keeps postponing the one thing Gazans desperately need: a return to normal life.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Christian Berger is European Commission representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Previously he served as EU representative on the team of Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn, and was responsible for crisis response and peace-building in the European Commission. This article reflects his personal views and not necessarily those of the European Commission.
International acrobats around Gaza
Ezzedine Choukri Fishere
The recent Israeli attacks on Gaza resuscitated the debate over a possible international role in the besieged Strip. What capacity, if any, can the international community fill in order to help run Gaza's crossings, patrol its borders, ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance and support imminent reconstruction efforts?
This debate is as old as Israeli unilateral withdrawal plans. In 2003, many United Nations officials suggested that an international force along Gaza's borders was the best way to ensure stability and security for both Israel and the Palestinians after Israel's withdrawal. They took their case to world capitals and the region, arguing that such a "presence" could, inter alia, patrol the border and territorial waters to prevent smuggling and illegal passage, train and assist Palestinian Authority security forces to enhance their capacity to enforce law and order, facilitate the crossings' operation and communication between the parties and assist in the reconstruction effort.
The UN prepared an operational plan for this presence, including various options for its mandate, command and control structure as well as its "exit clause". While American officials showed openness to the proposals, the Israeli government and its supporters in the US stood firm against it. Instead, Israeli officials focused their attention on persuading Cairo to play an expanded role in Gaza's security. Ultimately, Egypt declined such a responsibility, and the UN-led presence idea was nipped in the bud.
Twenty months after Hamas seized power in Gaza, an international presence/role has once again become a policy option. The difficulty this time is greater: to establish an international presence in Gaza, one needs the consent of those whom that presence is de facto targeting. No Egyptian, Arab or international force can be deployed in Gaza against the will of Hamas. For more than a year and a half, concerned parties have been trying every acrobatic move possible in order to avoid this simple fact: Hamas is in control of the Gaza Strip. Its consent--and protection--are necessary to run crossings, distribute aid, reconstruct or simply organize the visit of a foreign dignitary. This is the plain fact that the international community needs to recognize.
The question then becomes two: 1) what would it take for Hamas to give its support to an international role; and 2) what is the role that the international community would want to play in the shadow of Hamas? The answer to the first question is easy: recognition. The second is more difficult to answer.
On the one hand, the international community does not want to engage with Hamas or to help it strengthen its grip on the Strip as long as Hamas refuses to accept the principles of a two-state solution. Far from that, an international role is often presented as a tool to undermine Hamas' rule. Yet there is little the international community can do to achieve this goal. The suffering of the civilian population in Gaza hurts both Hamas and the international community almost equally, and therefore neither can leverage it. The siege certainly exhausts Hamas, but it will not make it kneel. Neither will further death and destruction.
Consequently, the international community has only two options related to Gaza. One is to operate in the Strip in cooperation with--or in the shadow of--the Islamic movement. The other is to gear its involvement toward a genuine Palestinian reconciliation.
The first option is self-explanatory: the international community can, most likely through the UN, launch a humanitarian relief and reconstruction operation under the gaze of Hamas leaders and with their blessing. The UN can become the interface between the world and Hamas; UN tradition and regulations allow its officials to engage with any force on the ground. This role can be expanded to include crossings management and security-related matters, where the UN would serve as interface between Israeli and Hamas representatives (as it did on the Israeli-Lebanese border for some time). The downside of this option is that the international community would acquiesce to and indeed strengthen Hamas' rule over Gaza, albeit without politically recognizing Hamas.
The other option is to gear the international role toward--and gauge it upon--Palestinian reconciliation. In practice, this means that the international community would carry out four tasks.
First, it would consolidate its plan for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. Second, it would agree with the concerned parties on possible assistance in running all of Gaza's crossings. Third, it would decide whether it would be prepared to deploy forces along Gaza's borders that would not only prevent smuggling but also provide the Palestinian population with protection against future Israeli attacks. And fourth, it would then present these plans as a heavy incentive package that would lubricate and compliment Egyptian efforts aimed at reconciling the two warring Palestinian factions. Such a role would give all concerned parties the needed assurances regarding their most important interests: security and political survival.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ezzedine Choukri Fishere is international politics professor at the American University in Cairo and a former advisor to the Egyptian foreign minister and the United Nations Middle East envoy in Jerusalem.
IDF humanitarian coordination
an interview with Baruch Spiegel
BI: Was the IDF fully prepared for the wartime humanitarian crisis?
Spiegel: Basically, the IDF's humanitarian and civil effort paralleled its operational effort. All units, from headquarters down to battalion level, were involved in humanitarian affairs during the operation in Gaza against Hamas. Dozens of humanitarian officers were seconded from operational HQ via Southern Command HQ down to brigade level. These officers were attached to combat units and had to give advice and provide solutions to commanders regarding any humanitarian need on the ground. All this was part of preparations for the operation.
When IDF ground forces entered Gaza, the humanitarian officers were with them at brigade level. When necessary, they were sent to specific sites and special checkpoints to provide immediate solutions to humanitarian needs such as movement of supply convoys, medical evacuation, evacuation of the dead and opening humanitarian access for civilian movements. They also dealt with infrastructure needs such as sending teams to fix water pipes and electricity and refueling power plants and generators that supply energy in Gaza.
BI: How do you evaluate the success of IDF coordination with the international donor community?
Spiegel: During the war we opened a joint operational center at headquarters. There the largest foreign agencies such as UNRWA, UNTSO, ICRC, USAID, the Quartet and EU representatives, the WFO and WHO sat together with Israeli officers and top civilian officials and worked hand-in-hand around the clock to provide the best answers for humanitarian needs during the operation. There was a joint understanding that this is a necessity for dealing with civilian issues such as enabling movement of ambulances to evacuate casualties, checking that convoys of supplies are arriving at distribution centers and delivering basic goods to people during the humanitarian windows of this operation. [This system] also enabled civilians to move to shelters in areas of fighting, especially in the crowded neighborhoods of Gaza City that were used by Hamas as combat bases against the IDF.
BI: What sort of special problems did you encounter?
Spiegel: There were shooting incidents in areas of international warehouses and supply depots where we had to act in real time to stop the shooting and instruct troops not to hit these infrastructure installations in Gaza. At times we had direct lines of communication from our center to an ambulance driver, the director of a hospital or a jeep escorting a convoy of food supplies. By using direct communication, we were better able to secure humanitarian movements and other activities. During the ground operation, more than 2,000 trucks were able to enter Gaza and distribute supplies. Sometimes Hamas stole drugs and other goods, but basically the system of supply by foreign agencies, including medical support built into the supply system, worked at high profile. Hundreds of trucks carried donations from neighboring countries, especially Jordan, Egypt and Turkey, to the people of Gaza.
BI: How do you explain the criticism of Israel's humanitarian performance during the war?
Spiegel: There were a few incidents, some involving ambulances, which did not reflect our policy. There was a lot of close shooting. Hamas sometimes used buildings near international sites knowing the IDF would not shoot at the sites. Still, unfortunately, some sites were hit. [In each case] we investigated immediately, drew lessons and the next day were more aware and careful. After three such incidents, there was a sharp decrease in this type of event.
The humanitarian ceasefire windows that we implemented daily after the third day were in most instances used by Palestinian civilians for movement, resupply, evacuation, etc. But Hamas also exploited these truces to initiate shooting incidents, reinforce its units and launch rockets at Israel. Our decision was that in any case the humanitarian ceasefire would continue.
Then too, because we used tanks, armored personnel carriers and bulldozers against sites used by Hamas, those sites and adjacent roads were damaged. This was urban warfare where Hamas exploited innocent people as human shields. Many buildings were booby-trapped and connected to underground tunnels as part of the Hamas operations system. The IDF had to hit these buildings and destroy them. Most international criticism directed at humanitarian issues referred to this kind of destruction. If you check the casualties among non-combatant civilians, most were killed because they were used by Hamas as human shields and Hamas targets and civilians were integrated together.
BI: What are your conclusions regarding the procedure you developed for dealing with humanitarian issues and the international community during the war?
Spiegel: This model of a combined humanitarian center reflected shared interest and understanding. It was a unique, ad hoc project that had to be managed in a very serious way. I believe it was very helpful for the IDF, Israel and the international agencies. We are now checking how to employ it in future at times of emergency and urgency for humanitarian issues. We need clearer rules of the game, common understanding and language, direct communications and a closed circle of debriefing and investigation. We will upgrade the humanitarian issues by learning lessons from this model.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Brigadier General (ret.) Baruch Spiegel has served as a senior consultant for ministers of defense and as special advisor for regional affairs for President Shimon Peres. During the recent IDF operation in Gaza, he was asked by the minister of defense to head a center that dealt with all humanitarian and civil aspects of the Palestinian population in Gaza.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 7 Volume 7 - February 19, 2009
Gaza: humanitarian issues and the international role
• Access needed to address some of Gaza's health needs - Laila Baker
Even the most resilient individuals and nations require political stability and socio-economic security to thrive.
• A call for a robust international presence - Nomi Bar-Yaacov
What is missing is the political will to appoint a tough mediator with a powerful mandate and international backing.
• A conflict of the third kind - Christian Berger
Humanitarian aid, crossing points...these are important albeit technical points that fail to address the underlying political issues.
• International acrobats around Gaza - Ezzedine Choukri Fishere
Twenty months after Hamas seized power in Gaza, an international role has once again become a policy option.
• IDF humanitarian coordination - an interview with Baruch Spiegel
When IDF ground forces entered Gaza, the humanitarian officers were with them at brigade level.
Access needed to address some of Gaza's health needs
Laila Baker
When emergency strikes, we become obsessed with numbers: 1,300 Palestinians killed, 5,400 injured, 50,000 displaced. Though there is certainly merit to the numbers game in exhibiting the magnitude of a crisis, it is also easy to see how figures can be manipulated and detract from the issues related to breaches of basic human rights. Fortunately, over the last half-century, ideas about the relationship between population and sustainable development have evolved significantly to include human rights.
Critically, countries in crisis face even the greatest obstacles in maintaining the delicate balance between these variables while addressing humanitarian needs. In the particular case of the most recent bombing of Gaza by Israel at the turn of 2008, perhaps nothing illustrates the human rights point better than the case of "Fatima", 34, who was nine months pregnant with her fifth child when the incursion began. She prayed that the shelling would stop before she went into labor, but on day 17 of the offensive, in a particularly aggressive bombardment, her labor pains began.
After calling the emergency medical services several times, her husband secured an ambulance to transfer her to Shifa hospital. Torn between leaving her children behind in such circumstances or risking a home delivery with no trained midwife or doctor, she chose to pile her family into the ambulance alongside with her. Five minutes into the trip and as Fatima had just begun feeling more secure with her family in tow, the ambulance was shelled, killing her, the unborn child and all the other family members traveling with her.
Even for the other estimated 170 women giving birth every day in Gaza whose fate was luckier than Fatima, recent events have resulted in a severe deterioration of already precarious living conditions and have further eroded a weakened health system in the Hamas-controlled territory. With hospital facilities turned quickly into trauma units, maternity wards were not readily available and women delivering normally were put in corridors and sometimes released within half an hour of giving birth.
Among the 3,500 babies who are calculated to have been born during the 23 days of the Israeli offensive, the consequences for maternal and child morbidity and mortality are not yet clear. Shifa Hospital alone, the largest facility in the central Gaza region, has a reported 50 percent increase in neonatal death rates during the crisis, according to a UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) reproductive health study conducted this month.
The state of the health services in Gaza was already precarious before the military offensive. The strict closure of the Gaza Strip since mid-2007 resulted in intermittent shortages of fuel, electricity and water and led to reduced services at both the primary care and hospital levels. Referrals for specialized care outside Gaza are nearly impossible. Materials needed for rehabilitating and building health facilities are still prevented from entering Gaza and access of people and goods remains the main obstacle to provision of any effective, systematic response for rehabilitation and recovery. Coupled with internal political turmoil and extensive health worker strikes, reduced health service delivery and public health programs capacity was inevitable.
Stress and losses, both human and material, in Gaza are also a risk factor for a wide range of mental health and psychosocial problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder. According to World Health Organization figures, the effects on mental health of the recent emergency in Gaza can be roughly estimated. Even with a conservative approach, it is reasonable to assume that 25,000 to 50,000 people will need some form of psychological intervention to address long-term effects of the violence recently witnessed. Staff dealing with psychosocial cases prior to the invasion have also become vulnerable to the same risk factors and cannot cope themselves at times. Difficulties in obtaining Israeli permission for qualified staff to enter Gaza, which requires lengthy and complicated procedures, mean less effective assistance to the most vulnerable population groups including those who have lost family and friends or are among the more than 5,000 injured and left disabled.
Experience shows that human beings are resilient and have a great capacity to cope even when faced with severe adversity. This is not the first crisis for the Palestinians in Gaza, nor is it, unfortunately, likely to be the last. However, even the most resilient individuals and nations require political stability and restoration of socio-economic security to thrive. Young people usually represent a nation's hope and future. What hope and future a damaged, besieged and politically isolated territory can offer the young people in Gaza remains to be seen.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Laila Baker is the United Nations Population Fund's humanitarian liaison specialist and was until recently the UNFPA assistant representative in Jerusalem.
A call for a robust international presence
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
The question of rebuilding Gaza must be linked to a new approach to peace and stability in the region. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that after the Strip is rebuilt it won't be bombed again.
After the war in Gaza and the Israeli election, it appears that a majority of Palestinians and Israelis no longer believe bilateral negotiations will achieve peace. A growing number of Palestinians believe in resistance and a majority of Israelis voted for parties that do not believe in a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. As the promise of a two-state solution looks increasingly remote, some advocate a one-state solution. However, the alternative to two states is not one state; it is regional instability, chaos and bloodshed.
The only way to achieve a two-state solution is to have a robust international presence in Palestine working with a forceful mandate on one clear goal, a sovereign Palestinian state, rather than the removal of a checkpoint here and an outpost there or the much necessary supply of food and nappies. The way to put an end to the occupation is to put an end to incrementalism.
International presence is not an alien idea to this conflict. Indeed, some think there is too much of it. Already present are the Quartet, composed of the United States, European Union, United Nations and Russia, with a mandate to oversee the peace process, and the UN Special Coordinator's Office, which coordinates the UN's multifarious efforts. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs deals with Palestinian welfare in general, UNRWA provides for Palestinian refugees, the US Security Coordinator helps train part of the Palestinian security forces and the EUCOPPS mission works with another part. Then there is the EU-BAM mission (currently suspended) monitoring the Gaza-Egypt crossing, the "Temporary" International Presence in Hebron which has been trying to maintain calm in the city for 15 years, World Bank and IMF missions advising on Palestinian development, economic and legal reform, a slew of international aid agencies and NGOs working on humanitarian, security, civil society and human-rights projects.
Yet all these efforts either focus narrowly on one aspect of the conflict or approach it in an incremental manner. What is missing is the international political will to appoint a tough mediator, with a powerful mandate and broad international backing, who could strike a comprehensive deal and implement it with the help of one robust international mission.
Such a mediator would have a mandate to negotiate the thorniest issues of the conflict--borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees--from the outset. These should not be left for last as in the Oslo process that failed. Nor can peace be negotiated on the West Bank only; it has to include Gaza. Both territories need to be treated as one.
With a new administration in the United States and a seemingly open-minded, well-intentioned and ambitious new president, it would appear that the newly appointed US Middle East envoy is a logical candidate for this broader mandate. But he needs the backing of all parties concerned, a robust mandate and strong mission in order to implement a peace plan. George Mitchell, a Lebanese-American, was instrumental in negotiating the 1998 Good Friday accords that led to the end of the conflict in Northern Ireland.
The Arab peace initiative of 2002 should be used as a vehicle to rally the support of Arab states and form the framework for peace talks, coupled with existing plans on the table. The mediator's mandate should be endorsed by the UN Security Council, and the plan should have a strict timeline for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a strong monitoring, verification and compliance mechanism and a built-in conflict-resolution mechanism, so that when one party accuses the other of violating the plan someone can resolve the dispute and implement a solution. There should be an international force with a Chapter VII mandate (the ability to intervene and separate hostile forces), as then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for during the fighting in the West Bank in April 2002.
This requires a very strong coalition of international actors including the US, EU, Russia and Arab states--a coalition of the willing to help negotiate, mediate and resolve conflicts and implement an agreement. These countries may be reluctant to contribute the extra resources and troops; yet as things stand, the considerable contributions they are already making now are going into a black hole and could continue to do so indefinitely. Scattered confidence-building measures and good-will gestures will not achieve a solution.
The obvious objection to this approach is that neither side is ready to have a solution imposed. Israelis have just voted against a two-state solution, while the Fateh-Hamas conflict means there is no single, unified legitimate Palestinian leadership to negotiate with. There is little or no mutual trust. But these problems are just what a powerful international mediator could overcome by putting on the table an offer that neither side can refuse: a comprehensive solution addressing the entire region, and the muscle to make each side meet its commitments.
This effort, coupled with the promise of the Arab initiative to normalize relations with all Arab states once a Palestinian state is established, offers a huge incentive to Israel. Serious security and economic guarantees will have to be agreed for the removal of settlers and resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. Appropriate security and economic incentives should also be given to Syria and Iran. This approach would offer a new security architecture in the Middle East.
This opportunity should be grabbed as a matter of urgency. It should not be missed, as the alternative is dire.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Nomi Bar-Yaacov is a foreign policy adviser on Middle Eastern affairs. She formerly headed the Middle East Conflict Management Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
A conflict of the third kind
Christian Berger
When comparing the recent fighting in Gaza with other violent conflicts around the world, there is one striking difference: there was no escape for the local civilian population, there was no way out. The sea, the fence and the border to Egypt did not allow civilians to flee from the shelling and shooting. This is quite unique in recent history.
A less unique feature was the ever shrinking humanitarian space. Delivering humanitarian assistance became a daily challenge; it largely still is. Access constraints, a narrow definition of humanitarian aid, the danger of being caught up in the fighting--all drastically reduced the international agencies' capacity to deliver aid. With the international community mainly engaged through humanitarian aid, there are few other conflicts where the need to respect humanitarian space is so acute and probably even fewer where the politicization of aid is so intense.
The international community, including the European Union, kept making these points throughout the fighting and succeeded in setting up, together with the Israeli military, a coordination structure that tried to solve humanitarian problems in real time. This led to the introduction of humanitarian time slots during which the fighting temporarily came to a halt. Paradoxically, it also led to a higher quantity of supplies going into the Gaza Strip than during the 18 months prior to the fighting. However, this was no substitute for the most important goal: an end to the hostilities and the killing.
Today, more than one month after the fighting ended, we are still grappling with the fallout from the crisis. Unemployment levels have risen to be among the highest in the world (46 percent) as a result of the collapse of the private sector, with a corresponding effect on rising poverty and almost 80 percent of the population dependent on some form of humanitarian assistance. The black market is booming with all its adverse consequences, ranging from skyrocketing prices to the lucrative smuggling enterprise at Rafah. This is compounded by a lack of cash permitted into the Gaza Strip that is crippling the banking system and does not allow for regular payment of assistance to vulnerable families and the payment of salaries of employees dependent on the legitimate Palestinian government.
The definition of humanitarian aid remains restrictive: the items allowed in are determined on a day-to-day, case-by-case basis. Needs estimates made after the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 have long been outdated by a prolonged period of import restrictions that has led to a depletion of stocks and lack of spare parts. Also, the demand for building materials and other basic items one takes for granted in daily life has exponentially grown in the wake of the recent fighting.
The international community and Palestinian engineers are now engaged in assessing the damage. They are drawing up a recovery plan to be discussed at a conference in Sharm al-Sheikh in early March. But is all this heightened activity really the answer? Will it lead to a solution? Humanitarian aid, crossing points, lists of items that can or cannot be imported ... these are important albeit technical points that fail to address the underlying political issues.
First among these are efforts to bring about Palestinian unity. The political divisions within Palestinian society make it difficult if not impossible to improve the quality of life of Palestinians. Our efforts will bring only limited benefit if Palestinian unity in pursuit of peace is not achieved.
Second, continuation of the peace process--or, rather, bringing the peace process to a successful conclusion.
Third, Gaza must not overshadow the problems of the West Bank. It must not jeopardize the real achievements that the Palestinian Authority, in partnership with the international community, has made in delivering greater security, greater--albeit modest--prosperity and a better quality of life for the Palestinians of the West Bank.
Fourth, implementation of the 2005 Access and Movement Agreement negotiated by then Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn. This entails the full opening of border crossings for imports and exports, the beginning of construction of a seaport, preparing the reopening of the airport and establishing a transport link with the West Bank.
The people of Gaza do not deserve the imprisonment that hatred, fanaticism and conflict bring in their ugly wake. The people, and in particular the children, of Gaza instead deserve reason, hope and an explanation of what was done to them during the hostilities. They deserve freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from hatred and freedom from the hazardous and irresponsible acts of others.
It is time that Gazans no longer have to worry whether goods that are not deemed strictly humanitarian in nature like macaroni, candy and fruit juice can be imported, let alone fuel, cement, reinforcing steel and glass panes. It is time that Gazans no longer have to worry whether or not their children can go to university abroad and their sick be treated in hospitals abroad, or whether or not they can entertain the outlandish thought of going on vacation abroad. Isn't this the way matters should be?
Gazans have the right not only to mere survival, but to a decent and normal life. The absence of a political breakthrough keeps postponing the one thing Gazans desperately need: a return to normal life.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Christian Berger is European Commission representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Previously he served as EU representative on the team of Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn, and was responsible for crisis response and peace-building in the European Commission. This article reflects his personal views and not necessarily those of the European Commission.
International acrobats around Gaza
Ezzedine Choukri Fishere
The recent Israeli attacks on Gaza resuscitated the debate over a possible international role in the besieged Strip. What capacity, if any, can the international community fill in order to help run Gaza's crossings, patrol its borders, ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance and support imminent reconstruction efforts?
This debate is as old as Israeli unilateral withdrawal plans. In 2003, many United Nations officials suggested that an international force along Gaza's borders was the best way to ensure stability and security for both Israel and the Palestinians after Israel's withdrawal. They took their case to world capitals and the region, arguing that such a "presence" could, inter alia, patrol the border and territorial waters to prevent smuggling and illegal passage, train and assist Palestinian Authority security forces to enhance their capacity to enforce law and order, facilitate the crossings' operation and communication between the parties and assist in the reconstruction effort.
The UN prepared an operational plan for this presence, including various options for its mandate, command and control structure as well as its "exit clause". While American officials showed openness to the proposals, the Israeli government and its supporters in the US stood firm against it. Instead, Israeli officials focused their attention on persuading Cairo to play an expanded role in Gaza's security. Ultimately, Egypt declined such a responsibility, and the UN-led presence idea was nipped in the bud.
Twenty months after Hamas seized power in Gaza, an international presence/role has once again become a policy option. The difficulty this time is greater: to establish an international presence in Gaza, one needs the consent of those whom that presence is de facto targeting. No Egyptian, Arab or international force can be deployed in Gaza against the will of Hamas. For more than a year and a half, concerned parties have been trying every acrobatic move possible in order to avoid this simple fact: Hamas is in control of the Gaza Strip. Its consent--and protection--are necessary to run crossings, distribute aid, reconstruct or simply organize the visit of a foreign dignitary. This is the plain fact that the international community needs to recognize.
The question then becomes two: 1) what would it take for Hamas to give its support to an international role; and 2) what is the role that the international community would want to play in the shadow of Hamas? The answer to the first question is easy: recognition. The second is more difficult to answer.
On the one hand, the international community does not want to engage with Hamas or to help it strengthen its grip on the Strip as long as Hamas refuses to accept the principles of a two-state solution. Far from that, an international role is often presented as a tool to undermine Hamas' rule. Yet there is little the international community can do to achieve this goal. The suffering of the civilian population in Gaza hurts both Hamas and the international community almost equally, and therefore neither can leverage it. The siege certainly exhausts Hamas, but it will not make it kneel. Neither will further death and destruction.
Consequently, the international community has only two options related to Gaza. One is to operate in the Strip in cooperation with--or in the shadow of--the Islamic movement. The other is to gear its involvement toward a genuine Palestinian reconciliation.
The first option is self-explanatory: the international community can, most likely through the UN, launch a humanitarian relief and reconstruction operation under the gaze of Hamas leaders and with their blessing. The UN can become the interface between the world and Hamas; UN tradition and regulations allow its officials to engage with any force on the ground. This role can be expanded to include crossings management and security-related matters, where the UN would serve as interface between Israeli and Hamas representatives (as it did on the Israeli-Lebanese border for some time). The downside of this option is that the international community would acquiesce to and indeed strengthen Hamas' rule over Gaza, albeit without politically recognizing Hamas.
The other option is to gear the international role toward--and gauge it upon--Palestinian reconciliation. In practice, this means that the international community would carry out four tasks.
First, it would consolidate its plan for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. Second, it would agree with the concerned parties on possible assistance in running all of Gaza's crossings. Third, it would decide whether it would be prepared to deploy forces along Gaza's borders that would not only prevent smuggling but also provide the Palestinian population with protection against future Israeli attacks. And fourth, it would then present these plans as a heavy incentive package that would lubricate and compliment Egyptian efforts aimed at reconciling the two warring Palestinian factions. Such a role would give all concerned parties the needed assurances regarding their most important interests: security and political survival.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ezzedine Choukri Fishere is international politics professor at the American University in Cairo and a former advisor to the Egyptian foreign minister and the United Nations Middle East envoy in Jerusalem.
IDF humanitarian coordination
an interview with Baruch Spiegel
BI: Was the IDF fully prepared for the wartime humanitarian crisis?
Spiegel: Basically, the IDF's humanitarian and civil effort paralleled its operational effort. All units, from headquarters down to battalion level, were involved in humanitarian affairs during the operation in Gaza against Hamas. Dozens of humanitarian officers were seconded from operational HQ via Southern Command HQ down to brigade level. These officers were attached to combat units and had to give advice and provide solutions to commanders regarding any humanitarian need on the ground. All this was part of preparations for the operation.
When IDF ground forces entered Gaza, the humanitarian officers were with them at brigade level. When necessary, they were sent to specific sites and special checkpoints to provide immediate solutions to humanitarian needs such as movement of supply convoys, medical evacuation, evacuation of the dead and opening humanitarian access for civilian movements. They also dealt with infrastructure needs such as sending teams to fix water pipes and electricity and refueling power plants and generators that supply energy in Gaza.
BI: How do you evaluate the success of IDF coordination with the international donor community?
Spiegel: During the war we opened a joint operational center at headquarters. There the largest foreign agencies such as UNRWA, UNTSO, ICRC, USAID, the Quartet and EU representatives, the WFO and WHO sat together with Israeli officers and top civilian officials and worked hand-in-hand around the clock to provide the best answers for humanitarian needs during the operation. There was a joint understanding that this is a necessity for dealing with civilian issues such as enabling movement of ambulances to evacuate casualties, checking that convoys of supplies are arriving at distribution centers and delivering basic goods to people during the humanitarian windows of this operation. [This system] also enabled civilians to move to shelters in areas of fighting, especially in the crowded neighborhoods of Gaza City that were used by Hamas as combat bases against the IDF.
BI: What sort of special problems did you encounter?
Spiegel: There were shooting incidents in areas of international warehouses and supply depots where we had to act in real time to stop the shooting and instruct troops not to hit these infrastructure installations in Gaza. At times we had direct lines of communication from our center to an ambulance driver, the director of a hospital or a jeep escorting a convoy of food supplies. By using direct communication, we were better able to secure humanitarian movements and other activities. During the ground operation, more than 2,000 trucks were able to enter Gaza and distribute supplies. Sometimes Hamas stole drugs and other goods, but basically the system of supply by foreign agencies, including medical support built into the supply system, worked at high profile. Hundreds of trucks carried donations from neighboring countries, especially Jordan, Egypt and Turkey, to the people of Gaza.
BI: How do you explain the criticism of Israel's humanitarian performance during the war?
Spiegel: There were a few incidents, some involving ambulances, which did not reflect our policy. There was a lot of close shooting. Hamas sometimes used buildings near international sites knowing the IDF would not shoot at the sites. Still, unfortunately, some sites were hit. [In each case] we investigated immediately, drew lessons and the next day were more aware and careful. After three such incidents, there was a sharp decrease in this type of event.
The humanitarian ceasefire windows that we implemented daily after the third day were in most instances used by Palestinian civilians for movement, resupply, evacuation, etc. But Hamas also exploited these truces to initiate shooting incidents, reinforce its units and launch rockets at Israel. Our decision was that in any case the humanitarian ceasefire would continue.
Then too, because we used tanks, armored personnel carriers and bulldozers against sites used by Hamas, those sites and adjacent roads were damaged. This was urban warfare where Hamas exploited innocent people as human shields. Many buildings were booby-trapped and connected to underground tunnels as part of the Hamas operations system. The IDF had to hit these buildings and destroy them. Most international criticism directed at humanitarian issues referred to this kind of destruction. If you check the casualties among non-combatant civilians, most were killed because they were used by Hamas as human shields and Hamas targets and civilians were integrated together.
BI: What are your conclusions regarding the procedure you developed for dealing with humanitarian issues and the international community during the war?
Spiegel: This model of a combined humanitarian center reflected shared interest and understanding. It was a unique, ad hoc project that had to be managed in a very serious way. I believe it was very helpful for the IDF, Israel and the international agencies. We are now checking how to employ it in future at times of emergency and urgency for humanitarian issues. We need clearer rules of the game, common understanding and language, direct communications and a closed circle of debriefing and investigation. We will upgrade the humanitarian issues by learning lessons from this model.- Published 19/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Brigadier General (ret.) Baruch Spiegel has served as a senior consultant for ministers of defense and as special advisor for regional affairs for President Shimon Peres. During the recent IDF operation in Gaza, he was asked by the minister of defense to head a center that dealt with all humanitarian and civil aspects of the Palestinian population in Gaza.
Monday, February 16, 2009
Arabs Closing Ranks by Marc Lynch
ABU AARDVARK
2/16/09
Arabs Closing Ranks
Marc Lynch
Arab reports suggest that Egyptian mediation is close to producing a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation (with a unity government to be chosen within 60 days) and a truce with Israel. Meanwhile, a high-level Saudi envoy (King Abdullah's head of intelligence Prince Muqrin) recently appeared in Damascus -- followed by Arab League head Amr Moussa -- while Egypt's Foreign Minister and intelligence chief showed up in Riyadh for consultations. The signs are adding up that the major Arab actors are trying seriously to overcome the intense divisions of the last few months and unify their ranks.
While it's hard tell at this point how serious these efforts are, or what they will produce -- the divides were deep, and the wounds remain fresh -- this suggests that the "couch diplomacy" in Kuwait last month may have more legs than most observers expected at the time. Al-Quds al-Arabi (a leading voice of the "rejection/resistance camp") dates the turnaround to the Kuwait meeting, where the Saudi King spoke harshly about Israel and called for the unification of Arab ranks in response. Most people (including, reportedly, the Syrians) thought that this was just for show and wouldn't matter... but developments since then may suggest otherwise.
Why? With divisions intensifying, Arab leaders may have recognized the dangers of a complete collapse of the existing order. There has been a lot of talk over the last few weeks in the Arab media about the destructiveness and pointlessness of the media wars and political divisions, the failures of the Arab order over Gaza, and the need to regroup. While good sense does not as a rule prevail in these situations, this time perhaps it did. Here are a few suggestions as to why:
Reading Obama's signals.
Riyadh and Cairo (and Damascus) may have been responding to the perception that the Obama administration would look favorably on the rehabilitation of Syria and an Arab formula for bringing Hamas back in to the game. At the least, their consultations reflect their uncertainty about Obama's intentions. Public signals have been mixed -- Mitchell's first visit including only representatives of the so-called "moderate" camp, Clinton's hawkish comments on Hamas, and so forth. But I suspect that different private messages from Mitchell may have reconfigured Saudi and Egyptian calculations. Arab leaders and publics are still trying to figure Obama's Middle East policy out -- who isn't? – and signals such as Senator John Kerry's mission to Damascus certainly factor into that. Obama's team should encourage this.
Palestinian realities.
Many understand the need to overcome the stalemate between Hamas's control of Gaza and rising popularity elsewhere on the one hand, and the general international refusal to work with anyone other than Fatah on the other. While animosity towards Hamas runs high in many official Arab circles, at some point reality and pragmatism sets in. Sure, they may prefer to see Fatah regain power and to see Israel and the U.S. actually help it by taking concrete steps to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas's hand (freezing settlements, removing barriers, and so forth) -- but they recognize that it isn't likely to happen.
Israel's elections. I don't think that many Arabs really think that the Israeli elections changed very much. They generally seem to see it as a choice between the right and the far right, with no real peace partner on the horizon. But that itself may have increased the urgency for putting forward a common Arab position to present to the Obama administration and to put the new Israeli government on the spot. And it also increases the urgency to find some workable stopgap to help the people of Gaza and defuse the intensity of the intra-Palestinian conflict in the meantime.
Denying Iran greater gains. For Saudis, in particular, the Iran factor always weighs heavily. The idea that Iran is benefiting from Arab division has been one of the main themes in recent op-eds in al-Sharq al-Awsat (which is often a useful guide to the thinking of the Saudi regime). There is considerable uncertainty about Obama's intentions towards Iran, and what the promised dialogue might entail. So the move to get the Arab house in (relative) order might be prompted in part by anticipation of such changes.
Saudi and Egyptian internal politics. Some sources suggest that the outreach to Syria is part and parcel of the major governmental shuffle carried out by King Abdullah the other day. Given the portfolios in question I'm not sure about this -- but with any luck, friendly Saudi experts might weigh in on the question soon (y'all know my email address and you know who you are). Egyptian domestic politics may have played a role, as well. The government's mediation efforts with Hamas can not help but interact with its high-tension relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, and this may have taken the heat off of government struggling with public dissatisfaction with a whole range of issues. A move to rebuild Arab consensus would also help out King Abdullah of Jordan for similar reasons.
I'm sure that people will disagree over the relative significance of these five factors. One point to make here, though. There's been a raging debate in the Arab press over which should come first -- Palestinian reconciliation or Arab reconciliation. This was always a false choice, though. Hamas and Fatah couldn't hope to reach agreement if their regional patrons were urging them towards conflict, while the Arab states could hardly close ranks if Hamas and Fatah remained at loggerheads. The simultaneous outreach to Syria and seeming moves towards a Hamas-Fatah deal (and truce with Israel) demonstrate the inter-connected nature of these tracks. That should have lessons for the American approach.
The moves towards Arab reconciliation is a positive sign, which the Obama administration should encourage and build upon. The sharp polarization between "moderate" and "rejection" camps is a baleful legacy of the Bush foreign policy and of the Gaza war. It may have been unrealistic to have expected it to fade overnight after years of shaping Arab foreign policy discourse and alliances. But it's high time to jettison that approach, and to attempt to bridge Arab differences rather than exacerbate them... whether that's led by the U.S. or by the Arab regimes themselves without an American veto.
2/16/09
Arabs Closing Ranks
Marc Lynch
Arab reports suggest that Egyptian mediation is close to producing a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation (with a unity government to be chosen within 60 days) and a truce with Israel. Meanwhile, a high-level Saudi envoy (King Abdullah's head of intelligence Prince Muqrin) recently appeared in Damascus -- followed by Arab League head Amr Moussa -- while Egypt's Foreign Minister and intelligence chief showed up in Riyadh for consultations. The signs are adding up that the major Arab actors are trying seriously to overcome the intense divisions of the last few months and unify their ranks.
While it's hard tell at this point how serious these efforts are, or what they will produce -- the divides were deep, and the wounds remain fresh -- this suggests that the "couch diplomacy" in Kuwait last month may have more legs than most observers expected at the time. Al-Quds al-Arabi (a leading voice of the "rejection/resistance camp") dates the turnaround to the Kuwait meeting, where the Saudi King spoke harshly about Israel and called for the unification of Arab ranks in response. Most people (including, reportedly, the Syrians) thought that this was just for show and wouldn't matter... but developments since then may suggest otherwise.
Why? With divisions intensifying, Arab leaders may have recognized the dangers of a complete collapse of the existing order. There has been a lot of talk over the last few weeks in the Arab media about the destructiveness and pointlessness of the media wars and political divisions, the failures of the Arab order over Gaza, and the need to regroup. While good sense does not as a rule prevail in these situations, this time perhaps it did. Here are a few suggestions as to why:
Reading Obama's signals.
Riyadh and Cairo (and Damascus) may have been responding to the perception that the Obama administration would look favorably on the rehabilitation of Syria and an Arab formula for bringing Hamas back in to the game. At the least, their consultations reflect their uncertainty about Obama's intentions. Public signals have been mixed -- Mitchell's first visit including only representatives of the so-called "moderate" camp, Clinton's hawkish comments on Hamas, and so forth. But I suspect that different private messages from Mitchell may have reconfigured Saudi and Egyptian calculations. Arab leaders and publics are still trying to figure Obama's Middle East policy out -- who isn't? – and signals such as Senator John Kerry's mission to Damascus certainly factor into that. Obama's team should encourage this.
Palestinian realities.
Many understand the need to overcome the stalemate between Hamas's control of Gaza and rising popularity elsewhere on the one hand, and the general international refusal to work with anyone other than Fatah on the other. While animosity towards Hamas runs high in many official Arab circles, at some point reality and pragmatism sets in. Sure, they may prefer to see Fatah regain power and to see Israel and the U.S. actually help it by taking concrete steps to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas's hand (freezing settlements, removing barriers, and so forth) -- but they recognize that it isn't likely to happen.
Israel's elections. I don't think that many Arabs really think that the Israeli elections changed very much. They generally seem to see it as a choice between the right and the far right, with no real peace partner on the horizon. But that itself may have increased the urgency for putting forward a common Arab position to present to the Obama administration and to put the new Israeli government on the spot. And it also increases the urgency to find some workable stopgap to help the people of Gaza and defuse the intensity of the intra-Palestinian conflict in the meantime.
Denying Iran greater gains. For Saudis, in particular, the Iran factor always weighs heavily. The idea that Iran is benefiting from Arab division has been one of the main themes in recent op-eds in al-Sharq al-Awsat (which is often a useful guide to the thinking of the Saudi regime). There is considerable uncertainty about Obama's intentions towards Iran, and what the promised dialogue might entail. So the move to get the Arab house in (relative) order might be prompted in part by anticipation of such changes.
Saudi and Egyptian internal politics. Some sources suggest that the outreach to Syria is part and parcel of the major governmental shuffle carried out by King Abdullah the other day. Given the portfolios in question I'm not sure about this -- but with any luck, friendly Saudi experts might weigh in on the question soon (y'all know my email address and you know who you are). Egyptian domestic politics may have played a role, as well. The government's mediation efforts with Hamas can not help but interact with its high-tension relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, and this may have taken the heat off of government struggling with public dissatisfaction with a whole range of issues. A move to rebuild Arab consensus would also help out King Abdullah of Jordan for similar reasons.
I'm sure that people will disagree over the relative significance of these five factors. One point to make here, though. There's been a raging debate in the Arab press over which should come first -- Palestinian reconciliation or Arab reconciliation. This was always a false choice, though. Hamas and Fatah couldn't hope to reach agreement if their regional patrons were urging them towards conflict, while the Arab states could hardly close ranks if Hamas and Fatah remained at loggerheads. The simultaneous outreach to Syria and seeming moves towards a Hamas-Fatah deal (and truce with Israel) demonstrate the inter-connected nature of these tracks. That should have lessons for the American approach.
The moves towards Arab reconciliation is a positive sign, which the Obama administration should encourage and build upon. The sharp polarization between "moderate" and "rejection" camps is a baleful legacy of the Bush foreign policy and of the Gaza war. It may have been unrealistic to have expected it to fade overnight after years of shaping Arab foreign policy discourse and alliances. But it's high time to jettison that approach, and to attempt to bridge Arab differences rather than exacerbate them... whether that's led by the U.S. or by the Arab regimes themselves without an American veto.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Bitterlemons-International.org Middle East Roundtable: Arab-Israel relations during and after Gaza, February 12, 2009
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 6 Volume 7 - February 12, 2009
Arab-Israel relations during and after Gaza
• Between radicals and authoritarians - Anouar Boukhars
The average Moroccan, Algerian, Libyan or Egyptian citizen is stuck with two unpalatable choices.
• A people not dwelling alone - Elie Podeh
In the recent war, Israel found itself on the same side as Egypt.
• Jordan braces for the worst - Saad Hattar
For the first time in more than a decade, Israeli elections are of a make-or-break importance to Jordanian policymakers.
• Israeli-Egyptian relations - Gamal A. G. Soltan
A calculated attitude toward Israel is likely to be Egypt's approach in the months to come.
Between radicals and authoritarians
Anouar Boukhars
I have just returned from Morocco where I witnessed first-hand the massive emotional reaction to Israel's brutal destruction of Gaza. Wherever I went, I could not help but notice the pervasive sense of popular anger and despair, powerlessness and humiliation, guilt and shamefulness. The country was a pot of boiling emotions and ardent indignation at both Israel's indiscriminate killing of innocent children and women and the stunning collusion of a number of Arab regimes in Israel's deadly assault on Gaza.
With few exceptions, no Arab leader has ever dared to openly legitimize and endorse a devastating Israeli war on fellow Arabs. But Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other so-called moderates showed no qualms about going to this length to tilt the regional balance of power from their "radical" rivals, rather than setting aside their personal feuds, tribal mentalities and mutual antagonism for the sake of the battered people of Gaza.
The crippling divisions and political posturing of all Arab authoritarian regimes were painful to watch. In a typical authoritarian posture, the eccentric Muammar Qadhafi blasted the "cowardly and defeatist" reactions of Arab leaders while his son and probable successor, Seif al-Islam Qadhafi, criticized Arabs for not holding their leaders accountable for their inaction during the Israeli offensive. Not to be outdone, the Algerian parliament passed a resolution that criminalizes any diplomatic or commercial relations with Israel. The Moroccan monarch for his part declared that he would not stoop to the level of self-ridicule by taking part in any Arab summit marred by discord and a fatal inability to respond effectively to the continuing suffering of the people of Gaza.
In the face of this organized hypocrisy, the average Moroccan, Algerian, Libyan or Egyptian citizen is stuck with two unpalatable choices: support or join forces with radical liberation or transnational revolutionary movements whose lack of a coherent strategic vision has brought chaos and destabilization to large swaths of Arab land, or continue to bow down to a power structure dominated by corrupt and dependent authoritarian regimes. The causes of these dangerously conflicting and at times polarizing sentiments of the masses about their predicament have existed for generations, though the hardening of the rift between the two extremes has never been revealed with such stark acuity.
In this context, the "Arab street" remains mired in agony over its leaders' disregard for its will and its frustration with the militant resistance movements' incapacity or unwillingness to transform themselves into credible middle ground political forces. So far, all attempts to straddle the fault line between these conflicting and unviable approaches have failed, leaving a whole region alienated and dangerously vulnerable to extreme radicalization. This environment of despair is a perfect breeding ground for terrorism and recruitment by anti-systemic movements. As militant organizations, Hamas, Hizballah, Muqtada Sadr's movement in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its international affiliates emerged as a direct result of both foreign occupation of Arab land and the passivity and incompetence of Arab leaders. Other powerful and more radical non-state actors may emerge to challenge the status-quo.
The post-Gaza political battle already resembles that of other past conflicts where squabbling Arab leaders were left seeking self-preservation and longing to score political propaganda points against each other. As is often the case, Arab unity is held hostage to a game of regional rivalries where the so-called forces of moderation, backed by the United States and now Israel, try to roll back those of radicalism. In the midst of this crippling cold war between countries that are hostile to militant resistance movements like Hamas and Hizballah, and those that support them, ordinary Arabs are left seething with anger and frustration with the persistently stubborn fractiousness of Arab politics and the exploitation of sectarian and ideological fault lines for personal gain.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Anouar Boukhars is assistant professor of political science and director of the Center For Defense & Security Policy at Wilberforce University.
A people not dwelling alone
Elie Podeh
The image associated with Israel's society and leaders since its founding in 1948 is the biblical "a people dwelling alone". The siege mentality has been internalized through a variety of socializing agents.
The sense of alone-ness has of course not been a fiction; it is grounded to a considerable extent in historic precedents and a reality of Arab hostility that at times has deteriorated into war. The siege was formally broken when Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. Jordan too signed a peace agreement in 1994, while the PLO and Israel signed a series of agreements during the 1990s. During this period, Israel also developed ties with the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (particularly Morocco, Oman and Qatar), even though formal agreements were not signed.
While the emergence of peace agreements did not constitute acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state, it did signal a change in the rules of the game and recognition of Israel as a player in the Middle East system. No longer was Israel a negative unifying force in the Arab world; now it was also a factor inducing divisions.
Still, at times of war or tension between Israel and any Arab actor, Israel has reverted to the familiar pose of "a people dwelling alone". The existence of a collective Arab identity and of an Arab commitment, however vague, to the Palestinian issue, has usually generated rhetorical if not operative Arab unity. This was the case in the First Lebanon War (1982) and the outbreak of both intifadas (1987 and 2000). Egypt and Jordan recalled their ambassadors, reduced their ties to the bare minimum and publicly expressed a clear anti-Israel stand.
The Second Lebanon War and the recent war in Gaza represent a change in Arab state behavior toward Israel. In fact, early signs of this change were evident following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and additional Arab states took the side of the West--and indirectly Israel's side--in the resultant first Gulf war (1991).
A more significant change took place when Israel launched a war against Hizballah in Lebanon in 2006: Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to openly criticize that organization's irresponsible behavior and blame it for the damage inflicted on Lebanon in the course of the war. Like Israel, they too recognized in Hizballah a dangerous actor that sought to strengthen the status of Iran and the Shi'ites in the region at the expense of the Sunni states. A tacit alliance was created between Israel and certain Arab states, dubbed "moderate", that reflected shared interests. Yet the longer the war dragged on and the more evidence of damage in Lebanon accumulated, the more the "moderate" leaders were obliged to square their position with that of the Arab consensus--as expressed in the clear anti-Israel language of Arab League resolutions and in other international fora.
In the recent Gaza war, Israel found itself in an even more comfortable situation: on the same side as Egypt. Hamas was perceived as a threat to both countries: if Israel was threatened by Palestinian terrorism, Egypt was threatened by the possible aggrandizement of radical Islamic actors who challenge its regime stability. Then too, Egypt and Israel--like additional Sunni states in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan--view Hamas as a tool to strengthen Tehran's position and that of the Shi'ites in the Arab world. Precisely because Hamas, unlike Hizballah, is Sunni, it draws even greater Arab anger for "collaborating" with Shi'ite Iran. Moreover, both the Egyptians and the Saudis resent Hamas having embarrassed the two leading Arab states in the course of long and fruitless negotiations they shepherded between it and Fateh (the Mecca agreement of 2007; the Cairo talks of 2008).
Israeli-Egyptian cooperation in the course of the war in Gaza testifies to the two countries' overlapping interests when it comes to Hamas. This phenomenon, while reflecting to some extent the Arab world's weakness, demonstrates to an even greater extent that the Arab world is behaving like a more "normal" system, in accordance more with interests than with ideologies and identity politics. That this behavior was repeated in both Lebanon and Gaza indicates that this is no chance occurrence.
Of course, we must qualify this optimistic picture with reference to the damage caused by Israel in Gaza. Qatar closed the Israeli trade mission in Doha, Mauritania withdrew its ambassador, relations with Turkey were damaged and Arab society as a whole was angered by the killing in Gaza. Yet beyond these reactions, some of which are reversible, it is important to note that not every Arab-Israel dispute generates automatic Arab unity and isolates Israel regionally. This insight is important insofar as the struggle against regional radical actors will continue during periods of calm as well.
Thus there exists an infrastructure of shared interests that can enable Israel, openly or clandestinely, to advance peace initiatives with Arab actors. The Arab peace initiative, which will again be deliberated at next month's Arab summit in Qatar, affords an excellent opportunity to renew the Israel-Arab dialogue that was halted by the war in Gaza.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Prof. Elie Podeh chairs the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Jordan braces for the worst
Saad Hattar
Had the late King Hussein of Jordan and Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel been alive today they would undoubtedly have despaired at witnessing the introverted and parochial right-wing parties take control in Israel just two years after the anti-peace Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, won the confidence of most Palestinian voters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The "fortress mentality" that King Hussein used to warn against seems to have infiltrated both the Israeli and Palestinian electorate, reversing the hopes for peace that were sparked 18 years ago in Madrid.
It was only two years after King Hussein and Rabin hammered out their peace treaty in 1994 that right-wing leader Binyamin Netanyahu rose to power in Israel, changing the rules of engagement between the two neighboring countries. In a few months, Netanyahu repeatedly incurred the wrath of King Hussein for the way he sought to negate the peace accords with the Palestinians or how he attempted to kill Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal in Amman in September 1997.
Now history is repeating itself, and Netanyahu's chances to form a right-wing government seem strong after his party clinched 27 seats in the recent elections.
Indeed, for the first time in more than decade, Israeli elections are of a make-or-break importance to Jordanian policymakers. Officials here fear that the rise of right-wing parties such as Likud and Yisrael Beitenu is the beginning of the end of hopes to establish a Palestinian state between Jordan and Israel. If such a possibility is scrapped, something that in Amman is seen as an Israeli ultra-nationalist goal, it will undermine Jordan's foreign policy foundations and wreak havoc across the whole region.
Between the lines, Jordan's official reaction to the Likud's apparent victory bore witness to the level of anxiety here. While Foreign Minister Salahudin Bashir voiced hope that a pro-peace government would be formed in Israel, he made it a point to reject the emphasis on the "economic factor" that Netanyahu stipulated in his campaign, and asserted that while the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had many dimensions, the most important is the political one.
But much damage to Israeli-Jordanian relations had already been done by the brutal Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip last month. That offensive was a wake-up call for the Jordanian leadership. Shocked by the level of violence and bloodshed, King Abdullah went on record to warn of "a conspiracy" against the Palestinian cause. His unprecedented remarks on the popular Al-Jazeerah channel reflected his dismay at what is perceived as Israeli attempts to buy time and escape ever further away from the country's peace commitments. The warning of a "conspiracy" was seen here as a pre-emptive rejection of any hidden agenda involving Jordan and the West Bank.
Hence, Jordan was already deeply disappointed with the Kadima and Labor leaders Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak. While Jordan does not condone Hamas' home-made and futile rockets on Israel, it blames Israel for its disproportionate reaction that caused so many civilian casualties and wrought such great damage. After Israeli wars on the West Bank, Lebanon and now Gaza, the hard-wrought confidence between Amman and Tel Aviv has foundered.
Jordan looked with suspicion to the Israeli elections. Nevertheless, given a choice between bad and worse, Jordan would rather deal with a center-left coalition headed by Kadima rather than having to confront a right-winger like Netanyahu, whose credentials, as far as Jordan is concerned, were undermined by his last stint in power, 12 years ago.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Saad Hattar is an Amman-based political analyst.
Israeli-Egyptian relations
Gamal A. G. Soltan
The Gaza war was seemingly an inevitable conflict. The pre-war reality was unacceptable to any of the concerned parties.
Hamas was not satisfied with a ceasefire that kept the tiny Gaza Strip isolated from the world. Palestinian suffering in besieged Gaza challenged Hamas' claim of effectiveness as an elected government capable of providing for the wellbeing of its people. Nor did the terms of the ceasefire allow Hamas to pursue the program of resilient resistance that is so central to the movement's identity. The war was Hamas' way out of this entrapment.
Israel, on the other hand, didn't feel comfortable with its Palestinian arch-enemy taking refuge behind a fragile ceasefire while continuing to build up an arsenal of primitive but annoying rockets. Israel's concern was not exactly about these barely lethal rounds of rockets fired from Gaza at the towns of the Negev. Israel's concern was more about the long-term implications should this situation be allowed to continue. This was particularly the case since the Israeli policy of tightening the screws on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip did not prove effective in softening Hamas' stand. Hence Israel, like Hamas, had to go to war to escape the entrapment of the six-month ceasefire that Egypt had tamed them both into.
Egypt is squeezed between Israel and Hamas. In Egypt's view, there is no lasting formula for reconciliation between today's Hamas and Israel. Only interim arrangements such as the six-month truce can be reached within these constraints. Egypt's strategy toward the situation in Gaza is an incremental long-term one, whereas the two direct parties to the conflict are rushing to achieve immediate results.
Egypt has multiple concerns regarding the situation in Gaza. Its main concern is to prevent the de facto separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip from developing into a de jure second partition of Palestine. Egypt is also keen not to starve the people of Gaza. Their suffering places Egypt under unbearable domestic and regional pressures; the Gazans might break into Egyptian territory or treat Egypt as the instigator and therefore a legitimate target for reprisals.
Egypt believes that Hamas is a genuine force in Palestine that can neither be ignored nor eliminated. However, Egypt also believes that Hamas, as an integral part of the radical destabilizing forces in the Middle East, should be gradually contained. While Israel shares with Egypt the goal of containing radicalism, it shows indifference to Egypt's gradualist approach. The recent war on Gaza testifies to Egyptian-Israeli differences in this regard.
Egypt's dilemma stems from the fact that it is neither happy with Hamas nor capable of pressuring it beyond a certain limit. Egypt's long-term policy had sought to guide Hamas toward a safe landing in the realm of moderation and pragmatism, but the Gaza war disrupted this endeavor. While that war is also likely to help accelerate Hamas' moderation, the cost incurred by Egypt has been heavy and risky; it could have been avoided if it were not for the confrontational policies pursued by both Hamas and Israel.
The conflict in Gaza is another inconclusive war in the Middle East. It is inconclusive regarding the future of relations between Israel and the Palestinians and it is also inconclusive regarding relations between Egypt and Israel. The irony of the Gaza war is that its high human cost does not qualify it to be a turning point in the politics of the Middle East. The many questions left unanswered by the end of the war create a great deal of uncertainty. By the same token, the Gaza war does not look like a turning point in Egypt's relations with Israel, which are likely to be clouded by regional uncertainties.
Three sources of such uncertainties should be watched very closely in the months to come: the nature of the new ruling coalition in Israel, Hamas' post-war strategy and the regional divide between radicals and moderates in the Middle East. Egypt's attitude toward Israel is likely to be governed by an overall policy of balancing the uncertain contending forces of the region.
The prolonged negotiations regarding consolidation of the fragile ceasefire in Gaza already convey a sense of how relations among Egypt, Hamas and Israel are likely to look in the future. Egypt will be walking a tightrope between Hamas, Israel and the Middle East radicals for months to come. Even though Egypt was able to upset radical attempts to corner it during the conflict in Gaza, it is also interested in repairing the damage caused to its image among segments of the Arab public by the radicals' propaganda war. And Egypt still needs to win Hamas' cooperation in order to pursue a policy of Palestinian reconciliation.
Renewal of the peace process is the safe exit out of the current quagmire in the Middle East. The key to the peace process is in the hands of Israel's next ruling coalition. The inconclusive results of the recent Israeli elections are not likely to help. A calculated and measured attitude toward Israel is likely to be Egypt's approach in the months to come. The deep doubts regarding the very cause of peace that the Gaza war instilled among the Arab public make such a guarded approach inevitable.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Gamal A. G. Soltan is a senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and a visiting professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.
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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 6 Volume 7 - February 12, 2009
Arab-Israel relations during and after Gaza
• Between radicals and authoritarians - Anouar Boukhars
The average Moroccan, Algerian, Libyan or Egyptian citizen is stuck with two unpalatable choices.
• A people not dwelling alone - Elie Podeh
In the recent war, Israel found itself on the same side as Egypt.
• Jordan braces for the worst - Saad Hattar
For the first time in more than a decade, Israeli elections are of a make-or-break importance to Jordanian policymakers.
• Israeli-Egyptian relations - Gamal A. G. Soltan
A calculated attitude toward Israel is likely to be Egypt's approach in the months to come.
Between radicals and authoritarians
Anouar Boukhars
I have just returned from Morocco where I witnessed first-hand the massive emotional reaction to Israel's brutal destruction of Gaza. Wherever I went, I could not help but notice the pervasive sense of popular anger and despair, powerlessness and humiliation, guilt and shamefulness. The country was a pot of boiling emotions and ardent indignation at both Israel's indiscriminate killing of innocent children and women and the stunning collusion of a number of Arab regimes in Israel's deadly assault on Gaza.
With few exceptions, no Arab leader has ever dared to openly legitimize and endorse a devastating Israeli war on fellow Arabs. But Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other so-called moderates showed no qualms about going to this length to tilt the regional balance of power from their "radical" rivals, rather than setting aside their personal feuds, tribal mentalities and mutual antagonism for the sake of the battered people of Gaza.
The crippling divisions and political posturing of all Arab authoritarian regimes were painful to watch. In a typical authoritarian posture, the eccentric Muammar Qadhafi blasted the "cowardly and defeatist" reactions of Arab leaders while his son and probable successor, Seif al-Islam Qadhafi, criticized Arabs for not holding their leaders accountable for their inaction during the Israeli offensive. Not to be outdone, the Algerian parliament passed a resolution that criminalizes any diplomatic or commercial relations with Israel. The Moroccan monarch for his part declared that he would not stoop to the level of self-ridicule by taking part in any Arab summit marred by discord and a fatal inability to respond effectively to the continuing suffering of the people of Gaza.
In the face of this organized hypocrisy, the average Moroccan, Algerian, Libyan or Egyptian citizen is stuck with two unpalatable choices: support or join forces with radical liberation or transnational revolutionary movements whose lack of a coherent strategic vision has brought chaos and destabilization to large swaths of Arab land, or continue to bow down to a power structure dominated by corrupt and dependent authoritarian regimes. The causes of these dangerously conflicting and at times polarizing sentiments of the masses about their predicament have existed for generations, though the hardening of the rift between the two extremes has never been revealed with such stark acuity.
In this context, the "Arab street" remains mired in agony over its leaders' disregard for its will and its frustration with the militant resistance movements' incapacity or unwillingness to transform themselves into credible middle ground political forces. So far, all attempts to straddle the fault line between these conflicting and unviable approaches have failed, leaving a whole region alienated and dangerously vulnerable to extreme radicalization. This environment of despair is a perfect breeding ground for terrorism and recruitment by anti-systemic movements. As militant organizations, Hamas, Hizballah, Muqtada Sadr's movement in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its international affiliates emerged as a direct result of both foreign occupation of Arab land and the passivity and incompetence of Arab leaders. Other powerful and more radical non-state actors may emerge to challenge the status-quo.
The post-Gaza political battle already resembles that of other past conflicts where squabbling Arab leaders were left seeking self-preservation and longing to score political propaganda points against each other. As is often the case, Arab unity is held hostage to a game of regional rivalries where the so-called forces of moderation, backed by the United States and now Israel, try to roll back those of radicalism. In the midst of this crippling cold war between countries that are hostile to militant resistance movements like Hamas and Hizballah, and those that support them, ordinary Arabs are left seething with anger and frustration with the persistently stubborn fractiousness of Arab politics and the exploitation of sectarian and ideological fault lines for personal gain.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Anouar Boukhars is assistant professor of political science and director of the Center For Defense & Security Policy at Wilberforce University.
A people not dwelling alone
Elie Podeh
The image associated with Israel's society and leaders since its founding in 1948 is the biblical "a people dwelling alone". The siege mentality has been internalized through a variety of socializing agents.
The sense of alone-ness has of course not been a fiction; it is grounded to a considerable extent in historic precedents and a reality of Arab hostility that at times has deteriorated into war. The siege was formally broken when Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. Jordan too signed a peace agreement in 1994, while the PLO and Israel signed a series of agreements during the 1990s. During this period, Israel also developed ties with the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (particularly Morocco, Oman and Qatar), even though formal agreements were not signed.
While the emergence of peace agreements did not constitute acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state, it did signal a change in the rules of the game and recognition of Israel as a player in the Middle East system. No longer was Israel a negative unifying force in the Arab world; now it was also a factor inducing divisions.
Still, at times of war or tension between Israel and any Arab actor, Israel has reverted to the familiar pose of "a people dwelling alone". The existence of a collective Arab identity and of an Arab commitment, however vague, to the Palestinian issue, has usually generated rhetorical if not operative Arab unity. This was the case in the First Lebanon War (1982) and the outbreak of both intifadas (1987 and 2000). Egypt and Jordan recalled their ambassadors, reduced their ties to the bare minimum and publicly expressed a clear anti-Israel stand.
The Second Lebanon War and the recent war in Gaza represent a change in Arab state behavior toward Israel. In fact, early signs of this change were evident following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and additional Arab states took the side of the West--and indirectly Israel's side--in the resultant first Gulf war (1991).
A more significant change took place when Israel launched a war against Hizballah in Lebanon in 2006: Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not hesitate to openly criticize that organization's irresponsible behavior and blame it for the damage inflicted on Lebanon in the course of the war. Like Israel, they too recognized in Hizballah a dangerous actor that sought to strengthen the status of Iran and the Shi'ites in the region at the expense of the Sunni states. A tacit alliance was created between Israel and certain Arab states, dubbed "moderate", that reflected shared interests. Yet the longer the war dragged on and the more evidence of damage in Lebanon accumulated, the more the "moderate" leaders were obliged to square their position with that of the Arab consensus--as expressed in the clear anti-Israel language of Arab League resolutions and in other international fora.
In the recent Gaza war, Israel found itself in an even more comfortable situation: on the same side as Egypt. Hamas was perceived as a threat to both countries: if Israel was threatened by Palestinian terrorism, Egypt was threatened by the possible aggrandizement of radical Islamic actors who challenge its regime stability. Then too, Egypt and Israel--like additional Sunni states in the region such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan--view Hamas as a tool to strengthen Tehran's position and that of the Shi'ites in the Arab world. Precisely because Hamas, unlike Hizballah, is Sunni, it draws even greater Arab anger for "collaborating" with Shi'ite Iran. Moreover, both the Egyptians and the Saudis resent Hamas having embarrassed the two leading Arab states in the course of long and fruitless negotiations they shepherded between it and Fateh (the Mecca agreement of 2007; the Cairo talks of 2008).
Israeli-Egyptian cooperation in the course of the war in Gaza testifies to the two countries' overlapping interests when it comes to Hamas. This phenomenon, while reflecting to some extent the Arab world's weakness, demonstrates to an even greater extent that the Arab world is behaving like a more "normal" system, in accordance more with interests than with ideologies and identity politics. That this behavior was repeated in both Lebanon and Gaza indicates that this is no chance occurrence.
Of course, we must qualify this optimistic picture with reference to the damage caused by Israel in Gaza. Qatar closed the Israeli trade mission in Doha, Mauritania withdrew its ambassador, relations with Turkey were damaged and Arab society as a whole was angered by the killing in Gaza. Yet beyond these reactions, some of which are reversible, it is important to note that not every Arab-Israel dispute generates automatic Arab unity and isolates Israel regionally. This insight is important insofar as the struggle against regional radical actors will continue during periods of calm as well.
Thus there exists an infrastructure of shared interests that can enable Israel, openly or clandestinely, to advance peace initiatives with Arab actors. The Arab peace initiative, which will again be deliberated at next month's Arab summit in Qatar, affords an excellent opportunity to renew the Israel-Arab dialogue that was halted by the war in Gaza.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Prof. Elie Podeh chairs the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Jordan braces for the worst
Saad Hattar
Had the late King Hussein of Jordan and Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel been alive today they would undoubtedly have despaired at witnessing the introverted and parochial right-wing parties take control in Israel just two years after the anti-peace Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, won the confidence of most Palestinian voters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The "fortress mentality" that King Hussein used to warn against seems to have infiltrated both the Israeli and Palestinian electorate, reversing the hopes for peace that were sparked 18 years ago in Madrid.
It was only two years after King Hussein and Rabin hammered out their peace treaty in 1994 that right-wing leader Binyamin Netanyahu rose to power in Israel, changing the rules of engagement between the two neighboring countries. In a few months, Netanyahu repeatedly incurred the wrath of King Hussein for the way he sought to negate the peace accords with the Palestinians or how he attempted to kill Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal in Amman in September 1997.
Now history is repeating itself, and Netanyahu's chances to form a right-wing government seem strong after his party clinched 27 seats in the recent elections.
Indeed, for the first time in more than decade, Israeli elections are of a make-or-break importance to Jordanian policymakers. Officials here fear that the rise of right-wing parties such as Likud and Yisrael Beitenu is the beginning of the end of hopes to establish a Palestinian state between Jordan and Israel. If such a possibility is scrapped, something that in Amman is seen as an Israeli ultra-nationalist goal, it will undermine Jordan's foreign policy foundations and wreak havoc across the whole region.
Between the lines, Jordan's official reaction to the Likud's apparent victory bore witness to the level of anxiety here. While Foreign Minister Salahudin Bashir voiced hope that a pro-peace government would be formed in Israel, he made it a point to reject the emphasis on the "economic factor" that Netanyahu stipulated in his campaign, and asserted that while the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had many dimensions, the most important is the political one.
But much damage to Israeli-Jordanian relations had already been done by the brutal Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip last month. That offensive was a wake-up call for the Jordanian leadership. Shocked by the level of violence and bloodshed, King Abdullah went on record to warn of "a conspiracy" against the Palestinian cause. His unprecedented remarks on the popular Al-Jazeerah channel reflected his dismay at what is perceived as Israeli attempts to buy time and escape ever further away from the country's peace commitments. The warning of a "conspiracy" was seen here as a pre-emptive rejection of any hidden agenda involving Jordan and the West Bank.
Hence, Jordan was already deeply disappointed with the Kadima and Labor leaders Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak. While Jordan does not condone Hamas' home-made and futile rockets on Israel, it blames Israel for its disproportionate reaction that caused so many civilian casualties and wrought such great damage. After Israeli wars on the West Bank, Lebanon and now Gaza, the hard-wrought confidence between Amman and Tel Aviv has foundered.
Jordan looked with suspicion to the Israeli elections. Nevertheless, given a choice between bad and worse, Jordan would rather deal with a center-left coalition headed by Kadima rather than having to confront a right-winger like Netanyahu, whose credentials, as far as Jordan is concerned, were undermined by his last stint in power, 12 years ago.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Saad Hattar is an Amman-based political analyst.
Israeli-Egyptian relations
Gamal A. G. Soltan
The Gaza war was seemingly an inevitable conflict. The pre-war reality was unacceptable to any of the concerned parties.
Hamas was not satisfied with a ceasefire that kept the tiny Gaza Strip isolated from the world. Palestinian suffering in besieged Gaza challenged Hamas' claim of effectiveness as an elected government capable of providing for the wellbeing of its people. Nor did the terms of the ceasefire allow Hamas to pursue the program of resilient resistance that is so central to the movement's identity. The war was Hamas' way out of this entrapment.
Israel, on the other hand, didn't feel comfortable with its Palestinian arch-enemy taking refuge behind a fragile ceasefire while continuing to build up an arsenal of primitive but annoying rockets. Israel's concern was not exactly about these barely lethal rounds of rockets fired from Gaza at the towns of the Negev. Israel's concern was more about the long-term implications should this situation be allowed to continue. This was particularly the case since the Israeli policy of tightening the screws on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip did not prove effective in softening Hamas' stand. Hence Israel, like Hamas, had to go to war to escape the entrapment of the six-month ceasefire that Egypt had tamed them both into.
Egypt is squeezed between Israel and Hamas. In Egypt's view, there is no lasting formula for reconciliation between today's Hamas and Israel. Only interim arrangements such as the six-month truce can be reached within these constraints. Egypt's strategy toward the situation in Gaza is an incremental long-term one, whereas the two direct parties to the conflict are rushing to achieve immediate results.
Egypt has multiple concerns regarding the situation in Gaza. Its main concern is to prevent the de facto separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip from developing into a de jure second partition of Palestine. Egypt is also keen not to starve the people of Gaza. Their suffering places Egypt under unbearable domestic and regional pressures; the Gazans might break into Egyptian territory or treat Egypt as the instigator and therefore a legitimate target for reprisals.
Egypt believes that Hamas is a genuine force in Palestine that can neither be ignored nor eliminated. However, Egypt also believes that Hamas, as an integral part of the radical destabilizing forces in the Middle East, should be gradually contained. While Israel shares with Egypt the goal of containing radicalism, it shows indifference to Egypt's gradualist approach. The recent war on Gaza testifies to Egyptian-Israeli differences in this regard.
Egypt's dilemma stems from the fact that it is neither happy with Hamas nor capable of pressuring it beyond a certain limit. Egypt's long-term policy had sought to guide Hamas toward a safe landing in the realm of moderation and pragmatism, but the Gaza war disrupted this endeavor. While that war is also likely to help accelerate Hamas' moderation, the cost incurred by Egypt has been heavy and risky; it could have been avoided if it were not for the confrontational policies pursued by both Hamas and Israel.
The conflict in Gaza is another inconclusive war in the Middle East. It is inconclusive regarding the future of relations between Israel and the Palestinians and it is also inconclusive regarding relations between Egypt and Israel. The irony of the Gaza war is that its high human cost does not qualify it to be a turning point in the politics of the Middle East. The many questions left unanswered by the end of the war create a great deal of uncertainty. By the same token, the Gaza war does not look like a turning point in Egypt's relations with Israel, which are likely to be clouded by regional uncertainties.
Three sources of such uncertainties should be watched very closely in the months to come: the nature of the new ruling coalition in Israel, Hamas' post-war strategy and the regional divide between radicals and moderates in the Middle East. Egypt's attitude toward Israel is likely to be governed by an overall policy of balancing the uncertain contending forces of the region.
The prolonged negotiations regarding consolidation of the fragile ceasefire in Gaza already convey a sense of how relations among Egypt, Hamas and Israel are likely to look in the future. Egypt will be walking a tightrope between Hamas, Israel and the Middle East radicals for months to come. Even though Egypt was able to upset radical attempts to corner it during the conflict in Gaza, it is also interested in repairing the damage caused to its image among segments of the Arab public by the radicals' propaganda war. And Egypt still needs to win Hamas' cooperation in order to pursue a policy of Palestinian reconciliation.
Renewal of the peace process is the safe exit out of the current quagmire in the Middle East. The key to the peace process is in the hands of Israel's next ruling coalition. The inconclusive results of the recent Israeli elections are not likely to help. A calculated and measured attitude toward Israel is likely to be Egypt's approach in the months to come. The deep doubts regarding the very cause of peace that the Gaza war instilled among the Arab public make such a guarded approach inevitable.- Published 12/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Gamal A. G. Soltan is a senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and a visiting professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.
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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Saturday, February 7, 2009
House Party: The alarming rise of radical nationalism in Israel. Arik Ben-Zvi
THE NEW REPUBLIC
2/6/09
House Party: The alarming rise of radical nationalism in Israel.
Arik Ben-Zvi
Israel suffered 13 deaths in the Gaza war. But we won't know the full extent of the wound the nation has suffered until February 10, when elections are held. If current polls are to be believed, an extremist right-wing party stands to make historic gains. That outcome will demonstrate just how deep the psychic wound from the conflict truly runs; just how far the latest violence has radicalized the Israeli public; and just how big a problem all this will be for Israel's long-term security.
The party in question is Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu (or "Israel is our Home") Party. Lieberman has been a figure on the Israeli far right for years, but the Gaza war has given his party an unprecedented boost. According to the most recent opinion polls published in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, Yisrael Beiteinu stands to win 15 or 16 seats in the next Knesset, which puts them even with the Labor Party. For a party of the extreme right to surpass Labor--the founding party of the state, the party of Ben Gurion, Golda, and Rabin--would mark a historic shift. Clearly, in the current mood of national anger and frustration, even formerly moderate voters are open to extreme ideas--and Lieberman has plenty of those. Under the catchy slogan "No citizenship without loyalty" (it rhymes in Hebrew), Yisrael Beiteinu is pushing for a new law requiring all citizens to swear an "oath of loyalty" to the state. Israeli-Arab citizens or others who refuse could have their citizenship stripped from them.
In order to sell that idea, Lieberman has focused much of his campaign inciting public anger against Israel's Arab minority. He accuses Israeli-Arab lawmakers of harboring Hamas sympathies, and has called for the parties to be banned from running in the election. His campaign ads show Israeli-Arab students demonstrating against the Gaza war as a narrator ominously intones, "We won't forget that, during the Gaza conflict, there were those among us who stood with Hamas." As for the Gaza operation itself, Lieberman has denounced the cease-fire as a sell-out of the military. His preferred strategy is total war against the Gazan population: "We must continue to fight Hamas just like the United States did with the Japanese in World War II." The message is clearly finding its audience. Of particular concern is evidence suggesting Lieberman's appeal is growing among young voters. While not a scientific barometer, high school straw polls show Yisrael Beiteinu trouncing the mainstream parties. And reporters visiting the party's central headquarters speak of it buzzing with young volunteers--a fun-house mirror image of the young voters who helped propel Barack Obama to victory in the United States.
Like all nations, Israel has always had its extremists. But never have these ideas been so widely embraced by an outraged mainstream. Nor is the public's anger confined to the fringes. Shaul Mofaz, a former IDF chief of staff and a leading member of the centrist Kadima Party, is pledging to assassinate Hamas leaders. Ehud Barak of the Labor Party is evoking Vladimir Putin, claiming that he will kill terrorists "when they are on the toilet." But all this scrambling to the right plays directly into Lieberman's hands. Yisrael Beiteinu's steady rise in the polls shows that voters are concluding there's no reason to settle for a watered-down version of radical nationalism when they can get the real thing.
For Israel, this unprecedented shift to the right is not just a moral danger--it is also a serious strategic problem. Israel's national security depends on its position as a democracy and a member in good standing of the international community. As a sovereign democracy, Israel has the freedom of action to respond to terrorist threats, to maintain its military, and to be an undeclared nuclear power. Israel's business connections with the rest of the world are fundamental to its economy. All of that will be threatened should Lieberman and his extremist supporters succeed in advancing their agenda.
Israel has always had its harsh critics in the U.N. and E.U. But, even at its worst, that criticism has been contained within well-defined limits. In Europe and the United States, calls to sanction, boycott, or prosecute Israeli leaders as war criminals have been almost the exclusive province of the extreme left. That won't hold if Israel crosses an anti-democratic tipping point. If Israel ever actually began enforcing a loyalty oath or stripping Arab citizens of their citizenship or property rights, the road to real international isolation of the sort experienced by South Africa in the 1980s or Serbia in the 1990s could be shockingly short. And an Israel isolated from the international community would be deeply vulnerable.
To be sure, Lieberman is not about to become prime minister. A government even under the right-wing Likud Party is highly unlikely to implement the most extreme of Lieberman's proposals. Moreover, Israel's Supreme Court stands as a last line of defense against blatantly discriminatory policies. Indeed, the court has already acted to prevent an Yisrael Beiteinu-led effort to ban two Israeli-Arab parties from running in the current elections. But, if Yisrael Beiteinu performs as well as the polls suggest it will, then it stands a good chance of sitting in the next government. And, with 15 or 16 seats, it would have a relatively strong voice there. Lieberman would hold a prominent ministerial post, along with at least two or three of his colleagues. As a bloc, they would be able to influence the direction of policymaking for the coming years. At a minimum, this would further alienate Israel's Arab citizens and complicate any peace efforts. It would certainly provide endless fodder to Israel's harshest critics around the world.
Given the extent of the danger, Israel's true friends in the United States and around the world must apply themselves to the task of helping the political center hold. That does not mean directly interfering in Israel's domestic politics. But it does mean encouraging the Obama administration and others to communicate to the Israeli public the costs involved in breaking with democratic norms. Unlike most other countries, Israelis don't applaud their leaders for taking on the United States. Israelis understand how vital their "special relationship" with America is to national security. If the Israeli public is made to understand that embrace of Lieberman's radical ideas threatens the U.S.-Israel bond, it will nudge voters back toward the center. And ensuring that Israel's center can continue to hold will be vital--to the peace process and to Israel's long-term position in the international community.
Arik Ben-Zvi is a managing director at The Glover Park Group and a former soldier in the Israel Defense Forces.
2/6/09
House Party: The alarming rise of radical nationalism in Israel.
Arik Ben-Zvi
Israel suffered 13 deaths in the Gaza war. But we won't know the full extent of the wound the nation has suffered until February 10, when elections are held. If current polls are to be believed, an extremist right-wing party stands to make historic gains. That outcome will demonstrate just how deep the psychic wound from the conflict truly runs; just how far the latest violence has radicalized the Israeli public; and just how big a problem all this will be for Israel's long-term security.
The party in question is Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu (or "Israel is our Home") Party. Lieberman has been a figure on the Israeli far right for years, but the Gaza war has given his party an unprecedented boost. According to the most recent opinion polls published in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, Yisrael Beiteinu stands to win 15 or 16 seats in the next Knesset, which puts them even with the Labor Party. For a party of the extreme right to surpass Labor--the founding party of the state, the party of Ben Gurion, Golda, and Rabin--would mark a historic shift. Clearly, in the current mood of national anger and frustration, even formerly moderate voters are open to extreme ideas--and Lieberman has plenty of those. Under the catchy slogan "No citizenship without loyalty" (it rhymes in Hebrew), Yisrael Beiteinu is pushing for a new law requiring all citizens to swear an "oath of loyalty" to the state. Israeli-Arab citizens or others who refuse could have their citizenship stripped from them.
In order to sell that idea, Lieberman has focused much of his campaign inciting public anger against Israel's Arab minority. He accuses Israeli-Arab lawmakers of harboring Hamas sympathies, and has called for the parties to be banned from running in the election. His campaign ads show Israeli-Arab students demonstrating against the Gaza war as a narrator ominously intones, "We won't forget that, during the Gaza conflict, there were those among us who stood with Hamas." As for the Gaza operation itself, Lieberman has denounced the cease-fire as a sell-out of the military. His preferred strategy is total war against the Gazan population: "We must continue to fight Hamas just like the United States did with the Japanese in World War II." The message is clearly finding its audience. Of particular concern is evidence suggesting Lieberman's appeal is growing among young voters. While not a scientific barometer, high school straw polls show Yisrael Beiteinu trouncing the mainstream parties. And reporters visiting the party's central headquarters speak of it buzzing with young volunteers--a fun-house mirror image of the young voters who helped propel Barack Obama to victory in the United States.
Like all nations, Israel has always had its extremists. But never have these ideas been so widely embraced by an outraged mainstream. Nor is the public's anger confined to the fringes. Shaul Mofaz, a former IDF chief of staff and a leading member of the centrist Kadima Party, is pledging to assassinate Hamas leaders. Ehud Barak of the Labor Party is evoking Vladimir Putin, claiming that he will kill terrorists "when they are on the toilet." But all this scrambling to the right plays directly into Lieberman's hands. Yisrael Beiteinu's steady rise in the polls shows that voters are concluding there's no reason to settle for a watered-down version of radical nationalism when they can get the real thing.
For Israel, this unprecedented shift to the right is not just a moral danger--it is also a serious strategic problem. Israel's national security depends on its position as a democracy and a member in good standing of the international community. As a sovereign democracy, Israel has the freedom of action to respond to terrorist threats, to maintain its military, and to be an undeclared nuclear power. Israel's business connections with the rest of the world are fundamental to its economy. All of that will be threatened should Lieberman and his extremist supporters succeed in advancing their agenda.
Israel has always had its harsh critics in the U.N. and E.U. But, even at its worst, that criticism has been contained within well-defined limits. In Europe and the United States, calls to sanction, boycott, or prosecute Israeli leaders as war criminals have been almost the exclusive province of the extreme left. That won't hold if Israel crosses an anti-democratic tipping point. If Israel ever actually began enforcing a loyalty oath or stripping Arab citizens of their citizenship or property rights, the road to real international isolation of the sort experienced by South Africa in the 1980s or Serbia in the 1990s could be shockingly short. And an Israel isolated from the international community would be deeply vulnerable.
To be sure, Lieberman is not about to become prime minister. A government even under the right-wing Likud Party is highly unlikely to implement the most extreme of Lieberman's proposals. Moreover, Israel's Supreme Court stands as a last line of defense against blatantly discriminatory policies. Indeed, the court has already acted to prevent an Yisrael Beiteinu-led effort to ban two Israeli-Arab parties from running in the current elections. But, if Yisrael Beiteinu performs as well as the polls suggest it will, then it stands a good chance of sitting in the next government. And, with 15 or 16 seats, it would have a relatively strong voice there. Lieberman would hold a prominent ministerial post, along with at least two or three of his colleagues. As a bloc, they would be able to influence the direction of policymaking for the coming years. At a minimum, this would further alienate Israel's Arab citizens and complicate any peace efforts. It would certainly provide endless fodder to Israel's harshest critics around the world.
Given the extent of the danger, Israel's true friends in the United States and around the world must apply themselves to the task of helping the political center hold. That does not mean directly interfering in Israel's domestic politics. But it does mean encouraging the Obama administration and others to communicate to the Israeli public the costs involved in breaking with democratic norms. Unlike most other countries, Israelis don't applaud their leaders for taking on the United States. Israelis understand how vital their "special relationship" with America is to national security. If the Israeli public is made to understand that embrace of Lieberman's radical ideas threatens the U.S.-Israel bond, it will nudge voters back toward the center. And ensuring that Israel's center can continue to hold will be vital--to the peace process and to Israel's long-term position in the international community.
Arik Ben-Zvi is a managing director at The Glover Park Group and a former soldier in the Israel Defense Forces.
Brady Kiesling in the Athens News, 6 February 2009 The Next Middle East Mission
Brady Kiesling in the Athens News, 6 February 2009
The Next Middle East Mission
There is good news for the Middle East: Barack Hussein Obama is using all three of his names. The new president's first television interview was a warm message to the Islamic world via the Al 'Arabiyya satellite television network. Obama ordered the closure of the detention camp at Guantanamo. Word went out that the "war on terrorism" is no longer what official Washington thinks it is fighting. And distinguished former Senator George Mitchell was sent to prop up the fragile calm with another round of listening to Middle Eastern leaders.
Is the name "Barack," which means "blessing," be enough to erase from Arab memories Obama's silence regarding the latest crop of dead children in Gaza? Of course not. But perhaps the Mitchell mission can be a first step in the direction of transforming Israeli and Palestinian understanding of the strategic environment is which they operate.
Israel/Palestine is a small, hard-edged country with too little water, arable land, or mineral resources to sustain the life and dignity of the millions of people with little choice but to live there. Middle Eastern society has always been organized on the basis of tribal competition. In less crowded times, one tribe could prosper by plundering its neighbors. Modern prosperity also requires a steady flow of resources from the rest of the world.
To that end, the marketing of Zionism, first to a diverse Jewish diaspora and more recently to selfish secular governments, has been a remarkable success. For fundamentalists, Israel was a country of holy men carrying out God's purpose by repopulating Judea and Samaria with His chosen people. For secular Jews, Israel offered an intensity of cultural and scientific expression that validated a sense of superiority. For idealists, the kibbutz movement was welcome evidence of the viability of socialist self-management. All these groups donated money, knowledge and political backing to help Israel flourish.
Europe's guilt for past anti-Semitism left a moral obligation to be generous to Israel. For the Chinese and other less sentimental governments, Israel's military industries dangled a smorgasbord of U.S.-origin high-tech wizardry, elegantly customized and with fewer political/humanitarian strings attached. American gentiles were assured the Israel Defense Forces were their loyal comrade in arms, that Israel was not the fiercely independent country it is, but instead an unsinkable U.S. aircraft carrier. The United States still happily pays more than $3 billion per year to console Israel for the shacks that were bulldozed in the Sinai desert when President Carter brokered peace with Egypt three decades ago.
Within the favorable international environment they shaped, Israelis have reaped the reward of hard work and sense of national purpose: an enviable lifestyle defended by a world-class, nuclear-armed military. As evolutionary adaptation, this has been brilliant.
The truncated Palestinian state is far more dependent on the kindness of strangers than Israel. Donor fatigue since 1948 is a dire problem, more so in today's global economic downturn. The Palestinians have proved less gifted at projecting different facets of their composite identity to different audiences. Shimon Peres could charm the U.S. and USSR simultaneously. Arafat managed to antagonize both. Christian Palestinians are excluded from the club of "Judeo-Christian civilization" while the militant piety of Palestinian Islamists makes neighboring Arab governments nervous rather than sympathetic. Thousands of articulate Palestinian engineers, doctors, and professors have remained politically almost irrelevant in exile. At home, rockets and suicide bombers have been worse than useless as politics by other means.
The evolutionary adaptation the Palestinians have made with proven effectiveness for attracting money and support is the steady supply of young children. International support, however, is not a child's reward for being born but instead for dying.
In December, Israeli politicians accepted the risk of strengthening the Palestinian cause through a slaughter of innocents. The invasion of Gaza was a desperate, perhaps futile attempt to redraw the domestic political map before the February 10 Israeli national elections.
Israel's ugly electoral arithmetic make the extortion talents of Greek farmers seem Scandinavian in comparison. No politician can build a working majority in the Knesset without selling his or her soul to bigots from the single-issue parties. Even to discuss a viable Palestinian state is to destroy that coalition. Ehud Olmert talks sensibly about meaningful concessions only now that he has been exiled permanently from electoral politics.
Per the opinion polls, Bibi Netanyahu of Likud looks likely to take back the prime ministry. His main platform plank is a promise to kill the thousands of Hamas members his political rivals had left alive. Kadima's Tzipi Livni, his chief rival, promises to kill more as well, but her true passion is bombing Iran.
These are not genocidal psychopaths, simply ambitious politicians bent on manipulating a flawed and cynical political system. They have seen ample evidence that most voters are tribal creatures with a tribal version of justice. Wanton slaughter is evil in Israel and everywhere else. Still, our tribal God smiles serenely on the targeted killing of a few hundred terrorists from the neighboring trib, provided our tribe's self-interest is not harmed thereby.
Enter Senator Mitchell. Ten years ago he convinced extremists on both sides of the Northern Ireland issue that he was a man of common sense and absolute integrity. He knows the Middle East already, and is thus an excellent choice to persuade the government of Israel that 1300 dead Palestinians cannot be written off as targeted killings. Killing more will harm Israel's self-interest and thus be an offense to God.
Mitchell's first message to the next Israeli coalition should be a selfish and thus believable one: the death of innocent Palestinian children harms U.S. national interests and the political standing of President Obama and his European colleagues. Should they persist, Israeli politicians risk equivalent harm in retaliation.
Mitchell can then make clear the following:
· Efforts to delegitimize Hamas in the eyes of Gazans have failed. It is preferable to talk to Hamas now, reaping some credit for magnanimity.
· Hamas will keep the peace provided that peace is crafted to serve the interests of its leaders. Their interests are no more theological and unknowable than those of the ultra-Orthodox rabbis Israeli politicians cut deals with every day.
· Israeli efforts to starve Gaza are a political gift to Hamas. Once the Gaza port and airport are rebuilt and operational under strict EU control, the porous land border can be closed as tight as Israel and Egypt decide.
· Preparing for the ultimate success of the peace process, the U.S. will place all future assistance to Israel in an escrow account to fund compensation for Israeli settlers removed from the West Bank.
Obama is a rare politician with the rhetorical power to give meaning to tragedy. He should use the blood of these children in Gaza to sanctify a political process aimed at making the desert bloom for Palestinians as well as Israelis. International generosity will be required, perhaps forever. Europe and the United States must be indivisible partners for either promises or threats to have any meaning to the warring tribes.
Brady Kiesling
Athens News of February 6, 2009
brady@bradykiesling.com
John Brady Kiesling is a former diplomat, author of Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower
The Next Middle East Mission
There is good news for the Middle East: Barack Hussein Obama is using all three of his names. The new president's first television interview was a warm message to the Islamic world via the Al 'Arabiyya satellite television network. Obama ordered the closure of the detention camp at Guantanamo. Word went out that the "war on terrorism" is no longer what official Washington thinks it is fighting. And distinguished former Senator George Mitchell was sent to prop up the fragile calm with another round of listening to Middle Eastern leaders.
Is the name "Barack," which means "blessing," be enough to erase from Arab memories Obama's silence regarding the latest crop of dead children in Gaza? Of course not. But perhaps the Mitchell mission can be a first step in the direction of transforming Israeli and Palestinian understanding of the strategic environment is which they operate.
Israel/Palestine is a small, hard-edged country with too little water, arable land, or mineral resources to sustain the life and dignity of the millions of people with little choice but to live there. Middle Eastern society has always been organized on the basis of tribal competition. In less crowded times, one tribe could prosper by plundering its neighbors. Modern prosperity also requires a steady flow of resources from the rest of the world.
To that end, the marketing of Zionism, first to a diverse Jewish diaspora and more recently to selfish secular governments, has been a remarkable success. For fundamentalists, Israel was a country of holy men carrying out God's purpose by repopulating Judea and Samaria with His chosen people. For secular Jews, Israel offered an intensity of cultural and scientific expression that validated a sense of superiority. For idealists, the kibbutz movement was welcome evidence of the viability of socialist self-management. All these groups donated money, knowledge and political backing to help Israel flourish.
Europe's guilt for past anti-Semitism left a moral obligation to be generous to Israel. For the Chinese and other less sentimental governments, Israel's military industries dangled a smorgasbord of U.S.-origin high-tech wizardry, elegantly customized and with fewer political/humanitarian strings attached. American gentiles were assured the Israel Defense Forces were their loyal comrade in arms, that Israel was not the fiercely independent country it is, but instead an unsinkable U.S. aircraft carrier. The United States still happily pays more than $3 billion per year to console Israel for the shacks that were bulldozed in the Sinai desert when President Carter brokered peace with Egypt three decades ago.
Within the favorable international environment they shaped, Israelis have reaped the reward of hard work and sense of national purpose: an enviable lifestyle defended by a world-class, nuclear-armed military. As evolutionary adaptation, this has been brilliant.
The truncated Palestinian state is far more dependent on the kindness of strangers than Israel. Donor fatigue since 1948 is a dire problem, more so in today's global economic downturn. The Palestinians have proved less gifted at projecting different facets of their composite identity to different audiences. Shimon Peres could charm the U.S. and USSR simultaneously. Arafat managed to antagonize both. Christian Palestinians are excluded from the club of "Judeo-Christian civilization" while the militant piety of Palestinian Islamists makes neighboring Arab governments nervous rather than sympathetic. Thousands of articulate Palestinian engineers, doctors, and professors have remained politically almost irrelevant in exile. At home, rockets and suicide bombers have been worse than useless as politics by other means.
The evolutionary adaptation the Palestinians have made with proven effectiveness for attracting money and support is the steady supply of young children. International support, however, is not a child's reward for being born but instead for dying.
In December, Israeli politicians accepted the risk of strengthening the Palestinian cause through a slaughter of innocents. The invasion of Gaza was a desperate, perhaps futile attempt to redraw the domestic political map before the February 10 Israeli national elections.
Israel's ugly electoral arithmetic make the extortion talents of Greek farmers seem Scandinavian in comparison. No politician can build a working majority in the Knesset without selling his or her soul to bigots from the single-issue parties. Even to discuss a viable Palestinian state is to destroy that coalition. Ehud Olmert talks sensibly about meaningful concessions only now that he has been exiled permanently from electoral politics.
Per the opinion polls, Bibi Netanyahu of Likud looks likely to take back the prime ministry. His main platform plank is a promise to kill the thousands of Hamas members his political rivals had left alive. Kadima's Tzipi Livni, his chief rival, promises to kill more as well, but her true passion is bombing Iran.
These are not genocidal psychopaths, simply ambitious politicians bent on manipulating a flawed and cynical political system. They have seen ample evidence that most voters are tribal creatures with a tribal version of justice. Wanton slaughter is evil in Israel and everywhere else. Still, our tribal God smiles serenely on the targeted killing of a few hundred terrorists from the neighboring trib, provided our tribe's self-interest is not harmed thereby.
Enter Senator Mitchell. Ten years ago he convinced extremists on both sides of the Northern Ireland issue that he was a man of common sense and absolute integrity. He knows the Middle East already, and is thus an excellent choice to persuade the government of Israel that 1300 dead Palestinians cannot be written off as targeted killings. Killing more will harm Israel's self-interest and thus be an offense to God.
Mitchell's first message to the next Israeli coalition should be a selfish and thus believable one: the death of innocent Palestinian children harms U.S. national interests and the political standing of President Obama and his European colleagues. Should they persist, Israeli politicians risk equivalent harm in retaliation.
Mitchell can then make clear the following:
· Efforts to delegitimize Hamas in the eyes of Gazans have failed. It is preferable to talk to Hamas now, reaping some credit for magnanimity.
· Hamas will keep the peace provided that peace is crafted to serve the interests of its leaders. Their interests are no more theological and unknowable than those of the ultra-Orthodox rabbis Israeli politicians cut deals with every day.
· Israeli efforts to starve Gaza are a political gift to Hamas. Once the Gaza port and airport are rebuilt and operational under strict EU control, the porous land border can be closed as tight as Israel and Egypt decide.
· Preparing for the ultimate success of the peace process, the U.S. will place all future assistance to Israel in an escrow account to fund compensation for Israeli settlers removed from the West Bank.
Obama is a rare politician with the rhetorical power to give meaning to tragedy. He should use the blood of these children in Gaza to sanctify a political process aimed at making the desert bloom for Palestinians as well as Israelis. International generosity will be required, perhaps forever. Europe and the United States must be indivisible partners for either promises or threats to have any meaning to the warring tribes.
Brady Kiesling
Athens News of February 6, 2009
brady@bradykiesling.com
John Brady Kiesling is a former diplomat, author of Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower
Last, last chance for diplomacy with Iran By Olivier Guitta
Last, last chance for diplomacy with Iran
By Olivier Guitta
I wrote a piece for the Middle East TImes on the slim chances of a potential resolution of the Iranian nuclear file through diplomacy at this time.
You can read the full article here.
Here is an excerpt:
This coming week, for an umpteenth time the P-5 plus one –the U.N. permanent five members plus Germany - will meet to talk about Iran and try to adopt a common position. It will be the first time the U.S. Barack Obama administration will take part in the discussions. With an affirmed will of breaking from the precedent administration, the Obama team has a lot at stake. At this point, with Iran inching so much closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon, the next few weeks might be the last chance for a diplomatic solution.
Obama's opening to the Tehran regime has been received quite coldly. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replied by demanding apologies for the crimes the United States has allegedly committed. He also asked for the U.S. withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan. But that is not all, when it comes to the core issue of Iran's military nuclear program, Aliakbar Javanfekr, a senior aide to Ahmadinejad, stated that Iran had no intention of stopping it.
That sounds pretty definitive. A non-starter, really. Interestingly, the White House muscled up its tone when it warned Iran that military action is still one of the options on the table. But at the same time the very dovish German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier reiterated his view that only diplomacy should be used, therefore removing a large stick from the negotiating table. Indeed, if Iran thinks there will be no major repercussions for defying the international community, then what incentive has Iran to stop?
February 6, 2009 09:35 AM Link
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/last_last_chance_for_diplomacy.php
By Olivier Guitta
I wrote a piece for the Middle East TImes on the slim chances of a potential resolution of the Iranian nuclear file through diplomacy at this time.
You can read the full article here.
Here is an excerpt:
This coming week, for an umpteenth time the P-5 plus one –the U.N. permanent five members plus Germany - will meet to talk about Iran and try to adopt a common position. It will be the first time the U.S. Barack Obama administration will take part in the discussions. With an affirmed will of breaking from the precedent administration, the Obama team has a lot at stake. At this point, with Iran inching so much closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon, the next few weeks might be the last chance for a diplomatic solution.
Obama's opening to the Tehran regime has been received quite coldly. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replied by demanding apologies for the crimes the United States has allegedly committed. He also asked for the U.S. withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan. But that is not all, when it comes to the core issue of Iran's military nuclear program, Aliakbar Javanfekr, a senior aide to Ahmadinejad, stated that Iran had no intention of stopping it.
That sounds pretty definitive. A non-starter, really. Interestingly, the White House muscled up its tone when it warned Iran that military action is still one of the options on the table. But at the same time the very dovish German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier reiterated his view that only diplomacy should be used, therefore removing a large stick from the negotiating table. Indeed, if Iran thinks there will be no major repercussions for defying the international community, then what incentive has Iran to stop?
February 6, 2009 09:35 AM Link
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/last_last_chance_for_diplomacy.php
Iran's New Satellites: The Pasdaran in Space By Walid Phares
Iran's New Satellites: The Pasdaran in Space
By Walid Phares
The launching of an Iranian satellite into orbit, said to be about "communications technology" and "earthquake monitoring," would have been a normal news item not exceeding the greater news report about India landing a space craft on the moon last month. But according to news agencies around the world, Western chanceries and national security agencies have taken the development "seriously." Associated Press and the BBC described reactions as "nervous." Although the debate about the value of Iranian space technology and commercial rocket capacity usually concludes that the Mullah regime is far away from reaching a respectable level, many defense analysts dismiss the issue as about the sole industrialization of the Islamic Republic: In fact it is about the "weaponization" of the satellite. Obviously this one launch may not be the crossing for the line, but the first step was accomplished and statements were made about the immediate following steps. The quasi consensus today is about the strategic intention of Tehran's war room, solidly in the hands of the Pasdaran. As I argued in discussions I had on France 24 TV and the BBC this week, the space program is one component of a regional strategic deployment. Hence it deserves to be analyzed from this perspective. Following is a short article published in Human Events
Read More »
Iran-Safir-satellite-carrier6.jpg
The Associated Press revealed to the world Tuesday that "according to Tehran, Iran has successfully sent its first domestically made satellite into orbit, as announced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad." But while the Iranian President claimed the move was to develop "science for friendship, brotherhood and justice," AP noted this was "a significant step in an ambitious space program that has worried many international observers."
The debate over the Iranian space program is going to look like the cacophony over its nuclear ambitions. Per AP, "Iran has said it wants to put its own satellites into orbit to monitor natural disasters in the earthquake-prone nation and improve its telecommunications."
Over the next weeks and months, Iran’s state propaganda machine and their sympathizers in the West will rush to praise the genuine scientific goals of the program while national security experts will look to find suspicious components in the program. But AP was quick to provide an eye opener in its first report, a golden revelation in words coming from Tehran: "Iranian officials point to America's use of satellites to monitor Afghanistan and Iraq and say they need similar abilities for their security." And that's the beginning of the depths this problem sinks to.
It doesn't take rocket scientists to figure out the first priority of the Iranian regime as it launches this rocket: to achieve an intelligence capability that only satellites can provide. They can not only intercept radio, satellite and e-mail communications but they can -- if highly enough developed -- also track the movement of military and economic assets.
Though Russia has sold Iran enormously capable anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems to protect its nuclear facilities, they haven’t given Iran the global detection capabilities that satellites do. Any attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities would be vastly harder given satellite radars and detection systems.
Iran’s apologists will rush to claim that Iran is still years away from competing with the US and Europe in this field. But once one satellite is up and observing and transmitting the next will bear higher more developed technology and its military function can be morphed to even threaten the single greatest vulnerability the US military and intelligence agencies have: the defenselessness of our satellite systems.
AP reports: "Iran hopes to launch three more satellites by 2010, the government has said." Once a web is installed, the strategic capacity of Tehran in intercepting moves aimed at its nuclear and other installations will increase. By 2010 and beyond Iran’s strategic weapons system is projected to develop further. By 2012, it may have reached the feared benchmark of possessing the nuclear weapons, the delivery systems and the satellite capacity to detect any action against them.
The Iranian regime has a strategic agenda which is clear and pronounced: Expansion in the region. All other developments of military, intelligence and technological nature are at the service of such world view. Had Tehran not been the seat of a radical ideological project with tentacles reaching as far as Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza and the rest of the world -- the placing of a single communications satellite in space to "check earthquakes" would be a nice news item. But the earthquakes the Iranian regime is looking for are of a different nature: they involve a massive change in the political and identity landscape of a whole region.
By now, the most realistic way to read the event is simple but worrisome: As the new US administration is bracing for a sit down with the Mullahs in an attempt to reduce tensions on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pasdaran power is already projected in space, in an attempt to seize influence in the whole region.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Walid Phares, author of The Confrontation, is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy.
« Close It
February 5, 2009 07:05 PM Link
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/irans_new_satellites_the_pasda.php
By Walid Phares
The launching of an Iranian satellite into orbit, said to be about "communications technology" and "earthquake monitoring," would have been a normal news item not exceeding the greater news report about India landing a space craft on the moon last month. But according to news agencies around the world, Western chanceries and national security agencies have taken the development "seriously." Associated Press and the BBC described reactions as "nervous." Although the debate about the value of Iranian space technology and commercial rocket capacity usually concludes that the Mullah regime is far away from reaching a respectable level, many defense analysts dismiss the issue as about the sole industrialization of the Islamic Republic: In fact it is about the "weaponization" of the satellite. Obviously this one launch may not be the crossing for the line, but the first step was accomplished and statements were made about the immediate following steps. The quasi consensus today is about the strategic intention of Tehran's war room, solidly in the hands of the Pasdaran. As I argued in discussions I had on France 24 TV and the BBC this week, the space program is one component of a regional strategic deployment. Hence it deserves to be analyzed from this perspective. Following is a short article published in Human Events
Read More »
Iran-Safir-satellite-carrier6.jpg
The Associated Press revealed to the world Tuesday that "according to Tehran, Iran has successfully sent its first domestically made satellite into orbit, as announced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad." But while the Iranian President claimed the move was to develop "science for friendship, brotherhood and justice," AP noted this was "a significant step in an ambitious space program that has worried many international observers."
The debate over the Iranian space program is going to look like the cacophony over its nuclear ambitions. Per AP, "Iran has said it wants to put its own satellites into orbit to monitor natural disasters in the earthquake-prone nation and improve its telecommunications."
Over the next weeks and months, Iran’s state propaganda machine and their sympathizers in the West will rush to praise the genuine scientific goals of the program while national security experts will look to find suspicious components in the program. But AP was quick to provide an eye opener in its first report, a golden revelation in words coming from Tehran: "Iranian officials point to America's use of satellites to monitor Afghanistan and Iraq and say they need similar abilities for their security." And that's the beginning of the depths this problem sinks to.
It doesn't take rocket scientists to figure out the first priority of the Iranian regime as it launches this rocket: to achieve an intelligence capability that only satellites can provide. They can not only intercept radio, satellite and e-mail communications but they can -- if highly enough developed -- also track the movement of military and economic assets.
Though Russia has sold Iran enormously capable anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems to protect its nuclear facilities, they haven’t given Iran the global detection capabilities that satellites do. Any attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities would be vastly harder given satellite radars and detection systems.
Iran’s apologists will rush to claim that Iran is still years away from competing with the US and Europe in this field. But once one satellite is up and observing and transmitting the next will bear higher more developed technology and its military function can be morphed to even threaten the single greatest vulnerability the US military and intelligence agencies have: the defenselessness of our satellite systems.
AP reports: "Iran hopes to launch three more satellites by 2010, the government has said." Once a web is installed, the strategic capacity of Tehran in intercepting moves aimed at its nuclear and other installations will increase. By 2010 and beyond Iran’s strategic weapons system is projected to develop further. By 2012, it may have reached the feared benchmark of possessing the nuclear weapons, the delivery systems and the satellite capacity to detect any action against them.
The Iranian regime has a strategic agenda which is clear and pronounced: Expansion in the region. All other developments of military, intelligence and technological nature are at the service of such world view. Had Tehran not been the seat of a radical ideological project with tentacles reaching as far as Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza and the rest of the world -- the placing of a single communications satellite in space to "check earthquakes" would be a nice news item. But the earthquakes the Iranian regime is looking for are of a different nature: they involve a massive change in the political and identity landscape of a whole region.
By now, the most realistic way to read the event is simple but worrisome: As the new US administration is bracing for a sit down with the Mullahs in an attempt to reduce tensions on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pasdaran power is already projected in space, in an attempt to seize influence in the whole region.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Walid Phares, author of The Confrontation, is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy.
« Close It
February 5, 2009 07:05 PM Link
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/irans_new_satellites_the_pasda.php
Friday, February 6, 2009
The Empire v. The Graveyard Whistling Past the Afghan Graveyard, Where Empires Go To Die by Tom Engelhardt
The Empire v. The Graveyard
Whistling Past the Afghan Graveyard, Where Empires Go To Die
by Tom Engelhardt
It is now a commonplace -- as a lead article in the New York Times's Week in Review pointed out recently -- that Afghanistan is "the graveyard of empires." Given Barack Obama's call for a greater focus on the Afghan War ("we took our eye off the ball when we invaded Iraq..."), and given indications that a "surge" of U.S. troops is about to get underway there, Afghanistan's dangers have been much in the news lately. Some of the writing on this subject, including recent essays by Juan Cole at Salon.com, Robert Dreyfuss at the Nation, and John Robertson at the War in Context website, has been incisive on just how the new administration's policy initiatives might transform Afghanistan and the increasingly unhinged Pakistani tribal borderlands into "Obama's War."
In other words, "the graveyard" has been getting its due. Far less attention has been paid to the "empire" part of the equation. And there's a good reason for that -- at least in Washington. Despite escalating worries about the deteriorating situation, no one in our nation's capital is ready to believe that Afghanistan could actually be the "graveyard" for the American role as the dominant hegemon on this planet.
In truth, to give "empire" its due you would have to start with a reassessment of how the Cold War ended. In 1989, which now seems centuries ago, the Berlin Wall came down; in 1991, to the amazement of the U.S. intelligence community, influential pundits, inside-the-Beltway think-tankers, and Washington's politicians, the Soviet Union, that "evil empire," that colossus of repression, that mortal enemy through nearly half a century of threatened nuclear MADness -- as in "mutually assured destruction" -- simply evaporated, almost without violence. (Soviet troops, camped out in the relatively cushy outposts of Eastern Europe, especially the former East Germany, were in no more hurry to come home to the economic misery of a collapsed empire than U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa, Japan, are likely to be in the future.)
In Washington where, in 1991, everything was visibly still standing, a stunned silence and a certain unwillingness to believe that the enemy of almost half a century was no more would quickly be overtaken by a sense of triumphalism. A multigenerational struggle had ended with only one of its super-participants still on its feet.
The conclusion seemed too obvious to belabor. Right before our eyes, the USSR had miraculously disappeared into the dustbin of history with only a desperate, impoverished Russia, shorn of its "near abroad," to replace it; ergo, we were the victors; we were, as everyone began to say with relish, the planet's "sole superpower." Huzzah!
Masters of the Universe
The Greeks, of course, had a word for it: "hubris." The ancient Greek playwrights would have assumed that we were in for a fall from the heights. But that thought crossed few minds in Washington (or on Wall Street) in those years.
Instead, our political and financial movers and shakers began to act as if the planet were truly ours (and other powers, including the Europeans and the Japanese, sometimes seemed to agree). To suggest at the time, as the odd scholar of imperial decline did, that there might have been no winners and two losers in the Cold War, that the weaker superpower had simply left the scene first, while the stronger, less hollowed out superpower was inching its way toward the same exit, was to speak to the deaf.
In the 1990s, "globalization" -- the worldwide spread of the Golden Arches, the Swoosh, and Mickey Mouse -- was on all lips in Washington, while the men who ran Wall Street were regularly referred to, and came to refer to themselves, as "masters of the universe."
The phrase was originally used by Tom Wolfe. It was the brand name of the superhero action figures his protagonist's daughter plays with in his 1987 novel Bonfire of the Vanities. ("On Wall Street he and a few others -- how many? three hundred, four hundred, five hundred? had become precisely that... Masters of the Universe...") As a result, the label initially had something of Wolfe's cheekiness about it. In the post-Cold War world, however, it soon enough became purely self-congratulatory.
In those years, when the economies of other countries suddenly cratered, Washington sent in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to "discipline" them. That was the actual term of tradecraft. To the immense pain of whole societies, the IMF regularly used local or regional disaster to pry open countries to the deregulatory wonders of "the Washington consensus." (Just imagine how Americans would react if, today, the IMF arrived at our battered doors with a similar menu of must-dos!)
Now, as the planet totters financially, while from Germany to Russia and China, world leaders blame the Bush administration's deregulatory blindness and Wall Street's derivative shenanigans for the financial hollowing out of the global economy, it's far more apparent that those titans of finance were actually masters of a flim-flam universe. Retrospectively, it's clearer that, in those post-Cold War years, Wall Street was already heading for the exits, that it was less a planetary economic tiger than a monstrously lucrative paper tiger. Someday, it might be a commonplace to say the same of Washington.
Almost twenty years later, in fact, it may finally be growing more acceptable to suggest that certain comparisons between the two Cold War superpowers were apt. As David Leonhardt of the New York Times pointed out recently:
"Richard Freeman, a Harvard economist, argues that the U.S. bubble economy had something in common with the old Soviet economy. The Soviet Union's growth was artificially raised by huge industrial output that ended up having little use. America's was artificially raised by mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and even the occasional Ponzi scheme."
Today, when it comes to Wall Street, you can feel the anger rising on Main Street as Americans grasp that those supposed masters of the universe actually hollowed out their world and brought immense suffering down on them. They understand what those former masters of financial firms, who handed out $18.4 billion in bonuses to their employees at the end of 2008, clearly don't. John Thain, former CEO of Merrill Lynch, for instance, still continues to defend his purchase of a $35,000 antique commode for his office, as well as the $4 billion in bonuses he dealt out to the mini-masters under him in a quarter in which his group racked up more than $15 billion in losses, in a year in which his firm's losses reached $27 billion.
At least now, however, no one -- except perhaps Thain himself -- would mistake the Thains for masters rather than charlatans, or the U.S. for a financial superpower riding high rather than a hollowed out economic powerhouse laid low.
As it happens, however, there was another set of all-American "masters of the universe," even if never given that label. I'm speaking of the top officials of our national security state, the key players in foreign and military policy. They, too, came to believe that the planet was their oyster. They came to believe as well that, uniquely in the history of empires, global domination might be theirs. They began to dream that they might oversee a new Rome or imperial Great Britain, but of a kind never before encountered, and that the competitive Great Game played by previous rivalrous Great Powers had been reduced to solitaire.
For them, the very idea that the U.S. might be the other loser in the Cold War was beyond the pale. And that was hardly surprising. Ahead of them, after all, they thought they saw clear sailing, not graveyards. Hence, Afghanistan.
Twice in the Same Graveyard
It's here, of course, that things get eerie. I mean, not just a graveyard, but the same two superpowers and the very same graveyard. In November 2001, knowing intimately what had happened to the USSR in Afghanistan, the Bush administration invaded anyway -- and with a clear intent to build bases, occupy the country, and install a government of its choice.
When it comes to the neocon architects of global Bushism, hubris remains a weak word. Breathless at the thought of the supposed power of the U.S. military to crush anything in its path, they were blind to other power realities and to history. They equated power with the power to destroy.
Believing that the military force at their bidding was nothing short of invincible, and that whatever had happened to the Soviets couldn't possibly happen to them, they launched their invasion. They came, they saw, they conquered, they celebrated, they settled in, and then they invaded again -- this time in Iraq. A trillion dollars in wasted taxpayer funds later, we look a lot more like the Russians.
What made this whole process so remarkable was that there was no other superpower to ambush them in Afghanistan, as the U.S. had once done to the Soviet Union. George W. Bush's crew, it turned out, didn't need another superpower, not when they were perfectly capable of driving themselves off that Afghan cliff and into the graveyard below with no more help than Osama bin Laden could muster.
They promoted a convenient all-purpose fantasy explanation for their global actions, but also gave in to it, and it has yet to be dispelled, even now that the American economy has gone over its own cliff. Under the rubric of the Global War on Terror, they insisted that the greatest danger to the planet's "sole superpower" came from a ragtag group of fanatics backed by the relatively modest moneys a rich Saudi could get his hands on. Indeed, while the Bush administration paid no attention whatsoever, bin Laden had launched a devastating and televisually spectacular set of assaults on major American landmarks of power -- financial, military, and (except for the crash of Flight 93 in a field in Pennsylvania) political. Keep in mind, however, that those attacks had been launched as much from Hamburg and Florida as from the Afghan backlands.
Given the history of the graveyard, Americans should probably have locked their plane doors, put in some reasonable protections domestically, and taken their time going after bin Laden. Al-Qaeda was certainly capable of doing real harm every couple of years, but their strength remained minimal, their "caliphate" a joke, and Afghanistan -- for anyone but Afghans -- truly represented the backlands of the planet. Even now, we could undoubtedly go home and, disastrous as the situation there (and in Pakistan) has become under our ministrations, do less harm than we're going to do with our prospective surges in the years to come.
The irony is that, had they not been so blinded by triumphalism, Bush's people really wouldn't have needed to know much to avoid catastrophe. This wasn't atomic science or brain surgery. They needn't have been experts on Central Asia, or mastered Pashto or Dari, or recalled the history of the anti-Soviet War that had ended barely a decade earlier, or even read the prophetic November 2001 essay in Foreign Affairs magazine, "Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires," by former CIA station chief in Pakistan Michael Bearden, which concluded: "The United States must proceed with caution -- or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history."
They could simply have visited a local Barnes & Noble, grabbed a paperback copy of George MacDonald Fraser's rollicking novel Flashman, and followed his blackguard of an anti-hero through England's disastrous Afghan War of 1839-1842 from which only one Englishman returned alive. In addition to a night's reading pleasure, that would have provided any neocon national security manager with all he needed to know when it came to getting in and out of Afghanistan fast.
Or subsequently, they could have spent a little time with the Russian ambassador to Kabul, a KGB veteran of the Soviet Union's Afghan catastrophe. He complained to John Burns of the New York Times last year that neither Americans nor NATO representatives were willing to listen to him, even though the U.S. had repeated "all of our mistakes," which he carefully enumerated. "Now," he added, "they're making mistakes of their own, ones for which we do not own the copyright."
True, the Obama crew at the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, the Pentagon, and in the U.S. military, even holdovers like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Centcom Commander David Petraeus, are not the ones who got us into this. Yes, they are more realistic about the world. Yes, they believe -- and say so -- that we're, at best, in a stalemate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that it's going to be truly tough sledding, that it probably will take years and years, and that the end result won't be victory. Yes, they want some "new thinking," some actual negotiations with factions of the Taliban, some kind of a grand regional bargain, and above all, they want to "lower expectations."
As Gates summed things up in congressional testimony recently:
"This is going to be a long slog, and frankly, my view is that we need to be very careful about the nature of the goals we set for ourselves in Afghanistan... If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose, because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience and money."
Okay, in Norse mythology, Valhalla may be the great hall for dead warriors and the Secretary of Defense may have meant an "Asian Eden," but cut him a little slack: at least he acknowledged that there were financial limits to the American role in the world. That's a new note in official Washington, where global military and diplomatic policy have, until now, existed in splendid isolation from the economic meltdown sweeping the country and the planet.
Similarly, official Washington is increasingly willing to talk about a "multi-polar world," rather than the unipolar fantasy planet on which the first-term Bush presidency dwelled. Its denizens are even ready to imagine a relatively distant moment when the U.S. will have "reduced dominance," as Global Trends 2025, a futuristic report produced for the new President by the National Intelligence Council, put it. Or as Thomas Fingar, the U.S. intelligence community's "top analyst," suggested of the same moment:
"[T]he U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished over this period of time... [T]he overwhelming dominance that the United States has enjoyed in the international system in military, political, economic, and arguably, cultural arenas is eroding and will erode at an accelerating pace with the partial exception of military."
Still, it's a long way from fretting about finances, while calling for more dollars for the Pentagon, to imagining that we already might be something less than the dominant hegemon on this planet, or that the urge to tame the backlands of Afghanistan, half a world from home, makes no sense at all. Not for us, not for the Afghans, not for anybody (except maybe al-Qaeda).
For all their differences with Bush's first-term neocons, here's what the Obama team still has in common with them -- and it's no small thing: they still think the U.S. won the Cold War. They still haven't accepted that they can't, even if in a subtler fashion than the Busheviks, control how this world spins; they still can't imagine that the United States of America, as an imperial power, could possibly be heading for the exits.
Whistling Past the Graveyard
Back in 1979, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, plotting to draw the Soviets into a quagmire in Afghanistan, wrote President Jimmy Carter: "We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War."
In fact, the CIA-backed anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan that lasted through the 1980s would give the Soviets far worse. After all, while the Vietnam War was a defeat for the U.S., it was by no means a bankrupting one.
In 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev vividly described the Afghan War as a "bleeding wound." Three years later, by which time it had long been obvious that transfusions were hopeless, the Soviets withdrew. It turned out, however, that the bleeding still couldn't be staunched, and so the Soviet Union, with its sclerotic economy collapsing and "people power" rising on its peripheries, went down the tubes.
Hand it to the Bush administration, in the last seven-plus years the U.S. has essentially inflicted a version of the Soviets' "Afghanistan" on itself. Now the Obama team is attempting to remedy this disaster, but what new thinking there is remains, as far as we can tell, essentially tactical. Whether the new team's plans are more or less "successful" in Afghanistan and on the Pakistani border may, in the end, prove somewhat beside the point. The term Pyrrhic victory, meaning a triumph more costly than a loss, was made for just such moments.
After all, more than a trillion dollars later, with essentially nothing to show except an unbroken record of destruction, corruption, and an inability to build anything of value, the U.S. is only slowly drawing down its 140,000-plus troops in Iraq to a "mere" 40,000 or so, while surging yet more troops into Afghanistan to fight a counterinsurgency war, possibly for years to come. At the same time, the U.S. continues to expand its armed forces and to garrison the globe, even as it attempts to bail out an economy and banking system evidently at the edge of collapse. This is a sure-fire formula for further disaster -- unless the new administration took the unlikely decision to downsize the U.S. global mission in a major way.
Right now, Washington is whistling past the graveyard. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the question is no longer whether the U.S. is in command, but whether it can get out in time. If not, when the moment for a bailout comes, don't expect the other pressed powers of the planet to do for Washington what it has been willing to do for the John Thains of our world. The Europeans are already itching to get out of town. The Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, the Indians... who exactly will ride to our rescue?
Perhaps it would be more prudent to stop hanging out in graveyards. They are, after all, meant for burials, not resurrections.
© 2009 TomDispatch.com
Tom Engelhardt, who runs the Nation Institute's Tomdispatch.com ("a regular antidote to the mainstream media"), is the co-founder of the American Empire Project and, most recently, the author of Mission Unaccomplished: Tomdispatch Interviews with American Iconoclasts and Dissenters (Nation Books), the first collection of Tomdispatch interviews. His book, The End of Victory Culture (University of Massachusetts Press), has been thoroughly updated in a newly issued edition that deals with victory culture's crash-and-burn sequel in Iraq. He is the editor of the recently released The World According to TomDispatc: America and the Age of Empire.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/02/05-6
Whistling Past the Afghan Graveyard, Where Empires Go To Die
by Tom Engelhardt
It is now a commonplace -- as a lead article in the New York Times's Week in Review pointed out recently -- that Afghanistan is "the graveyard of empires." Given Barack Obama's call for a greater focus on the Afghan War ("we took our eye off the ball when we invaded Iraq..."), and given indications that a "surge" of U.S. troops is about to get underway there, Afghanistan's dangers have been much in the news lately. Some of the writing on this subject, including recent essays by Juan Cole at Salon.com, Robert Dreyfuss at the Nation, and John Robertson at the War in Context website, has been incisive on just how the new administration's policy initiatives might transform Afghanistan and the increasingly unhinged Pakistani tribal borderlands into "Obama's War."
In other words, "the graveyard" has been getting its due. Far less attention has been paid to the "empire" part of the equation. And there's a good reason for that -- at least in Washington. Despite escalating worries about the deteriorating situation, no one in our nation's capital is ready to believe that Afghanistan could actually be the "graveyard" for the American role as the dominant hegemon on this planet.
In truth, to give "empire" its due you would have to start with a reassessment of how the Cold War ended. In 1989, which now seems centuries ago, the Berlin Wall came down; in 1991, to the amazement of the U.S. intelligence community, influential pundits, inside-the-Beltway think-tankers, and Washington's politicians, the Soviet Union, that "evil empire," that colossus of repression, that mortal enemy through nearly half a century of threatened nuclear MADness -- as in "mutually assured destruction" -- simply evaporated, almost without violence. (Soviet troops, camped out in the relatively cushy outposts of Eastern Europe, especially the former East Germany, were in no more hurry to come home to the economic misery of a collapsed empire than U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa, Japan, are likely to be in the future.)
In Washington where, in 1991, everything was visibly still standing, a stunned silence and a certain unwillingness to believe that the enemy of almost half a century was no more would quickly be overtaken by a sense of triumphalism. A multigenerational struggle had ended with only one of its super-participants still on its feet.
The conclusion seemed too obvious to belabor. Right before our eyes, the USSR had miraculously disappeared into the dustbin of history with only a desperate, impoverished Russia, shorn of its "near abroad," to replace it; ergo, we were the victors; we were, as everyone began to say with relish, the planet's "sole superpower." Huzzah!
Masters of the Universe
The Greeks, of course, had a word for it: "hubris." The ancient Greek playwrights would have assumed that we were in for a fall from the heights. But that thought crossed few minds in Washington (or on Wall Street) in those years.
Instead, our political and financial movers and shakers began to act as if the planet were truly ours (and other powers, including the Europeans and the Japanese, sometimes seemed to agree). To suggest at the time, as the odd scholar of imperial decline did, that there might have been no winners and two losers in the Cold War, that the weaker superpower had simply left the scene first, while the stronger, less hollowed out superpower was inching its way toward the same exit, was to speak to the deaf.
In the 1990s, "globalization" -- the worldwide spread of the Golden Arches, the Swoosh, and Mickey Mouse -- was on all lips in Washington, while the men who ran Wall Street were regularly referred to, and came to refer to themselves, as "masters of the universe."
The phrase was originally used by Tom Wolfe. It was the brand name of the superhero action figures his protagonist's daughter plays with in his 1987 novel Bonfire of the Vanities. ("On Wall Street he and a few others -- how many? three hundred, four hundred, five hundred? had become precisely that... Masters of the Universe...") As a result, the label initially had something of Wolfe's cheekiness about it. In the post-Cold War world, however, it soon enough became purely self-congratulatory.
In those years, when the economies of other countries suddenly cratered, Washington sent in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to "discipline" them. That was the actual term of tradecraft. To the immense pain of whole societies, the IMF regularly used local or regional disaster to pry open countries to the deregulatory wonders of "the Washington consensus." (Just imagine how Americans would react if, today, the IMF arrived at our battered doors with a similar menu of must-dos!)
Now, as the planet totters financially, while from Germany to Russia and China, world leaders blame the Bush administration's deregulatory blindness and Wall Street's derivative shenanigans for the financial hollowing out of the global economy, it's far more apparent that those titans of finance were actually masters of a flim-flam universe. Retrospectively, it's clearer that, in those post-Cold War years, Wall Street was already heading for the exits, that it was less a planetary economic tiger than a monstrously lucrative paper tiger. Someday, it might be a commonplace to say the same of Washington.
Almost twenty years later, in fact, it may finally be growing more acceptable to suggest that certain comparisons between the two Cold War superpowers were apt. As David Leonhardt of the New York Times pointed out recently:
"Richard Freeman, a Harvard economist, argues that the U.S. bubble economy had something in common with the old Soviet economy. The Soviet Union's growth was artificially raised by huge industrial output that ended up having little use. America's was artificially raised by mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and even the occasional Ponzi scheme."
Today, when it comes to Wall Street, you can feel the anger rising on Main Street as Americans grasp that those supposed masters of the universe actually hollowed out their world and brought immense suffering down on them. They understand what those former masters of financial firms, who handed out $18.4 billion in bonuses to their employees at the end of 2008, clearly don't. John Thain, former CEO of Merrill Lynch, for instance, still continues to defend his purchase of a $35,000 antique commode for his office, as well as the $4 billion in bonuses he dealt out to the mini-masters under him in a quarter in which his group racked up more than $15 billion in losses, in a year in which his firm's losses reached $27 billion.
At least now, however, no one -- except perhaps Thain himself -- would mistake the Thains for masters rather than charlatans, or the U.S. for a financial superpower riding high rather than a hollowed out economic powerhouse laid low.
As it happens, however, there was another set of all-American "masters of the universe," even if never given that label. I'm speaking of the top officials of our national security state, the key players in foreign and military policy. They, too, came to believe that the planet was their oyster. They came to believe as well that, uniquely in the history of empires, global domination might be theirs. They began to dream that they might oversee a new Rome or imperial Great Britain, but of a kind never before encountered, and that the competitive Great Game played by previous rivalrous Great Powers had been reduced to solitaire.
For them, the very idea that the U.S. might be the other loser in the Cold War was beyond the pale. And that was hardly surprising. Ahead of them, after all, they thought they saw clear sailing, not graveyards. Hence, Afghanistan.
Twice in the Same Graveyard
It's here, of course, that things get eerie. I mean, not just a graveyard, but the same two superpowers and the very same graveyard. In November 2001, knowing intimately what had happened to the USSR in Afghanistan, the Bush administration invaded anyway -- and with a clear intent to build bases, occupy the country, and install a government of its choice.
When it comes to the neocon architects of global Bushism, hubris remains a weak word. Breathless at the thought of the supposed power of the U.S. military to crush anything in its path, they were blind to other power realities and to history. They equated power with the power to destroy.
Believing that the military force at their bidding was nothing short of invincible, and that whatever had happened to the Soviets couldn't possibly happen to them, they launched their invasion. They came, they saw, they conquered, they celebrated, they settled in, and then they invaded again -- this time in Iraq. A trillion dollars in wasted taxpayer funds later, we look a lot more like the Russians.
What made this whole process so remarkable was that there was no other superpower to ambush them in Afghanistan, as the U.S. had once done to the Soviet Union. George W. Bush's crew, it turned out, didn't need another superpower, not when they were perfectly capable of driving themselves off that Afghan cliff and into the graveyard below with no more help than Osama bin Laden could muster.
They promoted a convenient all-purpose fantasy explanation for their global actions, but also gave in to it, and it has yet to be dispelled, even now that the American economy has gone over its own cliff. Under the rubric of the Global War on Terror, they insisted that the greatest danger to the planet's "sole superpower" came from a ragtag group of fanatics backed by the relatively modest moneys a rich Saudi could get his hands on. Indeed, while the Bush administration paid no attention whatsoever, bin Laden had launched a devastating and televisually spectacular set of assaults on major American landmarks of power -- financial, military, and (except for the crash of Flight 93 in a field in Pennsylvania) political. Keep in mind, however, that those attacks had been launched as much from Hamburg and Florida as from the Afghan backlands.
Given the history of the graveyard, Americans should probably have locked their plane doors, put in some reasonable protections domestically, and taken their time going after bin Laden. Al-Qaeda was certainly capable of doing real harm every couple of years, but their strength remained minimal, their "caliphate" a joke, and Afghanistan -- for anyone but Afghans -- truly represented the backlands of the planet. Even now, we could undoubtedly go home and, disastrous as the situation there (and in Pakistan) has become under our ministrations, do less harm than we're going to do with our prospective surges in the years to come.
The irony is that, had they not been so blinded by triumphalism, Bush's people really wouldn't have needed to know much to avoid catastrophe. This wasn't atomic science or brain surgery. They needn't have been experts on Central Asia, or mastered Pashto or Dari, or recalled the history of the anti-Soviet War that had ended barely a decade earlier, or even read the prophetic November 2001 essay in Foreign Affairs magazine, "Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires," by former CIA station chief in Pakistan Michael Bearden, which concluded: "The United States must proceed with caution -- or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history."
They could simply have visited a local Barnes & Noble, grabbed a paperback copy of George MacDonald Fraser's rollicking novel Flashman, and followed his blackguard of an anti-hero through England's disastrous Afghan War of 1839-1842 from which only one Englishman returned alive. In addition to a night's reading pleasure, that would have provided any neocon national security manager with all he needed to know when it came to getting in and out of Afghanistan fast.
Or subsequently, they could have spent a little time with the Russian ambassador to Kabul, a KGB veteran of the Soviet Union's Afghan catastrophe. He complained to John Burns of the New York Times last year that neither Americans nor NATO representatives were willing to listen to him, even though the U.S. had repeated "all of our mistakes," which he carefully enumerated. "Now," he added, "they're making mistakes of their own, ones for which we do not own the copyright."
True, the Obama crew at the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, the Pentagon, and in the U.S. military, even holdovers like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Centcom Commander David Petraeus, are not the ones who got us into this. Yes, they are more realistic about the world. Yes, they believe -- and say so -- that we're, at best, in a stalemate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that it's going to be truly tough sledding, that it probably will take years and years, and that the end result won't be victory. Yes, they want some "new thinking," some actual negotiations with factions of the Taliban, some kind of a grand regional bargain, and above all, they want to "lower expectations."
As Gates summed things up in congressional testimony recently:
"This is going to be a long slog, and frankly, my view is that we need to be very careful about the nature of the goals we set for ourselves in Afghanistan... If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose, because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience and money."
Okay, in Norse mythology, Valhalla may be the great hall for dead warriors and the Secretary of Defense may have meant an "Asian Eden," but cut him a little slack: at least he acknowledged that there were financial limits to the American role in the world. That's a new note in official Washington, where global military and diplomatic policy have, until now, existed in splendid isolation from the economic meltdown sweeping the country and the planet.
Similarly, official Washington is increasingly willing to talk about a "multi-polar world," rather than the unipolar fantasy planet on which the first-term Bush presidency dwelled. Its denizens are even ready to imagine a relatively distant moment when the U.S. will have "reduced dominance," as Global Trends 2025, a futuristic report produced for the new President by the National Intelligence Council, put it. Or as Thomas Fingar, the U.S. intelligence community's "top analyst," suggested of the same moment:
"[T]he U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished over this period of time... [T]he overwhelming dominance that the United States has enjoyed in the international system in military, political, economic, and arguably, cultural arenas is eroding and will erode at an accelerating pace with the partial exception of military."
Still, it's a long way from fretting about finances, while calling for more dollars for the Pentagon, to imagining that we already might be something less than the dominant hegemon on this planet, or that the urge to tame the backlands of Afghanistan, half a world from home, makes no sense at all. Not for us, not for the Afghans, not for anybody (except maybe al-Qaeda).
For all their differences with Bush's first-term neocons, here's what the Obama team still has in common with them -- and it's no small thing: they still think the U.S. won the Cold War. They still haven't accepted that they can't, even if in a subtler fashion than the Busheviks, control how this world spins; they still can't imagine that the United States of America, as an imperial power, could possibly be heading for the exits.
Whistling Past the Graveyard
Back in 1979, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, plotting to draw the Soviets into a quagmire in Afghanistan, wrote President Jimmy Carter: "We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War."
In fact, the CIA-backed anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan that lasted through the 1980s would give the Soviets far worse. After all, while the Vietnam War was a defeat for the U.S., it was by no means a bankrupting one.
In 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev vividly described the Afghan War as a "bleeding wound." Three years later, by which time it had long been obvious that transfusions were hopeless, the Soviets withdrew. It turned out, however, that the bleeding still couldn't be staunched, and so the Soviet Union, with its sclerotic economy collapsing and "people power" rising on its peripheries, went down the tubes.
Hand it to the Bush administration, in the last seven-plus years the U.S. has essentially inflicted a version of the Soviets' "Afghanistan" on itself. Now the Obama team is attempting to remedy this disaster, but what new thinking there is remains, as far as we can tell, essentially tactical. Whether the new team's plans are more or less "successful" in Afghanistan and on the Pakistani border may, in the end, prove somewhat beside the point. The term Pyrrhic victory, meaning a triumph more costly than a loss, was made for just such moments.
After all, more than a trillion dollars later, with essentially nothing to show except an unbroken record of destruction, corruption, and an inability to build anything of value, the U.S. is only slowly drawing down its 140,000-plus troops in Iraq to a "mere" 40,000 or so, while surging yet more troops into Afghanistan to fight a counterinsurgency war, possibly for years to come. At the same time, the U.S. continues to expand its armed forces and to garrison the globe, even as it attempts to bail out an economy and banking system evidently at the edge of collapse. This is a sure-fire formula for further disaster -- unless the new administration took the unlikely decision to downsize the U.S. global mission in a major way.
Right now, Washington is whistling past the graveyard. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the question is no longer whether the U.S. is in command, but whether it can get out in time. If not, when the moment for a bailout comes, don't expect the other pressed powers of the planet to do for Washington what it has been willing to do for the John Thains of our world. The Europeans are already itching to get out of town. The Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, the Indians... who exactly will ride to our rescue?
Perhaps it would be more prudent to stop hanging out in graveyards. They are, after all, meant for burials, not resurrections.
© 2009 TomDispatch.com
Tom Engelhardt, who runs the Nation Institute's Tomdispatch.com ("a regular antidote to the mainstream media"), is the co-founder of the American Empire Project and, most recently, the author of Mission Unaccomplished: Tomdispatch Interviews with American Iconoclasts and Dissenters (Nation Books), the first collection of Tomdispatch interviews. His book, The End of Victory Culture (University of Massachusetts Press), has been thoroughly updated in a newly issued edition that deals with victory culture's crash-and-burn sequel in Iraq. He is the editor of the recently released The World According to TomDispatc: America and the Age of Empire.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/02/05-6
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Stratfor: Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence
Stratfor Logo
Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence
Russian power is in long-term decline. Compared to the Soviet Union in 1989, the Russian Federation has less than half the population, one-third the economic bulk, lower commodity production and vastly decreased industrial output. Demographically, Russia is both shrinking and aging at rates that have not been seen outside of wartime since the time of the Black Death. The educational system has stalled, so Russia is facing an impending slide in labor quantity and quality, which will make it difficult if not outright impossible for Russia to keep up with its advancing neighbors. The long-term prognosis is, at best, very poor.
But "long-term" is the operative term. Russian power today must not be measured in the terms that will dominate its existence in the future. Instead, it must be assessed dispassionately in relative terms against its neighbors and competitors. Of those neighbors, only China can compare to Russia regarding military and economic capability, and the two states are bending over backward to avoid an adversarial relationship. True, in 2009 Russia faces the most dire economic challenges since the 1998 ruble crash and debt default, but so do all the states in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Europe and the Baltics. In fact, since Russia maintains more reserve funds and currency reserves than all the states in this arc combined, Russia even maintains a financial edge over the competition. And even with the global recession placing very real limits on what Moscow can achieve financially — both at home and abroad — Russia has myriad tools that place countries of interest to it at the Kremlin's mercy. The Kremlin (rightly) fears that Russia's days are numbered, but it has a simple plan: Re-establish as large of a buffer zone around the Russian core as possible while the balance of power remains in Russia's favor.
For Russia, most of the post-Cold War era was a chronicle of retreat from previous prominence, culminating in the West's decision in 2008 to recognize the independence of the former Serbian province of Kosovo — a decision that Russia campaigned long and hard to prevent. But in August 2008, Russia invaded its former territory of Georgia and proved to the world that Russian power was far from spent, marking the inflection point on the question of Russia's resurgence. The year 2009 will be about Russia using its military, intelligence and energy might to extend its influence back into its periphery.
Russia's primary target in 2009 is Ukraine, a country uniquely critical to Russia's geopolitical position and uniquely vulnerable to Russia's energy, intelligence and military tools — and then there is the influence Russia can wield over Ukraine's large Russian-speaking population. Russia has many other regions that it wants to bring into its fold while it can still act decisively — the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, the Baltics and Poland — but Ukraine is at the top of the list.
Ukraine occupies a piece of territory that is completely integrated into Russia's agricultural, industrial, energy and transport networks. Its physical position makes it crucial to Russia's ability to project power. A Ukraine at odds with Russia constrains Russia's position in the Caucasus, limits Russian power in Europe, threatens the entire Russian core and puts Moscow within spitting distance of a hostile border. A defiant Ukraine not only forces Russia to be purely defensive, but actually makes Russian territory indefensible from the west and south, as there are no natural boundaries to hide behind. In contrast, an acquiescent Ukraine allows Russia to project power outward into Central Europe and gives Russia greater access to the Black Sea and thus the Mediterranean and outside world.
Russia lost the territory in 1992 with the Soviet collapse, but managed to keep Ukraine a political no-mans-land. In 2004, however, the Orange Revolution brought to power a government not just oriented toward the West but downright hostile to Moscow. This sparked a panic in the Kremlin that prompted a foreign policy leading to Russia's resurgence. That resurgence is now stable enough that the Kremlin feels it can return Ukraine to the Russian orbit — forcibly, if necessary.
Russia has no shortage of tools to use on Ukraine to mold it into a shape more amenable to Russian interests. Russia backs and bankrolls Viktor Yanukovich, Yulia Timoshenko and Rinat Akhmetov — three of Ukraine's four most powerful political forces. Russia supplies Ukraine with two-thirds of its natural gas and four-fifths of its energy needs, and is not shy about using that control to damage the government. Ukraine is integrated into the Russian industrial heartland, and Russian firms directly control large portions of the Ukrainian metals industries. Russian control over several of Ukraine's ports links several Ukrainian oligarchs — and some Ukrainian organized crime syndicates — directly to the Kremlin.
Ukraine is not well equipped to resist Russia's efforts. The United States has been working with Ukrainian intelligence (which is currently under President Viktor Yushchenko), sparking a fierce battle within the Ukrainian intelligence services, which spun off from the KGB. Yushchenko is trying to purge ex-KGB forces and put in younger, American-trained staff members, but the Russian intelligence surge into the country since 2004 has been massive and is hard to counteract. Other Western intelligence agencies are simply too far behind to make much of a difference; only the Turks have made a notable effort. The rest of the "Western" moves are largely limited to bureaucratized American processes, largely financial and social, which simply are no match for the powerful, multi-vectored effort that Russia is making.
Russia is perfectly capable of achieving its goals in Ukraine on its own. The natural gas crisis at the start of 2009 is a testament to Russian capability, but Moscow has shown that it is willing to accept a deal that will make Ukraine more malleable. Specifically, the United States is attempting to forge a means of supplying its growing troop commitment in Afghanistan without becoming more dependent upon Pakistan. Russia is willing to allow American supplies to transit Russia and Russian-influenced Central Asia. But the price is Yushchenko's ouster and an agreement that the United States will not parlay its transit routes across Central Asia into actual influence over the region. And just in case the United States decides to push for more, Russia has established a network of options in the Middle East to complicate American efforts there should the need arise (for more information, see the Middle East section of the Annual Forecast), and is even putting some flags in the ground in Latin America.
Under the Obama administration, American foreign policy's initial focus is on fighting the Afghan war. So the question regarding the Russian resurgence is not what the Americans will give the Russians, but how much and how publicly. This will give the United States greater leverage in dealing with what it has identified as its prime concern, but at the cost of both creating a greater challenge in the future and undermining the strength of the Transatlantic alliance structure.
Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence
Russian power is in long-term decline. Compared to the Soviet Union in 1989, the Russian Federation has less than half the population, one-third the economic bulk, lower commodity production and vastly decreased industrial output. Demographically, Russia is both shrinking and aging at rates that have not been seen outside of wartime since the time of the Black Death. The educational system has stalled, so Russia is facing an impending slide in labor quantity and quality, which will make it difficult if not outright impossible for Russia to keep up with its advancing neighbors. The long-term prognosis is, at best, very poor.
But "long-term" is the operative term. Russian power today must not be measured in the terms that will dominate its existence in the future. Instead, it must be assessed dispassionately in relative terms against its neighbors and competitors. Of those neighbors, only China can compare to Russia regarding military and economic capability, and the two states are bending over backward to avoid an adversarial relationship. True, in 2009 Russia faces the most dire economic challenges since the 1998 ruble crash and debt default, but so do all the states in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Europe and the Baltics. In fact, since Russia maintains more reserve funds and currency reserves than all the states in this arc combined, Russia even maintains a financial edge over the competition. And even with the global recession placing very real limits on what Moscow can achieve financially — both at home and abroad — Russia has myriad tools that place countries of interest to it at the Kremlin's mercy. The Kremlin (rightly) fears that Russia's days are numbered, but it has a simple plan: Re-establish as large of a buffer zone around the Russian core as possible while the balance of power remains in Russia's favor.
For Russia, most of the post-Cold War era was a chronicle of retreat from previous prominence, culminating in the West's decision in 2008 to recognize the independence of the former Serbian province of Kosovo — a decision that Russia campaigned long and hard to prevent. But in August 2008, Russia invaded its former territory of Georgia and proved to the world that Russian power was far from spent, marking the inflection point on the question of Russia's resurgence. The year 2009 will be about Russia using its military, intelligence and energy might to extend its influence back into its periphery.
Russia's primary target in 2009 is Ukraine, a country uniquely critical to Russia's geopolitical position and uniquely vulnerable to Russia's energy, intelligence and military tools — and then there is the influence Russia can wield over Ukraine's large Russian-speaking population. Russia has many other regions that it wants to bring into its fold while it can still act decisively — the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, the Baltics and Poland — but Ukraine is at the top of the list.
Ukraine occupies a piece of territory that is completely integrated into Russia's agricultural, industrial, energy and transport networks. Its physical position makes it crucial to Russia's ability to project power. A Ukraine at odds with Russia constrains Russia's position in the Caucasus, limits Russian power in Europe, threatens the entire Russian core and puts Moscow within spitting distance of a hostile border. A defiant Ukraine not only forces Russia to be purely defensive, but actually makes Russian territory indefensible from the west and south, as there are no natural boundaries to hide behind. In contrast, an acquiescent Ukraine allows Russia to project power outward into Central Europe and gives Russia greater access to the Black Sea and thus the Mediterranean and outside world.
Russia lost the territory in 1992 with the Soviet collapse, but managed to keep Ukraine a political no-mans-land. In 2004, however, the Orange Revolution brought to power a government not just oriented toward the West but downright hostile to Moscow. This sparked a panic in the Kremlin that prompted a foreign policy leading to Russia's resurgence. That resurgence is now stable enough that the Kremlin feels it can return Ukraine to the Russian orbit — forcibly, if necessary.
Russia has no shortage of tools to use on Ukraine to mold it into a shape more amenable to Russian interests. Russia backs and bankrolls Viktor Yanukovich, Yulia Timoshenko and Rinat Akhmetov — three of Ukraine's four most powerful political forces. Russia supplies Ukraine with two-thirds of its natural gas and four-fifths of its energy needs, and is not shy about using that control to damage the government. Ukraine is integrated into the Russian industrial heartland, and Russian firms directly control large portions of the Ukrainian metals industries. Russian control over several of Ukraine's ports links several Ukrainian oligarchs — and some Ukrainian organized crime syndicates — directly to the Kremlin.
Ukraine is not well equipped to resist Russia's efforts. The United States has been working with Ukrainian intelligence (which is currently under President Viktor Yushchenko), sparking a fierce battle within the Ukrainian intelligence services, which spun off from the KGB. Yushchenko is trying to purge ex-KGB forces and put in younger, American-trained staff members, but the Russian intelligence surge into the country since 2004 has been massive and is hard to counteract. Other Western intelligence agencies are simply too far behind to make much of a difference; only the Turks have made a notable effort. The rest of the "Western" moves are largely limited to bureaucratized American processes, largely financial and social, which simply are no match for the powerful, multi-vectored effort that Russia is making.
Russia is perfectly capable of achieving its goals in Ukraine on its own. The natural gas crisis at the start of 2009 is a testament to Russian capability, but Moscow has shown that it is willing to accept a deal that will make Ukraine more malleable. Specifically, the United States is attempting to forge a means of supplying its growing troop commitment in Afghanistan without becoming more dependent upon Pakistan. Russia is willing to allow American supplies to transit Russia and Russian-influenced Central Asia. But the price is Yushchenko's ouster and an agreement that the United States will not parlay its transit routes across Central Asia into actual influence over the region. And just in case the United States decides to push for more, Russia has established a network of options in the Middle East to complicate American efforts there should the need arise (for more information, see the Middle East section of the Annual Forecast), and is even putting some flags in the ground in Latin America.
Under the Obama administration, American foreign policy's initial focus is on fighting the Afghan war. So the question regarding the Russian resurgence is not what the Americans will give the Russians, but how much and how publicly. This will give the United States greater leverage in dealing with what it has identified as its prime concern, but at the cost of both creating a greater challenge in the future and undermining the strength of the Transatlantic alliance structure.
Iranians wary of Obama's approach
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2/5/09
Iranians wary of Obama's approach
Despite President Obama's offer to extend a hand if Iran 'unclenched its fist,' Iranian officials say his choice of diplomats calls into question his commitment to change.
Scott Peterson
Tehran, Iran - Expectations soared in Iran with the election of President Barack Obama. He promised to meet Iranian leaders without preconditions, in a fresh American bid to engage Iran and end 30 years of mutual hostility. And he was not President Bush.
But even as Mr. Obama has vowed to extend America's hand in friendship if Iran "unclenched its fist," Iranians say other US signals raise doubts that real change is coming.
From Obama's choice of US officials who have expressed hawkish views on Iran in the past to continued use of some Bush-era language – such as the assumption that Iran harbors a nuclear-weapons program – officials and analysts in Tehran say suspicion remains about American motives.
A new Iran strategy topped the agenda at a meeting in Germany on Wednesday between a senior US diplomat and counterparts from Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday warned Iran of "consequences" if it did not comply with UN Security Council demands to suspend sensitive nuclear work.
"These are not positive signs, they are posturing; they are speaking about tactics, not a change of strategy," says Seyed Mohammad Marandi, head of North American studies at the University of Tehran, who is a dual US-Iran citizen. Iranian leaders "are willing to give Obama a chance. [But] the first move in the eyes of Iranians is not talks but a change of substance, to change the demonization."
Iran questions Obama's outreach
Iran has its own demonization issues, after three decades of fiery anti-Americanism encapsulated in the regular chant "Death to America!" Questioning Obama's outreach last week, Iran's arch-conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivered his own laundry list of Iranian grievances that stretched back 56 years.
"We have not seen a new outlook yet – there is still the 'big stick and the big carrot,' which is not honoring the Iranian people," Ali Larijani, Iran's speaker of Parliament and former top nuclear negotiator, said this week. "If there is a new way [from the US], someone should clearly state that new way."
Obama's silence on "atrocities" committed by Israel in Gaza, Mr. Larijani said – even though Obama was still president-elect during the 22-day conflict that left more than 1,330 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead – was a missed chance for a new stance. During protests about Gaza outside Western embassies in Tehran last month, demonstrators burned pictures of Obama.
Iran was disappointed, Larijani said, "but we have not lost hope" that the US-Iran relationship can improve.
The Obama administration is conducting a comprehensive review of Iran policy that has for years been defined by inclusion in Mr. Bush's "axis of evil," by regular hints at regime change, and by threats of military action to stop Iran's nuclear program.
"Our viewpoint is, the US strategy to Iran has not changed, but the tactics have changed," says Hamidreza Taraghi, a conservative politician. "When the US says to open your fist, our fist has always been in defense. It's the US that has always had its fist clenched."
Even during the barely two weeks of Obama's tenure, Mr. Taraghi charges, "the CIA has continued its soft plans to overthrow the Islamic Republic" and the "drum beat of sanctions is continuing."
Iran wary of hawkish diplomacy
Officials in Iran and Western diplomats have been surprised by Obama's picks for "tough and direct" talks with Iran.
As a presidential candidate last year, Mrs. Clinton said the US could "totally obliterate" Iran if it attacked Israel with nuclear weapons. Obama at the time accused her of "Bush-style cowboy diplomacy." Iran lodged a formal protest at the United Nations.
The Obama administration announced this week that it will retain Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department official who also sparked complaints from Iran when, working for Bush, he spearheaded US efforts to convince international banks as well as shipping and insurance companies to stop all dealings with Iran.
But it is Obama's expected pick to handle the Iran portfolio – former Mideast envoy Dennis Ross – that has raised most questions in Tehran. Though not officially announced, diplomats say the appointment is all but certain. In Iran, Mr. Ross has been vilified as too hawkish and too close to Israel and pro-Israel lobbies in the US to be effective.
Iran's hard-line Kayhan newspaper called Ross, who is Jewish, a "pioneer of the American-Zionist lobby," whose pick would be an "insult."
When Ross was Mideast envoy, Kayhan said, US policy was "not one millimeter different from Israeli policy."
"There is no doubt they are all going to look at Ross as an Israeli proxy," says one Western diplomat.
"Of course the policy is more important than the personality," says Sadegh Kharazi, a former ambassador to Paris, who helped draft a secret 2003 Iranian offer to Washington to discuss all issues from terrorism to nuclear programs.
A Ross appointment would be "dangerous" and amounts to "shooting the confidence building with the Iranians," says Mr. Kharazi, adding that Iranian officials will be reluctant to deal with Ross. "It shows that the Americans appointed Dennis Ross by the eyes of the Israelis. It means flying to Tehran by the connecting flight via Tel Aviv. Iranians are not happy [about] this."
Iran sees America's ironclad commitment to Israel as a primary source of insecurity, just as Iran says the US military presence destabilizes the region.
"It seems these people are not capable of having fundamental change in the US-Iran relationship," says Taraghi. Any US envoy "should be able to give the president of the United States a better understanding of the events of the Islamic Republic.... The Zionists should not be able to affect his decisions, or [they] will give Obama the wrong perspective."
2/5/09
Iranians wary of Obama's approach
Despite President Obama's offer to extend a hand if Iran 'unclenched its fist,' Iranian officials say his choice of diplomats calls into question his commitment to change.
Scott Peterson
Tehran, Iran - Expectations soared in Iran with the election of President Barack Obama. He promised to meet Iranian leaders without preconditions, in a fresh American bid to engage Iran and end 30 years of mutual hostility. And he was not President Bush.
But even as Mr. Obama has vowed to extend America's hand in friendship if Iran "unclenched its fist," Iranians say other US signals raise doubts that real change is coming.
From Obama's choice of US officials who have expressed hawkish views on Iran in the past to continued use of some Bush-era language – such as the assumption that Iran harbors a nuclear-weapons program – officials and analysts in Tehran say suspicion remains about American motives.
A new Iran strategy topped the agenda at a meeting in Germany on Wednesday between a senior US diplomat and counterparts from Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday warned Iran of "consequences" if it did not comply with UN Security Council demands to suspend sensitive nuclear work.
"These are not positive signs, they are posturing; they are speaking about tactics, not a change of strategy," says Seyed Mohammad Marandi, head of North American studies at the University of Tehran, who is a dual US-Iran citizen. Iranian leaders "are willing to give Obama a chance. [But] the first move in the eyes of Iranians is not talks but a change of substance, to change the demonization."
Iran questions Obama's outreach
Iran has its own demonization issues, after three decades of fiery anti-Americanism encapsulated in the regular chant "Death to America!" Questioning Obama's outreach last week, Iran's arch-conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivered his own laundry list of Iranian grievances that stretched back 56 years.
"We have not seen a new outlook yet – there is still the 'big stick and the big carrot,' which is not honoring the Iranian people," Ali Larijani, Iran's speaker of Parliament and former top nuclear negotiator, said this week. "If there is a new way [from the US], someone should clearly state that new way."
Obama's silence on "atrocities" committed by Israel in Gaza, Mr. Larijani said – even though Obama was still president-elect during the 22-day conflict that left more than 1,330 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead – was a missed chance for a new stance. During protests about Gaza outside Western embassies in Tehran last month, demonstrators burned pictures of Obama.
Iran was disappointed, Larijani said, "but we have not lost hope" that the US-Iran relationship can improve.
The Obama administration is conducting a comprehensive review of Iran policy that has for years been defined by inclusion in Mr. Bush's "axis of evil," by regular hints at regime change, and by threats of military action to stop Iran's nuclear program.
"Our viewpoint is, the US strategy to Iran has not changed, but the tactics have changed," says Hamidreza Taraghi, a conservative politician. "When the US says to open your fist, our fist has always been in defense. It's the US that has always had its fist clenched."
Even during the barely two weeks of Obama's tenure, Mr. Taraghi charges, "the CIA has continued its soft plans to overthrow the Islamic Republic" and the "drum beat of sanctions is continuing."
Iran wary of hawkish diplomacy
Officials in Iran and Western diplomats have been surprised by Obama's picks for "tough and direct" talks with Iran.
As a presidential candidate last year, Mrs. Clinton said the US could "totally obliterate" Iran if it attacked Israel with nuclear weapons. Obama at the time accused her of "Bush-style cowboy diplomacy." Iran lodged a formal protest at the United Nations.
The Obama administration announced this week that it will retain Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department official who also sparked complaints from Iran when, working for Bush, he spearheaded US efforts to convince international banks as well as shipping and insurance companies to stop all dealings with Iran.
But it is Obama's expected pick to handle the Iran portfolio – former Mideast envoy Dennis Ross – that has raised most questions in Tehran. Though not officially announced, diplomats say the appointment is all but certain. In Iran, Mr. Ross has been vilified as too hawkish and too close to Israel and pro-Israel lobbies in the US to be effective.
Iran's hard-line Kayhan newspaper called Ross, who is Jewish, a "pioneer of the American-Zionist lobby," whose pick would be an "insult."
When Ross was Mideast envoy, Kayhan said, US policy was "not one millimeter different from Israeli policy."
"There is no doubt they are all going to look at Ross as an Israeli proxy," says one Western diplomat.
"Of course the policy is more important than the personality," says Sadegh Kharazi, a former ambassador to Paris, who helped draft a secret 2003 Iranian offer to Washington to discuss all issues from terrorism to nuclear programs.
A Ross appointment would be "dangerous" and amounts to "shooting the confidence building with the Iranians," says Mr. Kharazi, adding that Iranian officials will be reluctant to deal with Ross. "It shows that the Americans appointed Dennis Ross by the eyes of the Israelis. It means flying to Tehran by the connecting flight via Tel Aviv. Iranians are not happy [about] this."
Iran sees America's ironclad commitment to Israel as a primary source of insecurity, just as Iran says the US military presence destabilizes the region.
"It seems these people are not capable of having fundamental change in the US-Iran relationship," says Taraghi. Any US envoy "should be able to give the president of the United States a better understanding of the events of the Islamic Republic.... The Zionists should not be able to affect his decisions, or [they] will give Obama the wrong perspective."
DE BORCHGRAVE: Discordant wavelengths
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/05/discordant-wavelengths/
DE BORCHGRAVE: Discordant wavelengths
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Thursday, February 5, 2009
As key policymakers abroad survey the attempts to stop and reverse the self-inflicted crumbling of the world's largest economy, they have reached startling conclusions that are out of sync with President Obama's foreign policy objectives.
(1) Pakistan. There is no military solution in Afghanistan, confided a top-ranking national security official in Islamabad, not for attribution. He explained the war will have to end with a political solution for a coalition government. This should include "moderate" Taliban fighters, along with major Pashtun tribal leaders, and President Hamid Karzai's "successor." He also confided security forces can barely cope with Taliban insurgents in the Swat valley, in Pakistan proper, let alone with Taliban's safe havens in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This makes the Afghan war unwinnable. The more U.S. pilotless Predators bomb FATA targets, the more Taliban jihadis cause mayhem inside Pakistan, one of the world's eight nuclear powers.
The Afghan war is enflaming Pakistani public opinion. The creation of a modern state in Afghanistan is mission impossible. Pakistan, therefore, would feel more secure with a reformed Taliban in charge in Kabul, one that would formally renounce all ties with al Qaeda, as well as the more pernicious aspects of the medieval theocracy that banned the education of girls. Further military operations should be designed to put pressure on the Taliban to compromise and to eradicate its al Qaeda allies. U.S. forces in Afghanistan will double to 60,000 by summer - at a cost of $70 billion a year - bringing the total of allied forces to just fewer than 100,000, for a mountainous country the size of France.
(2) NATO. The three allied countries whose parliaments have authorized their troops in Afghanistan to be in harm's way against Taliban fighters - Britain, Canada and the Netherlands - want out by the end of 2011. U.S. military commanders believe the British "will stay with us even if it takes several more years." London insiders are less sanguine. Lord West of Spithead, former first sea lord and now Prime Minister Gordon Brown's security minister, dropped a bombshell last week by declaring publicly Britain's intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan had fueled global radicalism against Britain. Foreign Secretary David Miliband, for his part, urged we all drop the term "war on terror," which he said was deceptive and misleading.
(3) Other NATO members. The alliance's head man, the Netherland's Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who steps down at NATO's 60th anniversary summit in April, is urging the 26 member nations to contribute more troops to Afghanistan. So far, no takers. Those with sizable numbers of troops on the ground are hamstrung by caveats against fighting - notably, Germany, France, Spain, Italy - and governments skeptical that a narco-state, where corruption from top to bottom is a world record, can be reformed. NATO defense ministers authorized their troops in Afghanistan to undertake "aggressive" counter-narcotics missions against the Taliban's chief source of revenue. There was no follow-through as national parliaments objected.
(4) Afghan National Army and Police. Underfunded and years behind schedule in their ability to replace western forces with any credibility.
(5) Middle East. Israel's leading newspaper, Ha'aretz, has published the equivalent of the Pentagon papers of Vietnam War fame, information the Israeli state had been hiding for years on the covert expansion of settlements in the West Bank. These were clearly designed to make a Palestinian state in the occupied territories impossible. After reading the voluminous secret file, U.S. mediator George Mitchell may well conclude the end game of a Palestinian state is unattainable. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Ha'aretz reported, "steadfastly refused to release the report" as "publication could endanger state security and harm Israel's foreign relations."
An analysis of the data "reveals that in the vast majority of settlements - 75 percent - construction, sometimes on a large scale without the appropriate permits or contrary to the permits that were issued. In 30 major settlements extensive construction of buildings and infrastructure (roads, schools, synagogues, yeshivas and even police stations) has been carried out on private lands belonging to Palestinian West Bank residents."
The database, Ha'aretz reported, does not conform to Israel's official position on the Foreign Ministry Web site, which states: "Israel's actions relating to the use and allocation of land under its administration are all taken with strict regard to the rules and norms of international law. Israel does not requisition private land for the establishment of settlements." It just takes it, says Ha'aretz.
According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics 290,000 Jews now live in 120 official settlements and dozens of outposts established throughout the West Bank over the last 41 years.
That's up 50,000 settlers in the West Bank since Gaza's 8,500 were forcibly removed by the Israeli police in 2005 to make room for a Palestinian authority and where elections were then held that sealed Hamas' victory over Fatah.
In realpolitik, Israel's leaders clearly have no intention of pulling 100,000 settlers out of what are now known to be illegal settlements, where Palestinian land was seized arbitrarily, to make a Palestinian state possible. As far as anyone can peer over the geopolitical horizon, President Obama's two principal foreign policy initiatives - a win in Afghanistan for a democratic government, and a final peace treaty between Israel and a Palestinian state - are will-o'-the-wisp.
Newsweek's cover story this week is headlined: "Afghanistan: Obama's Vietnam."
A more promising avenue holds the key to regional stability. Engaging Iran secretly at the highest level, much the way Henry Kissinger opened the way to Beijing's Forbidden City for President Nixon, would seem to be a more profitable avenue for George Mitchell's diplomatic dexterity. Iran's influence in the Middle East - Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Maliki government in Baghdad, diplomatic clout in Oman, Qatar, Dubai - is not negligible.
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.
DE BORCHGRAVE: Discordant wavelengths
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Thursday, February 5, 2009
As key policymakers abroad survey the attempts to stop and reverse the self-inflicted crumbling of the world's largest economy, they have reached startling conclusions that are out of sync with President Obama's foreign policy objectives.
(1) Pakistan. There is no military solution in Afghanistan, confided a top-ranking national security official in Islamabad, not for attribution. He explained the war will have to end with a political solution for a coalition government. This should include "moderate" Taliban fighters, along with major Pashtun tribal leaders, and President Hamid Karzai's "successor." He also confided security forces can barely cope with Taliban insurgents in the Swat valley, in Pakistan proper, let alone with Taliban's safe havens in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This makes the Afghan war unwinnable. The more U.S. pilotless Predators bomb FATA targets, the more Taliban jihadis cause mayhem inside Pakistan, one of the world's eight nuclear powers.
The Afghan war is enflaming Pakistani public opinion. The creation of a modern state in Afghanistan is mission impossible. Pakistan, therefore, would feel more secure with a reformed Taliban in charge in Kabul, one that would formally renounce all ties with al Qaeda, as well as the more pernicious aspects of the medieval theocracy that banned the education of girls. Further military operations should be designed to put pressure on the Taliban to compromise and to eradicate its al Qaeda allies. U.S. forces in Afghanistan will double to 60,000 by summer - at a cost of $70 billion a year - bringing the total of allied forces to just fewer than 100,000, for a mountainous country the size of France.
(2) NATO. The three allied countries whose parliaments have authorized their troops in Afghanistan to be in harm's way against Taliban fighters - Britain, Canada and the Netherlands - want out by the end of 2011. U.S. military commanders believe the British "will stay with us even if it takes several more years." London insiders are less sanguine. Lord West of Spithead, former first sea lord and now Prime Minister Gordon Brown's security minister, dropped a bombshell last week by declaring publicly Britain's intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan had fueled global radicalism against Britain. Foreign Secretary David Miliband, for his part, urged we all drop the term "war on terror," which he said was deceptive and misleading.
(3) Other NATO members. The alliance's head man, the Netherland's Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who steps down at NATO's 60th anniversary summit in April, is urging the 26 member nations to contribute more troops to Afghanistan. So far, no takers. Those with sizable numbers of troops on the ground are hamstrung by caveats against fighting - notably, Germany, France, Spain, Italy - and governments skeptical that a narco-state, where corruption from top to bottom is a world record, can be reformed. NATO defense ministers authorized their troops in Afghanistan to undertake "aggressive" counter-narcotics missions against the Taliban's chief source of revenue. There was no follow-through as national parliaments objected.
(4) Afghan National Army and Police. Underfunded and years behind schedule in their ability to replace western forces with any credibility.
(5) Middle East. Israel's leading newspaper, Ha'aretz, has published the equivalent of the Pentagon papers of Vietnam War fame, information the Israeli state had been hiding for years on the covert expansion of settlements in the West Bank. These were clearly designed to make a Palestinian state in the occupied territories impossible. After reading the voluminous secret file, U.S. mediator George Mitchell may well conclude the end game of a Palestinian state is unattainable. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Ha'aretz reported, "steadfastly refused to release the report" as "publication could endanger state security and harm Israel's foreign relations."
An analysis of the data "reveals that in the vast majority of settlements - 75 percent - construction, sometimes on a large scale without the appropriate permits or contrary to the permits that were issued. In 30 major settlements extensive construction of buildings and infrastructure (roads, schools, synagogues, yeshivas and even police stations) has been carried out on private lands belonging to Palestinian West Bank residents."
The database, Ha'aretz reported, does not conform to Israel's official position on the Foreign Ministry Web site, which states: "Israel's actions relating to the use and allocation of land under its administration are all taken with strict regard to the rules and norms of international law. Israel does not requisition private land for the establishment of settlements." It just takes it, says Ha'aretz.
According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics 290,000 Jews now live in 120 official settlements and dozens of outposts established throughout the West Bank over the last 41 years.
That's up 50,000 settlers in the West Bank since Gaza's 8,500 were forcibly removed by the Israeli police in 2005 to make room for a Palestinian authority and where elections were then held that sealed Hamas' victory over Fatah.
In realpolitik, Israel's leaders clearly have no intention of pulling 100,000 settlers out of what are now known to be illegal settlements, where Palestinian land was seized arbitrarily, to make a Palestinian state possible. As far as anyone can peer over the geopolitical horizon, President Obama's two principal foreign policy initiatives - a win in Afghanistan for a democratic government, and a final peace treaty between Israel and a Palestinian state - are will-o'-the-wisp.
Newsweek's cover story this week is headlined: "Afghanistan: Obama's Vietnam."
A more promising avenue holds the key to regional stability. Engaging Iran secretly at the highest level, much the way Henry Kissinger opened the way to Beijing's Forbidden City for President Nixon, would seem to be a more profitable avenue for George Mitchell's diplomatic dexterity. Iran's influence in the Middle East - Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Maliki government in Baghdad, diplomatic clout in Oman, Qatar, Dubai - is not negligible.
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.
Let Netanyahu win By Gideon Levy
w w w . h a a r e t z . c o m
05/02/2009
Let Netanyahu win
By Gideon Levy
Benjamin Netanyahu will apparently be Israel's next prime minister. There is, however, something encouraging about that fact. Netanyahu's election will free Israel from the burden of deception: If he can establish a right-wing government, the veil will be lifted and the nation's true face revealed to its citizens and the rest of the world, including Arab countries. Together with the world, we will see which direction we are facing and who we really are. The masquerade that has gone on for several years will finally come to an end.
Netanyahu's election is likely to bring the curtain down on the great fraud - the best show in town - the lie of "negotiations" and the injustice of the "peace process." Israel consistently claimed these acts proved the nation was focused on peace and the end of the occupation. All the while, it did everything it could to further entrench the occupation and distance any chance of a potential agreement.
For 16 years, we have been enamored with the peace process. We talk and talk, babble and prattle, and generally feel great about ourselves; meanwhile the settlements expand endlessly and Israel turns to the use of force at every possible opportunity, aside from a unilateral disengagement which did nothing to advance the cause of peace.
With the election of a prime ministerial candidate who speaks of "economic peace," the naked truth will finally emerge. If, however, Tzipi Livni or Ehud Barak are elected, the self-delusion will simply continue. Livni herself is enamored with futile, useless and cowardly negotiations, and Barak has long abandoned the brave efforts he made in the past. The election of either will only perpetuate the vacuum. The world, including Washington, will breathe a sigh of relief that for once, Israel has elected a leadership that will pursue peace. But there is no chance of that happening.
The record of each of these candidates, and the positions they have championed until now, proves that what has been will continue to be. Livni and Barak will rush to every photo opportunity with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan. The Americans and Europeans will be pleased, but nothing will come out of it other than the sowing of a few more illusions. We will move from war to war, uprising to uprising, settlement to settlement, and the world will continue to delude itself into thinking an agreement is within reach. Hamas will grow stronger, Abbas weaker and the last chance for peace will be irretrievably lost.
Netanyahu would offer something else. First, he is a faithful representative of an authentic "Israeli" view - an almost complete distrust of Arabs and the chance of reaching peace with them, mixed with condescension and dehumanization. Second, he will finally arouse the world's rage towards us, including that of the new U.S. administration. Sadly, this may be the only chance for the kind of dramatic change that is needed.
The Palestinian Authority, another mendacious facade, will finally collapse, and Israel will face the non-partner it has wanted and sought all these years. The world may not rush to embrace Netanyahu as it would the "moderates" - Livni or Barak, who have led Israel to more unnecessary wars than Netanyahu, the "extremist" - while the real difference between them is almost non-existent.
Lifting the veil will lead to a crisis situation, which unfortunately is the only one that can bring about change. We must hope that both Kadima and Labor do not join a Netanyahu government (regrettably, another futile hope), as Israel's exposure will then be that much starker. A government composed of Netanyahu, Shas and Avigdor Lieberman will not, of course, have to deal with an opposition of Netanyahu, Shas and Avigdor Lieberman, and may therefore behave differently once in power than one might expect. Have we mentioned Menachem Begin?
But even if Netanyahu is the same old Netanyahu, this will be an opportunity to place the right's policies under the microscope. Let's see him stand before Barack Obama and speak of the grotesque idea of "economic peace," or wage foreign or security policies according to his stated positions. Let's see him answer just what exactly his vision is for 20 to 30 years down the road.
In due course, his anticipated failure may just hasten an alternative route, on condition that Kadima and Labor do not join the government and bring us another year of fraud. The lemons may yet yield lemonade - maybe the establishment of a right-wing government will remove all of the masks for good. The alternative, known and expected by all, is far more ambiguous, dangerous and threatening.
So let Netanyahu win. There is no alternative at this point anyway.
05/02/2009
Let Netanyahu win
By Gideon Levy
Benjamin Netanyahu will apparently be Israel's next prime minister. There is, however, something encouraging about that fact. Netanyahu's election will free Israel from the burden of deception: If he can establish a right-wing government, the veil will be lifted and the nation's true face revealed to its citizens and the rest of the world, including Arab countries. Together with the world, we will see which direction we are facing and who we really are. The masquerade that has gone on for several years will finally come to an end.
Netanyahu's election is likely to bring the curtain down on the great fraud - the best show in town - the lie of "negotiations" and the injustice of the "peace process." Israel consistently claimed these acts proved the nation was focused on peace and the end of the occupation. All the while, it did everything it could to further entrench the occupation and distance any chance of a potential agreement.
For 16 years, we have been enamored with the peace process. We talk and talk, babble and prattle, and generally feel great about ourselves; meanwhile the settlements expand endlessly and Israel turns to the use of force at every possible opportunity, aside from a unilateral disengagement which did nothing to advance the cause of peace.
With the election of a prime ministerial candidate who speaks of "economic peace," the naked truth will finally emerge. If, however, Tzipi Livni or Ehud Barak are elected, the self-delusion will simply continue. Livni herself is enamored with futile, useless and cowardly negotiations, and Barak has long abandoned the brave efforts he made in the past. The election of either will only perpetuate the vacuum. The world, including Washington, will breathe a sigh of relief that for once, Israel has elected a leadership that will pursue peace. But there is no chance of that happening.
The record of each of these candidates, and the positions they have championed until now, proves that what has been will continue to be. Livni and Barak will rush to every photo opportunity with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan. The Americans and Europeans will be pleased, but nothing will come out of it other than the sowing of a few more illusions. We will move from war to war, uprising to uprising, settlement to settlement, and the world will continue to delude itself into thinking an agreement is within reach. Hamas will grow stronger, Abbas weaker and the last chance for peace will be irretrievably lost.
Netanyahu would offer something else. First, he is a faithful representative of an authentic "Israeli" view - an almost complete distrust of Arabs and the chance of reaching peace with them, mixed with condescension and dehumanization. Second, he will finally arouse the world's rage towards us, including that of the new U.S. administration. Sadly, this may be the only chance for the kind of dramatic change that is needed.
The Palestinian Authority, another mendacious facade, will finally collapse, and Israel will face the non-partner it has wanted and sought all these years. The world may not rush to embrace Netanyahu as it would the "moderates" - Livni or Barak, who have led Israel to more unnecessary wars than Netanyahu, the "extremist" - while the real difference between them is almost non-existent.
Lifting the veil will lead to a crisis situation, which unfortunately is the only one that can bring about change. We must hope that both Kadima and Labor do not join a Netanyahu government (regrettably, another futile hope), as Israel's exposure will then be that much starker. A government composed of Netanyahu, Shas and Avigdor Lieberman will not, of course, have to deal with an opposition of Netanyahu, Shas and Avigdor Lieberman, and may therefore behave differently once in power than one might expect. Have we mentioned Menachem Begin?
But even if Netanyahu is the same old Netanyahu, this will be an opportunity to place the right's policies under the microscope. Let's see him stand before Barack Obama and speak of the grotesque idea of "economic peace," or wage foreign or security policies according to his stated positions. Let's see him answer just what exactly his vision is for 20 to 30 years down the road.
In due course, his anticipated failure may just hasten an alternative route, on condition that Kadima and Labor do not join the government and bring us another year of fraud. The lemons may yet yield lemonade - maybe the establishment of a right-wing government will remove all of the masks for good. The alternative, known and expected by all, is far more ambiguous, dangerous and threatening.
So let Netanyahu win. There is no alternative at this point anyway.
Bitterlemons-International.org Middle East Roundtable: After Gaza: Talking to Hamas
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 5 Volume 7 - February 05, 2009
After Gaza: Talking to Hamas
• Turkey can persuade Hamas to opt for peace - Bulent Aras
Turkey has gained strategic depth in the Middle East.
• Amman suspends its Hamas flirtation - Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
The war showed the "Hamasization" of the Jordanian street.
• Time for new Israeli thinking - Asher Susser
The Hamas rise to power was no accident but part of a profound and lasting historical process.
• Time for a change of western policy - Jonathan Steele
If Abbas is being urged to talk to Hamas, why should western governments not do likewise?
Turkey can persuade Hamas to opt for peace
Bulent Aras
From a Turkish perspective, Israel could not have committed a worse mistake than attacking Gaza and thereby blocking hopes for peace in the Middle East. Like many observers, Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan blamed Israel for the human tragedy in Gaza. This response may not seem extraordinary if one remembers that he criticized Israel in the same way following earlier Israeli aggressions in the occupied territories. This time, however, Erdogan stated that the Israeli attack on Gaza, which began four days after PM Ehud Olmert's visit to Ankara, was "an act of disrespect toward Turkey".
The major issue on the agenda for Olmert's visit had been the Turkish-led indirect talks between Israel and Syria. In response to the latest Israeli attack, Erdogan suspended the talks and departed for Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to search for a solution to the Gaza situation. He also talked to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Erdogan addressed the international community before his visit to Egypt, saying that "the Palestinian and Gazan people, our brothers, can only be saved from their isolation when these embargoes are lifted." Erdogan's response to Israel, his suspension of Syrian-Israeli negotiations and his Middle East shuttle diplomacy reflect a high level of Turkish involvement in the Palestinian question.
Thus, Turkey has initiated an intensive diplomatic campaign at both the regional and international level to put an end to the Gaza tragedy. Turkey's position is to include Hamas in the political process; Erdogan aims to persuade Hamas to return to a truce in exchange for Israel lifting the blockade of Gaza, and Turkish policy-makers have asked Hamas to declare a ceasefire and work for the political accommodation of different groups within Palestinian politics. Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief foreign policy aide to Turkey's prime minister, has met twice in Syria with Khaled Mishaal, the leader-in-exile of Hamas. Davutoglu's second visit came as a result of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's demand for help from Erdogan. In this sense, Turkey has already begun to mediate between Hamas and international actors while maintaining regular contacts with Fateh, the Palestinian Authority and Abbas.
Erdogan's active diplomacy, aimed at preventing further tragedy in Gaza, coincides with Turkey's assumption of a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Erdogan welcomed the Arab League's call to lobby for a UN ceasefire resolution. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan attended the extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on January 3, 2009. The Turkish secretary-general of the OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, called for immediate international action to put an end to Israeli aggression in Gaza. And before departing from Saudi Arabia, Erdogan added: "Hamas abided by the truce. But Israel failed to lift the embargoes. In Gaza, people seem to live in an open prison. In fact, all Palestine looks like an open prison. I am calling out to the whole world: why do you not display the same sensitivity you showed in Georgia, now in Gaza? The United Nations, the United States and the EU-member states mobilized for Georgia immediately. But now, no one takes action for Gaza."
Erdogan's critical response led to a phone conversation between President Abdullah Gul and his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres. Gul released a written statement after this conversation, expressing concern for the political and humanitarian situation in Gaza, underlining the need for supplying humanitarian aid and calling for an immediate ceasefire. The Turkish National Security Council expressed deep concern over the deaths of high numbers of Palestinians in the Israeli operation in Gaza. The NSC issued its own statement calling for an immediate end to military operations and the lifting of barriers so that humanitarian aid might be delivered to the Palestinian people in Gaza, and urged the consideration of diplomacy for a solution. The statement added that the Palestinians should reach a compromise among themselves as soon as possible. The NSC statement exemplifies the broad consensus on the Palestinian issue in Turkey.
Turkey has a two-stage plan for dealing with the Gaza situation. The first phase is to broker a ceasefire and provide supervision by international peacekeepers, including Arab and Turkish forces. The second is to achieve compromise between rival Palestinian groups to stabilize Palestinian politics and ensure a commitment to peace.
Erdogan is working to build bridges among the Arabs to create a common stance toward the Palestinian question. Arab intellectuals in major Arab dailies praised Turkish activities on Gaza's behalf and asked Erdogan to remind Arab leaders that the Palestinian cause is also an Arab issue.
Turkish diplomatic activities continued after Israel announced a unilateral ceasefire. Davutoglu pursued shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Cairo while foreign ministry bureaucrats were talking to Israeli counterparts in Jerusalem. Turkish diplomats played a key role in persuading Hamas to announce a ceasefire.
Turkey adopted a severely critical attitude against the Israeli government's Gaza offensive and urged Israel to talk to Hamas to reach a solution. This critical attitude led to crisis in a panel discussion on Israel's Gaza offensive at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Erdogan, responding to Peres' defense of the Israeli attacks on Gaza, stated: "Maybe you [Peres] are feeling guilty and that is why you are so strong in your words. You killed people. I remember the children who died on beaches." He stormed out of the panel when the moderator tried to intervene during his response to Peres. Thousands of people extended a hero's welcome to Erdogan when he returned to Istanbul, waving Turkish and Palestinian flags and shouting "Turkey is with you."
Erdogan's attitude in Davos generated great sympathy in the Arab and Muslim world. Although his comments created some concern in Israel, high level officials on both sides recognized the value of good bilateral relations. Peres called Erdogan and said, "I am very sorry for what happened; friends can sometimes argue." Erdogan declared that he is against the Israeli government's policies and not the Israeli people or Jews elsewhere. He pointed out that he had "always declared that anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity."
Turkey has gained strategic depth in the Middle East and ever-increasing support among Arabs and Iranians. Turkey acquired this position without posing a war threat to Israel. It maintains good relations with Israel while registering progress in its relations with the enemies of Israel in the region. Indeed, Turkey has access to and dialogue with all countries and important actors in the area. Turkey's rising profile gives it an integral role in Middle East peace efforts. Erdogan will exploit his leverage over Hamas to transform that movement, reconcile Palestinian groups and prepare the groundwork for peace. Erdogan's attitude toward Israel will be determined to a considerable extent by Israel's response to his regional peace efforts.- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Professor Bulent Aras chairs the Department of International Relations at Isik University, Istanbul.
Amman suspends its Hamas flirtation
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
Jordan has stalled its brief "tactical" flirtation with Hamas pending formulation of the US strategy toward the totality of Middle Eastern challenges, including the peace process, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Amman, wedged between two regional zones of instability and chaos, Iraq to the east and Palestine to the west, also wants regional factors to clear before it decides what to do next with Hamas.
The Israel-Hamas war exposed the limits of Jordan's ability to stay out of the two key positions that define the degree of polarization within Arab political dynamics. The pro-US Arab moderates, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt that like Jordan support Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and peace talks as a strategy, are aligned against Syria, Hamas and Hizballah, backed by Iran, which want Arabs to deter Israel.
For now, Amman has opted to freeze talks begun this summer with Hamas and its Jordanian allies, the Muslim Brotherhood. This brief thaw was engineered by Gen. Mohammad Dahabi, the head of Jordan's General Intelligence Department, who was removed on December 29, partly because of the regional fallout of the Gaza campaign.
The war showed the "Hamasization" of the Jordanian street, where Islamists organized hundreds of demonstrations urging the government to engage with Hamas and reverse the unpopular 1994 peace treaty with Israel. They also accused Mahmoud Abbas of collaborating with Israel.
"The recent openness toward Hamas proved too costly for Jordan, both externally and internally," said a government official. "Apart from angering our key peace allies, the Americans, the Israelis and President Abbas, the legitimate president of the PA, we gained little from talking to Hamas and from improving ties with the Jordanian Brotherhood".
The Islamists and other independent politicians, however, disagree. They say easing tensions with Hamas and the local Islamists allowed unprecedented harmony between official Jordan and popular sentiments during the Gaza onslaught. With a solid national front behind the leadership, Jordan had more cards to play while trying to navigate the hot waters of regional alignments.
Officials say the government has recently decided to strip the Muslim Brotherhood and its local political arm, the Islamic Action Front of tools it believes have helped the IAF regain popularity after elections in 2007 battered it into virtual parliamentary insignificance, a defeat the IAF blamed on massive fraud by the GID.
The Interior Ministry is revisiting Gen. Dahabi's decision to allow 20 Islamist clerics back to deliver sermons at Friday prayers, after some of them blasted Arab leaders who talk to Israel. The government is also considering ways to delay the imminent publication of the pro-Islamist daily "As Sabeel".
And contrary to promises made in July, the government will not return the financial and investment arm of the Brotherhood back to Islamist control after taking it over two years ago amid charges of corruption. Furthermore, the ministry has reinforced regulations that require political parties to seek prior official approval for any public gathering or demonstrations after freezing such guidelines during the Gaza war in a bid to ease public tension. It turned down a request by Islamists to organize a rally last Friday to celebrate "Hamas' victory in Gaza".
The short-lived Hamas-Jordan thaw came nine years after Jordan expelled leaders of the Palestinian resistance group, in a reflection of the young King Abdullah's shifting priorities in comparison to those of his father, the late King Hussein who died in 1999. For his father, the Hamas presence in Jordan was a card to play against Yasser Arafat in Palestinian politics, from which he never really withdrew. For King Abdullah, far more focused on Jordan, that presence was a political nuisance, an irritant blocking his quest for a closer military and political alliance with Washington, and a potential domestic security policy.
However, Gen. Dahabi convinced the king and the National Strategic Council that Jordan needed to open up to Hamas and to the Jordanian Islamists as part of a precautionary strategy to face the fallout of US President George Bush's failure to deliver on his promise to see through the creation of a two-state solution before he left the White House in early 2009. Dahabi also pushed for better ties with Syria and Qatar, two regional players and allies of Hamas, to bolster Jordan's position.
Insiders say the GID had little confidence that President Abbas' PA would not collapse in 2009, either leaving a power vacuum in the West Bank that might be challenged by Hamas or allowing Hamas simply to take the helm. In either case, the GID assumed that Hamas would prevent the influx of West Bank Palestinians to Jordan. And it would help ease the spillover of any security deterioration that would likely follow the PA's collapse.
Gen. Dahabi's calculation also reflected growing mistrust within the Jordanian establishment of Fateh, the dominant faction in the PLO, which Abbas heads. Dahabi was worried that Fateh elites might negotiate a peace deal at the expense of Jordanian interests to save their faltering legitimacy. Having Hamas and the Jordanian Islamists on the side of official Jordan would curb the agenda of influential politicians in the US and Israel who continue to see Jordan as an "alternative homeland" for Palestinians.
Insiders say Jordan kept the "talks with Hamas through the security channel" to reduce criticism by western and Arab allies that it was legitimizing Hamas. Jordan also did not want to be seen as going back on its stated desire to see Hamas accept conditions set by the Quartet in 2005.
King Abdullah is now warning in private and public meetings with local politicians and foreign leaders that the coming six months will be filled with regional challenges detrimental to Jordan. But he is willing to give new US President Barack Obama some time to flesh out his promise of an American policy initiative in the Middle East by seeking to engage Syria and Iran as "constructive regional actors" and renewing efforts to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Abdullah also needs to see how Obama will deal with the outcome of the February 10 elections in Israel, where the Right, which has tough conditions for peace talks, is expected to make a strong comeback. And Amman wants to see if the latest US-led efforts to enforce the Gaza ceasefire and encourage intra-Palestinian reconciliation will bear fruit.
"We will continue to push for a two-state solution to protect Jordan's security and stability while making sure that Palestinians in the West Bank are empowered with security and economic stability to stay on the ground and to bury the 'Jordan is Palestine' scenario," an official said.
"We will not allow any local or regional forces to push us to embrace the agenda of chaos and destruction that Iran and its allies are pursuing".- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour is a journalist and former chief editor of the Jordan Times.
Time for new Israeli thinking
Asher Susser
The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections in early 2006 and the forceful takeover of Gaza by Hamas in the summer of 2007 were watersheds in the history of the Palestinian national movement. They signified the end of an era that lasted for close to half a century in which the PLO enjoyed virtually monopolistic domination of the Palestinian movement. The defeats of the PLO and Fateh were part of a regional phenomenon--the decline of secular nationalism--that extended far beyond Palestinian politics and was plain for all to see throughout the Middle East.
The Hamas rise to prominence was thus no accident but part of a profound and lasting historical process. It was therefore not very realistic from the outset to assume that Palestinian society could be engineered by the pressure of external powers like Israel to correct its "error" of electing Hamas and coerced into reinstating the PLO and Fateh. The Israeli political and economic blockade, not surprisingly, failed to have the desired effect and Hamas not only weathered the storm but emerged from it relatively unscathed and probably even stronger than before.
But Hamas' staying power went to its head. Its indiscretion, coupled with Iranian pressure, brought Hamas to the point of provoking the recent Israeli onslaught on Gaza. The war has cost Hamas dearly--not so much in its standing versus the PLO and Fateh but in terms of its image in the eyes of the people of Gaza.
It is the people who have paid the price of the movement's rash and irresponsible behavior, while the leaders took to their underground bunkers in Gaza or their secure residences in Damascus. No amount of "victory" parades on the ruins of Gaza will change this grim reality, while the PLO leadership and significant components of the Arab media miss no opportunity to remind the Palestinian people of these uncomfortable facts. Hamas has simultaneously exposed itself to greater Egyptian, Israeli and international pressure to desist from its prolonged armed confrontation with Israel.
While the war in Gaza is cause for a Hamas "reality check", it would seem to be time for the Israelis to do the same. Hamas cannot wish Israel away, just as Israel cannot hope for Hamas to disappear. Moreover Israel itself, in launching the war in Gaza, did not seek to demolish Hamas. Weighing between the options of reoccupying Gaza or leaving it in a Somalia-like state of chaos, Israel deliberately chose to leave Hamas in place after seeking to coerce the organization into accepting that the cost of continued rockets aimed at Israel would be prohibitive. In other words, Israel seems to have come to the realistic conclusion that it is preferable after all to have a tamed, albeit hostile but efficient neighbor in charge rather than a more friendly but feeble and ineffective alternative.
If Hamas reasserts its control of the Gaza Strip and a lasting ceasefire is kept in place, two further steps will become part of the immediate agenda: the formation of a Palestinian government of national unity and the restarting of some form of Palestinian-Israeli negotiation. Considering the present level of enmity between Hamas and the PLO/Fateh, a government of national unity is anything but a foregone conclusion. At the same time, however, it is difficult to imagine meaningful progress in any negotiation with Israel that does not have at least the acquiescence of Hamas.
Israel ought to recognize the current realities for what they are and should not reject out of hand a Palestinian national unity government that includes Hamas. Such a government would enable Israel and Hamas to come down off their high horses and communicate indirectly without either having to concede on major issues of principle just for the sake of resuming meaningful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. If Hamas' leaders were to refuse to take this route, the responsibility would be theirs and it is they who would have to face the consequences of their decisions and the opprobrium of more moderate Arab players within the Palestinian community and without.
It is time for Hamas to decide whether to take its cues from the radicals in Tehran or the moderates in Cairo. Needless to say, if Hamas proves incapable or unwilling to impose a stable ceasefire, progress on internal Palestinian unity or on the peace front will hardly be likely. In such circumstances, Israel and Hamas will sooner or later be back at war with each other and the Israelis and Hamas will have no need to face the question of whether or not to talk to each other outside of the battlefield--directly, indirectly or in any other fashion. But if the ceasefire holds, the time will have come for Israel and Hamas to rethink their respective policies on negotiations.- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Professor Asher Susser is a senior research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Time for a change of western policy
Jonathan Steele
Three years after the European Union and the United States greeted Hamas' victory in the Palestinian elections with a decision to boycott the new government, the folly of that policy has never looked clearer.
It created an undeniable case that the West's claims of supporting democracy are riven with double standards, thereby alienating Arabs throughout the Middle East. Encouraging President Mahmoud Abbas to believe he has more credibility than he has, it hollowed out his sporadic talks with Israel and made him appear as a western tool rather than a truly representative leader. It raised justifiable suspicions that the true aim of western policy was to provoke regime change in the Palestinian territories by ousting Hamas in Gaza and giving a green light for more arrests of Hamas followers in the West Bank by Fateh security police.
The absurdity of ignoring Hamas politically has now been made worse by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which Israel has provoked over the last three years, culminating in the recent, brutal attacks. Everything that needs to be done to produce peace and a tolerable standard of living for Palestinians in Gaza, whether it is a guaranteed supply of emergency aid as well as food, fuel and medical services, requires working with those who run Gaza. And that means Hamas.
Israel likes to portray Hamas as a terrorist organization, but Israel's assault on Gaza was based on the assumption that Hamas is a major political player. Armies and air forces do not target parliament buildings and ministries because of terrorism. They do so because they see the people in charge of those buildings as representatives of a political power that need to be contained or destroyed. Similarly, governments do not negotiate with people about ceasefires, as Egypt and Israel are doing directly or indirectly with Hamas, unless they recognize their interlocutors have the authority to maintain and police a ceasefire.
While Israeli hardliners, regrettably supported by most Israelis, have special reasons for not recognizing Hamas since they want to maintain the fiction they have "no partner for peace", other governments should not let themselves be tied to that policy. Within western foreign ministries and the EU that point is increasingly accepted by diplomats. The difficulty is that their political masters do not yet have the courage to say this openly and change the line that was set in 2006.
Several senior advisers to the Obama administration also recognize the need to engage with Hamas, but the new political team in Washington is not yet ready to take the plunge. During their contest in the Democratic primaries the future president and his future secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, were adamant that there could be "no talking to terrorists", even though they accept the principle of dialogue with "enemies". Unlike Bush, for example, they are in favor of engaging with Iran. There can be no logical reason to exclude Hamas from the principle that people who hold political power need to be engaged with, especially if you do not share their views.
The principle of Palestinian unity is at least accepted now by many western governments. They thereby knock away another prop from under their strategy of boycott. If Abbas is being urged to talk to Hamas, why should western governments not do likewise?
It has taken a long time for western governments to come round to the view that a Palestinian government of national unity is desirable as a platform for any serious discussion of a two-state solution. It will not be easy to achieve, given the record of bad blood between Fateh and Hamas and Abbas' insistence that he be in overall charge even though his mandate as PA president has just run out.
There are serious problems for Palestinians in reaching internal agreement about how to approach the negotiating table, even if there were willingness on the Israel side--a proposition that will be even more doubtful in a Netanyahu administration. Hamas still prefers the notion of a long-term "hudna" (which implicitly accepts the reality of Israel's existence) rather than the de facto recognition of Israel that comes with sitting down to face-to-face talks.
But a genuine government of national unity could find a division of labor that allowed for Fateh ministers to negotiate a two-state solution with Israel that would be put to the full government and the PLO for approval, or to a popular referendum, once a text was ready.
The benefits of US talks with Hamas would be immediate. At a stroke, they would distance Washington from Israeli policy, making it clear the US wanted to be a broker between the parties rather than a cheerleader for Israel. They would get the Europeans off their current hesitation and give them the courage to do what many of their own diplomats privately accept is necessary. This would free them to insist unequivocally that the crossings to Gaza must be opened urgently and permanently, under a system of international guarantees in which bans on arms transfers into the territory would be balanced by unfettered access for aid, fuel, goods and services.
The western boycott of Hamas has failed to weaken Hamas' authority in Gaza or its popularity in the West Bank. Israel's air and ground offensive has been equally counter-productive, though far bloodier. The time has come for a reversal.- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Jonathan Steele is international affairs columnist for The Guardian newspaper
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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 5 Volume 7 - February 05, 2009
After Gaza: Talking to Hamas
• Turkey can persuade Hamas to opt for peace - Bulent Aras
Turkey has gained strategic depth in the Middle East.
• Amman suspends its Hamas flirtation - Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
The war showed the "Hamasization" of the Jordanian street.
• Time for new Israeli thinking - Asher Susser
The Hamas rise to power was no accident but part of a profound and lasting historical process.
• Time for a change of western policy - Jonathan Steele
If Abbas is being urged to talk to Hamas, why should western governments not do likewise?
Turkey can persuade Hamas to opt for peace
Bulent Aras
From a Turkish perspective, Israel could not have committed a worse mistake than attacking Gaza and thereby blocking hopes for peace in the Middle East. Like many observers, Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan blamed Israel for the human tragedy in Gaza. This response may not seem extraordinary if one remembers that he criticized Israel in the same way following earlier Israeli aggressions in the occupied territories. This time, however, Erdogan stated that the Israeli attack on Gaza, which began four days after PM Ehud Olmert's visit to Ankara, was "an act of disrespect toward Turkey".
The major issue on the agenda for Olmert's visit had been the Turkish-led indirect talks between Israel and Syria. In response to the latest Israeli attack, Erdogan suspended the talks and departed for Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to search for a solution to the Gaza situation. He also talked to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Erdogan addressed the international community before his visit to Egypt, saying that "the Palestinian and Gazan people, our brothers, can only be saved from their isolation when these embargoes are lifted." Erdogan's response to Israel, his suspension of Syrian-Israeli negotiations and his Middle East shuttle diplomacy reflect a high level of Turkish involvement in the Palestinian question.
Thus, Turkey has initiated an intensive diplomatic campaign at both the regional and international level to put an end to the Gaza tragedy. Turkey's position is to include Hamas in the political process; Erdogan aims to persuade Hamas to return to a truce in exchange for Israel lifting the blockade of Gaza, and Turkish policy-makers have asked Hamas to declare a ceasefire and work for the political accommodation of different groups within Palestinian politics. Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief foreign policy aide to Turkey's prime minister, has met twice in Syria with Khaled Mishaal, the leader-in-exile of Hamas. Davutoglu's second visit came as a result of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's demand for help from Erdogan. In this sense, Turkey has already begun to mediate between Hamas and international actors while maintaining regular contacts with Fateh, the Palestinian Authority and Abbas.
Erdogan's active diplomacy, aimed at preventing further tragedy in Gaza, coincides with Turkey's assumption of a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Erdogan welcomed the Arab League's call to lobby for a UN ceasefire resolution. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan attended the extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on January 3, 2009. The Turkish secretary-general of the OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, called for immediate international action to put an end to Israeli aggression in Gaza. And before departing from Saudi Arabia, Erdogan added: "Hamas abided by the truce. But Israel failed to lift the embargoes. In Gaza, people seem to live in an open prison. In fact, all Palestine looks like an open prison. I am calling out to the whole world: why do you not display the same sensitivity you showed in Georgia, now in Gaza? The United Nations, the United States and the EU-member states mobilized for Georgia immediately. But now, no one takes action for Gaza."
Erdogan's critical response led to a phone conversation between President Abdullah Gul and his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres. Gul released a written statement after this conversation, expressing concern for the political and humanitarian situation in Gaza, underlining the need for supplying humanitarian aid and calling for an immediate ceasefire. The Turkish National Security Council expressed deep concern over the deaths of high numbers of Palestinians in the Israeli operation in Gaza. The NSC issued its own statement calling for an immediate end to military operations and the lifting of barriers so that humanitarian aid might be delivered to the Palestinian people in Gaza, and urged the consideration of diplomacy for a solution. The statement added that the Palestinians should reach a compromise among themselves as soon as possible. The NSC statement exemplifies the broad consensus on the Palestinian issue in Turkey.
Turkey has a two-stage plan for dealing with the Gaza situation. The first phase is to broker a ceasefire and provide supervision by international peacekeepers, including Arab and Turkish forces. The second is to achieve compromise between rival Palestinian groups to stabilize Palestinian politics and ensure a commitment to peace.
Erdogan is working to build bridges among the Arabs to create a common stance toward the Palestinian question. Arab intellectuals in major Arab dailies praised Turkish activities on Gaza's behalf and asked Erdogan to remind Arab leaders that the Palestinian cause is also an Arab issue.
Turkish diplomatic activities continued after Israel announced a unilateral ceasefire. Davutoglu pursued shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Cairo while foreign ministry bureaucrats were talking to Israeli counterparts in Jerusalem. Turkish diplomats played a key role in persuading Hamas to announce a ceasefire.
Turkey adopted a severely critical attitude against the Israeli government's Gaza offensive and urged Israel to talk to Hamas to reach a solution. This critical attitude led to crisis in a panel discussion on Israel's Gaza offensive at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Erdogan, responding to Peres' defense of the Israeli attacks on Gaza, stated: "Maybe you [Peres] are feeling guilty and that is why you are so strong in your words. You killed people. I remember the children who died on beaches." He stormed out of the panel when the moderator tried to intervene during his response to Peres. Thousands of people extended a hero's welcome to Erdogan when he returned to Istanbul, waving Turkish and Palestinian flags and shouting "Turkey is with you."
Erdogan's attitude in Davos generated great sympathy in the Arab and Muslim world. Although his comments created some concern in Israel, high level officials on both sides recognized the value of good bilateral relations. Peres called Erdogan and said, "I am very sorry for what happened; friends can sometimes argue." Erdogan declared that he is against the Israeli government's policies and not the Israeli people or Jews elsewhere. He pointed out that he had "always declared that anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity."
Turkey has gained strategic depth in the Middle East and ever-increasing support among Arabs and Iranians. Turkey acquired this position without posing a war threat to Israel. It maintains good relations with Israel while registering progress in its relations with the enemies of Israel in the region. Indeed, Turkey has access to and dialogue with all countries and important actors in the area. Turkey's rising profile gives it an integral role in Middle East peace efforts. Erdogan will exploit his leverage over Hamas to transform that movement, reconcile Palestinian groups and prepare the groundwork for peace. Erdogan's attitude toward Israel will be determined to a considerable extent by Israel's response to his regional peace efforts.- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Professor Bulent Aras chairs the Department of International Relations at Isik University, Istanbul.
Amman suspends its Hamas flirtation
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
Jordan has stalled its brief "tactical" flirtation with Hamas pending formulation of the US strategy toward the totality of Middle Eastern challenges, including the peace process, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Amman, wedged between two regional zones of instability and chaos, Iraq to the east and Palestine to the west, also wants regional factors to clear before it decides what to do next with Hamas.
The Israel-Hamas war exposed the limits of Jordan's ability to stay out of the two key positions that define the degree of polarization within Arab political dynamics. The pro-US Arab moderates, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt that like Jordan support Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and peace talks as a strategy, are aligned against Syria, Hamas and Hizballah, backed by Iran, which want Arabs to deter Israel.
For now, Amman has opted to freeze talks begun this summer with Hamas and its Jordanian allies, the Muslim Brotherhood. This brief thaw was engineered by Gen. Mohammad Dahabi, the head of Jordan's General Intelligence Department, who was removed on December 29, partly because of the regional fallout of the Gaza campaign.
The war showed the "Hamasization" of the Jordanian street, where Islamists organized hundreds of demonstrations urging the government to engage with Hamas and reverse the unpopular 1994 peace treaty with Israel. They also accused Mahmoud Abbas of collaborating with Israel.
"The recent openness toward Hamas proved too costly for Jordan, both externally and internally," said a government official. "Apart from angering our key peace allies, the Americans, the Israelis and President Abbas, the legitimate president of the PA, we gained little from talking to Hamas and from improving ties with the Jordanian Brotherhood".
The Islamists and other independent politicians, however, disagree. They say easing tensions with Hamas and the local Islamists allowed unprecedented harmony between official Jordan and popular sentiments during the Gaza onslaught. With a solid national front behind the leadership, Jordan had more cards to play while trying to navigate the hot waters of regional alignments.
Officials say the government has recently decided to strip the Muslim Brotherhood and its local political arm, the Islamic Action Front of tools it believes have helped the IAF regain popularity after elections in 2007 battered it into virtual parliamentary insignificance, a defeat the IAF blamed on massive fraud by the GID.
The Interior Ministry is revisiting Gen. Dahabi's decision to allow 20 Islamist clerics back to deliver sermons at Friday prayers, after some of them blasted Arab leaders who talk to Israel. The government is also considering ways to delay the imminent publication of the pro-Islamist daily "As Sabeel".
And contrary to promises made in July, the government will not return the financial and investment arm of the Brotherhood back to Islamist control after taking it over two years ago amid charges of corruption. Furthermore, the ministry has reinforced regulations that require political parties to seek prior official approval for any public gathering or demonstrations after freezing such guidelines during the Gaza war in a bid to ease public tension. It turned down a request by Islamists to organize a rally last Friday to celebrate "Hamas' victory in Gaza".
The short-lived Hamas-Jordan thaw came nine years after Jordan expelled leaders of the Palestinian resistance group, in a reflection of the young King Abdullah's shifting priorities in comparison to those of his father, the late King Hussein who died in 1999. For his father, the Hamas presence in Jordan was a card to play against Yasser Arafat in Palestinian politics, from which he never really withdrew. For King Abdullah, far more focused on Jordan, that presence was a political nuisance, an irritant blocking his quest for a closer military and political alliance with Washington, and a potential domestic security policy.
However, Gen. Dahabi convinced the king and the National Strategic Council that Jordan needed to open up to Hamas and to the Jordanian Islamists as part of a precautionary strategy to face the fallout of US President George Bush's failure to deliver on his promise to see through the creation of a two-state solution before he left the White House in early 2009. Dahabi also pushed for better ties with Syria and Qatar, two regional players and allies of Hamas, to bolster Jordan's position.
Insiders say the GID had little confidence that President Abbas' PA would not collapse in 2009, either leaving a power vacuum in the West Bank that might be challenged by Hamas or allowing Hamas simply to take the helm. In either case, the GID assumed that Hamas would prevent the influx of West Bank Palestinians to Jordan. And it would help ease the spillover of any security deterioration that would likely follow the PA's collapse.
Gen. Dahabi's calculation also reflected growing mistrust within the Jordanian establishment of Fateh, the dominant faction in the PLO, which Abbas heads. Dahabi was worried that Fateh elites might negotiate a peace deal at the expense of Jordanian interests to save their faltering legitimacy. Having Hamas and the Jordanian Islamists on the side of official Jordan would curb the agenda of influential politicians in the US and Israel who continue to see Jordan as an "alternative homeland" for Palestinians.
Insiders say Jordan kept the "talks with Hamas through the security channel" to reduce criticism by western and Arab allies that it was legitimizing Hamas. Jordan also did not want to be seen as going back on its stated desire to see Hamas accept conditions set by the Quartet in 2005.
King Abdullah is now warning in private and public meetings with local politicians and foreign leaders that the coming six months will be filled with regional challenges detrimental to Jordan. But he is willing to give new US President Barack Obama some time to flesh out his promise of an American policy initiative in the Middle East by seeking to engage Syria and Iran as "constructive regional actors" and renewing efforts to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Abdullah also needs to see how Obama will deal with the outcome of the February 10 elections in Israel, where the Right, which has tough conditions for peace talks, is expected to make a strong comeback. And Amman wants to see if the latest US-led efforts to enforce the Gaza ceasefire and encourage intra-Palestinian reconciliation will bear fruit.
"We will continue to push for a two-state solution to protect Jordan's security and stability while making sure that Palestinians in the West Bank are empowered with security and economic stability to stay on the ground and to bury the 'Jordan is Palestine' scenario," an official said.
"We will not allow any local or regional forces to push us to embrace the agenda of chaos and destruction that Iran and its allies are pursuing".- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour is a journalist and former chief editor of the Jordan Times.
Time for new Israeli thinking
Asher Susser
The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections in early 2006 and the forceful takeover of Gaza by Hamas in the summer of 2007 were watersheds in the history of the Palestinian national movement. They signified the end of an era that lasted for close to half a century in which the PLO enjoyed virtually monopolistic domination of the Palestinian movement. The defeats of the PLO and Fateh were part of a regional phenomenon--the decline of secular nationalism--that extended far beyond Palestinian politics and was plain for all to see throughout the Middle East.
The Hamas rise to prominence was thus no accident but part of a profound and lasting historical process. It was therefore not very realistic from the outset to assume that Palestinian society could be engineered by the pressure of external powers like Israel to correct its "error" of electing Hamas and coerced into reinstating the PLO and Fateh. The Israeli political and economic blockade, not surprisingly, failed to have the desired effect and Hamas not only weathered the storm but emerged from it relatively unscathed and probably even stronger than before.
But Hamas' staying power went to its head. Its indiscretion, coupled with Iranian pressure, brought Hamas to the point of provoking the recent Israeli onslaught on Gaza. The war has cost Hamas dearly--not so much in its standing versus the PLO and Fateh but in terms of its image in the eyes of the people of Gaza.
It is the people who have paid the price of the movement's rash and irresponsible behavior, while the leaders took to their underground bunkers in Gaza or their secure residences in Damascus. No amount of "victory" parades on the ruins of Gaza will change this grim reality, while the PLO leadership and significant components of the Arab media miss no opportunity to remind the Palestinian people of these uncomfortable facts. Hamas has simultaneously exposed itself to greater Egyptian, Israeli and international pressure to desist from its prolonged armed confrontation with Israel.
While the war in Gaza is cause for a Hamas "reality check", it would seem to be time for the Israelis to do the same. Hamas cannot wish Israel away, just as Israel cannot hope for Hamas to disappear. Moreover Israel itself, in launching the war in Gaza, did not seek to demolish Hamas. Weighing between the options of reoccupying Gaza or leaving it in a Somalia-like state of chaos, Israel deliberately chose to leave Hamas in place after seeking to coerce the organization into accepting that the cost of continued rockets aimed at Israel would be prohibitive. In other words, Israel seems to have come to the realistic conclusion that it is preferable after all to have a tamed, albeit hostile but efficient neighbor in charge rather than a more friendly but feeble and ineffective alternative.
If Hamas reasserts its control of the Gaza Strip and a lasting ceasefire is kept in place, two further steps will become part of the immediate agenda: the formation of a Palestinian government of national unity and the restarting of some form of Palestinian-Israeli negotiation. Considering the present level of enmity between Hamas and the PLO/Fateh, a government of national unity is anything but a foregone conclusion. At the same time, however, it is difficult to imagine meaningful progress in any negotiation with Israel that does not have at least the acquiescence of Hamas.
Israel ought to recognize the current realities for what they are and should not reject out of hand a Palestinian national unity government that includes Hamas. Such a government would enable Israel and Hamas to come down off their high horses and communicate indirectly without either having to concede on major issues of principle just for the sake of resuming meaningful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. If Hamas' leaders were to refuse to take this route, the responsibility would be theirs and it is they who would have to face the consequences of their decisions and the opprobrium of more moderate Arab players within the Palestinian community and without.
It is time for Hamas to decide whether to take its cues from the radicals in Tehran or the moderates in Cairo. Needless to say, if Hamas proves incapable or unwilling to impose a stable ceasefire, progress on internal Palestinian unity or on the peace front will hardly be likely. In such circumstances, Israel and Hamas will sooner or later be back at war with each other and the Israelis and Hamas will have no need to face the question of whether or not to talk to each other outside of the battlefield--directly, indirectly or in any other fashion. But if the ceasefire holds, the time will have come for Israel and Hamas to rethink their respective policies on negotiations.- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Professor Asher Susser is a senior research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Time for a change of western policy
Jonathan Steele
Three years after the European Union and the United States greeted Hamas' victory in the Palestinian elections with a decision to boycott the new government, the folly of that policy has never looked clearer.
It created an undeniable case that the West's claims of supporting democracy are riven with double standards, thereby alienating Arabs throughout the Middle East. Encouraging President Mahmoud Abbas to believe he has more credibility than he has, it hollowed out his sporadic talks with Israel and made him appear as a western tool rather than a truly representative leader. It raised justifiable suspicions that the true aim of western policy was to provoke regime change in the Palestinian territories by ousting Hamas in Gaza and giving a green light for more arrests of Hamas followers in the West Bank by Fateh security police.
The absurdity of ignoring Hamas politically has now been made worse by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which Israel has provoked over the last three years, culminating in the recent, brutal attacks. Everything that needs to be done to produce peace and a tolerable standard of living for Palestinians in Gaza, whether it is a guaranteed supply of emergency aid as well as food, fuel and medical services, requires working with those who run Gaza. And that means Hamas.
Israel likes to portray Hamas as a terrorist organization, but Israel's assault on Gaza was based on the assumption that Hamas is a major political player. Armies and air forces do not target parliament buildings and ministries because of terrorism. They do so because they see the people in charge of those buildings as representatives of a political power that need to be contained or destroyed. Similarly, governments do not negotiate with people about ceasefires, as Egypt and Israel are doing directly or indirectly with Hamas, unless they recognize their interlocutors have the authority to maintain and police a ceasefire.
While Israeli hardliners, regrettably supported by most Israelis, have special reasons for not recognizing Hamas since they want to maintain the fiction they have "no partner for peace", other governments should not let themselves be tied to that policy. Within western foreign ministries and the EU that point is increasingly accepted by diplomats. The difficulty is that their political masters do not yet have the courage to say this openly and change the line that was set in 2006.
Several senior advisers to the Obama administration also recognize the need to engage with Hamas, but the new political team in Washington is not yet ready to take the plunge. During their contest in the Democratic primaries the future president and his future secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, were adamant that there could be "no talking to terrorists", even though they accept the principle of dialogue with "enemies". Unlike Bush, for example, they are in favor of engaging with Iran. There can be no logical reason to exclude Hamas from the principle that people who hold political power need to be engaged with, especially if you do not share their views.
The principle of Palestinian unity is at least accepted now by many western governments. They thereby knock away another prop from under their strategy of boycott. If Abbas is being urged to talk to Hamas, why should western governments not do likewise?
It has taken a long time for western governments to come round to the view that a Palestinian government of national unity is desirable as a platform for any serious discussion of a two-state solution. It will not be easy to achieve, given the record of bad blood between Fateh and Hamas and Abbas' insistence that he be in overall charge even though his mandate as PA president has just run out.
There are serious problems for Palestinians in reaching internal agreement about how to approach the negotiating table, even if there were willingness on the Israel side--a proposition that will be even more doubtful in a Netanyahu administration. Hamas still prefers the notion of a long-term "hudna" (which implicitly accepts the reality of Israel's existence) rather than the de facto recognition of Israel that comes with sitting down to face-to-face talks.
But a genuine government of national unity could find a division of labor that allowed for Fateh ministers to negotiate a two-state solution with Israel that would be put to the full government and the PLO for approval, or to a popular referendum, once a text was ready.
The benefits of US talks with Hamas would be immediate. At a stroke, they would distance Washington from Israeli policy, making it clear the US wanted to be a broker between the parties rather than a cheerleader for Israel. They would get the Europeans off their current hesitation and give them the courage to do what many of their own diplomats privately accept is necessary. This would free them to insist unequivocally that the crossings to Gaza must be opened urgently and permanently, under a system of international guarantees in which bans on arms transfers into the territory would be balanced by unfettered access for aid, fuel, goods and services.
The western boycott of Hamas has failed to weaken Hamas' authority in Gaza or its popularity in the West Bank. Israel's air and ground offensive has been equally counter-productive, though far bloodier. The time has come for a reversal.- Published 5/2/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Jonathan Steele is international affairs columnist for The Guardian newspaper
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Obama and the Treatment of Terrorist Suspects
Obama and the Treatment of Terrorist Suspects
February 4, 2009 | 2122 GMT
Global Security and Intelligence Report
By Fred Burton and Ben West
U.S. President Barack Obama signed an executive order Feb. 1 approving the continued use of renditions by the CIA. The order seems to go against Obama's campaign promises to improve the image of the United States abroad, as renditions under the Bush administration had drawn criticism worldwide, especially from members of the European Union. The executive order does not necessarily mean that renditions and other tactics for dealing with terrorist suspects will proceed unchanged, however.
Obama came into office promising changes in the way the United States combats terrorism. One of these changes was a new emphasis on legal processes and a shift away from controversial methods of treating terrorist suspects, like rendition, harsh interrogation techniques and secret prisons. The Obama administration can and will roll back some of these tactics, as demonstrated by the president's Jan. 22 order to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. But some will continue.
Renditions and the Legal Process
Renditions are a powerful tool for counterterrorism operations. They involve agents moving into a foreign country to execute a warrant. Once the fugitive is located, agents track, seize and transport him out of the country for interrogations, or to stand trial, as in the cases of Lebanese hijacker Fawaz Younis, CIA shooter Mir Amal Kanzi, 1993 World Trade Center bombers Abdel Basit (aka Ramzi Yousef) and Mahmud Abouhalima, and even Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (aka Carlos the Jackal).
Some of the individuals targeted for renditions have warrants out for their arrest, but are taking refuge in countries that either lack the law enforcement capability to capture them or cannot arrest and extradite them for political reasons. By contrast, the renditions where there is no indictment or warrant and where the suspect is transported to a secret prison for interrogation and detention without a public trial are far more controversial. Renditions of either kind virtually always occur with the knowledge of the host country, and usually with the host government's express consent. (Few countries wish to shelter suspected terrorist masterminds.)
Renditions thus involve legal questions as much as they do diplomatic questions. Before renditions can be carried out, the Washington bureaucracy kicks into full swing. The U.S. State Department must consider the diplomatic ramifications. The ambassador in the host country must consider his or her position and judge the response of his or her contacts in the host country government. The U.S. Justice Department must also sign on. Finally, the agency in charge of actually nabbing the suspect must be willing to work within any restrictions imposed by any one of the many individuals who must approve the operation.
Even when the government ultimately deems a rendition operation legal, numerous factors can still stymie the effort (not least of which is that by the time all the necessary approvals have been obtained, the window of opportunity to nab the suspect might have closed). So while Obama's executive order in theory permits renditions, it is only one part of the whole process; the appropriate members of Obama's administration must also be on board.
Many members of the Obama administration also served in the Clinton administration, which was widely seen as considering all legal ramifications of potential renditions before taking any action. As a former deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration, new Attorney General Eric Holder enjoyed a reputation for deliberating on renditions to the point of inaction — effectively vetoing such operations.
While an appearance of greater attention to the law might come as a relief to many, actors in the field do not have the luxury of endless deliberation and total consensus — they have a narrow window of opportunity in which to act on perishable intelligence. Assuming that Obama's administration acts with deliberation and pursues consensus building (as he himself has emphasized, and has demonstrated in the bipartisan nature of his Cabinet selections), the legality of renditions might become moot if they are not agreed upon in a timely manner. There is a fine line to walk between efficiency and legality in this field, with extremes on either side being detrimental to national security.
By their very nature, renditions are ad hoc and rarely fit into a nice, clean process, something that explains their controversial nature. They frequently occur in countries allied to the United States, meaning the practice falls outside the scope of war. And renditions resulting in suspects' standing trial are far less controversial than those involving secret prisons, harsh interrogation tactics and reliance on third countries to carry out interrogations — tactics disfavored by the Obama administration.
Alternatives to Rendition
Apprehending suspects in foreign countries does not always involve controversial tactics. U.S. counterterrorism officials also use tactics abroad that are not forbidden under U.S. law, though they might be illegal if used within the United States (and could well be illegal in the country where U.S. agents employ them). In general, such tactics remain constant as administrations change. These tactics include surveillance of foreign targets, ruse operations and economic incentives and punishments to encourage cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.
Ruse operations, a less controversial way to apprehend fugitives than renditions, involve deception, obviating the need to jump through the bureaucratic hoops required for renditions. Ruse operations involve luring suspects to a location where U.S. agents can apprehend them legally. This involves persuading targets to venture into international waters, for example, or even to travel to the United States, where U.S. agents lie in wait.
While such tactics avoid the legal complexities surrounding renditions, they are extremely difficult to carry out. Suspects worth chasing around the world typically are not overly gullible, and know where it is safe to travel. So while there is no reason to believe that ruse operations will cease anytime soon, successful ones are few and far between.
Sometimes killing a terrorist target is both more efficient and less legally complex than renditions or ruse operations. Tactical strikes, such as the unmanned aerial vehicle-launched missile strikes against suspected al Qaeda targets in Pakistan, both remove a suspected terrorist target and avoid drawn-out legal processes. Like its predecessor, the Obama administration apparently sees striking at al Qaeda targets along the Pakistani-Afghan border as acceptable within the scope of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, despite Pakistani protests. The latest such U.S. strike came Jan. 23, just three days after Obama took office. Given the administration's presumed hesitation based on legal reservations and an unwillingness to expand warfare beyond the Afghan theater, this tactic is unlikely to pop up in other areas of the world without a serious threat escalation.
Secret Prisons and Interrogation Issues
Obama on Jan. 22 also ordered the CIA to close its secret prisons around the world that hold detainees without adhering to U.S. legal standards. Because fewer than 100 detainees were held in these prisons, however, this is a minor point.
A different executive order also issued Jan. 22 applied the interrogation guidelines outlined in the U.S. military field handbook and the Geneva Conventions to the CIA. Obama and Holder also have made it clear that the new administration views waterboarding as torture and thus illegal, settling the debate on the matter.
Still, it is only a matter of time before new techniques used by interrogators in the field will face questions of legality and morality. No national leader can micromanage at the field level. Even though the Justice Department and senior White House officials in the Bush administration signed secret findings authorizing the CIA to conduct waterboarding in specific cases, tactical, field-level topics do not stick around at the level of national policy for very long.
With secret prisons on the way out, more restrictions on how agents act in the field and an expected decline in renditions, a greater U.S. reliance on third countries to carry out rendition operations is possible. During the Clinton and Bush administrations, countries like Egypt and Jordan were known to cooperate with U.S. agencies in detaining and interrogating prisoners.
Critics claimed that relying on third countries exploited a loophole that allowed the United States to see that unsavory acts were committed without directly carrying them out. Obama's emphasis on using diplomacy to improve the U.S. image in the world suggests that his administration will turn to other countries for counterterrorism assistance instead of operating unilaterally. Obama already has asked for other countries to help out more in Afghanistan (specifically European countries). Obama might also tap third countries like Portugal, Switzerland or Germany to take in detainees leaving Guantanamo who are not sent back to home countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the facility's closure. Working with these countries to ensure safe delivery of the detainees out of U.S. custody will remove a lightning rod for criticism of the United States in the Muslim world.
Delegating counterterrorism responsibilities to other countries allows the United States to avoid the legal complexities inherent in renditions, secret prisons and harsh interrogation. But ultimately, increased reliance on other countries with different interests can enhance the overall complexity of missions. It is also important to remember that the United States possesses one of the most capable counterterrorism forces in the world, and that other countries simply cannot carry out the same missions that the United States does. This is not to say that pursuing U.S. interests abroad does not call for diplomacy (which is one of the administration's main tools to fight terror), but that seeking international approval and establishing legal cover does reduce efficiency and restrain U.S. capabilities. Finding the balance between fighting terror efficiently and remaining within legal boundaries will be a key challenge for the Obama administration.
February 4, 2009 | 2122 GMT
Global Security and Intelligence Report
By Fred Burton and Ben West
U.S. President Barack Obama signed an executive order Feb. 1 approving the continued use of renditions by the CIA. The order seems to go against Obama's campaign promises to improve the image of the United States abroad, as renditions under the Bush administration had drawn criticism worldwide, especially from members of the European Union. The executive order does not necessarily mean that renditions and other tactics for dealing with terrorist suspects will proceed unchanged, however.
Obama came into office promising changes in the way the United States combats terrorism. One of these changes was a new emphasis on legal processes and a shift away from controversial methods of treating terrorist suspects, like rendition, harsh interrogation techniques and secret prisons. The Obama administration can and will roll back some of these tactics, as demonstrated by the president's Jan. 22 order to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. But some will continue.
Renditions and the Legal Process
Renditions are a powerful tool for counterterrorism operations. They involve agents moving into a foreign country to execute a warrant. Once the fugitive is located, agents track, seize and transport him out of the country for interrogations, or to stand trial, as in the cases of Lebanese hijacker Fawaz Younis, CIA shooter Mir Amal Kanzi, 1993 World Trade Center bombers Abdel Basit (aka Ramzi Yousef) and Mahmud Abouhalima, and even Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (aka Carlos the Jackal).
Some of the individuals targeted for renditions have warrants out for their arrest, but are taking refuge in countries that either lack the law enforcement capability to capture them or cannot arrest and extradite them for political reasons. By contrast, the renditions where there is no indictment or warrant and where the suspect is transported to a secret prison for interrogation and detention without a public trial are far more controversial. Renditions of either kind virtually always occur with the knowledge of the host country, and usually with the host government's express consent. (Few countries wish to shelter suspected terrorist masterminds.)
Renditions thus involve legal questions as much as they do diplomatic questions. Before renditions can be carried out, the Washington bureaucracy kicks into full swing. The U.S. State Department must consider the diplomatic ramifications. The ambassador in the host country must consider his or her position and judge the response of his or her contacts in the host country government. The U.S. Justice Department must also sign on. Finally, the agency in charge of actually nabbing the suspect must be willing to work within any restrictions imposed by any one of the many individuals who must approve the operation.
Even when the government ultimately deems a rendition operation legal, numerous factors can still stymie the effort (not least of which is that by the time all the necessary approvals have been obtained, the window of opportunity to nab the suspect might have closed). So while Obama's executive order in theory permits renditions, it is only one part of the whole process; the appropriate members of Obama's administration must also be on board.
Many members of the Obama administration also served in the Clinton administration, which was widely seen as considering all legal ramifications of potential renditions before taking any action. As a former deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration, new Attorney General Eric Holder enjoyed a reputation for deliberating on renditions to the point of inaction — effectively vetoing such operations.
While an appearance of greater attention to the law might come as a relief to many, actors in the field do not have the luxury of endless deliberation and total consensus — they have a narrow window of opportunity in which to act on perishable intelligence. Assuming that Obama's administration acts with deliberation and pursues consensus building (as he himself has emphasized, and has demonstrated in the bipartisan nature of his Cabinet selections), the legality of renditions might become moot if they are not agreed upon in a timely manner. There is a fine line to walk between efficiency and legality in this field, with extremes on either side being detrimental to national security.
By their very nature, renditions are ad hoc and rarely fit into a nice, clean process, something that explains their controversial nature. They frequently occur in countries allied to the United States, meaning the practice falls outside the scope of war. And renditions resulting in suspects' standing trial are far less controversial than those involving secret prisons, harsh interrogation tactics and reliance on third countries to carry out interrogations — tactics disfavored by the Obama administration.
Alternatives to Rendition
Apprehending suspects in foreign countries does not always involve controversial tactics. U.S. counterterrorism officials also use tactics abroad that are not forbidden under U.S. law, though they might be illegal if used within the United States (and could well be illegal in the country where U.S. agents employ them). In general, such tactics remain constant as administrations change. These tactics include surveillance of foreign targets, ruse operations and economic incentives and punishments to encourage cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.
Ruse operations, a less controversial way to apprehend fugitives than renditions, involve deception, obviating the need to jump through the bureaucratic hoops required for renditions. Ruse operations involve luring suspects to a location where U.S. agents can apprehend them legally. This involves persuading targets to venture into international waters, for example, or even to travel to the United States, where U.S. agents lie in wait.
While such tactics avoid the legal complexities surrounding renditions, they are extremely difficult to carry out. Suspects worth chasing around the world typically are not overly gullible, and know where it is safe to travel. So while there is no reason to believe that ruse operations will cease anytime soon, successful ones are few and far between.
Sometimes killing a terrorist target is both more efficient and less legally complex than renditions or ruse operations. Tactical strikes, such as the unmanned aerial vehicle-launched missile strikes against suspected al Qaeda targets in Pakistan, both remove a suspected terrorist target and avoid drawn-out legal processes. Like its predecessor, the Obama administration apparently sees striking at al Qaeda targets along the Pakistani-Afghan border as acceptable within the scope of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, despite Pakistani protests. The latest such U.S. strike came Jan. 23, just three days after Obama took office. Given the administration's presumed hesitation based on legal reservations and an unwillingness to expand warfare beyond the Afghan theater, this tactic is unlikely to pop up in other areas of the world without a serious threat escalation.
Secret Prisons and Interrogation Issues
Obama on Jan. 22 also ordered the CIA to close its secret prisons around the world that hold detainees without adhering to U.S. legal standards. Because fewer than 100 detainees were held in these prisons, however, this is a minor point.
A different executive order also issued Jan. 22 applied the interrogation guidelines outlined in the U.S. military field handbook and the Geneva Conventions to the CIA. Obama and Holder also have made it clear that the new administration views waterboarding as torture and thus illegal, settling the debate on the matter.
Still, it is only a matter of time before new techniques used by interrogators in the field will face questions of legality and morality. No national leader can micromanage at the field level. Even though the Justice Department and senior White House officials in the Bush administration signed secret findings authorizing the CIA to conduct waterboarding in specific cases, tactical, field-level topics do not stick around at the level of national policy for very long.
With secret prisons on the way out, more restrictions on how agents act in the field and an expected decline in renditions, a greater U.S. reliance on third countries to carry out rendition operations is possible. During the Clinton and Bush administrations, countries like Egypt and Jordan were known to cooperate with U.S. agencies in detaining and interrogating prisoners.
Critics claimed that relying on third countries exploited a loophole that allowed the United States to see that unsavory acts were committed without directly carrying them out. Obama's emphasis on using diplomacy to improve the U.S. image in the world suggests that his administration will turn to other countries for counterterrorism assistance instead of operating unilaterally. Obama already has asked for other countries to help out more in Afghanistan (specifically European countries). Obama might also tap third countries like Portugal, Switzerland or Germany to take in detainees leaving Guantanamo who are not sent back to home countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the facility's closure. Working with these countries to ensure safe delivery of the detainees out of U.S. custody will remove a lightning rod for criticism of the United States in the Muslim world.
Delegating counterterrorism responsibilities to other countries allows the United States to avoid the legal complexities inherent in renditions, secret prisons and harsh interrogation. But ultimately, increased reliance on other countries with different interests can enhance the overall complexity of missions. It is also important to remember that the United States possesses one of the most capable counterterrorism forces in the world, and that other countries simply cannot carry out the same missions that the United States does. This is not to say that pursuing U.S. interests abroad does not call for diplomacy (which is one of the administration's main tools to fight terror), but that seeking international approval and establishing legal cover does reduce efficiency and restrain U.S. capabilities. Finding the balance between fighting terror efficiently and remaining within legal boundaries will be a key challenge for the Obama administration.
Pentagon study: Change course in Afghanistan Report urges less democracy-building and more strikes on Taliban, al-Qaida
MSNBC
2/4/09
Pentagon study: Change course in Afghanistan
Report urges less democracy-building and more strikes on Taliban, al-Qaida
Associated Press
WASHINGTON -- A classified Pentagon report urges President Barack Obama to shift U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, de-emphasizing democracy-building and concentrating more on targeting Taliban and al-Qaida sanctuaries inside Pakistan with the aid of Pakistani military forces.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has seen the report prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it has not yet been presented to the White House, officials said Tuesday. The recommendations are one element of a broad policy reassessment under way along with recommendations to be considered by the White House from the commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, and other military leaders.
In an interview with NBC News' Brian Williams on Tuesday Obama didn't specifically comment on the report but said it was "encouraging" that there is now a "convergence between myself and the joint chiefs and my national security team about what we have to do" on a variety of national security questions, including Afghanistan.
There is a shared view among the joint chiefs, Obama said, that "Afghanistan is getting worse, not getting better."
"We have to have a comprehensive strategy that not only deals with the military side but also the diplomacy," Obama said, "how are we doing development, how do we make sure that the Afghan people have a stake in change in that country which they don't have right now."
A senior defense official said Tuesday that it will likely take several weeks before the Obama administration rolls out its long-term strategy for Afghanistan.
More than U.S. can handle?
The Joint Chiefs' plan reflects growing worries that the U.S. military was taking on more than it could handle in Afghanistan by pursuing the Bush administration's broad goal of nurturing a thriving democratic government.
Instead, the plan calls for a more narrowly focused effort to root out militant strongholds along the Pakistani border and inside the neighboring country, according to officials who confirmed the essence of the report. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the plan publicly.
The recommendations are broadly cast and provide limited detail, meant to help develop the overarching strategy for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region rather than propose a detailed military action plan.
During a press conference Tuesday, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs noted ongoing reviews of Afghan policy, but did not say when they would be made public. Obama intends, he said, to "evaluate the current direction of our policy and make some corrections as he goes forward."
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman would not comment Tuesday on the details of the Joint Chiefs' report, but acknowledged that the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is a critical component for success in Afghanistan.
"When you talk about Afghanistan, you can't help but also recognize the fact that the border region with Pakistan is obviously a contributing factor to the stability and security of Afghanistan, and the work that Pakistan is doing to try to reduce and eliminate those safe havens, and the ability for people to move across that border that are engaged in hostile intentions," Whitman said.
Working with Pakistan
Part of the recommended approach is to search for ways to work more intensively and effectively with the Pakistanis to root out extremist elements in the border area, the senior defense official said.
The heightened emphasis on Pakistan reflects a realization that the root of the problem lies in the militant havens inside its border — a concern outlined last week to Congress in grim testimony by Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen.
But the report does not imply more incursions by U.S. combat forces inside Pakistan or accelerating other forms of U.S. military involvement, the senior defense official emphasized. Pakistani officials have repeatedly raised alarms after a surge of U.S. Hellfire missile strikes from drone predators in recent months, and renewed those complaints after a new strike killed 19 people inside Pakistan days after Obama took office.
'Art of the possible'
"The bottom line is we have to look at what the art of the possible is there," said a U.S. military official who has operated in Afghanistan. The official, who has not seen the Joint Chiefs' report, said the challenge is to craft a strategy that achieves U.S. goals of stabilizing the region and constraining al-Qaida, but also takes into account the powerful tribes that resist a strong central government and the ties among ethnic Pashtuns on either side of the Afghan-Pakistan border.
The Joint Chiefs' report advises a greater emphasis on U.S. military training of Pakistani forces for counter-terror work.
Pakistan's government is well aware of growing U.S. interest in collaborating to improve its military's muscle against al-Qaida and Taliban elements in the border areas. The topic has been broached repeatedly by senior U.S. officials, including Mullen.
The training efforts also would expand and develop the Afghan army and police force, while at the same time work to improve Afghan governance.
The report also stresses that Afghan strategy must be driven by what the Afghans want, and that the U.S. cannot impose its own goals on the Afghanistan government.
During discussions about a new Afghanistan strategy, military leaders expressed worries that the U.S. ambitions in Afghanistan — to stabilize the country and begin to build a democracy there — were beyond its ability.
And as they tried to balance military demands in both Iraq and Afghanistan, some increasingly questioned why the U.S. continued to maintain a war-fighting force in Iraq, even though the mission there has shifted to a more support role. Those fighting forces, they argued, were needed more urgently in Afghanistan.
Military leaders have been signaling for weeks that the focus of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan would change.
Gates wants focus on terrorists
Gates told armed services committees in Congress last week that the U.S. should keep its sights on one thing: preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and extremists who would harm the U.S. or its allies. He bluntly added that the military could not root out terrorists while also propping up Afghanistan's fledgling democracy.
"Afghanistan is the fourth or fifth poorest country in the world, and if we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose," Gates said, a mythology reference to heaven.
Sen. John McCain, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Tuesday that he was briefed last week on the military's proposed new Afghan strategy, which he called evolving but headed in the right direction.
"There will be no Anbar awakening," McCain, R-Ariz., told The Associated Press, referring to the tribal uprising against al-Qaida in Iraq's Anbar province that triggered a turnaround in that conflict. "It will be long, hard and difficult."
The Joint Chiefs report's overall conclusions were first reported Saturday by The Associated Press. Politico reported additional details of the report Tuesday.
The U.S. is considering doubling its troop presence in Afghanistan this year to roughly 60,000, in response to growing strength by the Islamic militant Taliban, fed by safe havens they and al-Qaida have developed in an increasingly unstable Pakistan.
Obama is expected to announce soon his decision on a request for additional forces from the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan. Several officials said they believe the president will approve sending three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan, totaling roughly 14,000 troops.
2/4/09
Pentagon study: Change course in Afghanistan
Report urges less democracy-building and more strikes on Taliban, al-Qaida
Associated Press
WASHINGTON -- A classified Pentagon report urges President Barack Obama to shift U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, de-emphasizing democracy-building and concentrating more on targeting Taliban and al-Qaida sanctuaries inside Pakistan with the aid of Pakistani military forces.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has seen the report prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it has not yet been presented to the White House, officials said Tuesday. The recommendations are one element of a broad policy reassessment under way along with recommendations to be considered by the White House from the commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, and other military leaders.
In an interview with NBC News' Brian Williams on Tuesday Obama didn't specifically comment on the report but said it was "encouraging" that there is now a "convergence between myself and the joint chiefs and my national security team about what we have to do" on a variety of national security questions, including Afghanistan.
There is a shared view among the joint chiefs, Obama said, that "Afghanistan is getting worse, not getting better."
"We have to have a comprehensive strategy that not only deals with the military side but also the diplomacy," Obama said, "how are we doing development, how do we make sure that the Afghan people have a stake in change in that country which they don't have right now."
A senior defense official said Tuesday that it will likely take several weeks before the Obama administration rolls out its long-term strategy for Afghanistan.
More than U.S. can handle?
The Joint Chiefs' plan reflects growing worries that the U.S. military was taking on more than it could handle in Afghanistan by pursuing the Bush administration's broad goal of nurturing a thriving democratic government.
Instead, the plan calls for a more narrowly focused effort to root out militant strongholds along the Pakistani border and inside the neighboring country, according to officials who confirmed the essence of the report. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the plan publicly.
The recommendations are broadly cast and provide limited detail, meant to help develop the overarching strategy for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region rather than propose a detailed military action plan.
During a press conference Tuesday, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs noted ongoing reviews of Afghan policy, but did not say when they would be made public. Obama intends, he said, to "evaluate the current direction of our policy and make some corrections as he goes forward."
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman would not comment Tuesday on the details of the Joint Chiefs' report, but acknowledged that the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is a critical component for success in Afghanistan.
"When you talk about Afghanistan, you can't help but also recognize the fact that the border region with Pakistan is obviously a contributing factor to the stability and security of Afghanistan, and the work that Pakistan is doing to try to reduce and eliminate those safe havens, and the ability for people to move across that border that are engaged in hostile intentions," Whitman said.
Working with Pakistan
Part of the recommended approach is to search for ways to work more intensively and effectively with the Pakistanis to root out extremist elements in the border area, the senior defense official said.
The heightened emphasis on Pakistan reflects a realization that the root of the problem lies in the militant havens inside its border — a concern outlined last week to Congress in grim testimony by Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen.
But the report does not imply more incursions by U.S. combat forces inside Pakistan or accelerating other forms of U.S. military involvement, the senior defense official emphasized. Pakistani officials have repeatedly raised alarms after a surge of U.S. Hellfire missile strikes from drone predators in recent months, and renewed those complaints after a new strike killed 19 people inside Pakistan days after Obama took office.
'Art of the possible'
"The bottom line is we have to look at what the art of the possible is there," said a U.S. military official who has operated in Afghanistan. The official, who has not seen the Joint Chiefs' report, said the challenge is to craft a strategy that achieves U.S. goals of stabilizing the region and constraining al-Qaida, but also takes into account the powerful tribes that resist a strong central government and the ties among ethnic Pashtuns on either side of the Afghan-Pakistan border.
The Joint Chiefs' report advises a greater emphasis on U.S. military training of Pakistani forces for counter-terror work.
Pakistan's government is well aware of growing U.S. interest in collaborating to improve its military's muscle against al-Qaida and Taliban elements in the border areas. The topic has been broached repeatedly by senior U.S. officials, including Mullen.
The training efforts also would expand and develop the Afghan army and police force, while at the same time work to improve Afghan governance.
The report also stresses that Afghan strategy must be driven by what the Afghans want, and that the U.S. cannot impose its own goals on the Afghanistan government.
During discussions about a new Afghanistan strategy, military leaders expressed worries that the U.S. ambitions in Afghanistan — to stabilize the country and begin to build a democracy there — were beyond its ability.
And as they tried to balance military demands in both Iraq and Afghanistan, some increasingly questioned why the U.S. continued to maintain a war-fighting force in Iraq, even though the mission there has shifted to a more support role. Those fighting forces, they argued, were needed more urgently in Afghanistan.
Military leaders have been signaling for weeks that the focus of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan would change.
Gates wants focus on terrorists
Gates told armed services committees in Congress last week that the U.S. should keep its sights on one thing: preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and extremists who would harm the U.S. or its allies. He bluntly added that the military could not root out terrorists while also propping up Afghanistan's fledgling democracy.
"Afghanistan is the fourth or fifth poorest country in the world, and if we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose," Gates said, a mythology reference to heaven.
Sen. John McCain, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Tuesday that he was briefed last week on the military's proposed new Afghan strategy, which he called evolving but headed in the right direction.
"There will be no Anbar awakening," McCain, R-Ariz., told The Associated Press, referring to the tribal uprising against al-Qaida in Iraq's Anbar province that triggered a turnaround in that conflict. "It will be long, hard and difficult."
The Joint Chiefs report's overall conclusions were first reported Saturday by The Associated Press. Politico reported additional details of the report Tuesday.
The U.S. is considering doubling its troop presence in Afghanistan this year to roughly 60,000, in response to growing strength by the Islamic militant Taliban, fed by safe havens they and al-Qaida have developed in an increasingly unstable Pakistan.
Obama is expected to announce soon his decision on a request for additional forces from the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan. Several officials said they believe the president will approve sending three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan, totaling roughly 14,000 troops.
George Mitchell and the end of the two-state solution
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2/4/09
George Mitchell and the end of the two-state solution
Israel's settlement growth means we have to find a different plan.
Sandy Tolan
Los Angeles - On the surface, the most daunting task facing US envoy George Mitchell in his trip to Israel and the Palestinian territories is strengthening the Gaza cease-fire, and helping Gazans rise from the rubble.
But actually, the super diplomat's biggest challenge, as he wraps up his first trip and lays plans for future journeys, lies in coming to terms with a grim and unavoidable fact: The two-state solution is on its deathbed.
Since the Six-Day War of June 1967, the two-state solution, based on the concept of "land for peace," has been the central focus of almost all diplomatic efforts to resolve this tragedy. But because of Israel's unrelenting occupation and settlement project in the West Bank, the long-fought-for two-state solution has finally, tragically, become unworkable. Consider:
•In 1993, when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat famously shook hands on the White House lawn, there were 109,000 Israelis living in settlements across the West Bank (not including Jerusalem). Today there are 275,000, in more than 230 settlements and strategically placed "outposts" designed to cement a permanent Jewish presence on Palestinian land.
•The biggest Israeli settlement outside East Jerusalem, Ariel, is now home to nearly 20,000 settlers. Their home lies one third of the way inside the West Bank, yet the Israeli "security barrier" veers well inside the occupied territory to wrap Ariel in its embrace. The settlement's leaders proclaim confidently that they are "here to stay," and embark on frequent missions to seek new waves of American Jews to move to the settlement.
•A massive Israeli infrastructure to serve and protect the settlements – military posts, surveillance towers, and settlers-only "bypass roads" that allow Israelis easy access to prayer in Jerusalem or the seaside in Tel Aviv – has cut the West Bank into tiny pieces, fragmenting Palestinian life.
•To maintain separation between West Bank Arabs and West Bank Jews, Israel has erected more than 625 roadblocks, checkpoints, and other barriers – a 70 percent increase since 2005 in a land the size of Delaware, the second-smallest state. Israelis rarely encounter such obstacles, but Palestinians seeking to travel between villages and towns must seek permits, and even then, a short journey can take hours.
•Israel's "suburbs" in Arab East Jerusalem, home now to nearly 200,000 Jews, form a concrete ring, isolating the would-be Palestinian capital from the rest of the West Bank. It is therefore increasingly difficult to imagine how a Palestinian president would govern from a capital that is sealed off from the people of his nation.
These massive changes on the ground – the majority made since the initiation of the Oslo "peace process" – have, after 41 years, rendered the two-state solution all but impossible. Workaround "fixes"– land swaps, consolidated settlements, and networks of roads and bridges to funnel Palestinians under and around the Jewish West Bank presence – have become increasingly hard to imagine. The goal, after all, is a "viable, contiguous" Palestine, not one cut up by the visions of Israeli engineers in order to maintain an everlasting Jewish presence on Arab land.
Adding to the increasing impracticality of a two-state solution is the stubborn presence of the settlers themselves, some of whom have pledged violence should soldiers come to evict them. Their religious fervor, and their formidable numbers – dozens of times that of the Gaza settlers removed in 2005 – suggest such threats are not idle.
Israeli President Shimon Peres warned in London recently that such an "evacuation" could trigger a civil war in Israel. Weakening the two-state option even further has been the rain of Hamas rockets from Gaza, and Israel's outsized response, which have placed basic necessities and reconstruction well above peacemaking on the list of priorities.
Mr. Mitchell would do well to listen to people who are thinking beyond two-state options, and foster an openness and creativity absent from American diplomacy since the beginning of this tragedy 60 years ago.
He will continue to hear from former US negotiators, such as Aaron Miller, author of "The Much Too Promised Land," that two states represent "the least bad alternative." Indeed, some of the nightmare futures – the continuation of the status quo, which is growing inexorably into apartheid; or, expulsion of West Bank Palestinians to Jordan, which is already being seriously discussed among Israelis – are completely unacceptable. So is a one-state solution, to Israelis, which they insist would mean the end of the Jewish state.
Yet it was no less a man than Albert Einstein who believed in "sympathetic cooperation" between "the two great Semitic peoples" and who insisted that "no problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it." A relative handful of Israelis and Palestinians are beginning to survey the proverbial new ground, considering what Einstein's theories would mean in practice. They might take heart from Einstein's friend Martin Buber, the great philosopher who advocated a binational state of "joint sovereignty," with "complete equality of rights between the two partners," based on "the love of their homeland that the two peoples share."
Sandy Tolan is author of "The Lemon Tree: An Arab, A Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East." He is associate professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California.
2/4/09
George Mitchell and the end of the two-state solution
Israel's settlement growth means we have to find a different plan.
Sandy Tolan
Los Angeles - On the surface, the most daunting task facing US envoy George Mitchell in his trip to Israel and the Palestinian territories is strengthening the Gaza cease-fire, and helping Gazans rise from the rubble.
But actually, the super diplomat's biggest challenge, as he wraps up his first trip and lays plans for future journeys, lies in coming to terms with a grim and unavoidable fact: The two-state solution is on its deathbed.
Since the Six-Day War of June 1967, the two-state solution, based on the concept of "land for peace," has been the central focus of almost all diplomatic efforts to resolve this tragedy. But because of Israel's unrelenting occupation and settlement project in the West Bank, the long-fought-for two-state solution has finally, tragically, become unworkable. Consider:
•In 1993, when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat famously shook hands on the White House lawn, there were 109,000 Israelis living in settlements across the West Bank (not including Jerusalem). Today there are 275,000, in more than 230 settlements and strategically placed "outposts" designed to cement a permanent Jewish presence on Palestinian land.
•The biggest Israeli settlement outside East Jerusalem, Ariel, is now home to nearly 20,000 settlers. Their home lies one third of the way inside the West Bank, yet the Israeli "security barrier" veers well inside the occupied territory to wrap Ariel in its embrace. The settlement's leaders proclaim confidently that they are "here to stay," and embark on frequent missions to seek new waves of American Jews to move to the settlement.
•A massive Israeli infrastructure to serve and protect the settlements – military posts, surveillance towers, and settlers-only "bypass roads" that allow Israelis easy access to prayer in Jerusalem or the seaside in Tel Aviv – has cut the West Bank into tiny pieces, fragmenting Palestinian life.
•To maintain separation between West Bank Arabs and West Bank Jews, Israel has erected more than 625 roadblocks, checkpoints, and other barriers – a 70 percent increase since 2005 in a land the size of Delaware, the second-smallest state. Israelis rarely encounter such obstacles, but Palestinians seeking to travel between villages and towns must seek permits, and even then, a short journey can take hours.
•Israel's "suburbs" in Arab East Jerusalem, home now to nearly 200,000 Jews, form a concrete ring, isolating the would-be Palestinian capital from the rest of the West Bank. It is therefore increasingly difficult to imagine how a Palestinian president would govern from a capital that is sealed off from the people of his nation.
These massive changes on the ground – the majority made since the initiation of the Oslo "peace process" – have, after 41 years, rendered the two-state solution all but impossible. Workaround "fixes"– land swaps, consolidated settlements, and networks of roads and bridges to funnel Palestinians under and around the Jewish West Bank presence – have become increasingly hard to imagine. The goal, after all, is a "viable, contiguous" Palestine, not one cut up by the visions of Israeli engineers in order to maintain an everlasting Jewish presence on Arab land.
Adding to the increasing impracticality of a two-state solution is the stubborn presence of the settlers themselves, some of whom have pledged violence should soldiers come to evict them. Their religious fervor, and their formidable numbers – dozens of times that of the Gaza settlers removed in 2005 – suggest such threats are not idle.
Israeli President Shimon Peres warned in London recently that such an "evacuation" could trigger a civil war in Israel. Weakening the two-state option even further has been the rain of Hamas rockets from Gaza, and Israel's outsized response, which have placed basic necessities and reconstruction well above peacemaking on the list of priorities.
Mr. Mitchell would do well to listen to people who are thinking beyond two-state options, and foster an openness and creativity absent from American diplomacy since the beginning of this tragedy 60 years ago.
He will continue to hear from former US negotiators, such as Aaron Miller, author of "The Much Too Promised Land," that two states represent "the least bad alternative." Indeed, some of the nightmare futures – the continuation of the status quo, which is growing inexorably into apartheid; or, expulsion of West Bank Palestinians to Jordan, which is already being seriously discussed among Israelis – are completely unacceptable. So is a one-state solution, to Israelis, which they insist would mean the end of the Jewish state.
Yet it was no less a man than Albert Einstein who believed in "sympathetic cooperation" between "the two great Semitic peoples" and who insisted that "no problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it." A relative handful of Israelis and Palestinians are beginning to survey the proverbial new ground, considering what Einstein's theories would mean in practice. They might take heart from Einstein's friend Martin Buber, the great philosopher who advocated a binational state of "joint sovereignty," with "complete equality of rights between the two partners," based on "the love of their homeland that the two peoples share."
Sandy Tolan is author of "The Lemon Tree: An Arab, A Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East." He is associate professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California.
Still Waiting for Obama's Iran Diplomacy by Massimo Calabresi
TIME
2/2/09
Still Waiting for Obama's Iran Diplomacy
Massimo Calabresi
When President Barack Obama visited the State Department on Jan. 22 and rolled out heavy-hitter envoys to handle Israeli-Palestinian and Afghan-Pakistani affairs, the question of the day on the diplomatic circuit was: Where's Dennis? That's because the rumor mill in the capital had been predicting that, along with George Mitchell (Israeli-Palestinian affairs) and Richard Holbrooke (Afghanistan-Pakistan), longtime U.S. Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross would be named as Obama's point man on Iran, tasked with implementing the President'scampaign promise
to employ "tough, direct diplomacy" with Tehran.
So what did Ross's absence from the envoy rollout signal about the Administration's Iran policy? Although Ross remains studiously silent, sources who have spoken with him recently provide two credible, not necessarily incompatible explanations — both of which underline just how difficult it will be for the new Administration to deliver a successful policy based on Obama's campaign promise.
The first version emphasizes traditional turf battles. Ross wants the job as described three weeks ago in a memo from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the pro-Israel think tank where Ross was based after leaving the government in 2001. The WINEP memo to its board of trustees announced that Ross had accepted a position as ambassador-at-large in Hillary Clinton's State Department with a broad regional policy role in which he would advise Clinton directly on a "wide range of Middle East issues, from the Arab-Israeli peace process to Iran." But that job definition would potentially undercut Mitchell's role as Middle East envoy reporting to Clinton. In this telling, Ross, who in the Clinton Administration had played the role now assigned to Mitchell, doesn't want his responsibilities limited strictly to Iran. "He's frustrated," says one person who spoke with him recently. And until a title and responsibilities can be agreed upon, Ross can't be rolled out.
The alternative explanation is that Ross is already hard at work on Iran, which will be his primary responsibility, but he can't be named as an envoy tasked with engaging Iran until the Administration's top players agree on a basic approach to the issue. "He's on board," says another Ross friend, but "it would be the height of folly to roll out Dennis [now] ... There's just a lot of very careful and, I would say, quiet spadework to be done [first]."
Engaging Iran is a lot more complicated than the rhetoric of "tough, direct diplomacy" suggests. For nearly three years, the U.S. and Europe have been trying to start meaningful talks with Iran, even showing a willingness to bend on key issues regarding Iran's nuclear program. As far back as 2006, for example, the U.S. agreed with European diplomatic proposals that included the possibility of allowing the Islamic republic to obtain enriched uranium for energy production sometime in the future. But Iran, in the words of one European diplomat, has been "less than forthcoming."
The Europeans not only approached the Iranians with an offer of a potentially peaceful nuclear future but said they would be eager to hear any counterproposal for talks from the Iranians on any set of issues. Tehran's response was simply to stall. "We've been knocking on Iran's door," says a senior European diplomat. "They've never responded." Given the price of gas in recent years and the limited levers for pressuring Iran, their reticence is not surprising.
So the first and most urgent task facing the new Administration may not be how to talk to the Iranians, but how to get them to talk to us. Ross may believe that only a broad policy portfolio will enable him to make that happen, because Iran's activities and interests are so deeply entrenched in the dynamic of the greater Middle East that a diplomatic opening would have to involve Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, among others. And introducing Ross as an Iran envoy would risk Tehran immediately announcing that they have no interest in talking to him.
The other problem facing the Administration is that launching any diplomatic outreach to Tehran right now could help hard-liners like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the run-up to Iran's presidential election in June. The Administration is "very cautious," according to the senior European diplomat. That explains the delicate walk-back by the White House after newly named U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice announced that the U.S. would begin direct negotiations with Iran. "There are no specific initiatives" at the moment to talk to Iran, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said, in response to questions about Rice's statement.
When there is an opening to Iran, Dennis Ross will emerge as one of its key architects. But for now, if the question outside the Administration is "Where's Dennis?" the question that he and others struggling to shape a diplomatic opening to Tehran might pose in response is "Where are the Iranians?"
2/2/09
Still Waiting for Obama's Iran Diplomacy
Massimo Calabresi
When President Barack Obama visited the State Department on Jan. 22 and rolled out heavy-hitter envoys to handle Israeli-Palestinian and Afghan-Pakistani affairs, the question of the day on the diplomatic circuit was: Where's Dennis? That's because the rumor mill in the capital had been predicting that, along with George Mitchell (Israeli-Palestinian affairs) and Richard Holbrooke (Afghanistan-Pakistan), longtime U.S. Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross would be named as Obama's point man on Iran, tasked with implementing the President'scampaign promise
to employ "tough, direct diplomacy" with Tehran.
So what did Ross's absence from the envoy rollout signal about the Administration's Iran policy? Although Ross remains studiously silent, sources who have spoken with him recently provide two credible, not necessarily incompatible explanations — both of which underline just how difficult it will be for the new Administration to deliver a successful policy based on Obama's campaign promise.
The first version emphasizes traditional turf battles. Ross wants the job as described three weeks ago in a memo from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the pro-Israel think tank where Ross was based after leaving the government in 2001. The WINEP memo to its board of trustees announced that Ross had accepted a position as ambassador-at-large in Hillary Clinton's State Department with a broad regional policy role in which he would advise Clinton directly on a "wide range of Middle East issues, from the Arab-Israeli peace process to Iran." But that job definition would potentially undercut Mitchell's role as Middle East envoy reporting to Clinton. In this telling, Ross, who in the Clinton Administration had played the role now assigned to Mitchell, doesn't want his responsibilities limited strictly to Iran. "He's frustrated," says one person who spoke with him recently. And until a title and responsibilities can be agreed upon, Ross can't be rolled out.
The alternative explanation is that Ross is already hard at work on Iran, which will be his primary responsibility, but he can't be named as an envoy tasked with engaging Iran until the Administration's top players agree on a basic approach to the issue. "He's on board," says another Ross friend, but "it would be the height of folly to roll out Dennis [now] ... There's just a lot of very careful and, I would say, quiet spadework to be done [first]."
Engaging Iran is a lot more complicated than the rhetoric of "tough, direct diplomacy" suggests. For nearly three years, the U.S. and Europe have been trying to start meaningful talks with Iran, even showing a willingness to bend on key issues regarding Iran's nuclear program. As far back as 2006, for example, the U.S. agreed with European diplomatic proposals that included the possibility of allowing the Islamic republic to obtain enriched uranium for energy production sometime in the future. But Iran, in the words of one European diplomat, has been "less than forthcoming."
The Europeans not only approached the Iranians with an offer of a potentially peaceful nuclear future but said they would be eager to hear any counterproposal for talks from the Iranians on any set of issues. Tehran's response was simply to stall. "We've been knocking on Iran's door," says a senior European diplomat. "They've never responded." Given the price of gas in recent years and the limited levers for pressuring Iran, their reticence is not surprising.
So the first and most urgent task facing the new Administration may not be how to talk to the Iranians, but how to get them to talk to us. Ross may believe that only a broad policy portfolio will enable him to make that happen, because Iran's activities and interests are so deeply entrenched in the dynamic of the greater Middle East that a diplomatic opening would have to involve Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, among others. And introducing Ross as an Iran envoy would risk Tehran immediately announcing that they have no interest in talking to him.
The other problem facing the Administration is that launching any diplomatic outreach to Tehran right now could help hard-liners like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the run-up to Iran's presidential election in June. The Administration is "very cautious," according to the senior European diplomat. That explains the delicate walk-back by the White House after newly named U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice announced that the U.S. would begin direct negotiations with Iran. "There are no specific initiatives" at the moment to talk to Iran, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said, in response to questions about Rice's statement.
When there is an opening to Iran, Dennis Ross will emerge as one of its key architects. But for now, if the question outside the Administration is "Where's Dennis?" the question that he and others struggling to shape a diplomatic opening to Tehran might pose in response is "Where are the Iranians?"
Another War, Another Defeat The Gaza Offensive has succeeded in punishing the Palestinians but not in making Israel more secure John J. Mearsheime
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
2/3/09
Another War, Another Defeat
The Gaza Offensive has succeeded in punishing the Palestinians but not in making Israel more secure
John J. Mearsheimer
Israelis and their American supporters claim that Israel learned its lessons well from the disastrous 2006 Lebanon war and has devised a winning strategy for the present war against Hamas. Of course, when a ceasefire comes, Israel will declare victory. Don't believe it. Israel has foolishly started another war it cannot win.
The campaign in Gaza is said to have two objectives: 1) to put an end to the rockets and mortars that Palestinians have been firing into southern Israel since it withdrew from Gaza in August 2005; 2) to restore Israel's deterrent, which was said to be diminished by the Lebanon fiasco, by Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, and by its inability to halt Iran's nuclear program.
But these are not the real goals of Operation Cast Lead. The actual purpose is connected to Israel's long-term vision of how it intends to live with millions of Palestinians in its midst. It is part of a broader strategic goal: the creation of a "Greater Israel." Specifically, Israel's leaders remain determined to control all of what used to be known as Mandate Palestine, which includes Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinians would have limited autonomy in a handful of disconnected and economically crippled enclaves, one of which is Gaza. Israel would control the borders around them, movement between them, the air above and the water below them.
The key to achieving this is to inflict massive pain on the Palestinians so that they come to accept the fact that they are a defeated people and that Israel will be largely responsible for controlling their future. This strategy, which was first articulated by Ze'ev Jabotinsky in the 1920s and has heavily influenced Israeli policy since 1948, is commonly referred to as the "Iron Wall."
What has been happening in Gaza is fully consistent with this strategy. Let's begin with Israel's decision to withdraw from Gaza in 2005. The conventional wisdom is that Israel was serious about making peace with the Palestinians and that its leaders hoped the exit from Gaza would be a major step toward creating a viable Palestinian state. According to the New York Times'
Thomas L. Friedman, Israel was giving the Palestinians an opportunity to "build a decent mini-state there—a Dubai on the Mediterranean," and if they did so, it would "fundamentally reshape the Israeli debate about whether the Palestinians can be handed most of the West Bank."
This is pure fiction. Even before Hamas came to power, the Israelis intended to create an open-air prison for the Palestinians in Gaza and inflict great pain on them until they complied with Israel's wishes. Dov Weisglass, Ariel Sharon's closest adviser at the time, candidly stated that the disengagement from Gaza was aimed at halting the peace process, not encouraging it. He described the disengagement as "formaldehyde that's necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians." Moreover, he emphasized that the withdrawal "places the Palestinians under tremendous pressure. It forces them into a corner where they hate to be."
Arnon Soffer, a prominent Israeli demographer who also advised Sharon, elaborated on what that pressure would look like. "When 2.5 million people live in a closed-off Gaza, it's going to be a human catastrophe. Those people will become even bigger animals than they are today, with the aid of an insane fundamentalist Islam. The pressure at the border will be awful. It's going to be a terrible war. So, if we want to remain alive, we will have to kill and kill and kill. All day, every day."
In January 2006, five months after the Israelis pulled their settlers out of Gaza, Hamas won a decisive victory over Fatah in the Palestinian legislative elections. This meant trouble for Israel's strategy because Hamas was democratically elected, well organized, not corrupt like Fatah, and unwilling to accept Israel's existence. Israel responded by ratcheting up economic pressure on the Palestinians, but it did not work. In fact, the situation took another turn for the worse in March 2007, when Fatah and Hamas came together to form a national unity government. Hamas's stature and political power were growing, and Israel's divide-and-conquer strategy was unraveling. To make matters worse, the national unity government began pushing for a longterm ceasefire. The Palestinians would end all missile attacks on Israel if the Israelis would stop arresting and assassinating Palestinians and end their economic stranglehold, opening the border crossings into Gaza. Israel rejected that offer and with American backing set out to foment a civil war between Fatah and Hamas that would wreck the national unity government and put Fatah in charge. The plan backfired when Hamas drove Fatah out of Gaza, leaving Hamas in charge there and the more pliant Fatah in control of the West Bank. Israel then tightened the screws on the blockade around Gaza, causing even greater hardship and suffering among the Palestinians living there. Hamas responded by continuing to fire rockets and mortars into Israel, while emphasizing that they still sought a long-term ceasefire, perhaps lasting ten years or more. This was not a noble gesture on Hamas's part: they sought a ceasefire because the balance of power heavily favored Israel. The Israelis had no interest in a ceasefire and merely intensified the economic pressure on Gaza. But in the late spring of 2008, pressure from Israelis living under the rocket attacks led the government to agree to a six-month ceasefire starting on June 19. That agreement, which formally ended on Dec. 19, immediately preceded the present war, which began on Dec. 27.
The official Israeli position blames Hamas for undermining the ceasefire. This view is widely accepted in the United States, but it is not true. Israeli leaders disliked the ceasefire from the start, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak instructed the IDF to begin preparing for the present war while the ceasefire was being negotiated in June 2008. Furthermore, Dan Gillerman, Israel's former ambassador to the UN, reports that Jerusalem began to prepare the propaganda campaign to sell the present war months before the conflict began. For its part, Hamas drastically reduced the number of missile attacks during the first five months of the ceasefire. A total of two rockets were fired into Israel during September and October, none by Hamas.
How did Israel behave during this same period? It continued arresting and assassinating Palestinians on the West Bank, and it continued the deadly blockade that was slowly strangling Gaza. Then on Nov. 4, as Americans voted for a new president, Israel attacked a tunnel inside Gaza and killed six Palestinians. It was the first major violation of the ceasefire, and the Palestinians— who had been "careful to maintain the ceasefire," according to Israel's Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center—responded by resuming rocket attacks. The calm that had prevailed since June vanished as Israel ratcheted up the blockade and its attacks into Gaza and the Palestinians hurled more rockets at Israel. It is worth noting that not a single Israeli was killed by Palestinian missiles between Nov. 4 and the launching of the war on Dec. 27. As the violence increased, Hamas made clear that it had no interest in extending the ceasefire beyond Dec. 19, which is hardly surprising, since it had not worked as intended. In mid-December, however, Hamas informed Israel that it was still willing to negotiate a long-term ceasefire if it included an end to the arrests and assassinations as well as the lifting of the blockade. But the Israelis, having used the ceasefire to prepare for war against Hamas, rejected this overture. The bombing of Gaza commenced eight days after the failed ceasefire formally ended. If Israel wanted to stop missile attacks from Gaza, it could have done so by arranging a long-term ceasefire with Hamas. And if Israel were genuinely interested in creating a viable Palestinian state, it could have worked with the national unity government to implement a meaningful ceasefire and change Hamas's thinking about a two-state solution. But Israel has a different agenda: it is determined to employ the Iron Wall strategy to get the Palestinians in Gaza to accept their fate as hapless subjects of a Greater Israel. This brutal policy is clearly reflected in Israel's conduct of the Gaza War. Israel and its supporters claim that the IDF is going to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties, in some cases taking risks that put Israeli soldiers in jeopardy. Hardly.
One reason to doubt these claims is that Israel refuses to allow reporters into the war zone: it does not want the world to see what its soldiers and bombs are doing inside Gaza. At the same time, Israel has launched a massive propaganda campaign to put a positive spin on the horror stories that do emerge. The best evidence, however, that Israel is deliberately seeking to punish the broader population in Gaza is the death and destruction the IDF has wrought on that small piece of real estate. Israel has killed over 1,000 Palestinians and wounded more than 4,000. Over half of the casualties are civilians, and many are children. The IDF's opening salvo on Dec. 27 took place as children were leaving school, and one of its primary targets that day was a large group of graduating police cadets, who hardly qualified as terrorists. In what Ehud Barak called "an all-out war against Hamas," Israel has targeted a university, schools, mosques, homes, apartment buildings, government offices, and even ambulances. A senior Israeli military official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, explained the logic behind Israel's expansive target set: "There are many aspects of Hamas, and we are trying to hit the whole spectrum, because everything is connected and everything supports terrorism against Israel." In other words, everyone is a terrorist and everything is a legitimate target.
Israelis tend to be blunt, and they occasionally say what they are really doing. After the IDF killed 40 Palestinian civilians in a UN school on Jan. 6, Ha'aretz reported that "senior officers admit that the IDF has been using enormous firepower." One officer explained, "For us, being cautious means being aggressive. From the minute we entered, we've acted like we're at war. That creates enormous damage on the ground … I just hope those who have fled the area of Gaza City in which we are operating will describe the shock." One might accept that Israel is waging "a cruel, all-out war against 1.5 million Palestinian civilians," as Ha'aretz put it in an editorial, but argue that it will eventually achieve its war aims and the rest of the world will quickly forget the horrors inflicted on the people of Gaza.
This is wishful thinking. For starters, Israel is unlikely to stop the rocket fire for any appreciable period of time unless it agrees to open Gaza's borders and stop arresting and killing Palestinians. Israelis talk about cutting off the supply of rockets and mortars into Gaza, but weapons will continue to come in via secret tunnels and ships that sneak through Israel's naval blockade. It will also be impossible to police all of the goods sent into Gaza through legitimate channels.
Israel could try to conquer all of Gaza and lock the place down. That would probably stop the rocket attacks if Israel deployed a large enough force. But then the IDF would be bogged down in a costly occupation against a deeply hostile population. They would eventually have to leave, and the rocket fire would resume. And if Israel fails to stop the rocket fire and keep it stopped, as seems likely, its deterrent will be diminished, not strengthened.
More importantly, there is little reason to think that the Israelis can beat Hamas into submission and get the Palestinians to live quietly in a handful of Bantustans inside Greater Israel. Israel has been humiliating, torturing, and killing Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since 1967 and has not come close to cowing them.
Indeed, Hamas's reaction to Israel's brutality seems to lend credence to Nietzsche's remark that what does not kill you makes you stronger. But even if the unexpected happens and the Palestinians cave, Israel would still lose because it will become an apartheid state. As Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently said, Israel will "face a South African-style struggle" if the Palestinians do not get a viable state of their own. "As soon as that happens," he argued, "the state of Israel is finished." Yet Olmert has done nothing to stop settlement expansion and create a viable Palestinian state, relying instead on the Iron Wall strategy to deal with the Palestinians.
There is also little chance that people around the world who follow the Israeli- Palestinian conflict will soon forget the appalling punishment that Israel is meting out in Gaza. The destruction is just too obvious to miss, and too many people—especially in the Arab and Islamic world—care about the Palestinians' fate. Moreover, discourse about this longstanding conflict has undergone a sea change in the West in recent years, and many of us who were once wholly sympathetic to Israel now see that the Israelis are the victimizers and the Palestinians are the victims. What is happening in Gaza will accelerate that changing picture of the conflict and long be seen as a dark stain on Israel's reputation.
The bottom line is that no matter what happens on the battlefield, Israel cannot win its war in Gaza. In fact, it is pursuing a strategy—with lots of help from its so-called friends in the Diaspora—that is placing its long-term future at risk.
2/3/09
Another War, Another Defeat
The Gaza Offensive has succeeded in punishing the Palestinians but not in making Israel more secure
John J. Mearsheimer
Israelis and their American supporters claim that Israel learned its lessons well from the disastrous 2006 Lebanon war and has devised a winning strategy for the present war against Hamas. Of course, when a ceasefire comes, Israel will declare victory. Don't believe it. Israel has foolishly started another war it cannot win.
The campaign in Gaza is said to have two objectives: 1) to put an end to the rockets and mortars that Palestinians have been firing into southern Israel since it withdrew from Gaza in August 2005; 2) to restore Israel's deterrent, which was said to be diminished by the Lebanon fiasco, by Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, and by its inability to halt Iran's nuclear program.
But these are not the real goals of Operation Cast Lead. The actual purpose is connected to Israel's long-term vision of how it intends to live with millions of Palestinians in its midst. It is part of a broader strategic goal: the creation of a "Greater Israel." Specifically, Israel's leaders remain determined to control all of what used to be known as Mandate Palestine, which includes Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinians would have limited autonomy in a handful of disconnected and economically crippled enclaves, one of which is Gaza. Israel would control the borders around them, movement between them, the air above and the water below them.
The key to achieving this is to inflict massive pain on the Palestinians so that they come to accept the fact that they are a defeated people and that Israel will be largely responsible for controlling their future. This strategy, which was first articulated by Ze'ev Jabotinsky in the 1920s and has heavily influenced Israeli policy since 1948, is commonly referred to as the "Iron Wall."
What has been happening in Gaza is fully consistent with this strategy. Let's begin with Israel's decision to withdraw from Gaza in 2005. The conventional wisdom is that Israel was serious about making peace with the Palestinians and that its leaders hoped the exit from Gaza would be a major step toward creating a viable Palestinian state. According to the New York Times'
Thomas L. Friedman, Israel was giving the Palestinians an opportunity to "build a decent mini-state there—a Dubai on the Mediterranean," and if they did so, it would "fundamentally reshape the Israeli debate about whether the Palestinians can be handed most of the West Bank."
This is pure fiction. Even before Hamas came to power, the Israelis intended to create an open-air prison for the Palestinians in Gaza and inflict great pain on them until they complied with Israel's wishes. Dov Weisglass, Ariel Sharon's closest adviser at the time, candidly stated that the disengagement from Gaza was aimed at halting the peace process, not encouraging it. He described the disengagement as "formaldehyde that's necessary so that there will not be a political process with the Palestinians." Moreover, he emphasized that the withdrawal "places the Palestinians under tremendous pressure. It forces them into a corner where they hate to be."
Arnon Soffer, a prominent Israeli demographer who also advised Sharon, elaborated on what that pressure would look like. "When 2.5 million people live in a closed-off Gaza, it's going to be a human catastrophe. Those people will become even bigger animals than they are today, with the aid of an insane fundamentalist Islam. The pressure at the border will be awful. It's going to be a terrible war. So, if we want to remain alive, we will have to kill and kill and kill. All day, every day."
In January 2006, five months after the Israelis pulled their settlers out of Gaza, Hamas won a decisive victory over Fatah in the Palestinian legislative elections. This meant trouble for Israel's strategy because Hamas was democratically elected, well organized, not corrupt like Fatah, and unwilling to accept Israel's existence. Israel responded by ratcheting up economic pressure on the Palestinians, but it did not work. In fact, the situation took another turn for the worse in March 2007, when Fatah and Hamas came together to form a national unity government. Hamas's stature and political power were growing, and Israel's divide-and-conquer strategy was unraveling. To make matters worse, the national unity government began pushing for a longterm ceasefire. The Palestinians would end all missile attacks on Israel if the Israelis would stop arresting and assassinating Palestinians and end their economic stranglehold, opening the border crossings into Gaza. Israel rejected that offer and with American backing set out to foment a civil war between Fatah and Hamas that would wreck the national unity government and put Fatah in charge. The plan backfired when Hamas drove Fatah out of Gaza, leaving Hamas in charge there and the more pliant Fatah in control of the West Bank. Israel then tightened the screws on the blockade around Gaza, causing even greater hardship and suffering among the Palestinians living there. Hamas responded by continuing to fire rockets and mortars into Israel, while emphasizing that they still sought a long-term ceasefire, perhaps lasting ten years or more. This was not a noble gesture on Hamas's part: they sought a ceasefire because the balance of power heavily favored Israel. The Israelis had no interest in a ceasefire and merely intensified the economic pressure on Gaza. But in the late spring of 2008, pressure from Israelis living under the rocket attacks led the government to agree to a six-month ceasefire starting on June 19. That agreement, which formally ended on Dec. 19, immediately preceded the present war, which began on Dec. 27.
The official Israeli position blames Hamas for undermining the ceasefire. This view is widely accepted in the United States, but it is not true. Israeli leaders disliked the ceasefire from the start, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak instructed the IDF to begin preparing for the present war while the ceasefire was being negotiated in June 2008. Furthermore, Dan Gillerman, Israel's former ambassador to the UN, reports that Jerusalem began to prepare the propaganda campaign to sell the present war months before the conflict began. For its part, Hamas drastically reduced the number of missile attacks during the first five months of the ceasefire. A total of two rockets were fired into Israel during September and October, none by Hamas.
How did Israel behave during this same period? It continued arresting and assassinating Palestinians on the West Bank, and it continued the deadly blockade that was slowly strangling Gaza. Then on Nov. 4, as Americans voted for a new president, Israel attacked a tunnel inside Gaza and killed six Palestinians. It was the first major violation of the ceasefire, and the Palestinians— who had been "careful to maintain the ceasefire," according to Israel's Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center—responded by resuming rocket attacks. The calm that had prevailed since June vanished as Israel ratcheted up the blockade and its attacks into Gaza and the Palestinians hurled more rockets at Israel. It is worth noting that not a single Israeli was killed by Palestinian missiles between Nov. 4 and the launching of the war on Dec. 27. As the violence increased, Hamas made clear that it had no interest in extending the ceasefire beyond Dec. 19, which is hardly surprising, since it had not worked as intended. In mid-December, however, Hamas informed Israel that it was still willing to negotiate a long-term ceasefire if it included an end to the arrests and assassinations as well as the lifting of the blockade. But the Israelis, having used the ceasefire to prepare for war against Hamas, rejected this overture. The bombing of Gaza commenced eight days after the failed ceasefire formally ended. If Israel wanted to stop missile attacks from Gaza, it could have done so by arranging a long-term ceasefire with Hamas. And if Israel were genuinely interested in creating a viable Palestinian state, it could have worked with the national unity government to implement a meaningful ceasefire and change Hamas's thinking about a two-state solution. But Israel has a different agenda: it is determined to employ the Iron Wall strategy to get the Palestinians in Gaza to accept their fate as hapless subjects of a Greater Israel. This brutal policy is clearly reflected in Israel's conduct of the Gaza War. Israel and its supporters claim that the IDF is going to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties, in some cases taking risks that put Israeli soldiers in jeopardy. Hardly.
One reason to doubt these claims is that Israel refuses to allow reporters into the war zone: it does not want the world to see what its soldiers and bombs are doing inside Gaza. At the same time, Israel has launched a massive propaganda campaign to put a positive spin on the horror stories that do emerge. The best evidence, however, that Israel is deliberately seeking to punish the broader population in Gaza is the death and destruction the IDF has wrought on that small piece of real estate. Israel has killed over 1,000 Palestinians and wounded more than 4,000. Over half of the casualties are civilians, and many are children. The IDF's opening salvo on Dec. 27 took place as children were leaving school, and one of its primary targets that day was a large group of graduating police cadets, who hardly qualified as terrorists. In what Ehud Barak called "an all-out war against Hamas," Israel has targeted a university, schools, mosques, homes, apartment buildings, government offices, and even ambulances. A senior Israeli military official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, explained the logic behind Israel's expansive target set: "There are many aspects of Hamas, and we are trying to hit the whole spectrum, because everything is connected and everything supports terrorism against Israel." In other words, everyone is a terrorist and everything is a legitimate target.
Israelis tend to be blunt, and they occasionally say what they are really doing. After the IDF killed 40 Palestinian civilians in a UN school on Jan. 6, Ha'aretz reported that "senior officers admit that the IDF has been using enormous firepower." One officer explained, "For us, being cautious means being aggressive. From the minute we entered, we've acted like we're at war. That creates enormous damage on the ground … I just hope those who have fled the area of Gaza City in which we are operating will describe the shock." One might accept that Israel is waging "a cruel, all-out war against 1.5 million Palestinian civilians," as Ha'aretz put it in an editorial, but argue that it will eventually achieve its war aims and the rest of the world will quickly forget the horrors inflicted on the people of Gaza.
This is wishful thinking. For starters, Israel is unlikely to stop the rocket fire for any appreciable period of time unless it agrees to open Gaza's borders and stop arresting and killing Palestinians. Israelis talk about cutting off the supply of rockets and mortars into Gaza, but weapons will continue to come in via secret tunnels and ships that sneak through Israel's naval blockade. It will also be impossible to police all of the goods sent into Gaza through legitimate channels.
Israel could try to conquer all of Gaza and lock the place down. That would probably stop the rocket attacks if Israel deployed a large enough force. But then the IDF would be bogged down in a costly occupation against a deeply hostile population. They would eventually have to leave, and the rocket fire would resume. And if Israel fails to stop the rocket fire and keep it stopped, as seems likely, its deterrent will be diminished, not strengthened.
More importantly, there is little reason to think that the Israelis can beat Hamas into submission and get the Palestinians to live quietly in a handful of Bantustans inside Greater Israel. Israel has been humiliating, torturing, and killing Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since 1967 and has not come close to cowing them.
Indeed, Hamas's reaction to Israel's brutality seems to lend credence to Nietzsche's remark that what does not kill you makes you stronger. But even if the unexpected happens and the Palestinians cave, Israel would still lose because it will become an apartheid state. As Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently said, Israel will "face a South African-style struggle" if the Palestinians do not get a viable state of their own. "As soon as that happens," he argued, "the state of Israel is finished." Yet Olmert has done nothing to stop settlement expansion and create a viable Palestinian state, relying instead on the Iron Wall strategy to deal with the Palestinians.
There is also little chance that people around the world who follow the Israeli- Palestinian conflict will soon forget the appalling punishment that Israel is meting out in Gaza. The destruction is just too obvious to miss, and too many people—especially in the Arab and Islamic world—care about the Palestinians' fate. Moreover, discourse about this longstanding conflict has undergone a sea change in the West in recent years, and many of us who were once wholly sympathetic to Israel now see that the Israelis are the victimizers and the Palestinians are the victims. What is happening in Gaza will accelerate that changing picture of the conflict and long be seen as a dark stain on Israel's reputation.
The bottom line is that no matter what happens on the battlefield, Israel cannot win its war in Gaza. In fact, it is pursuing a strategy—with lots of help from its so-called friends in the Diaspora—that is placing its long-term future at risk.
The Institutional Rigidity of American Foreign Policy by William Pfaff
The Institutional Rigidity of American Foreign Policy
William Pfaff
Paris, February 3, 2009 – The distinguished and irreverent economist, observer of American national mores, preconceptions and faults, and sometime U.S. Government official, the Canadian-born but U.S.-nationalized J.K. Galbraith, wrote the following of his
government experience in Washington and New Delhi in the 1960s. He was not the only one, he said, who fell afoul "of a major feature of our foreign policy. That is its institutional rigidity, which holds it on course even when it is visibly wrong.
"So it was on Vietnam, as is now accepted. So it was on ...military alliances with the poor lands.... So it was [and continues to be] on such matters as the enlargement of NATO or the continuing trade and travel sanctions on Cuba, or, as this is written [in 1999], on a
sensible response to the more liberal tendencies now evident in Iran....[It is] a rigidity with its strong commitment to error." Indeed, a decade later, one might be justified in speaking of an absolute, inevitable and chronic institutional commitment to error.
In the 1920s to the mid-1930s, the principal postulated enemy in U.S. naval war planning and exercises continued to be the Royal Navy, as had been the case for more than a century of American history.
The U.S. Navy today operates eleven large aircraft-carrier battle groups, which are, as William S. Lind has written, "still structured to fight the Imperial Japanese Navy," although the only available wars at the moment are those with non-state insurgent forces in
desert Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan.
The American air force today is bitterly divided between partisans of buying still more than it already has of the supersonic, stealth F-22 fighter, which was designed to counter a Soviet interceptor that was never built (there ceased to be a Soviet Union), or whether the
USAF should instead turn to the F-35 "Joint Strike Fighter" -- or insist on the acquisition of both fighters.
The F-35 is still more costly than the F-22, and according to one Air Force critic quoted by Chalmers Johnson, "has a distinction that even the F-22 cannot claim, namely that it is tailored to meet [a Soviet] threat that ceased to exist at least three years before [the F-35's research and development] program began."
The aircraft was promised to Congress in 1998 at a unit cost of $184 million. Its scheduled cost in 2008 is $355 million a unit, and its development is two years behind schedule.
Its original costing also assumed that it would be sold and partially paid for by an array of NATO allies led by Britain, Norway and the Netherlands (none of whom would receive a version that could be operated independently of U.S. Air Force personnel) -- a demonstration that NATO Europe is not acquainted with the 19th century American showman P.T. Barnum's maxim that "there's a sucker born every minute." However these foreign sales are not yet totally nailed down, so Barnum's wisdom might yet prevail, at Washington's expense.
This digression into military procurement is relevant to Galbraith's warning since it provides a further demonstration of the institutional incapacity of the United States international policy establishment to change course, no matter how flagrant the need to do so; and this is perhaps the biggest of all the problems faced by President Barack Obama.
The new machinery of counter-insurgency, nation-building and democratization in radicalized, failing, or "failed" states so as to "win" the war on terrorism was put into operation by the U.S. more than a year ago, at about the time Iraq tactics were changed to enlist Sunni tribesmen in the Awakening movement, and the ethnic segregation of Baghdad began to bring a significant (if impermanent?) drop in violence there. Despite the evidence that the Afghanistan situation bears little resemblance to Iraq, a version of the "surge" is planned there, using the reinforcement, ordered by President Obama, of U.S. forces by another 30 thousand soldiers. There have been calls for building a "Green Zone" in Kabul to house U.S., allied, and foreign institutions, as well as the Afghan government.
Despite the deteriorating political and military situation in neighboring Pakistan, and of the political situation in Kabul, as well as current Taliban success in conquering much of the Afghan countryside, it seems that the plan now is to secure Kabul with the new forces, and to do in Afghanistan what was done (or left half-done) in Iraq. The institutional rigidity of U.S. foreign policy has been locked in place. The ideas – there are many – about negotiations, local, regional, or multinational, seem ruled out.
Here we go again.
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All
Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=378
William Pfaff
Paris, February 3, 2009 – The distinguished and irreverent economist, observer of American national mores, preconceptions and faults, and sometime U.S. Government official, the Canadian-born but U.S.-nationalized J.K. Galbraith, wrote the following of his
government experience in Washington and New Delhi in the 1960s. He was not the only one, he said, who fell afoul "of a major feature of our foreign policy. That is its institutional rigidity, which holds it on course even when it is visibly wrong.
"So it was on Vietnam, as is now accepted. So it was on ...military alliances with the poor lands.... So it was [and continues to be] on such matters as the enlargement of NATO or the continuing trade and travel sanctions on Cuba, or, as this is written [in 1999], on a
sensible response to the more liberal tendencies now evident in Iran....[It is] a rigidity with its strong commitment to error." Indeed, a decade later, one might be justified in speaking of an absolute, inevitable and chronic institutional commitment to error.
In the 1920s to the mid-1930s, the principal postulated enemy in U.S. naval war planning and exercises continued to be the Royal Navy, as had been the case for more than a century of American history.
The U.S. Navy today operates eleven large aircraft-carrier battle groups, which are, as William S. Lind has written, "still structured to fight the Imperial Japanese Navy," although the only available wars at the moment are those with non-state insurgent forces in
desert Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan.
The American air force today is bitterly divided between partisans of buying still more than it already has of the supersonic, stealth F-22 fighter, which was designed to counter a Soviet interceptor that was never built (there ceased to be a Soviet Union), or whether the
USAF should instead turn to the F-35 "Joint Strike Fighter" -- or insist on the acquisition of both fighters.
The F-35 is still more costly than the F-22, and according to one Air Force critic quoted by Chalmers Johnson, "has a distinction that even the F-22 cannot claim, namely that it is tailored to meet [a Soviet] threat that ceased to exist at least three years before [the F-35's research and development] program began."
The aircraft was promised to Congress in 1998 at a unit cost of $184 million. Its scheduled cost in 2008 is $355 million a unit, and its development is two years behind schedule.
Its original costing also assumed that it would be sold and partially paid for by an array of NATO allies led by Britain, Norway and the Netherlands (none of whom would receive a version that could be operated independently of U.S. Air Force personnel) -- a demonstration that NATO Europe is not acquainted with the 19th century American showman P.T. Barnum's maxim that "there's a sucker born every minute." However these foreign sales are not yet totally nailed down, so Barnum's wisdom might yet prevail, at Washington's expense.
This digression into military procurement is relevant to Galbraith's warning since it provides a further demonstration of the institutional incapacity of the United States international policy establishment to change course, no matter how flagrant the need to do so; and this is perhaps the biggest of all the problems faced by President Barack Obama.
The new machinery of counter-insurgency, nation-building and democratization in radicalized, failing, or "failed" states so as to "win" the war on terrorism was put into operation by the U.S. more than a year ago, at about the time Iraq tactics were changed to enlist Sunni tribesmen in the Awakening movement, and the ethnic segregation of Baghdad began to bring a significant (if impermanent?) drop in violence there. Despite the evidence that the Afghanistan situation bears little resemblance to Iraq, a version of the "surge" is planned there, using the reinforcement, ordered by President Obama, of U.S. forces by another 30 thousand soldiers. There have been calls for building a "Green Zone" in Kabul to house U.S., allied, and foreign institutions, as well as the Afghan government.
Despite the deteriorating political and military situation in neighboring Pakistan, and of the political situation in Kabul, as well as current Taliban success in conquering much of the Afghan countryside, it seems that the plan now is to secure Kabul with the new forces, and to do in Afghanistan what was done (or left half-done) in Iraq. The institutional rigidity of U.S. foreign policy has been locked in place. The ideas – there are many – about negotiations, local, regional, or multinational, seem ruled out.
Here we go again.
© Copyright 2009 by Tribune Media Services International. All
Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=378
Monday, February 2, 2009
Mitchell gets earful from Mideast
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2/2/09
Mitchell gets earful from Mideast
The din of Gaza followed Obama's Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, as he conducted a listening tour. Arab leaders wonder why their peace plan remains untouched.
Caryle Murphy
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia - Winding up his week-long tour of the region, President Barack Obama's Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, met Saudi officials here over the weekend for an exchange of ideas on ending the volatile Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Mr. Mitchell conferred with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faisal Saturday night and met with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Sunday.
Specifically, the talks were said to cover the Saudi-initiated Arab Peace Initiative – first offered to Israel in 2002 – as well as how to counter what many Arab states regard as an alarming development: The increased involvement of Iran in Palestinian affairs, through its partners, Syria and Hamas.
"Something needs to be done about Syria, Iran, and Hamas," said one Saudi source. "They believe that by doing what they're doing it's going ... to put them on top.… [We need] to counter it once and for all."
Arab officials and commentators have praised Obama's initial moves to improve US relations with the Muslim world. But Mitchell is no doubt discovering that there is also a deep well of skepticism that the new US president will succeed in breaking the deadly impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Consensus seems widespread among Arabs that Washington must, at a minimum, demand a halt to expansions of Jewish settlements on the West Bank if the US is to convince the world that it is serious about tacking the six-decade-old conflict.
"The vast majority remains skeptical about America's efforts to repair relations with the Arab and Muslim world," wrote columnist Samar Fatany in the Arab News, a Saudi daily.
After being "an accessory to the Israeli brutality against innocent Palestinian women and children for many years," she added, "we need to hear America apply its sense of justice."
Mitchell's visit comes at a time when feelings are running high in the wake of Israel's three-week military assault on Gaza that left about 1,300 Palestinians dead, including many women and children. Israel claims it was targeting Hamas militants, but its bombs also hit hospitals and United Nations-run schools.
In brief remarks during previous stops in the Middle East, which included Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Mitchell said that securing a sustained, workable cease-fire between Israel and Hamas was of "critical importance."
Egypt, supported by Saudi Arabia, is leading the Arab diplomatic charge to reach that cease-fire, but their leverage over Hamas is limited because of their contentious relations with the Islamist movement.
Cairo and Riyadh have blamed Iranian and Syrian-backed Hamas for its rocket attacks on Israel, which instigated Israel's attack on Gaza.
Now, apparently emboldened by Iran's support, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has called for new Palestinian leadership to replace the Fatah-dominated Palestine Liberation Organization led by Mahmoud Abbas, who is favored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
On Saturday, King Abdullah called upon Palestinians to stop their "selfishness" and unite. "The competition between them is a big mistake," Saudi papers quoted him saying. "It will do them more harm than that done by Zionism. I appeal to them again to stand united in order to strengthen their cause."
Turki al-Sudairy, editor of Ar Riyadh newspaper, which reflects government thinking, said in a telephone interview: "Iran's meddling in Middle East affairs and the provocative acts of ... Hamas won't be stopped without a strong American stand on the peace process."
The Mitchell talks will include discussion on how to incorporate the Arab Peace Initiative into any new US approach to the conflict, according to a Saudi source.
Two weeks ago, frustrated by Israel's failure to respond positively to the initiative, King Abdullah told a gathering of Arab leaders in Kuwait that "Israel must understand that ... the Arab peace initiative that is on the table today will not remain there indefinitely."
Some Arab commentators were disappointed by President Obama's failure to unreservedly embrace the initiative. Announcing Mitchell's appointment at the State Department, the president said the plan "contains constructive elements" and urged Arab states to start "taking steps towards normalizing relations with Israel."
This was not received well by some Arab analysts, including Mouin Rabbani, in Amman, Jordan. To suggest that Arab countries should open diplomatic relations now, even before Israel accepted the Arab peace plan, was "an insult to Arab intelligence," Rabbani said in an interview.
But the Saudis have chosen not to dwell on that aspect of Obama's remarks. One source said that the Obama camp has been saying since last summer that it had "reservations" about the Arab peace plan.
Prince Saud bin Faisal told Saudi-owned Al Arabiya television station earlier this week that Arab states had "no reservations" about "respond[ing] to any questions posed by the American administration about the peace plan."
The prince's brother, former ambassador to Washington, Prince Turki al-Faisal, has been less diplomatic in recent days. In a widely noted opinion piece, published in the Financial Times, Mr. Turki wrote: "If the US wants to ... keep its strategic alliances intact – especially its 'special relationship' with Saudi Arabia, it will have to drastically revise its policies vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine."
2/2/09
Mitchell gets earful from Mideast
The din of Gaza followed Obama's Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, as he conducted a listening tour. Arab leaders wonder why their peace plan remains untouched.
Caryle Murphy
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia - Winding up his week-long tour of the region, President Barack Obama's Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, met Saudi officials here over the weekend for an exchange of ideas on ending the volatile Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Mr. Mitchell conferred with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faisal Saturday night and met with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Sunday.
Specifically, the talks were said to cover the Saudi-initiated Arab Peace Initiative – first offered to Israel in 2002 – as well as how to counter what many Arab states regard as an alarming development: The increased involvement of Iran in Palestinian affairs, through its partners, Syria and Hamas.
"Something needs to be done about Syria, Iran, and Hamas," said one Saudi source. "They believe that by doing what they're doing it's going ... to put them on top.… [We need] to counter it once and for all."
Arab officials and commentators have praised Obama's initial moves to improve US relations with the Muslim world. But Mitchell is no doubt discovering that there is also a deep well of skepticism that the new US president will succeed in breaking the deadly impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Consensus seems widespread among Arabs that Washington must, at a minimum, demand a halt to expansions of Jewish settlements on the West Bank if the US is to convince the world that it is serious about tacking the six-decade-old conflict.
"The vast majority remains skeptical about America's efforts to repair relations with the Arab and Muslim world," wrote columnist Samar Fatany in the Arab News, a Saudi daily.
After being "an accessory to the Israeli brutality against innocent Palestinian women and children for many years," she added, "we need to hear America apply its sense of justice."
Mitchell's visit comes at a time when feelings are running high in the wake of Israel's three-week military assault on Gaza that left about 1,300 Palestinians dead, including many women and children. Israel claims it was targeting Hamas militants, but its bombs also hit hospitals and United Nations-run schools.
In brief remarks during previous stops in the Middle East, which included Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Mitchell said that securing a sustained, workable cease-fire between Israel and Hamas was of "critical importance."
Egypt, supported by Saudi Arabia, is leading the Arab diplomatic charge to reach that cease-fire, but their leverage over Hamas is limited because of their contentious relations with the Islamist movement.
Cairo and Riyadh have blamed Iranian and Syrian-backed Hamas for its rocket attacks on Israel, which instigated Israel's attack on Gaza.
Now, apparently emboldened by Iran's support, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has called for new Palestinian leadership to replace the Fatah-dominated Palestine Liberation Organization led by Mahmoud Abbas, who is favored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
On Saturday, King Abdullah called upon Palestinians to stop their "selfishness" and unite. "The competition between them is a big mistake," Saudi papers quoted him saying. "It will do them more harm than that done by Zionism. I appeal to them again to stand united in order to strengthen their cause."
Turki al-Sudairy, editor of Ar Riyadh newspaper, which reflects government thinking, said in a telephone interview: "Iran's meddling in Middle East affairs and the provocative acts of ... Hamas won't be stopped without a strong American stand on the peace process."
The Mitchell talks will include discussion on how to incorporate the Arab Peace Initiative into any new US approach to the conflict, according to a Saudi source.
Two weeks ago, frustrated by Israel's failure to respond positively to the initiative, King Abdullah told a gathering of Arab leaders in Kuwait that "Israel must understand that ... the Arab peace initiative that is on the table today will not remain there indefinitely."
Some Arab commentators were disappointed by President Obama's failure to unreservedly embrace the initiative. Announcing Mitchell's appointment at the State Department, the president said the plan "contains constructive elements" and urged Arab states to start "taking steps towards normalizing relations with Israel."
This was not received well by some Arab analysts, including Mouin Rabbani, in Amman, Jordan. To suggest that Arab countries should open diplomatic relations now, even before Israel accepted the Arab peace plan, was "an insult to Arab intelligence," Rabbani said in an interview.
But the Saudis have chosen not to dwell on that aspect of Obama's remarks. One source said that the Obama camp has been saying since last summer that it had "reservations" about the Arab peace plan.
Prince Saud bin Faisal told Saudi-owned Al Arabiya television station earlier this week that Arab states had "no reservations" about "respond[ing] to any questions posed by the American administration about the peace plan."
The prince's brother, former ambassador to Washington, Prince Turki al-Faisal, has been less diplomatic in recent days. In a widely noted opinion piece, published in the Financial Times, Mr. Turki wrote: "If the US wants to ... keep its strategic alliances intact – especially its 'special relationship' with Saudi Arabia, it will have to drastically revise its policies vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine."
A New US Foreign Policy? by Norman Birnbaum
A New US Foreign Policy? Norman Birnbaum
Washington 1 February Campaigning as the candidate of change was rather easy for President Barack Obama: recall Senator McCain's unquestioning evocation of the nation's past. Now that Obama is in office, that past has become his present, and he requires more than rhetoric to master it. Indeed, his own language hasevoked large expectations of change within and without our borders. He is burdened, then, not only by the certainty of a future chain of uncontrollable events which no President is spared, but by his promises to control these.
He now enjoys very high rates of public approval, but matters can change rapidly in our perpetually volatile political culture. Forty-six percent of the electorate did vote against him and his opponents in Congress, the media and the larger society will prove unforgiving when, as is inevitable, they detect weakness in the President and his party.The Republicans are now unforgiving because they detect no weakness. Their national leader de facto is the radio personality Rush Limbaugh, whose hateful and ignorant diatribes express with consummate fidelity the racism, status anxiety. xenophobia and accumulated resentments of much of white America. The Republicans in the House of Representatives voted unanimously against the economic proposals of the President, despite the increasing severity of the economic crisis. It will not be too long before deep strata of belief about the nation's role in the world, and the impulsion of existing allegiances and interests, mobilize a determined opposition to his foreign policy. The themes of that opposition are at the moment appreciably clearer and more articulated than the President's own positions---evidence of the artisanal sobriety with which the President has begun to construct his government and of the deliberate pace he has chosen.
The foreign policy apparatus includes the armed forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department, and critical segments of other government departments, each with considerable institutional inertia and staffed by experienced professionals who have seen Presidents come---and go. The National Security Council at the White House is charged with coordinating this often incohate aggregate of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the conflicts accentuated by the colonization of parts of the apparatus by Congressional overlords or extra-governmental lobbies. Under Truman and Eisenhower, strong Secretaries of State (Dean Acheson and then John Foster Dulles) acted as Presidential deputies and surrogates in foreign policy. McGeorge Bundy under Kennedy and Johnson and then Kissinger under Nixon, Brzezinski under Carter, were National Security advisors who wrenched control of the foreign policy process back to the White House. A vertiginous alteration of strong Secretaries of State (Schultz under Reagan and Baker under the first Bush) with infrequently effective National Security advisors has followed. The entire process has been complicated by the intrusion of the senior commanders of the armed forces into the conduct of foreign policy. Not only the Chairman and separate Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but regional commanders overseas, are often as influential in shaping its course as the civilian officials nominally in charge of it. This has one advantage. Catholics are about twenty-five percent of the population but over represented in our officers corp. The senior Catholic officers are educated and reflective, learned in the Church doctrines of proportionality in the conduct of politics and war, and often morally far more profound than many of their contemporaries. That is true, as well, of many senior officers whatever their religion: most of them have been in combat and know the price of the bravado which appears to come so lightly to many Americans.
Obama as a Senator had a good vantage point from which to observe these persons and processes. As a student of American history, he has surely read enough Presidential biographies to learn that modern Presidents beginning with Franklin Roosevelt has had to struggle against the apparatus and often enough (true of both Kennedy and Johnson) their own closest advisors. Readers of Kissinger's memoir may recall Nixon's hostility to the permanent government. The President's senior appointments, then, are instructive.
His first step was to ask Robert Gates to remain as Secretary of Defense.Gates is a former CIA Director (he was expert on the old USSR) who was recalled to Washington by Bush to replace Rumsfeld. He is credited, with former Secretary of State Rice and senior military and political officials, with persuading Bush not to allow Israel to attack Iran. With Admiral Mullen, the senior military officer, he has warned against the over extension of the nation's military capacities---and, with the Admiral, publicly evoked the positive uses of diplomacy. He thinks that the State Department should have more funding, an implicit concession to the view that the armed forces have usurped functions not theirs. It is unclear how long he will remain in office. His retention is ambiguous and perhaps intended as such. It is a reward for his restraint, and a gesture to the permanent government.
The President has appointed two retired military commanders to posts which could have gone to civilians. General James Jones, the former commander of the US Marines and of NATO, a Vietnam veteran, is National Security Advisor.. He attended school in France and graduated from Georgetown, the Jesuit university. is thought of as a dispassionate technocrat. Admiral Dennis Blair is National Intelligence Director, responsible for coordinating the work of the separate intelligence agencies. Blair was Pacific Fleet Commander, and was not always punctillious about following orders he disagreed with. The CIA Director under him will be former Congressman Leon Panetta, who was also Clinton's Chief of Staff. A lawyer, he brings political sensitivity to an organization not always conspicuous for it.
Obama's retention of Gates, and enlistment of Jones and Blair, reflects the President's view of politics, evident in his autobiographical account of his immersion in Afro-American Chicago as a younger man. Matters being organized the way they are, change can only come from within the existing institutions. It also, of course, bespeaks a very large amount of self-confidence. The President has repeatedly declared that he takes his constitutional prerogatives very seriously, and nowhere more so than in foreign and military policy. The President had been an omnivorous reader and one hopes he will find an hour or two a day to learn of things under heaven and on earth not dreamed of by his officials. In crises, technocrats often recur to the lowest common denominator of available dogma.
His Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, is unlikely to allow her views to be homogenised by the bureaucracy. The appointment of Clinton provoked a good deal of comment to the effect that a conflict with the President is inevitable. That is far from the case, since Clinton knows that Presidents invariably eliminate troublesome Cabinet members. . After her eight active years in the White House as First Lady, she spent eight in the Senate representing New York, with a seat on the Armed Services Committee. As Senator from New York she was loyal to the Israel lobby: in the Presidential campaign she declared that if Iran attacked Israel, it would be "obliterated." If Clinton is to succeed as Secretary of State, she will have to abandon the opportunism that led her to support the attack on Iraq, to adopt the motto, Israel can do no wrong and to inflate an Iranian threat which is to a great extent fictional. Her very large ambition requires that she take a larger view of her own legacy. She began her public career as a student leader in the protest movements of the late sixties. Her lack of responsiveness to the protesters of recent years cost her the Presidential nomination (along with her absurd faith in the consultants and pollsters who charged her exorbitant sums of money for bad advice.) The appointment places huge burdens on her, but is also a liberation from much of her own recent past. The energetic, intelligent and well informed lady will not be bound by it. That is, apparently, the view not only of the President but of the diplomats who cheered her arrival at the State Department.
There are other figures in the picture. Vice-President Biden was Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and will not put his own experience and views in storage.Vice Presidents, however, are sometimes heard and seen but not necessarily listened to. His successor as Chair, John Kerry, is neither reticent or retiring. Perhaps, as Chair, he can admit what he tried to keep silent when he was running for President, that he speaks French. He began in politics as a Vietnam veteran who opposed the war and may now be free to re-identify with his anti-imperial past, which he repudiated in his inept campaign. Susan Rice, the United Nations Ambassador, is like the President of the successor generation, and did not live through the conflicts of the sixties.She is an African-American, for whom Africa itself has long been an area of interest and we can await greatly increased US political investment
Washington 1 February Campaigning as the candidate of change was rather easy for President Barack Obama: recall Senator McCain's unquestioning evocation of the nation's past. Now that Obama is in office, that past has become his present, and he requires more than rhetoric to master it. Indeed, his own language hasevoked large expectations of change within and without our borders. He is burdened, then, not only by the certainty of a future chain of uncontrollable events which no President is spared, but by his promises to control these.
He now enjoys very high rates of public approval, but matters can change rapidly in our perpetually volatile political culture. Forty-six percent of the electorate did vote against him and his opponents in Congress, the media and the larger society will prove unforgiving when, as is inevitable, they detect weakness in the President and his party.The Republicans are now unforgiving because they detect no weakness. Their national leader de facto is the radio personality Rush Limbaugh, whose hateful and ignorant diatribes express with consummate fidelity the racism, status anxiety. xenophobia and accumulated resentments of much of white America. The Republicans in the House of Representatives voted unanimously against the economic proposals of the President, despite the increasing severity of the economic crisis. It will not be too long before deep strata of belief about the nation's role in the world, and the impulsion of existing allegiances and interests, mobilize a determined opposition to his foreign policy. The themes of that opposition are at the moment appreciably clearer and more articulated than the President's own positions---evidence of the artisanal sobriety with which the President has begun to construct his government and of the deliberate pace he has chosen.
The foreign policy apparatus includes the armed forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department, and critical segments of other government departments, each with considerable institutional inertia and staffed by experienced professionals who have seen Presidents come---and go. The National Security Council at the White House is charged with coordinating this often incohate aggregate of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the conflicts accentuated by the colonization of parts of the apparatus by Congressional overlords or extra-governmental lobbies. Under Truman and Eisenhower, strong Secretaries of State (Dean Acheson and then John Foster Dulles) acted as Presidential deputies and surrogates in foreign policy. McGeorge Bundy under Kennedy and Johnson and then Kissinger under Nixon, Brzezinski under Carter, were National Security advisors who wrenched control of the foreign policy process back to the White House. A vertiginous alteration of strong Secretaries of State (Schultz under Reagan and Baker under the first Bush) with infrequently effective National Security advisors has followed. The entire process has been complicated by the intrusion of the senior commanders of the armed forces into the conduct of foreign policy. Not only the Chairman and separate Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but regional commanders overseas, are often as influential in shaping its course as the civilian officials nominally in charge of it. This has one advantage. Catholics are about twenty-five percent of the population but over represented in our officers corp. The senior Catholic officers are educated and reflective, learned in the Church doctrines of proportionality in the conduct of politics and war, and often morally far more profound than many of their contemporaries. That is true, as well, of many senior officers whatever their religion: most of them have been in combat and know the price of the bravado which appears to come so lightly to many Americans.
Obama as a Senator had a good vantage point from which to observe these persons and processes. As a student of American history, he has surely read enough Presidential biographies to learn that modern Presidents beginning with Franklin Roosevelt has had to struggle against the apparatus and often enough (true of both Kennedy and Johnson) their own closest advisors. Readers of Kissinger's memoir may recall Nixon's hostility to the permanent government. The President's senior appointments, then, are instructive.
His first step was to ask Robert Gates to remain as Secretary of Defense.Gates is a former CIA Director (he was expert on the old USSR) who was recalled to Washington by Bush to replace Rumsfeld. He is credited, with former Secretary of State Rice and senior military and political officials, with persuading Bush not to allow Israel to attack Iran. With Admiral Mullen, the senior military officer, he has warned against the over extension of the nation's military capacities---and, with the Admiral, publicly evoked the positive uses of diplomacy. He thinks that the State Department should have more funding, an implicit concession to the view that the armed forces have usurped functions not theirs. It is unclear how long he will remain in office. His retention is ambiguous and perhaps intended as such. It is a reward for his restraint, and a gesture to the permanent government.
The President has appointed two retired military commanders to posts which could have gone to civilians. General James Jones, the former commander of the US Marines and of NATO, a Vietnam veteran, is National Security Advisor.. He attended school in France and graduated from Georgetown, the Jesuit university. is thought of as a dispassionate technocrat. Admiral Dennis Blair is National Intelligence Director, responsible for coordinating the work of the separate intelligence agencies. Blair was Pacific Fleet Commander, and was not always punctillious about following orders he disagreed with. The CIA Director under him will be former Congressman Leon Panetta, who was also Clinton's Chief of Staff. A lawyer, he brings political sensitivity to an organization not always conspicuous for it.
Obama's retention of Gates, and enlistment of Jones and Blair, reflects the President's view of politics, evident in his autobiographical account of his immersion in Afro-American Chicago as a younger man. Matters being organized the way they are, change can only come from within the existing institutions. It also, of course, bespeaks a very large amount of self-confidence. The President has repeatedly declared that he takes his constitutional prerogatives very seriously, and nowhere more so than in foreign and military policy. The President had been an omnivorous reader and one hopes he will find an hour or two a day to learn of things under heaven and on earth not dreamed of by his officials. In crises, technocrats often recur to the lowest common denominator of available dogma.
His Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, is unlikely to allow her views to be homogenised by the bureaucracy. The appointment of Clinton provoked a good deal of comment to the effect that a conflict with the President is inevitable. That is far from the case, since Clinton knows that Presidents invariably eliminate troublesome Cabinet members. . After her eight active years in the White House as First Lady, she spent eight in the Senate representing New York, with a seat on the Armed Services Committee. As Senator from New York she was loyal to the Israel lobby: in the Presidential campaign she declared that if Iran attacked Israel, it would be "obliterated." If Clinton is to succeed as Secretary of State, she will have to abandon the opportunism that led her to support the attack on Iraq, to adopt the motto, Israel can do no wrong and to inflate an Iranian threat which is to a great extent fictional. Her very large ambition requires that she take a larger view of her own legacy. She began her public career as a student leader in the protest movements of the late sixties. Her lack of responsiveness to the protesters of recent years cost her the Presidential nomination (along with her absurd faith in the consultants and pollsters who charged her exorbitant sums of money for bad advice.) The appointment places huge burdens on her, but is also a liberation from much of her own recent past. The energetic, intelligent and well informed lady will not be bound by it. That is, apparently, the view not only of the President but of the diplomats who cheered her arrival at the State Department.
There are other figures in the picture. Vice-President Biden was Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and will not put his own experience and views in storage.Vice Presidents, however, are sometimes heard and seen but not necessarily listened to. His successor as Chair, John Kerry, is neither reticent or retiring. Perhaps, as Chair, he can admit what he tried to keep silent when he was running for President, that he speaks French. He began in politics as a Vietnam veteran who opposed the war and may now be free to re-identify with his anti-imperial past, which he repudiated in his inept campaign. Susan Rice, the United Nations Ambassador, is like the President of the successor generation, and did not live through the conflicts of the sixties.She is an African-American, for whom Africa itself has long been an area of interest and we can await greatly increased US political investment