Now I've Seen Everything
A spy goes to work for a thinktank
by Justin Raimondo
November 28, 2008
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13819
Of course there's nothing all that unusual about a spy going to work
for a Washington thinktank. Ex-CIA employees do it all the time: so
do all sorts of other spooks, who would otherwise be haunting the
world's darkest corners. No big deal. But what I've never seen, and
don't recall ever hearing about, is the spectacle of a spy for a
foreign country being hired by any organization that hopes to
influence U.S. foreign policy. Well, here's one for the record books:
The Middle East Forum has hired Steve Rosen, once the head of policy
development for the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
Rosen is accused of stealing highly classified information from the
U.S. government and passing it on to Israeli government officials.
Rosen was the sparkplug of AIPAC, known for implementing – with
notable success – the powerful lobbying group's efforts to influence
the executive branch. The very effective modus operandi of this
behind-the-scenes wheeler dealer was summed up by his reported
comment that:
"A lobby is like a night flower. It thrives in the dark and dies in
the sun."
Slinking about in the shadows, Rosen and his sidekick Keith Weissman –
an Iran expert – cultivated one Larry Franklin, the Pentagon policy
department's top Iran analyst, and pried top secret intelligence from
him, including information on al Qaeda, the Khobar Towers terrorist
attack, and Iranian armaments. Before the FBI descended on him,
Franklin had been passing information to the AIPAC espionage team for
over a year, planning to advance his career using the influential
lobby as his sponsor: he hoped for a spot on Bush's National Security
Council. In return, he gave his handlers access to some of America's
most closely guarded secrets. When FBI agents finally paid him a
visit, he led them to a treasure trove of stolen top secret dossiers
kept in his Alexandria,0 Virginia home – a veritable library of
classified information, 83 documents in all, spanning three decades.
The arrest was prefigured by two FBI raids on AIPAC headquarters in
Washington: federal law enforcement descended on the building early
in the morning, without warning, surrounded the place and carted away
loads of evidence. Four AIPAC officials were handed subpoenas.
Franklin pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 years in a federal
prison and a $10,000 fine, agreeing to testify for the prosecution.
Rosen and Weissman pleaded innocent, and their top-flight lawyers
have kept pretrial maneuvering ongoing for four years this past
August. Their very effective method: greymail. Apparently, the
purloined information is so sensitive that it cannot be revealed
without compromising America's national security interests in a major
way: the defense has delayed the trial by insisting that all this
information be discussed in open court, or else the defendants will
not be able to get a fair hearing.
What is amazing about this case isn't just the long delay in the
legal proceedings, but the brazenness of the accused: they openly
proclaim their guilt – that is, they admit to the actions detailed in
the indictment – while maintaining that they did absolutely nothing
wrong. Spying? Who – us? Why, we were just exercising our "First
Amendment rights" like any journalist out to get a scoop.
With one big difference, though: legitimate journalists don't report
their findings – classified sensitive purloined information – to the
intelligence agencies of foreign nations.
The contempt the defendants and their lawyers have for the very
concept of American national security permeates this case like a bad
smell, and is enough to make any patriot – heck, any ordinary
American – sick to his or her stomach. To give some further
indication of the unsavory flavor of this case, I'll only note the
latest wrinkle: in a recent court session, defense lawyers argued
that the information their clients are accused of stealing was
already known to the Israelis. This has been another of what I call
the "chutzpah defense" mounted by Rosen and Weissman's legal team:
the Israelis don't need to steal our secrets, they aver, because they
already know everything worth knowing anyway. As Josh Gerstein, a
former writer for the now-permanently-set New York Sun, puts it on
his blog:
"Both sides in the case seemed to agree that if information came from
Israel, even if it passed through U.S. Government hands, it could not
be a basis for the charges against Rosen and Weissman. That seemed
puzzling, since the mere fact that information came from a foreign
government is usually a good enough reason to get it classified."
The government has gone easy on the AIPAC defendants, and their
former employers. An apparent attempt was made by some in the Justice
Department to indict not only Rosen and Weissman, but AIPAC itself.
This was quashed by the chief prosecutor, Paul J. McNulty – who has
since gone on to graze in greener pastures – and the case was limited
from the outset: only Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman were charged.
As Grant F. Smith shows in his recent book, AIPAC's organizational
forerunner as Israel's Capitol Hill amen corner – the AZC, American
Zionist Council – was financed almost entirely by overseas sources,
i.e. Israel, and yet was not required to register as an agent of a
foreign government. Particularly fascinating is his original research
into the findings of Senator J. William Fulbright, remembered today
as an acerbic critic of the Vietnam war, who investigated and
uncovered financial conduits running from Israeli government agencies
to AIPAC in its AZC incarnation.
Everybody knows AIPAC is indeed an agent of a foreign government,
i.e. the Israelis. What most don't know, however, is that, unlike all
others, it is exempt from complying with the Foreign Agents
Registration Act. This immunity – the legal genesis of which Grant
traces in his fascinating account – created an opening for the
Israeli government and its various overseas agencies to act with
impunity within our borders. This includes not just advocacy, but
also providing the organizational mask behind which intelligence-
burglars like Rosen, Weissman, and god-knows-who-else are hiding.
AIPAC quickly threw Rosen and Weissman overboard, the apparent price
for avoiding a wider prosecution, and Rosen's quest to reemerge found
limited sympathy on his old stomping grounds, the Washington policy
wonk circuit. The Forward reports:
"Rosen has been looking for his way back to the foreign policy scene
for a long while, but he found that in most cases, doors of think
tanks and advisory groups were closed. "They'd pat me on my back and
say it is not fair, but there are only a few that agree to stand up,"
Rosen said, praising the Middle East Forum for 'having the courage'
to reach out to him."
While the presumption of innocence is obligatory in a narrow legal
sense, one has only to read the indictment to see that Rosen and
Weissman not only stole classified information, but knew perfectly
well they were breaking the law, and went to great pains to avoid
detection. At one point, the indictment has the defendants shifting
meeting locations three times, going from restaurant to restaurant in
the clear knowledge that they were likely being followed. Document
exchanges were avoided: Franklin briefed his handlers verbally.
Recordings of these conversations are the core of the government's
case, and their substance is highly sensitive. Wrangling over what to
play in open court has delayed the trial for four years. In playing
for time, the defense is hoping that the incoming administration will
rein in the Justice Department and quash the case, and there is good
reason to suspect that this is true.
In any case, what kind of a public policy organization would hire
Rosen, in hopes of influencing U.S. foreign policy? The Middle East
Forum is a hate-the-Muslims "educational" organization, run by Daniel
Pipes. Pipes and his pals have followed the time-honored traditions
of smear artists everywhere in maintaining an academic
blacklist, "Campus Watch," which keeps tabs on college professors
deemed insufficiently friendly to Israeli government policies. Pipes
believes a "substantial" number of American Muslims are plotting to
overthrow the government and establish an Islamist theocracy in
America, and that this represents a real threat: it's all downhill
from there. In one of his recent screeds, Pipes attacks Barack Obama
for his supposed "links" to … Sirhan Sirhan, Robert F. Kennedy's
assassin. Yikes.
M. J. Rosenberg, blogging at Talking Points Memo, asks: "Are these
people crazy?" and concludes they're "crazy/irrelevant rather than
crazy/dangerous," and yet Rosen wielded enormous influence in
Washington, at one point. Jeffrey Goldberg, over at the New Yorker,
relates a conversation with Rosen:
"He pushed a napkin across the table. 'You see this napkin?' he
said. 'In twenty-four hours, we could have the signatures of seventy
senators on this napkin.'"
Rosen may have personally fallen on hard times, having to take up
with a loony like Pipes, but one has to remember that the
organizational framework that spawned his treason is not only alive
and well – but it could still deliver those 70 senatorial signatures
on a napkin with the greatest of ease.
Crazy, yes – and dangerous, too.
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Same Old New Deal? By George F. Will
Same Old New Deal?
By George F. Will
Sunday, November 30, 2008; B07
Early in what became the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes was asked if anything similar had ever happened. "Yes," he replied, "it was called the Dark Ages, and it lasted 400 years." It did take 25 years, until November 1954, for the Dow to return to the peak it reached in September 1929. So caution is sensible concerning calls for a new New Deal.
The assumption is that the New Deal vanquished the Depression. Intelligent, informed people differ about why the Depression lasted so long. But people whose recipe for recovery today is another New Deal should remember that America's biggest industrial collapse occurred in 1937, eight years after the 1929 stock market crash and nearly five years into the New Deal. In 1939, after a decade of frantic federal spending -- President Herbert Hoover increased it more than 50 percent between 1929 and the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt -- unemployment was 17.2 percent.
"I say after eight years of this administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started," lamented Henry Morgenthau, FDR's Treasury secretary. Unemployment declined when America began selling materials to nations engaged in a war America would soon join.
In "The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression," Amity Shlaes of the Council on Foreign Relations and Bloomberg News argues that government policies, beyond the Federal Reserve's tight money, deepened and prolonged the Depression. The policies included encouraging strong unions and higher wages than lagging productivity justified, on the theory that workers' spending would be stimulative. Instead, corporate profits -- prerequisites for job-creating investments -- were excessively drained into labor expenses that left many workers priced out of the market.
In a 2004 paper, Harold L. Cole of the University of California at Los Angeles and Lee E. Ohanian of UCLA and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis argued that the Depression would have ended in 1936, rather than in 1943, were it not for policies that magnified the power of labor and encouraged the cartelization of industries. These policies expressed the New Deal premise that the Depression was caused by excessive competition that first reduced prices and wages and then reduced employment and consumer demand. In a forthcoming paper, Ohanian argues that "much of the depth of the Depression" is explained by Hoover's policy -- a precursor of the New Deal mentality -- of pressuring businesses to keep nominal wages fixed.
Furthermore, Hoover's 1932 increase in the top income tax rate, from 25 percent to 63 percent, was unhelpful. And FDR's hyperkinetic New Deal created uncertainties that paralyzed private-sector decision making. Which sounds familiar.
Bear Stearns? Broker a merger. Lehman Brothers? Death sentence. The $700 billion is for cleaning up toxic assets? Maybe not. Writes Russell Roberts of George Mason University:
"By acting without rhyme or reason, politicians have destroyed the rules of the game. There is no reason to invest, no reason to take risk, no reason to be prudent, no reason to look for buyers if your firm is failing. Everything is up in the air and as a result, the only prudent policy is to wait and see what the government will do next. The frenetic efforts of FDR had the same impact: Net investment was negative through much of the 1930s."
Barack Obama says that the next stimulus should deliver a "jolt." His adviser ustan Goolsbee says that it must be big enough to "startle the thing into submission." Their theory is that the crisis is largely psychological, requiring shock treatment. But shocks from government have been plentiful.
Unfortunately, one thing government can do quickly and efficiently -- distribute checks -- could fail to stimulate because Americans might do with the money what they have been rightly criticized for not doing nearly enough: Save it. Because individual consumption is 70 percent of economic activity, St. Augustine's prayer ("Give me chastity and continence, but not yet") is echoed today: Make Americans thrifty but not now.
Obama's "rescue plan for the middle class" includes a tax credit for businesses "for each new employee they hire" in America over the next two years. The assumption is that businesses will create jobs that would not have been created without the subsidy. If so, the subsidy will suffuse the economy with inefficiencies -- labor costs not justified by value added.
Here we go again? A new New Deal would vindicate pessimists who say that history is not one damn thing after another, it is the same damn thing over and over.
georgewill@washpost.com
.
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pricetag30-2008nov30,0,7549258.story
From the Los Angeles Times
Economic rescue could cost $8.5 trillion
Heavy spending to battle the financial crisis is unlikely to abate soon. Analysts say next year's deficit could top $1 trillion.
By Jim Puzzanghera
November 30, 2008
Reporting from Washington — With its decision last week to pump an additional $1 trillion into the financial crisis, the government eliminated any doubt that the nation is on a wartime footing in the battle to shore up the economy. The strategy now -- and in the coming Obama administration -- is essentially the win-at-any-cost approach previously adopted only to wage a major war.
And that means no hesitation in pledging to spend previously almost unimaginable sums of money and running up federal budget deficits on a scale not seen since World War II.
Indeed, analysts warn that the nation's next financial crisis could come from the staggering cost of battling the current one.
Just last week, new initiatives added $600 billion to lower mortgage rates, $200 billion to stimulate consumer loans and nearly $300 billion to steady Citigroup, the banking conglomerate. That pushed the potential long-term cost of the government's varied economic rescue initiatives, including direct loans and loan guarantees, to an estimated total of $8.5 trillion -- half of the entire economic output of the U.S. this year.
Nor has the cash register stopped ringing. President-elect Barack Obama and congressional Democrats are expected to enact a stimulus package of $500 billion to $700 billion soon after he takes office in January.
The spending already has had a dramatic effect on the federal budget deficit, which soared to a record $455 billion last year and began the 2009 fiscal year with an amazing $237-billion deficit for October alone. Analysts say next year's budget deficit could easily bust the $1-trillion barrier.
"I didn't think we'd see that for a long time," said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. "There's a huge risk of another economic crisis, a debt crisis, once we get on the other side of this one."
But the Bush administration and the economic team that Obama is rapidly assembling like a war Cabinet are vowing to spend whatever it takes to avoid a depression; they'll worry about the effect later.
"I don't think that there's any way of denying the fact that my first priority and my first job is to get us on the path of economic recovery, to create 2.5 million jobs, to provide relief to middle-class families," Obama told reporters last week.
"But as soon as the recovery is well underway, then we've got to set up a long-term plan to reduce the structural deficit and make sure that we're not leaving a mountain of debt for the next generation."
The mountain is already there, and rising faster than at any time since the 1940s, when the United States was fighting a global war.
Analysts say the current flood of red ink calls into question Obama's ability to launch programs such as middle-class tax cuts and a healthcare overhaul. In 1993, a deficit only a third the size of next year's projected $1 trillion prompted President Clinton to abandoned his campaign pledges of tax cuts.
Once the financial crisis eases, higher interest rates and soaring inflation will be risks. If they materialize, they could dramatically increase the government's borrowing costs to meet its annual debt payments. For consumers, borrowing could become more expensive even as the price of everyday items rise, holding back economic growth.
"We could have a super sub-prime crisis associated with the meltdown of the federal government," warned David Walker, president of the Peter G. Peterson Foundation and former head of the Government Accountability Office.
But even deficit hawks such as Walker acknowledge that the immediate crisis is priority No. 1. Just as with World War II, the government can worry about paying the bills once the enemy is defeated.
"You just throw everything you have at the problem to try to fix it as quickly as you can," said David Stowell, a finance professor at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management. "We're mortgaging our future to a certain extent, but we're trying to do things that give us a future."
Washington could wind up spending substantially less than the sum of the commitments. Though the total estimated cost of the government's efforts adds up to $8.5 trillion, only about $3.2 trillion has been tapped, according to an analysis by Bloomberg.
And not all the money committed is direct spending. About $5.5 trillion in loan guarantees and other financial backing by the Federal Reserve is included in the total.
"The only way those commitments would become obligations would be if the economy completely collapsed, in which case it's a whole new ballgame anyway," said John Steele Gordon, a business and economic historian.
The government even stands to make money on some expenditures, such as the $330 billion it has used to buy equity in banks and other financial institutions through the Treasury Department's Troubled Asset Relief Program.
In the $1.2-billion bailout of Chrysler in 1980, the government ended up gaining $311 million when it sold stock options back to the company three years later.
But the federal efforts to forestall a depression are still historic in scope.
A $1-trillion deficit next year would represent about 7% of the nation's total economic output, or gross domestic product. That would top the 5.9% reached during the height of the Great Depression in 1934 but would fall well short of the deficits of World War II. In 1943, the high point, the deficit amounted to 30% of GDP.
The national debt is soaring too. In September, the National Debt Clock in New York City ran out of digits as the figure ticked over $10 trillion. The debt is now larger than the 45% of GDP it reached at the end of the Great Depression, but less than in 1946, when war spending had pushed the debt to 129% of GDP, said Gordon, author of "Hamilton's Blessing: The Extraordinary Life and Times of Our National Debt."
There's a potentially crucial difference, however, between the spending then and the commitments now:
Much of the Depression-World War II spending was on industrial production -- building new factories and converting existing plants to produce tanks, planes and ships. Huge sums also went into developing new technologies.
Those investments, combined with pent-up consumer demand and savings from the lean war years, quickly led to budget surpluses and sharp economic growth in the late 1940s as the baby boom began.
Analysts warn not to expect that to happen again. This time the government spending is largely ethereal, with the Federal Reserve printing more money to inject liquidity into the financial system and keep banks and other institutions afloat. And savings rates are low.
"Too many Americans have overextended themselves with regard to credit and debt, and too many have been following the bad example of the government," Walker said. "It is imperative that we recognize that this country has been living beyond its means and that we face large and growing structural deficits even after we turn the economy around."
Walker said he understands the need to attack the financial crisis. But the spending only adds to the looming problems of unfunded Social Security and Medicare commitments as baby boomers begin to retire.
He noted that the Moody's bond-rating firm fired a shot across the government's bow in January with a warning that spending on entitlement programs poses a long-term threat to the triple-A rating for government bonds. And that was before the financial crisis.
Interest rates remain low because of the crisis. But they will rise, particularly when the U.S. government starts borrowing more money to cover its growing debt, analysts predict. That could cause inflation to increase as well.
"We could easily enter into a highly inflationary situation because of all the stimulus we have and all the borrowing we have once it works its way through the economy," MacGuineas said. "The single most important priority right now is to stabilize the economy . . . but it really means that there is a huge risk on the other side."
Puzzanghera is a Times staff writer.
jim.puzzanghera@ latimes.com
By George F. Will
Sunday, November 30, 2008; B07
Early in what became the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes was asked if anything similar had ever happened. "Yes," he replied, "it was called the Dark Ages, and it lasted 400 years." It did take 25 years, until November 1954, for the Dow to return to the peak it reached in September 1929. So caution is sensible concerning calls for a new New Deal.
The assumption is that the New Deal vanquished the Depression. Intelligent, informed people differ about why the Depression lasted so long. But people whose recipe for recovery today is another New Deal should remember that America's biggest industrial collapse occurred in 1937, eight years after the 1929 stock market crash and nearly five years into the New Deal. In 1939, after a decade of frantic federal spending -- President Herbert Hoover increased it more than 50 percent between 1929 and the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt -- unemployment was 17.2 percent.
"I say after eight years of this administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started," lamented Henry Morgenthau, FDR's Treasury secretary. Unemployment declined when America began selling materials to nations engaged in a war America would soon join.
In "The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression," Amity Shlaes of the Council on Foreign Relations and Bloomberg News argues that government policies, beyond the Federal Reserve's tight money, deepened and prolonged the Depression. The policies included encouraging strong unions and higher wages than lagging productivity justified, on the theory that workers' spending would be stimulative. Instead, corporate profits -- prerequisites for job-creating investments -- were excessively drained into labor expenses that left many workers priced out of the market.
In a 2004 paper, Harold L. Cole of the University of California at Los Angeles and Lee E. Ohanian of UCLA and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis argued that the Depression would have ended in 1936, rather than in 1943, were it not for policies that magnified the power of labor and encouraged the cartelization of industries. These policies expressed the New Deal premise that the Depression was caused by excessive competition that first reduced prices and wages and then reduced employment and consumer demand. In a forthcoming paper, Ohanian argues that "much of the depth of the Depression" is explained by Hoover's policy -- a precursor of the New Deal mentality -- of pressuring businesses to keep nominal wages fixed.
Furthermore, Hoover's 1932 increase in the top income tax rate, from 25 percent to 63 percent, was unhelpful. And FDR's hyperkinetic New Deal created uncertainties that paralyzed private-sector decision making. Which sounds familiar.
Bear Stearns? Broker a merger. Lehman Brothers? Death sentence. The $700 billion is for cleaning up toxic assets? Maybe not. Writes Russell Roberts of George Mason University:
"By acting without rhyme or reason, politicians have destroyed the rules of the game. There is no reason to invest, no reason to take risk, no reason to be prudent, no reason to look for buyers if your firm is failing. Everything is up in the air and as a result, the only prudent policy is to wait and see what the government will do next. The frenetic efforts of FDR had the same impact: Net investment was negative through much of the 1930s."
Barack Obama says that the next stimulus should deliver a "jolt." His adviser ustan Goolsbee says that it must be big enough to "startle the thing into submission." Their theory is that the crisis is largely psychological, requiring shock treatment. But shocks from government have been plentiful.
Unfortunately, one thing government can do quickly and efficiently -- distribute checks -- could fail to stimulate because Americans might do with the money what they have been rightly criticized for not doing nearly enough: Save it. Because individual consumption is 70 percent of economic activity, St. Augustine's prayer ("Give me chastity and continence, but not yet") is echoed today: Make Americans thrifty but not now.
Obama's "rescue plan for the middle class" includes a tax credit for businesses "for each new employee they hire" in America over the next two years. The assumption is that businesses will create jobs that would not have been created without the subsidy. If so, the subsidy will suffuse the economy with inefficiencies -- labor costs not justified by value added.
Here we go again? A new New Deal would vindicate pessimists who say that history is not one damn thing after another, it is the same damn thing over and over.
georgewill@washpost.com
.
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pricetag30-2008nov30,0,7549258.story
From the Los Angeles Times
Economic rescue could cost $8.5 trillion
Heavy spending to battle the financial crisis is unlikely to abate soon. Analysts say next year's deficit could top $1 trillion.
By Jim Puzzanghera
November 30, 2008
Reporting from Washington — With its decision last week to pump an additional $1 trillion into the financial crisis, the government eliminated any doubt that the nation is on a wartime footing in the battle to shore up the economy. The strategy now -- and in the coming Obama administration -- is essentially the win-at-any-cost approach previously adopted only to wage a major war.
And that means no hesitation in pledging to spend previously almost unimaginable sums of money and running up federal budget deficits on a scale not seen since World War II.
Indeed, analysts warn that the nation's next financial crisis could come from the staggering cost of battling the current one.
Just last week, new initiatives added $600 billion to lower mortgage rates, $200 billion to stimulate consumer loans and nearly $300 billion to steady Citigroup, the banking conglomerate. That pushed the potential long-term cost of the government's varied economic rescue initiatives, including direct loans and loan guarantees, to an estimated total of $8.5 trillion -- half of the entire economic output of the U.S. this year.
Nor has the cash register stopped ringing. President-elect Barack Obama and congressional Democrats are expected to enact a stimulus package of $500 billion to $700 billion soon after he takes office in January.
The spending already has had a dramatic effect on the federal budget deficit, which soared to a record $455 billion last year and began the 2009 fiscal year with an amazing $237-billion deficit for October alone. Analysts say next year's budget deficit could easily bust the $1-trillion barrier.
"I didn't think we'd see that for a long time," said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. "There's a huge risk of another economic crisis, a debt crisis, once we get on the other side of this one."
But the Bush administration and the economic team that Obama is rapidly assembling like a war Cabinet are vowing to spend whatever it takes to avoid a depression; they'll worry about the effect later.
"I don't think that there's any way of denying the fact that my first priority and my first job is to get us on the path of economic recovery, to create 2.5 million jobs, to provide relief to middle-class families," Obama told reporters last week.
"But as soon as the recovery is well underway, then we've got to set up a long-term plan to reduce the structural deficit and make sure that we're not leaving a mountain of debt for the next generation."
The mountain is already there, and rising faster than at any time since the 1940s, when the United States was fighting a global war.
Analysts say the current flood of red ink calls into question Obama's ability to launch programs such as middle-class tax cuts and a healthcare overhaul. In 1993, a deficit only a third the size of next year's projected $1 trillion prompted President Clinton to abandoned his campaign pledges of tax cuts.
Once the financial crisis eases, higher interest rates and soaring inflation will be risks. If they materialize, they could dramatically increase the government's borrowing costs to meet its annual debt payments. For consumers, borrowing could become more expensive even as the price of everyday items rise, holding back economic growth.
"We could have a super sub-prime crisis associated with the meltdown of the federal government," warned David Walker, president of the Peter G. Peterson Foundation and former head of the Government Accountability Office.
But even deficit hawks such as Walker acknowledge that the immediate crisis is priority No. 1. Just as with World War II, the government can worry about paying the bills once the enemy is defeated.
"You just throw everything you have at the problem to try to fix it as quickly as you can," said David Stowell, a finance professor at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management. "We're mortgaging our future to a certain extent, but we're trying to do things that give us a future."
Washington could wind up spending substantially less than the sum of the commitments. Though the total estimated cost of the government's efforts adds up to $8.5 trillion, only about $3.2 trillion has been tapped, according to an analysis by Bloomberg.
And not all the money committed is direct spending. About $5.5 trillion in loan guarantees and other financial backing by the Federal Reserve is included in the total.
"The only way those commitments would become obligations would be if the economy completely collapsed, in which case it's a whole new ballgame anyway," said John Steele Gordon, a business and economic historian.
The government even stands to make money on some expenditures, such as the $330 billion it has used to buy equity in banks and other financial institutions through the Treasury Department's Troubled Asset Relief Program.
In the $1.2-billion bailout of Chrysler in 1980, the government ended up gaining $311 million when it sold stock options back to the company three years later.
But the federal efforts to forestall a depression are still historic in scope.
A $1-trillion deficit next year would represent about 7% of the nation's total economic output, or gross domestic product. That would top the 5.9% reached during the height of the Great Depression in 1934 but would fall well short of the deficits of World War II. In 1943, the high point, the deficit amounted to 30% of GDP.
The national debt is soaring too. In September, the National Debt Clock in New York City ran out of digits as the figure ticked over $10 trillion. The debt is now larger than the 45% of GDP it reached at the end of the Great Depression, but less than in 1946, when war spending had pushed the debt to 129% of GDP, said Gordon, author of "Hamilton's Blessing: The Extraordinary Life and Times of Our National Debt."
There's a potentially crucial difference, however, between the spending then and the commitments now:
Much of the Depression-World War II spending was on industrial production -- building new factories and converting existing plants to produce tanks, planes and ships. Huge sums also went into developing new technologies.
Those investments, combined with pent-up consumer demand and savings from the lean war years, quickly led to budget surpluses and sharp economic growth in the late 1940s as the baby boom began.
Analysts warn not to expect that to happen again. This time the government spending is largely ethereal, with the Federal Reserve printing more money to inject liquidity into the financial system and keep banks and other institutions afloat. And savings rates are low.
"Too many Americans have overextended themselves with regard to credit and debt, and too many have been following the bad example of the government," Walker said. "It is imperative that we recognize that this country has been living beyond its means and that we face large and growing structural deficits even after we turn the economy around."
Walker said he understands the need to attack the financial crisis. But the spending only adds to the looming problems of unfunded Social Security and Medicare commitments as baby boomers begin to retire.
He noted that the Moody's bond-rating firm fired a shot across the government's bow in January with a warning that spending on entitlement programs poses a long-term threat to the triple-A rating for government bonds. And that was before the financial crisis.
Interest rates remain low because of the crisis. But they will rise, particularly when the U.S. government starts borrowing more money to cover its growing debt, analysts predict. That could cause inflation to increase as well.
"We could easily enter into a highly inflationary situation because of all the stimulus we have and all the borrowing we have once it works its way through the economy," MacGuineas said. "The single most important priority right now is to stabilize the economy . . . but it really means that there is a huge risk on the other side."
Puzzanghera is a Times staff writer.
jim.puzzanghera@ latimes.com
Colossal Financial Collapse: The Truth behind the Citigroup Bank "Nationalization" - by F. William Engdahl
Colossal Financial Collapse: The Truth behind the Citigroup Bank "Nationalization"
- by F. William Engdahl - 2008-11-24
The scale of the hidden losses of the twenty largest US banks is enormous
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11117
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/index.php?act=post&do=reply_post&f=268&t=79158
- by F. William Engdahl - 2008-11-24
The scale of the hidden losses of the twenty largest US banks is enormous
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11117
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/index.php?act=post&do=reply_post&f=268&t=79158
The Custodians Of Empire Obama's "New" National Security Team Is Not Very New By Tom Engelhardt
The Custodians Of Empire
Obama's "New" National Security Team Is Not Very New
By Tom Engelhardt
The next secretary of state looks to be Hillary Clinton, a hawk on the Middle East. During the campaign, she spoke of our ability to "totally obliterate" Iran, should that country carry out a nuclear strike against Israel. She will evidently be allowed to bring her own (hawkish) subordinates into the State Department with her. Her prospective appointment is now being praised by the likes of Newt Gingrich and Henry Kissinger. Continue http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article21337.htm
Obama's "New" National Security Team Is Not Very New
By Tom Engelhardt
The next secretary of state looks to be Hillary Clinton, a hawk on the Middle East. During the campaign, she spoke of our ability to "totally obliterate" Iran, should that country carry out a nuclear strike against Israel. She will evidently be allowed to bring her own (hawkish) subordinates into the State Department with her. Her prospective appointment is now being praised by the likes of Newt Gingrich and Henry Kissinger. Continue http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article21337.htm
Analysis: Mumbai Attack Differs from Past Terror Strikes.
Analysis: Mumbai Attack Differs from Past Terror Strikes.
... The Mumbai attack is unique from past terror strikes carried out by Islamic terrorists. Instead of one or more bombings at distinct sites, the Mumbai attackers struck throughout the city using military tactics. Instead of one or more bombings carried out over a short period of time, Mumbai is entering its third day of crisis.
An attack of this nature cannot be thrown together overnight. It requires planned, scouting, financing, training, and a support network to aid the fighters. Initial reports indicate the attacks originated from Pakistan, the hub of jihadi activity in South Asia. Few local terror groups have the capacity to pull off an attack such as this...
Much more at The Long War Journal.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/analysis_mumbai_atta.php
... The Mumbai attack is unique from past terror strikes carried out by Islamic terrorists. Instead of one or more bombings at distinct sites, the Mumbai attackers struck throughout the city using military tactics. Instead of one or more bombings carried out over a short period of time, Mumbai is entering its third day of crisis.
An attack of this nature cannot be thrown together overnight. It requires planned, scouting, financing, training, and a support network to aid the fighters. Initial reports indicate the attacks originated from Pakistan, the hub of jihadi activity in South Asia. Few local terror groups have the capacity to pull off an attack such as this...
Much more at The Long War Journal.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/analysis_mumbai_atta.php
A Wicked Brew Piracy and Islamism in the Horn of Africa by Tim Sullivan, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
A Wicked Brew
Piracy and Islamism in the Horn of Africa
by Tim Sullivan, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)
The recent surge in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has again revealed the vulnerability of U.S. and allied interests to transnational, unconventional security threats—and demonstrated just how confounded we remain in determining the appropriate responses to these challenges. Somali piracy has now become more than simply a nuisance: the explosion in attacks has the potential to disrupt international trade (at least one major international shipping firm has announced plans to shift its transit routes), and further destabilize the volatile Horn of Africa region. The audacity of recent hijackings, combined with an uncoordinated and anemic international response, portends a growing threat. In reaction to the news that the pirates had seized the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker, 450 miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed the sentiments of many analysts and observers when he said that he was “stunned” by the Somali pirates’ range of operations.
A more disturbing element of the Somali piracy phenomenon is the apparent connection between the pirates and the country’s militant Islamist movement. Though it hasn’t been making the front pages, Somalia is in the throes of a protracted insurgency. The country’s primary Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, was recently added to the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The group has emerged as the successor (and was the former militia) of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which in the summer of 2006 came close to unseating the country’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); the ICU was eventually defeated by the TFG with the help of the Ethiopian military.
A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/140-sullivan.pdf
Piracy and Islamism in the Horn of Africa
by Tim Sullivan, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)
The recent surge in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has again revealed the vulnerability of U.S. and allied interests to transnational, unconventional security threats—and demonstrated just how confounded we remain in determining the appropriate responses to these challenges. Somali piracy has now become more than simply a nuisance: the explosion in attacks has the potential to disrupt international trade (at least one major international shipping firm has announced plans to shift its transit routes), and further destabilize the volatile Horn of Africa region. The audacity of recent hijackings, combined with an uncoordinated and anemic international response, portends a growing threat. In reaction to the news that the pirates had seized the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker, 450 miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed the sentiments of many analysts and observers when he said that he was “stunned” by the Somali pirates’ range of operations.
A more disturbing element of the Somali piracy phenomenon is the apparent connection between the pirates and the country’s militant Islamist movement. Though it hasn’t been making the front pages, Somalia is in the throes of a protracted insurgency. The country’s primary Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, was recently added to the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The group has emerged as the successor (and was the former militia) of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which in the summer of 2006 came close to unseating the country’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); the ICU was eventually defeated by the TFG with the help of the Ethiopian military.
A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/140-sullivan.pdf
Thursday, November 27, 2008
Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai Attacks
Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai Attacks
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government's internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government's domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn't matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don't know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren't involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government's internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government's domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn't matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don't know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren't involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
Kristallnacht in Hebron When will Israel wake up to its gruesome legacy, asks Khaled Amayreh
Kristallnacht in Hebron
When will Israel wake up to its gruesome legacy, asks Khaled Amayreh
Unconcerned about arrest by the police or prosecution by the Israeli justice system, fanatical Jewish settlers in the Palestinian town of Hebron (Al-Khalil) have been attacking Palestinians, damaging and ransacking their property, exactly like Nazi thugs did to Jewish-owned property in Germany 80 years ago.
The settlers, who claim to be acting in the name of true Judaism, espouse a messianic doctrine advocating violence and terror against non- Jews in Israel-Palestine for the purpose of creating a pure Jewish kingdom that would be ruled by Halacha, or Jewish religious law.
The settlers, who represent the core of religious Zionism, believe that the ethnic cleansing of non-Jews in the Holy Land will eventually usher the messianic age and accelerate the appearance of the Jewish Messiah, or Redeemer, who would bring about redemption for Jews and rule the entire world from Jerusalem.
In recent weeks, these thugs have been attacking Palestinian homes, smashing cars, vandalising property and fostering a general atmosphere of fear and terror throughout this town of nearly 200,000 people.
Al-Ahram Weekly has inspected the damage inflicted by settlers and spoken with thoroughly terrorised victims who complained that the Israeli authorities and army were effectively giving the paramilitary terrorists a carte blanche to terrorise Palestinians. "They [the settlers] are Nazi, and if there was a stronger epithet, I would not hesitate to use. You can't imagine the ugliness and brutality of their behaviour," said Ahmed Al-Jamal, a frequent target of settler terror and vandalism.
"Every Friday night and Saturday, dozens of settlers, including kids, descend on our neighbourhood to smash our cars, windows and property and shout 'Death to the Arabs!' This is their way of sanctifying the Sabbath and pleasing God."
Al-Jamal said dozens of settlers, some of them masked, last week attacked his and his brother's and neighbour's homes around 2.30am, smashing windows and windshields of parked cars. "We informed the police, and the police told us they would look into the matter. This is pretty much what they have been telling us since 1970 when these 'Nazis' came to live here."
Mohamed Daana, who lives in Wadi Al-Nasara, located just south of the Jewish colony of Kiryat Araba, said he submitted at least 500 complaints to the Israeli police in a desperate effort to put an end to settler violence and terror against him and his family.
"The last time I went to submit a police complaint in Kiryat Araba one policeman took me to the next room and told me 'I want to advise you, there is no point in submitting all these complaints. We simply can't do anything to help you. The settlers control the state and the army can do little to protect you from them.'" Asked what he would do next to protect his family, Daana said, "I have no choice but to remain steadfast. A harmful neighbour will either die or move away," said Daana quoting an old Arabic proverb.
Last week, dozens of young settlers, many of them wearing masks and armed with submachine guns, rampaged through the Khaled Ibn Al-Walid neighbourhood, not far from the colony of Kiryat Araba. There the settlers, who reportedly were dressed in religious attire, vandalised a Muslim cemetery and scrawled the Star of David on Muslim graves.
On the walls of the Khaled Ibn Al-Walid Mosque, the rampaging thugs scrawled the following phrase: "Mohamed is a pig." This is the new slogan the settlers are mouthing to offend and provoke the Palestinians. The other slogan is Mavet le Arabim or "Death to the Arabs!"
These obscenities are infuriating the Palestinians who warned that settlers were trying to instigate a religious war in the Middle East. "What does the Prophet Mohamed have to do with the conflict? Why are they deliberately provoking us? We have never, and never will speak ill of their prophets and religious figures," said Hassan Jaber, a neighbour of the mosque.
"When someone touches a Jewish cemetery anywhere in the world, the Jews make a big outcry about anti-Semitism. But when Jews commit blasphemous acts against Islam and Christianity, it is freedom of speech."
This is not the first time self-righteous settlers, who claim to be following the Torah, seek to offend Muslim religious sensibilities. According to local Palestinians, settlers have markedly escalated their anti-Islam discourse, mainly by way of scrawling sacrilegious epithets that are deeply offensive to the Islamic faith, such as cursing the Arabic name of God (Allah) and the Prophet Mohamed. Several years ago, a Jewish immigrant from the former Soviet Union pasted on the doors of Arab stalls and shops in downtown Hebron drawings depicting the prophet of Islam as a pig writing the Quran.
Such sacrilegious acts generally go unpunished by the Israeli government, allowing the settlers and their supporters to feel powerful and immune from government action.
The bulk of Jewish settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories follow the teachings of Abraham Kook, the first rabbi of Israel, who taught that Jews should seek to expedite the appearance of the "redeemer" or Jewish Messiah by way of carrying out acts of violence and bloodshed. In 1994, a Jewish settler terrorist, an American immigrant by the name of Baruch Goldstein, murdered at least 29 Arab worshipers who as they were praying at the Ibrahimi Mosque.
Goldstein, who was eventually killed by survivors, became a national hero among religious Zionists and Jewish extremists in general, and his tomb in Kiryat Araba became a pilgrimage site for religious Zionists from around the world. The settlers adopt a manifestly genocidal ideology with regard to how non-Jews living in Israel ought to be treated.
This ideology, which settlers say is based on the Talmud and is taught at the Mirkaz Harav religious Zionist college in Jerusalem, and gives Palestinians in Israel-Palestine three choices: first, comprehensive enslavement whereby non- Jews, or goyem, would have to accept their inferior status, second, outright expulsion, "lest they remain a thorn in your side," and third, Old Testament-style physical extermination.
The settler community in Hebron is not large in terms of numbers. According to Israeli government statistics, no more than 500-600 settlers and Yeshiva (religious school) students live in the old quarter of Hebron among the town's 180,000--200,000 Palestinian inhabitants. However, thousands of Israeli soldiers and paramilitary troops guard and protect the settlers around the clock, with the chief method of protection taking the form of making large parts of the town off-limit to Palestinians. In other words, 200,000 are held hostage to the whims of 500- 600 thugs who demand that non-Jews be enslaved, expelled or exterminated.
Needless to say, this causes immense hardship to Palestinian inhabitants whose freedom of movement and economic activities are harshly restricted. In some cases, a Palestinian living, say, in the vicinity of the Ibrahimi Mosque, is forced to travel several miles in order to get home from a nearby school or grocery store. The reason for such draconian restrictions is to make ordinary life so unbearable for ordinary Palestinians that they would leave their homes "voluntarily" so that the settlers could then seize them without the need of murdering the inhabitants.
As usual, the Israeli government continues to treat the settlers with the greatest temerity, refusing to take decisive action to stop their almost daily acts of violent and terror against Palestinians.
There are three main reasons contributing to the soft-glove policy towards the settlers. First, many of the soldiers serving in the occupied territories, particularly in the Hebron region, are themselves settlers and reluctant to arrest their colleagues. After all, the soldiers and settlers often have the same rabbi and attend the same Yeshiva, and worship at the same synagogue. Moreover, soldiers who are also settlers are effectively answerable first and foremost to their local rabbis, and only secondarily to their army superior. Second, the Israeli state itself views the settlers as a strategic asset that will prevent the creation of a viable Palestinian state, guaranteeing the continuity of Israeli control over the West Bank. This is despite all official propaganda that Jewish settler violence is carried out in spite of the government. Third, the proximity of the upcoming Israeli elections, slated to take place on 10 February, makes the government, especially Defence Minister Ehud Barak (head of the Labour Party) think twice before alienating the settlers, even by carrying out High Court rulings.
Last week, the Israeli High Court ordered the state to vacate Jewish settlers from an Arab building they had seized after forging ownership documents. However, the settlers and their supporters, including 48 Knesset members (out of 120) and former ministers, vowed to confront the army and police "be it as it may". Moreover, the settlers were planing to hold a large rally in Hebron to protest against the court decision and to underscore their determination to have their way.
Israeli President Shimon Peres, the godfather of Jewish settlements in the West Bank who is falsely portrayed as a man of peace, was quoted as saying during a visit to London last week that "Israel will find it difficult to evacuate the settlements without civil war." Yossi Sarid, a former minister, spoke of "a state within a state that has arisen in the territories."
Writing in Haaretz on 21 November, Sarid wrote, "a new custom has come to the country: High Court rulings are one thing, reality is another. One has not the slightest thing to do with the other. The settlements and the outposts are planted firmly in place and refuse to be uprooted; private land of Palestinians is being freely stolen; whole neighbourhoods born in sin are being populated; homes that have been stolen are filled with people; a brazen fence stands according to its original, arbitrary plan with only minimal changes."
Sarid's remarks may even be an understatement of reality.
One noted Israeli journalist intimated to this writer last week that Israel was facing two nightmarish scenarios in light of the settlers' determined refusal to leave the West Bank: "We have two alternatives, either we go into civil war or become a fascist or Nazi state. These two choices are becoming starker with the passage of each day."
C a p t i o n : Clockwise from top left: Israeli settlers teach their children to kill Palestinians; the Khaled Ibn Al-Walid Mosque, threatened by Jewish fanatics; a Muslim cemetery desecrated by settlers
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/924/re81.htm
When will Israel wake up to its gruesome legacy, asks Khaled Amayreh
Unconcerned about arrest by the police or prosecution by the Israeli justice system, fanatical Jewish settlers in the Palestinian town of Hebron (Al-Khalil) have been attacking Palestinians, damaging and ransacking their property, exactly like Nazi thugs did to Jewish-owned property in Germany 80 years ago.
The settlers, who claim to be acting in the name of true Judaism, espouse a messianic doctrine advocating violence and terror against non- Jews in Israel-Palestine for the purpose of creating a pure Jewish kingdom that would be ruled by Halacha, or Jewish religious law.
The settlers, who represent the core of religious Zionism, believe that the ethnic cleansing of non-Jews in the Holy Land will eventually usher the messianic age and accelerate the appearance of the Jewish Messiah, or Redeemer, who would bring about redemption for Jews and rule the entire world from Jerusalem.
In recent weeks, these thugs have been attacking Palestinian homes, smashing cars, vandalising property and fostering a general atmosphere of fear and terror throughout this town of nearly 200,000 people.
Al-Ahram Weekly has inspected the damage inflicted by settlers and spoken with thoroughly terrorised victims who complained that the Israeli authorities and army were effectively giving the paramilitary terrorists a carte blanche to terrorise Palestinians. "They [the settlers] are Nazi, and if there was a stronger epithet, I would not hesitate to use. You can't imagine the ugliness and brutality of their behaviour," said Ahmed Al-Jamal, a frequent target of settler terror and vandalism.
"Every Friday night and Saturday, dozens of settlers, including kids, descend on our neighbourhood to smash our cars, windows and property and shout 'Death to the Arabs!' This is their way of sanctifying the Sabbath and pleasing God."
Al-Jamal said dozens of settlers, some of them masked, last week attacked his and his brother's and neighbour's homes around 2.30am, smashing windows and windshields of parked cars. "We informed the police, and the police told us they would look into the matter. This is pretty much what they have been telling us since 1970 when these 'Nazis' came to live here."
Mohamed Daana, who lives in Wadi Al-Nasara, located just south of the Jewish colony of Kiryat Araba, said he submitted at least 500 complaints to the Israeli police in a desperate effort to put an end to settler violence and terror against him and his family.
"The last time I went to submit a police complaint in Kiryat Araba one policeman took me to the next room and told me 'I want to advise you, there is no point in submitting all these complaints. We simply can't do anything to help you. The settlers control the state and the army can do little to protect you from them.'" Asked what he would do next to protect his family, Daana said, "I have no choice but to remain steadfast. A harmful neighbour will either die or move away," said Daana quoting an old Arabic proverb.
Last week, dozens of young settlers, many of them wearing masks and armed with submachine guns, rampaged through the Khaled Ibn Al-Walid neighbourhood, not far from the colony of Kiryat Araba. There the settlers, who reportedly were dressed in religious attire, vandalised a Muslim cemetery and scrawled the Star of David on Muslim graves.
On the walls of the Khaled Ibn Al-Walid Mosque, the rampaging thugs scrawled the following phrase: "Mohamed is a pig." This is the new slogan the settlers are mouthing to offend and provoke the Palestinians. The other slogan is Mavet le Arabim or "Death to the Arabs!"
These obscenities are infuriating the Palestinians who warned that settlers were trying to instigate a religious war in the Middle East. "What does the Prophet Mohamed have to do with the conflict? Why are they deliberately provoking us? We have never, and never will speak ill of their prophets and religious figures," said Hassan Jaber, a neighbour of the mosque.
"When someone touches a Jewish cemetery anywhere in the world, the Jews make a big outcry about anti-Semitism. But when Jews commit blasphemous acts against Islam and Christianity, it is freedom of speech."
This is not the first time self-righteous settlers, who claim to be following the Torah, seek to offend Muslim religious sensibilities. According to local Palestinians, settlers have markedly escalated their anti-Islam discourse, mainly by way of scrawling sacrilegious epithets that are deeply offensive to the Islamic faith, such as cursing the Arabic name of God (Allah) and the Prophet Mohamed. Several years ago, a Jewish immigrant from the former Soviet Union pasted on the doors of Arab stalls and shops in downtown Hebron drawings depicting the prophet of Islam as a pig writing the Quran.
Such sacrilegious acts generally go unpunished by the Israeli government, allowing the settlers and their supporters to feel powerful and immune from government action.
The bulk of Jewish settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories follow the teachings of Abraham Kook, the first rabbi of Israel, who taught that Jews should seek to expedite the appearance of the "redeemer" or Jewish Messiah by way of carrying out acts of violence and bloodshed. In 1994, a Jewish settler terrorist, an American immigrant by the name of Baruch Goldstein, murdered at least 29 Arab worshipers who as they were praying at the Ibrahimi Mosque.
Goldstein, who was eventually killed by survivors, became a national hero among religious Zionists and Jewish extremists in general, and his tomb in Kiryat Araba became a pilgrimage site for religious Zionists from around the world. The settlers adopt a manifestly genocidal ideology with regard to how non-Jews living in Israel ought to be treated.
This ideology, which settlers say is based on the Talmud and is taught at the Mirkaz Harav religious Zionist college in Jerusalem, and gives Palestinians in Israel-Palestine three choices: first, comprehensive enslavement whereby non- Jews, or goyem, would have to accept their inferior status, second, outright expulsion, "lest they remain a thorn in your side," and third, Old Testament-style physical extermination.
The settler community in Hebron is not large in terms of numbers. According to Israeli government statistics, no more than 500-600 settlers and Yeshiva (religious school) students live in the old quarter of Hebron among the town's 180,000--200,000 Palestinian inhabitants. However, thousands of Israeli soldiers and paramilitary troops guard and protect the settlers around the clock, with the chief method of protection taking the form of making large parts of the town off-limit to Palestinians. In other words, 200,000 are held hostage to the whims of 500- 600 thugs who demand that non-Jews be enslaved, expelled or exterminated.
Needless to say, this causes immense hardship to Palestinian inhabitants whose freedom of movement and economic activities are harshly restricted. In some cases, a Palestinian living, say, in the vicinity of the Ibrahimi Mosque, is forced to travel several miles in order to get home from a nearby school or grocery store. The reason for such draconian restrictions is to make ordinary life so unbearable for ordinary Palestinians that they would leave their homes "voluntarily" so that the settlers could then seize them without the need of murdering the inhabitants.
As usual, the Israeli government continues to treat the settlers with the greatest temerity, refusing to take decisive action to stop their almost daily acts of violent and terror against Palestinians.
There are three main reasons contributing to the soft-glove policy towards the settlers. First, many of the soldiers serving in the occupied territories, particularly in the Hebron region, are themselves settlers and reluctant to arrest their colleagues. After all, the soldiers and settlers often have the same rabbi and attend the same Yeshiva, and worship at the same synagogue. Moreover, soldiers who are also settlers are effectively answerable first and foremost to their local rabbis, and only secondarily to their army superior. Second, the Israeli state itself views the settlers as a strategic asset that will prevent the creation of a viable Palestinian state, guaranteeing the continuity of Israeli control over the West Bank. This is despite all official propaganda that Jewish settler violence is carried out in spite of the government. Third, the proximity of the upcoming Israeli elections, slated to take place on 10 February, makes the government, especially Defence Minister Ehud Barak (head of the Labour Party) think twice before alienating the settlers, even by carrying out High Court rulings.
Last week, the Israeli High Court ordered the state to vacate Jewish settlers from an Arab building they had seized after forging ownership documents. However, the settlers and their supporters, including 48 Knesset members (out of 120) and former ministers, vowed to confront the army and police "be it as it may". Moreover, the settlers were planing to hold a large rally in Hebron to protest against the court decision and to underscore their determination to have their way.
Israeli President Shimon Peres, the godfather of Jewish settlements in the West Bank who is falsely portrayed as a man of peace, was quoted as saying during a visit to London last week that "Israel will find it difficult to evacuate the settlements without civil war." Yossi Sarid, a former minister, spoke of "a state within a state that has arisen in the territories."
Writing in Haaretz on 21 November, Sarid wrote, "a new custom has come to the country: High Court rulings are one thing, reality is another. One has not the slightest thing to do with the other. The settlements and the outposts are planted firmly in place and refuse to be uprooted; private land of Palestinians is being freely stolen; whole neighbourhoods born in sin are being populated; homes that have been stolen are filled with people; a brazen fence stands according to its original, arbitrary plan with only minimal changes."
Sarid's remarks may even be an understatement of reality.
One noted Israeli journalist intimated to this writer last week that Israel was facing two nightmarish scenarios in light of the settlers' determined refusal to leave the West Bank: "We have two alternatives, either we go into civil war or become a fascist or Nazi state. These two choices are becoming starker with the passage of each day."
C a p t i o n : Clockwise from top left: Israeli settlers teach their children to kill Palestinians; the Khaled Ibn Al-Walid Mosque, threatened by Jewish fanatics; a Muslim cemetery desecrated by settlers
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/924/re81.htm
Former Georgian envoy to Moscow puts blame for war on his own country By Olesya Vartanyan and Ellen Barry
International Herald Tribune
Former Georgian envoy to Moscow puts blame for war on his own country
By Olesya Vartanyan and Ellen Barry
Thursday, November 27, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/26/europe/georgia.php
TBILISI, Georgia: A parliamentary hearing on the origins of the war between Georgia and Russia in August ended in tumult after a former Georgian diplomat testified that the Georgian authorities were responsible for starting the conflict.
Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Tbilisi's former ambassador to Moscow, testified Tuesday for three hours before he was shouted down by members of Parliament.
A former confidant of President Mikheil Saakashvili, Kitsmarishvili said Georgian officials had told him in April that they planned to start a war in Abkhazia, one of two breakaway regions at issue in the war, and had received a green light from the U.S. government to do so. He said the Georgian government later decided to start the war in South Ossetia, the other region, and continue into Abkhazia.
He would not identify the officials who he said had told him about the planned actions in Abkhazia, saying that identifying them would endanger their lives.
American officials have consistently said that they had warned Saakashvili against taking action in the two enclaves, where Russian peacekeepers were stationed.
Kitsmarishvili's testimony in front of a parliamentary commission, shown live on Georgian television, met with forceful and immediate denials. One commission member, Givi Targamadze, threw a pen and then lunged toward Kitsmarishvili, but was restrained by his colleagues.
The chairman of the commission, Paata Davitaia, said he would initiate a criminal case against Kitsmarishvili for "professional negligence."
Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria, who appeared on short notice to comment on Kitsmarishvili's testimony, called the allegations "irresponsible and shameless fabrication," and said they were "either the result of a lack of information or the personal resentment of a man who has lost his job and wants to get involved in politics." Kitsmarishvili was fired in September by the president.
Kitsmarishvili walked out amid the furor Tuesday.
"They don't want to listen to the truth," he said.
The hearings are part of an official Georgian inquiry, whose full name is the Temporary Commission to Study Russia's Military Aggression and Other Actions Undertaken With the Aim to Infringe Georgia's Territorial Integrity. Many senior Georgian officials have already testified, and the president is scheduled to appear Friday.
Kitsmarishvili had petitioned to appear, saying a refusal to hear him would show that the inquiry was hollow.
In his comments, the former diplomat said that Saakashvili was responding to Russian provocation, but that he had long been planning to take control of the enclaves, which won de facto independence from Georgia in fighting in the early 1990s.
Kitsmarishvili said the president aimed to start an offensive in 2004, but met with resistance from Western and other Georgian officials.
Among the catalysts for the offensive, Kitsmarishvili said, was the belief that U.S. officials had given their approval. When he tried to verify that information with the American diplomats in Tbilisi, Kitsmarishvili said, he was told no such approval had been given.
Olesya Vartanyan reported from Tbilisi and Ellen Barry from Moscow.
Former Georgian envoy to Moscow puts blame for war on his own country
By Olesya Vartanyan and Ellen Barry
Thursday, November 27, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/26/europe/georgia.php
TBILISI, Georgia: A parliamentary hearing on the origins of the war between Georgia and Russia in August ended in tumult after a former Georgian diplomat testified that the Georgian authorities were responsible for starting the conflict.
Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Tbilisi's former ambassador to Moscow, testified Tuesday for three hours before he was shouted down by members of Parliament.
A former confidant of President Mikheil Saakashvili, Kitsmarishvili said Georgian officials had told him in April that they planned to start a war in Abkhazia, one of two breakaway regions at issue in the war, and had received a green light from the U.S. government to do so. He said the Georgian government later decided to start the war in South Ossetia, the other region, and continue into Abkhazia.
He would not identify the officials who he said had told him about the planned actions in Abkhazia, saying that identifying them would endanger their lives.
American officials have consistently said that they had warned Saakashvili against taking action in the two enclaves, where Russian peacekeepers were stationed.
Kitsmarishvili's testimony in front of a parliamentary commission, shown live on Georgian television, met with forceful and immediate denials. One commission member, Givi Targamadze, threw a pen and then lunged toward Kitsmarishvili, but was restrained by his colleagues.
The chairman of the commission, Paata Davitaia, said he would initiate a criminal case against Kitsmarishvili for "professional negligence."
Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria, who appeared on short notice to comment on Kitsmarishvili's testimony, called the allegations "irresponsible and shameless fabrication," and said they were "either the result of a lack of information or the personal resentment of a man who has lost his job and wants to get involved in politics." Kitsmarishvili was fired in September by the president.
Kitsmarishvili walked out amid the furor Tuesday.
"They don't want to listen to the truth," he said.
The hearings are part of an official Georgian inquiry, whose full name is the Temporary Commission to Study Russia's Military Aggression and Other Actions Undertaken With the Aim to Infringe Georgia's Territorial Integrity. Many senior Georgian officials have already testified, and the president is scheduled to appear Friday.
Kitsmarishvili had petitioned to appear, saying a refusal to hear him would show that the inquiry was hollow.
In his comments, the former diplomat said that Saakashvili was responding to Russian provocation, but that he had long been planning to take control of the enclaves, which won de facto independence from Georgia in fighting in the early 1990s.
Kitsmarishvili said the president aimed to start an offensive in 2004, but met with resistance from Western and other Georgian officials.
Among the catalysts for the offensive, Kitsmarishvili said, was the belief that U.S. officials had given their approval. When he tried to verify that information with the American diplomats in Tbilisi, Kitsmarishvili said, he was told no such approval had been given.
Olesya Vartanyan reported from Tbilisi and Ellen Barry from Moscow.
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Bush's Follies Will Destroy Obama If He Lets Them
Bush's Follies Will Destroy Obama If He Lets Them
Bush's Follies Will Destroy Obama If He Lets Them
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20081125_bushs_follies_will_destroy_obama_if_he_lets_them/
Posted on Nov 25, 2008
By William Pfaff
One might think that if Barack Obama believes he can make a success of his new administration by largely reconstituting the Clinton administration, Hillary Clinton included, he should know better than to take on the reckless ambitions and commitments of the George W. Bush administration as well: the government that gave America the Mideast and Asian crises, blunders and humiliations of the past 6 1/2 years.
The world has witnessed a futile, destructive and illegal American invasion of Iraq, a war conducted on false pretenses, supposedly against terrorists, accompanied by worldwide actions that have made American policy in Bush's "global war on terror" seem to many Muslims an attack on Islamic society itself.
Obama is now taking on the quasi-impossible tasks of bringing to a successful and responsible conclusion the Bush government's wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as what shows signs of becoming another military intervention of grave and unforeseeable consequences in Pakistan. He is doing so without challenging the assumptions and goals of Bush administration policy.
It has been the mindset of the Bush administration—and, unfortunately, of much of the neoconservative-influenced foreign policy establishment in Washington—that international society's problems are reducible to wars that American armies will win. They are wrong on both counts. But some still argue that this is the way to a better and more democratic world.
Obama has no choice but to accept responsibility for these American crises. But why should he accept them on the distorted and even hysterical terms by which the Bush administration has defined world affairs since 2001?
Iraq has been a victim of the United States. Washington had no legal or moral justification for invading the country and destroying its infrastructure, killing an uncounted number of Iraqis and displacing millions more to ruined lives while setting off the sectarian conflicts that have wracked the country since 2003.
There is a heavy American responsibility to do no more harm, however well-intentioned. The present volatile situation in the country is for the moment a largely political shoving match between the divided and possibly ephemeral Shiite government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his rivals, who include the Shiite radicals of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Sunni, and largely ex-Baathist, Awakening Movement, sponsored by the U.S. Army to defend Sunni tribal regions against the foreigners of the fundamentalist al-Qaida. In addition, are the two Kurdish movements that together control, and plan to make independent and permanent, a Kurdistan nation incorporating—if they have their way—the oil-rich Kirkuk region.
One can make the political—and moral—argument that as the American invasion is responsible for the Iraqi upheaval, Washington should somehow settle it. The answer is that it's impossible for Americans to do so. The U.S. cannot do it by continued military occupation and intervention in the country's affairs.
Only the Iraqis themselves can settle this, and doing so may entail even more religious and ethnic struggle. The neighboring Shiite great power, Iran, will play its cards in the country. The Saudis will play theirs. Israel will do everything in its power to prevent an American withdrawal. All of this will probably add still more tragedies to those of the last six years, but at least the U.S. responsibility will have become only indirect, which is bad enough.
Barack Obama started off his presidential campaign by saying that he would get American troops out of Iraq by mid-2010. That was a strong, simple position that, if resolutely carried out, would make it clear to the Iraqis what they have to do to save themselves, and how long they have in which to do it.
Since the early campaign, the president-elect has been forced to qualify his position, weaken it, blur it, say that actually many U.S. troops probably will stay on, the dates may change, American involvement will continue, and so on. He has been forced back toward the Washington consensus opinion, the centrist and "responsible" position, close to the Bush opinion.
Nearly everyone is against his sticking to his original policy: The Iraq factions all plan to exploit American ambiguities to strengthen their own positions and maneuver the American command to favor them. The Kurds want time to make their proto-Kurdistan even more impregnable (while encouraging their reluctance to deal with Turkish and Iranian hostility to a sovereign Kurdistan, as well as deal realistically with their fellow Iraqis).
In Washington, the Pentagon is against withdrawal on Obama's terms. It still wants permanent bases in Iraq. It claims Obama's timetable is logistically impossible. The Republicans will shout "treason" and "betrayal." American oil companies and the corporations that are already part of the occupation, as well as those that have big ambitions for moving into an American-secured Iraq, will demand that the U.S. stay.
All this must be resisted if Obama is to be his own man. He has to rid himself of George Bush's folly. He must make Iraq truly independent. If he doesn't, it could destroy his administration.
© 2008 Tribune Media Services Inc.
_______________________________________________
Salon mailing list
http://mailman.listserve.com/listmanager/listinfo/salon
Posted on Nov 25, 2008
By William Pfaff
One might think that if Barack Obama believes he can make a success of his new administration by largely reconstituting the Clinton administration, Hillary Clinton included, he should know better than to take on the reckless ambitions and commitments of the George W. Bush administration as well: the government that gave America the Mideast and Asian crises, blunders and humiliations of the past 6 1/2 years.
The world has witnessed a futile, destructive and illegal American invasion of Iraq, a war conducted on false pretenses, supposedly against terrorists, accompanied by worldwide actions that have made American policy in Bush's "global war on terror" seem to many Muslims an attack on Islamic society itself.
Obama is now taking on the quasi-impossible tasks of bringing to a successful and responsible conclusion the Bush government's wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as what shows signs of becoming another military intervention of grave and unforeseeable consequences in Pakistan. He is doing so without challenging the assumptions and goals of Bush administration policy.
It has been the mindset of the Bush administration—and, unfortunately, of much of the neoconservative-influenced foreign policy establishment in Washington—that international society's problems are reducible to wars that American armies will win. They are wrong on both counts. But some still argue that this is the way to a better and more democratic world.
Obama has no choice but to accept responsibility for these American crises. But why should he accept them on the distorted and even hysterical terms by which the Bush administration has defined world affairs since 2001?
Iraq has been a victim of the United States. Washington had no legal or moral justification for invading the country and destroying its infrastructure, killing an uncounted number of Iraqis and displacing millions more to ruined lives while setting off the sectarian conflicts that have wracked the country since 2003.
There is a heavy American responsibility to do no more harm, however well-intentioned. The present volatile situation in the country is for the moment a largely political shoving match between the divided and possibly ephemeral Shiite government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his rivals, who include the Shiite radicals of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Sunni, and largely ex-Baathist, Awakening Movement, sponsored by the U.S. Army to defend Sunni tribal regions against the foreigners of the fundamentalist al-Qaida. In addition, are the two Kurdish movements that together control, and plan to make independent and permanent, a Kurdistan nation incorporating—if they have their way—the oil-rich Kirkuk region.
One can make the political—and moral—argument that as the American invasion is responsible for the Iraqi upheaval, Washington should somehow settle it. The answer is that it's impossible for Americans to do so. The U.S. cannot do it by continued military occupation and intervention in the country's affairs.
Only the Iraqis themselves can settle this, and doing so may entail even more religious and ethnic struggle. The neighboring Shiite great power, Iran, will play its cards in the country. The Saudis will play theirs. Israel will do everything in its power to prevent an American withdrawal. All of this will probably add still more tragedies to those of the last six years, but at least the U.S. responsibility will have become only indirect, which is bad enough.
Barack Obama started off his presidential campaign by saying that he would get American troops out of Iraq by mid-2010. That was a strong, simple position that, if resolutely carried out, would make it clear to the Iraqis what they have to do to save themselves, and how long they have in which to do it.
Since the early campaign, the president-elect has been forced to qualify his position, weaken it, blur it, say that actually many U.S. troops probably will stay on, the dates may change, American involvement will continue, and so on. He has been forced back toward the Washington consensus opinion, the centrist and "responsible" position, close to the Bush opinion.
Nearly everyone is against his sticking to his original policy: The Iraq factions all plan to exploit American ambiguities to strengthen their own positions and maneuver the American command to favor them. The Kurds want time to make their proto-Kurdistan even more impregnable (while encouraging their reluctance to deal with Turkish and Iranian hostility to a sovereign Kurdistan, as well as deal realistically with their fellow Iraqis).
In Washington, the Pentagon is against withdrawal on Obama's terms. It still wants permanent bases in Iraq. It claims Obama's timetable is logistically impossible. The Republicans will shout "treason" and "betrayal." American oil companies and the corporations that are already part of the occupation, as well as those that have big ambitions for moving into an American-secured Iraq, will demand that the U.S. stay.
All this must be resisted if Obama is to be his own man. He has to rid himself of George Bush's folly. He must make Iraq truly independent. If he doesn't, it could destroy his administration.
© 2008 Tribune Media Services Inc.
Bush's Follies Will Destroy Obama If He Lets Them
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20081125_bushs_follies_will_destroy_obama_if_he_lets_them/
Posted on Nov 25, 2008
By William Pfaff
One might think that if Barack Obama believes he can make a success of his new administration by largely reconstituting the Clinton administration, Hillary Clinton included, he should know better than to take on the reckless ambitions and commitments of the George W. Bush administration as well: the government that gave America the Mideast and Asian crises, blunders and humiliations of the past 6 1/2 years.
The world has witnessed a futile, destructive and illegal American invasion of Iraq, a war conducted on false pretenses, supposedly against terrorists, accompanied by worldwide actions that have made American policy in Bush's "global war on terror" seem to many Muslims an attack on Islamic society itself.
Obama is now taking on the quasi-impossible tasks of bringing to a successful and responsible conclusion the Bush government's wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as what shows signs of becoming another military intervention of grave and unforeseeable consequences in Pakistan. He is doing so without challenging the assumptions and goals of Bush administration policy.
It has been the mindset of the Bush administration—and, unfortunately, of much of the neoconservative-influenced foreign policy establishment in Washington—that international society's problems are reducible to wars that American armies will win. They are wrong on both counts. But some still argue that this is the way to a better and more democratic world.
Obama has no choice but to accept responsibility for these American crises. But why should he accept them on the distorted and even hysterical terms by which the Bush administration has defined world affairs since 2001?
Iraq has been a victim of the United States. Washington had no legal or moral justification for invading the country and destroying its infrastructure, killing an uncounted number of Iraqis and displacing millions more to ruined lives while setting off the sectarian conflicts that have wracked the country since 2003.
There is a heavy American responsibility to do no more harm, however well-intentioned. The present volatile situation in the country is for the moment a largely political shoving match between the divided and possibly ephemeral Shiite government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his rivals, who include the Shiite radicals of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Sunni, and largely ex-Baathist, Awakening Movement, sponsored by the U.S. Army to defend Sunni tribal regions against the foreigners of the fundamentalist al-Qaida. In addition, are the two Kurdish movements that together control, and plan to make independent and permanent, a Kurdistan nation incorporating—if they have their way—the oil-rich Kirkuk region.
One can make the political—and moral—argument that as the American invasion is responsible for the Iraqi upheaval, Washington should somehow settle it. The answer is that it's impossible for Americans to do so. The U.S. cannot do it by continued military occupation and intervention in the country's affairs.
Only the Iraqis themselves can settle this, and doing so may entail even more religious and ethnic struggle. The neighboring Shiite great power, Iran, will play its cards in the country. The Saudis will play theirs. Israel will do everything in its power to prevent an American withdrawal. All of this will probably add still more tragedies to those of the last six years, but at least the U.S. responsibility will have become only indirect, which is bad enough.
Barack Obama started off his presidential campaign by saying that he would get American troops out of Iraq by mid-2010. That was a strong, simple position that, if resolutely carried out, would make it clear to the Iraqis what they have to do to save themselves, and how long they have in which to do it.
Since the early campaign, the president-elect has been forced to qualify his position, weaken it, blur it, say that actually many U.S. troops probably will stay on, the dates may change, American involvement will continue, and so on. He has been forced back toward the Washington consensus opinion, the centrist and "responsible" position, close to the Bush opinion.
Nearly everyone is against his sticking to his original policy: The Iraq factions all plan to exploit American ambiguities to strengthen their own positions and maneuver the American command to favor them. The Kurds want time to make their proto-Kurdistan even more impregnable (while encouraging their reluctance to deal with Turkish and Iranian hostility to a sovereign Kurdistan, as well as deal realistically with their fellow Iraqis).
In Washington, the Pentagon is against withdrawal on Obama's terms. It still wants permanent bases in Iraq. It claims Obama's timetable is logistically impossible. The Republicans will shout "treason" and "betrayal." American oil companies and the corporations that are already part of the occupation, as well as those that have big ambitions for moving into an American-secured Iraq, will demand that the U.S. stay.
All this must be resisted if Obama is to be his own man. He has to rid himself of George Bush's folly. He must make Iraq truly independent. If he doesn't, it could destroy his administration.
© 2008 Tribune Media Services Inc.
_______________________________________________
Salon mailing list
http://mailman.listserve.com/listmanager/listinfo/salon
Posted on Nov 25, 2008
By William Pfaff
One might think that if Barack Obama believes he can make a success of his new administration by largely reconstituting the Clinton administration, Hillary Clinton included, he should know better than to take on the reckless ambitions and commitments of the George W. Bush administration as well: the government that gave America the Mideast and Asian crises, blunders and humiliations of the past 6 1/2 years.
The world has witnessed a futile, destructive and illegal American invasion of Iraq, a war conducted on false pretenses, supposedly against terrorists, accompanied by worldwide actions that have made American policy in Bush's "global war on terror" seem to many Muslims an attack on Islamic society itself.
Obama is now taking on the quasi-impossible tasks of bringing to a successful and responsible conclusion the Bush government's wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as what shows signs of becoming another military intervention of grave and unforeseeable consequences in Pakistan. He is doing so without challenging the assumptions and goals of Bush administration policy.
It has been the mindset of the Bush administration—and, unfortunately, of much of the neoconservative-influenced foreign policy establishment in Washington—that international society's problems are reducible to wars that American armies will win. They are wrong on both counts. But some still argue that this is the way to a better and more democratic world.
Obama has no choice but to accept responsibility for these American crises. But why should he accept them on the distorted and even hysterical terms by which the Bush administration has defined world affairs since 2001?
Iraq has been a victim of the United States. Washington had no legal or moral justification for invading the country and destroying its infrastructure, killing an uncounted number of Iraqis and displacing millions more to ruined lives while setting off the sectarian conflicts that have wracked the country since 2003.
There is a heavy American responsibility to do no more harm, however well-intentioned. The present volatile situation in the country is for the moment a largely political shoving match between the divided and possibly ephemeral Shiite government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his rivals, who include the Shiite radicals of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Sunni, and largely ex-Baathist, Awakening Movement, sponsored by the U.S. Army to defend Sunni tribal regions against the foreigners of the fundamentalist al-Qaida. In addition, are the two Kurdish movements that together control, and plan to make independent and permanent, a Kurdistan nation incorporating—if they have their way—the oil-rich Kirkuk region.
One can make the political—and moral—argument that as the American invasion is responsible for the Iraqi upheaval, Washington should somehow settle it. The answer is that it's impossible for Americans to do so. The U.S. cannot do it by continued military occupation and intervention in the country's affairs.
Only the Iraqis themselves can settle this, and doing so may entail even more religious and ethnic struggle. The neighboring Shiite great power, Iran, will play its cards in the country. The Saudis will play theirs. Israel will do everything in its power to prevent an American withdrawal. All of this will probably add still more tragedies to those of the last six years, but at least the U.S. responsibility will have become only indirect, which is bad enough.
Barack Obama started off his presidential campaign by saying that he would get American troops out of Iraq by mid-2010. That was a strong, simple position that, if resolutely carried out, would make it clear to the Iraqis what they have to do to save themselves, and how long they have in which to do it.
Since the early campaign, the president-elect has been forced to qualify his position, weaken it, blur it, say that actually many U.S. troops probably will stay on, the dates may change, American involvement will continue, and so on. He has been forced back toward the Washington consensus opinion, the centrist and "responsible" position, close to the Bush opinion.
Nearly everyone is against his sticking to his original policy: The Iraq factions all plan to exploit American ambiguities to strengthen their own positions and maneuver the American command to favor them. The Kurds want time to make their proto-Kurdistan even more impregnable (while encouraging their reluctance to deal with Turkish and Iranian hostility to a sovereign Kurdistan, as well as deal realistically with their fellow Iraqis).
In Washington, the Pentagon is against withdrawal on Obama's terms. It still wants permanent bases in Iraq. It claims Obama's timetable is logistically impossible. The Republicans will shout "treason" and "betrayal." American oil companies and the corporations that are already part of the occupation, as well as those that have big ambitions for moving into an American-secured Iraq, will demand that the U.S. stay.
All this must be resisted if Obama is to be his own man. He has to rid himself of George Bush's folly. He must make Iraq truly independent. If he doesn't, it could destroy his administration.
© 2008 Tribune Media Services Inc.
The Slow Death of Gaza The collective punishment of Gaza's civilian population is illegal. But international law was tossed aside long ago By Andrea
The Slow Death of Gaza
The collective punishment of Gaza's civilian population is illegal. But international law was tossed aside long ago
By Andrea Becker
November 24, 2008 "The Guardian" -- -It has been two weeks since Israel imposed a complete closure of Gaza, after months when its crossings have been open only for the most minimal of humanitarian supplies. Now it is even worse: two weeks without United Nations food trucks for the 80% of the population entirely dependent on food aid, and no medical supplies or drugs for Gaza's ailing hospitals. No fuel (paid for by the EU) for Gaza's electricity plant, and no fuel for the generators during the long blackouts. Last Monday morning, 33 trucks of food for UN distribution were finally let in - a few days of few supplies for very few, but as the UN asks, then what?
Israel's official explanation for blocking even minimal humanitarian aid, according to IDF spokesperson Major Peter Lerner, was "continued rocket fire and security threats at the crossings". Israel's blockade, in force since Hamas seized control of Gaza in mid-2007, can be described as an intensification of policies designed to isolate the population of Gaza, cripple its economy, and incentivise the population against Hamas by harsh - and illegal - measures of collective punishment. However, these actions are not all new: the blockade is but the terminal end of Israel's closure policy, in place since 1991, which in turn builds on Israel's policies as occupier since 1967.
In practice, Israel's blockade means the denial of a broad range of items - food, industrial, educational, medical - deemed "non-essential" for a population largely unable to be self-sufficient at the end of decades of occupation. It means that industrial, cooking and diesel fuel, normally scarce, are virtually absent now. There are no queues at petrol stations; they are simply shut. The lack of fuel in turn means that sewage and treatment stations cannot function properly, resulting in decreased potable water and tens of millions of litres of untreated or partly treated sewage being dumped into the sea every day. Electricity cuts - previously around eight hours a day, now up to 16 hours a day in many areas - affect all homes and hospitals. Those lucky enough to have generators struggle to find the fuel to make them work, or spare parts to repair them when they break from overuse. Even candles are running out.
There can be no dispute that measures of collective punishment against the civilian population of Gaza are illegal under international humanitarian law. Fuel and food cannot be withheld or wielded as reward or punishment. But international law was tossed aside long ago. The blockade has been presented as punishment for the democratic election of Hamas, punishment for its subsequent takeover of Gaza, and punishment for militant attacks on Israeli civilians. The civilians of Gaza, from the maths teacher in a United Nations refugee camp to the premature baby in an incubator, properly punished for actions over which they have no control, will rise up and get rid of Hamas. Or so it goes.
And so what of these civilian agents of political change?
For all its complexities and tragedies, the over-arching effect of Israel's blockade has been to reduce the entire population to survival mode. Individuals are reduced to the daily detail of survival, and its exhaustions.
Consider Gaza's hospital staff. In hospitals, the blockade is as seemingly benign as doctors not having paper upon which to write diagnostic results or prescriptions, and as sinister as those seconds - between power cut and generator start - when a child on life support doesn't have the oxygen of a mechanical ventilator. A nurse on a neo-natal ward rushes between patients, battling the random schedule of power cuts. A hospital worker tries to keep a few kidney dialysis machines from breaking down, by farming spare parts from those that already have. The surgeon operates without a bulb in the surgery lamp, across from the anaesthetist who can no longer prevent patient pain. The hospital administrator updates lists of essential drugs and medical supplies that have run out, which vaccines from medical fridges are now unusable because they can't be kept cold, and which procedures must be cancelled altogether. The ambulance driver decides whether to respond to an emergency call, based on dwindling petrol in the tank.
By reducing the population to survival mode, the blockade robs people of the time and essence to do anything but negotiate the minutiae of what is and isn't possible in their personal and professional lives. Whether any flour will be available to make bread, where it might be found, how much it now costs. Rich or poor, taxi drivers, human rights defenders, and teachers alike spend hours speculating about where a canister of cooking gas might be found. Exhaustion is gripping hold of all in Gaza. Survival leaves little if no room for political engagement - and beyond exhaustion, anger and frustration are all that is left.
Andrea Becker is head of advocacy for Medical Aid for Palestinians.
© Guardian News and Media Limited 2008
The collective punishment of Gaza's civilian population is illegal. But international law was tossed aside long ago
By Andrea Becker
November 24, 2008 "The Guardian" -- -It has been two weeks since Israel imposed a complete closure of Gaza, after months when its crossings have been open only for the most minimal of humanitarian supplies. Now it is even worse: two weeks without United Nations food trucks for the 80% of the population entirely dependent on food aid, and no medical supplies or drugs for Gaza's ailing hospitals. No fuel (paid for by the EU) for Gaza's electricity plant, and no fuel for the generators during the long blackouts. Last Monday morning, 33 trucks of food for UN distribution were finally let in - a few days of few supplies for very few, but as the UN asks, then what?
Israel's official explanation for blocking even minimal humanitarian aid, according to IDF spokesperson Major Peter Lerner, was "continued rocket fire and security threats at the crossings". Israel's blockade, in force since Hamas seized control of Gaza in mid-2007, can be described as an intensification of policies designed to isolate the population of Gaza, cripple its economy, and incentivise the population against Hamas by harsh - and illegal - measures of collective punishment. However, these actions are not all new: the blockade is but the terminal end of Israel's closure policy, in place since 1991, which in turn builds on Israel's policies as occupier since 1967.
In practice, Israel's blockade means the denial of a broad range of items - food, industrial, educational, medical - deemed "non-essential" for a population largely unable to be self-sufficient at the end of decades of occupation. It means that industrial, cooking and diesel fuel, normally scarce, are virtually absent now. There are no queues at petrol stations; they are simply shut. The lack of fuel in turn means that sewage and treatment stations cannot function properly, resulting in decreased potable water and tens of millions of litres of untreated or partly treated sewage being dumped into the sea every day. Electricity cuts - previously around eight hours a day, now up to 16 hours a day in many areas - affect all homes and hospitals. Those lucky enough to have generators struggle to find the fuel to make them work, or spare parts to repair them when they break from overuse. Even candles are running out.
There can be no dispute that measures of collective punishment against the civilian population of Gaza are illegal under international humanitarian law. Fuel and food cannot be withheld or wielded as reward or punishment. But international law was tossed aside long ago. The blockade has been presented as punishment for the democratic election of Hamas, punishment for its subsequent takeover of Gaza, and punishment for militant attacks on Israeli civilians. The civilians of Gaza, from the maths teacher in a United Nations refugee camp to the premature baby in an incubator, properly punished for actions over which they have no control, will rise up and get rid of Hamas. Or so it goes.
And so what of these civilian agents of political change?
For all its complexities and tragedies, the over-arching effect of Israel's blockade has been to reduce the entire population to survival mode. Individuals are reduced to the daily detail of survival, and its exhaustions.
Consider Gaza's hospital staff. In hospitals, the blockade is as seemingly benign as doctors not having paper upon which to write diagnostic results or prescriptions, and as sinister as those seconds - between power cut and generator start - when a child on life support doesn't have the oxygen of a mechanical ventilator. A nurse on a neo-natal ward rushes between patients, battling the random schedule of power cuts. A hospital worker tries to keep a few kidney dialysis machines from breaking down, by farming spare parts from those that already have. The surgeon operates without a bulb in the surgery lamp, across from the anaesthetist who can no longer prevent patient pain. The hospital administrator updates lists of essential drugs and medical supplies that have run out, which vaccines from medical fridges are now unusable because they can't be kept cold, and which procedures must be cancelled altogether. The ambulance driver decides whether to respond to an emergency call, based on dwindling petrol in the tank.
By reducing the population to survival mode, the blockade robs people of the time and essence to do anything but negotiate the minutiae of what is and isn't possible in their personal and professional lives. Whether any flour will be available to make bread, where it might be found, how much it now costs. Rich or poor, taxi drivers, human rights defenders, and teachers alike spend hours speculating about where a canister of cooking gas might be found. Exhaustion is gripping hold of all in Gaza. Survival leaves little if no room for political engagement - and beyond exhaustion, anger and frustration are all that is left.
Andrea Becker is head of advocacy for Medical Aid for Palestinians.
© Guardian News and Media Limited 2008
Islamabad tries to take military out of politics By Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad and James Lamont in New Delhi
FT.com logo
Pakistan
Islamabad tries to take military out of politics
By Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad and James Lamont in New Delhi
Published: November 24 2008 19:15 | Last updated: November 24 2008 19:15
Pakistan's government has disbanded the political wing of the Inter-Services Intelligence, the notorious military-run spy agency, in a bold move intended to reduce sharply the military's influence in politics.
The effort to refocus the intelligence agency came a day after Asif Ali Zardari made one of the strongest overtures of any Pakistani president to India. He offered to abandon Pakistan's first-strike nuclear threat, sign a South Asian nuclear non-proliferation treaty and join India in an economic union.
The ISI is one of the most powerful forces in Pakistan. Often described as a "state within a state", it has a domestic and international remit that has helped the army tighten its grip on the country.
The agency played a role in supporting insurgents in Kashmir and militants in Afghanistan during the Russian occupation of the country. However, military rule during much of Pakistan's short history has encouraged its political wing to expand its role deep into domestic affairs.
"The ISI is a precious national institution and it wants to focus fully on counter-terrorism activities," said Shah Mehmood Qureshi, foreign minister, in a statement. He described the change as a "positive development".
Mr Zardari's latest initiative will be welcomed in Washington, where the incoming administration of president-elect Barack Obama is preparing for a renewed engagement with Islamabad to counter the Islamist threat. A senior US official this year appealed to the newly elected Pakistani government to bring the ISI under greater control to prevent it aiding terrorist attacks and supporting the Taliban.
Mr Qureshi's announcement coincided with the arrival of Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's former military ruler, in London. His visit has fuelled speculation that he may be scouting for residence outside Pakistan.
"The direct consequence of this decision [on the ISI] should be the evolution of democracy without interference from the military," said Nasim Zehra, a Pakistani newspaper columnist.
However, Tariq Azim, a former minister and now leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid e Azam, warned that a permanent end to the military's role in politics would only be achieved when civilian governments were more robust and effective.
"The quality of governance remains very weak in Pakistan and the government today has failed to take charge on a number of fronts," he said.
"We must always remember . . . that every time a civilian government has become weak and controversial, the military has used that as a pretext to take charge in the name of improving the country's outlook."
Indian officials have met the reforming mood in Islamabad with caution. They are doubtful of the extent to which the fragile democratic government can exert authority over a military establishment that is hostile to the country's eastern neighbour.
"The [Pakistani] army realises it's taking a battering within the country. Now it is saying 'If anything goes wrong, don't blame us'. And there's plenty that could go wrong," said G. Parthasarathy, a former Indian high commissioner to Islamabad.
India suspects the ISI's hand in the bombing of its embassy in Kabul in July, when 41 people were killed and 140 injured.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times.
Pakistan
Islamabad tries to take military out of politics
By Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad and James Lamont in New Delhi
Published: November 24 2008 19:15 | Last updated: November 24 2008 19:15
Pakistan's government has disbanded the political wing of the Inter-Services Intelligence, the notorious military-run spy agency, in a bold move intended to reduce sharply the military's influence in politics.
The effort to refocus the intelligence agency came a day after Asif Ali Zardari made one of the strongest overtures of any Pakistani president to India. He offered to abandon Pakistan's first-strike nuclear threat, sign a South Asian nuclear non-proliferation treaty and join India in an economic union.
The ISI is one of the most powerful forces in Pakistan. Often described as a "state within a state", it has a domestic and international remit that has helped the army tighten its grip on the country.
The agency played a role in supporting insurgents in Kashmir and militants in Afghanistan during the Russian occupation of the country. However, military rule during much of Pakistan's short history has encouraged its political wing to expand its role deep into domestic affairs.
"The ISI is a precious national institution and it wants to focus fully on counter-terrorism activities," said Shah Mehmood Qureshi, foreign minister, in a statement. He described the change as a "positive development".
Mr Zardari's latest initiative will be welcomed in Washington, where the incoming administration of president-elect Barack Obama is preparing for a renewed engagement with Islamabad to counter the Islamist threat. A senior US official this year appealed to the newly elected Pakistani government to bring the ISI under greater control to prevent it aiding terrorist attacks and supporting the Taliban.
Mr Qureshi's announcement coincided with the arrival of Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's former military ruler, in London. His visit has fuelled speculation that he may be scouting for residence outside Pakistan.
"The direct consequence of this decision [on the ISI] should be the evolution of democracy without interference from the military," said Nasim Zehra, a Pakistani newspaper columnist.
However, Tariq Azim, a former minister and now leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid e Azam, warned that a permanent end to the military's role in politics would only be achieved when civilian governments were more robust and effective.
"The quality of governance remains very weak in Pakistan and the government today has failed to take charge on a number of fronts," he said.
"We must always remember . . . that every time a civilian government has become weak and controversial, the military has used that as a pretext to take charge in the name of improving the country's outlook."
Indian officials have met the reforming mood in Islamabad with caution. They are doubtful of the extent to which the fragile democratic government can exert authority over a military establishment that is hostile to the country's eastern neighbour.
"The [Pakistani] army realises it's taking a battering within the country. Now it is saying 'If anything goes wrong, don't blame us'. And there's plenty that could go wrong," said G. Parthasarathy, a former Indian high commissioner to Islamabad.
India suspects the ISI's hand in the bombing of its embassy in Kabul in July, when 41 people were killed and 140 injured.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times.
Battling the Somali Pirates: The Return of the Islamists by Tony Karon
TIME
11/25/08
Battling the Somali Pirates: The Return of the Islamists
Tony Karon
T.E. Lawrence ("of Arabia") famously compared counterinsurgency warfare to "eating soup with a knife". The same might apply to the efforts of Western navies to protect commercial shipping from the marauding pirates of Somalia, except for the fact that soup is typically contained within a bowl — and the pirates have the freedom of a vast ocean in which to move. They recently captured a Saudi supertanker carrying $100 million in crude oil, by striking hundreds of miles away from the shipping lanes being patrolled by some of the world's most powerful navies. But if the pirates have the wind at their backs out at sea, they got some bad news back on shore last weekend, when five armored vehicles loaded with fighters of the Islamist Shabab militia arrived in the port town of Harardhere, where the pirates who seized the Sirius Star are based.
The Islamic Courts Union, which had controlled Mogadishu until it was ousted in a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006, denounced the seizure of the Saudi vessel as a "major crime," and its erstwhile affiliate, the more militant Shabab movement, was even more forthright. "Saudi is a Muslim country and it is very big crime to hold Muslim property," Sheikh Abdulaahi Osman, a commander of the group in Harardhere, told the Bloomberg news service on Sunday. "I warned again and again, those who hold the ship must free it unconditionally or armed conflict should be the solution. If they don't free the ship, we will rescue it by force." (See pictures of Somalia's pirates.)
Some locals believed the Islamists had come to confront the pirates; others speculated that the Shabab may simply be seeking a share in the booty. The pirates didn't wait around to find out, reportedly high-tailing it out of town and onto the high seas to avoid an encounter with the Shabab. While the presence of NATO and allied navies on the high seas has failed to stamp out piracy, the emergence of an authority more powerful than the buccaneers themselves in their on-shore sanctuaries could clearly be a game-changer.
Piracy has thrived along the Somali coastline not because commercial shipping is poorly defended, but because Somalia is a failed state where anarchy has prevailed for most of the past two decades. The Transitional Government currently backed by the U.S. is a loose coalition of rival clan warlords fighting among themselves, and whose authority is tenuous. Mogadishu and southern Somalia were a little more stable during the brief reign in 2006 of the Islamic Courts Union, whose militia fighters drove out the warlords and imposed a peace generally welcomed by the local population even if they chafed under the resultant sharia law. And the Islamists cracked down on piracy in areas under their control, including Harardheere.
The Islamists, however, were giving shelter to a handful of al-Qaeda operatives wanted in connection with terror attacks in East Africa, so the U.S. threw its weight behind the beleaguered Transitional Government and helped direct an Ethiopian invasion aimed at dislodging the Islamists. Although the invasion scattered the Islamists, the Transitional Government remains deeply unpopular and unable to cement its control. The government's security is largely dependent on an Ethiopian occupation that is itself growing weary of the cost of fighting the resurgent Islamists, led by the radicalized Shabab movement. The government and its allies arguably control only two Somali cities. It is now involved in U.N.-brokered power-sharing talks with more moderate elements among the Islamists.
But the clock cannot be turned back to 2006 when the more cohesive Islamist authority in Mogadishu had some success in stamping out piracy. Some analysts suggest that the Shabab have themselves lately made use of pirate groups to ferry weapons and train their fighters in naval combat, in exchange for protection. There is no solid evidence to back this claim, however, and other analysts insist that the Islamists remain the best bet for policing piracy. (It is also alleged that some pirate groups are in league with warlords who form part of the transitional government.) But both the Islamists and the Transitional Government are riven by internal power struggles, further complicating the task of forging a law-and-order consensus necessary to combat the pirates. (See pictures of the brazen pirates of Somalia.)
Establishing order on shore, however, remains the key to stamping out the problem, for the simple reason that keeping a dozen or more vessels from the navies of the U.S. and its allies engaged in escort missions for all commercial shipping in the area is too costly to sustain over the long term. As long as the pirates remain unmolested on shore and flush with cash —Kenya last week suggested the pirates have extorted as much as $150 million over the past year in ransom payments — they will find ways around the protection offered by sophisticated warships.
By moving into Harardhere, the Islamists are signaling an intent to reassert control over the coastline. They recently took control of the key southern port city of Kismayo. That could help tamp down the incidence of piracy — although only if the Shabab are committed to doing that, rather than seeking to profit from the lucrative industry. In that way, it can be compared to the Taliban in Afghanistan that stamped out opium production when it was in power and seeking international recognition. Today, as it wages an insurgency, the Taliban sustains itself by taxing the poppy trade. The key players in Somalia are likely to police piracy only when the political and economic incentives for doing so outweigh the gains to be made from encouraging and taxing it.
11/25/08
Battling the Somali Pirates: The Return of the Islamists
Tony Karon
T.E. Lawrence ("of Arabia") famously compared counterinsurgency warfare to "eating soup with a knife". The same might apply to the efforts of Western navies to protect commercial shipping from the marauding pirates of Somalia, except for the fact that soup is typically contained within a bowl — and the pirates have the freedom of a vast ocean in which to move. They recently captured a Saudi supertanker carrying $100 million in crude oil, by striking hundreds of miles away from the shipping lanes being patrolled by some of the world's most powerful navies. But if the pirates have the wind at their backs out at sea, they got some bad news back on shore last weekend, when five armored vehicles loaded with fighters of the Islamist Shabab militia arrived in the port town of Harardhere, where the pirates who seized the Sirius Star are based.
The Islamic Courts Union, which had controlled Mogadishu until it was ousted in a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006, denounced the seizure of the Saudi vessel as a "major crime," and its erstwhile affiliate, the more militant Shabab movement, was even more forthright. "Saudi is a Muslim country and it is very big crime to hold Muslim property," Sheikh Abdulaahi Osman, a commander of the group in Harardhere, told the Bloomberg news service on Sunday. "I warned again and again, those who hold the ship must free it unconditionally or armed conflict should be the solution. If they don't free the ship, we will rescue it by force." (See pictures of Somalia's pirates.)
Some locals believed the Islamists had come to confront the pirates; others speculated that the Shabab may simply be seeking a share in the booty. The pirates didn't wait around to find out, reportedly high-tailing it out of town and onto the high seas to avoid an encounter with the Shabab. While the presence of NATO and allied navies on the high seas has failed to stamp out piracy, the emergence of an authority more powerful than the buccaneers themselves in their on-shore sanctuaries could clearly be a game-changer.
Piracy has thrived along the Somali coastline not because commercial shipping is poorly defended, but because Somalia is a failed state where anarchy has prevailed for most of the past two decades. The Transitional Government currently backed by the U.S. is a loose coalition of rival clan warlords fighting among themselves, and whose authority is tenuous. Mogadishu and southern Somalia were a little more stable during the brief reign in 2006 of the Islamic Courts Union, whose militia fighters drove out the warlords and imposed a peace generally welcomed by the local population even if they chafed under the resultant sharia law. And the Islamists cracked down on piracy in areas under their control, including Harardheere.
The Islamists, however, were giving shelter to a handful of al-Qaeda operatives wanted in connection with terror attacks in East Africa, so the U.S. threw its weight behind the beleaguered Transitional Government and helped direct an Ethiopian invasion aimed at dislodging the Islamists. Although the invasion scattered the Islamists, the Transitional Government remains deeply unpopular and unable to cement its control. The government's security is largely dependent on an Ethiopian occupation that is itself growing weary of the cost of fighting the resurgent Islamists, led by the radicalized Shabab movement. The government and its allies arguably control only two Somali cities. It is now involved in U.N.-brokered power-sharing talks with more moderate elements among the Islamists.
But the clock cannot be turned back to 2006 when the more cohesive Islamist authority in Mogadishu had some success in stamping out piracy. Some analysts suggest that the Shabab have themselves lately made use of pirate groups to ferry weapons and train their fighters in naval combat, in exchange for protection. There is no solid evidence to back this claim, however, and other analysts insist that the Islamists remain the best bet for policing piracy. (It is also alleged that some pirate groups are in league with warlords who form part of the transitional government.) But both the Islamists and the Transitional Government are riven by internal power struggles, further complicating the task of forging a law-and-order consensus necessary to combat the pirates. (See pictures of the brazen pirates of Somalia.)
Establishing order on shore, however, remains the key to stamping out the problem, for the simple reason that keeping a dozen or more vessels from the navies of the U.S. and its allies engaged in escort missions for all commercial shipping in the area is too costly to sustain over the long term. As long as the pirates remain unmolested on shore and flush with cash —Kenya last week suggested the pirates have extorted as much as $150 million over the past year in ransom payments — they will find ways around the protection offered by sophisticated warships.
By moving into Harardhere, the Islamists are signaling an intent to reassert control over the coastline. They recently took control of the key southern port city of Kismayo. That could help tamp down the incidence of piracy — although only if the Shabab are committed to doing that, rather than seeking to profit from the lucrative industry. In that way, it can be compared to the Taliban in Afghanistan that stamped out opium production when it was in power and seeking international recognition. Today, as it wages an insurgency, the Taliban sustains itself by taxing the poppy trade. The key players in Somalia are likely to police piracy only when the political and economic incentives for doing so outweigh the gains to be made from encouraging and taxing it.
Monday, November 24, 2008
'Nobody is Watching:' America's hidden war in Somalia by Paul Salopek
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
11/24/08
'Nobody is Watching:' America's hidden war in Somalia
Paul Salopek
To glimpse America's secret war in Africa, you must bang with a rock on the iron gate of the prison in this remote port in northern Somalia. A sleepy guard will yank open a rusty deadbolt. Then, you ask to speak to an inmate named Mohamed Ali Isse.
Isse, 36, is a convicted murderer and jihadist. He is known among his fellow prisoners, with grudging awe, as "The Man with the American Thing in His Leg."
That "thing" is a stainless steel surgical pin screwed into his bullet-shattered femur, courtesy, he says, of the U.S. Navy. How it got there — or more to the point, how Isse ended up in this crumbling, stone-walled hellhole at the uttermost end of the Earth—is a story that the U.S. government probably would prefer to remain untold.
That's because Isse and his fancy surgery scars offer what little tangible evidence exists of a bare-knuckled war that has been waged silently, over the past five years, with the sole aim of preventing anarchic Somalia from becoming the world's next Afghanistan.
It is a standoff war in which the Pentagon lobs million-dollar cruise missiles into a famine-haunted African wasteland the size of Texas, hoping to kill lone terror suspects who might be dozing in candlelit huts. (The raids' success or failure is almost impossible to verify.)
It is a covert war in which the CIA has recruited gangs of unsavory warlords to hunt down and kidnap Islamic militants and—according to Isse and civil rights activists—secretly imprison them offshore, aboard U.S. warships.
Mostly, though, it is a policy time bomb that will be inherited by the incoming Obama administration: a little-known front in the global war on terrorism that Washington appears to be losing, if it hasn't already been lost.
"Somalia is one of the great unrecognized U.S. policy failures since 9/11," said Ken Menkhaus, a leading Somalia scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina. "By any rational metric, what we've ended up with there today is the opposite of what we wanted."
What the Bush administration wanted, when it tacitly backed Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in late 2006, was clear enough: to help a close African ally in the war on terror crush the Islamic Courts Union, or ICU. The Taliban-like movement emerged from the ashes of more than 15 years of anarchy and lawlessness in Africa's most infamous failed state, Somalia.
At first, the invasion seemed an easy victory. By early 2007, the ICU had been routed, a pro-Western transitional government installed, and hundreds of Islamic militants in Somalia either captured or killed.
But over the last 18 months, Somalia's Islamists—now more radical than ever—have regrouped and roared back.
On a single day last month, they flexed their muscles by killing nearly 30 people in a spate of bloody car-bomb attacks that recalled the darkest days of Iraq. And their brutal militia, the Shabab or "Youth," today controls much of the destitute nation, a shattered but strategic country that overlooks the vital oil-shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden.
Even worse, in recent days Shabab's fighters have moved to within miles of the Somalian capital of Mogadishu, threatening to topple the weak interim government supported by the U.S. and Ethiopia.
At the same time, according to the UN, the explosion of violence is inflaming what probably is the worst humanitarian tragedy in the world.
In the midst of a killing drought, more than 700,000 city dwellers have been driven out of bullet-scarred Mogadishu by the recent clashes between the Islamist rebels and the interim government.
The U.S. role in Somalia's current agonies has not always been clear. But back in the Berbera prison, Isse, who is both a villain and a victim in this immense panorama of suffering, offered a keyhole view that extended all the way back to Washington.
Wrapped in a faded sarong, scowling in the blistering-hot prison yard, the jihadist at first refused to meet foreign visitors—a loathed American in particular. But after some cajoling, he agreed to tell his story through a fellow inmate: a surreal but credible tale of illicit abduction by the CIA, secret helicopter rides and a journey through an African gulag that lifts the curtain, albeit only briefly, on an American invisible war.
"Your government gets away with a lot here," said the warden, Hassan Mohamed Ibrahim, striding about his antique facility with a pistol tucked in the back of his pants. "In Iraq, the world is watching. In Afghanistan, the world is watching. In Somalia, nobody is watching."
From ashes of 'Black Hawk Down'
In truth, merely watching in Mogadishu these days is apt to get you killed.
Somalia's hapless capital has long been considered the Dodge City of Africa—a seaside metropolis sundered by clan fighting ever since the nation's central government collapsed in 1991. That feral reputation was cemented in 1993, when chanting mobs dragged the bodies of U.S. Army Rangers through the streets in a disastrous UN peacekeeping mission chronicled in the book and movie "Black Hawk Down."
Yet if Mogadishu was once merely a perilous destination for outsiders, visiting today is suicidal.
For the first time in local memory, the airport—the city's frail lifeline to the world—is regularly closed by insurgent mortar attacks despite a small and jittery contingent of African Union peacekeepers.
Foreign workers who once toiled quietly for years in Somalia have been evacuated. A U.S. missile strike in May killed the Shabab commander, Aden Hashi Ayro, enraging Islamist militants who have since vowed to kidnap and kill any outsider found in the country.
The upshot: Most of Somalia today is closed to the world.
It wasn't supposed to turn out this way when Washington provided intelligence to the invading Ethiopians two years ago.
The homegrown Islamic radicals who controlled most of central and southern Somalia in mid-2006 certainly were no angels. They shuttered Mogadishu's cinemas, demanded that Somali men grow beards and, according to the U.S. State Department, provided refuge to some 30 local and international jihadists associated with Al Qaeda.
But the Islamic Courts Union's turbaned militiamen had actually defeated Somalia's hated warlords. And their enforcement of Islamic religious laws, while unpopular among many Somalis, made Mogadishu safe to walk in for the first time in a generation.
"It's not just that people miss those days," said a Somali humanitarian worker who, for safety reasons, asked to be identified only as Hassan. "They resent the Ethiopians and Americans tearing it all up, using Somalia as their battlefield against global terrorism. It's like the Cold War all over again. Somalis aren't in control."
When the Islamic movement again strengthened, Isse, the terrorist jailed in Berbera, was a pharmacy owner from the isolated town of Buro in Somaliland, a parched northern enclave that declared independence from Somalia in the early 1990s.
Radicalized by U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, he is serving a life sentence for organizing the killings of four foreign aid workers in late 2003 and early 2004. Two of his victims were elderly British teachers.
A dour, bearded man with bullet scars puckering his neck and leg, Isse still maintains his innocence. Much of Isse's account of his capture and imprisonment was independently corroborated by Western intelligence analysts, Somali security officials and court records in Somaliland, where the wounded jihadist was tried and jailed for murdering the aid workers. Those sources say Isse was snatched by the U.S. after fleeing to the safe house of a notorious Islamist militant in Mogadishu.
How that operation unfolded on a hot June night in 2004 reveals the extent of American clandestine involvement in Somalia's chaotic affairs—and how such anti-terrorism efforts appear to have backfired.
Interrogation aboard ship
"I captured Isse for the Americans," said Mohamed Afrah Qanyare. "The Americans contracted us to do certain things, and we did them. Isse put up resistance so we shot him. But he survived."
A scar-faced warlord in a business suit, Qanyare is a member of Somalia's weak transitional government. Today he divides his days between lawless Mogadishu and luxury hotels in Nairobi.
But four years ago, his militia helped form the kernel of a CIA-created mercenary force called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism in Somalia. The unit cobbled together some of the world's most violent, wily and unreliable clan militias—including gangs that had attacked U.S. forces in the early 1990s—to confront a rising tide of Islamic militancy in Somalia's anarchic capital.
The Somalis on the CIA payroll engaged in a grim tit-for-tat exchange of kidnappings and assassinations with extremists. And Isse was one of their catches.
He was wounded in a CIA-ordered raid on his Mogadishu safe house in June 2004, according to Qanyare and Matt Bryden, one of the world's leading scholars of the Somali insurgency who has access to intelligence regarding it. They say Isse was then loaded aboard a U.S. military helicopter summoned by satellite phone and was flown, bleeding, to an offshore U.S. vessel.
"He saw white people in uniforms working on his body," said Isse's Somali defense lawyer, Bashir Hussein Abdi, describing how Isse was rushed into a ship-board operating room. "He felt the ship moving. He thought he was dreaming."
Navy doctors spliced a steel rod into Isse's bullet-shattered leg, according to Abdi. Every day for about a month afterward, Isse's court depositions assert, plainclothes U.S. agents grilled the bedridden Somali at sea about Al Qaeda's presence.
The CIA never has publicly acknowledged its operations in Somalia. Agency spokesman George Little declined to comment on Isse's case.
For years, human-rights organizations attempted to expose the rumored detention and interrogation of terror suspects aboard U.S. warships to avoid media and legal scrutiny. In June, the British civil rights group Reprieve contended that as many as 17 U.S. warships may have doubled as "floating prisons" since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Calling such claims "misleading," the Pentagon has insisted that U.S. ships have served only as transit stops for terror suspects being shuttled to permanent detention camps such as the one in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
But Tribune reporting on Isse indicates strongly that a U.S. warship was used for interrogation at least once off the lawless coast of Somalia.
The U.S. Navy conceded Isse had stayed aboard one of its vessels. In a terse statement, Lt. Nathan Christensen, a spokesman for the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet that patrols the Gulf of Aden, said only that the Navy was "not able to confirm dates" of Isse's imprisonment.
For reasons that remain unclear, he was later flown to Camp Lemonier, a U.S. military base in the African state of Djibouti, Somali intelligence sources say, and from there to a clandestine prison in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Isse and his lawyer allege he was detained there for six weeks and tortured by Ethiopian military intelligence with electric shocks.
Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and office of prime minister did not respond to queries about Isse's allegations.
However, security officials in neighboring Somaliland did confirm that they collected Isse from the Ethiopian police at a dusty border crossing in late 2004. "The Man with the American Thing in His Leg" was interrogated again. After a local trial, he was locked in the ancient Berbera prison.
"It doesn't matter if he is guilty or innocent," said Abdi, the defense lawyer. "Countries like Ethiopia and America use terrorism to justify this treatment. This is not justice. It is a crime in itself."
Tales of CIA "snatch and grab" operations against terror suspects abroad aren't new, of course. President George W. Bush finally confirmed two years ago the existence of an international program that "renditioned" terrorism suspects to a network of "black site" prisons in Eastern Europe, Iraq and Afghanistan.
As for the CIA's anti-terror mercenaries in Mogadishu, they may have kidnapped a dozen or more wanted Islamists for the Americans, intelligence experts say. But their excesses ended up swelling the ranks of their enemy, the Islamic Courts Union militias.
"It was a stupid idea," said Bryden, the security analyst who has written extensively on Somalia's Islamist insurgency. "It actually strengthened the hand of the Islamists and helped trigger the crisis we're in today."
In the sweltering Berbera prison, Exhibit A in Washington's phantom war in Somalia had finished his afternoon prayers. He clapped his sandals together, then limped off to his cell without a word.
A sinking nation
The future of Somalia and its 8 million people is totally unscripted. This unbearable lack of certainty, of a way forward, accommodates little hope.
Ethiopian and U.S. actions have eroded Somalis' hidebound allegiance to their clans, once a firewall against Al Qaeda's global ideology, says Bryden. Somalia's 2 million-strong diaspora is of greatest concern. Angry young men, foreign passports in hand, could be lured back to the reopened Shabab training camps, where instructors occasionally use photocopied portraits of Bush as rifle targets.
Some envision no Somalia at all.
With about $8 billion in humanitarian aid fire-hosed into the smoking ruins of Somalia since the early 1990s—the U.S. will donate roughly $200 million this year alone—a growing chorus of policymakers is advocating that the failed state be allowed to fail, to break up into autonomous zones or fiefdoms, such as Isse's home of Somaliland.
But there is another possible future for Somalia. To see it, you must go to Bosaso, a port 300 miles east of Isse's cell.
Bosaso is an escape hatch from Somalia. Thousands of people swarm through the town's scruffy waterfront every year, seeking passage across the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East. Dressed in rags, they sleep by the hundreds in dirt alleys and empty lots. Stranded women and girls are forced into prostitution.
"You can see why we still need America's help," said Abdinur Jama, the coast guard commander for Puntland, the semiautonomous state encompassing Bosaso. "We need training and equipment to stop this."
Dapper in camouflage and a Yankees cap, Jama was a rarity in Somalia, an optimist. While Bosaso's teenagers shook their fists at high-flying U.S. jets on routine patrols—"Go to hell!" they chanted—Jama still spoke well of international engagement in Somalia.
On a morning when he offered to take visitors on a coast patrol, it did not seem kind to tell him what a U.S. military think tank at West Point had concluded about Somalia last year: that, in some respects, failed states were admirable places to combat Al Qaeda, because the absence of local sovereignty permitted "relatively unrestricted Western counterterrorism efforts."
After all, Jama's decrepit patrol boat was sinking.
A crew member scrambled to stanch a yard-high geyser of seawater that spurted through the cracked hull. Jama screwed his cap on tighter and peered professionally at land that, despite Washington's best-laid plans, has turned far more desperate than Afghanistan.
"Can you swim?" Jama asked. But it hardly seemed to matter. Back on dry land, in Somalia, an entire country was drowning.
11/24/08
'Nobody is Watching:' America's hidden war in Somalia
Paul Salopek
To glimpse America's secret war in Africa, you must bang with a rock on the iron gate of the prison in this remote port in northern Somalia. A sleepy guard will yank open a rusty deadbolt. Then, you ask to speak to an inmate named Mohamed Ali Isse.
Isse, 36, is a convicted murderer and jihadist. He is known among his fellow prisoners, with grudging awe, as "The Man with the American Thing in His Leg."
That "thing" is a stainless steel surgical pin screwed into his bullet-shattered femur, courtesy, he says, of the U.S. Navy. How it got there — or more to the point, how Isse ended up in this crumbling, stone-walled hellhole at the uttermost end of the Earth—is a story that the U.S. government probably would prefer to remain untold.
That's because Isse and his fancy surgery scars offer what little tangible evidence exists of a bare-knuckled war that has been waged silently, over the past five years, with the sole aim of preventing anarchic Somalia from becoming the world's next Afghanistan.
It is a standoff war in which the Pentagon lobs million-dollar cruise missiles into a famine-haunted African wasteland the size of Texas, hoping to kill lone terror suspects who might be dozing in candlelit huts. (The raids' success or failure is almost impossible to verify.)
It is a covert war in which the CIA has recruited gangs of unsavory warlords to hunt down and kidnap Islamic militants and—according to Isse and civil rights activists—secretly imprison them offshore, aboard U.S. warships.
Mostly, though, it is a policy time bomb that will be inherited by the incoming Obama administration: a little-known front in the global war on terrorism that Washington appears to be losing, if it hasn't already been lost.
"Somalia is one of the great unrecognized U.S. policy failures since 9/11," said Ken Menkhaus, a leading Somalia scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina. "By any rational metric, what we've ended up with there today is the opposite of what we wanted."
What the Bush administration wanted, when it tacitly backed Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in late 2006, was clear enough: to help a close African ally in the war on terror crush the Islamic Courts Union, or ICU. The Taliban-like movement emerged from the ashes of more than 15 years of anarchy and lawlessness in Africa's most infamous failed state, Somalia.
At first, the invasion seemed an easy victory. By early 2007, the ICU had been routed, a pro-Western transitional government installed, and hundreds of Islamic militants in Somalia either captured or killed.
But over the last 18 months, Somalia's Islamists—now more radical than ever—have regrouped and roared back.
On a single day last month, they flexed their muscles by killing nearly 30 people in a spate of bloody car-bomb attacks that recalled the darkest days of Iraq. And their brutal militia, the Shabab or "Youth," today controls much of the destitute nation, a shattered but strategic country that overlooks the vital oil-shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden.
Even worse, in recent days Shabab's fighters have moved to within miles of the Somalian capital of Mogadishu, threatening to topple the weak interim government supported by the U.S. and Ethiopia.
At the same time, according to the UN, the explosion of violence is inflaming what probably is the worst humanitarian tragedy in the world.
In the midst of a killing drought, more than 700,000 city dwellers have been driven out of bullet-scarred Mogadishu by the recent clashes between the Islamist rebels and the interim government.
The U.S. role in Somalia's current agonies has not always been clear. But back in the Berbera prison, Isse, who is both a villain and a victim in this immense panorama of suffering, offered a keyhole view that extended all the way back to Washington.
Wrapped in a faded sarong, scowling in the blistering-hot prison yard, the jihadist at first refused to meet foreign visitors—a loathed American in particular. But after some cajoling, he agreed to tell his story through a fellow inmate: a surreal but credible tale of illicit abduction by the CIA, secret helicopter rides and a journey through an African gulag that lifts the curtain, albeit only briefly, on an American invisible war.
"Your government gets away with a lot here," said the warden, Hassan Mohamed Ibrahim, striding about his antique facility with a pistol tucked in the back of his pants. "In Iraq, the world is watching. In Afghanistan, the world is watching. In Somalia, nobody is watching."
From ashes of 'Black Hawk Down'
In truth, merely watching in Mogadishu these days is apt to get you killed.
Somalia's hapless capital has long been considered the Dodge City of Africa—a seaside metropolis sundered by clan fighting ever since the nation's central government collapsed in 1991. That feral reputation was cemented in 1993, when chanting mobs dragged the bodies of U.S. Army Rangers through the streets in a disastrous UN peacekeeping mission chronicled in the book and movie "Black Hawk Down."
Yet if Mogadishu was once merely a perilous destination for outsiders, visiting today is suicidal.
For the first time in local memory, the airport—the city's frail lifeline to the world—is regularly closed by insurgent mortar attacks despite a small and jittery contingent of African Union peacekeepers.
Foreign workers who once toiled quietly for years in Somalia have been evacuated. A U.S. missile strike in May killed the Shabab commander, Aden Hashi Ayro, enraging Islamist militants who have since vowed to kidnap and kill any outsider found in the country.
The upshot: Most of Somalia today is closed to the world.
It wasn't supposed to turn out this way when Washington provided intelligence to the invading Ethiopians two years ago.
The homegrown Islamic radicals who controlled most of central and southern Somalia in mid-2006 certainly were no angels. They shuttered Mogadishu's cinemas, demanded that Somali men grow beards and, according to the U.S. State Department, provided refuge to some 30 local and international jihadists associated with Al Qaeda.
But the Islamic Courts Union's turbaned militiamen had actually defeated Somalia's hated warlords. And their enforcement of Islamic religious laws, while unpopular among many Somalis, made Mogadishu safe to walk in for the first time in a generation.
"It's not just that people miss those days," said a Somali humanitarian worker who, for safety reasons, asked to be identified only as Hassan. "They resent the Ethiopians and Americans tearing it all up, using Somalia as their battlefield against global terrorism. It's like the Cold War all over again. Somalis aren't in control."
When the Islamic movement again strengthened, Isse, the terrorist jailed in Berbera, was a pharmacy owner from the isolated town of Buro in Somaliland, a parched northern enclave that declared independence from Somalia in the early 1990s.
Radicalized by U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, he is serving a life sentence for organizing the killings of four foreign aid workers in late 2003 and early 2004. Two of his victims were elderly British teachers.
A dour, bearded man with bullet scars puckering his neck and leg, Isse still maintains his innocence. Much of Isse's account of his capture and imprisonment was independently corroborated by Western intelligence analysts, Somali security officials and court records in Somaliland, where the wounded jihadist was tried and jailed for murdering the aid workers. Those sources say Isse was snatched by the U.S. after fleeing to the safe house of a notorious Islamist militant in Mogadishu.
How that operation unfolded on a hot June night in 2004 reveals the extent of American clandestine involvement in Somalia's chaotic affairs—and how such anti-terrorism efforts appear to have backfired.
Interrogation aboard ship
"I captured Isse for the Americans," said Mohamed Afrah Qanyare. "The Americans contracted us to do certain things, and we did them. Isse put up resistance so we shot him. But he survived."
A scar-faced warlord in a business suit, Qanyare is a member of Somalia's weak transitional government. Today he divides his days between lawless Mogadishu and luxury hotels in Nairobi.
But four years ago, his militia helped form the kernel of a CIA-created mercenary force called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism in Somalia. The unit cobbled together some of the world's most violent, wily and unreliable clan militias—including gangs that had attacked U.S. forces in the early 1990s—to confront a rising tide of Islamic militancy in Somalia's anarchic capital.
The Somalis on the CIA payroll engaged in a grim tit-for-tat exchange of kidnappings and assassinations with extremists. And Isse was one of their catches.
He was wounded in a CIA-ordered raid on his Mogadishu safe house in June 2004, according to Qanyare and Matt Bryden, one of the world's leading scholars of the Somali insurgency who has access to intelligence regarding it. They say Isse was then loaded aboard a U.S. military helicopter summoned by satellite phone and was flown, bleeding, to an offshore U.S. vessel.
"He saw white people in uniforms working on his body," said Isse's Somali defense lawyer, Bashir Hussein Abdi, describing how Isse was rushed into a ship-board operating room. "He felt the ship moving. He thought he was dreaming."
Navy doctors spliced a steel rod into Isse's bullet-shattered leg, according to Abdi. Every day for about a month afterward, Isse's court depositions assert, plainclothes U.S. agents grilled the bedridden Somali at sea about Al Qaeda's presence.
The CIA never has publicly acknowledged its operations in Somalia. Agency spokesman George Little declined to comment on Isse's case.
For years, human-rights organizations attempted to expose the rumored detention and interrogation of terror suspects aboard U.S. warships to avoid media and legal scrutiny. In June, the British civil rights group Reprieve contended that as many as 17 U.S. warships may have doubled as "floating prisons" since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Calling such claims "misleading," the Pentagon has insisted that U.S. ships have served only as transit stops for terror suspects being shuttled to permanent detention camps such as the one in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
But Tribune reporting on Isse indicates strongly that a U.S. warship was used for interrogation at least once off the lawless coast of Somalia.
The U.S. Navy conceded Isse had stayed aboard one of its vessels. In a terse statement, Lt. Nathan Christensen, a spokesman for the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet that patrols the Gulf of Aden, said only that the Navy was "not able to confirm dates" of Isse's imprisonment.
For reasons that remain unclear, he was later flown to Camp Lemonier, a U.S. military base in the African state of Djibouti, Somali intelligence sources say, and from there to a clandestine prison in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Isse and his lawyer allege he was detained there for six weeks and tortured by Ethiopian military intelligence with electric shocks.
Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and office of prime minister did not respond to queries about Isse's allegations.
However, security officials in neighboring Somaliland did confirm that they collected Isse from the Ethiopian police at a dusty border crossing in late 2004. "The Man with the American Thing in His Leg" was interrogated again. After a local trial, he was locked in the ancient Berbera prison.
"It doesn't matter if he is guilty or innocent," said Abdi, the defense lawyer. "Countries like Ethiopia and America use terrorism to justify this treatment. This is not justice. It is a crime in itself."
Tales of CIA "snatch and grab" operations against terror suspects abroad aren't new, of course. President George W. Bush finally confirmed two years ago the existence of an international program that "renditioned" terrorism suspects to a network of "black site" prisons in Eastern Europe, Iraq and Afghanistan.
As for the CIA's anti-terror mercenaries in Mogadishu, they may have kidnapped a dozen or more wanted Islamists for the Americans, intelligence experts say. But their excesses ended up swelling the ranks of their enemy, the Islamic Courts Union militias.
"It was a stupid idea," said Bryden, the security analyst who has written extensively on Somalia's Islamist insurgency. "It actually strengthened the hand of the Islamists and helped trigger the crisis we're in today."
In the sweltering Berbera prison, Exhibit A in Washington's phantom war in Somalia had finished his afternoon prayers. He clapped his sandals together, then limped off to his cell without a word.
A sinking nation
The future of Somalia and its 8 million people is totally unscripted. This unbearable lack of certainty, of a way forward, accommodates little hope.
Ethiopian and U.S. actions have eroded Somalis' hidebound allegiance to their clans, once a firewall against Al Qaeda's global ideology, says Bryden. Somalia's 2 million-strong diaspora is of greatest concern. Angry young men, foreign passports in hand, could be lured back to the reopened Shabab training camps, where instructors occasionally use photocopied portraits of Bush as rifle targets.
Some envision no Somalia at all.
With about $8 billion in humanitarian aid fire-hosed into the smoking ruins of Somalia since the early 1990s—the U.S. will donate roughly $200 million this year alone—a growing chorus of policymakers is advocating that the failed state be allowed to fail, to break up into autonomous zones or fiefdoms, such as Isse's home of Somaliland.
But there is another possible future for Somalia. To see it, you must go to Bosaso, a port 300 miles east of Isse's cell.
Bosaso is an escape hatch from Somalia. Thousands of people swarm through the town's scruffy waterfront every year, seeking passage across the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East. Dressed in rags, they sleep by the hundreds in dirt alleys and empty lots. Stranded women and girls are forced into prostitution.
"You can see why we still need America's help," said Abdinur Jama, the coast guard commander for Puntland, the semiautonomous state encompassing Bosaso. "We need training and equipment to stop this."
Dapper in camouflage and a Yankees cap, Jama was a rarity in Somalia, an optimist. While Bosaso's teenagers shook their fists at high-flying U.S. jets on routine patrols—"Go to hell!" they chanted—Jama still spoke well of international engagement in Somalia.
On a morning when he offered to take visitors on a coast patrol, it did not seem kind to tell him what a U.S. military think tank at West Point had concluded about Somalia last year: that, in some respects, failed states were admirable places to combat Al Qaeda, because the absence of local sovereignty permitted "relatively unrestricted Western counterterrorism efforts."
After all, Jama's decrepit patrol boat was sinking.
A crew member scrambled to stanch a yard-high geyser of seawater that spurted through the cracked hull. Jama screwed his cap on tighter and peered professionally at land that, despite Washington's best-laid plans, has turned far more desperate than Afghanistan.
"Can you swim?" Jama asked. But it hardly seemed to matter. Back on dry land, in Somalia, an entire country was drowning.
Who are Somalia's pirates?
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11/24/08
Who are Somalia's pirates?
A Monitor Q&A reveals who's behind the modern-day pirates, how they got so good at taking ships, and what's being done to stop them.
Scott Baldauf
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa - – Today's pirates are mainly fighters for Somalia's many warlord factions, who have fought each other for control of the country since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991.
Their motives? A mixture of entrepreneurialism and survival, says Iqbal Jhazbhay, a Somali expert at the University of South Africa in Tshwane, as Pretoria is now called.
"From the evidence so far, these primarily appear to be fighters looking for predatory opportunities," says Mr. Jhazbhay. They operated "roadblocks in the past, which were fleecing people as a form of taxation. Now they've seen the opportunities on the high seas."
Initially, one of the main motives for taking to the seas – working first with local fishermen, and later buying boats and weapons with the proceeds of every ship they captured – was "pure survival," says Jhazbhay, explaining that armed extortion is one of the few opportunities to make a living in lawless Somalia.
"It's spiked more recently because of a spike in food prices," he says.
Now it has become a highly profitable, sophisticated criminal enterprise hauling in millions of dollars in ransom payments.
Whom do they work for?
The pirates mainly work for themselves.
Much of the piracy seems to be based out of the Puntland, a semiautonomous region on the northern shore of Somalia that broke away from Somalia soon after 1991.
Thousands of pirates now operate off Somalia's coast, although there are no accurate numbers on precisely how many there are.
United Nations monitoring reports on arms smuggling in the Horn of Africa have pointed to evidence that pirate gangs have established relations with corrupt officials of the Puntland government. They bribe port officials to allow the pirates to use Eyl and other ports as their bases of operation, and to bring some of their captured ships in for safekeeping while the pirates negotiate ransoms with the ships' owners.
There is also evidence that expatriate Somalis living in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and throughout the Persian Gulf may be feeding information to the pirates about ships that have docked in those regions and may be heading toward the Gulf of Aden and other pirate-infested areas.
Who benefits from this piracy?
The money seems to be distributed by warlords to their families and friends, and then further outward toward their fellow clan-members, says Jhazbhay.
There have been charges recently that local Islamist groups may be linked to the pirate gangs, and may have begun to use piracy as a source of funds to buy weapons.
Certainly, Islamist groups such as Al Shabab – an insurgent group formed after the Islamic Courts Union lost control of the country last year in the wake of a US-backed invasion by Somalia's neighbor, Ethiopia – have used pirate gangs to smuggle weapons into Somalia, which is currently under international weapons sanctions. But the evidence is thin, as yet, that Islamist groups are using piracy on the high seas as a funding mechanism.
"The last thing the Islamists want to do is give an unnecessary provocation to the major powers, who might come after them in a big way," says Richard Cornwell, a senior analyst at the Institute for Security Studies in Tshwane. "What experience tells us is that if the Islamists did take control of Somalia, piracy would stop overnight. They don't want warlords gaining arms and money outside of their control."
Is there an Al Qaeda connection?
While the CIA's chief, Gen. Michael Hayden, suggested recently that Al Qaeda was beginning to expand its reach in the Horn of Africa, and possibly reaching out to radical local Islamist parties such as Al Shabab in Somalia, there appears to be little evidence of a connection between international Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and piracy.
"There may be some loose elements among the Islamist groups that have tie-ups with the pirates, because the movement is fractured into six or seven different groups, and each may have its own problems getting funding," says Jhazbhay.
How did they get so good at taking ships?
Practice, practice, practice.
More than 90 ships have been attacked off the coast of Somalia this year. Seventeen ships remain in the hands of Somali pirates. The Saudi owners of the Sirius Star, the oil tanker taken Nov. 15, are reportedly in contact with the pirates, possibly to negotiate the release of the ship, its crew, and the estimated $110 million cargo of crude oil.
"What staggered the mind is that this capture was 400 nautical miles out to sea," says Mr. Cornwell. "That's far deeper water than anything we've seen before. But with a GPS they can hijack to order." Using a mother ship – often an old Russian trawler – to prowl deeper waters for their target, they can offload smaller boats to move in close and overtake the ship, and climb up with hooks and ladders, and submachine guns.
"With a fully laden tanker ship, you have a fairly low free board, so it is easy to get up on board from smaller boats," says Cornwell. "Tankers are an obvious target of opportunity."
How will it affect security and trade?
Somalia is under international weapons sanctions, and warlord groups continue to fight both against the Ethiopian peacekeeping mission and against each other. But an influx of money is likely to mean a further influx of weapons to an already wartorn land.
"Regionally, I think the major problem is that piracy has given some groups the chance to lay their hands on money," says Jhazbhay. "There may be $30 million in ransom money received in recent years. Once they [the various armed groups] get that kind of money, they can buy a ground-to-air missile. Getting [a hold of] arms can affect the struggle for freedom in Somalia, and that affects the whole region."
What's being done to stop them?
Currently, the NATO alliance, the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, and a host of other countries have ships patrolling the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden – an area of approximately 1.1 million square miles – to prevent piracy.
On Nov. 18, an Indian warship sank a suspected pirate mother ship off the coast of Yemen, after the pirates fired on them.
But given the size of the territory, and the amount of shipping traffic that flows past Somalia from the Suez Canal, naval patrolling cannot guarantee the safety of commercial vessels.
"Unless you have a warship in the immediate area, and, crucially, with a helicopter, you've got no chance of stopping them," says Cornwell.
While individual ships can protect themselves with everything from barbed wire around the ship itself to high-pressure hoses, coalition forces can also do more to track and neutralize suspected pirate mother ships. "I can't see why more work isn't being done with satellites to find the mother ships," says Cornwell.
Egypt hosted a Nov. 20 emergency meeting with Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Jordan to try to forge a joint strategy against piracy, which threatens a crucial international trade route through the Suez Canal in the Red Sea – Egypt's key source of revenue.
11/24/08
Who are Somalia's pirates?
A Monitor Q&A reveals who's behind the modern-day pirates, how they got so good at taking ships, and what's being done to stop them.
Scott Baldauf
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa - – Today's pirates are mainly fighters for Somalia's many warlord factions, who have fought each other for control of the country since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991.
Their motives? A mixture of entrepreneurialism and survival, says Iqbal Jhazbhay, a Somali expert at the University of South Africa in Tshwane, as Pretoria is now called.
"From the evidence so far, these primarily appear to be fighters looking for predatory opportunities," says Mr. Jhazbhay. They operated "roadblocks in the past, which were fleecing people as a form of taxation. Now they've seen the opportunities on the high seas."
Initially, one of the main motives for taking to the seas – working first with local fishermen, and later buying boats and weapons with the proceeds of every ship they captured – was "pure survival," says Jhazbhay, explaining that armed extortion is one of the few opportunities to make a living in lawless Somalia.
"It's spiked more recently because of a spike in food prices," he says.
Now it has become a highly profitable, sophisticated criminal enterprise hauling in millions of dollars in ransom payments.
Whom do they work for?
The pirates mainly work for themselves.
Much of the piracy seems to be based out of the Puntland, a semiautonomous region on the northern shore of Somalia that broke away from Somalia soon after 1991.
Thousands of pirates now operate off Somalia's coast, although there are no accurate numbers on precisely how many there are.
United Nations monitoring reports on arms smuggling in the Horn of Africa have pointed to evidence that pirate gangs have established relations with corrupt officials of the Puntland government. They bribe port officials to allow the pirates to use Eyl and other ports as their bases of operation, and to bring some of their captured ships in for safekeeping while the pirates negotiate ransoms with the ships' owners.
There is also evidence that expatriate Somalis living in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and throughout the Persian Gulf may be feeding information to the pirates about ships that have docked in those regions and may be heading toward the Gulf of Aden and other pirate-infested areas.
Who benefits from this piracy?
The money seems to be distributed by warlords to their families and friends, and then further outward toward their fellow clan-members, says Jhazbhay.
There have been charges recently that local Islamist groups may be linked to the pirate gangs, and may have begun to use piracy as a source of funds to buy weapons.
Certainly, Islamist groups such as Al Shabab – an insurgent group formed after the Islamic Courts Union lost control of the country last year in the wake of a US-backed invasion by Somalia's neighbor, Ethiopia – have used pirate gangs to smuggle weapons into Somalia, which is currently under international weapons sanctions. But the evidence is thin, as yet, that Islamist groups are using piracy on the high seas as a funding mechanism.
"The last thing the Islamists want to do is give an unnecessary provocation to the major powers, who might come after them in a big way," says Richard Cornwell, a senior analyst at the Institute for Security Studies in Tshwane. "What experience tells us is that if the Islamists did take control of Somalia, piracy would stop overnight. They don't want warlords gaining arms and money outside of their control."
Is there an Al Qaeda connection?
While the CIA's chief, Gen. Michael Hayden, suggested recently that Al Qaeda was beginning to expand its reach in the Horn of Africa, and possibly reaching out to radical local Islamist parties such as Al Shabab in Somalia, there appears to be little evidence of a connection between international Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and piracy.
"There may be some loose elements among the Islamist groups that have tie-ups with the pirates, because the movement is fractured into six or seven different groups, and each may have its own problems getting funding," says Jhazbhay.
How did they get so good at taking ships?
Practice, practice, practice.
More than 90 ships have been attacked off the coast of Somalia this year. Seventeen ships remain in the hands of Somali pirates. The Saudi owners of the Sirius Star, the oil tanker taken Nov. 15, are reportedly in contact with the pirates, possibly to negotiate the release of the ship, its crew, and the estimated $110 million cargo of crude oil.
"What staggered the mind is that this capture was 400 nautical miles out to sea," says Mr. Cornwell. "That's far deeper water than anything we've seen before. But with a GPS they can hijack to order." Using a mother ship – often an old Russian trawler – to prowl deeper waters for their target, they can offload smaller boats to move in close and overtake the ship, and climb up with hooks and ladders, and submachine guns.
"With a fully laden tanker ship, you have a fairly low free board, so it is easy to get up on board from smaller boats," says Cornwell. "Tankers are an obvious target of opportunity."
How will it affect security and trade?
Somalia is under international weapons sanctions, and warlord groups continue to fight both against the Ethiopian peacekeeping mission and against each other. But an influx of money is likely to mean a further influx of weapons to an already wartorn land.
"Regionally, I think the major problem is that piracy has given some groups the chance to lay their hands on money," says Jhazbhay. "There may be $30 million in ransom money received in recent years. Once they [the various armed groups] get that kind of money, they can buy a ground-to-air missile. Getting [a hold of] arms can affect the struggle for freedom in Somalia, and that affects the whole region."
What's being done to stop them?
Currently, the NATO alliance, the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, and a host of other countries have ships patrolling the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden – an area of approximately 1.1 million square miles – to prevent piracy.
On Nov. 18, an Indian warship sank a suspected pirate mother ship off the coast of Yemen, after the pirates fired on them.
But given the size of the territory, and the amount of shipping traffic that flows past Somalia from the Suez Canal, naval patrolling cannot guarantee the safety of commercial vessels.
"Unless you have a warship in the immediate area, and, crucially, with a helicopter, you've got no chance of stopping them," says Cornwell.
While individual ships can protect themselves with everything from barbed wire around the ship itself to high-pressure hoses, coalition forces can also do more to track and neutralize suspected pirate mother ships. "I can't see why more work isn't being done with satellites to find the mother ships," says Cornwell.
Egypt hosted a Nov. 20 emergency meeting with Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Jordan to try to forge a joint strategy against piracy, which threatens a crucial international trade route through the Suez Canal in the Red Sea – Egypt's key source of revenue.
Sunday, November 23, 2008
2025 Global Trends Final Report text
For those who have yet to see it, the full 120-page unclassified text of the National Intelligence Council's 2025 Global Trends report may be viewed or downloaded at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf
Eyes Wide Shut by Uri Avnery
Uri Avnery
22.11.08
Eyes Wide Shut
THE DAY before yesterday, two documents appeared side by side in Haaretz: a giant advertisement from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the results of a public opinion poll.
The proximity was accidental, but to the point. The PLO ad sets out the details of the 2002 Saudi peace offer, decorated with the colorful flags of the 22 Arab and the 35 other Muslim countries which have endorsed the offer.
The public opinion poll predicts a landslide victory for Likud, which opposes every single word of the Saudi proposal.
THE PLO ad is a first of its kind. At long last, the PLO leaders have decided to address the Israeli people directly.
The ad discloses to the Israeli population the exact terms of the all-Arab peace offer: full recognition of the State of Israel by all Arab and Muslim countries, full normalization of relations - in return for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders and the establishment of the Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refugee problem would be solved by mutual agreement – meaning that Israel could veto any solution it considered unacceptable.
I have said it before: if this offer had been made on June 4, 1967, the day before the Six Day War, Israelis would have felt as if the Messiah had arrived. But when it was published in 2002, many Israelis saw it as a cunning Arab ploy to rob Israel of the fruits of its 1967 victory.
The Israeli government has never officially reacted to this historic offer. Public opinion and the media ignored it almost completely, walled in by the national consensus that there is no chance for peace.
Recently, the old offer woke up to new life. Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak discovered it suddenly, as if they had found a treasure in a hidden cave. Tzipi Livni discovered that it has some interesting points. That is the background to the blessed initiative of Saeb Erekat's "PLO Negotiation Department" to publish the ad.
Israeli public reaction: nil.
THE PUBLIC opinion poll, on the other hand, made a deep impression. It cast its shadow over the entire political arena.
True, there are still 80 days to go before election day, and in Israel 80 days is a very, very long time. Moreover, unlike American polls, Israeli polls conducted for the media are notoriously unreliable. Nonetheless, the poll caused a shock.
It says that if the elections were held this week, the Likud would have 34 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, three times more than it has now, and become the largest faction. Kadima would get only 28 seats, one less than in the present Knesset. (Explanation: Kadima would lose many voters, who would return to Likud, but gain almost the same number from Labor.) The Labor party would come down to 10 seats, half of their present miserable number. Shas would get the same number, as would the ultra-right Liberman. Meretz would rise from 5 to 7. (In Yediot Aharonot's competing poll, Likud got 32, Kadima 26 and Labor 8.)
THE DAZZLING ascent of Likud is an ominous phenomenon by itself, but even more important is the general picture: the bloc of all the parties that support peace, whether by paying lip service or sincerely (called "the Left") will have, according to the polls, 56 seats at most, as against the 64 seats of all the anti-peace parties combined (called "the Right").
Meaning: if the election had taken place this week, the outcome would have been a Knesset devoted to the continuation of the occupation, the settlements and the annexation. Binyamin Netanyahu would be Prime Minister and would be able to choose freely between a dozen possible compositions of the next government coalition.
How did Netanyahu achieve such a status? After all, 10 years ago he was shamefully thrown out of the Prime Minister's office by a public that had decided that they could not stand him for one more day. No other previous prime minister has attracted so much opposition, disgust and even loathing.
For several months now Netanyahu has been behaving like a model pupil. He kept silent when it was right to keep silent. He acted in a statesman-like manner. And then, like a magician at a children's birthday party, he pulled one rabbit after another from his top hat. Every few days another personality joined Likud with much fanfare, in a well controlled selection and dosage: Binyamin Begin, a man of the extreme right and Dan Meridor, of the moderate right, Assaf Hefetz, former police chief and Moshe ("Bogi") Yaalon, former army chief, and more and more. Big and small stars, who gave the impression that Likud is now regarded by everybody as the coming governing party. A multicolored party, a party of renewal, headed by an experienced and responsible leader. A party in which there are many shades of opinion, but which is united by a platform that says no to withdrawal, no to a Palestinian state, no to any compromise on Jerusalem, no to any meaningful peace negotiation. And, of course: no to the Arab peace offer.
Is there a yes? I almost forgot: Netanyahu proposes an "economic peace" – to ameliorate the situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank, so that some day in the future, before or after the coming of the Messiah, Israel could perhaps reach an accommodation – and perhaps not. But economic amelioration under an occupation regime is, of course, an oxymoron. Occupation arouses resistance, resistance arouses repression, repression means economic punishment. Nobody is going to invest money in an occupied territory.
If Netanyahu is elected, we must expect four years in which we shall not only not advance toward peace by one single inch, but, on the contrary, the ongoing thrust of the settlement enterprise will push peace ever further away.
THE FLIGHT of Tzipi Livni, on the other hand, is not gaining any height. That is another clear conclusion of the polls.
She has had a few months of grace. When the whole country was mesmerized by the corruption affairs of Ehud Olmert, Livni looked, in comparison, like a shining white dove. An ideal candidate: also a woman, also honest, also speaking the language of ordinary human beings, also one who believes what she says.
But after Olmert's resignation, corruption disappeared as a central theme of the elections. So what does Tzipi have to offer?
She has no overpowering charisma. She is no orator (and that is perhaps to the good). She does not excite. She does not appeal to the emotions. She does not touch the heart of people. She is compelled to rely on rational arguments.
But what is her rationale? She is a great believer in "peace negotiations". But "peace negotiations", like the "political process", can easily become a substitute for peace itself.
Livni does not offer an exciting peace message. She does not draw up a peace proposal of her own. She is "diplomatic" and keeps her cards close to her chest. No clear solution for Jerusalem (Don't even mention it! It may provide ammunition for Bibi!), nor for the refugee problem (God forbid!). She has promised the No. 2 spot on her list to Shaul Mofaz, who could easily find his place between Bibi, Begin and Bogi. This is not the way to change the hearts of the hundreds of thousands of indifferent and/or tired citizens, who believe that "there is no partner for peace". Neither are there any new acquisitions: no new personalities are joining Kadima. There is no sense of an approaching victory. The chances don't look good.
THE SITUATION of the Labor party is even worse. Much worse. The polls give Labor 10 seats at most, perhaps only 8. The party that in its former incarnations kept absolute control over the Yishuv and the new state for 44 consecutive years may shrivel in the next Knesset to the status of fifth largest faction (after Likud, Kadima, Shas and Liberman.)
No wonder. Like an aging strip-teaser, the party has dropped all its garments. It has embraced "swinish capitalism" (a Peres coinage) like the other parties. As far as peace is concerned, it limps behind Kadima, and sometimes even tries to outflank Likud on the right. It seems that its real platform is down to one single clause: Ehud Barak must remain Minister of Defense under whoever will be the next Prime Minister, Netanyahu or Livni.
It is not an attractive sight: not only the rats are leaving the sinking ship, but also the admiral himself: Ami Ayalon, former commander of the Israeli navy, announced this week that he is leaving the party. The incumbent 19 Knesset members are squaring up for a fight to the death over the few remaining "real" seats, competing with each other and with the handful of new joiners (including the director of "Peace Now", Yariv Oppenheimer, and the journalist Daniel Ben-Simon).
Ehud Barak is a walking disaster. But he cannot be removed from the leadership of Labor before the elections. The party is crawling towards its rout with eyes wide shut.
SEVERAL MEN OF LETTERS, professors and political consultants, some of them refugees from Labor, have done something: they got together and announced that they would ally themselves to Meretz, in order to create a kind of super-Meretz.
They did raise an echo, but the recent polls still give the reinforced Meretz no more than 7 seats (compared to the present 5). Not quite a revolution.
Why? The initiators are well known. They are members of the Ashkenazi elite, like all of Meretz. The public got the impression that instead of the past and far-past leaders who have left the Meretz leadership one after another (Shulamit Aloni, Yossi Sarid, Yossi Beilin, Ran Cohen, all of them with positive credentials), other people are coming in, good people but not really different, with the same good but failed slogans. They have no new message for the new generation, for the Oriental Jews, for the Arab citizens, for Russian immigrants, for the secular people who want to fight against religious encroachment.
The active peace groups, with their young and enthusiastic members, were not invited, so as not to give the party a "radical" look. In the best case, the renewed party might take a few seats from Labor. As far as the general picture is concerned, that would be quite unimportant, since only changes in the balance between the two large blocs have any real effect. Many new voters must be mobilized.
There is a place for a new Left party, with a new name, a new spirit and a message of hope, that will do an Obama: arouse the masses of the young generation, infect them with enthusiasm, promise real change.
Such an experiment was conducted just now in the Tel-Aviv municipal elections with astonishing results. A new election list appeared out of nowhere, the young generation of Tel-Avivians joined it with gusto. It attracted the new voters, as well as voters who are disgusted with all politicians, people with a green agenda, people with a social conscience, gays and lesbians, and many others. Hundreds volunteered for it, their candidate attracted a third of the votes against a popular incumbent mayor.
Meaning: yes, it is possible. But it will not happen this time.
BARACK OBAMA will enter the Oval Office twenty days before the Israeli elections. He has still got a chance to have a decisive impact on the outcome. Nobody in Israel wants to quarrel with the United States.
If the new President announces immediately after taking office that he is determined to achieve peace between Israel and the Arabs in the spirit of the Saudi peace initiative, before the end of 2009, this will influence many voters.
If Netanyahu is elected, President Obama will be faced with a dilemma: either to enter into a serious conflict with the Government of Israel, with all the American domestic implications, or to leave peace in the freezer, like his predecessors.
The American elections were important for Israel. The Israeli elections will be important for America, too.
22.11.08
Eyes Wide Shut
THE DAY before yesterday, two documents appeared side by side in Haaretz: a giant advertisement from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the results of a public opinion poll.
The proximity was accidental, but to the point. The PLO ad sets out the details of the 2002 Saudi peace offer, decorated with the colorful flags of the 22 Arab and the 35 other Muslim countries which have endorsed the offer.
The public opinion poll predicts a landslide victory for Likud, which opposes every single word of the Saudi proposal.
THE PLO ad is a first of its kind. At long last, the PLO leaders have decided to address the Israeli people directly.
The ad discloses to the Israeli population the exact terms of the all-Arab peace offer: full recognition of the State of Israel by all Arab and Muslim countries, full normalization of relations - in return for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders and the establishment of the Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refugee problem would be solved by mutual agreement – meaning that Israel could veto any solution it considered unacceptable.
I have said it before: if this offer had been made on June 4, 1967, the day before the Six Day War, Israelis would have felt as if the Messiah had arrived. But when it was published in 2002, many Israelis saw it as a cunning Arab ploy to rob Israel of the fruits of its 1967 victory.
The Israeli government has never officially reacted to this historic offer. Public opinion and the media ignored it almost completely, walled in by the national consensus that there is no chance for peace.
Recently, the old offer woke up to new life. Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak discovered it suddenly, as if they had found a treasure in a hidden cave. Tzipi Livni discovered that it has some interesting points. That is the background to the blessed initiative of Saeb Erekat's "PLO Negotiation Department" to publish the ad.
Israeli public reaction: nil.
THE PUBLIC opinion poll, on the other hand, made a deep impression. It cast its shadow over the entire political arena.
True, there are still 80 days to go before election day, and in Israel 80 days is a very, very long time. Moreover, unlike American polls, Israeli polls conducted for the media are notoriously unreliable. Nonetheless, the poll caused a shock.
It says that if the elections were held this week, the Likud would have 34 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, three times more than it has now, and become the largest faction. Kadima would get only 28 seats, one less than in the present Knesset. (Explanation: Kadima would lose many voters, who would return to Likud, but gain almost the same number from Labor.) The Labor party would come down to 10 seats, half of their present miserable number. Shas would get the same number, as would the ultra-right Liberman. Meretz would rise from 5 to 7. (In Yediot Aharonot's competing poll, Likud got 32, Kadima 26 and Labor 8.)
THE DAZZLING ascent of Likud is an ominous phenomenon by itself, but even more important is the general picture: the bloc of all the parties that support peace, whether by paying lip service or sincerely (called "the Left") will have, according to the polls, 56 seats at most, as against the 64 seats of all the anti-peace parties combined (called "the Right").
Meaning: if the election had taken place this week, the outcome would have been a Knesset devoted to the continuation of the occupation, the settlements and the annexation. Binyamin Netanyahu would be Prime Minister and would be able to choose freely between a dozen possible compositions of the next government coalition.
How did Netanyahu achieve such a status? After all, 10 years ago he was shamefully thrown out of the Prime Minister's office by a public that had decided that they could not stand him for one more day. No other previous prime minister has attracted so much opposition, disgust and even loathing.
For several months now Netanyahu has been behaving like a model pupil. He kept silent when it was right to keep silent. He acted in a statesman-like manner. And then, like a magician at a children's birthday party, he pulled one rabbit after another from his top hat. Every few days another personality joined Likud with much fanfare, in a well controlled selection and dosage: Binyamin Begin, a man of the extreme right and Dan Meridor, of the moderate right, Assaf Hefetz, former police chief and Moshe ("Bogi") Yaalon, former army chief, and more and more. Big and small stars, who gave the impression that Likud is now regarded by everybody as the coming governing party. A multicolored party, a party of renewal, headed by an experienced and responsible leader. A party in which there are many shades of opinion, but which is united by a platform that says no to withdrawal, no to a Palestinian state, no to any compromise on Jerusalem, no to any meaningful peace negotiation. And, of course: no to the Arab peace offer.
Is there a yes? I almost forgot: Netanyahu proposes an "economic peace" – to ameliorate the situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank, so that some day in the future, before or after the coming of the Messiah, Israel could perhaps reach an accommodation – and perhaps not. But economic amelioration under an occupation regime is, of course, an oxymoron. Occupation arouses resistance, resistance arouses repression, repression means economic punishment. Nobody is going to invest money in an occupied territory.
If Netanyahu is elected, we must expect four years in which we shall not only not advance toward peace by one single inch, but, on the contrary, the ongoing thrust of the settlement enterprise will push peace ever further away.
THE FLIGHT of Tzipi Livni, on the other hand, is not gaining any height. That is another clear conclusion of the polls.
She has had a few months of grace. When the whole country was mesmerized by the corruption affairs of Ehud Olmert, Livni looked, in comparison, like a shining white dove. An ideal candidate: also a woman, also honest, also speaking the language of ordinary human beings, also one who believes what she says.
But after Olmert's resignation, corruption disappeared as a central theme of the elections. So what does Tzipi have to offer?
She has no overpowering charisma. She is no orator (and that is perhaps to the good). She does not excite. She does not appeal to the emotions. She does not touch the heart of people. She is compelled to rely on rational arguments.
But what is her rationale? She is a great believer in "peace negotiations". But "peace negotiations", like the "political process", can easily become a substitute for peace itself.
Livni does not offer an exciting peace message. She does not draw up a peace proposal of her own. She is "diplomatic" and keeps her cards close to her chest. No clear solution for Jerusalem (Don't even mention it! It may provide ammunition for Bibi!), nor for the refugee problem (God forbid!). She has promised the No. 2 spot on her list to Shaul Mofaz, who could easily find his place between Bibi, Begin and Bogi. This is not the way to change the hearts of the hundreds of thousands of indifferent and/or tired citizens, who believe that "there is no partner for peace". Neither are there any new acquisitions: no new personalities are joining Kadima. There is no sense of an approaching victory. The chances don't look good.
THE SITUATION of the Labor party is even worse. Much worse. The polls give Labor 10 seats at most, perhaps only 8. The party that in its former incarnations kept absolute control over the Yishuv and the new state for 44 consecutive years may shrivel in the next Knesset to the status of fifth largest faction (after Likud, Kadima, Shas and Liberman.)
No wonder. Like an aging strip-teaser, the party has dropped all its garments. It has embraced "swinish capitalism" (a Peres coinage) like the other parties. As far as peace is concerned, it limps behind Kadima, and sometimes even tries to outflank Likud on the right. It seems that its real platform is down to one single clause: Ehud Barak must remain Minister of Defense under whoever will be the next Prime Minister, Netanyahu or Livni.
It is not an attractive sight: not only the rats are leaving the sinking ship, but also the admiral himself: Ami Ayalon, former commander of the Israeli navy, announced this week that he is leaving the party. The incumbent 19 Knesset members are squaring up for a fight to the death over the few remaining "real" seats, competing with each other and with the handful of new joiners (including the director of "Peace Now", Yariv Oppenheimer, and the journalist Daniel Ben-Simon).
Ehud Barak is a walking disaster. But he cannot be removed from the leadership of Labor before the elections. The party is crawling towards its rout with eyes wide shut.
SEVERAL MEN OF LETTERS, professors and political consultants, some of them refugees from Labor, have done something: they got together and announced that they would ally themselves to Meretz, in order to create a kind of super-Meretz.
They did raise an echo, but the recent polls still give the reinforced Meretz no more than 7 seats (compared to the present 5). Not quite a revolution.
Why? The initiators are well known. They are members of the Ashkenazi elite, like all of Meretz. The public got the impression that instead of the past and far-past leaders who have left the Meretz leadership one after another (Shulamit Aloni, Yossi Sarid, Yossi Beilin, Ran Cohen, all of them with positive credentials), other people are coming in, good people but not really different, with the same good but failed slogans. They have no new message for the new generation, for the Oriental Jews, for the Arab citizens, for Russian immigrants, for the secular people who want to fight against religious encroachment.
The active peace groups, with their young and enthusiastic members, were not invited, so as not to give the party a "radical" look. In the best case, the renewed party might take a few seats from Labor. As far as the general picture is concerned, that would be quite unimportant, since only changes in the balance between the two large blocs have any real effect. Many new voters must be mobilized.
There is a place for a new Left party, with a new name, a new spirit and a message of hope, that will do an Obama: arouse the masses of the young generation, infect them with enthusiasm, promise real change.
Such an experiment was conducted just now in the Tel-Aviv municipal elections with astonishing results. A new election list appeared out of nowhere, the young generation of Tel-Avivians joined it with gusto. It attracted the new voters, as well as voters who are disgusted with all politicians, people with a green agenda, people with a social conscience, gays and lesbians, and many others. Hundreds volunteered for it, their candidate attracted a third of the votes against a popular incumbent mayor.
Meaning: yes, it is possible. But it will not happen this time.
BARACK OBAMA will enter the Oval Office twenty days before the Israeli elections. He has still got a chance to have a decisive impact on the outcome. Nobody in Israel wants to quarrel with the United States.
If the new President announces immediately after taking office that he is determined to achieve peace between Israel and the Arabs in the spirit of the Saudi peace initiative, before the end of 2009, this will influence many voters.
If Netanyahu is elected, President Obama will be faced with a dilemma: either to enter into a serious conflict with the Government of Israel, with all the American domestic implications, or to leave peace in the freezer, like his predecessors.
The American elections were important for Israel. The Israeli elections will be important for America, too.
Strategic Deterrence and a Nuclear Iran by William Pfaff
Strategic Deterrence and a Nuclear Iran
William Pfaff
Paris, November 20, 2008 – The cynical view of national sovereignty holds that it belongs only to those who can defend it. This was said recently at the Pentagon concerning American manned and unmanned attacks inside Pakistan, in violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.
Terrorists also ignore sovereignty. There is an reciprocal relationship between international terrorism and American and NATO international counter-terrorism, or supposed preemption of terrorism, in that both ignore sovereignty -- whose legal definition is a nation's undivided and exclusive jurisdiction over its affairs, and absolute right to defend itself.
The closest to an absolute means for defense of sovereignty is the possession of nuclear weapons. This is why such countries as Iran and North Korea have nuclear programs meant – or so in the Iranian case it is assumed – to provide them with nuclear weapons.
The motive for nuclear weapons proliferation is defense of national sovereignty. Proliferation does not itself imply aggressive intent: nuclear weapons are literally useless in an aggressive role. The only exception to this rule is regional, between nuclear and non-nuclear states. However India and Pakistan have gone to great expense to recreate for themselves the same MAD (mutual assured destruction) relationship that prevailed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and China) during the cold war.
(Given that one will never allow the other to gain a nuclear advantage, India and Pakistan would have been better off to leave things as they were before. Pakistan may now think itself safer from India's much larger army, but both countries are actually worse off, in mindless rivalry over the status of Kashmir, a matter of infinitesimal importance, compared with a nuclear war.)
A nuclear defense of national sovereignty is meaningful -- if it is ever meaningful -- only in extreme circumstances, and if the threat comes from another nuclear power would probably prove suicidal; hence unlikely to be employed. Nevertheless possession of nuclear weapons makes the other side think twice.
The propaganda argument usually made about Iran is that nuclear weapons would allow that country to threaten the United States, Israel, and Europe. The missile defense that the Bush administration has wanted to build in Poland and Czechoslovakia is not meant to defend anything. It was designed to have a political effect by dividing "old" Europeans from the "new" ones who support the American proposal.
Mostly, it is meant to intimidate Russia. It is not directed at Iran, for whom a nuclear missile attack on the West would be nonsensical, as Teheran and Washington both know.
The purpose of U.S. pressure on the UN International Atomic Energy Agency to provide further justification for Security Council sanctions on Iran is to prevent that country from obtaining the only feasible deterrence it could present to a future American or Israeli intervention.
Israel has wanted a U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities not because it fears nuclear aggression by Iran, which is inconceivable and would be suicidal folly. Israel's concern is that if Iran acquires one or several nuclear weapons this would deter any kind of future attack by the United States to disarm Iran.
The existence of a nuclear Iran, whatever the strategic military insignificance of its nuclear force, would also deprive Israel of the political power it derives from being the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East.
Pakistan's nuclear weapons obviously do not deter the United States' repeated violations of its sovereignty with bombing and raids into the country, nor does it dissuade the American president-elect from promising to continue (or enlarge) those sovereignty violations if Pakistan fails to capture and deliver to the U.S al-Qaeda and Osama bin-Laden. The weapons were not intended to do so. They relate exclusively to India.
However there is another and much more practical penalty for American disregard of Pakistani sovereignty (even when it may be secretly authorized by the new government in Islamabad). This policy exacts a heavy political cost among the Pakistani population, and in the long run could turn Pakistan into another Afghanistan, even more dangerous to the United States than the war in Afghanistan is now.
The most recent American missile launched from Afghanistan into Pakistan struck a village some 30 miles (50 kilometers) inside the country, well beyond the tribal region where the Taliban are. U.S. officials make the usual claim that the victims were Taliban or foreign militants. Villagers and a local official made the usual response that the victims were civilians and included no militants. A large Islamist political party announced that in retaliation it would block the major routes used by the U.S and NATO to supply their forces in Afghanistan.
The Wall Street Journal reports that one important supply route running from Peshawar through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan was only reopened last Monday after a week's shutdown because of previous Taliban attacks, and now is again blocked for security reasons. Some 75% of supplies for Afghanistan pass through Pakistan, and according to officials on the scene the latest attacks on supply convoys are of unprecedented sophistication.
The maxim that sovereignty depends on the military ability to defend it can be reversed. The systematic military violation of sovereignty can eventually generate the political defeat the policy is intended to prevent.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserve
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=358
William Pfaff
Paris, November 20, 2008 – The cynical view of national sovereignty holds that it belongs only to those who can defend it. This was said recently at the Pentagon concerning American manned and unmanned attacks inside Pakistan, in violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.
Terrorists also ignore sovereignty. There is an reciprocal relationship between international terrorism and American and NATO international counter-terrorism, or supposed preemption of terrorism, in that both ignore sovereignty -- whose legal definition is a nation's undivided and exclusive jurisdiction over its affairs, and absolute right to defend itself.
The closest to an absolute means for defense of sovereignty is the possession of nuclear weapons. This is why such countries as Iran and North Korea have nuclear programs meant – or so in the Iranian case it is assumed – to provide them with nuclear weapons.
The motive for nuclear weapons proliferation is defense of national sovereignty. Proliferation does not itself imply aggressive intent: nuclear weapons are literally useless in an aggressive role. The only exception to this rule is regional, between nuclear and non-nuclear states. However India and Pakistan have gone to great expense to recreate for themselves the same MAD (mutual assured destruction) relationship that prevailed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and China) during the cold war.
(Given that one will never allow the other to gain a nuclear advantage, India and Pakistan would have been better off to leave things as they were before. Pakistan may now think itself safer from India's much larger army, but both countries are actually worse off, in mindless rivalry over the status of Kashmir, a matter of infinitesimal importance, compared with a nuclear war.)
A nuclear defense of national sovereignty is meaningful -- if it is ever meaningful -- only in extreme circumstances, and if the threat comes from another nuclear power would probably prove suicidal; hence unlikely to be employed. Nevertheless possession of nuclear weapons makes the other side think twice.
The propaganda argument usually made about Iran is that nuclear weapons would allow that country to threaten the United States, Israel, and Europe. The missile defense that the Bush administration has wanted to build in Poland and Czechoslovakia is not meant to defend anything. It was designed to have a political effect by dividing "old" Europeans from the "new" ones who support the American proposal.
Mostly, it is meant to intimidate Russia. It is not directed at Iran, for whom a nuclear missile attack on the West would be nonsensical, as Teheran and Washington both know.
The purpose of U.S. pressure on the UN International Atomic Energy Agency to provide further justification for Security Council sanctions on Iran is to prevent that country from obtaining the only feasible deterrence it could present to a future American or Israeli intervention.
Israel has wanted a U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities not because it fears nuclear aggression by Iran, which is inconceivable and would be suicidal folly. Israel's concern is that if Iran acquires one or several nuclear weapons this would deter any kind of future attack by the United States to disarm Iran.
The existence of a nuclear Iran, whatever the strategic military insignificance of its nuclear force, would also deprive Israel of the political power it derives from being the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East.
Pakistan's nuclear weapons obviously do not deter the United States' repeated violations of its sovereignty with bombing and raids into the country, nor does it dissuade the American president-elect from promising to continue (or enlarge) those sovereignty violations if Pakistan fails to capture and deliver to the U.S al-Qaeda and Osama bin-Laden. The weapons were not intended to do so. They relate exclusively to India.
However there is another and much more practical penalty for American disregard of Pakistani sovereignty (even when it may be secretly authorized by the new government in Islamabad). This policy exacts a heavy political cost among the Pakistani population, and in the long run could turn Pakistan into another Afghanistan, even more dangerous to the United States than the war in Afghanistan is now.
The most recent American missile launched from Afghanistan into Pakistan struck a village some 30 miles (50 kilometers) inside the country, well beyond the tribal region where the Taliban are. U.S. officials make the usual claim that the victims were Taliban or foreign militants. Villagers and a local official made the usual response that the victims were civilians and included no militants. A large Islamist political party announced that in retaliation it would block the major routes used by the U.S and NATO to supply their forces in Afghanistan.
The Wall Street Journal reports that one important supply route running from Peshawar through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan was only reopened last Monday after a week's shutdown because of previous Taliban attacks, and now is again blocked for security reasons. Some 75% of supplies for Afghanistan pass through Pakistan, and according to officials on the scene the latest attacks on supply convoys are of unprecedented sophistication.
The maxim that sovereignty depends on the military ability to defend it can be reversed. The systematic military violation of sovereignty can eventually generate the political defeat the policy is intended to prevent.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserve
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=358
Friday, November 21, 2008
Sittin' on the dock of a bay
Sittin' on the dock of a bay
Nov 20th 2008 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
Trade slows and gloom mounts. But Asia's economic downturn will be milder than the one it endured a decade ago
EARLIER this year most businessmen and investors hoped that Asia's emerging economies could withstand the economic and financial turmoil in the developed world. Now, however, stockmarkets seem to be betting on a rerun of Asia's deep recession after its own crisis in 1997-98. Share prices in the region have plunged by an average of two-thirds (in dollar terms) from their peak in 2007—almost as much as they fell during the Asian financial crisis. Is Asia really heading for such a painful economic slump?
The latest figures are certainly worrying. Japan is now in recession. China's economy is slowing much more sharply than expected, with the 12-month growth in its industrial production falling from 18% to 8% over the past year. Indian spending is being squeezed by the credit crunch: commercial-vehicle sales fell by 36% in the year to October. Hong Kong and Singapore are already in recession, with GDP having fallen for two consecutive quarters.
Asia is more reliant on exports than is any other region, so it is bound to be hurt by the rich world's worst recession since the 1930s. China's exports have so far held up surprisingly well, growing by 19% in the 12 months to October. South Korea's have increased by 10%. But in Singapore and Taiwan exports have plunged this year. An Indian official has said that exports in October were 15% lower than a year ago.
Asia's foreign sales are being choked by the global credit squeeze as well as weak demand. Cargoes pile up on the dockside and ships wait empty because exporters cannot get letters of credit to secure payment on delivery. Robert Subbaraman, an economist at Nomura in Hong Kong, reckons that over the next year exports from Asia (excluding Japan) could fall by 20%—roughly the same drop as during the 2001 dotcom crash. Weaker exports will dent investment and consumer spending. Yet Mr Subbaraman reckons emerging Asia as a whole will see GDP growth of 5.6% in 2009. That would be well down on the 9% seen in 2007 and perhaps 7% this year, but it would be slightly faster than during the 2001 downturn and much stronger than the 2% average growth in 1998.
In 1998 Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand all suffered slumps in GDP of more than 6%. Even the gloomiest forecasters do not expect anything so dire this time. A few, such as JPMorgan, expect GDP to decline next year in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong's chief executive, Donald Tsang, expects growth to be flat or negative in all the region's "mature" economies, including his own and Singapore. But everywhere else should see positive growth (see chart), and generally remain stronger than during the 2001 dotcom crash. Only Taiwan is likely to have a worse year in 2009 than in 1998.
Mr Subbaraman also believes that Asia will recover sooner than other parts of the world, because most governments have ample room to ease policy and their economies are in better shape than those elsewhere. China, India, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong have all cut interest rates in the past two months. Falling energy and food prices will push inflation lower, and so allow further rate cuts.
All the main Asian emerging economies, apart from India's, have public debt-to-GDP ratios well below the average in rich economies, giving them room to boost public spending or cut taxes in order to spur domestic demand. China, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand have already announced fiscal stimuli. Singapore is expected to fire its hefty fiscal ammunition soon. Hong Kong's Mr Tsang is "up to his eyeballs in contingency plans".
In contrast to the late 1990s, most Asian economies are in relatively good shape, if not Pakistan's (see article). Elsewhere, foreign-exchange reserves exceed short-term foreign debts. Almost all the region's countries have current-account surpluses, though India and South Korea have deficits, which explains why they have seen large currency depreciations this year.
Most Asian households and companies are also modest borrowers. The black sheep is South Korea, where households and firms are even more indebted than in America. But total domestic debt (private and public) fell to 143% of GDP in emerging Asia in 2007, compared with 251% of GDP in America. As its exports stumble, Asia faces a nasty cyclical downturn. But it is spared the deep structural problems, such as excessive debt, which could depress growth elsewhere for several years.
Tortoise or tiger?
All the Asian economies will slow sharply next year, but some more than others. As the most open economies that are also big financial centres, Singapore and Hong Kong have been hit hardest. India is the least dependent on exports, at only 22% of its GDP, compared with a regional average of over half. So, in theory, it should be the least affected by the global slump. But India has two disadvantages. First, it is more exposed to the global credit crunch as a result of its previous reliance on large capital inflows. The sudden reversal of capital has sharply increased the cost of borrowing, forcing firms to cut investment—an important driver of growth in recent years. The Reserve Bank of India has cut interest rates and pumped liquidity into the banking system, but borrowing rates remain high.
A second problem is that, unlike China, the Indian government has little room for a fiscal stimulus. Its budget deficit is running at an estimated 8% of GDP (including off-budget items). Whereas China is boosting infrastructure spending to prop up demand, India's plans to build roads and power plants with the help of private money may be delayed by the credit squeeze. The finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, declared this week that growth will "bounce back" to 9% next year. Many economists reckon it is likely to be closer to 6%, while China's slows to 8%.
Among the South-East Asian economies, Indonesia seems to be holding up best, with GDP up by 6.1% in the year to the third quarter. As a big exporter of commodities it will be squeezed by falling prices. But Malaysia, which is much more dependent on foreign demand, will be hit harder. Its exports are equivalent to over 100% of its GDP—proportionally, more than three times bigger than Indonesia's. Thailand, where Asia's financial crisis began in 1997, has learnt its lesson the hard way. Its foreign-exchange reserves are now four times as large as its short-term foreign debt, and it has a current-account surplus. It is not about to suffer another crisis. But as exports fall, business and consumer confidence remain depressed by political uncertainty. Thailand will remain one of Asia's slowcoaches.
On the surface, the massive debts of South Korea's households and firms might suggest serious trouble ahead. However, the government has been quick to bail out its banking system, and most economists reckon that a large fiscal boost and the cheaper won (down by 29% this year) will help to cushion the economy, resulting in modest growth, of around 3% next year.
In contrast, Taiwan is already in recession. Its GDP fell by 1% in the year to the third quarter, dragged down both by a collapse in exports and by weak domestic demand. Some economists forecast growth of only 1% next year. To lift consumer demand, the government this week said that it would give everybody NT$3,600 ($108) in shopping vouchers to spend in shops and restaurants.
Such measures are a far cry from 1997, when rather than urging households to spend, governments in Asia begged them to hand over their gold jewellery to be melted down to bolster official reserves. Times have changed. Asia is certainly not immune to the rich world's recession, nor will its economies quickly regain their previous rapid growth trajectory. But the current gloom and doom among investors in the region might yet prove overdone.
Copyright © 2008 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserve
Nov 20th 2008 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
Trade slows and gloom mounts. But Asia's economic downturn will be milder than the one it endured a decade ago
EARLIER this year most businessmen and investors hoped that Asia's emerging economies could withstand the economic and financial turmoil in the developed world. Now, however, stockmarkets seem to be betting on a rerun of Asia's deep recession after its own crisis in 1997-98. Share prices in the region have plunged by an average of two-thirds (in dollar terms) from their peak in 2007—almost as much as they fell during the Asian financial crisis. Is Asia really heading for such a painful economic slump?
The latest figures are certainly worrying. Japan is now in recession. China's economy is slowing much more sharply than expected, with the 12-month growth in its industrial production falling from 18% to 8% over the past year. Indian spending is being squeezed by the credit crunch: commercial-vehicle sales fell by 36% in the year to October. Hong Kong and Singapore are already in recession, with GDP having fallen for two consecutive quarters.
Asia is more reliant on exports than is any other region, so it is bound to be hurt by the rich world's worst recession since the 1930s. China's exports have so far held up surprisingly well, growing by 19% in the 12 months to October. South Korea's have increased by 10%. But in Singapore and Taiwan exports have plunged this year. An Indian official has said that exports in October were 15% lower than a year ago.
Asia's foreign sales are being choked by the global credit squeeze as well as weak demand. Cargoes pile up on the dockside and ships wait empty because exporters cannot get letters of credit to secure payment on delivery. Robert Subbaraman, an economist at Nomura in Hong Kong, reckons that over the next year exports from Asia (excluding Japan) could fall by 20%—roughly the same drop as during the 2001 dotcom crash. Weaker exports will dent investment and consumer spending. Yet Mr Subbaraman reckons emerging Asia as a whole will see GDP growth of 5.6% in 2009. That would be well down on the 9% seen in 2007 and perhaps 7% this year, but it would be slightly faster than during the 2001 downturn and much stronger than the 2% average growth in 1998.
In 1998 Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand all suffered slumps in GDP of more than 6%. Even the gloomiest forecasters do not expect anything so dire this time. A few, such as JPMorgan, expect GDP to decline next year in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong's chief executive, Donald Tsang, expects growth to be flat or negative in all the region's "mature" economies, including his own and Singapore. But everywhere else should see positive growth (see chart), and generally remain stronger than during the 2001 dotcom crash. Only Taiwan is likely to have a worse year in 2009 than in 1998.
Mr Subbaraman also believes that Asia will recover sooner than other parts of the world, because most governments have ample room to ease policy and their economies are in better shape than those elsewhere. China, India, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong have all cut interest rates in the past two months. Falling energy and food prices will push inflation lower, and so allow further rate cuts.
All the main Asian emerging economies, apart from India's, have public debt-to-GDP ratios well below the average in rich economies, giving them room to boost public spending or cut taxes in order to spur domestic demand. China, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand have already announced fiscal stimuli. Singapore is expected to fire its hefty fiscal ammunition soon. Hong Kong's Mr Tsang is "up to his eyeballs in contingency plans".
In contrast to the late 1990s, most Asian economies are in relatively good shape, if not Pakistan's (see article). Elsewhere, foreign-exchange reserves exceed short-term foreign debts. Almost all the region's countries have current-account surpluses, though India and South Korea have deficits, which explains why they have seen large currency depreciations this year.
Most Asian households and companies are also modest borrowers. The black sheep is South Korea, where households and firms are even more indebted than in America. But total domestic debt (private and public) fell to 143% of GDP in emerging Asia in 2007, compared with 251% of GDP in America. As its exports stumble, Asia faces a nasty cyclical downturn. But it is spared the deep structural problems, such as excessive debt, which could depress growth elsewhere for several years.
Tortoise or tiger?
All the Asian economies will slow sharply next year, but some more than others. As the most open economies that are also big financial centres, Singapore and Hong Kong have been hit hardest. India is the least dependent on exports, at only 22% of its GDP, compared with a regional average of over half. So, in theory, it should be the least affected by the global slump. But India has two disadvantages. First, it is more exposed to the global credit crunch as a result of its previous reliance on large capital inflows. The sudden reversal of capital has sharply increased the cost of borrowing, forcing firms to cut investment—an important driver of growth in recent years. The Reserve Bank of India has cut interest rates and pumped liquidity into the banking system, but borrowing rates remain high.
A second problem is that, unlike China, the Indian government has little room for a fiscal stimulus. Its budget deficit is running at an estimated 8% of GDP (including off-budget items). Whereas China is boosting infrastructure spending to prop up demand, India's plans to build roads and power plants with the help of private money may be delayed by the credit squeeze. The finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, declared this week that growth will "bounce back" to 9% next year. Many economists reckon it is likely to be closer to 6%, while China's slows to 8%.
Among the South-East Asian economies, Indonesia seems to be holding up best, with GDP up by 6.1% in the year to the third quarter. As a big exporter of commodities it will be squeezed by falling prices. But Malaysia, which is much more dependent on foreign demand, will be hit harder. Its exports are equivalent to over 100% of its GDP—proportionally, more than three times bigger than Indonesia's. Thailand, where Asia's financial crisis began in 1997, has learnt its lesson the hard way. Its foreign-exchange reserves are now four times as large as its short-term foreign debt, and it has a current-account surplus. It is not about to suffer another crisis. But as exports fall, business and consumer confidence remain depressed by political uncertainty. Thailand will remain one of Asia's slowcoaches.
On the surface, the massive debts of South Korea's households and firms might suggest serious trouble ahead. However, the government has been quick to bail out its banking system, and most economists reckon that a large fiscal boost and the cheaper won (down by 29% this year) will help to cushion the economy, resulting in modest growth, of around 3% next year.
In contrast, Taiwan is already in recession. Its GDP fell by 1% in the year to the third quarter, dragged down both by a collapse in exports and by weak domestic demand. Some economists forecast growth of only 1% next year. To lift consumer demand, the government this week said that it would give everybody NT$3,600 ($108) in shopping vouchers to spend in shops and restaurants.
Such measures are a far cry from 1997, when rather than urging households to spend, governments in Asia begged them to hand over their gold jewellery to be melted down to bolster official reserves. Times have changed. Asia is certainly not immune to the rich world's recession, nor will its economies quickly regain their previous rapid growth trajectory. But the current gloom and doom among investors in the region might yet prove overdone.
Copyright © 2008 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserve
STRATFOR Saudi Arabia: Implications of the Crown Prince's Health
STRATFOR
11/21/08
Saudi Arabia: Implications of the Crown Prince's Health
Stratfor has learned that Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz, who has been sick for some time, could be near death. The death of this most influential member of the al-Saud family will lead to a shake-up in the kingdom's ruling hierarchy, and in the short term would come at a critical time for the country.
Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz's already frail health is rapidly deteriorating, sources in Saudi Arabia told Stratfor on Nov 20. Crown Prince Sultan's reported decline comes a little more than three years after the death of his elder full brother, King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. As those reportedly next in line to the throne are all older than 70, the royal family could soon see a new elite take over, one dominated by the grandsons of the founder of the modern Saudi state, King Abdul-Aziz bin Abdel-Rehman al-Saud.
Crown Prince Sultan heads the Sudeiris, the most powerful clan within the house of al-Saud; he is also the most influential member of the royal family. His death is therefore likely to result in significant changes in the power structure in the al-Saud family. It will also be a test of the newly instituted succession council, which went into effect in October 2006 with the enactment of the so-called Allegiance Institution Law.
Before then, Saudi Arabia dealt with transitions in an ad hoc manner. The new law governing succession is quite detailed, specifying how a new king and crown prince are to be appointed based on consensus within the 35-member body. As these rules and regulations have never been implemented, the next succession will gauge the efficacy or lack thereof of the new system.
Crown Prince Sultan would have taken over after the death of the current monarch and the crown prince's older half-brother, King Abdullah. But as it appears that the crown prince is likely to pass away before the king, the succession calculus is in flux. The next-most senior member of the family is Interior Minister Prince Nayef. Prince Nayef has a reputation for being quite right-wing, given his closeness to the Wahhabi religious establishment. He therefore is probably not a viable candidate for crown prince, especially not at a time when the current monarch is spearheading a major reform initiative.
Crown Prince Sultan has long held the post of defense minister. Though his son, retired Gen. Khalid bin Sultan, is one of his deputies, we are told Khalid is not likely to succeed his father as defense minister. Crown Prince Sultan's second son, Prince Bandar, is an extremely influential member of the royal family. Prince Bandar served as Riyadh's envoy to Washington for 22 years until 2005, and is now Saudi Arabia's national security chief. Crown Prince Sultan and his faction clearly enjoy a disproportionate amount of power within the Saudi hierarchy.
His pivotal position and the influence he wields have given him a major say in the distribution of the kingdom's oil wealth, both within the kingdom and abroad. Crown Prince Sultan's death at a time when the West is looking to Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter of oil, to become the largest donor in international efforts to counter the global financial crisis could therefore have serious implications.
From Riyadh's point of view, the kingdom — which has remained largely immune from the global financial contagion — faces two main challenges. First, on the domestic front, Riyadh must ensure that successes in countering terrorism and in Saudi Arabia's ongoing program to deal with extremism are not reversed. The second challenge is more important. This one is posed by the rise of Iran, Saudi Arabia's main regional rival, in the wake of U.S. efforts to draw down its forces in Iraq.
These challenges mean Saudi power transitions must be dealt with as smoothly as possible, and must not lead to power struggles. While the house of al-Saud has proven resilient over the course of the last 264 years, the growth in the number of stakeholders within the kingdom is cause for major concern. During this transition, power increasingly will fall to a third generation of the royal family. Just how smoothly the transition will go remains to be seen.
STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 to provide analysis of global business, economic, security and geopolitical affairs.
11/21/08
Saudi Arabia: Implications of the Crown Prince's Health
Stratfor has learned that Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz, who has been sick for some time, could be near death. The death of this most influential member of the al-Saud family will lead to a shake-up in the kingdom's ruling hierarchy, and in the short term would come at a critical time for the country.
Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz's already frail health is rapidly deteriorating, sources in Saudi Arabia told Stratfor on Nov 20. Crown Prince Sultan's reported decline comes a little more than three years after the death of his elder full brother, King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. As those reportedly next in line to the throne are all older than 70, the royal family could soon see a new elite take over, one dominated by the grandsons of the founder of the modern Saudi state, King Abdul-Aziz bin Abdel-Rehman al-Saud.
Crown Prince Sultan heads the Sudeiris, the most powerful clan within the house of al-Saud; he is also the most influential member of the royal family. His death is therefore likely to result in significant changes in the power structure in the al-Saud family. It will also be a test of the newly instituted succession council, which went into effect in October 2006 with the enactment of the so-called Allegiance Institution Law.
Before then, Saudi Arabia dealt with transitions in an ad hoc manner. The new law governing succession is quite detailed, specifying how a new king and crown prince are to be appointed based on consensus within the 35-member body. As these rules and regulations have never been implemented, the next succession will gauge the efficacy or lack thereof of the new system.
Crown Prince Sultan would have taken over after the death of the current monarch and the crown prince's older half-brother, King Abdullah. But as it appears that the crown prince is likely to pass away before the king, the succession calculus is in flux. The next-most senior member of the family is Interior Minister Prince Nayef. Prince Nayef has a reputation for being quite right-wing, given his closeness to the Wahhabi religious establishment. He therefore is probably not a viable candidate for crown prince, especially not at a time when the current monarch is spearheading a major reform initiative.
Crown Prince Sultan has long held the post of defense minister. Though his son, retired Gen. Khalid bin Sultan, is one of his deputies, we are told Khalid is not likely to succeed his father as defense minister. Crown Prince Sultan's second son, Prince Bandar, is an extremely influential member of the royal family. Prince Bandar served as Riyadh's envoy to Washington for 22 years until 2005, and is now Saudi Arabia's national security chief. Crown Prince Sultan and his faction clearly enjoy a disproportionate amount of power within the Saudi hierarchy.
His pivotal position and the influence he wields have given him a major say in the distribution of the kingdom's oil wealth, both within the kingdom and abroad. Crown Prince Sultan's death at a time when the West is looking to Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter of oil, to become the largest donor in international efforts to counter the global financial crisis could therefore have serious implications.
From Riyadh's point of view, the kingdom — which has remained largely immune from the global financial contagion — faces two main challenges. First, on the domestic front, Riyadh must ensure that successes in countering terrorism and in Saudi Arabia's ongoing program to deal with extremism are not reversed. The second challenge is more important. This one is posed by the rise of Iran, Saudi Arabia's main regional rival, in the wake of U.S. efforts to draw down its forces in Iraq.
These challenges mean Saudi power transitions must be dealt with as smoothly as possible, and must not lead to power struggles. While the house of al-Saud has proven resilient over the course of the last 264 years, the growth in the number of stakeholders within the kingdom is cause for major concern. During this transition, power increasingly will fall to a third generation of the royal family. Just how smoothly the transition will go remains to be seen.
STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) is a private intelligence agency founded in 1996 to provide analysis of global business, economic, security and geopolitical affairs.
'The Time Has Come to Say These Things' by Ehud Olmert
The New York Review of Books
Volume 55, Number 19 · December 4, 2008
'The Time Has Come to Say These Things'
By Ehud Olmert
On the eve of the Jewish New Year, Israel's most popular daily newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, published an extended interview of lame-duck prime minister Ehud Olmert by journalists Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer. Olmert is a former mayor of Jerusalem (1993–2003), member of the Knesset, and cabinet-level official. In 2005, he left the right-wing Likud party and joined the Kadima party, a centrist alliance formed by then prime minister Ariel Sharon in the wake of Israel's "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip. Olmert, who served as deputy prime minister in the Kadima-led government, assumed the premiership in 2006 when Sharon suffered a stroke. He announced his intention to resign this July amid a growing corruption scandal and a dismal public approval rating that never recovered from his failed 2006 war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
On September 21, upon tendering his official resignation, Olmert became head of an interim government and will hold that position until a new prime minister is sworn in. Under Israeli law, the prime minister–designate, Kadima's Tzipi Livni, had forty-two days from the resignation to form a workable ruling coalition. On October 26, Livni announced that she had failed to do so. A general election will take place next year.
The following are excerpts from the Yedioth interview, which Olmert gave hours after handing in his letter of resignation.
—Avi Steinberg
Yedioth Ahronoth: You must have done some soul-searching before your resignation?
Ehud Olmert: At the moment, I'd like to do some soul-searching on behalf of the nation of Israel.... In a few years, my grandchildren will ask what their grandfather did, what kind of country we have bequeathed them. I said it five years ago, in an interview with Yedioth Ahronoth, and I'll say it to you today: we have a window of opportunity—a short amount of time before we enter an extremely dangerous situation—in which to take a historic step in our relations with the Palestinians and a historic step in our relations with the Syrians. In both instances, the decision we have to make is the decision we've spent forty years refusing to look at with our eyes open.
We must make these decisions, and yet we are not prepared to say to ourselves, "Yes, this is what we must do." We must reach an agreement with the Palestinians, meaning a withdrawal from nearly all, if not all, of the [occupied] territories. Some percentage of these territories would remain in our hands, but we must give the Palestinians the same percentage [of territory elsewhere]—without this, there will be no peace.
Yedioth Ahronoth: Including Jerusalem?
Ehud Olmert: Including Jerusalem—with, I'd imagine, special arrangements made for the Temple Mount and the holy/historical sites. Whoever talks seriously about security in Jerusalem, and about not wanting tractors and bulldozers to crush the legs of his best friends—as happened to a close friend of mine, who lost a leg when a terrorist ran him over on a tractor—must be willing to relinquish parts of Jerusalem. [In July 2008, Jerusalem saw two separate attacks involving construction vehicles operated by Arab East Jerusalemites.]
Whoever wants to maintain control over the entire city will have to absorb 270,000 Arabs into the borders of Israel proper. This won't do. We need to make a decision. This decision is difficult, awful, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our deepest yearnings, our collective memories, and the prayers of the nation of Israel for the past two thousand years.
I was the first person who wanted to maintain Israeli control over the entire city. I confess. I'm not trying to retroactively justify what I've done for the past thirty-five years. For a significant portion of those years I wasn't ready to contemplate the depth of this reality.
Yedioth Ahronoth: If you could continue your administration, do you think that you would be able to reach agreements?
Ehud Olmert: I think we're very close to reaching agreements.
Yedioth Ahronoth: With both the Palestinians and the Syrians?
Ehud Olmert: Yes, also with the Syrians. What we need first and foremost is to make a decision. I'd like to know if there's a serious person in the State of Israel who believes that we can make peace with the Syrians without, in the end, giving up the Golan Heights.
Yedioth Ahronoth: It seems that political leaders in Israel always reach this conclusion only when they themselves are no longer in a position to make this decision.
Ehud Olmert: Not in my case. I reached this conclusion when I was still able to do something about it. I established contacts with the Syrians in February 2007, long before the police opened investigations on me. And I engaged in them quietly. Throughout that period I made many efforts, sent envoys all over the place, and had various people working secretly on my behalf to convince the Syrians that I wanted serious talks with them. Today we've arrived at the point at which we must ask ourselves whether we really want to make peace or not.
I'm not saying that this is a simple question. One might argue, ostensibly with good reason, that, look, for thirty-five years, since the Yom Kippur War, we've lived on the Golan Heights without any violation of the cease-fire; and there's none of the day-to-day friction with a civilian population, as in the territories—so why not carry on?
Yedioth Ahronoth: Based on what you have said, you seem to think that the guilt falls entirely on [Israel].
Ehud Olmert: No. Our burden is ours; their burden belongs to them. I'm not suggesting we make peace with Syria simply by surrendering the Golan Heights. The Syrians know well what they must surrender to get the Golan. They must give up their connections with Iran, such as they are, and their connections with Hezbollah; they must cease funding terrorism, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the holy war in Iraq. They know. These things have been made clear to them.
Were a regional war to break out in the next year or two and were we to enter into a military confrontation with Syria, I have no doubt that we'd defeat them soundly. We are stronger than they. Israel is the strongest country in the Middle East. We could contend with any of our enemies or against all of our enemies combined and win. The question that I ask myself is, what happens when we win? First of all, we'd have to pay a painful price.
And after we paid the price, what would we say to them? "Let's talk." And what would the Syrians say to us? "Let's talk about the Golan Heights."
So, I ask: Why enter a war with the Syrians, full of losses and destruction, in order to achieve what might be achieved without paying such a heavy price?
...In the absence of peace, the probability of war is always much greater. A prime minister must ask himself where to best direct his efforts. Are his efforts directed toward making peace or are they directed constantly toward making the country stronger and stronger and stronger in order to win a war?
...What I'm saying here has never been said by a leader of Israel. But the time has come to say these things. The time has come to put them on the table.
I read the reports of our generals and I say, "how have they not learned a single thing?" Once, a very senior official told me, "They're still living in the War of Independence and the Sinai Campaign." With them it's all about tanks, about controlling territories or controlled territories, holding this or that hill. But these things are worthless.
...The true threat we are facing today in the north, south, and east is from missiles and rockets. We will need to answer these threats but we will not find such answers within a range of two hundred meters.
...Our goal should be, for the first time, to designate a final and exact borderline between us and the Palestinians so that the entire world, the United States, the UN, and Europe can say, "These are the borders of the State of Israel, we recognize them, and we will anchor them with formal resolutions in the major international bodies. These are the recognized borders of Israel and these are the recognized borders of the State of Palestine."
...Who seriously thinks that if we sit on another hilltop, on another hundred meters, this will make a difference for Israel's basic security?
...Is the absence of a resolution between us and the Palestinians the result of Israel's intransigence? No. Let there be no doubt in this matter. I regret to say that the Palestinians lack the necessary courage, power, inner strength, will, and enthusiasm. If we don't reach a solution, I'm in no way prepared to lay the blame on Israel. The blame rests first and foremost with the other side.
I would like to learn from my own mistakes. I hadn't seen this before and I'm not trying to justify myself. Exactly thirty years ago, when Menachem Begin returned from Camp David, I spoke out against [the agreement he made there] and I voted against it. I confess; I'm not trying to hide or obscure that.
What was Menachem Begin's genius?... He started from the end. He began by saying, "I am ready to pull out of the entire Sinai—now, let us negotiate."
...When I look back to the prime ministers who preceded me, Arik Sharon, Bibi Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Yitzhak Rabin, of blessed memory, I can say that each made a step in the right direction but that at a certain point in time, at a particular juncture at which a decision was necessary, the decision did not come....
Yedioth Ahronoth: Israel's deterrent threat is not deterring Iran from developing a nuclear arms program; [the Iranians] appear to be on the verge of attaining nuclear capability.
Ehud Olmert: There is a major difference in our approach to the Iranian issue and our approach to the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese issue. These are our immediate neighbors. The way we deal with them is not the way we can deal with Iran.
Iran is a major power that constitutes a serious threat to the international community. And it is the international community that is most responsible for dealing with the Iranian situation. One senses a megalomania and a loss of proportion in the things said here about Iran. We are a country that has lost a sense of scale.
The assumption that if America, Russia, China, England, and Germany don't know how to deal with the Iranians, but we, the Israelis, will know, and that we'll do something, we'll act, is an example of this loss of proportions.
...One day the whole story of the Lebanon war [of 2006] will be told and the picture will look completely different. I am the only one who hasn't spoken about it. Bogie Yaalon [Former Lieutenant General and Chief of the General Staff Moshe Yaalon], who doesn't know what happened, has spoken. The military brass, the brigadier generals, majors, and lieutenant colonels, each saw only his own narrow slice of things. The person who knows the whole story, from beginning to end, has been silent. Thus the picture has been distorted.
Yedioth Ahronoth: Do certain extremely harsh statements that have been coming from members of the Knesset indicate a new lack of esteem for the office of the prime minister?
Ehud Olmert: I will never forget an encounter I had with Sharon on the evening that I was to fly to the US for a secret meeting with Condoleezza Rice. This was shortly after the August 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip. I saw Sharon immediately after he met with the Foreign and Defense staffs. Sharon was paler than I had ever seen him. I asked my friend Dov Weisglass, Sharon's chief of staff, what had happened. He said that Arik had returned from the committee, where Knesset members Uzi Landau and Effi Eitam had said to him, "you're a gangster," "you're a criminal," "you're despicable," "you're a thief." Sharon is an older man and not in great shape—a number of weeks later he was through—and he was in complete shock.
This phenomenon is not new. It started on the eve of the Rabin murder and it brought about [that] murder....
Yedioth Ahronoth: Now that you have resigned, do you have a different take on the war? Are there things you'd do differently? Are you more suspicious of [Israel's] military leadership?
Ehud Olmert: The Lebanon war will go down in history as the first war in which the military leadership understood that classic warfare has become obsolete. Only narrow-minded Bogie Yaalon could believe that had we entered Lebanon with the entire army things would have ended differently.
...But this was the only war that ended with a political resolution. Since then there hasn't been a single shot fired in that area. If we knew how to create such an arrangement in the south today [i.e., in Gaza], our fighting forces would certainly support it.... But the true lesson is what I have said before, that in contemporary wars the home front is the front, the home front is engaged in battle.
—Translated from the Hebrew by Avi Steinberg
Volume 55, Number 19 · December 4, 2008
'The Time Has Come to Say These Things'
By Ehud Olmert
On the eve of the Jewish New Year, Israel's most popular daily newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, published an extended interview of lame-duck prime minister Ehud Olmert by journalists Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer. Olmert is a former mayor of Jerusalem (1993–2003), member of the Knesset, and cabinet-level official. In 2005, he left the right-wing Likud party and joined the Kadima party, a centrist alliance formed by then prime minister Ariel Sharon in the wake of Israel's "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip. Olmert, who served as deputy prime minister in the Kadima-led government, assumed the premiership in 2006 when Sharon suffered a stroke. He announced his intention to resign this July amid a growing corruption scandal and a dismal public approval rating that never recovered from his failed 2006 war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
On September 21, upon tendering his official resignation, Olmert became head of an interim government and will hold that position until a new prime minister is sworn in. Under Israeli law, the prime minister–designate, Kadima's Tzipi Livni, had forty-two days from the resignation to form a workable ruling coalition. On October 26, Livni announced that she had failed to do so. A general election will take place next year.
The following are excerpts from the Yedioth interview, which Olmert gave hours after handing in his letter of resignation.
—Avi Steinberg
Yedioth Ahronoth: You must have done some soul-searching before your resignation?
Ehud Olmert: At the moment, I'd like to do some soul-searching on behalf of the nation of Israel.... In a few years, my grandchildren will ask what their grandfather did, what kind of country we have bequeathed them. I said it five years ago, in an interview with Yedioth Ahronoth, and I'll say it to you today: we have a window of opportunity—a short amount of time before we enter an extremely dangerous situation—in which to take a historic step in our relations with the Palestinians and a historic step in our relations with the Syrians. In both instances, the decision we have to make is the decision we've spent forty years refusing to look at with our eyes open.
We must make these decisions, and yet we are not prepared to say to ourselves, "Yes, this is what we must do." We must reach an agreement with the Palestinians, meaning a withdrawal from nearly all, if not all, of the [occupied] territories. Some percentage of these territories would remain in our hands, but we must give the Palestinians the same percentage [of territory elsewhere]—without this, there will be no peace.
Yedioth Ahronoth: Including Jerusalem?
Ehud Olmert: Including Jerusalem—with, I'd imagine, special arrangements made for the Temple Mount and the holy/historical sites. Whoever talks seriously about security in Jerusalem, and about not wanting tractors and bulldozers to crush the legs of his best friends—as happened to a close friend of mine, who lost a leg when a terrorist ran him over on a tractor—must be willing to relinquish parts of Jerusalem. [In July 2008, Jerusalem saw two separate attacks involving construction vehicles operated by Arab East Jerusalemites.]
Whoever wants to maintain control over the entire city will have to absorb 270,000 Arabs into the borders of Israel proper. This won't do. We need to make a decision. This decision is difficult, awful, a decision that contradicts our natural instincts, our deepest yearnings, our collective memories, and the prayers of the nation of Israel for the past two thousand years.
I was the first person who wanted to maintain Israeli control over the entire city. I confess. I'm not trying to retroactively justify what I've done for the past thirty-five years. For a significant portion of those years I wasn't ready to contemplate the depth of this reality.
Yedioth Ahronoth: If you could continue your administration, do you think that you would be able to reach agreements?
Ehud Olmert: I think we're very close to reaching agreements.
Yedioth Ahronoth: With both the Palestinians and the Syrians?
Ehud Olmert: Yes, also with the Syrians. What we need first and foremost is to make a decision. I'd like to know if there's a serious person in the State of Israel who believes that we can make peace with the Syrians without, in the end, giving up the Golan Heights.
Yedioth Ahronoth: It seems that political leaders in Israel always reach this conclusion only when they themselves are no longer in a position to make this decision.
Ehud Olmert: Not in my case. I reached this conclusion when I was still able to do something about it. I established contacts with the Syrians in February 2007, long before the police opened investigations on me. And I engaged in them quietly. Throughout that period I made many efforts, sent envoys all over the place, and had various people working secretly on my behalf to convince the Syrians that I wanted serious talks with them. Today we've arrived at the point at which we must ask ourselves whether we really want to make peace or not.
I'm not saying that this is a simple question. One might argue, ostensibly with good reason, that, look, for thirty-five years, since the Yom Kippur War, we've lived on the Golan Heights without any violation of the cease-fire; and there's none of the day-to-day friction with a civilian population, as in the territories—so why not carry on?
Yedioth Ahronoth: Based on what you have said, you seem to think that the guilt falls entirely on [Israel].
Ehud Olmert: No. Our burden is ours; their burden belongs to them. I'm not suggesting we make peace with Syria simply by surrendering the Golan Heights. The Syrians know well what they must surrender to get the Golan. They must give up their connections with Iran, such as they are, and their connections with Hezbollah; they must cease funding terrorism, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the holy war in Iraq. They know. These things have been made clear to them.
Were a regional war to break out in the next year or two and were we to enter into a military confrontation with Syria, I have no doubt that we'd defeat them soundly. We are stronger than they. Israel is the strongest country in the Middle East. We could contend with any of our enemies or against all of our enemies combined and win. The question that I ask myself is, what happens when we win? First of all, we'd have to pay a painful price.
And after we paid the price, what would we say to them? "Let's talk." And what would the Syrians say to us? "Let's talk about the Golan Heights."
So, I ask: Why enter a war with the Syrians, full of losses and destruction, in order to achieve what might be achieved without paying such a heavy price?
...In the absence of peace, the probability of war is always much greater. A prime minister must ask himself where to best direct his efforts. Are his efforts directed toward making peace or are they directed constantly toward making the country stronger and stronger and stronger in order to win a war?
...What I'm saying here has never been said by a leader of Israel. But the time has come to say these things. The time has come to put them on the table.
I read the reports of our generals and I say, "how have they not learned a single thing?" Once, a very senior official told me, "They're still living in the War of Independence and the Sinai Campaign." With them it's all about tanks, about controlling territories or controlled territories, holding this or that hill. But these things are worthless.
...The true threat we are facing today in the north, south, and east is from missiles and rockets. We will need to answer these threats but we will not find such answers within a range of two hundred meters.
...Our goal should be, for the first time, to designate a final and exact borderline between us and the Palestinians so that the entire world, the United States, the UN, and Europe can say, "These are the borders of the State of Israel, we recognize them, and we will anchor them with formal resolutions in the major international bodies. These are the recognized borders of Israel and these are the recognized borders of the State of Palestine."
...Who seriously thinks that if we sit on another hilltop, on another hundred meters, this will make a difference for Israel's basic security?
...Is the absence of a resolution between us and the Palestinians the result of Israel's intransigence? No. Let there be no doubt in this matter. I regret to say that the Palestinians lack the necessary courage, power, inner strength, will, and enthusiasm. If we don't reach a solution, I'm in no way prepared to lay the blame on Israel. The blame rests first and foremost with the other side.
I would like to learn from my own mistakes. I hadn't seen this before and I'm not trying to justify myself. Exactly thirty years ago, when Menachem Begin returned from Camp David, I spoke out against [the agreement he made there] and I voted against it. I confess; I'm not trying to hide or obscure that.
What was Menachem Begin's genius?... He started from the end. He began by saying, "I am ready to pull out of the entire Sinai—now, let us negotiate."
...When I look back to the prime ministers who preceded me, Arik Sharon, Bibi Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Yitzhak Rabin, of blessed memory, I can say that each made a step in the right direction but that at a certain point in time, at a particular juncture at which a decision was necessary, the decision did not come....
Yedioth Ahronoth: Israel's deterrent threat is not deterring Iran from developing a nuclear arms program; [the Iranians] appear to be on the verge of attaining nuclear capability.
Ehud Olmert: There is a major difference in our approach to the Iranian issue and our approach to the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese issue. These are our immediate neighbors. The way we deal with them is not the way we can deal with Iran.
Iran is a major power that constitutes a serious threat to the international community. And it is the international community that is most responsible for dealing with the Iranian situation. One senses a megalomania and a loss of proportion in the things said here about Iran. We are a country that has lost a sense of scale.
The assumption that if America, Russia, China, England, and Germany don't know how to deal with the Iranians, but we, the Israelis, will know, and that we'll do something, we'll act, is an example of this loss of proportions.
...One day the whole story of the Lebanon war [of 2006] will be told and the picture will look completely different. I am the only one who hasn't spoken about it. Bogie Yaalon [Former Lieutenant General and Chief of the General Staff Moshe Yaalon], who doesn't know what happened, has spoken. The military brass, the brigadier generals, majors, and lieutenant colonels, each saw only his own narrow slice of things. The person who knows the whole story, from beginning to end, has been silent. Thus the picture has been distorted.
Yedioth Ahronoth: Do certain extremely harsh statements that have been coming from members of the Knesset indicate a new lack of esteem for the office of the prime minister?
Ehud Olmert: I will never forget an encounter I had with Sharon on the evening that I was to fly to the US for a secret meeting with Condoleezza Rice. This was shortly after the August 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip. I saw Sharon immediately after he met with the Foreign and Defense staffs. Sharon was paler than I had ever seen him. I asked my friend Dov Weisglass, Sharon's chief of staff, what had happened. He said that Arik had returned from the committee, where Knesset members Uzi Landau and Effi Eitam had said to him, "you're a gangster," "you're a criminal," "you're despicable," "you're a thief." Sharon is an older man and not in great shape—a number of weeks later he was through—and he was in complete shock.
This phenomenon is not new. It started on the eve of the Rabin murder and it brought about [that] murder....
Yedioth Ahronoth: Now that you have resigned, do you have a different take on the war? Are there things you'd do differently? Are you more suspicious of [Israel's] military leadership?
Ehud Olmert: The Lebanon war will go down in history as the first war in which the military leadership understood that classic warfare has become obsolete. Only narrow-minded Bogie Yaalon could believe that had we entered Lebanon with the entire army things would have ended differently.
...But this was the only war that ended with a political resolution. Since then there hasn't been a single shot fired in that area. If we knew how to create such an arrangement in the south today [i.e., in Gaza], our fighting forces would certainly support it.... But the true lesson is what I have said before, that in contemporary wars the home front is the front, the home front is engaged in battle.
—Translated from the Hebrew by Avi Steinberg
Globalist Bookshelf > Global Diplomacy
Globalist Bookshelf > Global Diplomacy
History Strikes Back
By Hubert Védrine | Tuesday, November 18, 2008 Though the global West has long been in control of the world market, new powers are emerging as leaders of the market. Former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine argues that Europe can still stay on top — by joining forces with the United States as world powers.
For some time after its victory in the cold war, the West thought that it alone was in charge of world affairs, the sole arbiter of good and evil. Now, more than 20 years later, it must understand that it no longer has a monopoly on history or power.
New powers
Having promoted universal values and the rules of the free market, other world powers — which the West Neither competition nor politics nor history is over. does not control and which have not forgotten the Western domination of the past 500 years — are on the rise.
Aided by the very globalization desired by the West, they are emerging — or reemerging — with the intention of redesigning the world in their own way and free market economics will continue to spread but not necessarily under Western leadership in a way.
Democracy and free market economics will continue to spread, but not necessarily under Western leadership — or in a way that will guarantee Western supremacy.
Losing their grip?
Neither competition nor politics nor history is over. On the contrary, the tectonic plates of geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoecology have again begun to shift, and these enormous changes will not take place without significant disruption.
We are entering an era of serious tensions. Westerners are going to lose, or perhaps have already lost, their monopoly. But they have not lost either their power or their influence, which could be considerable if put to use in the right way.
A new approach
If the United States is unable to get beyond the For their part, if the Europeans do not overcome their naiveté, they will be mere spectators of an unstable multipolar world. hubris that led it astray over the past few years, it will create further disappointments and catastrophes, for itself and the West as a whole.
With the 2008 presidential elections, the Americans must seriously analyze the causes of the failures of the Bush Administration in the Middle East, including the deep conceptual reasons for this foreseeable fiasco.
And the new administration will have to take a very different approach. For their part, if the Europeans do not overcome their naiveté, they will be mere spectators of an unstable multipolar world being created without them.
Coming together
On the other hand, if they do face up to realities, they could by acting together become a major world power and true partner of the United States.
A coherent and determined Europe would help compensate for the alarming vacuity of the notion of an "international community."
From slogan to reality
Such a Europe would take account of the geopolitical We are entering an era of serious tensions. Westerners are going to lose, or perhaps have already lost, their monopoly. balance of power and adapt its strategy accordingly.
It could, for example, help promote global awareness of the environmental time bomb we are facing, which it has so far recognized more clearly than the United States.
It could thus help transform the environmentally destructive economy of today into the ecological economy we need and make "sustainable development" a real policy as opposed to a slogan.
Showing solidarity
Such a Europe could put the concept of solidarity among the world's 6.5 billion people on a solid footing since, whatever our divisions, we face the same threats.
These ideas should be at the heart of the notion of "regulation" of untamed globalization and of the "global governance" so often praised in speeches. Europe is well placed to promote such thinking just as it can help rehabilitate the role of states and governments.
This feature is adapted from HISTORY STRIKES BACK by Hubert Vedrine. Copyright 2008 Brookings Institution Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
Copyright © 2000-2008 by The Globalist. Reproduction of content on this site without The Globalist's written permission is strictly prohibited. Terms of Use | Privacy Policy
McPherson Square, 927 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005
History Strikes Back
By Hubert Védrine | Tuesday, November 18, 2008 Though the global West has long been in control of the world market, new powers are emerging as leaders of the market. Former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine argues that Europe can still stay on top — by joining forces with the United States as world powers.
For some time after its victory in the cold war, the West thought that it alone was in charge of world affairs, the sole arbiter of good and evil. Now, more than 20 years later, it must understand that it no longer has a monopoly on history or power.
New powers
Having promoted universal values and the rules of the free market, other world powers — which the West Neither competition nor politics nor history is over. does not control and which have not forgotten the Western domination of the past 500 years — are on the rise.
Aided by the very globalization desired by the West, they are emerging — or reemerging — with the intention of redesigning the world in their own way and free market economics will continue to spread but not necessarily under Western leadership in a way.
Democracy and free market economics will continue to spread, but not necessarily under Western leadership — or in a way that will guarantee Western supremacy.
Losing their grip?
Neither competition nor politics nor history is over. On the contrary, the tectonic plates of geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoecology have again begun to shift, and these enormous changes will not take place without significant disruption.
We are entering an era of serious tensions. Westerners are going to lose, or perhaps have already lost, their monopoly. But they have not lost either their power or their influence, which could be considerable if put to use in the right way.
A new approach
If the United States is unable to get beyond the For their part, if the Europeans do not overcome their naiveté, they will be mere spectators of an unstable multipolar world. hubris that led it astray over the past few years, it will create further disappointments and catastrophes, for itself and the West as a whole.
With the 2008 presidential elections, the Americans must seriously analyze the causes of the failures of the Bush Administration in the Middle East, including the deep conceptual reasons for this foreseeable fiasco.
And the new administration will have to take a very different approach. For their part, if the Europeans do not overcome their naiveté, they will be mere spectators of an unstable multipolar world being created without them.
Coming together
On the other hand, if they do face up to realities, they could by acting together become a major world power and true partner of the United States.
A coherent and determined Europe would help compensate for the alarming vacuity of the notion of an "international community."
From slogan to reality
Such a Europe would take account of the geopolitical We are entering an era of serious tensions. Westerners are going to lose, or perhaps have already lost, their monopoly. balance of power and adapt its strategy accordingly.
It could, for example, help promote global awareness of the environmental time bomb we are facing, which it has so far recognized more clearly than the United States.
It could thus help transform the environmentally destructive economy of today into the ecological economy we need and make "sustainable development" a real policy as opposed to a slogan.
Showing solidarity
Such a Europe could put the concept of solidarity among the world's 6.5 billion people on a solid footing since, whatever our divisions, we face the same threats.
These ideas should be at the heart of the notion of "regulation" of untamed globalization and of the "global governance" so often praised in speeches. Europe is well placed to promote such thinking just as it can help rehabilitate the role of states and governments.
This feature is adapted from HISTORY STRIKES BACK by Hubert Vedrine. Copyright 2008 Brookings Institution Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
Copyright © 2000-2008 by The Globalist. Reproduction of content on this site without The Globalist's written permission is strictly prohibited. Terms of Use | Privacy Policy
McPherson Square, 927 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005
Exorcism By Half
Exorcism By Half
Al-Sijill 11/13/08
Senator Barak Obama entered the 2008 presidential campaign with a full ledger, and the entries on either side more or less balanced out.
His liabilities were daunting: a black man with a Muslim heritage, young and with limited experience as a federal legislator. He opposed far more seasoned pretenders, including Hillary Clinton, his fellow senator and presumed heir apparent to the dynasty begun by her husband and rudely slashed by the Bush interregnum.
His assets were equally formidable. Not since John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential run have voters beheld so universally attractive a candidate: He was articulate in a society where oratory had become a rare artifact. He was at once cool, cunning, and fiercely intelligent, as elegant a public speaker as Ronald Reagan and as seductive a stage presence as Bill Clinton, minus the gluttony. Clearly a shrewd judge of character, he surrounded himself with men and women whose reserves of competence and discipline were at parity with his own.
Then there were the extraordinary items, which thankfully for Mr. Obama broke almost exclusively his way. He would campaign amid the rubble of an incumbent presidency that began sabotaging itself almost immediately after its re-election in 2004 with a disastrous plan to privatize Social Security. This was followed by Hurricane Katrina, the sectarian holocaust in Iraq, the indictment of a top White House aid for compromising a CIA operative, revelations of warrantless wiretapping, the politicalization of the country's once-sacred Justice Department, and finally and decisively, the collapse of Wall Street and the onset of economic recession. When measured against the tragic-comic demise of the Bush presidency, Mr. Obama's liabilities seem to deflate significantly.
That being the case, was the young Senator's victory truly the historic, transcendent event it is held to be? Were Americans really converted by Mr. Obama's accomplishments and his humanist appeals to tolerance and civility? Or did they simply rebel against eight years of Republican misrule, which clung to Republican challenger John McCain like the smell of death?
Certainly Mr. Obama's election is historic and should be celebrated as such. His campaign was a testament to the power of restraint and reason at a time when citizens – in America and around the world – were weary of the arrogance, fear-mongering and labored hyperbole of the incumbent regime. Many voters, no doubt, saw in Mr. Obama deliverance from Mr. Bush who did more to undermine American interests at home and abroad than any foreign power or terrorist cell. In the aftermath of last week's conclusive Democratic victory, America's two-party political system is now in peril; thanks to Mr. Bush and his ghostly commissar, Vice President Dick Cheney, to say nothing of the creepy Sarah Palin and her anti-intellectual claque, the Republican Party – the party of Lincoln, the world's oldest political movement – has been reduced to a gated community of aging, southern white people.
Voters were also impressed by the brilliance of the Obama campaign, which melded the internet with grass-roots intimacy to decisive effect. As the current administration consumed itself with its own incompetence, and as the field of candidates vying to replace it were felled by one gaffe after another, the flawlessness of the Obama bid became irresistible. As Mr. McCain graciously conceded on election night, his rival ran the superior race, and the voters decided appropriately. Presidential historians will no doubt study the Obama campaign the way military men dissect Wellington's victory at Waterloo. (An imperfect analogy, actually, as Mr. McCain was no Bonaparte.)
And yet, in Mr. Obama's triumph for the forces of light there was disturbingly dark subtext. Attempts by Mr. Obama's enemies to identify him as a Muslim, though not so compelling as to derail his quest, were serious enough to keep him on the defensive. He was careful not to be photographed with Muslims anywhere, let alone in a mosque. His loyalty oath to Israel before the American-Israel Political Affairs Committee was as convincing a parody of a Beltway pol as was Tina Fey's sendup of Sarah Palin, only without the laughs. During his tour of the Middle East, he kibbutzed heartily with Israelis but allocated a desultory 45 minutes with Palestinians. While touring the West Bank, he did not stand for photo opportunities nor did he give a press conference, pointedly shunning the very people who represent one half of a negotiated peace in that benighted region.
On the Republican side, a woman at a McCain rally told the candidate she could never vote for Mr. Obama because "he's an Arab." Mr. McCain's response was an authentic, if unintentional measure of American Islamophobia.
"No," Mr. McCain said. "He's a decent family man."
The editorial pages of America's liberal heralds – the New York Times, the Washington Post, Newsweek – largely ignored Mr. McCain's reply as well as Mr. Obama's tactical snubbing of the country's Muslim community. It took Colin Powell, America's first black Secretary of State and apparently its sole statesman, to acknowledge the appalling bigotry of it all. His comments on CBS Television's Meet the Press is worth quoting at length:
"I'm also troubled by, not what Senator McCain says, but what members of the [Republican] party say, and it is permitted to be said. Such things as 'Well you know that Mr. Obama is a Muslim.' Well the correct answer is 'He is not a Muslim, he's a Christian, he's always been a Christian.' But the really right answer is 'What if he is? Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country?' The answer is 'No. That's not America.' Is there something wrong with some 7-year old Muslim-American kid believing that he or she can be president? Yet I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion he's a Muslim and he might be associated with terrorists. This is not the way we should be doing it in America."
In politics there are always red lines. Mr. Obama can be forgiven for appeasing a largely anti-Muslim electorate while pandering to its Likudnik proxies, assuming he would sup with the devil today in exchange for a lasting and just Middle East peace tomorrow. But it says something about the character of a society where any serious attempt to relieve a long-suffering people would need to come calling the same way Mr. Obama's forbearers did – through the back door.
The outcome of America's 2008 presidential campaign was a welcome salve against two centuries of violent discrimination against black Americans. Yet however redemptive, it also sanctioned a new reality in the politics of ethnicity and religion: American Muslims, particularly Arab ones, are the new darkies.
Al-Sijill 11/13/08
Senator Barak Obama entered the 2008 presidential campaign with a full ledger, and the entries on either side more or less balanced out.
His liabilities were daunting: a black man with a Muslim heritage, young and with limited experience as a federal legislator. He opposed far more seasoned pretenders, including Hillary Clinton, his fellow senator and presumed heir apparent to the dynasty begun by her husband and rudely slashed by the Bush interregnum.
His assets were equally formidable. Not since John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential run have voters beheld so universally attractive a candidate: He was articulate in a society where oratory had become a rare artifact. He was at once cool, cunning, and fiercely intelligent, as elegant a public speaker as Ronald Reagan and as seductive a stage presence as Bill Clinton, minus the gluttony. Clearly a shrewd judge of character, he surrounded himself with men and women whose reserves of competence and discipline were at parity with his own.
Then there were the extraordinary items, which thankfully for Mr. Obama broke almost exclusively his way. He would campaign amid the rubble of an incumbent presidency that began sabotaging itself almost immediately after its re-election in 2004 with a disastrous plan to privatize Social Security. This was followed by Hurricane Katrina, the sectarian holocaust in Iraq, the indictment of a top White House aid for compromising a CIA operative, revelations of warrantless wiretapping, the politicalization of the country's once-sacred Justice Department, and finally and decisively, the collapse of Wall Street and the onset of economic recession. When measured against the tragic-comic demise of the Bush presidency, Mr. Obama's liabilities seem to deflate significantly.
That being the case, was the young Senator's victory truly the historic, transcendent event it is held to be? Were Americans really converted by Mr. Obama's accomplishments and his humanist appeals to tolerance and civility? Or did they simply rebel against eight years of Republican misrule, which clung to Republican challenger John McCain like the smell of death?
Certainly Mr. Obama's election is historic and should be celebrated as such. His campaign was a testament to the power of restraint and reason at a time when citizens – in America and around the world – were weary of the arrogance, fear-mongering and labored hyperbole of the incumbent regime. Many voters, no doubt, saw in Mr. Obama deliverance from Mr. Bush who did more to undermine American interests at home and abroad than any foreign power or terrorist cell. In the aftermath of last week's conclusive Democratic victory, America's two-party political system is now in peril; thanks to Mr. Bush and his ghostly commissar, Vice President Dick Cheney, to say nothing of the creepy Sarah Palin and her anti-intellectual claque, the Republican Party – the party of Lincoln, the world's oldest political movement – has been reduced to a gated community of aging, southern white people.
Voters were also impressed by the brilliance of the Obama campaign, which melded the internet with grass-roots intimacy to decisive effect. As the current administration consumed itself with its own incompetence, and as the field of candidates vying to replace it were felled by one gaffe after another, the flawlessness of the Obama bid became irresistible. As Mr. McCain graciously conceded on election night, his rival ran the superior race, and the voters decided appropriately. Presidential historians will no doubt study the Obama campaign the way military men dissect Wellington's victory at Waterloo. (An imperfect analogy, actually, as Mr. McCain was no Bonaparte.)
And yet, in Mr. Obama's triumph for the forces of light there was disturbingly dark subtext. Attempts by Mr. Obama's enemies to identify him as a Muslim, though not so compelling as to derail his quest, were serious enough to keep him on the defensive. He was careful not to be photographed with Muslims anywhere, let alone in a mosque. His loyalty oath to Israel before the American-Israel Political Affairs Committee was as convincing a parody of a Beltway pol as was Tina Fey's sendup of Sarah Palin, only without the laughs. During his tour of the Middle East, he kibbutzed heartily with Israelis but allocated a desultory 45 minutes with Palestinians. While touring the West Bank, he did not stand for photo opportunities nor did he give a press conference, pointedly shunning the very people who represent one half of a negotiated peace in that benighted region.
On the Republican side, a woman at a McCain rally told the candidate she could never vote for Mr. Obama because "he's an Arab." Mr. McCain's response was an authentic, if unintentional measure of American Islamophobia.
"No," Mr. McCain said. "He's a decent family man."
The editorial pages of America's liberal heralds – the New York Times, the Washington Post, Newsweek – largely ignored Mr. McCain's reply as well as Mr. Obama's tactical snubbing of the country's Muslim community. It took Colin Powell, America's first black Secretary of State and apparently its sole statesman, to acknowledge the appalling bigotry of it all. His comments on CBS Television's Meet the Press is worth quoting at length:
"I'm also troubled by, not what Senator McCain says, but what members of the [Republican] party say, and it is permitted to be said. Such things as 'Well you know that Mr. Obama is a Muslim.' Well the correct answer is 'He is not a Muslim, he's a Christian, he's always been a Christian.' But the really right answer is 'What if he is? Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country?' The answer is 'No. That's not America.' Is there something wrong with some 7-year old Muslim-American kid believing that he or she can be president? Yet I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion he's a Muslim and he might be associated with terrorists. This is not the way we should be doing it in America."
In politics there are always red lines. Mr. Obama can be forgiven for appeasing a largely anti-Muslim electorate while pandering to its Likudnik proxies, assuming he would sup with the devil today in exchange for a lasting and just Middle East peace tomorrow. But it says something about the character of a society where any serious attempt to relieve a long-suffering people would need to come calling the same way Mr. Obama's forbearers did – through the back door.
The outcome of America's 2008 presidential campaign was a welcome salve against two centuries of violent discrimination against black Americans. Yet however redemptive, it also sanctioned a new reality in the politics of ethnicity and religion: American Muslims, particularly Arab ones, are the new darkies.
Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis
Lessons from the
Global Financial Crisis
Leaders from the G-20 countries met in Washington to discuss the global economic crisis. The inclusion of countries like China, India, and Brazil in the talks highlights the redistribution of economic power beyond the industrialized nations. Albert Keidel explains how China's historic decision to fund a $600 billion domestic stimulus package provides a road map for future U.S. policy. David Rothkopf argues that President-elect Obama will need to promote stronger multilateral institutions to govern global markets. | MORE >
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/topic/index.cfm?fa=viewTopic&topic=2000145
Global Financial Crisis
Leaders from the G-20 countries met in Washington to discuss the global economic crisis. The inclusion of countries like China, India, and Brazil in the talks highlights the redistribution of economic power beyond the industrialized nations. Albert Keidel explains how China's historic decision to fund a $600 billion domestic stimulus package provides a road map for future U.S. policy. David Rothkopf argues that President-elect Obama will need to promote stronger multilateral institutions to govern global markets. | MORE >
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/topic/index.cfm?fa=viewTopic&topic=2000145
Nuclear Energy, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control in the Next Administration
Nuclear Energy, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control in the Next Administration
The next U.S. administration will face critical choices on the nation’s future as a nuclear power—expiring arms control agreements with Russia; a nuclear energy renaissance unaccompanied by the necessary regulatory structure; and a nonproliferation treaty regime under serious strain. George Perkovich and Rose Gottemoeller call for U.S. leadership in disarmament and renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control. Deepti Choubey offers a step-by-step approach to engage states without nuclear weapons to help rebuild the dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime. Sharon Squassoni explains that before committing to a rapid expansion of nuclear energy, the Obama administration must address its feasibility and safety, and act to minimize current proliferation risks. | MORE >
In this series...
* Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges
* Nuclear Renaissance: Is It Coming? Should It?
* Russian–American Security Relations After Georgia
* Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the U.S. Should Lead
* Iran: Is Productive Engagement Possible?
* Iran Says “No”—Now What?
* Engaging Pakistan—Getting the Balance Right
* Asia—Shaping the Future
* Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?
* Sunset for the Two-State Solution?
* Breaking the Suicide Pact: U.S.–China Cooperation on Climate Change
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/topic/index.cfm?fa=viewTopic&topic=3000154
The next U.S. administration will face critical choices on the nation’s future as a nuclear power—expiring arms control agreements with Russia; a nuclear energy renaissance unaccompanied by the necessary regulatory structure; and a nonproliferation treaty regime under serious strain. George Perkovich and Rose Gottemoeller call for U.S. leadership in disarmament and renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control. Deepti Choubey offers a step-by-step approach to engage states without nuclear weapons to help rebuild the dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime. Sharon Squassoni explains that before committing to a rapid expansion of nuclear energy, the Obama administration must address its feasibility and safety, and act to minimize current proliferation risks. | MORE >
In this series...
* Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges
* Nuclear Renaissance: Is It Coming? Should It?
* Russian–American Security Relations After Georgia
* Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the U.S. Should Lead
* Iran: Is Productive Engagement Possible?
* Iran Says “No”—Now What?
* Engaging Pakistan—Getting the Balance Right
* Asia—Shaping the Future
* Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?
* Sunset for the Two-State Solution?
* Breaking the Suicide Pact: U.S.–China Cooperation on Climate Change
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/topic/index.cfm?fa=viewTopic&topic=3000154
Security Agreement Deja Vu By Stephen Farrell Security Agreement Déjà Vu
Security Agreement Deja Vu
By Stephen Farrell
Security Agreement Déjà VuA January 1948 map of Iraq showing British air bases in the country.
BAGHDAD — The security agreement allowing U.S. combat troops to remain in Iraq for three years, which Iraq's Parliament is to vote on Monday, took more than 12 months to negotiate.
Some of that time was taken up with the "vanilla" elements, as one senior U.S. official described them, like taxes, licensing and import-export requirements.
But the knottiest parts were delicate issues touching on sovereignty, including what legal rules apply to American soldiers, and who authorizes military operations involving American troops. The Iraqis insisted on knowing exactly what and who the U.S. will be moving into and within Iraq's borders after Jan. 1, 2009.
On such issues, the Iraqi negotiators bargained hard, to the point that behind the scenes, U.S. officials used words ranging from "suspicion" to "paranoia" to describe their mindset.
Citing the false beliefs that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that the United States used to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one Islamist Shiite lawmaker said that the negotiators had to be sure the Americans would not smuggle wanted people out of Iraq — or sneak in nuclear weapons.
There is some earlier history that might further explain Iraqi skepticism.
The Status of Forces Agreement and the wider Strategic Framework Agreement accompanying it are the latest in a long line of treaties, pacts and agreements negotiated by successive Iraqi governments with powerful western nations dating back to just after the First World War.
Few of these treaties produced terms that satisfied domestic Iraqi nationalists. At least one — in 1948 — ended with riots and the forced resignation of Iraq's first Shiite prime minister. That fact was unlikely to have been lost on Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's own, Shiite-led, government.
We have collected contemporary reports from The New York Times of some of those previous negotiations. The echoes of today's headlines are uncanny.
In a treaty signed on Oct. 10, 1922, Britain agreed to prepare the country for independence. But the treaty postponed discussion of exactly how this would happen, and effectively prolonged Britain's mandate under another form for at least 20 years (a period later reduced).
Oct. 12, 1922 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"In official circles in London the treaty is regarded as the first
important step for securing complete self-government for Irak."
[Read the Original Report (pdf)]
Revised treaties were to follow later in the 1920s, including one in 1927 which said Iraq would become independent by 1932. But it was never ratified, and left open the question of military relations between the two countries.
Jan. 22 1929 - THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"The Iraq Government refuses to accept the British proposals that a British force should remain in Iraq for a further unspecified period."
[Read the Original Report (pdf)]
The issue was revisited in June 30, 1930, when a new treaty of alliance was signed by the Iraqi government and the British High Commissioner in Baghdad, to run for 25 years. This left Iraq in charge of its internal affairs, but stipulated that Britain would supervise its foreign relations. Britain's desire to retain long term military bases featured prominently in the discussions.
July 6, 1930 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
'Iraq's Freedom Now in Sight'
Times Past
"Iraq shall lease to Britain three air bases to the west of the Euphrates and Shatt al-Arab …..Britain has too much to lose to permit any violent change to take place in the Arabian status quo. But it remains to be seen if, out of Iraq, she can prevent it."
[Read the Original Report (pdf)]
Feb. 8, 1931 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"Kurds, Assyrians and Others Want the Protection of a Western Power….
…The treaty concluded between the British Government and Iraq, which has been confirmed by the Iraqian House of Deputies despite the opposition of a large number of Nationalist members, is still a cause of controversy here." [Read the Original Report (pdf)]
Iraq finally gained independence in 1932 but maintained an uneasy relationship with its colonial power. In January 1948, Saleh Jaber, the first Shiite prime minister, tried to revise the 1930 treaty with Britain to be more favorable to Iraq.
Jan. 16, 1948–THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"Britain signed a twenty-year treaty with Iraq today that in effect guarantees the protection of that country… British and Iraqi armed forces will be interconnected in many ways. Britain will, for instance, under this treaty continue to sell arms to Iraq as heretofore." [Read the Original Report (pdf)]
But the resulting treaty was again rejected, amid violent street demonstrations in which protesters said it did not go far enough to satisfy nationalist ambitions. Facing Sunni opposition and political
intrigue, Jaber was forced to resign.
Jan. 21. 1948 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"The United States Information Offices were stoned…efforts of rioters to reach the British Embassy were halted by the police." [Read the Original Report (pdf)]
The atmosphere surrounding the 2008 negotiations has been altogether more restrained thus far, aside from scuffles in the Iraqi parliament.
Dr. Ala'a al-Ruhaimi, head of the Department of History at Al Kufa University in Najaf, identified similarities between past and present.
"In all of these agreements Iraq was a weak country surrounded by aggressive neighboring countries," he said. "It had three major components disputing with each others -– the Shia, the Kurds and the Sunnis -– and no strong army. All Iraq's neighbors were just waiting for the right time to devour Iraq."
But in the past, he pointed out, it was the Shiite Arabs and Kurds resisting deals struck by Iraq's ruling Sunni minority. Today it is the Sunnis who are heading the opposition, though they are of course joined by joined by rejectionist Shiites, including Moktada al-Sadr.
He believes that Iraq's leaders, having learned the lessons of history, are now intent on asserting themselves more than their predecessors could in the first half of the 20th century, when pragmatism limited ambition.
"I think Maliki believes Iraq is more powerful now, so he has to get a better deal than the previous agreements with the British," Dr. Ruhaimi concluded.
Riyadh Mohammed contributed reporting.
By Stephen Farrell
Security Agreement Déjà VuA January 1948 map of Iraq showing British air bases in the country.
BAGHDAD — The security agreement allowing U.S. combat troops to remain in Iraq for three years, which Iraq's Parliament is to vote on Monday, took more than 12 months to negotiate.
Some of that time was taken up with the "vanilla" elements, as one senior U.S. official described them, like taxes, licensing and import-export requirements.
But the knottiest parts were delicate issues touching on sovereignty, including what legal rules apply to American soldiers, and who authorizes military operations involving American troops. The Iraqis insisted on knowing exactly what and who the U.S. will be moving into and within Iraq's borders after Jan. 1, 2009.
On such issues, the Iraqi negotiators bargained hard, to the point that behind the scenes, U.S. officials used words ranging from "suspicion" to "paranoia" to describe their mindset.
Citing the false beliefs that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that the United States used to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one Islamist Shiite lawmaker said that the negotiators had to be sure the Americans would not smuggle wanted people out of Iraq — or sneak in nuclear weapons.
There is some earlier history that might further explain Iraqi skepticism.
The Status of Forces Agreement and the wider Strategic Framework Agreement accompanying it are the latest in a long line of treaties, pacts and agreements negotiated by successive Iraqi governments with powerful western nations dating back to just after the First World War.
Few of these treaties produced terms that satisfied domestic Iraqi nationalists. At least one — in 1948 — ended with riots and the forced resignation of Iraq's first Shiite prime minister. That fact was unlikely to have been lost on Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's own, Shiite-led, government.
We have collected contemporary reports from The New York Times of some of those previous negotiations. The echoes of today's headlines are uncanny.
In a treaty signed on Oct. 10, 1922, Britain agreed to prepare the country for independence. But the treaty postponed discussion of exactly how this would happen, and effectively prolonged Britain's mandate under another form for at least 20 years (a period later reduced).
Oct. 12, 1922 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"In official circles in London the treaty is regarded as the first
important step for securing complete self-government for Irak."
[Read the Original Report (pdf)]
Revised treaties were to follow later in the 1920s, including one in 1927 which said Iraq would become independent by 1932. But it was never ratified, and left open the question of military relations between the two countries.
Jan. 22 1929 - THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"The Iraq Government refuses to accept the British proposals that a British force should remain in Iraq for a further unspecified period."
[Read the Original Report (pdf)]
The issue was revisited in June 30, 1930, when a new treaty of alliance was signed by the Iraqi government and the British High Commissioner in Baghdad, to run for 25 years. This left Iraq in charge of its internal affairs, but stipulated that Britain would supervise its foreign relations. Britain's desire to retain long term military bases featured prominently in the discussions.
July 6, 1930 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
'Iraq's Freedom Now in Sight'
Times Past
"Iraq shall lease to Britain three air bases to the west of the Euphrates and Shatt al-Arab …..Britain has too much to lose to permit any violent change to take place in the Arabian status quo. But it remains to be seen if, out of Iraq, she can prevent it."
[Read the Original Report (pdf)]
Feb. 8, 1931 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"Kurds, Assyrians and Others Want the Protection of a Western Power….
…The treaty concluded between the British Government and Iraq, which has been confirmed by the Iraqian House of Deputies despite the opposition of a large number of Nationalist members, is still a cause of controversy here." [Read the Original Report (pdf)]
Iraq finally gained independence in 1932 but maintained an uneasy relationship with its colonial power. In January 1948, Saleh Jaber, the first Shiite prime minister, tried to revise the 1930 treaty with Britain to be more favorable to Iraq.
Jan. 16, 1948–THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"Britain signed a twenty-year treaty with Iraq today that in effect guarantees the protection of that country… British and Iraqi armed forces will be interconnected in many ways. Britain will, for instance, under this treaty continue to sell arms to Iraq as heretofore." [Read the Original Report (pdf)]
But the resulting treaty was again rejected, amid violent street demonstrations in which protesters said it did not go far enough to satisfy nationalist ambitions. Facing Sunni opposition and political
intrigue, Jaber was forced to resign.
Jan. 21. 1948 –THE NEW YORK TIMES
Times Past
"The United States Information Offices were stoned…efforts of rioters to reach the British Embassy were halted by the police." [Read the Original Report (pdf)]
The atmosphere surrounding the 2008 negotiations has been altogether more restrained thus far, aside from scuffles in the Iraqi parliament.
Dr. Ala'a al-Ruhaimi, head of the Department of History at Al Kufa University in Najaf, identified similarities between past and present.
"In all of these agreements Iraq was a weak country surrounded by aggressive neighboring countries," he said. "It had three major components disputing with each others -– the Shia, the Kurds and the Sunnis -– and no strong army. All Iraq's neighbors were just waiting for the right time to devour Iraq."
But in the past, he pointed out, it was the Shiite Arabs and Kurds resisting deals struck by Iraq's ruling Sunni minority. Today it is the Sunnis who are heading the opposition, though they are of course joined by joined by rejectionist Shiites, including Moktada al-Sadr.
He believes that Iraq's leaders, having learned the lessons of history, are now intent on asserting themselves more than their predecessors could in the first half of the 20th century, when pragmatism limited ambition.
"I think Maliki believes Iraq is more powerful now, so he has to get a better deal than the previous agreements with the British," Dr. Ruhaimi concluded.
Riyadh Mohammed contributed reporting.
Tempting fate in FATA? Arnaud de Borchgrave
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/21/tempting-fate-in-fata/
Tempting fate in FATA?
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Friday, November 21, 2008
COMMENTARY:
It was tantamount to a dialogue of the deaf as a lame-duck U.S. president tried to make himself understood by President Hamid Karzai in Kabul and President Asif Zardari in Islamabad. "I know you believe you understood what you think I said, but I'm not sure you realize what you heard is not what I meant," was interchangeable for anything one said to the other two.
In Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai, barely in control of his own capital, pushed ahead with a Saudi peace initiative, by offering to talk turkey with arch-enemy Mullah Mohammad Omar, the reclusive, one-eyed Taliban leader who has been in hiding since the United States invaded Oct. 7, 2001 and toppled his regime. There is a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. Mr. Karzai pledged he would resist demands from the international community to hand over Mullah Omar to U.S. authorities.
Defiant, the Afghan president said he would go to any length to protect Mullah Omar, and NATO forces in Afghanistan would be left with two choices: "Remove me or leave." Despite a string of denials, Saudi King Abdullah's dinner in Mecca Sept. 27 with both Taliban and Karzai government envoys, was the first step on a protracted negotiation with a view to forming a coalition government.
Meanwhile, Mr. Karzai is setting up a new organization to identity Taliban fighters who might want to switch sides and accept retraining for civilian jobs. And this at a time when Taliban's Islamist guerrillas have stepped up operations throughout Afghanistan, a country the size of France, and are slowly encircling the capital city of Kabul. Some 70,000 allied troops are spread around some of the world's most inhospitable terrain, but only 10 percent of the non-U.S. troops are allowed to engage in combat, hamstrung by scores of caveats imposed by their national parliaments.
It didn't take long for the new CENTCOM commander, Gen. David Petraeus, to conclude there is no military solution comparable to his brilliantly successful "surge" in Iraq. Like in Vietnam in the 1970s, negotiations with the enemy are not only inevitable but necessary. Europe's NATO allies and Canada would welcome a negotiated end to the conflict. Their parliaments have made clear they expect all of their troops out by 2011.
The discouraged Europeans, like the United States, only have one irreducible demand: an irrevocable Taliban break with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda kept some 20 bases throughout Afghanistan where jihadist volunteers from former Soviet Muslim Republics in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, Britain and the rest of Europe, trained in conducting acts of terrorism.
Mullah Omar, who is believed to be operating out of a secret headquarters in or near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, which Taliban fighters based in Pakistan's tribal areas use for clandestine rest and recreation, is not about to give Mr. Karzai a favorable response to his invitation to talk. In fact, his response was that the evacuation of all foreign troops would have to come first. But the buzz on talks about talks may encourage Taliban dissidents and hopefully provoke a schism among the leaders.
Across the Hindu Kush, in Pakistan, the new civilian government, backed by a now apolitical army, led by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, reminded the United States that Pakistan still holds the whip hand in Afghanistan. Forty percent of supplies shipped to NATO forces in Afghanistan by sea unload onto trucks in Karachi that then drive over 1,000 miles up the entire length of Pakistan, exiting through the Khyber Pass. Native drivers have little or no security and frequently are attacked on their way to Kabul. On Nov. 13, Taliban hijacked 13 NATO supply trucks. So there was no resistance when the Pakistani army closed the main trunk road, backing up almost 1,000 trucks, "pending improved security."
The unspoken message to the U.S. military: agree to joint intelligence exchanges in real time and we'll simply deplore the action when your unmanned Predators bomb Taliban targets and kill Pakistani civilians. Any official endorsement of U.S. remote controlled bombing in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) would unleash violent street demonstrations against the United States.
Pakistan, teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, saddled with 30 percent inflation, stock market down 35 percent, 25 percent unemployment, soaring food prices, and under attack from religious fanatics, was still waiting for a financial bailout from the International Monetary Fund in Washington. The $10.5 billion request was whittled down to $4 billion for immediate needs. Pakistan has to begin paying the debt down at 4 percent in 2011. China agreed to kick in $500 million while further U.S. aid will have to wait for the Obama administration and the new Congress. Dire straits would be an understatement.
Yet the Pakistani army presses ahead with efforts to increase the range, accuracy and lethality of its nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, sparked by what it still believes is a potential Indian threat. There is a constant effort to achieve parity with, or even a qualitative edge over, India.
Pakistani defense correspondent Usman Ansari reported in Defense News that "with the deployment of the 2,500-kilometer Shaheen II, development has shifted to the proposed 3,500 to 4,000-kilometer range Ghauri-III, which is then to be replaced by the 4,000- to 4,500-kilometer Shaheen-III." The world's second-largest Muslim state (165 million people), one of the world's eight nuclear powers, is also working out of the sight of prying Indian, Israeli and Western eyes on MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles) warheads, soon to be fielded on the Shaheen-II ballistic missile.
The interregnum in Washington and the global economic crisis provide a unique opportunity to broaden and deepen the strategic relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Long-term stability requires strengthening the world economy by helping Pakistan get back on its feet, beginning in FATA. Short of a bold stroke, Pakistan and Afghanistan - and FATA in between - remain the world's most dangerous neighborhood.
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large for The Washington Times and for United Press International.
Tempting fate in FATA?
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Friday, November 21, 2008
COMMENTARY:
It was tantamount to a dialogue of the deaf as a lame-duck U.S. president tried to make himself understood by President Hamid Karzai in Kabul and President Asif Zardari in Islamabad. "I know you believe you understood what you think I said, but I'm not sure you realize what you heard is not what I meant," was interchangeable for anything one said to the other two.
In Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai, barely in control of his own capital, pushed ahead with a Saudi peace initiative, by offering to talk turkey with arch-enemy Mullah Mohammad Omar, the reclusive, one-eyed Taliban leader who has been in hiding since the United States invaded Oct. 7, 2001 and toppled his regime. There is a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. Mr. Karzai pledged he would resist demands from the international community to hand over Mullah Omar to U.S. authorities.
Defiant, the Afghan president said he would go to any length to protect Mullah Omar, and NATO forces in Afghanistan would be left with two choices: "Remove me or leave." Despite a string of denials, Saudi King Abdullah's dinner in Mecca Sept. 27 with both Taliban and Karzai government envoys, was the first step on a protracted negotiation with a view to forming a coalition government.
Meanwhile, Mr. Karzai is setting up a new organization to identity Taliban fighters who might want to switch sides and accept retraining for civilian jobs. And this at a time when Taliban's Islamist guerrillas have stepped up operations throughout Afghanistan, a country the size of France, and are slowly encircling the capital city of Kabul. Some 70,000 allied troops are spread around some of the world's most inhospitable terrain, but only 10 percent of the non-U.S. troops are allowed to engage in combat, hamstrung by scores of caveats imposed by their national parliaments.
It didn't take long for the new CENTCOM commander, Gen. David Petraeus, to conclude there is no military solution comparable to his brilliantly successful "surge" in Iraq. Like in Vietnam in the 1970s, negotiations with the enemy are not only inevitable but necessary. Europe's NATO allies and Canada would welcome a negotiated end to the conflict. Their parliaments have made clear they expect all of their troops out by 2011.
The discouraged Europeans, like the United States, only have one irreducible demand: an irrevocable Taliban break with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Prior to Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda kept some 20 bases throughout Afghanistan where jihadist volunteers from former Soviet Muslim Republics in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, Britain and the rest of Europe, trained in conducting acts of terrorism.
Mullah Omar, who is believed to be operating out of a secret headquarters in or near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, which Taliban fighters based in Pakistan's tribal areas use for clandestine rest and recreation, is not about to give Mr. Karzai a favorable response to his invitation to talk. In fact, his response was that the evacuation of all foreign troops would have to come first. But the buzz on talks about talks may encourage Taliban dissidents and hopefully provoke a schism among the leaders.
Across the Hindu Kush, in Pakistan, the new civilian government, backed by a now apolitical army, led by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, reminded the United States that Pakistan still holds the whip hand in Afghanistan. Forty percent of supplies shipped to NATO forces in Afghanistan by sea unload onto trucks in Karachi that then drive over 1,000 miles up the entire length of Pakistan, exiting through the Khyber Pass. Native drivers have little or no security and frequently are attacked on their way to Kabul. On Nov. 13, Taliban hijacked 13 NATO supply trucks. So there was no resistance when the Pakistani army closed the main trunk road, backing up almost 1,000 trucks, "pending improved security."
The unspoken message to the U.S. military: agree to joint intelligence exchanges in real time and we'll simply deplore the action when your unmanned Predators bomb Taliban targets and kill Pakistani civilians. Any official endorsement of U.S. remote controlled bombing in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) would unleash violent street demonstrations against the United States.
Pakistan, teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, saddled with 30 percent inflation, stock market down 35 percent, 25 percent unemployment, soaring food prices, and under attack from religious fanatics, was still waiting for a financial bailout from the International Monetary Fund in Washington. The $10.5 billion request was whittled down to $4 billion for immediate needs. Pakistan has to begin paying the debt down at 4 percent in 2011. China agreed to kick in $500 million while further U.S. aid will have to wait for the Obama administration and the new Congress. Dire straits would be an understatement.
Yet the Pakistani army presses ahead with efforts to increase the range, accuracy and lethality of its nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, sparked by what it still believes is a potential Indian threat. There is a constant effort to achieve parity with, or even a qualitative edge over, India.
Pakistani defense correspondent Usman Ansari reported in Defense News that "with the deployment of the 2,500-kilometer Shaheen II, development has shifted to the proposed 3,500 to 4,000-kilometer range Ghauri-III, which is then to be replaced by the 4,000- to 4,500-kilometer Shaheen-III." The world's second-largest Muslim state (165 million people), one of the world's eight nuclear powers, is also working out of the sight of prying Indian, Israeli and Western eyes on MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles) warheads, soon to be fielded on the Shaheen-II ballistic missile.
The interregnum in Washington and the global economic crisis provide a unique opportunity to broaden and deepen the strategic relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Long-term stability requires strengthening the world economy by helping Pakistan get back on its feet, beginning in FATA. Short of a bold stroke, Pakistan and Afghanistan - and FATA in between - remain the world's most dangerous neighborhood.
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large for The Washington Times and for United Press International.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Bitterlemons-International Middle East Roundtable: President Obama and the Middle East II Edition 43 Volume 6 - November 20, 2008
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 43 Volume 6 - November 20, 2008
President Obama and the Middle East II
• Lebanon and US foreign policy - Nizar Abdel-Kader
Lebanon's independence and transition to democracy will be a by-product of an honorable exit strategy from Iraq.
• President-elect Obama, Is Turkey western and European? - Soner Cagaptay
Turkey is the rare country in which anti-western statements actually matter because they help shape people's identity.
• Concerns about the region - Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
Jordan is not perturbed about the future of bilateral relations.
• Limited expectations for a central role - Gamal A. G. Soltan
Egypt is concerned that a hasty American withdrawal from Iraq could cause further deterioration there.
Lebanon and US foreign policy
Nizar Abdel-Kader
People in Lebanon closely followed the election of Barack Obama as the forty-forth United States president. They now speculate whether his policies will deliver positive changes to their country and to the Middle East as a whole. Mostly, they think that the American president will attempt to master all the dynamics of the games in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Many comments in the media assess that the "change" promised during Obama's campaign will affect US behavior toward Iran and Syria as well as Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.
Prominent politicians like Walid Jumblatt describe Obama's election as "an achievement and a sign of a continuous revival of democracy regardless of the position of the Arab world toward US policy in Palestine and in the region". This great achievement comes at a time when many western democracies have become "old" and while the Arab world has not moved forward toward better governance.
The government of PM Fuad Siniora and the March 14 coalition are expressing the hope that Obama will keep backing the legitimate government of Lebanon in its struggle to ensure implementation of the "Cedars Revolution" objectives: to achieve total independence and sovereignty for the country and to ensure justice through the Hariri international tribunal that is expected to start functioning at about the same time Obama takes office.
There are hopes within the March 14 coalition that Obama's policy will be based on some of the promises he made during his campaign: "It's time to engage in diplomatic efforts to help build a new Lebanese consensus that focuses on electoral reform, an end to the current corrupt patronage system and the development of the economy that provides for a fair distribution of services, opportunities and employment." Yet this prescription to solve some aspects of the Lebanese crisis does not represent a clear understanding of the dynamics in Lebanon and especially of the role played by Hizballah inside and outside the government and its key role in Iranian and Syrian designs for Lebanon and the region. Obama ought to recognize that Syria and Iran are not playing a constructive role in Iraq and Palestine and they remain the masterminds behind the violence and the continuous crisis in Lebanon.
In reality, only minor changes in US foreign policy toward Lebanon and the Middle East are expected from the Obama administration in the foreseeable future, particularly in view of the heavy burdens left by the Bush administration, especially regarding the economic situation. There are other more important Middle East issues than Lebanon that will take priority on Obama's agenda, e.g., Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Lebanon, however, will benefit from a positive outcome on any of these issues.
There is conviction among government officials in Beirut that the basics of US foreign policy do not change very quickly with the change of presidents and that consequently the Bush policy of backing the legitimate government and the Lebanese armed forces will continue. From 2006 to 2008, the US government provided more than one billion dollars in assistance to Lebanon, including nearly $380 million in military aid. It's expected the new administration will remain convinced that Lebanon cannot survive if the US ceases its help to strengthen the Lebanese army. In this regard it is unimaginable that any difference could exist between Obama's and Bush's policies because both reject the idea of Lebanon falling under the hegemony of Hizballah and other Syrian proxies.
The Obama administration should continue backing the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, with special care to stop Israeli violations of Resolution 1701 that ended 33 days of war between Israel and Hizballah and created a buffer zone between the two belligerents. While the majority of Lebanese agree that US policy toward Hizballah is unlikely to change, the new administration should not pressure the Lebanese government to disarm Hizballah by coercive means; this task should be left to be resolved through national dialogue.
Such action must not lessen US support for Lebanon's sovereignty and the implementation of 1701 with all its provisions. Nor should Iran and Syria be allowed to become the real winners from the new status gained by Hizballah through the Doha agreement that gave the opposition veto power in the cabinet of ministers.
The new US administration should not allow Syria and Israel to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip in their negotiations for a peace settlement. Special attention should be paid to stop both parties from diminishing Lebanon's sovereignty or using Lebanon to ameliorate the position of one or the other in negotiations. Indeed, bringing Lebanon itself to the negotiating table as an independent player should remain a high US priority. Lebanon is ready for peace if it is given the freedom and the opportunity.
It is well understood that Iraq will be a focal point for the new administration; however, attaching importance to ending the US involvement in Iraq should not be a cause for neglecting US goals in Lebanon. Eventually it is hoped that Lebanon's independence and transition to democracy will be a by-product of an honorable exit strategy from Iraq.
Last but not least, Obama should offer unequivocal support for the international tribunal to try the assassins of Rafiq Hariri.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar in Beirut.
President-elect Obama, Is Turkey western and European?
Soner Cagaptay
Dear President-elect Obama,
Obamania in Turkey will help you change America's image, but I fear it will be insufficient to change Turkey's behavior. After spending three months in Turkey, I have some suggestions for your Turkey policy. Today, Turkey faces tough choices between Iran and the West and between European Union membership and the abysmal alternative. As a liberal, you are no doubt committed to Turkey's western and European inclinations. You can help prod the Turks in the right direction by confirming these identities. Washington has repeatedly said that it considers Turkey a western and European country, but it has not treated Turkey as one. Washington has not given Turkey western-level assistance against terrorism, nor has it assessed Turkey's domestic environment by European benchmarks.
The litmus test of whether Washington considers Turkey western is US assistance to Ankara against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terror attacks. Washington has provided strong counter-terrorism assistance to its western allies, from the United Kingdom to Colombia. Vis-a-vis the PKK presence in northern Iraq, however, the Bush administration has given Turkey delayed and limited support. Dear President-elect Obama, signal to Turkey that you see it as a full member of the western alliance by providing full support against the PKK.
Despite close cooperation with the United States on Iraq, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has been bashing America at home in an attempt to boost its own popularity. Do not dismiss the AKP's rhetoric as benign domestic politicking. While an anti-western statement by a Danish politician could be dismissed as "crazy" and the same statement by an Egyptian might be considered "normal", Turkey is neither Denmark nor Egypt. This is the rare country in which anti-western statements actually matter because they help shape people's identity.
For Turkey to commit itself to the West, the AKP has to make an effort. Since the AKP assumed power in 2002, the Turks have heard nothing positive about the West or the United States from their leadership. Today Turkey is the most anti-American nation in the world; a recent Pew Center poll shows that only 12 percent of the Turks have a favorable view of the United States. Anti-Americanism places Turkey's cooperation on foreign policy issues at risk. Turkey is not Saudi Arabia. Turkey being a democracy, when the Turks turn anti-American eventually Turkish foreign policy, too, will turn anti-American.
The lesson for you, President-elect Obama, is clear: given this anti-western rhetoric and the tenuous Turkish attachment to the West, your strategy must be to constantly remind Turks that they belong to the West. Hence, my next suggestion: you must recognize that while the United States cannot stop this entrenched anti-Americanism altogether, the AKP government can. You should make this issue a part of your conversation with Ankara, demanding zero tolerance toward official anti-American and anti-western rhetoric in Turkey.
My final suggestion concerns Turkey's European vocation. After coming to power in 2002, the AKP initially pushed for EU accession. However, just as Turkey began membership talks with the EU in 2005, the party's appetite for a European Turkey waned. As Turkey moved closer to the EU, it slipped away from Europe and its values. Various indices reveal an alarming phenomenon: Turkey is less free and equal today than it was when the AKP assumed power in 2002. According to the UNDP's gender empowerment index, in 2002 Turkey ranked 63 in the world. Today, it has slipped dramatically to 90. The World Economic Forum's gender gap report shows a similar startling slip, from 105 in 2002 to 123 in 2008. Freedom House's freedom of press index reports that Turkish media is less free today than it was in 2002, slipping from 100 in 2002 to 103 in 2008.
You should expect from the AKP's Turkey what you expect from any liberal European democracy. A diplomat friend once said, "Turkey is in good shape, because its Islamists would be democrats in Egypt." True, but while Turkey's population is predominantly Muslim like Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, its political system is a secular democracy like Europe's and Turkey is an aspiring EU member. Comparing Turkey politically to Muslim yet undemocratic Egypt is as anachronistic as comparing the United States to Christian yet undemocratic Belarus. As Turkey goes soul-searching for what it means to be a liberal, secular democracy, your political yardstick for Turkey should be Italy and France--not Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Dear President-elect Obama, given Turkey's location it is important for you to get Turkey right to achieve success in Iraq, Iran, Georgia and Afghanistan. But you also need to get Turkey right to bring this country as a pro-western, liberal democracy into Europe and the western fold.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey (2006).
Concerns about the region
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
Jordan's King Abdullah has every reason to celebrate the landslide victory of US president-elect Barack Obama.
Both men, 46, had immediate rapport at their first one-on-one meeting in Amman on July 22--on the third leg of a carefully choreographed trip designed to boost Obama's foreign policy and military credentials in the run up to the presidential race.
Back then, and according to a palace aide who attended the private dinner, Obama was so impressed with the youthful style of King Abdullah's leadership, domestic modernization drive and relentless effort to find a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that he told him: "Your Majesty, we need to clone you."
Afterwards, and in a rare gesture of royal appreciation, the monarch personally drove his guest to the airport, and he was the first Arab leader to congratulate Obama by phone after his election victory on Nov. 4. He urged him to take immediate steps to realize a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an issue he had raised at their Amman encounter. In the eyes of moderate Arab leaders, this is vital for restoring US credibility in the region after years of failed American diplomacy. The king, like most Arab leaders, also hopes Obama will solve Washington's standoff with Iran through diplomatic means and agree with the Iraqi government on a timetable for a withdrawal of US troops under a pact that is accepted by all parties in Iraq.
The king will visit Washington next February, say diplomats, making him the first Arab leader to visit the White House under Obama. This comes at a time when Jordanian-US ties have never been so strong.
Amman is among the largest recipients of US military and economic aid. In 2008 alone, it was promised $910 million, up from $450 in 2007 in recognition of its role as a linchpin for regional peace and for its effort to fight terrorism through strong intelligence sharing.
In a nutshell, Jordan, whose ties with Washington have always transcended bipartisan politics, is not perturbed about the future of bilateral relations. What worries King Abdullah is the political future of Jordan, resulting from stalled peace efforts since the US launched a Middle East peace conference in Madrid in 1991. He wants Obama to demand a halt to all settlement activity while proceeding with practical measures to realize a two-state solution.
The creation of an independent, territorially contiguous and viable Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, next to Israel, is Jordan's key strategic goal to ensure political stability and the survival of the Hashemite regime in a country where half the population is of Palestinian origin. The alternative is a Palestinian state in Jordan, an idea long promoted by the Jewish right.
A two-state solution is a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Arab peace initiative, first launched in 2002 and repackaged in 2007. It allows 57 Arab and Muslim states to recognize Israel's right to exist in return for peace and security guarantees. So far Israel has not accepted the initiative--although President Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni have recently expressed willingness to negotiate the terms of the plan, a proposal rejected by the Arabs.
Any revived peace effort will boost the image of pro-US leaders in the region, who have lost popular credibility for banking on the success of peace initiatives promoted by President George W. Bush since 2000--starting with the roadmap and ending with the Annapolis conference in November 2007.
They feel that Bush has taken them for a ride, boosting the power of hardliners like Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah, and allowing Israel time to build more settlements and set up a separation wall snaking in and around the West Bank while discrediting the Palestinian Authority led by President Mahmoud Abbas.
For now, Arab moderate leaders remain wary of admitting in public that the peace process is dead for lack of a tenable alternative. They want Obama to "shepherd" a real process leading to the creation of a Palestinian state, the lack of which remains the root cause of all regional conflicts and continued anti-US terror threats.
But they also know that the new president, who will continue to nurture the impregnable American-Israeli alliance and will face pressure by the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington, will devote his first few months in office to deal with the economic crisis before taking on Iraq and Afghanistan. He will also have to wait for the outcome of early Israeli parliamentary elections in February and for the results of Egyptian-led Arab efforts to unify Palestinian ranks.
For now, Jordan is bracing for the worse-case scenario: a worsening political, security and economic situation in the Palestinian territories and the election of a Likud-led government in Israel, two factors that could force all sides to push Jordan and Egypt into assuming some form of responsibility over the nearby territories. This is one of the main reasons that have encouraged Jordan to revive relations with Hamas after a 10-year break and to seek improved ties with Syria.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour is a journalist and former chief editor of the Jordan Times.
Limited expectations for a central role
Gamal A. G. Soltan
Barack Obama's electoral victory has been received warmly in most of the Arab world, Egypt included. The region is guardedly optimistic. But you don't need to be a cynic to curb your expectations of an incoming US president regarding the Middle East. Peoples and governments in the region have learned to keep their expectations low when it comes to American foreign policy.
There is no reason to see in Obama anything but a genuine realist. In his campaign discourse, he refrained from making strong moral arguments detached from the American national interest. A realist leadership in America can better serve the interests of the US, its allies and the world-at-large.
This is exactly what the Bush administration failed to do. Deviating from the established principles of realist foreign policy, the Bush administration committed a number of serious mistakes. These included the simplistic dichotomous vision of a world divided between forces of good and evil, the messianic vision of an American role in bringing democracy to the Middle East, allowing ideological blinders to distort American Middle East policy and ignoring the reality of power distribution on the global and regional levels.
The outgoing administration also displayed an unrealistic belief in American power and its ability to achieve American goals regardless of the opposition and resistance of other world and regional powers, marginalized diplomacy in the package of instruments applied toward the pursuance of US foreign policy and overemphasized the role of military power in achieving American goals. The expected return to realism under an Obama presidency is what generates the guarded optimism that can be sensed in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.
The Middle East is the region that was hurt most during President Bush's years in power. Egyptian national interests have been negatively affected by Bush's policy in a number of ways. The Iraq invasion resulted in the formation and rise of a radical bloc led by Iran that undermined the interests of moderate governments. Ignoring the Middle East peace process removed a safety valve that used to be instrumental in maintaining regional stability. Ill-advised policy initiatives in Palestine were instrumental in the creation of a Hamas-led mini-state on Egypt's borders. And changing attitudes in Washington regarding relations with Egypt made the US less than a reliable ally.
During the Bush years, American-Egyptian relations were at their lowest ebb since the resumption of relations between the two countries in the mid-1970s. Under Bush, the US was on the losing side in the Middle East along with its regional allies, including Egypt. Cairo is looking forward to a reversal of this trend with the coming administration. Once again, this is the backdrop to the sense of guarded optimism felt in Egypt.
Three Middle East issues figured prominently in Obama's campaign: Iraq, dialogue with Iran and Syria and Arab-Israel peace. Tackling the situation in Iraq is a priority for the president-elect. Iraq is not only a pressing issue in US foreign policy; it is also a matter of legitimacy and credibility for the president-elect. Obama's pledge to withdraw from Iraq has had a relaxing effect on the political atmosphere in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Egypt and other countries in the region are concerned that a hasty American withdrawal from Iraq could cause further deterioration in the situation there. Safe withdrawal is a policy that would better serve stability in the Middle East. Consultation with relevant countries is needed to collectively contribute to the avoidance of a power vacuum should American troops be rushed out of Iraq.
Dialogue with Iran and Syria is another element in the incoming administration's Middle East policy. A diplomatic orientation that uses dialogue as a foreign policy tool rather than a reward is highly constructive. However, putting Syria and Iran in the same basket does not serve the desired goals; a distinction should be made between the two countries.
Syria has a number of legitimate demands that should be accommodated. Ending the Israeli occupation of the Golan, obtaining security guarantees and the reversal of the policy of regime change that was directed against Damascus during the outgoing administration's years are legitimate Syrian demands. Iran, on the other hand, subscribes to a hard-line revisionist policy in the Middle East. Dialogue with Iran should not come at the expense of Iraq or requirements for long-term stability in the region.
Even though it is strongly believed in Egypt that the Arab-Israel conflict is by far the most important source of instability in the region, it is understandable that the incoming Obama administration is compelled to emphasize the more pressing issues of Iraq and Iran. Advancing the priority status of the Middle East conflict on Obama's agenda requires hard work from regional actors. A sudden outburst of violence in the region could be effective in drawing Obama's attention to the Middle East--but not necessarily in the right direction. Improving the chances of a political settlement in the region might be a safer way to encourage the new administration to activate the US role in leading the peace process.
A lot of coordinated efforts are needed at the regional level to ensure constructive American involvement in the Middle East. On the US side, Obama's administration needs to take an independent position vis-a-vis the diverse Middle East parties. The role of impartial, honest and committed peace broker is badly needed from the US.
Egypt looks forward to the restoration of the working relationship it had with the US prior to 9/11. Here a resumption of the strategic and political dialogue between Egypt and the US at the leadership level is instrumental. Renewal of talks about a bilateral free trade agreement could be a litmus test for the new administration's intentions toward Egypt. The US, which was instrumental in facilitating Egypt's economic reform in the 1990s, could now contribute to further economic reforms, but this time through trade, not aid.
The restrained optimism and the limited expectations that peoples and governments in the Middle East have regarding Barak Obama's presidency are convenient for the Obama foreign policy team that is expected to assume responsibility shortly. But this should not cause it to back off from dealing with Middle East problems. No matter how low the expectations from the incoming administration, they will not prevent the peoples and governments of the region from blaming the next president should things stagnate or deteriorate further.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Gamal A. G. Soltan is a senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and a visiting professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.
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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 43 Volume 6 - November 20, 2008
President Obama and the Middle East II
• Lebanon and US foreign policy - Nizar Abdel-Kader
Lebanon's independence and transition to democracy will be a by-product of an honorable exit strategy from Iraq.
• President-elect Obama, Is Turkey western and European? - Soner Cagaptay
Turkey is the rare country in which anti-western statements actually matter because they help shape people's identity.
• Concerns about the region - Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
Jordan is not perturbed about the future of bilateral relations.
• Limited expectations for a central role - Gamal A. G. Soltan
Egypt is concerned that a hasty American withdrawal from Iraq could cause further deterioration there.
Lebanon and US foreign policy
Nizar Abdel-Kader
People in Lebanon closely followed the election of Barack Obama as the forty-forth United States president. They now speculate whether his policies will deliver positive changes to their country and to the Middle East as a whole. Mostly, they think that the American president will attempt to master all the dynamics of the games in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Many comments in the media assess that the "change" promised during Obama's campaign will affect US behavior toward Iran and Syria as well as Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.
Prominent politicians like Walid Jumblatt describe Obama's election as "an achievement and a sign of a continuous revival of democracy regardless of the position of the Arab world toward US policy in Palestine and in the region". This great achievement comes at a time when many western democracies have become "old" and while the Arab world has not moved forward toward better governance.
The government of PM Fuad Siniora and the March 14 coalition are expressing the hope that Obama will keep backing the legitimate government of Lebanon in its struggle to ensure implementation of the "Cedars Revolution" objectives: to achieve total independence and sovereignty for the country and to ensure justice through the Hariri international tribunal that is expected to start functioning at about the same time Obama takes office.
There are hopes within the March 14 coalition that Obama's policy will be based on some of the promises he made during his campaign: "It's time to engage in diplomatic efforts to help build a new Lebanese consensus that focuses on electoral reform, an end to the current corrupt patronage system and the development of the economy that provides for a fair distribution of services, opportunities and employment." Yet this prescription to solve some aspects of the Lebanese crisis does not represent a clear understanding of the dynamics in Lebanon and especially of the role played by Hizballah inside and outside the government and its key role in Iranian and Syrian designs for Lebanon and the region. Obama ought to recognize that Syria and Iran are not playing a constructive role in Iraq and Palestine and they remain the masterminds behind the violence and the continuous crisis in Lebanon.
In reality, only minor changes in US foreign policy toward Lebanon and the Middle East are expected from the Obama administration in the foreseeable future, particularly in view of the heavy burdens left by the Bush administration, especially regarding the economic situation. There are other more important Middle East issues than Lebanon that will take priority on Obama's agenda, e.g., Iraq, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Lebanon, however, will benefit from a positive outcome on any of these issues.
There is conviction among government officials in Beirut that the basics of US foreign policy do not change very quickly with the change of presidents and that consequently the Bush policy of backing the legitimate government and the Lebanese armed forces will continue. From 2006 to 2008, the US government provided more than one billion dollars in assistance to Lebanon, including nearly $380 million in military aid. It's expected the new administration will remain convinced that Lebanon cannot survive if the US ceases its help to strengthen the Lebanese army. In this regard it is unimaginable that any difference could exist between Obama's and Bush's policies because both reject the idea of Lebanon falling under the hegemony of Hizballah and other Syrian proxies.
The Obama administration should continue backing the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, with special care to stop Israeli violations of Resolution 1701 that ended 33 days of war between Israel and Hizballah and created a buffer zone between the two belligerents. While the majority of Lebanese agree that US policy toward Hizballah is unlikely to change, the new administration should not pressure the Lebanese government to disarm Hizballah by coercive means; this task should be left to be resolved through national dialogue.
Such action must not lessen US support for Lebanon's sovereignty and the implementation of 1701 with all its provisions. Nor should Iran and Syria be allowed to become the real winners from the new status gained by Hizballah through the Doha agreement that gave the opposition veto power in the cabinet of ministers.
The new US administration should not allow Syria and Israel to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip in their negotiations for a peace settlement. Special attention should be paid to stop both parties from diminishing Lebanon's sovereignty or using Lebanon to ameliorate the position of one or the other in negotiations. Indeed, bringing Lebanon itself to the negotiating table as an independent player should remain a high US priority. Lebanon is ready for peace if it is given the freedom and the opportunity.
It is well understood that Iraq will be a focal point for the new administration; however, attaching importance to ending the US involvement in Iraq should not be a cause for neglecting US goals in Lebanon. Eventually it is hoped that Lebanon's independence and transition to democracy will be a by-product of an honorable exit strategy from Iraq.
Last but not least, Obama should offer unequivocal support for the international tribunal to try the assassins of Rafiq Hariri.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar in Beirut.
President-elect Obama, Is Turkey western and European?
Soner Cagaptay
Dear President-elect Obama,
Obamania in Turkey will help you change America's image, but I fear it will be insufficient to change Turkey's behavior. After spending three months in Turkey, I have some suggestions for your Turkey policy. Today, Turkey faces tough choices between Iran and the West and between European Union membership and the abysmal alternative. As a liberal, you are no doubt committed to Turkey's western and European inclinations. You can help prod the Turks in the right direction by confirming these identities. Washington has repeatedly said that it considers Turkey a western and European country, but it has not treated Turkey as one. Washington has not given Turkey western-level assistance against terrorism, nor has it assessed Turkey's domestic environment by European benchmarks.
The litmus test of whether Washington considers Turkey western is US assistance to Ankara against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terror attacks. Washington has provided strong counter-terrorism assistance to its western allies, from the United Kingdom to Colombia. Vis-a-vis the PKK presence in northern Iraq, however, the Bush administration has given Turkey delayed and limited support. Dear President-elect Obama, signal to Turkey that you see it as a full member of the western alliance by providing full support against the PKK.
Despite close cooperation with the United States on Iraq, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has been bashing America at home in an attempt to boost its own popularity. Do not dismiss the AKP's rhetoric as benign domestic politicking. While an anti-western statement by a Danish politician could be dismissed as "crazy" and the same statement by an Egyptian might be considered "normal", Turkey is neither Denmark nor Egypt. This is the rare country in which anti-western statements actually matter because they help shape people's identity.
For Turkey to commit itself to the West, the AKP has to make an effort. Since the AKP assumed power in 2002, the Turks have heard nothing positive about the West or the United States from their leadership. Today Turkey is the most anti-American nation in the world; a recent Pew Center poll shows that only 12 percent of the Turks have a favorable view of the United States. Anti-Americanism places Turkey's cooperation on foreign policy issues at risk. Turkey is not Saudi Arabia. Turkey being a democracy, when the Turks turn anti-American eventually Turkish foreign policy, too, will turn anti-American.
The lesson for you, President-elect Obama, is clear: given this anti-western rhetoric and the tenuous Turkish attachment to the West, your strategy must be to constantly remind Turks that they belong to the West. Hence, my next suggestion: you must recognize that while the United States cannot stop this entrenched anti-Americanism altogether, the AKP government can. You should make this issue a part of your conversation with Ankara, demanding zero tolerance toward official anti-American and anti-western rhetoric in Turkey.
My final suggestion concerns Turkey's European vocation. After coming to power in 2002, the AKP initially pushed for EU accession. However, just as Turkey began membership talks with the EU in 2005, the party's appetite for a European Turkey waned. As Turkey moved closer to the EU, it slipped away from Europe and its values. Various indices reveal an alarming phenomenon: Turkey is less free and equal today than it was when the AKP assumed power in 2002. According to the UNDP's gender empowerment index, in 2002 Turkey ranked 63 in the world. Today, it has slipped dramatically to 90. The World Economic Forum's gender gap report shows a similar startling slip, from 105 in 2002 to 123 in 2008. Freedom House's freedom of press index reports that Turkish media is less free today than it was in 2002, slipping from 100 in 2002 to 103 in 2008.
You should expect from the AKP's Turkey what you expect from any liberal European democracy. A diplomat friend once said, "Turkey is in good shape, because its Islamists would be democrats in Egypt." True, but while Turkey's population is predominantly Muslim like Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, its political system is a secular democracy like Europe's and Turkey is an aspiring EU member. Comparing Turkey politically to Muslim yet undemocratic Egypt is as anachronistic as comparing the United States to Christian yet undemocratic Belarus. As Turkey goes soul-searching for what it means to be a liberal, secular democracy, your political yardstick for Turkey should be Italy and France--not Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Dear President-elect Obama, given Turkey's location it is important for you to get Turkey right to achieve success in Iraq, Iran, Georgia and Afghanistan. But you also need to get Turkey right to bring this country as a pro-western, liberal democracy into Europe and the western fold.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey (2006).
Concerns about the region
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour
Jordan's King Abdullah has every reason to celebrate the landslide victory of US president-elect Barack Obama.
Both men, 46, had immediate rapport at their first one-on-one meeting in Amman on July 22--on the third leg of a carefully choreographed trip designed to boost Obama's foreign policy and military credentials in the run up to the presidential race.
Back then, and according to a palace aide who attended the private dinner, Obama was so impressed with the youthful style of King Abdullah's leadership, domestic modernization drive and relentless effort to find a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that he told him: "Your Majesty, we need to clone you."
Afterwards, and in a rare gesture of royal appreciation, the monarch personally drove his guest to the airport, and he was the first Arab leader to congratulate Obama by phone after his election victory on Nov. 4. He urged him to take immediate steps to realize a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an issue he had raised at their Amman encounter. In the eyes of moderate Arab leaders, this is vital for restoring US credibility in the region after years of failed American diplomacy. The king, like most Arab leaders, also hopes Obama will solve Washington's standoff with Iran through diplomatic means and agree with the Iraqi government on a timetable for a withdrawal of US troops under a pact that is accepted by all parties in Iraq.
The king will visit Washington next February, say diplomats, making him the first Arab leader to visit the White House under Obama. This comes at a time when Jordanian-US ties have never been so strong.
Amman is among the largest recipients of US military and economic aid. In 2008 alone, it was promised $910 million, up from $450 in 2007 in recognition of its role as a linchpin for regional peace and for its effort to fight terrorism through strong intelligence sharing.
In a nutshell, Jordan, whose ties with Washington have always transcended bipartisan politics, is not perturbed about the future of bilateral relations. What worries King Abdullah is the political future of Jordan, resulting from stalled peace efforts since the US launched a Middle East peace conference in Madrid in 1991. He wants Obama to demand a halt to all settlement activity while proceeding with practical measures to realize a two-state solution.
The creation of an independent, territorially contiguous and viable Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, next to Israel, is Jordan's key strategic goal to ensure political stability and the survival of the Hashemite regime in a country where half the population is of Palestinian origin. The alternative is a Palestinian state in Jordan, an idea long promoted by the Jewish right.
A two-state solution is a prerequisite for the full implementation of the Arab peace initiative, first launched in 2002 and repackaged in 2007. It allows 57 Arab and Muslim states to recognize Israel's right to exist in return for peace and security guarantees. So far Israel has not accepted the initiative--although President Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni have recently expressed willingness to negotiate the terms of the plan, a proposal rejected by the Arabs.
Any revived peace effort will boost the image of pro-US leaders in the region, who have lost popular credibility for banking on the success of peace initiatives promoted by President George W. Bush since 2000--starting with the roadmap and ending with the Annapolis conference in November 2007.
They feel that Bush has taken them for a ride, boosting the power of hardliners like Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah, and allowing Israel time to build more settlements and set up a separation wall snaking in and around the West Bank while discrediting the Palestinian Authority led by President Mahmoud Abbas.
For now, Arab moderate leaders remain wary of admitting in public that the peace process is dead for lack of a tenable alternative. They want Obama to "shepherd" a real process leading to the creation of a Palestinian state, the lack of which remains the root cause of all regional conflicts and continued anti-US terror threats.
But they also know that the new president, who will continue to nurture the impregnable American-Israeli alliance and will face pressure by the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington, will devote his first few months in office to deal with the economic crisis before taking on Iraq and Afghanistan. He will also have to wait for the outcome of early Israeli parliamentary elections in February and for the results of Egyptian-led Arab efforts to unify Palestinian ranks.
For now, Jordan is bracing for the worse-case scenario: a worsening political, security and economic situation in the Palestinian territories and the election of a Likud-led government in Israel, two factors that could force all sides to push Jordan and Egypt into assuming some form of responsibility over the nearby territories. This is one of the main reasons that have encouraged Jordan to revive relations with Hamas after a 10-year break and to seek improved ties with Syria.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour is a journalist and former chief editor of the Jordan Times.
Limited expectations for a central role
Gamal A. G. Soltan
Barack Obama's electoral victory has been received warmly in most of the Arab world, Egypt included. The region is guardedly optimistic. But you don't need to be a cynic to curb your expectations of an incoming US president regarding the Middle East. Peoples and governments in the region have learned to keep their expectations low when it comes to American foreign policy.
There is no reason to see in Obama anything but a genuine realist. In his campaign discourse, he refrained from making strong moral arguments detached from the American national interest. A realist leadership in America can better serve the interests of the US, its allies and the world-at-large.
This is exactly what the Bush administration failed to do. Deviating from the established principles of realist foreign policy, the Bush administration committed a number of serious mistakes. These included the simplistic dichotomous vision of a world divided between forces of good and evil, the messianic vision of an American role in bringing democracy to the Middle East, allowing ideological blinders to distort American Middle East policy and ignoring the reality of power distribution on the global and regional levels.
The outgoing administration also displayed an unrealistic belief in American power and its ability to achieve American goals regardless of the opposition and resistance of other world and regional powers, marginalized diplomacy in the package of instruments applied toward the pursuance of US foreign policy and overemphasized the role of military power in achieving American goals. The expected return to realism under an Obama presidency is what generates the guarded optimism that can be sensed in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.
The Middle East is the region that was hurt most during President Bush's years in power. Egyptian national interests have been negatively affected by Bush's policy in a number of ways. The Iraq invasion resulted in the formation and rise of a radical bloc led by Iran that undermined the interests of moderate governments. Ignoring the Middle East peace process removed a safety valve that used to be instrumental in maintaining regional stability. Ill-advised policy initiatives in Palestine were instrumental in the creation of a Hamas-led mini-state on Egypt's borders. And changing attitudes in Washington regarding relations with Egypt made the US less than a reliable ally.
During the Bush years, American-Egyptian relations were at their lowest ebb since the resumption of relations between the two countries in the mid-1970s. Under Bush, the US was on the losing side in the Middle East along with its regional allies, including Egypt. Cairo is looking forward to a reversal of this trend with the coming administration. Once again, this is the backdrop to the sense of guarded optimism felt in Egypt.
Three Middle East issues figured prominently in Obama's campaign: Iraq, dialogue with Iran and Syria and Arab-Israel peace. Tackling the situation in Iraq is a priority for the president-elect. Iraq is not only a pressing issue in US foreign policy; it is also a matter of legitimacy and credibility for the president-elect. Obama's pledge to withdraw from Iraq has had a relaxing effect on the political atmosphere in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Egypt and other countries in the region are concerned that a hasty American withdrawal from Iraq could cause further deterioration in the situation there. Safe withdrawal is a policy that would better serve stability in the Middle East. Consultation with relevant countries is needed to collectively contribute to the avoidance of a power vacuum should American troops be rushed out of Iraq.
Dialogue with Iran and Syria is another element in the incoming administration's Middle East policy. A diplomatic orientation that uses dialogue as a foreign policy tool rather than a reward is highly constructive. However, putting Syria and Iran in the same basket does not serve the desired goals; a distinction should be made between the two countries.
Syria has a number of legitimate demands that should be accommodated. Ending the Israeli occupation of the Golan, obtaining security guarantees and the reversal of the policy of regime change that was directed against Damascus during the outgoing administration's years are legitimate Syrian demands. Iran, on the other hand, subscribes to a hard-line revisionist policy in the Middle East. Dialogue with Iran should not come at the expense of Iraq or requirements for long-term stability in the region.
Even though it is strongly believed in Egypt that the Arab-Israel conflict is by far the most important source of instability in the region, it is understandable that the incoming Obama administration is compelled to emphasize the more pressing issues of Iraq and Iran. Advancing the priority status of the Middle East conflict on Obama's agenda requires hard work from regional actors. A sudden outburst of violence in the region could be effective in drawing Obama's attention to the Middle East--but not necessarily in the right direction. Improving the chances of a political settlement in the region might be a safer way to encourage the new administration to activate the US role in leading the peace process.
A lot of coordinated efforts are needed at the regional level to ensure constructive American involvement in the Middle East. On the US side, Obama's administration needs to take an independent position vis-a-vis the diverse Middle East parties. The role of impartial, honest and committed peace broker is badly needed from the US.
Egypt looks forward to the restoration of the working relationship it had with the US prior to 9/11. Here a resumption of the strategic and political dialogue between Egypt and the US at the leadership level is instrumental. Renewal of talks about a bilateral free trade agreement could be a litmus test for the new administration's intentions toward Egypt. The US, which was instrumental in facilitating Egypt's economic reform in the 1990s, could now contribute to further economic reforms, but this time through trade, not aid.
The restrained optimism and the limited expectations that peoples and governments in the Middle East have regarding Barak Obama's presidency are convenient for the Obama foreign policy team that is expected to assume responsibility shortly. But this should not cause it to back off from dealing with Middle East problems. No matter how low the expectations from the incoming administration, they will not prevent the peoples and governments of the region from blaming the next president should things stagnate or deteriorate further.- Published 20/11/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Gamal A. G. Soltan is a senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and a visiting professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.
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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
A BONE IN AMERICA'S THROAT by Jeff Halper
A BONE IN AMERICA'S THROAT
Jeff Halper
Even before the voting began, Israeli politicians and pundits were asking: Will
an Obama Administration be good for Israel? "Be good for Israel" is our code for
"Will the US allow us to keep our settlements and continue to support our
efforts to prevent negotiations with the Palestinians from ever bearing fruit?"
For Americans the question should be: Will the Obama Administration understand
that without addressing Palestinian needs it will not be able to disentangle
itself from its broader Middle Eastern imbroglios, rejoin the community of
nations and rescue its economy?
The Israel-Palestine conflict should be of central concern to Americans, near
the top of the new Administration's agenda. It may not be the bloodiest conflict
in the world – its minor when compared to Iraq – but it is emblematic to Muslims
and to peoples the world over of American hostility and belligerence. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not merely a localized one between two
squabbling tribes. It lies at the epicenter of global instability. Go where you
may in the world and you will encounter the same phenomenon: a sense that the
suffering of the Palestinians represents all that is wrong in an
American-dominated world.
As Obama comes into office, he will encounter a global reality very different
from that of eight years before: a multilateral one in which a weakened and
isolated US must find its place. He will discover that much of America's
isolation comes from the view that the Occupation of the Palestinian territories
is, in fact, an American-Israeli Occupation. If restoring a weakened American
economy depends on repairing relations with the rest of the world, he will learn
that without resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict he will not create those
conditions in which the US will be accepted once more into the wider global
community.
To be more specific, the Israel-Palestine conflict directly affects Americans in
at least five ways:
· It isolates the US from major global markets, forcing it to embark on
aggressive measures to secure markets rather than peaceful accommodation;
· It thereby diverts the American economy into non-productive production
(tanks not roads), making it dependent upon deficit spending which only
increases dependency upon foreign financing while diverting resources into the
military rather than into education, health and investment;
· Support for the Israeli military costs US taxpayers more than $3
billion annually at a time of deepening recession and crumbling national
infrastructure;
· It leads to an American involvement in the world that is mainly
military, thus begetting hostility and resistance which produce the threats to
security Americans so greatly fear; and
· It ends up threatening American civil liberties by encouraging such
legislation as the Patriot Act and by introducing Israeli "counterinsurgency"
tactics and weaponry developed in the West Bank and Gaza into American police
forces.
For many peoples of th e world, the Palestinians represent the plight of the
majority. They are the tiny grains of sand resisting what most Americans and
privileged people of the West do not see. They are a people who are denied the
most fundamental right: to a state of their own, even on the 22% of historic
Palestine that Israel has occupied since 1967. For the majority of humanity that
lives in economic and political conditions unimaginable in the West, the
suffering caused by Israel's occupation – impoverishment and a total denial of
freedom that can only be sustained by total American support – is emblematic of
their own continued suffering. Israel's oppression of the Palestinians with the
active backing of the US shows demonstrably the existence of a global system of
Western domination that prevents others from achieving their own dreams of
political and economic well-being.
Like a bone in the throat, the issue of Israel's occupation can be neither
ignored nor by-passed. To make things even more difficult, it is doubtful if a
two-state solution is still possible, since Israeli settlement activity has
largely eliminated that option. Whatever the eventual solution, if this most
destabilizing of conflicts is not addressed, the US – even under Obama – will
remain mired in conflicts with Muslim peoples and reviled by peoples seeking
genuine freedom. Neither the US nor Israel will find the security they claim
they seek. We live in a global reality, not a Pax Americana. The logic of the
Bush Administration has run its course. No longer can the US throw its weight
around in a War Against Terror. No longer can its involvement be purely
military. The new logic that will accompany Obama into office can be summarized
in one word: accommodation. And the US will not get to first base until it
achieves accommodation with the Muslim world, which means ending the Israeli
Occupation. What happens to the Palestinians takes on a global significance.
Clearing the bone in the throat – that is, ending the Israeli Occupation and
allowing the Palestinians a state and a future of their own – should be a top
priority of the next American administration. Indeed, America's attempt to
restore its standing in the world depends on it. In the global reality in which
we live, the fate of Americans and Palestinians, it turns out, are closely
intertwined.
(Jeff Halper is the Director of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions.
He can be reached at .)
The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions is based in Jerusalem and has
chapters in the United Kingdom and the United States.
Please visit our websites:
www.icahd.org
www.icahduk.org
www.icahdusa.org
Jeff Halper
Even before the voting began, Israeli politicians and pundits were asking: Will
an Obama Administration be good for Israel? "Be good for Israel" is our code for
"Will the US allow us to keep our settlements and continue to support our
efforts to prevent negotiations with the Palestinians from ever bearing fruit?"
For Americans the question should be: Will the Obama Administration understand
that without addressing Palestinian needs it will not be able to disentangle
itself from its broader Middle Eastern imbroglios, rejoin the community of
nations and rescue its economy?
The Israel-Palestine conflict should be of central concern to Americans, near
the top of the new Administration's agenda. It may not be the bloodiest conflict
in the world – its minor when compared to Iraq – but it is emblematic to Muslims
and to peoples the world over of American hostility and belligerence. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not merely a localized one between two
squabbling tribes. It lies at the epicenter of global instability. Go where you
may in the world and you will encounter the same phenomenon: a sense that the
suffering of the Palestinians represents all that is wrong in an
American-dominated world.
As Obama comes into office, he will encounter a global reality very different
from that of eight years before: a multilateral one in which a weakened and
isolated US must find its place. He will discover that much of America's
isolation comes from the view that the Occupation of the Palestinian territories
is, in fact, an American-Israeli Occupation. If restoring a weakened American
economy depends on repairing relations with the rest of the world, he will learn
that without resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict he will not create those
conditions in which the US will be accepted once more into the wider global
community.
To be more specific, the Israel-Palestine conflict directly affects Americans in
at least five ways:
· It isolates the US from major global markets, forcing it to embark on
aggressive measures to secure markets rather than peaceful accommodation;
· It thereby diverts the American economy into non-productive production
(tanks not roads), making it dependent upon deficit spending which only
increases dependency upon foreign financing while diverting resources into the
military rather than into education, health and investment;
· Support for the Israeli military costs US taxpayers more than $3
billion annually at a time of deepening recession and crumbling national
infrastructure;
· It leads to an American involvement in the world that is mainly
military, thus begetting hostility and resistance which produce the threats to
security Americans so greatly fear; and
· It ends up threatening American civil liberties by encouraging such
legislation as the Patriot Act and by introducing Israeli "counterinsurgency"
tactics and weaponry developed in the West Bank and Gaza into American police
forces.
For many peoples of th e world, the Palestinians represent the plight of the
majority. They are the tiny grains of sand resisting what most Americans and
privileged people of the West do not see. They are a people who are denied the
most fundamental right: to a state of their own, even on the 22% of historic
Palestine that Israel has occupied since 1967. For the majority of humanity that
lives in economic and political conditions unimaginable in the West, the
suffering caused by Israel's occupation – impoverishment and a total denial of
freedom that can only be sustained by total American support – is emblematic of
their own continued suffering. Israel's oppression of the Palestinians with the
active backing of the US shows demonstrably the existence of a global system of
Western domination that prevents others from achieving their own dreams of
political and economic well-being.
Like a bone in the throat, the issue of Israel's occupation can be neither
ignored nor by-passed. To make things even more difficult, it is doubtful if a
two-state solution is still possible, since Israeli settlement activity has
largely eliminated that option. Whatever the eventual solution, if this most
destabilizing of conflicts is not addressed, the US – even under Obama – will
remain mired in conflicts with Muslim peoples and reviled by peoples seeking
genuine freedom. Neither the US nor Israel will find the security they claim
they seek. We live in a global reality, not a Pax Americana. The logic of the
Bush Administration has run its course. No longer can the US throw its weight
around in a War Against Terror. No longer can its involvement be purely
military. The new logic that will accompany Obama into office can be summarized
in one word: accommodation. And the US will not get to first base until it
achieves accommodation with the Muslim world, which means ending the Israeli
Occupation. What happens to the Palestinians takes on a global significance.
Clearing the bone in the throat – that is, ending the Israeli Occupation and
allowing the Palestinians a state and a future of their own – should be a top
priority of the next American administration. Indeed, America's attempt to
restore its standing in the world depends on it. In the global reality in which
we live, the fate of Americans and Palestinians, it turns out, are closely
intertwined.
(Jeff Halper is the Director of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions.
He can be reached at .)
The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions is based in Jerusalem and has
chapters in the United Kingdom and the United States.
Please visit our websites:
www.icahd.org
www.icahduk.org
www.icahdusa.org
Britain and Syria Resume Intelligence Sharing Joshua Landis
SYRIA COMMENT
11/19/08
Britain and Syria Resume Intelligence Sharing
Joshua Landis
Two pieces of important news. Al-Baradei claims that the traces of uranium discovered at the Euphrates bomb site do not mean there was a reactor. He has demanded greater Syrian and Israeli cooperation. The Syrians are unlikely to allow further teams of investigators to explore Syrian sites.
Second, Miliband, Great Britain's foreign minister, did two important things. He visited Damascus, which raises the pressure on Obama to revise US policy toward Syria. He has asked Syria to push harder for advances on the peace process - but this should be read in two ways - one as a genuine message to the Syrians, but two is a message to Washington to throw its weight behind the talks and to place the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations high on its agenda. Gordon Brown has already state that Mr Obama's foreign policy priority should be the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The announcement that Miliband has re-established high level intelligence sharing with Syria is also significant. Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Mu`allim discussed restarting intelligence sharing in May 2007 at Sharm al-Sheikh, but Syria asked the US to return an ambassador to Damascus as a sign of Syria's cooperation. The US refused this gesture, forcing the US military "to take matters in their own hands." Ultimately, the politicians in Washington forced the Defense department to settle the border issue militarily - hence the raid last month that killed eight Syrians. (We still have no proof that the Americans killed or captured the "facilitator" Abu Ghadiyya, whom they claim they snagged n the raid. I find it a bit odd that they have not shown us a photo of the man as they did with Saddam or his sons. Why all the secrecy about a raid they claimed as a stunning success and a person they have told us so much about?)
At any rate, the Syrians clearly offered the British the same offer they made to the Americans well over a year ago. The difference is that the British have been smart enough to take the offer, sending their foreign minister to Damascus as a gesture of good will and cooperation. So the British will now supply the US with Syrian intelligence. This will be awkward for the Americans; they will be dependent on the British for intelligence. Of course, if the Americans like the bits of intelligence they get from the Syrians, they will have to ask for more and will have to ask the Syrians to act on the intelligence or to deliver certain fighters. In this way, one can only presume that the Americans will start to negotiate with the Syrians indirectly. Just as the Syrians talk to the Israelis through the Turks, the US will talk to the Syrians through the British. The silliness of this will strengthen the Defense Department's hand in insisting that Washington politicians do the right thing and grow up. It is just plain silly. Syria wants to help the US kill al-Qaida types, but the US refuses to say yes. How goofey is that? If Obama doesn't send someone of stature to Damascus to fix this, I will eat my hat.
11/19/08
Britain and Syria Resume Intelligence Sharing
Joshua Landis
Two pieces of important news. Al-Baradei claims that the traces of uranium discovered at the Euphrates bomb site do not mean there was a reactor. He has demanded greater Syrian and Israeli cooperation. The Syrians are unlikely to allow further teams of investigators to explore Syrian sites.
Second, Miliband, Great Britain's foreign minister, did two important things. He visited Damascus, which raises the pressure on Obama to revise US policy toward Syria. He has asked Syria to push harder for advances on the peace process - but this should be read in two ways - one as a genuine message to the Syrians, but two is a message to Washington to throw its weight behind the talks and to place the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations high on its agenda. Gordon Brown has already state that Mr Obama's foreign policy priority should be the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The announcement that Miliband has re-established high level intelligence sharing with Syria is also significant. Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Mu`allim discussed restarting intelligence sharing in May 2007 at Sharm al-Sheikh, but Syria asked the US to return an ambassador to Damascus as a sign of Syria's cooperation. The US refused this gesture, forcing the US military "to take matters in their own hands." Ultimately, the politicians in Washington forced the Defense department to settle the border issue militarily - hence the raid last month that killed eight Syrians. (We still have no proof that the Americans killed or captured the "facilitator" Abu Ghadiyya, whom they claim they snagged n the raid. I find it a bit odd that they have not shown us a photo of the man as they did with Saddam or his sons. Why all the secrecy about a raid they claimed as a stunning success and a person they have told us so much about?)
At any rate, the Syrians clearly offered the British the same offer they made to the Americans well over a year ago. The difference is that the British have been smart enough to take the offer, sending their foreign minister to Damascus as a gesture of good will and cooperation. So the British will now supply the US with Syrian intelligence. This will be awkward for the Americans; they will be dependent on the British for intelligence. Of course, if the Americans like the bits of intelligence they get from the Syrians, they will have to ask for more and will have to ask the Syrians to act on the intelligence or to deliver certain fighters. In this way, one can only presume that the Americans will start to negotiate with the Syrians indirectly. Just as the Syrians talk to the Israelis through the Turks, the US will talk to the Syrians through the British. The silliness of this will strengthen the Defense Department's hand in insisting that Washington politicians do the right thing and grow up. It is just plain silly. Syria wants to help the US kill al-Qaida types, but the US refuses to say yes. How goofey is that? If Obama doesn't send someone of stature to Damascus to fix this, I will eat my hat.
Operation Enduring Disaster Breaking With Afghan Policy Tariq Ali
THE NATION
11/17/08
Operation Enduring Disaster
Breaking With Afghan Policy
Tariq Ali
Afghanistan has been almost continuously at war for thirty years, longer than both World Wars and the American war in Vietnam combined. Each occupation of the country has mimicked its predecessor. A tiny interval between wars saw the imposition of a malignant social order, the Taliban, with the help of the Pakistani military and the late Benazir Bhutto, the prime minister who approved the Taliban takeover in Kabul.
Over the last two years, the US/NATO occupation of that country has run into serious military problems. Given a severe global economic crisis and the election of a new American president--a man separated in style, intellect and temperament from his predecessor--the possibility of a serious discussion about an exit strategy from the Afghan disaster hovers on the horizon. The predicament the United States and its allies find themselves in is not an inescapable one, but a change in policy, if it is to matter, cannot be of the cosmetic variety.
Washington's hawks will argue that, while bad, the military situation is, in fact, still salvageable. This may be technically accurate, but it would require the carpet-bombing of southern Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, the destruction of scores of villages and small towns, the killing of untold numbers of Pashtuns and the dispatch to the region of at least 200,000 more troops with all their attendant equipment, air and logistical support. The political consequences of such a course are so dire that even Dick Cheney, the closest thing to Dr. Strangelove that Washington has yet produced, has been uncharacteristically cautious when it comes to suggesting a military solution to the conflict.
It has, by now, become obvious to the Pentagon that Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his family cannot deliver what is required, and yet it is probably far too late to replace him with UN ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. On his part, fighting for his political (and probably physical) existence, Karzai continues to protect his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai, accused of being involved in the country's staggering drug trade, but has belatedly sacked Hamidullah Qadri, his transport minister, for corruption.
Qadri was taking massive kickbacks from a company flying pilgrims to Mecca. Is nothing sacred?
A Deteriorating Situation
Of course, axing one minister is like whistling in the wind, given the levels of corruption reported in Karzai's government, which, in any case, controls little of the country. The Afghan president parries Washington's thrusts by blaming the US military for killing too many civilians from the air. The bombing of the village of Azizabad in Herat province in August, which led to ninety-one civilian deaths (of which sixty were children), was only the most extreme of such recent acts. Karzai's men, hurriedly dispatched to distribute sweets and supplies to the survivors, were stoned by angry villagers.
Given the thousands of Afghans killed in recent years, small wonder that support for the neo-Taliban is increasing, even in non-Pashtun areas of the country. Many Afghans hostile to the old Taliban still support the resistance simply to make it clear that they are against the helicopters and missile-armed unmanned aerial drones that destroy homes, and to "Big Daddy" who wipes out villages, and the flames that devour children.
Last February, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell presented a bleak survey of the situation on the ground to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
Afghan leaders must deal with the endemic corruption and pervasive poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on the government's ability to improve security, deliver services and expand development for economic opportunity.
Although the international forces and the Afghan National Army continue to score tactical victories over the Taliban, the security situation has deteriorated in some areas in the south and Taliban forces have expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban insurgency has expanded in scope despite operational disruption caused by the ISAF [NATO forces] and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year--their first high level losses--does not yet appear to have significantly disrupted insurgent operations.
Since then the situation has only deteriorated further, leading to calls for sending in yet more American and NATO troops--and creating ever deeper divisions inside NATO itself. In recent months, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador to Kabul, wrote a French colleague (in a leaked memo) that the war was lost and more troops were not a solution, a view reiterated recently by Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the British Defense Chief, who came out in public against a one-for-one transfer of troops withdrawn from Iraq to Kabul. He put it this way:
I think we would all take some persuading that there would have to be a much larger British contingent there.... So we also have to get ourselves back into balance; it's crucial that we reduce the operational tempo for our armed forces, so it cannot be, even if the situation demanded it, just a one for one transfer from Iraq to Afghanistan; we have to reduce that tempo.
The Spanish government is considering an Afghan withdrawal, and there is serious dissent within the German and Norwegian foreign policy elites. The Canadian foreign minister has already announced that his country will not extend its Afghan commitment beyond 2011. And even if the debates in the Pentagon have not been aired in public, it's becoming obvious that, in Washington, too, some see the war as unwinnable.
Enter former Iraq commander General David Petraeus, center stage, as the new CentCom commander. Ever since the "success" of "the surge" he oversaw in Iraq (a process designed to create temporary stability in that ravaged land by buying off the opposition and, among other things, the selective use of death squads), Petraeus has sounded, and behaved, more and more like Lazarus on returning from the dead--and before his body could be closely inspected.
The situation in Iraq was so dire that even a modest reduction in casualties was seen as a massive leap forward. With increasing outbreaks of violence in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, however, the talk of success sounds ever hollower. To launch a new "surge" in Afghanistan now by sending more troops there will simply not work, not even as a public relations triumph. Perhaps some of the 100 advisers that General Petraeus has just appointed will point this out to him in forceful terms.
Flight Path to Disaster
Obama would be foolish to imagine that Petraeus can work a miracle cure in Afghanistan. The cancer has spread too far and is affecting US troops as well. If the American media chose to interview active-duty soldiers in Afghanistan (on the promise of anonymity), they might get a more accurate picture of what is happening inside the US Army there.
I learned a great deal from Jules, a 20-year-old American soldier I met recently in Canada. He became so disenchanted with the war that he decided to go AWOL, proving--at least to himself--that the Afghan situation was not an inescapable predicament. Many of his fellow soldiers, he claims, felt similarly, hating a war that dehumanized both them and the Afghans. "We just couldn't bring ourselves to accept that bombing Afghans was no different from bombing the landscape" was the way he summed up the situation.
Morale inside the Army there is low, he told me. The aggression unleashed against Afghan civilians often hides a deep depression. He does not, however, encourage others to follow in his footsteps. As he sees it, each soldier must make that choice for himself, accepting with it the responsibility that going AWOL permanently entails. Jules was convinced, however, that the war could not be won and did not want to see any more of his friends die. That's why he was wearing an "Obama out of Afghanistan" T-shirt.
Before he revealed his identity, I mistook this young soldier--a Filipino-American born in southern California--for an Afghan. His features reminded me of the Hazara tribesmen he must have encountered in Kabul. Trained as a mortar gunner and paratrooper at Fort Benning, Georgia, he was later assigned to the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg. Here is part of the account he offered me:
I deployed to southeastern Afghanistan in January 2007. We controlled everything from Jalalabad down to the northernmost areas of Kandahar province in Regional Command East. My unit had the job of pacifying the insurgency in Paktika, Paktia, and Khost provinces-- areas that had received no aid, but had been devastated during the initial invasion. Operation Anaconda [in 2002] was supposed to have wiped out the Taliban. That was the boast of the military leaders, but ridiculed by everyone else with a brain.
He spoke also of how impossible he found it to treat the Afghans as subhumans:
I swear I could not for a second view these people as anything but human. The best way to fashion a young hard dick like myself--dick being an acronym for 'dedicated infantry combat killer' -- is simple and the effect of racist indoctrination. Take an empty shell off the streets of L.A. or Brooklyn, or maybe from some Podunk town in Tennessee...and these days America isn't in short supply.... I was one of those no-child-left-behind products...
Anyway, you take this empty vessel and you scare the living shit out of him, break him down to nothing, cultivate a brotherhood and camaraderie with those he suffers with, and fill his head with racist nonsense like all Arabs, Iraqis, Afghans are Hajj. Hajj hates you. Hajj wants to hurt your family. Hajj children are the worst because they beg all the time. Just some of the most hurtful and ridiculous propaganda, but you'd be amazed at how effective it's been in fostering my generation of soldiers.
As this young man spoke to me, I felt he should be testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The effect of the war on those carrying out the orders is leaving scars just as deep as the imprints of previous imperial wars. "Change we can believe in" must include the end of this, which means, among other things, a withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In my latest book, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power, I have written of the necessity of involving Afghanistan's neighbors in a political solution that ends the war, preserves the peace and reconstructs the country. Iran, Russia, India and China, as well as Pakistan, need to be engaged in the search for a political solution that would sustain a genuine national government for a decade after the withdrawal of the Americans, NATO and their quisling regime. However, such a solution is not possible within the context of the plans proposed by both present Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and President-elect Barack Obama, which focus on a new surge of American troops in Afghanistan.
The main task at hand should be to create a social infrastructure and thus preserve the peace, something that the West and its horde of attendant non-governmental organizations have failed to do. School buildings constructed, often for outrageous sums, by foreign companies that lack furniture, teachers and kids are part of the surreal presence of the West, which cannot last.
Whether you are a policymaker in the next administration or an AWOL veteran of the Afghan War in Canada, Operation Enduring Freedom of 2001 has visibly become Operation Enduring Disaster. Less clear is whether an Obama administration can truly break from past policy or will just create a military-plus add-on to it. Only a total break from the catastrophe that George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld created in Afghanistan will offer pathways to a viable future.
For this to happen, both external and domestic pressures will probably be needed. China is known to be completely opposed to a NATO presence on, or near, its borders, but while Beijing has proved willing to exert economic pressure to force policy changes in Washington--as it did when the Bank of China "cut its exposure to agency debt last summer," leaving US Treasury Secretary Paulson with little option but to functionally nationalize the mortgage giants--it has yet to use its diplomatic muscle in the region.
But don't think that will last forever. Why wait until then? Another external pressure will certainly prove to be the already evident destabilizing effects of the Afghan war on neighboring Pakistan, a country in a precarious economic state, with a military facing growing internal tensions.
Domestic pressure in the United States to pull out of Afghanistan remains weak, but could grow rapidly as the extent of the debacle becomes clearer and NATO allies refuse to supply the shocktroops for the future surge.
In the meantime, they're predicting a famine in Afghanistan this winter.
11/17/08
Operation Enduring Disaster
Breaking With Afghan Policy
Tariq Ali
Afghanistan has been almost continuously at war for thirty years, longer than both World Wars and the American war in Vietnam combined. Each occupation of the country has mimicked its predecessor. A tiny interval between wars saw the imposition of a malignant social order, the Taliban, with the help of the Pakistani military and the late Benazir Bhutto, the prime minister who approved the Taliban takeover in Kabul.
Over the last two years, the US/NATO occupation of that country has run into serious military problems. Given a severe global economic crisis and the election of a new American president--a man separated in style, intellect and temperament from his predecessor--the possibility of a serious discussion about an exit strategy from the Afghan disaster hovers on the horizon. The predicament the United States and its allies find themselves in is not an inescapable one, but a change in policy, if it is to matter, cannot be of the cosmetic variety.
Washington's hawks will argue that, while bad, the military situation is, in fact, still salvageable. This may be technically accurate, but it would require the carpet-bombing of southern Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, the destruction of scores of villages and small towns, the killing of untold numbers of Pashtuns and the dispatch to the region of at least 200,000 more troops with all their attendant equipment, air and logistical support. The political consequences of such a course are so dire that even Dick Cheney, the closest thing to Dr. Strangelove that Washington has yet produced, has been uncharacteristically cautious when it comes to suggesting a military solution to the conflict.
It has, by now, become obvious to the Pentagon that Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his family cannot deliver what is required, and yet it is probably far too late to replace him with UN ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. On his part, fighting for his political (and probably physical) existence, Karzai continues to protect his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai, accused of being involved in the country's staggering drug trade, but has belatedly sacked Hamidullah Qadri, his transport minister, for corruption.
Qadri was taking massive kickbacks from a company flying pilgrims to Mecca. Is nothing sacred?
A Deteriorating Situation
Of course, axing one minister is like whistling in the wind, given the levels of corruption reported in Karzai's government, which, in any case, controls little of the country. The Afghan president parries Washington's thrusts by blaming the US military for killing too many civilians from the air. The bombing of the village of Azizabad in Herat province in August, which led to ninety-one civilian deaths (of which sixty were children), was only the most extreme of such recent acts. Karzai's men, hurriedly dispatched to distribute sweets and supplies to the survivors, were stoned by angry villagers.
Given the thousands of Afghans killed in recent years, small wonder that support for the neo-Taliban is increasing, even in non-Pashtun areas of the country. Many Afghans hostile to the old Taliban still support the resistance simply to make it clear that they are against the helicopters and missile-armed unmanned aerial drones that destroy homes, and to "Big Daddy" who wipes out villages, and the flames that devour children.
Last February, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell presented a bleak survey of the situation on the ground to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
Afghan leaders must deal with the endemic corruption and pervasive poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on the government's ability to improve security, deliver services and expand development for economic opportunity.
Although the international forces and the Afghan National Army continue to score tactical victories over the Taliban, the security situation has deteriorated in some areas in the south and Taliban forces have expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban insurgency has expanded in scope despite operational disruption caused by the ISAF [NATO forces] and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year--their first high level losses--does not yet appear to have significantly disrupted insurgent operations.
Since then the situation has only deteriorated further, leading to calls for sending in yet more American and NATO troops--and creating ever deeper divisions inside NATO itself. In recent months, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador to Kabul, wrote a French colleague (in a leaked memo) that the war was lost and more troops were not a solution, a view reiterated recently by Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the British Defense Chief, who came out in public against a one-for-one transfer of troops withdrawn from Iraq to Kabul. He put it this way:
I think we would all take some persuading that there would have to be a much larger British contingent there.... So we also have to get ourselves back into balance; it's crucial that we reduce the operational tempo for our armed forces, so it cannot be, even if the situation demanded it, just a one for one transfer from Iraq to Afghanistan; we have to reduce that tempo.
The Spanish government is considering an Afghan withdrawal, and there is serious dissent within the German and Norwegian foreign policy elites. The Canadian foreign minister has already announced that his country will not extend its Afghan commitment beyond 2011. And even if the debates in the Pentagon have not been aired in public, it's becoming obvious that, in Washington, too, some see the war as unwinnable.
Enter former Iraq commander General David Petraeus, center stage, as the new CentCom commander. Ever since the "success" of "the surge" he oversaw in Iraq (a process designed to create temporary stability in that ravaged land by buying off the opposition and, among other things, the selective use of death squads), Petraeus has sounded, and behaved, more and more like Lazarus on returning from the dead--and before his body could be closely inspected.
The situation in Iraq was so dire that even a modest reduction in casualties was seen as a massive leap forward. With increasing outbreaks of violence in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, however, the talk of success sounds ever hollower. To launch a new "surge" in Afghanistan now by sending more troops there will simply not work, not even as a public relations triumph. Perhaps some of the 100 advisers that General Petraeus has just appointed will point this out to him in forceful terms.
Flight Path to Disaster
Obama would be foolish to imagine that Petraeus can work a miracle cure in Afghanistan. The cancer has spread too far and is affecting US troops as well. If the American media chose to interview active-duty soldiers in Afghanistan (on the promise of anonymity), they might get a more accurate picture of what is happening inside the US Army there.
I learned a great deal from Jules, a 20-year-old American soldier I met recently in Canada. He became so disenchanted with the war that he decided to go AWOL, proving--at least to himself--that the Afghan situation was not an inescapable predicament. Many of his fellow soldiers, he claims, felt similarly, hating a war that dehumanized both them and the Afghans. "We just couldn't bring ourselves to accept that bombing Afghans was no different from bombing the landscape" was the way he summed up the situation.
Morale inside the Army there is low, he told me. The aggression unleashed against Afghan civilians often hides a deep depression. He does not, however, encourage others to follow in his footsteps. As he sees it, each soldier must make that choice for himself, accepting with it the responsibility that going AWOL permanently entails. Jules was convinced, however, that the war could not be won and did not want to see any more of his friends die. That's why he was wearing an "Obama out of Afghanistan" T-shirt.
Before he revealed his identity, I mistook this young soldier--a Filipino-American born in southern California--for an Afghan. His features reminded me of the Hazara tribesmen he must have encountered in Kabul. Trained as a mortar gunner and paratrooper at Fort Benning, Georgia, he was later assigned to the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg. Here is part of the account he offered me:
I deployed to southeastern Afghanistan in January 2007. We controlled everything from Jalalabad down to the northernmost areas of Kandahar province in Regional Command East. My unit had the job of pacifying the insurgency in Paktika, Paktia, and Khost provinces-- areas that had received no aid, but had been devastated during the initial invasion. Operation Anaconda [in 2002] was supposed to have wiped out the Taliban. That was the boast of the military leaders, but ridiculed by everyone else with a brain.
He spoke also of how impossible he found it to treat the Afghans as subhumans:
I swear I could not for a second view these people as anything but human. The best way to fashion a young hard dick like myself--dick being an acronym for 'dedicated infantry combat killer' -- is simple and the effect of racist indoctrination. Take an empty shell off the streets of L.A. or Brooklyn, or maybe from some Podunk town in Tennessee...and these days America isn't in short supply.... I was one of those no-child-left-behind products...
Anyway, you take this empty vessel and you scare the living shit out of him, break him down to nothing, cultivate a brotherhood and camaraderie with those he suffers with, and fill his head with racist nonsense like all Arabs, Iraqis, Afghans are Hajj. Hajj hates you. Hajj wants to hurt your family. Hajj children are the worst because they beg all the time. Just some of the most hurtful and ridiculous propaganda, but you'd be amazed at how effective it's been in fostering my generation of soldiers.
As this young man spoke to me, I felt he should be testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The effect of the war on those carrying out the orders is leaving scars just as deep as the imprints of previous imperial wars. "Change we can believe in" must include the end of this, which means, among other things, a withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In my latest book, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power, I have written of the necessity of involving Afghanistan's neighbors in a political solution that ends the war, preserves the peace and reconstructs the country. Iran, Russia, India and China, as well as Pakistan, need to be engaged in the search for a political solution that would sustain a genuine national government for a decade after the withdrawal of the Americans, NATO and their quisling regime. However, such a solution is not possible within the context of the plans proposed by both present Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and President-elect Barack Obama, which focus on a new surge of American troops in Afghanistan.
The main task at hand should be to create a social infrastructure and thus preserve the peace, something that the West and its horde of attendant non-governmental organizations have failed to do. School buildings constructed, often for outrageous sums, by foreign companies that lack furniture, teachers and kids are part of the surreal presence of the West, which cannot last.
Whether you are a policymaker in the next administration or an AWOL veteran of the Afghan War in Canada, Operation Enduring Freedom of 2001 has visibly become Operation Enduring Disaster. Less clear is whether an Obama administration can truly break from past policy or will just create a military-plus add-on to it. Only a total break from the catastrophe that George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld created in Afghanistan will offer pathways to a viable future.
For this to happen, both external and domestic pressures will probably be needed. China is known to be completely opposed to a NATO presence on, or near, its borders, but while Beijing has proved willing to exert economic pressure to force policy changes in Washington--as it did when the Bank of China "cut its exposure to agency debt last summer," leaving US Treasury Secretary Paulson with little option but to functionally nationalize the mortgage giants--it has yet to use its diplomatic muscle in the region.
But don't think that will last forever. Why wait until then? Another external pressure will certainly prove to be the already evident destabilizing effects of the Afghan war on neighboring Pakistan, a country in a precarious economic state, with a military facing growing internal tensions.
Domestic pressure in the United States to pull out of Afghanistan remains weak, but could grow rapidly as the extent of the debacle becomes clearer and NATO allies refuse to supply the shocktroops for the future surge.
In the meantime, they're predicting a famine in Afghanistan this winter.
Power Shortage For as long as troops stay in Iraq after 2009, America will take the blame for anything that goes wrong. Grenville Byford
NEWSWEEK
11/19/08
Power Shortage
For as long as troops stay in Iraq after 2009, America will take the blame for anything that goes wrong.
Grenville Byford
Everyone knows it is foolish to give someone power without responsibility. It is even more foolish, however, to accept responsibility without powernd that is just what the Bush administration has done with the new Status of Forces agreement with Iraq. Don't get me wrong, it is good that there is an agreement. Letting the United Nations mandate expire with no clear idea of what would replace it was a recipe for a disaster. I am delighted too that the Iraqis, feel they are ready to take over day-to-day security from June 2009. It is the following two and a half years that worries me. Between mid-2009 and late 2011, a large number of American soldiers will remain in Iraq, essentially confined to barracks, unless the Iraqi government calls for their help.
This is not a problem if you believe that the Iraq of 2008 is essentially West Germany circa 1948: That everything is under control and the Iraqis only need logistical and training support to keep things that way. Obviously, this is what we would all like to believe. Our track record of predicting events in Iraq even six months out, however, is rotten. Things may very well fall apart once more. What then? After June 2009, the United States will not take military action without an Iraqi request for help, and Iraq will likely delay asking until long after a minor scratch on the body politic has escalated into a raging infectionhey are a proud people after all. Furthermore, it is not even clear that we would wish to take the side of the Iraqi government in all cases.
Consider the ways Iraq might fall apart. Suppose al Qaeda in Iraq revives and the Iraqi army needs extra muscle. In this case, at least we would know whose side we are on, and al Qaeda alone would not likely be a huge problem. In Iraq, al Qaeda has never been that big, and it caused serious difficulty only when it had significant Sunni support. Removing this support through the Anbar awakening is the surge's greatest success. It has been achieved, however, essentially by bribing the Sunni tribal leadership. What happens when the money dries upspecially if the promised integration of young Sunni militiamen into the Iraqi army does not materialize? (It has not yet.) Then the Iraqi army might find itself an essentially Shia outfit fighting the Sunnis. Al Qaeda will seek to bring this about, but if Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his colleagues misjudge how far they must reach out to keep the Sunnis on board, this clash might well happen without Jihadist intervention. Which side, if any, would the United States want to be on if it does ?
Then again, the control of Kirkuk and its oil remains unresolved. The Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga came close to a firefight a few months back. What happens without an American referee? If we are not referee, do we want to be on the pitch at all? Finally, Iraq's Shias may come to blows. Suppose Maliki's Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly SCIRI) decide to eliminate Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army; they send the Iraqi Army into Sadr City and a civilian bloodbath ensues. Do we just stand back and watch it on Al-Jazeera and CNN?
For as long as there are large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq, the world (and many Americans) will see the United States as being responsible for anything bad that happens there. Doing nothing would be deeply unappealing, but siding with the present Iraqi government might well be against U.S. interests, or morally indefensible, or both. Like it or not, we will have, at least, moral responsibility for the situation for as long as we have combat troops in Iraq. After June 2009, however, we will have little power to affect matters beyond mere persuasion. Maliki and his associates have shown themselves to be stubborn men. Two and a half years is simply too long to be in that situation.
President Barack Obama can rectify matters. All he has to do is tell the Iraqis that he was serious about getting out in 16 months and bring back the pullout date to early 2010. Chances are they will accept with alacrity. If not, some renegotiation will be in order. The principle the new administration must not compromise, however, is "we will not accept continued responsibility without power". As for suggestions from the Pentagon that we cannot pull out in less than three years, they are simply absurd. We do not have to recover every screw and nail.
Some people will respond that the Iraqi Army cannot survive without logistical support. Well, we will have over a year to fix that. In any case, it is not the Iraqi Army's lack of combat power, but rather the Iraqi leadership's lack of political will and judgment that is the real potential stumbling block. Regardless of how serious this problem proves to be, our troops cannot fix it as long as they hang around in their bases. With luck, it will not lead to disaster, but if we leave before it does, then it will be Iraq's problem, not America's. Which is as it should be.
11/19/08
Power Shortage
For as long as troops stay in Iraq after 2009, America will take the blame for anything that goes wrong.
Grenville Byford
Everyone knows it is foolish to give someone power without responsibility. It is even more foolish, however, to accept responsibility without powernd that is just what the Bush administration has done with the new Status of Forces agreement with Iraq. Don't get me wrong, it is good that there is an agreement. Letting the United Nations mandate expire with no clear idea of what would replace it was a recipe for a disaster. I am delighted too that the Iraqis, feel they are ready to take over day-to-day security from June 2009. It is the following two and a half years that worries me. Between mid-2009 and late 2011, a large number of American soldiers will remain in Iraq, essentially confined to barracks, unless the Iraqi government calls for their help.
This is not a problem if you believe that the Iraq of 2008 is essentially West Germany circa 1948: That everything is under control and the Iraqis only need logistical and training support to keep things that way. Obviously, this is what we would all like to believe. Our track record of predicting events in Iraq even six months out, however, is rotten. Things may very well fall apart once more. What then? After June 2009, the United States will not take military action without an Iraqi request for help, and Iraq will likely delay asking until long after a minor scratch on the body politic has escalated into a raging infectionhey are a proud people after all. Furthermore, it is not even clear that we would wish to take the side of the Iraqi government in all cases.
Consider the ways Iraq might fall apart. Suppose al Qaeda in Iraq revives and the Iraqi army needs extra muscle. In this case, at least we would know whose side we are on, and al Qaeda alone would not likely be a huge problem. In Iraq, al Qaeda has never been that big, and it caused serious difficulty only when it had significant Sunni support. Removing this support through the Anbar awakening is the surge's greatest success. It has been achieved, however, essentially by bribing the Sunni tribal leadership. What happens when the money dries upspecially if the promised integration of young Sunni militiamen into the Iraqi army does not materialize? (It has not yet.) Then the Iraqi army might find itself an essentially Shia outfit fighting the Sunnis. Al Qaeda will seek to bring this about, but if Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his colleagues misjudge how far they must reach out to keep the Sunnis on board, this clash might well happen without Jihadist intervention. Which side, if any, would the United States want to be on if it does ?
Then again, the control of Kirkuk and its oil remains unresolved. The Iraqi army and the Kurdish peshmerga came close to a firefight a few months back. What happens without an American referee? If we are not referee, do we want to be on the pitch at all? Finally, Iraq's Shias may come to blows. Suppose Maliki's Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly SCIRI) decide to eliminate Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army; they send the Iraqi Army into Sadr City and a civilian bloodbath ensues. Do we just stand back and watch it on Al-Jazeera and CNN?
For as long as there are large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq, the world (and many Americans) will see the United States as being responsible for anything bad that happens there. Doing nothing would be deeply unappealing, but siding with the present Iraqi government might well be against U.S. interests, or morally indefensible, or both. Like it or not, we will have, at least, moral responsibility for the situation for as long as we have combat troops in Iraq. After June 2009, however, we will have little power to affect matters beyond mere persuasion. Maliki and his associates have shown themselves to be stubborn men. Two and a half years is simply too long to be in that situation.
President Barack Obama can rectify matters. All he has to do is tell the Iraqis that he was serious about getting out in 16 months and bring back the pullout date to early 2010. Chances are they will accept with alacrity. If not, some renegotiation will be in order. The principle the new administration must not compromise, however, is "we will not accept continued responsibility without power". As for suggestions from the Pentagon that we cannot pull out in less than three years, they are simply absurd. We do not have to recover every screw and nail.
Some people will respond that the Iraqi Army cannot survive without logistical support. Well, we will have over a year to fix that. In any case, it is not the Iraqi Army's lack of combat power, but rather the Iraqi leadership's lack of political will and judgment that is the real potential stumbling block. Regardless of how serious this problem proves to be, our troops cannot fix it as long as they hang around in their bases. With luck, it will not lead to disaster, but if we leave before it does, then it will be Iraq's problem, not America's. Which is as it should be.
Uri Avnery: An Unforgettable Moment by Uri Avnery
Uri Avnery: An Unforgettable Moment
Monday, 17 November 2008, 3:05 pm
Column: Uri Avnery
An Unforgettable Moment
Uri Avnery, Gush Shalom
WHEN I told this to Anwar Sadat, he laughed: "The moment the door of your airplane opened, all Israelis held their breath. I live on a main street in Tel-Aviv, and at that moment I looked out at the street below. It was totally empty. Nothing moved, except one cat which was probably hurrying home to the television."
The day after tomorrow, 31 years will have passed from that moment, one of the greatest in our lives.
THROUGH THE eyes of an Israeli, this is how it looked: Egypt and Israel were in a state of war. In the previous 30 years, four major campaigns had been fought, with thousands of Israelis and tens of thousands of Egyptians killed and maimed. The hatred between the two peoples was deep and bitter. Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, Sadat's predecessor, had been officially designated as "the Egyptian Tyrant", whose effigy Israeli children used to put on bonfires. Radio Cairo's incitement against Israel was vicious. Only four years earlier, the Egyptians had launched a surprise attack against Israel and dealt us a heavy blow.
And here, without any prelude, was the Egyptian president standing up in his Parliament and announcing that he intended to fly to Jerusalem and make peace. Many did not believe their ears. The Israeli Chief of Staff thought it was a trap. No one took it seriously.
And here he was. The unbelievable was happening before our eyes. A date to remember: November 17, 1977. The entire Israeli leadership stood in a row on the tarmac. The Egyptian airplane landed and slowly taxied towards the red carpet. The stairs were attached. For a moment the atmosphere was surreal. And then the door opened, and there stood the Egyptian leader, slim, erect and solemn. Israeli army buglers sounded the salute. An unforgettable moment.
I have looked for a historical parallel and found none. It could even be compared with the first steps of man on the moon.
Anwar Sadat had done something that was without precedent.
THIS WEEK, I remembered this event in a topical context, separate from its political significance.
I was sitting with a group of friends discussing, as usual, the chances of peace. Somebody said that the negotiations would not bear fruit if we could not change the attitude of most Israelis to the Palestinians. Another doubted that this would be possible and added that even a serious crisis would not help - after a crisis everybody returns to their original opinion as if nothing has happened.
I said that most opinions of people are not based on rational thought, but on emotion. If there is a contradiction between the two, then logical thought is subordinated to the existing emotional pattern. Therefore, in order to really change a person's opinion, one has to address his emotions, too.
I needed a real example, and that's where Sadat came in.
Sadat did it. He had addressed the emotions of every Israeli.
This bold deed was the shock to the emotions and consciousness, without which the peace with Egypt would not have been possible. Sadat captured the hearts of a whole people. Emotional attitudes that had been frozen for decades melted like butter in the midday sun, clearing the path for a completely different way of looking at things. People who hated the Egyptians - and, indeed, all Arabs - liked him on sight. From this moment on he could talk to the Israeli public and persuade it - they hung on his lips.
Until that moment, there was a complete consensus in Israel that we must not, under any circumstances, "give up" the Sinai Peninsula. That this would amount to national suicide. That we would lose our essential "strategic depth". Moshe Dayan, then serving as Defense Minister and national idol, declared that he "preferred Sharm-al-Sheikh without peace to peace without Sharm-al-Sheikh". Nobody was ready to give up the Sinai oil fields. The Labor Party ministers had built a large settlement bloc in North Sinai, centered on a new town, Yamit, considered our most beautiful and well-planned. And Sadat himself was known to have collaborated with the Nazis in World War II and to have spent time in prison for that.
Now, practically overnight, all this was wiped out. Who needs Sinai, who needs Sharm-al-Sheikh (and who remembers today that the place was known in Israel at the time as "Ophira"?), who needs the oil, who needs Yamit - when we can have peace instead? All was gone. All was evacuated. Nothing remained but the pictures of Tzachi Hanegbi's ridiculous last stand on a tower and Meir Kahane's unfulfilled promise to die in a bunker.
WITHOUT A DOUBT, Sadat was a genius. He had a specifically Egyptian wisdom, the 6000-year old wisdom of a people who have seen it all and lived through it all. That does not mean that he did not make serious mistakes, that he did not entertain illusions, that he did not say quite foolish things together with very wise things, sometimes in the same breath.
But no one who met him face to face could avoid the feeling that they were in the presence of a historic figure.
How did he arrive at his decision? As he told me (and many others), he had an almost mystic illumination. He was on his way back from a visit to the Romanian ruler. He had posed to his host two questions: Can one believe Menachem Begin? Will Begin be able to carry out his decisions? Nicolae Ceaucescu answered both questions in the affirmative.
Flying over Mount Ararat in Turkey he was struck by the idea: why not go to Jerusalem and speak directly to the Israelis at home?
That is a nice story. But it does not cover all the facts. Sadat was neither naïve nor a gambler. Before he took his fateful step, he had secret negotiations with Begin. The Egyptian deputy prime minister, Hassan Tohami, was sent to Morocco to meet with Moshe Dayan, Begin's foreign minister at the time. Dayan assured him unequivocally that Begin was prepared to give back all of Sinai, to the last grain of sand.
(When I published this long ago, it was denied by both sides. Recently, however, General Binyamin Gibli, Dayan's confidant, confirmed it on his deathbed.)
In simple words: Before the dramatic gesture, before the start of the official negotiations, Sadat knew that he would get back all the Egyptian territory occupied by Israel. He was walking on solid ground.
THAT IS the reverse side of the coin, the Israeli side. Sadat's initiative would not have succeeded without Menachem Begin.
When I saw the two standing together, it struck me that no two people could be more different.
Sadat was an impulsive person, a man with a wide vision. He was not interested in details. He believed in people. He was a quintessential Egyptian, a village boy with a dark complexion (inherited from his Sudanese mother).
Begin was a quintessential East European Jew. He never quite became an Israeli. He was a lawyer by temperament, a stickler for details, suspicious by nature.
But they shared one crucial trait: they were both very dramatic types. They loved the great gesture and believed in its effectiveness. They were very conscious of being actors on the stage of history. They both had a gift for touching the deepest emotions of people.
Unlike Sadat, Begin had a fixed and rigid ideology. It was expressed by a specific map of the Land of Israel, the one drawn by the British when they received their mandate over the country. It had nothing to do with the map of the Holy Land as depicted in the Bible, but it was adopted by Vladimir Jabotinsky and incorporated in the emblem of the Irgun underground army long before Begin took over its command.
According to this map, the land beyond the Jordan (today's Hashemite Kingdom) belongs to Eretz Israel, too, but Sinai does not. Neither do the Golan Heights. Therefore it was easy for Begin to give back Sinai, and, I believe, it would have been easy for him to give back the Golan, if events had not taken another turn.
But Begin was unable to give back the West Bank. Autonomy to the inhabitants - yes. Fair treatment of the Arabs there - why not? After all, it was Jabotinsky himself who had laid down that if the president of the Jewish state was a Jew, the prime minister should be an Arab - and vice versa. But withdraw from the West Bank? Out of the question!
Sadat was certain that he could get Begin to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Begin did indeed officially recognize the "Palestinian people", but added at once that what he meant was the "Arabs of Eretz Israel". The Egyptians later believed that Israel had betrayed their trust. Dayan resigned in protest when he realized that Begin had no intention of implementing the Palestinian aspect of the agreement. But anyone who knew Begin realized that he could not have behaved differently. (I spent some hours in an effort to explain to the Egyptian acting foreign minister, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an extremely intelligent person, what Begin was, what his map of Eretz Israel signified and what "autonomy" meant in the Likud lexicon.)
The Palestinian issue was the stone of controversy which knocked the Egyptian-Israeli peace off course.
DEFLECTED PERHAPS, but immensely successful nevertheless.
It is enough for an Israeli to imagine what would have happened if Sadat had not undertaken his historic journey. How many wars would have broken out? How many soldiers and civilians on both sides would have been killed or maimed? How many hundreds of billions would we have been compelled to spend on the defense of our Southern border?
One small example should suffice: a few days ago the Egyptian navy held an exercise, the largest in its history. The Hebrew newspapers dismissed it in a few lines. If there had been no peace, all alarms in Israel would have sounded. The Egyptian navy is larger than ours, and in the past has dealt us some very painful blows.
It was said at the time: this is Sadat's peace. It will disappear when he goes. We have given back all of Sinai, and tomorrow a new Egyptian Pharaoh will attack us. Well, Sadat was assassinated, and his successor is keeping the peace.
BUT MUCH more important than even the change on the political map was the change on the psychological one. As Sadat himself used to say, the psychological dimension of the conflict is much more important than all the others put together.
True, Sadat did not succeed in getting the Israeli public to change its attitude towards the Arab world, and towards the Palestinian people in particular. The emotional opposition to that was too strong, and Begin's ideology reduced the momentum before it could reach the Palestinian issue. Also, the Israeli attitude towards the West Bank is unlike the attitude towards the Sinai desert. This part of the conflict is longer and deeper even than the bitter conflict with Egypt.
But Sadat proved one thing, which in my eyes is more important than anything else: one can change the emotional state of an entire people. One can cut the psychological knot with one bold stroke. For that one needs leaders, on both sides. Such leaders can appear quite suddenly, in the most unexpected place and at the most unexpected time. Barak Obama could prove to be a kind of American Sadat.
Personally, my most emotional experience connected with the Sadat visit took place in Cairo. Begin had invited me, as the editor of a news magazine, to take part in the gala state dinner given by Sadat in his palace. During the meal, my former brigade commander introduced me to an Egyptian general who in 1948, as a young captain, had been in command of the position from where I was shot and seriously wounded.
We shook hands.
*************
Monday, 17 November 2008, 3:05 pm
Column: Uri Avnery
An Unforgettable Moment
Uri Avnery, Gush Shalom
WHEN I told this to Anwar Sadat, he laughed: "The moment the door of your airplane opened, all Israelis held their breath. I live on a main street in Tel-Aviv, and at that moment I looked out at the street below. It was totally empty. Nothing moved, except one cat which was probably hurrying home to the television."
The day after tomorrow, 31 years will have passed from that moment, one of the greatest in our lives.
THROUGH THE eyes of an Israeli, this is how it looked: Egypt and Israel were in a state of war. In the previous 30 years, four major campaigns had been fought, with thousands of Israelis and tens of thousands of Egyptians killed and maimed. The hatred between the two peoples was deep and bitter. Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, Sadat's predecessor, had been officially designated as "the Egyptian Tyrant", whose effigy Israeli children used to put on bonfires. Radio Cairo's incitement against Israel was vicious. Only four years earlier, the Egyptians had launched a surprise attack against Israel and dealt us a heavy blow.
And here, without any prelude, was the Egyptian president standing up in his Parliament and announcing that he intended to fly to Jerusalem and make peace. Many did not believe their ears. The Israeli Chief of Staff thought it was a trap. No one took it seriously.
And here he was. The unbelievable was happening before our eyes. A date to remember: November 17, 1977. The entire Israeli leadership stood in a row on the tarmac. The Egyptian airplane landed and slowly taxied towards the red carpet. The stairs were attached. For a moment the atmosphere was surreal. And then the door opened, and there stood the Egyptian leader, slim, erect and solemn. Israeli army buglers sounded the salute. An unforgettable moment.
I have looked for a historical parallel and found none. It could even be compared with the first steps of man on the moon.
Anwar Sadat had done something that was without precedent.
THIS WEEK, I remembered this event in a topical context, separate from its political significance.
I was sitting with a group of friends discussing, as usual, the chances of peace. Somebody said that the negotiations would not bear fruit if we could not change the attitude of most Israelis to the Palestinians. Another doubted that this would be possible and added that even a serious crisis would not help - after a crisis everybody returns to their original opinion as if nothing has happened.
I said that most opinions of people are not based on rational thought, but on emotion. If there is a contradiction between the two, then logical thought is subordinated to the existing emotional pattern. Therefore, in order to really change a person's opinion, one has to address his emotions, too.
I needed a real example, and that's where Sadat came in.
Sadat did it. He had addressed the emotions of every Israeli.
This bold deed was the shock to the emotions and consciousness, without which the peace with Egypt would not have been possible. Sadat captured the hearts of a whole people. Emotional attitudes that had been frozen for decades melted like butter in the midday sun, clearing the path for a completely different way of looking at things. People who hated the Egyptians - and, indeed, all Arabs - liked him on sight. From this moment on he could talk to the Israeli public and persuade it - they hung on his lips.
Until that moment, there was a complete consensus in Israel that we must not, under any circumstances, "give up" the Sinai Peninsula. That this would amount to national suicide. That we would lose our essential "strategic depth". Moshe Dayan, then serving as Defense Minister and national idol, declared that he "preferred Sharm-al-Sheikh without peace to peace without Sharm-al-Sheikh". Nobody was ready to give up the Sinai oil fields. The Labor Party ministers had built a large settlement bloc in North Sinai, centered on a new town, Yamit, considered our most beautiful and well-planned. And Sadat himself was known to have collaborated with the Nazis in World War II and to have spent time in prison for that.
Now, practically overnight, all this was wiped out. Who needs Sinai, who needs Sharm-al-Sheikh (and who remembers today that the place was known in Israel at the time as "Ophira"?), who needs the oil, who needs Yamit - when we can have peace instead? All was gone. All was evacuated. Nothing remained but the pictures of Tzachi Hanegbi's ridiculous last stand on a tower and Meir Kahane's unfulfilled promise to die in a bunker.
WITHOUT A DOUBT, Sadat was a genius. He had a specifically Egyptian wisdom, the 6000-year old wisdom of a people who have seen it all and lived through it all. That does not mean that he did not make serious mistakes, that he did not entertain illusions, that he did not say quite foolish things together with very wise things, sometimes in the same breath.
But no one who met him face to face could avoid the feeling that they were in the presence of a historic figure.
How did he arrive at his decision? As he told me (and many others), he had an almost mystic illumination. He was on his way back from a visit to the Romanian ruler. He had posed to his host two questions: Can one believe Menachem Begin? Will Begin be able to carry out his decisions? Nicolae Ceaucescu answered both questions in the affirmative.
Flying over Mount Ararat in Turkey he was struck by the idea: why not go to Jerusalem and speak directly to the Israelis at home?
That is a nice story. But it does not cover all the facts. Sadat was neither naïve nor a gambler. Before he took his fateful step, he had secret negotiations with Begin. The Egyptian deputy prime minister, Hassan Tohami, was sent to Morocco to meet with Moshe Dayan, Begin's foreign minister at the time. Dayan assured him unequivocally that Begin was prepared to give back all of Sinai, to the last grain of sand.
(When I published this long ago, it was denied by both sides. Recently, however, General Binyamin Gibli, Dayan's confidant, confirmed it on his deathbed.)
In simple words: Before the dramatic gesture, before the start of the official negotiations, Sadat knew that he would get back all the Egyptian territory occupied by Israel. He was walking on solid ground.
THAT IS the reverse side of the coin, the Israeli side. Sadat's initiative would not have succeeded without Menachem Begin.
When I saw the two standing together, it struck me that no two people could be more different.
Sadat was an impulsive person, a man with a wide vision. He was not interested in details. He believed in people. He was a quintessential Egyptian, a village boy with a dark complexion (inherited from his Sudanese mother).
Begin was a quintessential East European Jew. He never quite became an Israeli. He was a lawyer by temperament, a stickler for details, suspicious by nature.
But they shared one crucial trait: they were both very dramatic types. They loved the great gesture and believed in its effectiveness. They were very conscious of being actors on the stage of history. They both had a gift for touching the deepest emotions of people.
Unlike Sadat, Begin had a fixed and rigid ideology. It was expressed by a specific map of the Land of Israel, the one drawn by the British when they received their mandate over the country. It had nothing to do with the map of the Holy Land as depicted in the Bible, but it was adopted by Vladimir Jabotinsky and incorporated in the emblem of the Irgun underground army long before Begin took over its command.
According to this map, the land beyond the Jordan (today's Hashemite Kingdom) belongs to Eretz Israel, too, but Sinai does not. Neither do the Golan Heights. Therefore it was easy for Begin to give back Sinai, and, I believe, it would have been easy for him to give back the Golan, if events had not taken another turn.
But Begin was unable to give back the West Bank. Autonomy to the inhabitants - yes. Fair treatment of the Arabs there - why not? After all, it was Jabotinsky himself who had laid down that if the president of the Jewish state was a Jew, the prime minister should be an Arab - and vice versa. But withdraw from the West Bank? Out of the question!
Sadat was certain that he could get Begin to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Begin did indeed officially recognize the "Palestinian people", but added at once that what he meant was the "Arabs of Eretz Israel". The Egyptians later believed that Israel had betrayed their trust. Dayan resigned in protest when he realized that Begin had no intention of implementing the Palestinian aspect of the agreement. But anyone who knew Begin realized that he could not have behaved differently. (I spent some hours in an effort to explain to the Egyptian acting foreign minister, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an extremely intelligent person, what Begin was, what his map of Eretz Israel signified and what "autonomy" meant in the Likud lexicon.)
The Palestinian issue was the stone of controversy which knocked the Egyptian-Israeli peace off course.
DEFLECTED PERHAPS, but immensely successful nevertheless.
It is enough for an Israeli to imagine what would have happened if Sadat had not undertaken his historic journey. How many wars would have broken out? How many soldiers and civilians on both sides would have been killed or maimed? How many hundreds of billions would we have been compelled to spend on the defense of our Southern border?
One small example should suffice: a few days ago the Egyptian navy held an exercise, the largest in its history. The Hebrew newspapers dismissed it in a few lines. If there had been no peace, all alarms in Israel would have sounded. The Egyptian navy is larger than ours, and in the past has dealt us some very painful blows.
It was said at the time: this is Sadat's peace. It will disappear when he goes. We have given back all of Sinai, and tomorrow a new Egyptian Pharaoh will attack us. Well, Sadat was assassinated, and his successor is keeping the peace.
BUT MUCH more important than even the change on the political map was the change on the psychological one. As Sadat himself used to say, the psychological dimension of the conflict is much more important than all the others put together.
True, Sadat did not succeed in getting the Israeli public to change its attitude towards the Arab world, and towards the Palestinian people in particular. The emotional opposition to that was too strong, and Begin's ideology reduced the momentum before it could reach the Palestinian issue. Also, the Israeli attitude towards the West Bank is unlike the attitude towards the Sinai desert. This part of the conflict is longer and deeper even than the bitter conflict with Egypt.
But Sadat proved one thing, which in my eyes is more important than anything else: one can change the emotional state of an entire people. One can cut the psychological knot with one bold stroke. For that one needs leaders, on both sides. Such leaders can appear quite suddenly, in the most unexpected place and at the most unexpected time. Barak Obama could prove to be a kind of American Sadat.
Personally, my most emotional experience connected with the Sadat visit took place in Cairo. Begin had invited me, as the editor of a news magazine, to take part in the gala state dinner given by Sadat in his palace. During the meal, my former brigade commander introduced me to an Egyptian general who in 1948, as a young captain, had been in command of the position from where I was shot and seriously wounded.
We shook hands.
*************
An Obama-Clinton Administration? by William Pfaff
An Obama-Clinton Administration?
William Pfaff
Brussels, November 18, 2008 – The Americans who voted for Barack Obama as president were promised change they could count on, but it rather looks as if they may actually be asked to make do with a mildly refurbished Clinton Administration, with many of the same officials and nearly all of the same policies. The policies are drawn from the same centrist Democratic Party sources as those of Bill Clinton, and Obama's admirers might even find themselves with Hillary Rodham Clinton as Secretary of State -- which makes no sense whatever.
Are there no significant differences of view on war and peace between the two of them? Why did the American (and international) public have inflicted upon it a year and a half of Democratic party primaries in addition to the national election contest if the Democratic race could have been settled by the flip of a coin between people who believed in the same policies and thought the same thoughts?
Where is the sweeping change Barack Obama was promising the electorate? Although, looking back, he was rarely specific about the changes he intended to make. He constantly invoked the principle of change, without going much into the messy details, for which – admittedly – he was criticized at the time.
Many who voted for him, as did this writer, relied upon his evident qualities, in comparison with his predecessor and most of his competitors, which were that he clearly was very intelligent, and was a balanced and mature man: he was a grown-up, an adult, who spoke to his audiences as fellow-adults. This was his great difference from Hillary Clinton. Personally very intelligent, she has spent too long in the shady political precincts of ambition and calculation. She could never have made the speech Obama made on race. (Possibly he will never again be able to make such a speech. He has himself said that we must settle down now to being disappointed by Obama.)
The disappointment problem is international. The enormous expectations Obama's election has aroused abroad, above all among America's European allies, mean that any Obama-Clinton restoration of Clintonism would be met with incomprehension and disappointment. Not because the Clinton administration was so awful, but it was so confused in perception and lacking in foreign policy direction that it was easy for George W. Bush to meld it into the Great War on Terror. He had simply to add doses of fear, security hysteria, lies about mass destruction weapons, and torture.
Europeans had never thought of Americans as torturers. When it turned out that the sponsors and defenders of torture occupied the highest offices of government in the United States, with the chief legal enablers of torture in the White House Counsel's office itself, and heading no less than the Department of Justice, a chill passed through the western alliance. It was noted that the chosen euphemism for torture by president, lawyers, and the CIA was "enhanced measures," a direct translation of the term employed by the Gestapo.
I came to Brussels to speak to the European Ideas Network, sponsored by the Christian Democratic-Center Right- Conservative group, the largest in the European Parliament. The audience seemed taken aback when I answered their question about what will change in European-American relations under Barack Obama by replying, "probably not much."
The president-elect has said he will stop torture and extra-legal imprisonment, but on fundamental matters of transatlantic relations he clearly has indicated that he wants an alliance in which the Europeans contribute more. (This will undoubtedly be a welcome change from the Bush effort to split the European Union by encouraging hostility towards the West Europeans by the pro-American former Warsaw Pact governments.)
The U.S. contribution to the Georgia fiasco has undermined the U.S reputation among the East Europeans. In the future there probably will be more American consultation and good will in transatlantic relations, and perhaps even in dealing with Russia (there certainly is nothing to gain from hostility). However Barack Obama himself said in his Berlin speech that he expects the Europeans to contribute a lot more to "winning" the war in Afghanistan.
This is not a popular idea; the European governments have been encouraging regional diplomatic solutions for Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. Most Americans may be surprised to know that there is West European concern (as French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner told a Brookings audience in Washington last week) that the new American administration might try to take all this over for itself, and thereby wreck the progress already made. After all, it was Barack Obama who said that he would himself talk to the Iranians.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=357
William Pfaff
Brussels, November 18, 2008 – The Americans who voted for Barack Obama as president were promised change they could count on, but it rather looks as if they may actually be asked to make do with a mildly refurbished Clinton Administration, with many of the same officials and nearly all of the same policies. The policies are drawn from the same centrist Democratic Party sources as those of Bill Clinton, and Obama's admirers might even find themselves with Hillary Rodham Clinton as Secretary of State -- which makes no sense whatever.
Are there no significant differences of view on war and peace between the two of them? Why did the American (and international) public have inflicted upon it a year and a half of Democratic party primaries in addition to the national election contest if the Democratic race could have been settled by the flip of a coin between people who believed in the same policies and thought the same thoughts?
Where is the sweeping change Barack Obama was promising the electorate? Although, looking back, he was rarely specific about the changes he intended to make. He constantly invoked the principle of change, without going much into the messy details, for which – admittedly – he was criticized at the time.
Many who voted for him, as did this writer, relied upon his evident qualities, in comparison with his predecessor and most of his competitors, which were that he clearly was very intelligent, and was a balanced and mature man: he was a grown-up, an adult, who spoke to his audiences as fellow-adults. This was his great difference from Hillary Clinton. Personally very intelligent, she has spent too long in the shady political precincts of ambition and calculation. She could never have made the speech Obama made on race. (Possibly he will never again be able to make such a speech. He has himself said that we must settle down now to being disappointed by Obama.)
The disappointment problem is international. The enormous expectations Obama's election has aroused abroad, above all among America's European allies, mean that any Obama-Clinton restoration of Clintonism would be met with incomprehension and disappointment. Not because the Clinton administration was so awful, but it was so confused in perception and lacking in foreign policy direction that it was easy for George W. Bush to meld it into the Great War on Terror. He had simply to add doses of fear, security hysteria, lies about mass destruction weapons, and torture.
Europeans had never thought of Americans as torturers. When it turned out that the sponsors and defenders of torture occupied the highest offices of government in the United States, with the chief legal enablers of torture in the White House Counsel's office itself, and heading no less than the Department of Justice, a chill passed through the western alliance. It was noted that the chosen euphemism for torture by president, lawyers, and the CIA was "enhanced measures," a direct translation of the term employed by the Gestapo.
I came to Brussels to speak to the European Ideas Network, sponsored by the Christian Democratic-Center Right- Conservative group, the largest in the European Parliament. The audience seemed taken aback when I answered their question about what will change in European-American relations under Barack Obama by replying, "probably not much."
The president-elect has said he will stop torture and extra-legal imprisonment, but on fundamental matters of transatlantic relations he clearly has indicated that he wants an alliance in which the Europeans contribute more. (This will undoubtedly be a welcome change from the Bush effort to split the European Union by encouraging hostility towards the West Europeans by the pro-American former Warsaw Pact governments.)
The U.S. contribution to the Georgia fiasco has undermined the U.S reputation among the East Europeans. In the future there probably will be more American consultation and good will in transatlantic relations, and perhaps even in dealing with Russia (there certainly is nothing to gain from hostility). However Barack Obama himself said in his Berlin speech that he expects the Europeans to contribute a lot more to "winning" the war in Afghanistan.
This is not a popular idea; the European governments have been encouraging regional diplomatic solutions for Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. Most Americans may be surprised to know that there is West European concern (as French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner told a Brookings audience in Washington last week) that the new American administration might try to take all this over for itself, and thereby wreck the progress already made. After all, it was Barack Obama who said that he would himself talk to the Iranians.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=357
CNOOC chief expects $40 oil price By Alan Beattie
CNOOC chief expects $40 oil price
By Alan Beattie in Barcelona and Carola Hoyos in London
Published: November 19 2008 02:00 | Last updated: November 19 2008 02:00
The world's national oil companies expect oil prices to fall further and will cancel most planned investment projects even at current levels, says the head of a Chinese state-owned group.
A recent meeting of the national oil companies in Beijing had predicted oil prices would fall to about $40 a barrel, Fu Chengyu, chief executive of China National Offshore Oil Corporation, told a conference in Barcelona.
"The consensus at the time was that everybody realised the oil price would be even lower," Mr Fu told the Global China Business meeting. "Nobody knew where it would be but most of them said around $40."
Mr Fu said that about 27 companies from 23 countries attended the meeting in Beijing, which he said was on October 17 or 18, though he declined to name those present. He described the tone of the meeting as one of "panic" at falling prices.
Oil yesterday was trading around $54 a barrel, down from a high of $147.27 touched in July.
Mr Fu's bleak pronouncement echoes other recent warnings. The International Energy Agency, in its annual report released last week, warned of a second capacity crunch because national oil companies were likely to underinvest, especially at low prices.
Opec ministers, whose countries' national companies control 40 per cent of world oil supplies, warned last month that low prices threatened worldwide inv-est-ment in new capacity. Nig-eria's oil minister told the FT the country's deep-water projects were in jeopardy.
This month Adnoc, the UAE's national oil company, said its target to expand oil capacity by 1m barrels a day would be delayed by eight years. Also this month, Saudi Arabia, delayed two $10bn-$20bn refining projects with Total of France and ConocoPhillips of the US, leading some energy executives to suggest they might be cancelled altogether.
Mr Fu said executives at this month's Beijing meeting thought oil would soon rebound to $50-$55, but even at those levels investment in new production would be cut heavily.
"If the oil price remained around $50 or $55, that would mean cutting at least 60 per cent of budgeted projects for the next one or two years from the national oil companies," Mr Fu said.
Of the new extraction projects planned by state-owned companies in deep-sea areas, the lowest break-even oil price was about $60 a barrel and the highest about $90 per barrel, he said.
"When most of the oil companies budgeted their projects, they were using $70, $80, even $100 a barrel for their cash-flow calculations," he said.
"For those projects that have started, certainly they will try to complete them, but for those projects that have not started yet they will delay or cancel. Simply, they don't have enough cash to do all of those that they budgeted."
Mr Fu also said that any cut in production by Opec, the cartel of oil-exporting countries, was regarded as likely to be ineffectual.
By Alan Beattie in Barcelona and Carola Hoyos in London
Published: November 19 2008 02:00 | Last updated: November 19 2008 02:00
The world's national oil companies expect oil prices to fall further and will cancel most planned investment projects even at current levels, says the head of a Chinese state-owned group.
A recent meeting of the national oil companies in Beijing had predicted oil prices would fall to about $40 a barrel, Fu Chengyu, chief executive of China National Offshore Oil Corporation, told a conference in Barcelona.
"The consensus at the time was that everybody realised the oil price would be even lower," Mr Fu told the Global China Business meeting. "Nobody knew where it would be but most of them said around $40."
Mr Fu said that about 27 companies from 23 countries attended the meeting in Beijing, which he said was on October 17 or 18, though he declined to name those present. He described the tone of the meeting as one of "panic" at falling prices.
Oil yesterday was trading around $54 a barrel, down from a high of $147.27 touched in July.
Mr Fu's bleak pronouncement echoes other recent warnings. The International Energy Agency, in its annual report released last week, warned of a second capacity crunch because national oil companies were likely to underinvest, especially at low prices.
Opec ministers, whose countries' national companies control 40 per cent of world oil supplies, warned last month that low prices threatened worldwide inv-est-ment in new capacity. Nig-eria's oil minister told the FT the country's deep-water projects were in jeopardy.
This month Adnoc, the UAE's national oil company, said its target to expand oil capacity by 1m barrels a day would be delayed by eight years. Also this month, Saudi Arabia, delayed two $10bn-$20bn refining projects with Total of France and ConocoPhillips of the US, leading some energy executives to suggest they might be cancelled altogether.
Mr Fu said executives at this month's Beijing meeting thought oil would soon rebound to $50-$55, but even at those levels investment in new production would be cut heavily.
"If the oil price remained around $50 or $55, that would mean cutting at least 60 per cent of budgeted projects for the next one or two years from the national oil companies," Mr Fu said.
Of the new extraction projects planned by state-owned companies in deep-sea areas, the lowest break-even oil price was about $60 a barrel and the highest about $90 per barrel, he said.
"When most of the oil companies budgeted their projects, they were using $70, $80, even $100 a barrel for their cash-flow calculations," he said.
"For those projects that have started, certainly they will try to complete them, but for those projects that have not started yet they will delay or cancel. Simply, they don't have enough cash to do all of those that they budgeted."
Mr Fu also said that any cut in production by Opec, the cartel of oil-exporting countries, was regarded as likely to be ineffectual.
My “Outrage List” keeps getting longer and longer by Mike Larson
My “Outrage List” keeps getting longer and longer
by Mike Larson 11-14-08
Mike Larson
I don’t know about you. But I started keeping a mental “Outrage List” a while back. The idea: Chronicle all the ridiculous statistics, all the lies, all the questionable practices, and all the dubious “rescue packages” Wall Street and Washington keep shoveling onto the public’s lap.
And boy oh boy, is it getting long these days!
Heck, it’s getting to the point where I need to pop a Valium before reading the headlines or watching the tube — because if I don’t, I might just put my shoe through the TV screen!
Just Consider What Has Happened in
Only the Past Few Days and Weeks …
American Express manages to get approval (from the Federal Reserve) to become a bank holding company in the blink of an eye. This kind of thing usually takes weeks or even months. And within 24 hours, the reason they did so leaks — they want to reach into your wallet and pull out some bailout money, too! Amex is reportedly seeking $3.5 billion in taxpayer funds.
General Motors operates for years churning out gas-guzzling SUVs and Hummers. Ford also stakes its future on big trucks like the F-150 — instead of choosing the same prudent path as competitors like Honda and Toyota, who focus on fuel-conscious sedans and compacts.
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It’s beginning just like I told you it would:
HEDGE FUND REDEMPTIONS SKYROCKETING!
With hedge funds losing $100 billion in October and with panicky investors demanding their money back THIS WEEK, the U.S. Congress is so terrified that funds will be forced to dump stocks at fire-sale prices and crush the stock market — it is grilling George Soros and other fund managers!
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GM (via its financing arm GMAC) even goes a step further. Not content to stick to car loans, it decides to branch out and make billions and billions of dollars of crappy mortgage loans.
Then, when the utterly predictable consequences of this foolish corporate strategy come home to roost, GM and the other automakers come back to the trough like pigs looking for slop. Only in this case, we’re talking real money — $25 billion or more.
Paulson and Bernanke cajole Congress into forking over $700 BILLION to create TARP.
Paulson and Bernanke cajole Congress into forking over $700 BILLION to create TARP.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chief Ben Bernanke urge Congress to create the Troubled Asset Relief Program — with as little debate and oversight as possible and a price tag of $700 billion. They warn of financial cataclysm if the government doesn’t start buying up mortgages and mortgage related assets from banks.
Yet just a few short weeks later, they totally change course. They say “Never mind — we’re not going to buy up assets after all. We’re going to buy up stakes in small banks, big banks, insurers, and God knows who else, with the money. We know the last 20 or so ’solutions’ to the credit crunch didn’t work. But this one will. Really. We mean it.”
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make a huge deal about a new program to modify more mortgages. We get the mid-afternoon press conference, the intraday ramp in the stock market, the usual stuff.
Citigroup, JPMorgan and other lenders get in on the action too, issuing glowing press releases about foreclosure moratoriums and other plans to keep borrowers in their homes.
But in reality, many lenders and mortgage servicers have ALREADY been trying all kinds of loss mitigation strategies and loan modifications (loan term extensions, temporary interest rate reductions, and so on).
Yet …
They Haven’t Managed to Stop the
Nation’s Foreclosure Rate From Rising.
Why? It’s Simple …
1. All those modification efforts can’t overcome the negative impact of surging unemployment.
2. Many borrowers lied about their income and their assets in the first place, meaning they can’t even make the reduced payments their lenders are offering.
3. Others were speculators and second-home owners, who don’t qualify for relief.
4. Home prices are falling so far, so fast, that millions of borrowers are underwater — owing $20,000, $50,000, even $100,000 more than their homes are worth. They have little financial incentive to stay in their houses — even at a lower monthly payment — because they know they won’t breakeven for years, if ever. And many of them know darn well they can rent for less … sometimes much less … at a house or apartment down the street or across town.
5. Still others have loans that were ultimately sliced, diced, and repackaged into complex securities — now owned by various Ferrari-driving hedge fund managers who leveraged up to buy junky paper just a few months after they got out of B-school.
6. Because of the “miracle” of this financial alchemy … which made Wall Street rich beyond measure … these borrowers are stuck. Their loan “servicers” WON’T modify their loans because they’re afraid of getting their pants sued off by the investors who own securities derived from those underlying loans, securities that in some cases can lose value if the loan terms are changed.
The Hole Keeps Getting Deeper …
And Deeper … and DEEPER …
How about the bottomless pit known as AIG?
The company made a bunch of stupid decisions to insure crummy mortgage-related securities against default. It clearly had no idea what the heck it was doing, and managed to lose a whopping $24.5 billion in the most recent quarter. But instead of going broke, they get thrown a helping hand courtesy of, well, you and me. The tab for that bailout keeps on rising — approximately $150 billion at last count!
Then there’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They take on hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage and interest rate risk. They pile headlong into the derivatives market, dig deeper into the riskier subprime and Alt-A part of the mortgage business, and continually operate on relatively small capital cushions.
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Furthermore, they keep carrying billions and billions of dollars of dubious tax-related “assets” on their balance sheets and claim that means they’re in decent shape.
But soon after, the two companies are essentially nationalized.
And those tax assets? Fannie Mae just slashed their value by 78% to $4.6 billion.
Why Can’t the Government Just Cut
The Crap and Level With Us?
Sometimes I just can’t help but ask myself that question. I mean, I know it makes for bad politics. But like the old saying goes, honesty is the best policy. And we’re just not getting it from Washington and Wall Street.
Instead, policymakers and industry officials have been offering up a steady diet of B.S. about this credit crisis and the housing bust for the greater part of two years now …
* “It’s just a subprime mortgage problem.”
* “There’s nothing to worry about, the problem is ‘well-contained’.”
* “Major banks and brokers will never fail. It’ll just be a few small institutions.”
* “Home prices never go down.”
* “It’s a great time to buy or sell a house.”
That’s what you’ve been told by officialdom. And all of it — every last bit of it — has proven to be dead wrong.
On the other hand, we’ve been doing our best to give it to you straight the entire time, no matter the consequences. This morning, I’m going to do it again …
I’m Going to Tell You the Brutal Truth You
Won’t Hear From Washington or Wall Street …
You can’t just wave a magic wand in Washington and wish all this stuff away.
You can’t reverse years and years of reckless overspending, overborrowing, and overlending — even with hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money.
You can’t keep borrowers in homes they should have never bought in the first place.
You can give banks and consumers billions and billions of dollars … but you can’t make them lend and spend it. If they know the economy stinks, they’re going to lose their jobs, or that there’s just too much risk out there, they aren’t going to do what you want them to do. Instead, they’ll do what is PRUDENT — repair their balance sheets, hunker down, and rebuild their capital base over time.
The harsh reality is that the economy is cyclical. Busts follow booms. They have for hundreds of years. And those busts are healthy over the longer term, even if they’re painful in the short-term. They set the stage for healthy, productive growth.
Greenspan's policies drove the cost of money into the gutter.
Greenspan’s policies drove the cost of money into the gutter.
Unfortunately, the Fed has consistently gotten in the way of that curative process in recent years.
It went totally overboard under Alan Greenspan after the dot-com bust, driving the cost of money into the gutter. Thanks to that reckless monetary policy, and the reckless disregard for prudence throughout the lending industry, we experienced the biggest housing and mortgage bubble in the history of the U.S. We also saw too much dumb lending and asset inflation in the leveraged buyout business, in the commercial real estate arena, and in the emerging markets.
Now, we have to suffer the consequences. They’re baked in the cake.
The government can try to ease the pain of that process. That’s what all these bailouts are about. But in case you haven’t noticed, they really haven’t worked. We’ve gotten brief bounces in stocks, brief periods of economic expansion, temporary improvements in the credit markets.
But they don’t stick. They fail.
What to Do Now …
I know this is a sobering big-picture view. But it has the added benefit of being true — unlike a lot of the garbage you’re hearing from your elected and unelected leaders.
Someday, we’ll see the depths of the recession’s eyes. Someday, we’ll get to the point where enough companies have failed, enough homes have fallen into foreclosure, enough lenders have gone under, and enough debt has been crunched to get a real bottom in the markets and the economy. Then we’ll be ready for our country to grow in a healthy, sustainable fashion for the long term.
But we’re not there yet. And judging from what I’m seeing, my outrage list appears doomed to grow.
http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/my-outrage-list-keeps-getting-longer-and-longer-28009
by Mike Larson 11-14-08
Mike Larson
I don’t know about you. But I started keeping a mental “Outrage List” a while back. The idea: Chronicle all the ridiculous statistics, all the lies, all the questionable practices, and all the dubious “rescue packages” Wall Street and Washington keep shoveling onto the public’s lap.
And boy oh boy, is it getting long these days!
Heck, it’s getting to the point where I need to pop a Valium before reading the headlines or watching the tube — because if I don’t, I might just put my shoe through the TV screen!
Just Consider What Has Happened in
Only the Past Few Days and Weeks …
American Express manages to get approval (from the Federal Reserve) to become a bank holding company in the blink of an eye. This kind of thing usually takes weeks or even months. And within 24 hours, the reason they did so leaks — they want to reach into your wallet and pull out some bailout money, too! Amex is reportedly seeking $3.5 billion in taxpayer funds.
General Motors operates for years churning out gas-guzzling SUVs and Hummers. Ford also stakes its future on big trucks like the F-150 — instead of choosing the same prudent path as competitors like Honda and Toyota, who focus on fuel-conscious sedans and compacts.
Internal Sponsorship
It’s beginning just like I told you it would:
HEDGE FUND REDEMPTIONS SKYROCKETING!
With hedge funds losing $100 billion in October and with panicky investors demanding their money back THIS WEEK, the U.S. Congress is so terrified that funds will be forced to dump stocks at fire-sale prices and crush the stock market — it is grilling George Soros and other fund managers!
IN THIS UPDATE: The next shoe to drop in this crisis — and how it could hand you gains of 46.1% … 89.9% … 106.7% or more … WITHOUT options, margin or short-selling … Exclusively with ETFs that are as easy to buy or sell as Microsoft or IBM … All for the price of a single gallon of gas: As little as $2.47 per day!
Click here for more information …
GM (via its financing arm GMAC) even goes a step further. Not content to stick to car loans, it decides to branch out and make billions and billions of dollars of crappy mortgage loans.
Then, when the utterly predictable consequences of this foolish corporate strategy come home to roost, GM and the other automakers come back to the trough like pigs looking for slop. Only in this case, we’re talking real money — $25 billion or more.
Paulson and Bernanke cajole Congress into forking over $700 BILLION to create TARP.
Paulson and Bernanke cajole Congress into forking over $700 BILLION to create TARP.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chief Ben Bernanke urge Congress to create the Troubled Asset Relief Program — with as little debate and oversight as possible and a price tag of $700 billion. They warn of financial cataclysm if the government doesn’t start buying up mortgages and mortgage related assets from banks.
Yet just a few short weeks later, they totally change course. They say “Never mind — we’re not going to buy up assets after all. We’re going to buy up stakes in small banks, big banks, insurers, and God knows who else, with the money. We know the last 20 or so ’solutions’ to the credit crunch didn’t work. But this one will. Really. We mean it.”
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make a huge deal about a new program to modify more mortgages. We get the mid-afternoon press conference, the intraday ramp in the stock market, the usual stuff.
Citigroup, JPMorgan and other lenders get in on the action too, issuing glowing press releases about foreclosure moratoriums and other plans to keep borrowers in their homes.
But in reality, many lenders and mortgage servicers have ALREADY been trying all kinds of loss mitigation strategies and loan modifications (loan term extensions, temporary interest rate reductions, and so on).
Yet …
They Haven’t Managed to Stop the
Nation’s Foreclosure Rate From Rising.
Why? It’s Simple …
1. All those modification efforts can’t overcome the negative impact of surging unemployment.
2. Many borrowers lied about their income and their assets in the first place, meaning they can’t even make the reduced payments their lenders are offering.
3. Others were speculators and second-home owners, who don’t qualify for relief.
4. Home prices are falling so far, so fast, that millions of borrowers are underwater — owing $20,000, $50,000, even $100,000 more than their homes are worth. They have little financial incentive to stay in their houses — even at a lower monthly payment — because they know they won’t breakeven for years, if ever. And many of them know darn well they can rent for less … sometimes much less … at a house or apartment down the street or across town.
5. Still others have loans that were ultimately sliced, diced, and repackaged into complex securities — now owned by various Ferrari-driving hedge fund managers who leveraged up to buy junky paper just a few months after they got out of B-school.
6. Because of the “miracle” of this financial alchemy … which made Wall Street rich beyond measure … these borrowers are stuck. Their loan “servicers” WON’T modify their loans because they’re afraid of getting their pants sued off by the investors who own securities derived from those underlying loans, securities that in some cases can lose value if the loan terms are changed.
The Hole Keeps Getting Deeper …
And Deeper … and DEEPER …
How about the bottomless pit known as AIG?
The company made a bunch of stupid decisions to insure crummy mortgage-related securities against default. It clearly had no idea what the heck it was doing, and managed to lose a whopping $24.5 billion in the most recent quarter. But instead of going broke, they get thrown a helping hand courtesy of, well, you and me. The tab for that bailout keeps on rising — approximately $150 billion at last count!
Then there’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They take on hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage and interest rate risk. They pile headlong into the derivatives market, dig deeper into the riskier subprime and Alt-A part of the mortgage business, and continually operate on relatively small capital cushions.
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Furthermore, they keep carrying billions and billions of dollars of dubious tax-related “assets” on their balance sheets and claim that means they’re in decent shape.
But soon after, the two companies are essentially nationalized.
And those tax assets? Fannie Mae just slashed their value by 78% to $4.6 billion.
Why Can’t the Government Just Cut
The Crap and Level With Us?
Sometimes I just can’t help but ask myself that question. I mean, I know it makes for bad politics. But like the old saying goes, honesty is the best policy. And we’re just not getting it from Washington and Wall Street.
Instead, policymakers and industry officials have been offering up a steady diet of B.S. about this credit crisis and the housing bust for the greater part of two years now …
* “It’s just a subprime mortgage problem.”
* “There’s nothing to worry about, the problem is ‘well-contained’.”
* “Major banks and brokers will never fail. It’ll just be a few small institutions.”
* “Home prices never go down.”
* “It’s a great time to buy or sell a house.”
That’s what you’ve been told by officialdom. And all of it — every last bit of it — has proven to be dead wrong.
On the other hand, we’ve been doing our best to give it to you straight the entire time, no matter the consequences. This morning, I’m going to do it again …
I’m Going to Tell You the Brutal Truth You
Won’t Hear From Washington or Wall Street …
You can’t just wave a magic wand in Washington and wish all this stuff away.
You can’t reverse years and years of reckless overspending, overborrowing, and overlending — even with hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money.
You can’t keep borrowers in homes they should have never bought in the first place.
You can give banks and consumers billions and billions of dollars … but you can’t make them lend and spend it. If they know the economy stinks, they’re going to lose their jobs, or that there’s just too much risk out there, they aren’t going to do what you want them to do. Instead, they’ll do what is PRUDENT — repair their balance sheets, hunker down, and rebuild their capital base over time.
The harsh reality is that the economy is cyclical. Busts follow booms. They have for hundreds of years. And those busts are healthy over the longer term, even if they’re painful in the short-term. They set the stage for healthy, productive growth.
Greenspan's policies drove the cost of money into the gutter.
Greenspan’s policies drove the cost of money into the gutter.
Unfortunately, the Fed has consistently gotten in the way of that curative process in recent years.
It went totally overboard under Alan Greenspan after the dot-com bust, driving the cost of money into the gutter. Thanks to that reckless monetary policy, and the reckless disregard for prudence throughout the lending industry, we experienced the biggest housing and mortgage bubble in the history of the U.S. We also saw too much dumb lending and asset inflation in the leveraged buyout business, in the commercial real estate arena, and in the emerging markets.
Now, we have to suffer the consequences. They’re baked in the cake.
The government can try to ease the pain of that process. That’s what all these bailouts are about. But in case you haven’t noticed, they really haven’t worked. We’ve gotten brief bounces in stocks, brief periods of economic expansion, temporary improvements in the credit markets.
But they don’t stick. They fail.
What to Do Now …
I know this is a sobering big-picture view. But it has the added benefit of being true — unlike a lot of the garbage you’re hearing from your elected and unelected leaders.
Someday, we’ll see the depths of the recession’s eyes. Someday, we’ll get to the point where enough companies have failed, enough homes have fallen into foreclosure, enough lenders have gone under, and enough debt has been crunched to get a real bottom in the markets and the economy. Then we’ll be ready for our country to grow in a healthy, sustainable fashion for the long term.
But we’re not there yet. And judging from what I’m seeing, my outrage list appears doomed to grow.
http://www.moneyandmarkets.com/my-outrage-list-keeps-getting-longer-and-longer-28009
Japan economists call for 'Obama bonds' By Kosuke Takahashi
Japan economists call for 'Obama bonds'
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - Japanese economists, increasingly concerned that the United States might seek to pay its enormous and growing debt obligations in a weakened US dollar, are looking to the possibility of US Treasuries being issued in yen.
The US government needs to borrow at least US$1 trillion in the coming year, excluding the US Treasury's $700 billion plan to bail out the financial and other industries, said Kazuo Mizuno, chief economist in Tokyo at Mitsubishi UFJ Securities Co, a unit of Japan's largest publicly traded lender by assets. That amount is likely to grow as the US government continues to rescue failed parts of the economy and has to raise more debt - that is, issue government bonds, or Treasuries - to fund such rescues.
Since 2004, when the amount of the government bond issuance reached an annual average of $400 billion, 94% of new buyers of US government bonds have been foreigners, Mizuno told Asia Times Online.
One measure of the increased concern at the ability of the United States to finance its enormous deficits in the future is the rising cost of credit default swaps bought as protection of Treasury debt. These traded near a record high on Tuesday, with benchmark 10-year contracts on Treasuries increased to 42 basis points, or 0.42 percentage points, from around 20 in early September. The contracts have also risen from below two basis points at the start of the credit crisis in July 2007.
While it remains unlikely that the US government will default on its debt, a weaker dollar would ease the burden of payment on existing debt.
In the past few months, the US dollar has strengthened against other major currencies, with the notable exception of the yen, even as the country has been at the epicenter of the deepening financial crisis. That dollar strength is not expected to last.
"There is no wonder the dollar will weaken," said Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan's former top currency official and now a professor at Waseda University. "The dollar now looks strong for a technical reason. The money the US financial firms had invested in the world is being repatriated into the homeland, causing dollar-buying. But once this conversion into the dollars is done, the currency will head south," Sakakibara said at a forum in Tokyo on Sunday.
Faced with the unprecedented growth of the US budget deficit and the prospect of an increasingly weaker dollar compared with the yen reducing the value of Treasury debt held by Japan, economists in Tokyo are calling for the administration of president-elect Barack Obama to issue US Treasuries denominated in yen and other currencies. The issuance of foreign currency-denominated US Treasures would reduce the perceived risk of holding the debt.
The idea of issuing foreign currency-denominated US Treasures is not new. The Jimmy Carter administration, buffeted by the two oil crises of the 1970s, sold "Carter bonds", denominated in German marks and Swiss francs, in 1978 to attract foreign investors into Treasuries.
"The US will be forced to issue foreign currency-denominated US Treasures in its hour of need," said Mizuno. "The US cannot finance its deficit by itself. The US financial system cannot survive without foreign investors. We will see 'Obama Bonds' in the future."
With the US owing increasing amounts to foreign nations, the confidence in US Treasuries continues to be shaken, said Masaaki Kanno, chief economist at JPMorgan Securities Japan Co in Tokyo, said. "This will push up long-term yields, and the dollar will be sold," said Kanno, speaking at the forum in Tokyo on Sunday.
So far, the Japanese yen has been the biggest winner out of the current financial turmoil as investors increasingly unwind the so-called yen carry trade, in which yen borrowed at low interest is changed into other currencies and invested for higher yields than the interest charged on the yen loan.
The yen has advanced 15% versus the dollar this year, 33% against the euro and 53% against the pound sterling. The yen may rise to 85 per dollar this year, predicted Masaki Fukui, senior market economist in Tokyo at Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd, a unit of Japan's second-largest financial group by market value. The Japanese currency at present is trading at about 96.28 to the US dollar.
"Japan’s financial authorities may intervene in the foreign exchange markets only when the yen breaks 90 per dollar," Sakakibara said.
As the yen strengthens, the effective value of debt held in dollars will decline, a fate that yen-denominated Treasuries would escape.
"Yen-denominated US Treasuries would reduce currency risks for Japanese and Chinese buyers of US Treasuries," said Fukui. "If concerns over US Treasuries continue to grow, no one will want to buy them. Yen-denominated US Treasuries would make it easy for foreign investors to buy them."
Looking ahead to 2009, foreign buyers such as Japan, China and other emerging market central banks are likely to reduce their holdings of US Treasuries rather than increase them, as their own countries face massive funding needs to buoy their economies at home and as America will continue to face financial instability and deteriorating economic fundamentals.
Japan holds the world's second-largest foreign reserves, totaling about $1 trillion, following China, which has about $2 trillion in forex reserves, including some $600 billion worth of US Treasuries. Japan plans to provide up to $100 billion to the International Monetary Fund, which would reduce the nation’s holding of short-term US Treasury bills.
China on November 9 announced its sweeping economic stimulus package valued at about 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion), to be spent over the next two years. Market players are speculating China, to secure financial resources, would reduce its holding of US Treasury securities rather than increase them.
Kosuke Takahashi is a freelance correspondent based in Tokyo. He can be contacted at letters@kosuke.net.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
http://atimes.com/atimes/Japan/JK19Dh01.html
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - Japanese economists, increasingly concerned that the United States might seek to pay its enormous and growing debt obligations in a weakened US dollar, are looking to the possibility of US Treasuries being issued in yen.
The US government needs to borrow at least US$1 trillion in the coming year, excluding the US Treasury's $700 billion plan to bail out the financial and other industries, said Kazuo Mizuno, chief economist in Tokyo at Mitsubishi UFJ Securities Co, a unit of Japan's largest publicly traded lender by assets. That amount is likely to grow as the US government continues to rescue failed parts of the economy and has to raise more debt - that is, issue government bonds, or Treasuries - to fund such rescues.
Since 2004, when the amount of the government bond issuance reached an annual average of $400 billion, 94% of new buyers of US government bonds have been foreigners, Mizuno told Asia Times Online.
One measure of the increased concern at the ability of the United States to finance its enormous deficits in the future is the rising cost of credit default swaps bought as protection of Treasury debt. These traded near a record high on Tuesday, with benchmark 10-year contracts on Treasuries increased to 42 basis points, or 0.42 percentage points, from around 20 in early September. The contracts have also risen from below two basis points at the start of the credit crisis in July 2007.
While it remains unlikely that the US government will default on its debt, a weaker dollar would ease the burden of payment on existing debt.
In the past few months, the US dollar has strengthened against other major currencies, with the notable exception of the yen, even as the country has been at the epicenter of the deepening financial crisis. That dollar strength is not expected to last.
"There is no wonder the dollar will weaken," said Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan's former top currency official and now a professor at Waseda University. "The dollar now looks strong for a technical reason. The money the US financial firms had invested in the world is being repatriated into the homeland, causing dollar-buying. But once this conversion into the dollars is done, the currency will head south," Sakakibara said at a forum in Tokyo on Sunday.
Faced with the unprecedented growth of the US budget deficit and the prospect of an increasingly weaker dollar compared with the yen reducing the value of Treasury debt held by Japan, economists in Tokyo are calling for the administration of president-elect Barack Obama to issue US Treasuries denominated in yen and other currencies. The issuance of foreign currency-denominated US Treasures would reduce the perceived risk of holding the debt.
The idea of issuing foreign currency-denominated US Treasures is not new. The Jimmy Carter administration, buffeted by the two oil crises of the 1970s, sold "Carter bonds", denominated in German marks and Swiss francs, in 1978 to attract foreign investors into Treasuries.
"The US will be forced to issue foreign currency-denominated US Treasures in its hour of need," said Mizuno. "The US cannot finance its deficit by itself. The US financial system cannot survive without foreign investors. We will see 'Obama Bonds' in the future."
With the US owing increasing amounts to foreign nations, the confidence in US Treasuries continues to be shaken, said Masaaki Kanno, chief economist at JPMorgan Securities Japan Co in Tokyo, said. "This will push up long-term yields, and the dollar will be sold," said Kanno, speaking at the forum in Tokyo on Sunday.
So far, the Japanese yen has been the biggest winner out of the current financial turmoil as investors increasingly unwind the so-called yen carry trade, in which yen borrowed at low interest is changed into other currencies and invested for higher yields than the interest charged on the yen loan.
The yen has advanced 15% versus the dollar this year, 33% against the euro and 53% against the pound sterling. The yen may rise to 85 per dollar this year, predicted Masaki Fukui, senior market economist in Tokyo at Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd, a unit of Japan's second-largest financial group by market value. The Japanese currency at present is trading at about 96.28 to the US dollar.
"Japan’s financial authorities may intervene in the foreign exchange markets only when the yen breaks 90 per dollar," Sakakibara said.
As the yen strengthens, the effective value of debt held in dollars will decline, a fate that yen-denominated Treasuries would escape.
"Yen-denominated US Treasuries would reduce currency risks for Japanese and Chinese buyers of US Treasuries," said Fukui. "If concerns over US Treasuries continue to grow, no one will want to buy them. Yen-denominated US Treasuries would make it easy for foreign investors to buy them."
Looking ahead to 2009, foreign buyers such as Japan, China and other emerging market central banks are likely to reduce their holdings of US Treasuries rather than increase them, as their own countries face massive funding needs to buoy their economies at home and as America will continue to face financial instability and deteriorating economic fundamentals.
Japan holds the world's second-largest foreign reserves, totaling about $1 trillion, following China, which has about $2 trillion in forex reserves, including some $600 billion worth of US Treasuries. Japan plans to provide up to $100 billion to the International Monetary Fund, which would reduce the nation’s holding of short-term US Treasury bills.
China on November 9 announced its sweeping economic stimulus package valued at about 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion), to be spent over the next two years. Market players are speculating China, to secure financial resources, would reduce its holding of US Treasury securities rather than increase them.
Kosuke Takahashi is a freelance correspondent based in Tokyo. He can be contacted at letters@kosuke.net.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
http://atimes.com/atimes/Japan/JK19Dh01.html
EU-Russia close on US
EU-Russia close on US
The incoming Obama administration is unlikely to back away from missile defence systems in Europe any time soon, following Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's initial threatening speech, a nuclear nonproliferation expert who served in the Clinton Administration told New Europe. "The problem is that the Russians have been very unwise, I would say, in their approach to the incoming Obama administration," Carnegie Center's Rose Gottemoeller, who served Clinton as Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the National Security Council and as Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in the US Department of Energy, said telephonically from Washington DC on November 14.
She referred to the tough speech Medvedev gave, just hours after Barack Obamawon the US presidential election "as a result of which the Russians have made it more difficult for an Obama administration to back away from missile defence because basically the Obama administration will have to take account of their own critics and they don't want to be accused of being soft on the Russians." Throughout the presidential campaign, the position of the Obama team on arms-control and nuclear security matters had been that the US will not, under an Obama administration, deploy missile defences in Europe unless they can be proven effective.
"That position has not changed, but whereas I would have perhaps expected the Obama team to back away from missile defences in Europe prior to Medvedev's threatening speech, I don't expect they would back away any time soon. So it is a complicated situation and I think the Russians have created a problem for themselves," Gottemoeller said. Prompted by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Nice, Medvedev retreated on November 14 from his threat to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad, on Europe's borders, but only if Obama joined Russia and France in calling for a conference on European security by next summer.
Sarkozy appears determined to solve the US-Russia row over their respective plans to site missiles in Europe and agree on a new security treaty. Sarkozy, who presided over the summit between Russia and the EU in his capacity as the current holder of the EU's rotating presidency, helped ease the way for Medvedev's retreat. The French president supported the idea of talks on a new security plan for Europe and suggested that they could be held by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in June or July. Both Russia and the US belong to the organisation.
Sarkozy made clear that he wants Washington to reconsider the missile defense systems that it plans to build in Poland and the Czech Republic. Referring to the EU-Russia summit in Nice, Gottemoeller told New Europe that Medvedev is trying to repair the damage from his state-of-the-nation speech. "So they are now trying to spread perfume around," she said, laughing, just as the Russian president was en route to Washington DC to attend a G20 summit. "But they definitely started out on the wrong foot trying to threaten the incoming Obama president." Earlier on November 14 in Nice, EU leaders and Russia concluded their summit with little tangible achievements. The EU failed to persuade Russia to change its position on Georgia.
Medvedev was tough on the issue and refused to back down on Moscow's position to recognise the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independence states. Nevertheless, Sarkozy and Medvedev agreed that negotiations for talks on a new EU-Russia strategic partnership and cooperation agreement would indeed go ahead. "We just decided to continue negotiations: I can't give you a date for signing the treaty. It's a strategically important deal, and it's extremely complex, in view of the range of areas it looks at," European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said.
"We should go down the path of economics, not the path of missiles," he added. Russian and EU officials held the first round of talks on the new agreement, which is intended to give a legal framework to their relations in fields ranging from trade and investment to environmental protection and education, on July 4. But EU leaders then froze further talks on September 1 in protest at Russia's August invasion of Georgia. Both Russia and the EU hope that talks would resume in early December. Medvedev said Russia hoped to see relations pushed forward and talks would re-start "in the near future."
He said that the final treaty "should be substantive, clear in structure, and provide a framework for future work." Gottemoeller told New Europe that "it does seem pretty clear that the EU has decided now that they want to have a vigorous negotiation with the Russians on possibility of an agreement between Russia and the EU. I don't think it's going to be an easy negotiation because the main issues that were out there before the Georgia crisis, were complicated by the Russian crisis." But she opined that Russia would no longer been acting from a position of strength, given the current world economic developments.
"We have to also take account of the economic changes that have occurred since the Georgia crisis," she said, pointing to Russia's troubled stock market after the events in Georgia. "But since then we had this enormous economic crisis and the drop in the price of oil has really put Russia in a difficult spot," she said, adding that the low oil revenues have taken their toll on Russia's federal budget. "The situation has changed pretty considerably since the time Russia was throwing its weight around and saying, 'We are now in a very powerful position at the negotiating table because we have all the cards on our side.'
Now Russia is a little bit more vulnerable because the price of oil and gas has gone down so significantly," Gottemoeller said, asked if energy priorities in the EU would take priority over Brussels' position on Georgia. In Nice, Medvedev said Moscow would remain a reliable energy partner. The EU is concerned about the security of energy supplies from Russia, the bloc's number one supplier of gas and number two supplier of oil. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin did little to calm EU unease when he warned on November 12 that Moscow may scrap Nord Stream and build LNG plants instead if Europe keeps delaying the project.
But as Putin threatened to scrap plans for the gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany, the European Commission on November 13 unveiled proposals to increase energy security and cut back its dependence on Russian energy supplies. "We have to do more, be more ambitious, and be even bolder to avoid the risk of energy disruption in the future," EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs said. To ensure the security of energy supplies to the Baltic states, an interconnection plan, covering gas, electricity and storage in 2009, which would identify the infrastructure is needed to link these countries to the rest of the EU.
Norway, which is not a member of the EU, said it would increase the amount of gas it exports to the bloc. The European Commission also emphasised the development of a Southern Gas Corridor to import energy from the Caspian Sea and Middle East regions without crossing Russian territory.
The incoming Obama administration is unlikely to back away from missile defence systems in Europe any time soon, following Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's initial threatening speech, a nuclear nonproliferation expert who served in the Clinton Administration told New Europe. "The problem is that the Russians have been very unwise, I would say, in their approach to the incoming Obama administration," Carnegie Center's Rose Gottemoeller, who served Clinton as Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the National Security Council and as Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in the US Department of Energy, said telephonically from Washington DC on November 14.
She referred to the tough speech Medvedev gave, just hours after Barack Obamawon the US presidential election "as a result of which the Russians have made it more difficult for an Obama administration to back away from missile defence because basically the Obama administration will have to take account of their own critics and they don't want to be accused of being soft on the Russians." Throughout the presidential campaign, the position of the Obama team on arms-control and nuclear security matters had been that the US will not, under an Obama administration, deploy missile defences in Europe unless they can be proven effective.
"That position has not changed, but whereas I would have perhaps expected the Obama team to back away from missile defences in Europe prior to Medvedev's threatening speech, I don't expect they would back away any time soon. So it is a complicated situation and I think the Russians have created a problem for themselves," Gottemoeller said. Prompted by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Nice, Medvedev retreated on November 14 from his threat to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad, on Europe's borders, but only if Obama joined Russia and France in calling for a conference on European security by next summer.
Sarkozy appears determined to solve the US-Russia row over their respective plans to site missiles in Europe and agree on a new security treaty. Sarkozy, who presided over the summit between Russia and the EU in his capacity as the current holder of the EU's rotating presidency, helped ease the way for Medvedev's retreat. The French president supported the idea of talks on a new security plan for Europe and suggested that they could be held by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in June or July. Both Russia and the US belong to the organisation.
Sarkozy made clear that he wants Washington to reconsider the missile defense systems that it plans to build in Poland and the Czech Republic. Referring to the EU-Russia summit in Nice, Gottemoeller told New Europe that Medvedev is trying to repair the damage from his state-of-the-nation speech. "So they are now trying to spread perfume around," she said, laughing, just as the Russian president was en route to Washington DC to attend a G20 summit. "But they definitely started out on the wrong foot trying to threaten the incoming Obama president." Earlier on November 14 in Nice, EU leaders and Russia concluded their summit with little tangible achievements. The EU failed to persuade Russia to change its position on Georgia.
Medvedev was tough on the issue and refused to back down on Moscow's position to recognise the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independence states. Nevertheless, Sarkozy and Medvedev agreed that negotiations for talks on a new EU-Russia strategic partnership and cooperation agreement would indeed go ahead. "We just decided to continue negotiations: I can't give you a date for signing the treaty. It's a strategically important deal, and it's extremely complex, in view of the range of areas it looks at," European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said.
"We should go down the path of economics, not the path of missiles," he added. Russian and EU officials held the first round of talks on the new agreement, which is intended to give a legal framework to their relations in fields ranging from trade and investment to environmental protection and education, on July 4. But EU leaders then froze further talks on September 1 in protest at Russia's August invasion of Georgia. Both Russia and the EU hope that talks would resume in early December. Medvedev said Russia hoped to see relations pushed forward and talks would re-start "in the near future."
He said that the final treaty "should be substantive, clear in structure, and provide a framework for future work." Gottemoeller told New Europe that "it does seem pretty clear that the EU has decided now that they want to have a vigorous negotiation with the Russians on possibility of an agreement between Russia and the EU. I don't think it's going to be an easy negotiation because the main issues that were out there before the Georgia crisis, were complicated by the Russian crisis." But she opined that Russia would no longer been acting from a position of strength, given the current world economic developments.
"We have to also take account of the economic changes that have occurred since the Georgia crisis," she said, pointing to Russia's troubled stock market after the events in Georgia. "But since then we had this enormous economic crisis and the drop in the price of oil has really put Russia in a difficult spot," she said, adding that the low oil revenues have taken their toll on Russia's federal budget. "The situation has changed pretty considerably since the time Russia was throwing its weight around and saying, 'We are now in a very powerful position at the negotiating table because we have all the cards on our side.'
Now Russia is a little bit more vulnerable because the price of oil and gas has gone down so significantly," Gottemoeller said, asked if energy priorities in the EU would take priority over Brussels' position on Georgia. In Nice, Medvedev said Moscow would remain a reliable energy partner. The EU is concerned about the security of energy supplies from Russia, the bloc's number one supplier of gas and number two supplier of oil. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin did little to calm EU unease when he warned on November 12 that Moscow may scrap Nord Stream and build LNG plants instead if Europe keeps delaying the project.
But as Putin threatened to scrap plans for the gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany, the European Commission on November 13 unveiled proposals to increase energy security and cut back its dependence on Russian energy supplies. "We have to do more, be more ambitious, and be even bolder to avoid the risk of energy disruption in the future," EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs said. To ensure the security of energy supplies to the Baltic states, an interconnection plan, covering gas, electricity and storage in 2009, which would identify the infrastructure is needed to link these countries to the rest of the EU.
Norway, which is not a member of the EU, said it would increase the amount of gas it exports to the bloc. The European Commission also emphasised the development of a Southern Gas Corridor to import energy from the Caspian Sea and Middle East regions without crossing Russian territory.
Four crises on Obama's horizon By Daniel Levy
Four crises on Obama's horizon
By Daniel Levy
No one should be surprised that president-elect Barack Obama's first press conference, three days after his historic November 4th victory, was devoted almost exclusively to the economy. Obama was also quick to remind reporters that there is only one president at a time, and his turn does not begin until January 20. While domestic challenges will dominate his agenda, a not-insignificant list of Middle East crises will confront America's 44th president as well. Here are four of the more urgent issues in which Israel has a keen interest, and which are likely to force themselves onto the Obama team transition agenda and its early days in office.
Why not start with the issue closest to home, with Israel's upcoming February 11 election? Recent American presidents have had a decidedly mixed record of intervention in Israeli elections. President Bill Clinton hastily convened the March 1996 Summit of Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh, but it did not save Shimon Peres in the polls that May. Clinton was more effective in ensnaring a peace-shy prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the Wye River Memorandum - paving the way to Netanyahu's downfall and Ehud Barak's May 1999 election victory. Before that, president George H.W. Bush tripped up Yitzhak Shamir on the issue of settlements, assisting Yitzhak Rabin in Israel's 1992 vote.
A new president, however, is unlikely to dip his hand in the shark-infested waters of Israeli politics, certainly not on Day 1, especially since the possible impact would be hard to predict. The Obama team would be best advised to simply remind Israelis of its own standpoint: a commitment to two states and to advancing the peace process "from the minute I'm sworn into office" (Obama in Amman, July 2008). To forget this pledge until after February 10 would in itself be an intervention of sorts, and an unwelcome one. Will Kadima, Labor or Meretz be able to ride the wave of Obama expectations? That will be for them to attempt and for the voters to decide.
Another upcoming Middle East election the new American president will have to navigate is in Iran, where presidential polls are scheduled for June 2009. The tricky balancing act here will be, on the one hand, not to lose time testing direct engagement with Iran, an Obama election pledge, while, at the same time, doing nothing that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could use to strengthen his own re-election efforts. Paradoxically, a less threatening, more open-for-business tone from the U.S. may be the best way to undermine Ahmadinejad. Direct talks with Ahmadinejad are very unlikely to feature on the immediate Obama to-do list, and would almost certainly be ill advised. In any event, he is not the key address for diplomatic approaches. That would more likely be supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Expect discreet feelers and exploratory contacts with key Khamenei confidants, such as Ali Akbar Velayati and Ali Larijani, and expect not to know that they are taking place.
Israel's best posture on this is surely to avoid any public disagreement with the U.S. on Iran, to ensure that Israel has input into the agenda for talks, and to give American-Iranian negotiations a real chance, as the best option for addressing our concerns.
For Syria, a two-year waiting game ends on Inauguration Day. President Bashar al-Assad apparently decided some time ago that his best bet was to wait out the implacable opposition of French president Jacques Chirac and American president Bush. Syria has recently prepared for this day, for instance by relaunching peace talks with Israel via Turkish mediation, by assuming a constructive role regarding Lebanon, and by moving closer to Europe, most notably to Chirac's successor, Nicolas Sarkozy.
In some senses, Syria is seen as low-hanging fruit for a U.S. re-engagement that would reshuffle Middle East alliances in its favor. After all, Syria is a relevant player when it comes to Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian arena. A reorientation of Syria's policies will not take place overnight or following a brief diplomatic flirtation. But a new approach to U.S.-Syria bilateral relations, with reasonably calibrated benchmarks and including American support for Israeli-Syrian talks, stands a good chance of success. Look out for early indications of that change.
Finally, how to deal with Palestinian internal politics? One of the more devastating legacies of the Bush years was the failure to constructively navigate the Palestinian transition away from the strongman rule of Yasser Arafat and the single-party domination of Fatah. A stable Palestine and sustainable peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis cannot be built on a divided Palestinian house. The American position has been one of encouraging Palestinian division. That needs to change urgently, not by an Obama administration directly engaging Hamas, but by it discreetly signaling an end to the American veto on Palestinian national reconciliation along lines similar to the Saudi-brokered Mecca deal of February 2007. Given the stop-start Palestinian talks now being brokered by Egypt, there might be some urgency to the American policy re-think on this issue - the peace process is deeply flawed in its absence.
Of course, Iraq will loom largest when president-elect Obama turns his attention to the Middle East - and therein lies the core challenge: Will the next administration, unlike its predecessor, appreciate both the extent and the nature of the interconnectivity between the region's varied crises? The signs at least are encouraging.
Daniel Levy, a senior fellow at the New America and Century Foundations, was previously an adviser in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=79158&pid=929133&st=1020&#entry929133
By Daniel Levy
No one should be surprised that president-elect Barack Obama's first press conference, three days after his historic November 4th victory, was devoted almost exclusively to the economy. Obama was also quick to remind reporters that there is only one president at a time, and his turn does not begin until January 20. While domestic challenges will dominate his agenda, a not-insignificant list of Middle East crises will confront America's 44th president as well. Here are four of the more urgent issues in which Israel has a keen interest, and which are likely to force themselves onto the Obama team transition agenda and its early days in office.
Why not start with the issue closest to home, with Israel's upcoming February 11 election? Recent American presidents have had a decidedly mixed record of intervention in Israeli elections. President Bill Clinton hastily convened the March 1996 Summit of Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh, but it did not save Shimon Peres in the polls that May. Clinton was more effective in ensnaring a peace-shy prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the Wye River Memorandum - paving the way to Netanyahu's downfall and Ehud Barak's May 1999 election victory. Before that, president George H.W. Bush tripped up Yitzhak Shamir on the issue of settlements, assisting Yitzhak Rabin in Israel's 1992 vote.
A new president, however, is unlikely to dip his hand in the shark-infested waters of Israeli politics, certainly not on Day 1, especially since the possible impact would be hard to predict. The Obama team would be best advised to simply remind Israelis of its own standpoint: a commitment to two states and to advancing the peace process "from the minute I'm sworn into office" (Obama in Amman, July 2008). To forget this pledge until after February 10 would in itself be an intervention of sorts, and an unwelcome one. Will Kadima, Labor or Meretz be able to ride the wave of Obama expectations? That will be for them to attempt and for the voters to decide.
Another upcoming Middle East election the new American president will have to navigate is in Iran, where presidential polls are scheduled for June 2009. The tricky balancing act here will be, on the one hand, not to lose time testing direct engagement with Iran, an Obama election pledge, while, at the same time, doing nothing that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could use to strengthen his own re-election efforts. Paradoxically, a less threatening, more open-for-business tone from the U.S. may be the best way to undermine Ahmadinejad. Direct talks with Ahmadinejad are very unlikely to feature on the immediate Obama to-do list, and would almost certainly be ill advised. In any event, he is not the key address for diplomatic approaches. That would more likely be supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Expect discreet feelers and exploratory contacts with key Khamenei confidants, such as Ali Akbar Velayati and Ali Larijani, and expect not to know that they are taking place.
Israel's best posture on this is surely to avoid any public disagreement with the U.S. on Iran, to ensure that Israel has input into the agenda for talks, and to give American-Iranian negotiations a real chance, as the best option for addressing our concerns.
For Syria, a two-year waiting game ends on Inauguration Day. President Bashar al-Assad apparently decided some time ago that his best bet was to wait out the implacable opposition of French president Jacques Chirac and American president Bush. Syria has recently prepared for this day, for instance by relaunching peace talks with Israel via Turkish mediation, by assuming a constructive role regarding Lebanon, and by moving closer to Europe, most notably to Chirac's successor, Nicolas Sarkozy.
In some senses, Syria is seen as low-hanging fruit for a U.S. re-engagement that would reshuffle Middle East alliances in its favor. After all, Syria is a relevant player when it comes to Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian arena. A reorientation of Syria's policies will not take place overnight or following a brief diplomatic flirtation. But a new approach to U.S.-Syria bilateral relations, with reasonably calibrated benchmarks and including American support for Israeli-Syrian talks, stands a good chance of success. Look out for early indications of that change.
Finally, how to deal with Palestinian internal politics? One of the more devastating legacies of the Bush years was the failure to constructively navigate the Palestinian transition away from the strongman rule of Yasser Arafat and the single-party domination of Fatah. A stable Palestine and sustainable peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis cannot be built on a divided Palestinian house. The American position has been one of encouraging Palestinian division. That needs to change urgently, not by an Obama administration directly engaging Hamas, but by it discreetly signaling an end to the American veto on Palestinian national reconciliation along lines similar to the Saudi-brokered Mecca deal of February 2007. Given the stop-start Palestinian talks now being brokered by Egypt, there might be some urgency to the American policy re-think on this issue - the peace process is deeply flawed in its absence.
Of course, Iraq will loom largest when president-elect Obama turns his attention to the Middle East - and therein lies the core challenge: Will the next administration, unlike its predecessor, appreciate both the extent and the nature of the interconnectivity between the region's varied crises? The signs at least are encouraging.
Daniel Levy, a senior fellow at the New America and Century Foundations, was previously an adviser in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=79158&pid=929133&st=1020&#entry929133
Will Afghanistan Become Obama's War? Tom Engelhardt
THE NATION
11/17/08
Will Afghanistan Become Obama's War?
Tom Engelhardt
One of the eerier reports on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan appeared recently in the New York Times. Journalist John Burns visited the Russian ambassador in Kabul, Zamir N. Kabulov, who, back in the 1980s, when the Russians were the Americans in Afghanistan, and the Americans were launching the jihad that would eventually wend its way to the 9/11 attacks… well, you get the idea…
In any case, Kabulov was, in the years of the Soviet occupation, a KGB agent in the same city and, in the 1990s, an adviser to a UN peacekeeping envoy during the Afghan civil war that followed. "They've already repeated all of our mistakes," he told Burns, speaking of the American/NATO effort in the country. "Now," he added, "they're making mistakes of their own, ones for which we do not own the copyright." His list of Soviet-style American mistakes included: underestimating "the resistance," an over-reliance on air power, a failure to understand the Afghan "irritative allergy" to foreign occupation, "and thinking that because they swept into Kabul easily, the occupation would be untroubled." Of present occupiers who have stopped by to catch his sorry tale, Kabulov concludes world-wearily, "They listen, but they do not hear."
The question is: Does this experience really have to be repeated to the bitter end -- in the case of the Soviets, a calamitous defeat and retreat from Afghanistan, followed by years of civil war in that wrecked country, and finally the rise of the Pakistani-backed Taliban? The answer is: perhaps. There is no question that the advisers President Obama will be listening to are already exploring more complex strategies in Afghanistan, including possible negotiations with "reconcilable elements" of the Taliban. But these all remain military-plus strategies at whose heart lies the kind of troop surge that candidate Obama called for so vehemently -- and, given the fate of the previous 2007 U.S./NATO "surge" in Afghanistan, this, too, has failure written all over it.
If you want a glimmer of hope when it comes to the spreading Afghan War--American missile-armed drones have been attacking across the Pakistani border regularly in recent months--consider that Barack Obama has made ex-CIA official Bruce Reidel a key advisor on the deteriorating Pakistani situation. And Reidel recently reviewed startlingly favorably Tariq Ali's must-read, hard-hitting new book on Pakistan (and so Afghanistan and so American policy), The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power for the Washington Post. ("My employers of the past three decades, the CIA and the Brookings Institution, get their share of blame," Reidel wrote. "So do both of the current presidential candidates…")
Ali believes that there could be a grand, brokered regional solution to the Afghan War, essentially a military-minus strategy. In his most recent piece, "Operation Enduring Disaster," he wrote:
"Over the last two years, the U.S./NATO occupation of that country has run into serious military problems. Given a severe global economic crisis and the election of a new American president--a man separated in style, intellect, and temperament from his predecessor -- the possibility of a serious discussion about an exit strategy from the Afghan disaster hovers on the horizon. The predicament the U.S. and its allies find themselves in is not an inescapable one, but a change in policy, if it is to matter, cannot be of the cosmetic variety."
Let's hope Reidel and others are willing to listen to non-surge options; otherwise Afghanistan will certainly become "Obama's war," and -- for anyone old enough to remember -- haven't we been through that before?
11/17/08
Will Afghanistan Become Obama's War?
Tom Engelhardt
One of the eerier reports on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan appeared recently in the New York Times. Journalist John Burns visited the Russian ambassador in Kabul, Zamir N. Kabulov, who, back in the 1980s, when the Russians were the Americans in Afghanistan, and the Americans were launching the jihad that would eventually wend its way to the 9/11 attacks… well, you get the idea…
In any case, Kabulov was, in the years of the Soviet occupation, a KGB agent in the same city and, in the 1990s, an adviser to a UN peacekeeping envoy during the Afghan civil war that followed. "They've already repeated all of our mistakes," he told Burns, speaking of the American/NATO effort in the country. "Now," he added, "they're making mistakes of their own, ones for which we do not own the copyright." His list of Soviet-style American mistakes included: underestimating "the resistance," an over-reliance on air power, a failure to understand the Afghan "irritative allergy" to foreign occupation, "and thinking that because they swept into Kabul easily, the occupation would be untroubled." Of present occupiers who have stopped by to catch his sorry tale, Kabulov concludes world-wearily, "They listen, but they do not hear."
The question is: Does this experience really have to be repeated to the bitter end -- in the case of the Soviets, a calamitous defeat and retreat from Afghanistan, followed by years of civil war in that wrecked country, and finally the rise of the Pakistani-backed Taliban? The answer is: perhaps. There is no question that the advisers President Obama will be listening to are already exploring more complex strategies in Afghanistan, including possible negotiations with "reconcilable elements" of the Taliban. But these all remain military-plus strategies at whose heart lies the kind of troop surge that candidate Obama called for so vehemently -- and, given the fate of the previous 2007 U.S./NATO "surge" in Afghanistan, this, too, has failure written all over it.
If you want a glimmer of hope when it comes to the spreading Afghan War--American missile-armed drones have been attacking across the Pakistani border regularly in recent months--consider that Barack Obama has made ex-CIA official Bruce Reidel a key advisor on the deteriorating Pakistani situation. And Reidel recently reviewed startlingly favorably Tariq Ali's must-read, hard-hitting new book on Pakistan (and so Afghanistan and so American policy), The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power for the Washington Post. ("My employers of the past three decades, the CIA and the Brookings Institution, get their share of blame," Reidel wrote. "So do both of the current presidential candidates…")
Ali believes that there could be a grand, brokered regional solution to the Afghan War, essentially a military-minus strategy. In his most recent piece, "Operation Enduring Disaster," he wrote:
"Over the last two years, the U.S./NATO occupation of that country has run into serious military problems. Given a severe global economic crisis and the election of a new American president--a man separated in style, intellect, and temperament from his predecessor -- the possibility of a serious discussion about an exit strategy from the Afghan disaster hovers on the horizon. The predicament the U.S. and its allies find themselves in is not an inescapable one, but a change in policy, if it is to matter, cannot be of the cosmetic variety."
Let's hope Reidel and others are willing to listen to non-surge options; otherwise Afghanistan will certainly become "Obama's war," and -- for anyone old enough to remember -- haven't we been through that before?
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
The G-20 Summit Was a Failure By Desmond Lachman
The G-20 Summit Was a Failure
By Desmond Lachman Tuesday, November 18, 2008
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-11-08/the-g-20-summit-was-a-failure
Filed under: Science & Technology, Economic Policy
Global financial markets want an immediate, bold, and coordinated policy response. G-20 members did not provide it.
This past weekend’s G-20 financial summit has to be considered a failure. At a time when the global recession shows every sign of worsening, G-20 members were unable to agree on a concrete policy response. This raises serious questions about whether the G-20 is an appropriate forum in which to coordinate monetary and fiscal measures for the world's major economies during a crisis.
The most recent data from the United States, Europe, and Japan confirm that the financial crisis has dealt a severe blow to the world economy. Global equity and credit markets remain highly fragile, and most analysts expect the developed economies to experience significantly negative growth for the next few quarters. Meanwhile, it appears that growth has slowed abruptly in emerging market economies such as China and India.
G-20 members should have responded to this dismal outlook with firm action. They should have focused on immediate fiscal stimulus programs, which would have been a useful complement to the coordinated interest rate cuts and bank rescue measures announced at the previous G-20 meeting in early October.
At a time when the global recession shows every sign of worsening, G-20 members were unable to agree on a concrete policy response.
Instead, the weekend summit produced merely a nebulous commitment to “take whatever actions might be necessary” to stabilize global financial markets and an agreement on principles for reforming both the financial system and multilateral lending agencies. Mercifully, G-20 members agreed to pursue these reforms within a framework of free and open markets. Yet their vague pledges were announced in a wordy communiqué that was short on specifics.
Their lack of urgency is disturbing. At a time when global financial markets are clamoring for an immediate, bold, and coordinated policy response, G-20 members have delayed their next summit until April 2009. This only heightens the probability that equity and credit markets will experience another meltdown as the global economy sinks deeper into recession.
Why did the weekend summit yield such meager results? Several reasons. For one thing, it was convened hastily at the behest of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, both of whom were motivated more by domestic political concerns than they were by a pressing desire to stabilize the global economy. As for President Bush, his lame-duck status deprived the meeting of the strong leadership that it desperately needed. For better or worse, President-elect Obama decided to skip the summit and watch its proceedings from Chicago.
On a more basic level, the large and diverse G-20 may not be an appropriate forum in which to tackle a crisis whose roots lie in the U.S. and European economies. Indeed, it might be easier to achieve policy coordination among the major economies in the smaller G-7, assuming that China were included.
Ultimately, real economic leadership must come from the United States. The world trusts that Barack Obama will provide that leadership after January 20. Let us hope that global financial markets can wait until then.
Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
By Desmond Lachman Tuesday, November 18, 2008
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-11-08/the-g-20-summit-was-a-failure
Filed under: Science & Technology, Economic Policy
Global financial markets want an immediate, bold, and coordinated policy response. G-20 members did not provide it.
This past weekend’s G-20 financial summit has to be considered a failure. At a time when the global recession shows every sign of worsening, G-20 members were unable to agree on a concrete policy response. This raises serious questions about whether the G-20 is an appropriate forum in which to coordinate monetary and fiscal measures for the world's major economies during a crisis.
The most recent data from the United States, Europe, and Japan confirm that the financial crisis has dealt a severe blow to the world economy. Global equity and credit markets remain highly fragile, and most analysts expect the developed economies to experience significantly negative growth for the next few quarters. Meanwhile, it appears that growth has slowed abruptly in emerging market economies such as China and India.
G-20 members should have responded to this dismal outlook with firm action. They should have focused on immediate fiscal stimulus programs, which would have been a useful complement to the coordinated interest rate cuts and bank rescue measures announced at the previous G-20 meeting in early October.
At a time when the global recession shows every sign of worsening, G-20 members were unable to agree on a concrete policy response.
Instead, the weekend summit produced merely a nebulous commitment to “take whatever actions might be necessary” to stabilize global financial markets and an agreement on principles for reforming both the financial system and multilateral lending agencies. Mercifully, G-20 members agreed to pursue these reforms within a framework of free and open markets. Yet their vague pledges were announced in a wordy communiqué that was short on specifics.
Their lack of urgency is disturbing. At a time when global financial markets are clamoring for an immediate, bold, and coordinated policy response, G-20 members have delayed their next summit until April 2009. This only heightens the probability that equity and credit markets will experience another meltdown as the global economy sinks deeper into recession.
Why did the weekend summit yield such meager results? Several reasons. For one thing, it was convened hastily at the behest of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, both of whom were motivated more by domestic political concerns than they were by a pressing desire to stabilize the global economy. As for President Bush, his lame-duck status deprived the meeting of the strong leadership that it desperately needed. For better or worse, President-elect Obama decided to skip the summit and watch its proceedings from Chicago.
On a more basic level, the large and diverse G-20 may not be an appropriate forum in which to tackle a crisis whose roots lie in the U.S. and European economies. Indeed, it might be easier to achieve policy coordination among the major economies in the smaller G-7, assuming that China were included.
Ultimately, real economic leadership must come from the United States. The world trusts that Barack Obama will provide that leadership after January 20. Let us hope that global financial markets can wait until then.
Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
The pirates of Somalia
The pirates of Somalia
War-torn Somalia, carved as it is into several autonomous pockets, is fast becoming a haven for pirates. Over 75 ships have been attacked so far this year in the waters off the country’s northern coast, nearly a dozen in October alone. The geographical layout of the region would appear to favour the marauders since the Yemen coastline to the north and the Horn of Africa to the south together funnel shipping into the Gulf of Aden. Economic conditions in Somalia are su ch that piracy holds promise as a major, perhaps only, source of income for the adventurous. Unemployment is rampant, food insecurity is growing, and there is little hope that a central government capable of imposing its writ will emerge in the near future. With the food processing industry and exports lagging, fishery is no longer a viable option. Large vessels seldom dock at Somali ports since it is almost certain that they will be hijacked and their crew and cargo held to ransom. This makes for a situation where a host of people with seagoing skills have few legitimate avenues for earning an income. At the same time, the means required for pirating ships are apparently simple. In most cases, attacks are carried out by small groups armed with hand-held weapons. They approach the target in light skiffs, tag it with chains tipped by grapple-hooks, overwhelm the usually unarmed crewmen, and then wait for the ransom to be paid.
The Indian Navy registered a handsome success on November 11 when helicopter-borne marine commandos took off from a guided missile frigate and landed on a merchant vessel in time to thwart a band of pirates. This operation might not have come off but for the pre-existing agreement with the Sultanate of Oman under which the frigate is provided berthing facility in the port of Salalah. The navies of the United States, Russia, and some of the European Union member-states are also involved in patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb. However, there does not appear to be a very high degree of coordination among the navies patrolling the north-western Arabian Sea. This is quite in contrast with the situation in South East Asia where a serious effort is being made to set up a cooperative framework to tackle buccaneering off the Indonesian coast. As the m.v. Stolt Valor case brought home, the laws of the sea can come in the way of rescue or pre-emptive operations when ships carrying the flag of one nation but crewed by sailors belonging to another are taken into the territorial waters of a third. The military, legal, and technical issues must be rapidly sorted out so that the piracy off Somalia is eliminated.
© Copyright 2000 - 2008 The Hindu
http://www.thehindu.com/2008/11/18/stories/2008111855380800.htm
War-torn Somalia, carved as it is into several autonomous pockets, is fast becoming a haven for pirates. Over 75 ships have been attacked so far this year in the waters off the country’s northern coast, nearly a dozen in October alone. The geographical layout of the region would appear to favour the marauders since the Yemen coastline to the north and the Horn of Africa to the south together funnel shipping into the Gulf of Aden. Economic conditions in Somalia are su ch that piracy holds promise as a major, perhaps only, source of income for the adventurous. Unemployment is rampant, food insecurity is growing, and there is little hope that a central government capable of imposing its writ will emerge in the near future. With the food processing industry and exports lagging, fishery is no longer a viable option. Large vessels seldom dock at Somali ports since it is almost certain that they will be hijacked and their crew and cargo held to ransom. This makes for a situation where a host of people with seagoing skills have few legitimate avenues for earning an income. At the same time, the means required for pirating ships are apparently simple. In most cases, attacks are carried out by small groups armed with hand-held weapons. They approach the target in light skiffs, tag it with chains tipped by grapple-hooks, overwhelm the usually unarmed crewmen, and then wait for the ransom to be paid.
The Indian Navy registered a handsome success on November 11 when helicopter-borne marine commandos took off from a guided missile frigate and landed on a merchant vessel in time to thwart a band of pirates. This operation might not have come off but for the pre-existing agreement with the Sultanate of Oman under which the frigate is provided berthing facility in the port of Salalah. The navies of the United States, Russia, and some of the European Union member-states are also involved in patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb. However, there does not appear to be a very high degree of coordination among the navies patrolling the north-western Arabian Sea. This is quite in contrast with the situation in South East Asia where a serious effort is being made to set up a cooperative framework to tackle buccaneering off the Indonesian coast. As the m.v. Stolt Valor case brought home, the laws of the sea can come in the way of rescue or pre-emptive operations when ships carrying the flag of one nation but crewed by sailors belonging to another are taken into the territorial waters of a third. The military, legal, and technical issues must be rapidly sorted out so that the piracy off Somalia is eliminated.
© Copyright 2000 - 2008 The Hindu
http://www.thehindu.com/2008/11/18/stories/2008111855380800.htm
Report on Nuclear Security Urges Prompt Global Action Yearly Study Offers Agenda for New Administration
Report on Nuclear Security Urges Prompt Global Action
Yearly Study Offers Agenda for New Administration
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/17/AR2008111702976.html
By David E. Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, November 18, 2008; Page A25
When armed men attacked South Africa's most closely guarded nuclear facility a year ago, they penetrated the detection systems at the perimeter, cut through an electrified fence and broke into the emergency control center, shooting one worker there in the chest before escaping.
The Pelindaba facility holds hundreds of pounds of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium. Although the attackers last November did not steal any of it, the assault highlights what a new report describes as the increasingly global challenge of keeping nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.
The South African facility was better protected than dozens of other sites around the world that hold bomb-grade nuclear materials. Yet a team of four armed men made it into the control room and out without being caught.
The report, "Securing the Bomb 2008," the seventh annual study from Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, is to be released today. The study was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonproliferation organization co-chaired by former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia.
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President-elect Barack Obama pledged during the campaign to secure all nuclear materials at vulnerable sites within four years. Nunn said the challenge will be to keep that an urgent priority, given so many other competing demands.
"You have to decide whether it is urgent enough and important enough to be on the front burner," Nunn said. "Getting the other parts of the world to understand the urgency is also important."
In an agenda for the incoming administration, the report urges "a global campaign to lock down every nuclear weapon and every significant stock of potential nuclear bomb material worldwide as rapidly as that can possibly be done." The report also calls for the appointment of a senior White House official with daily responsibility for preventing a nuclear terrorist attack.
While there has been progress in the former Soviet Union in recent years, the report recommends broadening the effort to secure nuclear materials to include China, India, Pakistan and South Africa. The report says the weapons and the ingredients for a nuclear bomb exist in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries.
About 130 research reactors around the world still use highly enriched uranium as fuel, and many of them have only "the most modest security measures in place -- in some cases, no more than a night watchman and a chain link fence," the report says. The South African break-in "is a reminder that nuclear security is a global problem, not just a problem in the former Soviet Union."
In that case, according to the report, the intruders spent 45 minutes inside the secured perimeter of the nuclear compound without being engaged by security forces, then disappeared. It is not known who they were or what they were after. South African authorities arrested three people but released them without charge. The security manager and several of the guards on duty were fired.
South Africa had refused U.S. offers to remove the highly enriched uranium or to help improve security at the facility, the report said.
Matthew Bunn, associate professor of public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and author of the report, said many nations need to address weaknesses in guarding bulk supplies of bomb-grade uranium and plutonium. In the past, "almost all the cases of theft are bulk materials," as opposed to finished weapons, he said.
The report notes that "it is a sobering fact that nearly all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed before it was seized," referring to highly enriched uranium.
Russia still possesses "the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials, located in the world's largest number of buildings and bunkers," an estimated 250 structures at dozens of sites, the report found. The study concluded that "some serious weaknesses still remain" in Russia, including "widespread insider corruption and theft," "poorly trained and motivated conscript guards forces" and a poorly developed security culture.
The report also calls on the United States to get its house in order, pointing to the inadvertent flight of six nuclear warheads last year to Barksdale Air Force Base.
The report says it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear weapon, but so far none has. "The use of a nuclear bomb would be among the most difficult types of attack for terrorists to accomplish," the report says, "but the massive, assured, instantaneous and comprehensive destruction of life and property that wou
Yearly Study Offers Agenda for New Administration
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/17/AR2008111702976.html
By David E. Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, November 18, 2008; Page A25
When armed men attacked South Africa's most closely guarded nuclear facility a year ago, they penetrated the detection systems at the perimeter, cut through an electrified fence and broke into the emergency control center, shooting one worker there in the chest before escaping.
The Pelindaba facility holds hundreds of pounds of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium. Although the attackers last November did not steal any of it, the assault highlights what a new report describes as the increasingly global challenge of keeping nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.
The South African facility was better protected than dozens of other sites around the world that hold bomb-grade nuclear materials. Yet a team of four armed men made it into the control room and out without being caught.
The report, "Securing the Bomb 2008," the seventh annual study from Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, is to be released today. The study was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonproliferation organization co-chaired by former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia.
ad_icon
President-elect Barack Obama pledged during the campaign to secure all nuclear materials at vulnerable sites within four years. Nunn said the challenge will be to keep that an urgent priority, given so many other competing demands.
"You have to decide whether it is urgent enough and important enough to be on the front burner," Nunn said. "Getting the other parts of the world to understand the urgency is also important."
In an agenda for the incoming administration, the report urges "a global campaign to lock down every nuclear weapon and every significant stock of potential nuclear bomb material worldwide as rapidly as that can possibly be done." The report also calls for the appointment of a senior White House official with daily responsibility for preventing a nuclear terrorist attack.
While there has been progress in the former Soviet Union in recent years, the report recommends broadening the effort to secure nuclear materials to include China, India, Pakistan and South Africa. The report says the weapons and the ingredients for a nuclear bomb exist in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries.
About 130 research reactors around the world still use highly enriched uranium as fuel, and many of them have only "the most modest security measures in place -- in some cases, no more than a night watchman and a chain link fence," the report says. The South African break-in "is a reminder that nuclear security is a global problem, not just a problem in the former Soviet Union."
In that case, according to the report, the intruders spent 45 minutes inside the secured perimeter of the nuclear compound without being engaged by security forces, then disappeared. It is not known who they were or what they were after. South African authorities arrested three people but released them without charge. The security manager and several of the guards on duty were fired.
South Africa had refused U.S. offers to remove the highly enriched uranium or to help improve security at the facility, the report said.
Matthew Bunn, associate professor of public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and author of the report, said many nations need to address weaknesses in guarding bulk supplies of bomb-grade uranium and plutonium. In the past, "almost all the cases of theft are bulk materials," as opposed to finished weapons, he said.
The report notes that "it is a sobering fact that nearly all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed before it was seized," referring to highly enriched uranium.
Russia still possesses "the world's largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials, located in the world's largest number of buildings and bunkers," an estimated 250 structures at dozens of sites, the report found. The study concluded that "some serious weaknesses still remain" in Russia, including "widespread insider corruption and theft," "poorly trained and motivated conscript guards forces" and a poorly developed security culture.
The report also calls on the United States to get its house in order, pointing to the inadvertent flight of six nuclear warheads last year to Barksdale Air Force Base.
The report says it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear weapon, but so far none has. "The use of a nuclear bomb would be among the most difficult types of attack for terrorists to accomplish," the report says, "but the massive, assured, instantaneous and comprehensive destruction of life and property that wou
Is Pakistan Obama's Cambodia
Much more than a simple expansion of the mess awaits President Obama in Pakistan if he takes the advice of those who want to "clean out" the nests of terrorists across the border from the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Veteran national security journalist George Wilson reminds us that this dangerous and simplistic view of the situation has been tried - quite disastrously - before. Moreover, Pakistan will almost certainly be much worse than Cambodia.
Wilson's commentary appeared in the November 17 Congress Daily Am at www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily, and it is shown below with the author's permission.
Congress Daily AM, Monday, November 17, 2008
Forward Observer
Perils Of Pakistan
By George C. Wilson
President-elect Obama has committed himself to stepping up the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is not an overstatement to say that he will risk his whole presidency, and perhaps even unwittingly put nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists who might use them to attack the United States, if he leaps too far into neighboring Pakistan in pursuit of elusive victory.
The rub, as the Vietnam and Iraq wars showed us all, is unintended consequences. Our military leaders can, and almost certainly will, make a strong case to Obama that there is no way to defeat the Taliban and their allied tribes in Afghanistan without cleaning out their sanctuaries just over the Afghan border in Pakistan.
I can hear frustrated U.S. commanders on the ground in Afghanistan making the same kind of argument to Obama’s team tomorrow that I heard yesterday in Vietnam when I was a combat correspondent there.
I could empathize with this lament, for example, that I heard in 1968 from a 9th Division infantry battalion commander, whose mission was to rid his area — South Vietnam’s rice bowl, the Delta — of the stealthy Viet Cong guerrillas:
“I can have my kids chase the Viet Cong all day and all night. But whenever they catch up to a good number of them, they just run over the border into Cambodia where we can’t go. All I’m really doing down here is buying time with my kids’ lives for the diplomats to settle this thing.”
His was among the impressive military arguments I heard for either invading Cambodian border sanctuaries or getting the United States out of the otherwise unwinnable Vietnam War.
President Lyndon Johnson resisted invading Cambodia. He had concluded that this would only widen the war, infuriating an already skeptical Congress. Early on in Johnson’s presidency he confided to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, but not the public, that he saw the war as a no-win. Secret tapes of Johnson’s conversations, since made public, document him saying this to McNamara on Feb. 26, 1965: “I don’t think anything is going to be as bad as losing, and I don’t see any way of winning.”
His successor, Richard Nixon, who took office in 1969 after the Vietnam War had ruined Johnson’s presidency, including his dream of building a Great Society, rushed into Cambodia where Johnson had feared to tread.
First, Nixon authorized, without telling the public, secret bombings of Cambodia, which had tried to stay neutral. Then on April 30, 1970, Nixon announced he had ordered the invasion of Cambodia with U.S. and South Vietnamese troops to “clean out” the enemy’s border sanctuaries.
Now think “Pakistan” to hear the same ring. Four days later — on May 4, 1970 — National Guardsmen killed four student anti-war protesters on the campus of Kent State in Ohio.
Those two events, coming right on top of each other, mobilized anti-war lawmakers in Congress to curb the president’s war-making powers and to cut off the money the South Vietnamese army needed to continue fighting the war after U.S. troops left the field under Nixon’s Vietnamization strategy.
The military defeat Johnson had feared all along, without saying so publicly, came in 1975 when Communist North Vietnam conquered capitalist South Vietnam.
Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia, even though his announced purpose was just to clean out the border sanctuaries, contributed to Cambodia’s political turmoil.
The invaders also failed to achieve the military objective of finding and destroying the Communist headquarters in Cambodia known as COSVN for Central Office for South Vietnam.
The Communist Khmer Rouge in the aftermath of the invasion toppled the pro-American leader of the country, Lon Nol, and wiped out the upper classes in a bloodbath that some reports estimated murdered 2 million Cambodians. Again, unintended consequences.
Fast forward to Pakistan today. President Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto, a Muslim moderate who was assassinated in December while campaigning in parliamentary elections, is already complaining about U. S. military strikes against alleged al Qaida and Taliban targets in Pakistan’s border regions.
An American-led ground invasion of Pakistan under the same “clean out” rationale Nixon used could cause such political turmoil that the bad guys might get their hands on one or more of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates Pakistan has at least 60 nuclear weapons.
Imagine a worst case scenario of terrorists sneaking just one nuke into New York City and setting it off at lunch hour. Thousands of people could be incinerated, skyscrapers toppled and the air poisoned for years.
The Bush administration, Congress and the media have been rightly faulted for not worst-casing the American invasion of Iraq before it was ordered in 2003. History warns that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
Obama needs to look long and hard at the worst unintended consequences of leaping into Pakistan. While he’s at it, the new president should consider what would happen if U. S. forces captured or killed Osama bin Laden. Osama’s deputies would feel compelled to retaliate against the United States in a spectacular way. Does Obama want another 9/11? Better to keep American fingerprints off the deed if it is done.
“Forward Observer,” an insider’s look at defense and military topics, appears every other Monday in CongressDailyAM. Special Correspondent George C. Wilson can be reached at gwilson@nationaljournal.com.
__________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
winslowwheeler@msn.com
301 791-2397
CDI | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW | Washington, DC 20036 | US
Wilson's commentary appeared in the November 17 Congress Daily Am at www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily, and it is shown below with the author's permission.
Congress Daily AM, Monday, November 17, 2008
Forward Observer
Perils Of Pakistan
By George C. Wilson
President-elect Obama has committed himself to stepping up the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is not an overstatement to say that he will risk his whole presidency, and perhaps even unwittingly put nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists who might use them to attack the United States, if he leaps too far into neighboring Pakistan in pursuit of elusive victory.
The rub, as the Vietnam and Iraq wars showed us all, is unintended consequences. Our military leaders can, and almost certainly will, make a strong case to Obama that there is no way to defeat the Taliban and their allied tribes in Afghanistan without cleaning out their sanctuaries just over the Afghan border in Pakistan.
I can hear frustrated U.S. commanders on the ground in Afghanistan making the same kind of argument to Obama’s team tomorrow that I heard yesterday in Vietnam when I was a combat correspondent there.
I could empathize with this lament, for example, that I heard in 1968 from a 9th Division infantry battalion commander, whose mission was to rid his area — South Vietnam’s rice bowl, the Delta — of the stealthy Viet Cong guerrillas:
“I can have my kids chase the Viet Cong all day and all night. But whenever they catch up to a good number of them, they just run over the border into Cambodia where we can’t go. All I’m really doing down here is buying time with my kids’ lives for the diplomats to settle this thing.”
His was among the impressive military arguments I heard for either invading Cambodian border sanctuaries or getting the United States out of the otherwise unwinnable Vietnam War.
President Lyndon Johnson resisted invading Cambodia. He had concluded that this would only widen the war, infuriating an already skeptical Congress. Early on in Johnson’s presidency he confided to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, but not the public, that he saw the war as a no-win. Secret tapes of Johnson’s conversations, since made public, document him saying this to McNamara on Feb. 26, 1965: “I don’t think anything is going to be as bad as losing, and I don’t see any way of winning.”
His successor, Richard Nixon, who took office in 1969 after the Vietnam War had ruined Johnson’s presidency, including his dream of building a Great Society, rushed into Cambodia where Johnson had feared to tread.
First, Nixon authorized, without telling the public, secret bombings of Cambodia, which had tried to stay neutral. Then on April 30, 1970, Nixon announced he had ordered the invasion of Cambodia with U.S. and South Vietnamese troops to “clean out” the enemy’s border sanctuaries.
Now think “Pakistan” to hear the same ring. Four days later — on May 4, 1970 — National Guardsmen killed four student anti-war protesters on the campus of Kent State in Ohio.
Those two events, coming right on top of each other, mobilized anti-war lawmakers in Congress to curb the president’s war-making powers and to cut off the money the South Vietnamese army needed to continue fighting the war after U.S. troops left the field under Nixon’s Vietnamization strategy.
The military defeat Johnson had feared all along, without saying so publicly, came in 1975 when Communist North Vietnam conquered capitalist South Vietnam.
Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia, even though his announced purpose was just to clean out the border sanctuaries, contributed to Cambodia’s political turmoil.
The invaders also failed to achieve the military objective of finding and destroying the Communist headquarters in Cambodia known as COSVN for Central Office for South Vietnam.
The Communist Khmer Rouge in the aftermath of the invasion toppled the pro-American leader of the country, Lon Nol, and wiped out the upper classes in a bloodbath that some reports estimated murdered 2 million Cambodians. Again, unintended consequences.
Fast forward to Pakistan today. President Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto, a Muslim moderate who was assassinated in December while campaigning in parliamentary elections, is already complaining about U. S. military strikes against alleged al Qaida and Taliban targets in Pakistan’s border regions.
An American-led ground invasion of Pakistan under the same “clean out” rationale Nixon used could cause such political turmoil that the bad guys might get their hands on one or more of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates Pakistan has at least 60 nuclear weapons.
Imagine a worst case scenario of terrorists sneaking just one nuke into New York City and setting it off at lunch hour. Thousands of people could be incinerated, skyscrapers toppled and the air poisoned for years.
The Bush administration, Congress and the media have been rightly faulted for not worst-casing the American invasion of Iraq before it was ordered in 2003. History warns that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
Obama needs to look long and hard at the worst unintended consequences of leaping into Pakistan. While he’s at it, the new president should consider what would happen if U. S. forces captured or killed Osama bin Laden. Osama’s deputies would feel compelled to retaliate against the United States in a spectacular way. Does Obama want another 9/11? Better to keep American fingerprints off the deed if it is done.
“Forward Observer,” an insider’s look at defense and military topics, appears every other Monday in CongressDailyAM. Special Correspondent George C. Wilson can be reached at gwilson@nationaljournal.com.
__________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
winslowwheeler@msn.com
301 791-2397
CDI | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW | Washington, DC 20036 | US
Monday, November 17, 2008
China's huge poverty gap slowing growth, UN says Tania Branigan in Beijing
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/17/china-poverty-united-nations-growth
China's huge poverty gap slowing growth, UN says
Tania Branigan in Beijing
Monday November 17 2008
The Guardian
The gulf between rich and poor in China is affecting growth by
deterring consumption and holding down productivity, according to a
report released by the United Nations Development Programme.
It tracks the vast and increasing gaps between rural and urban areas
and regions of China - warning that differences in income are matched
by disparities in social welfare, education and elderly care.
While Beijing and Shanghai have reached the development level of
countries such as Cyprus and Portugal, provinces such as south-western
Guizhou are comparable to Namibia or Botswana.
The Human Development Report argues that pressing ahead in providing
basic healthcare, education and welfare to all Chinese citizens will
boost the country's economy in the face of the global slowdown.
Chi Fulin, one of its authors, told reporters: "Equalisation of basic
public services is an important condition for expanding domestic
demand and maintaining steady and rapid economic growth."
China's president, Hu Jintao, told the G20 summit in Washington this
weekend that his nation's continued fast growth was its "important
contribution" to steadying the global economy.
The government has announced a 4tn yuan (£395bn) stimulus
package, which will include higher spending on public services and
infrastructure, though details are not yet clear.
Khalid Malik, UN resident coordinator and UN Development Programme
resident representative in China, praised the government's commitment
to increasing services.
"These timely actions can make people feel more secure to consume and,
in turn, help realise China's urgent goal of keeping a high economic
growth rate," he said.
"China now has the resources to make equitable provision of key public
services to all China's people a reality."
The report, by authors from the China Institute for Reform and
Development and other thinktanks, describes the nation's progress over
the past 30 years of reform as "a miracle in the history of poverty
reduction".
Economic growth has benefited even the poorest groups in society. But
it warns that reforming public services is necessary too. Urban
residents enjoy far higher levels of government funding than those in
the countryside.
According to the UN human development index - which measures health,
knowledge and income - China has made dramatic gains for its citizens,
climbing from 101st to 81st in the global rankings between 1990 and
2005.
But life expectancy in Guizhou is a decade shorter than in Beijing;
child mortality in Qinghai is seven times as high as in the capital;
and illiteracy in Gansu five times more common. Spending also varies
widely: the average public funding rate per student for primary and
junior middle schools in Shanghai was about 10 times that of central
Henan province.
Copyright Guardian Newspapers Limited 2008
China's huge poverty gap slowing growth, UN says
Tania Branigan in Beijing
Monday November 17 2008
The Guardian
The gulf between rich and poor in China is affecting growth by
deterring consumption and holding down productivity, according to a
report released by the United Nations Development Programme.
It tracks the vast and increasing gaps between rural and urban areas
and regions of China - warning that differences in income are matched
by disparities in social welfare, education and elderly care.
While Beijing and Shanghai have reached the development level of
countries such as Cyprus and Portugal, provinces such as south-western
Guizhou are comparable to Namibia or Botswana.
The Human Development Report argues that pressing ahead in providing
basic healthcare, education and welfare to all Chinese citizens will
boost the country's economy in the face of the global slowdown.
Chi Fulin, one of its authors, told reporters: "Equalisation of basic
public services is an important condition for expanding domestic
demand and maintaining steady and rapid economic growth."
China's president, Hu Jintao, told the G20 summit in Washington this
weekend that his nation's continued fast growth was its "important
contribution" to steadying the global economy.
The government has announced a 4tn yuan (£395bn) stimulus
package, which will include higher spending on public services and
infrastructure, though details are not yet clear.
Khalid Malik, UN resident coordinator and UN Development Programme
resident representative in China, praised the government's commitment
to increasing services.
"These timely actions can make people feel more secure to consume and,
in turn, help realise China's urgent goal of keeping a high economic
growth rate," he said.
"China now has the resources to make equitable provision of key public
services to all China's people a reality."
The report, by authors from the China Institute for Reform and
Development and other thinktanks, describes the nation's progress over
the past 30 years of reform as "a miracle in the history of poverty
reduction".
Economic growth has benefited even the poorest groups in society. But
it warns that reforming public services is necessary too. Urban
residents enjoy far higher levels of government funding than those in
the countryside.
According to the UN human development index - which measures health,
knowledge and income - China has made dramatic gains for its citizens,
climbing from 101st to 81st in the global rankings between 1990 and
2005.
But life expectancy in Guizhou is a decade shorter than in Beijing;
child mortality in Qinghai is seven times as high as in the capital;
and illiteracy in Gansu five times more common. Spending also varies
widely: the average public funding rate per student for primary and
junior middle schools in Shanghai was about 10 times that of central
Henan province.
Copyright Guardian Newspapers Limited 2008
Lessons That Should Be Learned Dr. James J. Zogby
Washington Watch
November 17, 2008
Lessons That
Should Be Learned
Dr. James J. Zogby (c)
President
Arab American Institute
On November 5th, my office sent an email to tens of thousands of
our members and contacts congratulating President-elect Barack Obama.
In our message, we noted the historic transformation his victory
represented and commended the thousands of Arab Americans who
participated in this winning campaign.
The initial and near universal response was heartwarming, with
many sharing moving anecdotes of their campaign experiences, their
reactions to the victory, and their hopes for change.
One day and one announcement later, the tide turned.
With the naming of Congressman Rahm Emanuel as Obama's White House
Chief of Staff, the euphoria of some, not all, turned to despair. The
emails and calls to my office were both troubled and troubling because
much of the reaction was based on misinformation and because of what
the entire episode revealed about the larger political dynamics
involved.
First, the facts.
Rahm Emanuel is a brilliant strategist and a practitioner of
hard-ball politics who in campaigns, his time in the Clinton White
House, and more recently in Congress has demonstrated that he knows
how to get a job done. Because there will be critical legislation the
President-elect will need to move through Congress, from an economic
recovery package and health care reform to a comprehensive approach to
alternative energy, Obama has tapped Emanuel for his proven political
skills. It is that simple.
This, of course, was neither the content nor the concerns raised
by the emails I received. Some charged that Emanuel was an Israeli
citizen or a dual U.S.-Israeli national (he is neither, he was born in
Chicago in 1959); or, they alleged that he served in the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) and lost his finger confronting a Syrian tank
during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (he did not serve in the
IDF, and lost his finger in a freak accident while working as a
teenager in an Arby's restaurant). A few accused Emanuel of skipping
U.S. military service to join the IDF in 1991 (also not true - in the
midst of the 1991 Gulf War, while U.S. forces were manning Patriot
missile batteries in Israel and the Arab Gulf, Emanuel volunteered for
a few weeks, as a civilian, doing maintenance on Israeli vehicles).
The most recent story alleges that Rahm Emanuel was fired from the
White House in 1998 after being implicated by the FBI, together with
Monica Lewinsky, in a Mossad plot to spy on then-President Clinton (a
total fabrication, compliments of a shady character who claims to have
been a U.S. intelligence official and is a purveyor of many bizarre
tales).
That stories such as these have been circulating, and have taken
hold, is as reprehensible as the "Barack Obama is a secret
Muslim/Manchurian candidate" tale, or the anti-Arab anti-Muslim
canards to which I and many of my colleagues have been subjected over
the years.
Putting aside the fiction or, more accurately, the slanderous
myths, the truth is that Emanuel is an effective leader in Congress.
He is a strong supporter of Israel. But then, how many members of
Congress are not?
Emanuel is Jewish and his father is an Israeli. Arab Americans
should be especially sensitive to attacks on anyone based on religion
or ethnicity. He has worked closely with and is liked by the Arab
American Members of Congress from both parties, and he was the
architect of the 1993 White House lawn signing ceremony for the Oslo
Accords that brought Arab Americans and American Jews together. When,
in 1994, Rahm accepted my invitation to a luncheon with Arab American
community leaders, those who met him were impressed by his openness
and honesty.
Beyond these facts, however, there are two concerns that must be addressed.
It is deeply troubling how quickly, for some, the excitement of
Barack Obama's victory was eclipsed by cynicism and suspicion, and how
receptive some were to wild tales. This could only occur, on one
level, because the victory itself was not understood. If it had been,
the excitement would have been tempered by an appreciation of
political realities.
Obama's victory, no doubt, demonstrated that change is possible -
but incremental change. Pressures remain, from the right and the left
as well as the interest groups of all sorts that continue to have
influence, limiting political options. The economy is in free-fall
and, after eight years of Bush neglect and recklessness, dangers
abound in the world. An Obama victory doesn't alter those realities.
And so our excitement was justified, but our euphoria should never
have taken us so high as to lose our grounding and understanding of
the limits of what is possible.
My concern is that, for some, the need for change became so great
as to make them susceptible to wild swings - from unrealistic
expectations to unwarranted despair and, therefore, to become prone to
believe the worst.
But the fault here should be shared. I am concerned by the
slowness of the Obama camp to respond more quickly or effectively to
address the situation. Modern political operations have learned the
need to confront false stories, to manage perception, and to
anticipate problems -- and, here, the Obama team had been especially
masterful.
During the campaign, for example, they repeatedly demonstrated how
tuned-in they were to public perception - and in particular to matters
that might have created discomfort in the Jewish community. They knew
that these stories needed to be shot down quickly. (American Muslims
understood much of this, despite feeling slighted, at times.) But in
this most recent instance, the Obama camp displayed both
inattentiveness and tone-deafness to Arab misperceptions about who
Rahm Emanuel is, and what role he will play. (Aside from the flap over
the comments made by Rahm's father, for which Rahm, himself, has now
profoundly apologized.) As a result, the situation festered.
The campaign is now over, and the President-elect is playing on a
world stage with more than one audience at stake. And in the Middle
East, especially, sensitivities are as great and (perceived) sleights
are felt as acutely as they are among any people in the world. With
feelings having been rubbed raw by decades of U.S. policy miscues,
with U.S. favorability ratings at all-time lows, and with extremists
preying off resentment and fear - perceptions matter.
If we are to succeed in making changes in U.S.-Arab relations -
and I believe that an Obama Administration can - greater attentiveness
and sensitivity is in order.
Bottom line - there are lessons to learn and work to be done.
Arabs and Arab Americans need to ground their expectations in
political realities and be wary of slanderous attacks smacking of
anti-Semitism, and U.S. political leadership must learn to be as
attentive to Arab sensitivities as they are to the concerns of others.
Washington Watch is a weekly column written by AAI President James
Zogby. The views expressed within this column do not necessarily
reflect those of the Arab American Institute. We invite you to share
your views on the topics addressed within Dr. Zogby's weekly
Washington Watch by emailing jzogby@aaiusa.org.
November 17, 2008
Lessons That
Should Be Learned
Dr. James J. Zogby (c)
President
Arab American Institute
On November 5th, my office sent an email to tens of thousands of
our members and contacts congratulating President-elect Barack Obama.
In our message, we noted the historic transformation his victory
represented and commended the thousands of Arab Americans who
participated in this winning campaign.
The initial and near universal response was heartwarming, with
many sharing moving anecdotes of their campaign experiences, their
reactions to the victory, and their hopes for change.
One day and one announcement later, the tide turned.
With the naming of Congressman Rahm Emanuel as Obama's White House
Chief of Staff, the euphoria of some, not all, turned to despair. The
emails and calls to my office were both troubled and troubling because
much of the reaction was based on misinformation and because of what
the entire episode revealed about the larger political dynamics
involved.
First, the facts.
Rahm Emanuel is a brilliant strategist and a practitioner of
hard-ball politics who in campaigns, his time in the Clinton White
House, and more recently in Congress has demonstrated that he knows
how to get a job done. Because there will be critical legislation the
President-elect will need to move through Congress, from an economic
recovery package and health care reform to a comprehensive approach to
alternative energy, Obama has tapped Emanuel for his proven political
skills. It is that simple.
This, of course, was neither the content nor the concerns raised
by the emails I received. Some charged that Emanuel was an Israeli
citizen or a dual U.S.-Israeli national (he is neither, he was born in
Chicago in 1959); or, they alleged that he served in the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) and lost his finger confronting a Syrian tank
during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (he did not serve in the
IDF, and lost his finger in a freak accident while working as a
teenager in an Arby's restaurant). A few accused Emanuel of skipping
U.S. military service to join the IDF in 1991 (also not true - in the
midst of the 1991 Gulf War, while U.S. forces were manning Patriot
missile batteries in Israel and the Arab Gulf, Emanuel volunteered for
a few weeks, as a civilian, doing maintenance on Israeli vehicles).
The most recent story alleges that Rahm Emanuel was fired from the
White House in 1998 after being implicated by the FBI, together with
Monica Lewinsky, in a Mossad plot to spy on then-President Clinton (a
total fabrication, compliments of a shady character who claims to have
been a U.S. intelligence official and is a purveyor of many bizarre
tales).
That stories such as these have been circulating, and have taken
hold, is as reprehensible as the "Barack Obama is a secret
Muslim/Manchurian candidate" tale, or the anti-Arab anti-Muslim
canards to which I and many of my colleagues have been subjected over
the years.
Putting aside the fiction or, more accurately, the slanderous
myths, the truth is that Emanuel is an effective leader in Congress.
He is a strong supporter of Israel. But then, how many members of
Congress are not?
Emanuel is Jewish and his father is an Israeli. Arab Americans
should be especially sensitive to attacks on anyone based on religion
or ethnicity. He has worked closely with and is liked by the Arab
American Members of Congress from both parties, and he was the
architect of the 1993 White House lawn signing ceremony for the Oslo
Accords that brought Arab Americans and American Jews together. When,
in 1994, Rahm accepted my invitation to a luncheon with Arab American
community leaders, those who met him were impressed by his openness
and honesty.
Beyond these facts, however, there are two concerns that must be addressed.
It is deeply troubling how quickly, for some, the excitement of
Barack Obama's victory was eclipsed by cynicism and suspicion, and how
receptive some were to wild tales. This could only occur, on one
level, because the victory itself was not understood. If it had been,
the excitement would have been tempered by an appreciation of
political realities.
Obama's victory, no doubt, demonstrated that change is possible -
but incremental change. Pressures remain, from the right and the left
as well as the interest groups of all sorts that continue to have
influence, limiting political options. The economy is in free-fall
and, after eight years of Bush neglect and recklessness, dangers
abound in the world. An Obama victory doesn't alter those realities.
And so our excitement was justified, but our euphoria should never
have taken us so high as to lose our grounding and understanding of
the limits of what is possible.
My concern is that, for some, the need for change became so great
as to make them susceptible to wild swings - from unrealistic
expectations to unwarranted despair and, therefore, to become prone to
believe the worst.
But the fault here should be shared. I am concerned by the
slowness of the Obama camp to respond more quickly or effectively to
address the situation. Modern political operations have learned the
need to confront false stories, to manage perception, and to
anticipate problems -- and, here, the Obama team had been especially
masterful.
During the campaign, for example, they repeatedly demonstrated how
tuned-in they were to public perception - and in particular to matters
that might have created discomfort in the Jewish community. They knew
that these stories needed to be shot down quickly. (American Muslims
understood much of this, despite feeling slighted, at times.) But in
this most recent instance, the Obama camp displayed both
inattentiveness and tone-deafness to Arab misperceptions about who
Rahm Emanuel is, and what role he will play. (Aside from the flap over
the comments made by Rahm's father, for which Rahm, himself, has now
profoundly apologized.) As a result, the situation festered.
The campaign is now over, and the President-elect is playing on a
world stage with more than one audience at stake. And in the Middle
East, especially, sensitivities are as great and (perceived) sleights
are felt as acutely as they are among any people in the world. With
feelings having been rubbed raw by decades of U.S. policy miscues,
with U.S. favorability ratings at all-time lows, and with extremists
preying off resentment and fear - perceptions matter.
If we are to succeed in making changes in U.S.-Arab relations -
and I believe that an Obama Administration can - greater attentiveness
and sensitivity is in order.
Bottom line - there are lessons to learn and work to be done.
Arabs and Arab Americans need to ground their expectations in
political realities and be wary of slanderous attacks smacking of
anti-Semitism, and U.S. political leadership must learn to be as
attentive to Arab sensitivities as they are to the concerns of others.
Washington Watch is a weekly column written by AAI President James
Zogby. The views expressed within this column do not necessarily
reflect those of the Arab American Institute. We invite you to share
your views on the topics addressed within Dr. Zogby's weekly
Washington Watch by emailing jzogby@aaiusa.org.
TIME 11/17/08 Afghan Overture: Behind Karzai's Appeal to Mullah Omar Aryn Baker
TIME
11/17/08
Afghan Overture: Behind Karzai's Appeal to Mullah Omar
Aryn Baker
On Sunday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai shocked Afghan and international observers when he reached out to the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar, offering him a guarantee of safety if he agrees to peace talks. Omar, who has a $10 million price on his head for his support of al-Qaeda, has not been seen since 2001, when his Taliban regime was toppled by U.S. forces. Omar is thought to be hiding in the ungoverned tribal areas along the Pakistan and Afghan border, though he still appears to be engaged in key leadership decisions regarding the growing militancy in the country. Addressing journalists at a press conference at the presidential palace, Karzai said, "If I hear from [Mullah Omar] that he is willing to come to Afghanistan or to negotiate for peace... I, as the president of Afghanistan, will go to any length to provide him [with] protection."
But how much of Karzai's bold statement can be counted as a real offer, and how much a desperate political move by a leader faced with waning support both at home and abroad? (See pictures of the frontline in the battle against the Taliban.)
As the insurgency gains a stronger foothold in Afghanistan, there has been growing debate both inside and outside the country about the possibility of reconciling with some moderate elements of the Taliban. Until now, however, Mullah Omar has always been considered one of the "irreconcilables," a key leader unacceptable because of his extremist ideology and his alliance with al-Qaeda. Omar, through Taliban spokesmen, has repeatedly asserted that he has no interest in peace talks unless all foreign forces leave the country. Karzai, for his part, asserted in the same speech that any militant seeking reconciliation must be willing to respect the Afghan constitution, the very document that Omar rejects as heresy. "It is ridiculous to think that Mullah Omar would be willing to come to the negotiating table now," scoffs a NATO commander. "This is the man who draped himself in the cloak of the Prophet and declared himself commander of the faithful. He has nothing to gain by negotiating, and we have nothing to gain by offering talks when the Taliban think they are winning."
Mullah Brother, deputy leader of the Taliban, rejected Karzai's offer, telling Reuters News via satellite telephone, "We are safe in Afghanistan and we have no need for Hamid Karzai's offer of safety." He added that foreign forces had to leave before the start of any negotiations. "As long as foreign occupiers remain in Afghanistan, we aren't ready for talks because they hold the power and talks won't bear fruit... The problems in Afghanistan are because of them," Brother said. To further underscore the Taliban rejection of Karzai's offer, a suicide bomber killed four today in the southern province of Kandahar.
Karzai, on the other hand, may see some political advantage in extending an offer that most likely will be refused. Coupled with his offer to the Taliban was an admonishment to his international backers, who have bristled at the idea of negotiating with Mullah Omar in the past. "If I say I want protection for Mullah Omar, then the international community has two choices: remove me, or leave if they disagree," said Karzai. "If I am removed [by force by the western alliance] in the cause of peace for Afghanistan... then I'll be very happy. But we are not in that stage yet."
Many observers regard Karzai's announcement as a piece of crude political theater in preparation for next fall's presidential election. Xenophobia has always proved popular in Afghan politics, so by appearing defiant he can hope to gain more support, which has been steadily diminishing over frustration with his government's inability to provide security or development. In addition, Karzai can no longer be assured of unwavering U.S. support once the new administration comes in. In 2004 Karzai benefited from U.S. backing in the country's first election, but President-elect Barack Obama has been clear about his dissatisfaction with Karzai's performance so far, saying in an interview that he told Karzai in July that "you are going to have to do better by your people in order for us to gain the popular support that is necessary."
Wadir Safi, a professor of International Relations at Kabul University, says that Karzai's speech directly contradicts his platform of several months ago, when he called on lower ranking Taliban to reconcile, but ruled out negotiations with avowed enemies of Afghanistan, such as Mullah Omar. Karzai's recent trips to both the U.S. and London, where the Afghan president was criticized for his inability to stabilize his country, crack down on corruption and stop the narcotics trade, may have precipitated the about-face, says Safi. "What he said [on Sunday] was not based on analysis but political survival. He knows he is losing support from Afghans and the international community, so instead he announced this in order to get support from Pashtuns in the south — those who want peace, but support the Taliban."
But political analyst Dad Noorani believes that Karzai may have unwittingly undermined his already weak standing with his defiant stance. "When he said the international community has two choices, he clearly discredited himself. All along he has been saying that he was elected by the Afghan people, and now he says if the international community does not accept his offer to Mullah Omar then they can remove him or leave. How can the international community remove him if he is elected?" Professor Safi agrees. "This just proves that the whole election was a farce, and that Karzai is president not by the will of the people, but of the West." But if Karzai keeps up this kind of talk, they say, he won't even have that any more. With reporting by Ali Safi/Kabul
11/17/08
Afghan Overture: Behind Karzai's Appeal to Mullah Omar
Aryn Baker
On Sunday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai shocked Afghan and international observers when he reached out to the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar, offering him a guarantee of safety if he agrees to peace talks. Omar, who has a $10 million price on his head for his support of al-Qaeda, has not been seen since 2001, when his Taliban regime was toppled by U.S. forces. Omar is thought to be hiding in the ungoverned tribal areas along the Pakistan and Afghan border, though he still appears to be engaged in key leadership decisions regarding the growing militancy in the country. Addressing journalists at a press conference at the presidential palace, Karzai said, "If I hear from [Mullah Omar] that he is willing to come to Afghanistan or to negotiate for peace... I, as the president of Afghanistan, will go to any length to provide him [with] protection."
But how much of Karzai's bold statement can be counted as a real offer, and how much a desperate political move by a leader faced with waning support both at home and abroad? (See pictures of the frontline in the battle against the Taliban.)
As the insurgency gains a stronger foothold in Afghanistan, there has been growing debate both inside and outside the country about the possibility of reconciling with some moderate elements of the Taliban. Until now, however, Mullah Omar has always been considered one of the "irreconcilables," a key leader unacceptable because of his extremist ideology and his alliance with al-Qaeda. Omar, through Taliban spokesmen, has repeatedly asserted that he has no interest in peace talks unless all foreign forces leave the country. Karzai, for his part, asserted in the same speech that any militant seeking reconciliation must be willing to respect the Afghan constitution, the very document that Omar rejects as heresy. "It is ridiculous to think that Mullah Omar would be willing to come to the negotiating table now," scoffs a NATO commander. "This is the man who draped himself in the cloak of the Prophet and declared himself commander of the faithful. He has nothing to gain by negotiating, and we have nothing to gain by offering talks when the Taliban think they are winning."
Mullah Brother, deputy leader of the Taliban, rejected Karzai's offer, telling Reuters News via satellite telephone, "We are safe in Afghanistan and we have no need for Hamid Karzai's offer of safety." He added that foreign forces had to leave before the start of any negotiations. "As long as foreign occupiers remain in Afghanistan, we aren't ready for talks because they hold the power and talks won't bear fruit... The problems in Afghanistan are because of them," Brother said. To further underscore the Taliban rejection of Karzai's offer, a suicide bomber killed four today in the southern province of Kandahar.
Karzai, on the other hand, may see some political advantage in extending an offer that most likely will be refused. Coupled with his offer to the Taliban was an admonishment to his international backers, who have bristled at the idea of negotiating with Mullah Omar in the past. "If I say I want protection for Mullah Omar, then the international community has two choices: remove me, or leave if they disagree," said Karzai. "If I am removed [by force by the western alliance] in the cause of peace for Afghanistan... then I'll be very happy. But we are not in that stage yet."
Many observers regard Karzai's announcement as a piece of crude political theater in preparation for next fall's presidential election. Xenophobia has always proved popular in Afghan politics, so by appearing defiant he can hope to gain more support, which has been steadily diminishing over frustration with his government's inability to provide security or development. In addition, Karzai can no longer be assured of unwavering U.S. support once the new administration comes in. In 2004 Karzai benefited from U.S. backing in the country's first election, but President-elect Barack Obama has been clear about his dissatisfaction with Karzai's performance so far, saying in an interview that he told Karzai in July that "you are going to have to do better by your people in order for us to gain the popular support that is necessary."
Wadir Safi, a professor of International Relations at Kabul University, says that Karzai's speech directly contradicts his platform of several months ago, when he called on lower ranking Taliban to reconcile, but ruled out negotiations with avowed enemies of Afghanistan, such as Mullah Omar. Karzai's recent trips to both the U.S. and London, where the Afghan president was criticized for his inability to stabilize his country, crack down on corruption and stop the narcotics trade, may have precipitated the about-face, says Safi. "What he said [on Sunday] was not based on analysis but political survival. He knows he is losing support from Afghans and the international community, so instead he announced this in order to get support from Pashtuns in the south — those who want peace, but support the Taliban."
But political analyst Dad Noorani believes that Karzai may have unwittingly undermined his already weak standing with his defiant stance. "When he said the international community has two choices, he clearly discredited himself. All along he has been saying that he was elected by the Afghan people, and now he says if the international community does not accept his offer to Mullah Omar then they can remove him or leave. How can the international community remove him if he is elected?" Professor Safi agrees. "This just proves that the whole election was a farce, and that Karzai is president not by the will of the people, but of the West." But if Karzai keeps up this kind of talk, they say, he won't even have that any more. With reporting by Ali Safi/Kabul
Barak approved settlement expansion despite Road Map By Uri Blau, Haaretz Correspondent
Barak approved settlement expansion despite Road Map
By Uri Blau, Haaretz Correspondent
Defense Minister Ehud Barak has approved dozens of construction projects in the West Bank in recent months, contradicting Israel's commitments to the Road Map, Haaretz has learned. Barak also approved the marketing of hundreds of housing units in settlements.
Some of the permits for construction projects were granted in settlements to the east of the separation fence, which are beyond the areas the state defines as "settlement blocks" and it expects to retain under Israel's control following a permanent agreement with the Palestinians.
By press time, the Defense Ministry had not responded to Haaretz's query on the matter.
The Road Map, an American initiative put in place in 2003, calls on Israel to avoid any expansion of settlements, except for construction necessitated by the needs of natural population growth. The construction permits appear to contravene Israel's obligations.
Construction in the settlements is a permanent matter of dispute in talks for a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and has drawn strong criticism from both the U.S. and the European Union.
At a March press conference with P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the U.S. continues to insist that Israel ceases settlement expansion. Rice stressed that such construction contravenes the Road Map.
In January Barak asked that all construction projects in the West Bank be brought to him for authorization. Data received by Haaretz suggests that since April, Barak has authorized the following construction projects in the West Bank:
* The marketing of at least 400 housing units and plots, of which 315 homes and 32 plots are in Beitar Ilit, 48 homes and 19 plots in Ariel, and 40 housing units and and a commercial center at Efrat.
* The construction of some 60 homes in a neighborhood that is several kilometers away from its mother settlement of Eshkolot, in southern Mount Hebron, but is included in its municipal jurisdiction.
* The registration and publication of construction projects in Ariel, Modi'in Ilit, Ma'aleh Adumim, Mevo Horon, Oranit, Efrat, Givat Ze'ev, Beit El, Neveh Daniel, Alon Shvut, Har Adar, Kochav Ya'akov and Talmon. The two latter settlements are situated to the east of the separation fence.
* Mekorot, the Israeli water company, was given permission to prepare plans in Kiryat Arba, which is also situated east of the fence.
* Authorization to plan "an experimental electricity production farm" in southern Mount Hebron.
* Renewal of authorization for the marketing of 31 homes and commercial properties in Beitar Ilit.
* The planning of a cemetery in the area of Ma'aleh Adumim.
* The allocation of 4.6 dunams (just over one acre) for the development of a nature reserve in the Prat stream in Wadi Kelt, which is east of the fence.
* The allotment of plots for the construction of public buildings in the neighborhood of Matityahu-East in Modi'in Ilit (which has been partially built on lands of the Palestinian village of Bil'in). Similar allotments were made in Elkana, Kfar Oranim, Kedumim and Beit Aryeh.
By Uri Blau, Haaretz Correspondent
Defense Minister Ehud Barak has approved dozens of construction projects in the West Bank in recent months, contradicting Israel's commitments to the Road Map, Haaretz has learned. Barak also approved the marketing of hundreds of housing units in settlements.
Some of the permits for construction projects were granted in settlements to the east of the separation fence, which are beyond the areas the state defines as "settlement blocks" and it expects to retain under Israel's control following a permanent agreement with the Palestinians.
By press time, the Defense Ministry had not responded to Haaretz's query on the matter.
The Road Map, an American initiative put in place in 2003, calls on Israel to avoid any expansion of settlements, except for construction necessitated by the needs of natural population growth. The construction permits appear to contravene Israel's obligations.
Construction in the settlements is a permanent matter of dispute in talks for a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and has drawn strong criticism from both the U.S. and the European Union.
At a March press conference with P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the U.S. continues to insist that Israel ceases settlement expansion. Rice stressed that such construction contravenes the Road Map.
In January Barak asked that all construction projects in the West Bank be brought to him for authorization. Data received by Haaretz suggests that since April, Barak has authorized the following construction projects in the West Bank:
* The marketing of at least 400 housing units and plots, of which 315 homes and 32 plots are in Beitar Ilit, 48 homes and 19 plots in Ariel, and 40 housing units and and a commercial center at Efrat.
* The construction of some 60 homes in a neighborhood that is several kilometers away from its mother settlement of Eshkolot, in southern Mount Hebron, but is included in its municipal jurisdiction.
* The registration and publication of construction projects in Ariel, Modi'in Ilit, Ma'aleh Adumim, Mevo Horon, Oranit, Efrat, Givat Ze'ev, Beit El, Neveh Daniel, Alon Shvut, Har Adar, Kochav Ya'akov and Talmon. The two latter settlements are situated to the east of the separation fence.
* Mekorot, the Israeli water company, was given permission to prepare plans in Kiryat Arba, which is also situated east of the fence.
* Authorization to plan "an experimental electricity production farm" in southern Mount Hebron.
* Renewal of authorization for the marketing of 31 homes and commercial properties in Beitar Ilit.
* The planning of a cemetery in the area of Ma'aleh Adumim.
* The allocation of 4.6 dunams (just over one acre) for the development of a nature reserve in the Prat stream in Wadi Kelt, which is east of the fence.
* The allotment of plots for the construction of public buildings in the neighborhood of Matityahu-East in Modi'in Ilit (which has been partially built on lands of the Palestinian village of Bil'in). Similar allotments were made in Elkana, Kfar Oranim, Kedumim and Beit Aryeh.
Kilcullen on Afghanistan: "It's Still Winnable, But Only Just."
November 14, 2008
New Yorker Magazine
Article by George Packer
Kilcullen on Afghanistan: "It's Still Winnable, But Only Just."
AFGANISTAN.JPGI wrote about David Kilcullen two years ago, in a piece called "Knowing the Enemy." Few experts understand counterinsurgency and counterterrorism better than this former Australian army officer and anthropology Ph.D, who has advised the American, British, and Australian governments, was one of General Petraeus's strategic whizzes at the start of the surge, in early 2007, and writes so well that you'd never imagine he's spent his whole career in government, the military, and academia. Kilcullen is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, which has provided Obama with foreign-policy advisers and advice.
This week, Kilcullen agreed to do an e-mail Q. & A. on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he's spent a lot of time, and where the most pressing foreign crisis awaits the new Administration. Though Kilcullen is still an adviser to the State Department, he emphasized that his views are his own. And they are characteristically blunt.
The White House briefed both campaigns on Afghanistan before the election. Apparently that's how little time we have to turn things around. So how bad is it?
It's bad: violence is way up, Taliban influence has spread at the local level, and popular confidence in the government and the international community is waning fast. It's still winnable, but only just, and to turn this thing around will take an extremely major effort starting with local-level governance, political strategy, giving the Afghan people a well-founded feeling of security, and dealing with the active sanctuary in Pakistan. A normal U.S. government transition takes six to nine months, by the time new political appointees are confirmed, briefed, and in position. But nine months out from now will be the height of the Afghan fighting season, and less than a month out from critical Presidential elections in Afghanistan. If we do this the "normal" way, it will be too late for the Obama Administration to grip it up. I think this is shaping up to be one of the smoothest transitions on record, with the current Administration going out of its way to assist and facilitate. That said, the incoming Administration has a steep learning curve, and has inherited a dire situation—so whatever we do, it's not going to be easy.
It sounds like you're proposing classic counterinsurgency strategy: a combination of offensive and defensive military operations, political and economic development, and diplomacy. Isn't that what we've been doing these past seven years? Have we just not been doing enough of all these? Or do we need to change strategy to something fundamentally new?
Well, we need to be more effective in what we are doing, but we also need to do some different things, as well, with the focus on security and governance. The classical counterinsurgency theorist Bernard Fall wrote, in 1965, that a government which is losing to an insurgency isn't being out-fought, it's being out-governed. In our case, we are being both out-fought and out-governed for four basic reasons:
(1) We have failed to secure the Afghan people. That is, we have failed to deliver them a well-founded feeling of security. Our failing lies as much in providing human security—economic and social wellbeing, law and order, trust in institutions and hope for the future—as in protection from the Taliban, narco-traffickers, and terrorists. In particular, we have spent too much effort chasing and attacking an elusive enemy who has nothing he needs to defend—and so can always run away to fight another day—and too little effort in securing the people where they sleep. (And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations).
(2) We have failed to deal with the Pakistani sanctuary that forms the political base and operational support system for the Taliban, and which creates a protective cocoon (abetted by the fecklessness or complicity of some elements in Pakistan) around senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.
(3) The Afghan government has not delivered legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level—with the emphasis on good governance. In some areas, we have left a vacuum that the Taliban has filled, in other areas some of the Afghan government's own representatives have been seen as inefficient, corrupt, or exploitative.
(4) Neither we nor the Afghans are organized, staffed, or resourced to do these three things (secure the people, deal with the safe haven, and govern legitimately and well at the local level)—partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.
So, bottom line—we need to do better, but we also need a rethink in some key areas starting with security and governance.
Let's take these one at a time. Has there been too much emphasis on offensive operations, especially air strikes? We read a lot recently about civilian deaths and growing Afghan anger. Should we cut back on the use of air power and put in more ground troops, as Obama has said he will? Or is this not a matter of managing numbers and assets so much as changing the focus of our tactics?
It's both. There has been an emphasis on fighting the Taliban, which has led us into operations (both air and ground-based) that do a lot of damage but do not make people feel safer. Similarly, we have a lot of troops in rural areas—small outposts—positioned there because it's easier to bring firepower to bear on the enemy out in these areas. Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key.
Police are another main issue. We have built the Afghan police into a less well-armed, less well-trained version of the Army and launched them into operations against the insurgents. Meanwhile, nobody is doing the job of actual policing—rule of law, keeping the population safe from all comers (including friendly fire and coalition operations), providing justice and dispute resolution, and civil and criminal law enforcement. As a consequence, the Taliban have stepped into this gap; they currently run thirteen law courts across the south, and ninety-five per cent of the work of these courts is civil law, property disputes, criminal matters, water and grazing disuptes, inheritances etc.—basic governance things that the police and judiciary ought to be doing, but instead they're out in the countryside chasing bad guys. Where governance does exist, it is seen as corrupt or exploitative, in many cases, whereas the people remember the Taliban as cruel but not as corrupt. They remember they felt safer back then. The Taliban are doing the things we ought to be doing because we are off chasing them instead of keeping our eye on the prize—securing and governing the people in a way that meets their needs.
So, on the military side, three additional brigades isn't the answer? Or isn't the only answer?
That's right. The first thing we have to do is to "triage" the environment: figure out the smallest number of Afghan population centers that accounts for the greatest percentage of the population. Once we understand that lay-down (e.g., in the South, it's two towns that account for eighty per cent of the population, but the east is more rural, so it's a different calculation there), then we tailor a security plan for each major cluster of population, and for the key communications—roads, essentially—that link them together. Then we will have an idea of the extra troops we need, if any. But we can start right away with the troops we have.
Also, there are assets beyond (or, at a pinch, instead of) combat troops that would make a huge difference, without "breaking the bank" for combat troops elsewhere. These include construction engineers, aid and development personnel, aid project money, intelligence analysts, helicopters, trainers and advisers, mentors for local mayors and district officials, surveillance assets and so on—so it's not necessarily a straight zero-sum between having combat troops pull out of Iraq so we can send them to Afghanistan. (In any case, if you accept the argument that a key part of our grand-strategic problem is that we are over-committed in Iraq—and I do accept that argument—then it makes no sense to pull troops out of Iraq just so we can go and re-commit them somewhere else. We need to be reducing overall force commitment everywhere, not just moving troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. That would be tantamount to un-bogging ourselves from Iraq just so we can re-bog ourselves in Afghanistan).
On the Pakistani sanctuary, this seems to be the cancer in the bones of Afghanistan, and no one has a good answer. Both air power and special-forces incursions have drawn the wrath of the Pakistani government and people, but their efforts, as you say, have been weak at best and two-faced at worst. Our diplomats and development workers are being systematically targeted, and there's a question how well we can spend $750 million in the northwest. Is there a way to clear out this sanctuary, that doesn't cause the problem to metastasize?
You're right. Pakistan is extremely important; indeed, Pakistan (rather than either Afghanistan or Iraq) is the central front of world terrorism. The problem is time frame: it takes six to nine months to plan an attack of the scale of 9/11, so we need a "counter-sanctuary" strategy that delivers over that time frame, to prevent al Qaeda from using its Pakistan safe haven to mount another attack on the West. This means that building an effective nation-state in Pakistan, though an important and noble objective, cannot be our sole solution—nation-building in Pakistan is a twenty to thirty year project, minimum, if indeed it proves possible at all—i.e. nation-building doesn't deliver in the time frame we need. So we need a short-term counter-sanctuary program, a long-term nation-building program to ultimately resolve the problem, and a medium-term "bridging" strategy (five to ten years)—counterinsurgency, in essence—that gets us from here to there. That middle part is the weakest link right now. All of that boils down to a policy of:
(a) encouraging and supporting Pakistan to step up and effectively govern its entire territory including the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], and to resolve the current Baluch and Pashtun insurgency, while
(b) assisting wherever possible in the long-term process of state-building and governance, but
(c) reserving the right to strike, as a last resort, at al Qaeda-linked terrorist targets that threaten the international community, if (and only if) they are operating in areas that lie outside effective Pakistani sovereignty.
During the campaign, McCain talked about transferring the surge from Iraq
to Afghanistan. We've discussed the military side. On the political side, is there any possible counterpart to the Sunni Awakening in Afghanistan—perhaps local Taliban disenchanted with foreign influences on their leadership? Should part of our political strategy be to talk to Taliban leaders who might be prepared to negotiate with us?
Well, I doubt that an Anbar-style "awakening" is likely in Afghanistan. The enemy is very different from A.Q.I. and, in any case, Pashtun tribes have a very different makeup from Arab tribes. So even if an awakening happened it would likely play out differently from Iraq. Rather than talking about negotiations (which implies offering an undefeated Taliban a seat at the table, and is totally not in the cards) I would prefer the term "community engagement." The local communities (tribes, districts, villages) in some parts of Afghanistan have been alienated by poor governance and feel disenfranchised through the lack of district elections. This creates a vacuum, especially in terms of rule of law, dispute resolution, and mediation at the village level, that the Taliban have filled. Rather than negotiate directly with the Taliban, a program to reconcile with local communities who are tacitly supporting the Taliban by default (because of lack of an alternative) would bear more fruit. The Taliban movement itself is disunited and fissured with mutual suspicion—local tribal leaders have told me that ninety per cent of the people we call Taliban could be reconcilable under some circumstances, but that many are terrified of what the Quetta shura and other extremists associated with the old Taliban regime might do to them if they tried to reconcile. So, while an awakening may not happen, the basic principles we applied in Iraq—co-opt the reconcilables, make peace with anyone willing to give up the armed struggle, but simultaneously kill or capture all those who prove themselves to be irreconcilable—are probably very applicable.
You spoke of Iraq's effect in draining our energy and focus away from Afghanistan. President-elect Obama has made it clear that he plans to alter the balance significantly. But, as you say, he doesn't have much time. If you had his ear, what would be your basic advice?
Well, I don't have his ear, and I don't envy the pressure he must be under. But if I did have his ear, I think I would argue for the four major points we discussed above. First, the draw-down in Iraq needs to be conditions-based and needs to recognize how fragile our gains there have been, and our moral obligation to Iraqis who have trusted us. As I said, we don't want to un-bog ourselves from Iraq only to get bogged in Afghanistan while Iraq turns bad again. Second, our priorities in Afghanistan should be security, governance, and dealing with the Pakistan safe haven—and we may not necessarily need that many more combat troops to do so. Third, the Afghan elections of September 2009 are a key milestone—we can't just muddle through, and the key problem is political: delivering effective and legitimate governance that meets Afghans' needs. And finally, most importantly, this is a wartime transition and we can't afford the normal nine-month hiatus while we put the new Administration in place: the war in Afghanistan will be won or lost in the next fighting season, i.e. by the time of the September elections.
The situation in Afghanistan is dire. But the war is winnable. We need to focus our attention on the problem, and think before acting. But we need to think fast, and our actions need to involve a major change of direction, focussing on securing the population rather than chasing the enemy, and delivering effective legitimate governance to the people, bottom-up, at the local level. Do that, do it fast, and we stand an excellent chance of turning things around.
New Yorker Magazine
Article by George Packer
Kilcullen on Afghanistan: "It's Still Winnable, But Only Just."
AFGANISTAN.JPGI wrote about David Kilcullen two years ago, in a piece called "Knowing the Enemy." Few experts understand counterinsurgency and counterterrorism better than this former Australian army officer and anthropology Ph.D, who has advised the American, British, and Australian governments, was one of General Petraeus's strategic whizzes at the start of the surge, in early 2007, and writes so well that you'd never imagine he's spent his whole career in government, the military, and academia. Kilcullen is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, which has provided Obama with foreign-policy advisers and advice.
This week, Kilcullen agreed to do an e-mail Q. & A. on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he's spent a lot of time, and where the most pressing foreign crisis awaits the new Administration. Though Kilcullen is still an adviser to the State Department, he emphasized that his views are his own. And they are characteristically blunt.
The White House briefed both campaigns on Afghanistan before the election. Apparently that's how little time we have to turn things around. So how bad is it?
It's bad: violence is way up, Taliban influence has spread at the local level, and popular confidence in the government and the international community is waning fast. It's still winnable, but only just, and to turn this thing around will take an extremely major effort starting with local-level governance, political strategy, giving the Afghan people a well-founded feeling of security, and dealing with the active sanctuary in Pakistan. A normal U.S. government transition takes six to nine months, by the time new political appointees are confirmed, briefed, and in position. But nine months out from now will be the height of the Afghan fighting season, and less than a month out from critical Presidential elections in Afghanistan. If we do this the "normal" way, it will be too late for the Obama Administration to grip it up. I think this is shaping up to be one of the smoothest transitions on record, with the current Administration going out of its way to assist and facilitate. That said, the incoming Administration has a steep learning curve, and has inherited a dire situation—so whatever we do, it's not going to be easy.
It sounds like you're proposing classic counterinsurgency strategy: a combination of offensive and defensive military operations, political and economic development, and diplomacy. Isn't that what we've been doing these past seven years? Have we just not been doing enough of all these? Or do we need to change strategy to something fundamentally new?
Well, we need to be more effective in what we are doing, but we also need to do some different things, as well, with the focus on security and governance. The classical counterinsurgency theorist Bernard Fall wrote, in 1965, that a government which is losing to an insurgency isn't being out-fought, it's being out-governed. In our case, we are being both out-fought and out-governed for four basic reasons:
(1) We have failed to secure the Afghan people. That is, we have failed to deliver them a well-founded feeling of security. Our failing lies as much in providing human security—economic and social wellbeing, law and order, trust in institutions and hope for the future—as in protection from the Taliban, narco-traffickers, and terrorists. In particular, we have spent too much effort chasing and attacking an elusive enemy who has nothing he needs to defend—and so can always run away to fight another day—and too little effort in securing the people where they sleep. (And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations).
(2) We have failed to deal with the Pakistani sanctuary that forms the political base and operational support system for the Taliban, and which creates a protective cocoon (abetted by the fecklessness or complicity of some elements in Pakistan) around senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.
(3) The Afghan government has not delivered legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level—with the emphasis on good governance. In some areas, we have left a vacuum that the Taliban has filled, in other areas some of the Afghan government's own representatives have been seen as inefficient, corrupt, or exploitative.
(4) Neither we nor the Afghans are organized, staffed, or resourced to do these three things (secure the people, deal with the safe haven, and govern legitimately and well at the local level)—partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.
So, bottom line—we need to do better, but we also need a rethink in some key areas starting with security and governance.
Let's take these one at a time. Has there been too much emphasis on offensive operations, especially air strikes? We read a lot recently about civilian deaths and growing Afghan anger. Should we cut back on the use of air power and put in more ground troops, as Obama has said he will? Or is this not a matter of managing numbers and assets so much as changing the focus of our tactics?
It's both. There has been an emphasis on fighting the Taliban, which has led us into operations (both air and ground-based) that do a lot of damage but do not make people feel safer. Similarly, we have a lot of troops in rural areas—small outposts—positioned there because it's easier to bring firepower to bear on the enemy out in these areas. Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key.
Police are another main issue. We have built the Afghan police into a less well-armed, less well-trained version of the Army and launched them into operations against the insurgents. Meanwhile, nobody is doing the job of actual policing—rule of law, keeping the population safe from all comers (including friendly fire and coalition operations), providing justice and dispute resolution, and civil and criminal law enforcement. As a consequence, the Taliban have stepped into this gap; they currently run thirteen law courts across the south, and ninety-five per cent of the work of these courts is civil law, property disputes, criminal matters, water and grazing disuptes, inheritances etc.—basic governance things that the police and judiciary ought to be doing, but instead they're out in the countryside chasing bad guys. Where governance does exist, it is seen as corrupt or exploitative, in many cases, whereas the people remember the Taliban as cruel but not as corrupt. They remember they felt safer back then. The Taliban are doing the things we ought to be doing because we are off chasing them instead of keeping our eye on the prize—securing and governing the people in a way that meets their needs.
So, on the military side, three additional brigades isn't the answer? Or isn't the only answer?
That's right. The first thing we have to do is to "triage" the environment: figure out the smallest number of Afghan population centers that accounts for the greatest percentage of the population. Once we understand that lay-down (e.g., in the South, it's two towns that account for eighty per cent of the population, but the east is more rural, so it's a different calculation there), then we tailor a security plan for each major cluster of population, and for the key communications—roads, essentially—that link them together. Then we will have an idea of the extra troops we need, if any. But we can start right away with the troops we have.
Also, there are assets beyond (or, at a pinch, instead of) combat troops that would make a huge difference, without "breaking the bank" for combat troops elsewhere. These include construction engineers, aid and development personnel, aid project money, intelligence analysts, helicopters, trainers and advisers, mentors for local mayors and district officials, surveillance assets and so on—so it's not necessarily a straight zero-sum between having combat troops pull out of Iraq so we can send them to Afghanistan. (In any case, if you accept the argument that a key part of our grand-strategic problem is that we are over-committed in Iraq—and I do accept that argument—then it makes no sense to pull troops out of Iraq just so we can go and re-commit them somewhere else. We need to be reducing overall force commitment everywhere, not just moving troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. That would be tantamount to un-bogging ourselves from Iraq just so we can re-bog ourselves in Afghanistan).
On the Pakistani sanctuary, this seems to be the cancer in the bones of Afghanistan, and no one has a good answer. Both air power and special-forces incursions have drawn the wrath of the Pakistani government and people, but their efforts, as you say, have been weak at best and two-faced at worst. Our diplomats and development workers are being systematically targeted, and there's a question how well we can spend $750 million in the northwest. Is there a way to clear out this sanctuary, that doesn't cause the problem to metastasize?
You're right. Pakistan is extremely important; indeed, Pakistan (rather than either Afghanistan or Iraq) is the central front of world terrorism. The problem is time frame: it takes six to nine months to plan an attack of the scale of 9/11, so we need a "counter-sanctuary" strategy that delivers over that time frame, to prevent al Qaeda from using its Pakistan safe haven to mount another attack on the West. This means that building an effective nation-state in Pakistan, though an important and noble objective, cannot be our sole solution—nation-building in Pakistan is a twenty to thirty year project, minimum, if indeed it proves possible at all—i.e. nation-building doesn't deliver in the time frame we need. So we need a short-term counter-sanctuary program, a long-term nation-building program to ultimately resolve the problem, and a medium-term "bridging" strategy (five to ten years)—counterinsurgency, in essence—that gets us from here to there. That middle part is the weakest link right now. All of that boils down to a policy of:
(a) encouraging and supporting Pakistan to step up and effectively govern its entire territory including the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], and to resolve the current Baluch and Pashtun insurgency, while
(b) assisting wherever possible in the long-term process of state-building and governance, but
(c) reserving the right to strike, as a last resort, at al Qaeda-linked terrorist targets that threaten the international community, if (and only if) they are operating in areas that lie outside effective Pakistani sovereignty.
During the campaign, McCain talked about transferring the surge from Iraq
to Afghanistan. We've discussed the military side. On the political side, is there any possible counterpart to the Sunni Awakening in Afghanistan—perhaps local Taliban disenchanted with foreign influences on their leadership? Should part of our political strategy be to talk to Taliban leaders who might be prepared to negotiate with us?
Well, I doubt that an Anbar-style "awakening" is likely in Afghanistan. The enemy is very different from A.Q.I. and, in any case, Pashtun tribes have a very different makeup from Arab tribes. So even if an awakening happened it would likely play out differently from Iraq. Rather than talking about negotiations (which implies offering an undefeated Taliban a seat at the table, and is totally not in the cards) I would prefer the term "community engagement." The local communities (tribes, districts, villages) in some parts of Afghanistan have been alienated by poor governance and feel disenfranchised through the lack of district elections. This creates a vacuum, especially in terms of rule of law, dispute resolution, and mediation at the village level, that the Taliban have filled. Rather than negotiate directly with the Taliban, a program to reconcile with local communities who are tacitly supporting the Taliban by default (because of lack of an alternative) would bear more fruit. The Taliban movement itself is disunited and fissured with mutual suspicion—local tribal leaders have told me that ninety per cent of the people we call Taliban could be reconcilable under some circumstances, but that many are terrified of what the Quetta shura and other extremists associated with the old Taliban regime might do to them if they tried to reconcile. So, while an awakening may not happen, the basic principles we applied in Iraq—co-opt the reconcilables, make peace with anyone willing to give up the armed struggle, but simultaneously kill or capture all those who prove themselves to be irreconcilable—are probably very applicable.
You spoke of Iraq's effect in draining our energy and focus away from Afghanistan. President-elect Obama has made it clear that he plans to alter the balance significantly. But, as you say, he doesn't have much time. If you had his ear, what would be your basic advice?
Well, I don't have his ear, and I don't envy the pressure he must be under. But if I did have his ear, I think I would argue for the four major points we discussed above. First, the draw-down in Iraq needs to be conditions-based and needs to recognize how fragile our gains there have been, and our moral obligation to Iraqis who have trusted us. As I said, we don't want to un-bog ourselves from Iraq only to get bogged in Afghanistan while Iraq turns bad again. Second, our priorities in Afghanistan should be security, governance, and dealing with the Pakistan safe haven—and we may not necessarily need that many more combat troops to do so. Third, the Afghan elections of September 2009 are a key milestone—we can't just muddle through, and the key problem is political: delivering effective and legitimate governance that meets Afghans' needs. And finally, most importantly, this is a wartime transition and we can't afford the normal nine-month hiatus while we put the new Administration in place: the war in Afghanistan will be won or lost in the next fighting season, i.e. by the time of the September elections.
The situation in Afghanistan is dire. But the war is winnable. We need to focus our attention on the problem, and think before acting. But we need to think fast, and our actions need to involve a major change of direction, focussing on securing the population rather than chasing the enemy, and delivering effective legitimate governance to the people, bottom-up, at the local level. Do that, do it fast, and we stand an excellent chance of turning things around.
Sitting on top of the world by Garrison Keillor
Sitting on top of the world
Garrison Keillor
November 12, 2008
Be happy, dear hearts, and allow yourselves a few more weeks of quiet exultation. It isn't gloating, it's satisfaction at a job well done. He was a superb candidate, serious, professorial but with a flashing grin and a buoyancy that comes from working out in the gym every morning. He spoke in a genuine voice, not senatorial at all. He relished campaigning. He accepted adulation gracefully. He brandished his sword against his opponents without mocking or belittling them. He was elegant, unaffected, utterly American, and now (Wow) suddenly America is cool. Chicago is cool. Chicago!!!
We threw the dice and we won the jackpot and elected a black guy with a Harvard degree, the middle name Hussein and a sense of humor—he said, "I've got relatives who look like Bernie Mac, and I've got relatives who look like Margaret Thatcher." The French junior minister for human rights said, "On this morning, we all want to be American so we can take a bite of this dream unfolding before our eyes." When was the last time you heard someone from France say they wanted to be American and take a bite of something of ours? Ponder that for a moment.
The world expects us to elect pompous yahoos, and instead we have us a 47-year-old prince from the prairie who cheerfully ran the race, and when his opponents threw sand at him, he just smiled back. He'll be the first president in history to look really good making a jump shot. He loves his classy wife and his sweet little daughters. At the same time, he knows pop music, American lit and constitutional law. I just can't imagine anybody cooler.
It feels good to be cool, and all of us can share in that, even sour old right-wingers and embittered blottoheads. Next time you fly to Heathrow and hand your passport to the man with the badge, he's going to see " United States of America" and look up and grin. Even if you worship in the church of Fox, everyone you meet overseas is going to ask you about Obama, and you may as well say you voted for him because, my friends, he is your line of credit over there. No need anymore to try to look Canadian.
And the coolest thing about him is the fact that back in the early '90s, given a book contract after the hoo-ha about his becoming the First Black Editor of The Harvard Law Review, instead of writing the basic exploitation book he could've written, he put his head down and worked hard for a few years and wrote a good book, an honest one, which, since his rise in politics, has earned the Obamas enough to buy a nice house and put money in the bank. A successful American entrepreneur.
Our hero who galloped to victory has inherited a gigantic mess. The country is sunk in debt. The Treasury announced it must borrow $550 billion to get the government through the fourth quarter, more than the entire deficit for 2008, so he will have to raise taxes and not only on bankers and lumber barons. His promise never to raise the retirement age is not a good idea. Whatever he promised the Iowa farmers about subsidizing ethanol is best forgotten at this point. We may not be getting our National Health Service cards anytime soon. And so on and so on.
So enjoy the afterglow of the election awhile longer. We all walk taller this fall. People in Copenhagen and Stockholm are sending congratulatory e-mails—imagine! We are being admired by Danes and Swedes! And Chicago becomes The First City. Step aside, San Francisco. Shut up, New York. The Midwest is cool now. The mind reels. Have a good day.
Garrison Keillor
November 12, 2008
Be happy, dear hearts, and allow yourselves a few more weeks of quiet exultation. It isn't gloating, it's satisfaction at a job well done. He was a superb candidate, serious, professorial but with a flashing grin and a buoyancy that comes from working out in the gym every morning. He spoke in a genuine voice, not senatorial at all. He relished campaigning. He accepted adulation gracefully. He brandished his sword against his opponents without mocking or belittling them. He was elegant, unaffected, utterly American, and now (Wow) suddenly America is cool. Chicago is cool. Chicago!!!
We threw the dice and we won the jackpot and elected a black guy with a Harvard degree, the middle name Hussein and a sense of humor—he said, "I've got relatives who look like Bernie Mac, and I've got relatives who look like Margaret Thatcher." The French junior minister for human rights said, "On this morning, we all want to be American so we can take a bite of this dream unfolding before our eyes." When was the last time you heard someone from France say they wanted to be American and take a bite of something of ours? Ponder that for a moment.
The world expects us to elect pompous yahoos, and instead we have us a 47-year-old prince from the prairie who cheerfully ran the race, and when his opponents threw sand at him, he just smiled back. He'll be the first president in history to look really good making a jump shot. He loves his classy wife and his sweet little daughters. At the same time, he knows pop music, American lit and constitutional law. I just can't imagine anybody cooler.
It feels good to be cool, and all of us can share in that, even sour old right-wingers and embittered blottoheads. Next time you fly to Heathrow and hand your passport to the man with the badge, he's going to see " United States of America" and look up and grin. Even if you worship in the church of Fox, everyone you meet overseas is going to ask you about Obama, and you may as well say you voted for him because, my friends, he is your line of credit over there. No need anymore to try to look Canadian.
And the coolest thing about him is the fact that back in the early '90s, given a book contract after the hoo-ha about his becoming the First Black Editor of The Harvard Law Review, instead of writing the basic exploitation book he could've written, he put his head down and worked hard for a few years and wrote a good book, an honest one, which, since his rise in politics, has earned the Obamas enough to buy a nice house and put money in the bank. A successful American entrepreneur.
Our hero who galloped to victory has inherited a gigantic mess. The country is sunk in debt. The Treasury announced it must borrow $550 billion to get the government through the fourth quarter, more than the entire deficit for 2008, so he will have to raise taxes and not only on bankers and lumber barons. His promise never to raise the retirement age is not a good idea. Whatever he promised the Iowa farmers about subsidizing ethanol is best forgotten at this point. We may not be getting our National Health Service cards anytime soon. And so on and so on.
So enjoy the afterglow of the election awhile longer. We all walk taller this fall. People in Copenhagen and Stockholm are sending congratulatory e-mails—imagine! We are being admired by Danes and Swedes! And Chicago becomes The First City. Step aside, San Francisco. Shut up, New York. The Midwest is cool now. The mind reels. Have a good day.
G20 Nations Agree More Concerted Efforts, Regulatory Coordination But No Coordinated Fiscal Stimulus
G20 Nations Agree More Concerted Efforts, Regulatory Coordination But No Coordinated Fiscal Stimulus
* Following up on the previous week’s meeting of finance officials in Sao Paolo, G20 leaders (including 10 major emerging economies+ G8, Australia and the EU) meeting in Washington agreed to continue to take steps to stabilize the global financial system and improve the international regulatory framework. Action plan includes regulatory policy changes to be implemented by March 31, 2009 and G20 agrees to meet again before April 30, 2009
* G20 statement: Against this background of deteriorating economic conditions worldwide, ... a broader policy response is needed, based on closer macroeconomic cooperation, to restore growth, avoid negative spillovers and support emerging market economies and developing countries. --> Further policy steps to include Monetary policy support as appropriate for domestic conditions, fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand, while maintaining a policy framework conducive to fiscal sustainability. Increased transparency of financial sector, regulation of rating agencies, avoiding pro-cyclical regulation, increased information sharing between national authorities, expanding the FSF to include emerging economies and ensuring that IMF and other multilateral institutions to have sufficient resources to support emerging economies capital needs
Click Here For Full Analysis
http://www.rgemonitor.com/10000?cluster_id=13215
* Following up on the previous week’s meeting of finance officials in Sao Paolo, G20 leaders (including 10 major emerging economies+ G8, Australia and the EU) meeting in Washington agreed to continue to take steps to stabilize the global financial system and improve the international regulatory framework. Action plan includes regulatory policy changes to be implemented by March 31, 2009 and G20 agrees to meet again before April 30, 2009
* G20 statement: Against this background of deteriorating economic conditions worldwide, ... a broader policy response is needed, based on closer macroeconomic cooperation, to restore growth, avoid negative spillovers and support emerging market economies and developing countries. --> Further policy steps to include Monetary policy support as appropriate for domestic conditions, fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand, while maintaining a policy framework conducive to fiscal sustainability. Increased transparency of financial sector, regulation of rating agencies, avoiding pro-cyclical regulation, increased information sharing between national authorities, expanding the FSF to include emerging economies and ensuring that IMF and other multilateral institutions to have sufficient resources to support emerging economies capital needs
Click Here For Full Analysis
http://www.rgemonitor.com/10000?cluster_id=13215
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Global Crisis -- Made in America By Joseph E. Stiglitz
Global Crisis -- Made in America
By Joseph E. Stiglitz
Spiegel on line
November 12, 2008
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,590028,00.html
It should come as no surprise in a world of
globalization that it's not just the good things that
move more easily across borders, but the bad things as
well. Now, America has exported its downturn to the
world.
A global financial crisis requires a global solution.
Uncoordinated macro-economic policies, for instance,
have contributed to Europe's problems. When the
European Central Bank refused to lower interest rates
earlier this year, focused as it was on the threat of
inflation, while America's did, focused on the
impending downturn, it led to a stronger euro. This in
turn contributed to Europe's downturn, though it made
America's GDP numbers look better for a while. Now,
Europe's downturn is ricocheting back on America:
Europe's weaknesses are contributing to America's.
The same has happened when it comes to regulation. To
too great extent, there has been a race to the bottom
in accordance with the myth that deregulation breeds
innovation. Instead, the innovation was greatest when
it came to getting around the regulations designed to
ensure good information and a safe and sound financial
system.
Financial markets are supposed to be a means to an end
-- a more prosperous and stable economy as a result of
good allocation of resources and better management of
risk. But instead, financial markets didn't manage
risk, they created it. They didn't enable America's
families to manage the risk of volatile interest rates,
and now millions are losing their homes. Furthermore,
they misallocated hundreds of billions of dollar.
The Human Toll
The consequences of these mistakes will run into the
trillions -- not just the money that is being spent on
the bailouts, but the shortfall between global economic
potential growth and actual performance.
Beyond this, of course, is the human toll -- families
whose life dreams are destroyed as they lose their
homes, their jobs, and their life savings. If we are to
maintain global financial liberalization, with
financial products moving easily across borders, we
must be sure that these products are safe and that the
financial institutions who are selling them can stand
behind the products they create.
Financial market regulators, at both the national and
international level, have failed. To a large extent,
Basel II, the new framework of bank regulation, was
based on self-regulation, itself an oxymoron. Banks
have shown that they are not up to the task of managing
their own risk. But even if they had, there is the more
fundamental problem of systemic risk.
The current global financial architecture hasn't been
working well. But more than that, it is unfair,
especially to the developing countries. They will be
among the innocent victims of this global crisis that
wears the 'made in America' label. Even countries which
have done everything right -- those which have managed
their economy with far better regulation and better
macro-economic prudence than the US -- will suffer as a
result of America's mistakes. Worse, the International
Monetary Fund has -- at least in the past -- demanded
pro-cyclical policies (raising interest rates and
taxes, lowering expenditures when an economy goes into
a recession), while Europe and America do just the
opposite. The result is that capital flees developing
countries in times of crisis, reinforcing the vicious
cycle.
Flawed Governance Structure
There is mounting evidence that the developing
countries may require massive amounts of money, amounts
that are beyond the capacity of the IMF. The sources of
liquid funds are in Asia and the Middle East. But why
should they turn their hard earned money over to an
institution with a failed track record; one which
pushed the deregulatory policies that have gotten the
world into the mess where are in now; one which
continues to advocate the asymmetric policies which
contribute to global instability; and one whose
governance structure is so flawed?
We need a new financial facility to help the developing
countries, one whose governance reflects the realities
of today. Going forward, this new facility might lead
to deeper reforms at the IMF. Such a facility needs to
be created quickly, but if experts from the finance
ministries and central banks are loaned out to this new
institution, it could be up and running in short order.
There are further reforms that need to be undertaken.
The dollar-based global reserve system is already
fraying -- the dollar has proven not to be a good store
of value. But moving to a dollar-euro, or a dollar-
euro-yen system could be even more unstable. We need a
global reserve system, for a global financial system.
Keynes wrote about this at the time of the last big
downturn, but the need today is even greater. His hope
was that the IMF would create a new global reserve
currency. He called his Bancor, much akin to the IMF's
SDR (special drawing rights). This is an idea whose
time may have finally come.
It is inconceivable that America would have prospered
had it left the management of its financial system to
the 50 separate states. They have a role, but that of
the national government is essential. We now have a
global financial system, but we are leaving its
management to that of the individual countries. This
system simply cannot work.
We will never achieve perfect stability of our
financial markets, or of our economy. Markets are not
self-correcting. But we can do a lot better. Hopefully,
at the summit in Washington, the leaders of Europe and
Asia will lead the way, beginning the task of creating
the global financial architecture that the world needs
if we are to have a stable and prosperous 21st century.
_____________
Joseph E. Stiglitz, 65, won the Nobel Prize in
economics in 2001 for his contribution to analyses of
the relationship between markets and information
uncertainties. He is widely cited and writes a popular
column for the New Yorker.
By Joseph E. Stiglitz
Spiegel on line
November 12, 2008
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,590028,00.html
It should come as no surprise in a world of
globalization that it's not just the good things that
move more easily across borders, but the bad things as
well. Now, America has exported its downturn to the
world.
A global financial crisis requires a global solution.
Uncoordinated macro-economic policies, for instance,
have contributed to Europe's problems. When the
European Central Bank refused to lower interest rates
earlier this year, focused as it was on the threat of
inflation, while America's did, focused on the
impending downturn, it led to a stronger euro. This in
turn contributed to Europe's downturn, though it made
America's GDP numbers look better for a while. Now,
Europe's downturn is ricocheting back on America:
Europe's weaknesses are contributing to America's.
The same has happened when it comes to regulation. To
too great extent, there has been a race to the bottom
in accordance with the myth that deregulation breeds
innovation. Instead, the innovation was greatest when
it came to getting around the regulations designed to
ensure good information and a safe and sound financial
system.
Financial markets are supposed to be a means to an end
-- a more prosperous and stable economy as a result of
good allocation of resources and better management of
risk. But instead, financial markets didn't manage
risk, they created it. They didn't enable America's
families to manage the risk of volatile interest rates,
and now millions are losing their homes. Furthermore,
they misallocated hundreds of billions of dollar.
The Human Toll
The consequences of these mistakes will run into the
trillions -- not just the money that is being spent on
the bailouts, but the shortfall between global economic
potential growth and actual performance.
Beyond this, of course, is the human toll -- families
whose life dreams are destroyed as they lose their
homes, their jobs, and their life savings. If we are to
maintain global financial liberalization, with
financial products moving easily across borders, we
must be sure that these products are safe and that the
financial institutions who are selling them can stand
behind the products they create.
Financial market regulators, at both the national and
international level, have failed. To a large extent,
Basel II, the new framework of bank regulation, was
based on self-regulation, itself an oxymoron. Banks
have shown that they are not up to the task of managing
their own risk. But even if they had, there is the more
fundamental problem of systemic risk.
The current global financial architecture hasn't been
working well. But more than that, it is unfair,
especially to the developing countries. They will be
among the innocent victims of this global crisis that
wears the 'made in America' label. Even countries which
have done everything right -- those which have managed
their economy with far better regulation and better
macro-economic prudence than the US -- will suffer as a
result of America's mistakes. Worse, the International
Monetary Fund has -- at least in the past -- demanded
pro-cyclical policies (raising interest rates and
taxes, lowering expenditures when an economy goes into
a recession), while Europe and America do just the
opposite. The result is that capital flees developing
countries in times of crisis, reinforcing the vicious
cycle.
Flawed Governance Structure
There is mounting evidence that the developing
countries may require massive amounts of money, amounts
that are beyond the capacity of the IMF. The sources of
liquid funds are in Asia and the Middle East. But why
should they turn their hard earned money over to an
institution with a failed track record; one which
pushed the deregulatory policies that have gotten the
world into the mess where are in now; one which
continues to advocate the asymmetric policies which
contribute to global instability; and one whose
governance structure is so flawed?
We need a new financial facility to help the developing
countries, one whose governance reflects the realities
of today. Going forward, this new facility might lead
to deeper reforms at the IMF. Such a facility needs to
be created quickly, but if experts from the finance
ministries and central banks are loaned out to this new
institution, it could be up and running in short order.
There are further reforms that need to be undertaken.
The dollar-based global reserve system is already
fraying -- the dollar has proven not to be a good store
of value. But moving to a dollar-euro, or a dollar-
euro-yen system could be even more unstable. We need a
global reserve system, for a global financial system.
Keynes wrote about this at the time of the last big
downturn, but the need today is even greater. His hope
was that the IMF would create a new global reserve
currency. He called his Bancor, much akin to the IMF's
SDR (special drawing rights). This is an idea whose
time may have finally come.
It is inconceivable that America would have prospered
had it left the management of its financial system to
the 50 separate states. They have a role, but that of
the national government is essential. We now have a
global financial system, but we are leaving its
management to that of the individual countries. This
system simply cannot work.
We will never achieve perfect stability of our
financial markets, or of our economy. Markets are not
self-correcting. But we can do a lot better. Hopefully,
at the summit in Washington, the leaders of Europe and
Asia will lead the way, beginning the task of creating
the global financial architecture that the world needs
if we are to have a stable and prosperous 21st century.
_____________
Joseph E. Stiglitz, 65, won the Nobel Prize in
economics in 2001 for his contribution to analyses of
the relationship between markets and information
uncertainties. He is widely cited and writes a popular
column for the New Yorker.
What Is the Afghanistan War About? William Pfaff
What Is the Afghanistan War About?
William Pfaff
Paris, November 13, 2008 – Barack Obama has said that he is not against war, only against stupid wars. One might then reasonably ask if the present war in Afghanistan is not a stupid war?
During the election campaign the president-elect said it was the "right war" (instead of the one in Iraq), and that he would even support opportunistic illegal raids into Pakistan to seize Osama bin Laden, in emulation of that contempt for international law that when displayed by the George W. Bush administration won the United States so much condemnation.
What is this war for? To seize Osama bin Laden and his associates. The American government believes that he and his headquarters are in Pakistan, and presumably has intelligence to support that conclusion -- although it has not been good enough for many months of American air attacks and special forces operations into the badlands of the Pakistani-Afghanistan frontier to succeed in capturing him.
What level of confidence do American officials have that he still is there, despite all the effort to find him? If he is still in Pakistan's tribal region, and given that he is an intelligent man, why should he stay there, waiting to be bombed or captured? Assuming that he is still alive.
During the Vietnam war, according to Stanley Karnow's comprehensive history, the American command insisted that there was a large Communist headquarters, COSVN, "Central Office for South Vietnam," located in the so-called Fishhook region of Cambodia. That was one reason for the Nixon-Kissinger invasion of Cambodia. The combined South Vietnamese and American operation was in part motivated by the goal of finding and destroying this headquarters.
When they found it, according to Karnow, instead of being "the miniature Pentagon imagined by official U.S. spokesmen," American troops found "a scattering of empty huts, their occupants having fled weeks before."
What reason is there to think that Osama Bin Laden is less prudent than the Vietnamese? Given six years of warnings that Washington believes he is in the Pakistan tribal territories, and is trying to find him there, would it not be reasonable for him to make other arrangements?
Is it not possible that he and his headquarters would be gone by the time Americans, or their auxiliaries, the reluctant Pakistani army and frontier police, finally arrive? Assuming that they do.
We are incessantly reminded that this is a world of instant communications. Bin-Laden and his staff, for all that we know, might long ago have set themselves up in a comfortable resort hotel somewhere in the Emirates, or in the South American highlands, or the South Seas. Perhaps they have trimmed their beards, visited fashionable tailors, and now live in comfortable apartments in Paris or London, meeting in restaurants, and communicating with their collaborators through e-mails sent through constantly shifting networks of e-mail cafés.
Or perhaps he uses the ordinary Post Office. His agents may also regularly disseminate heartless rumors in Pakistan about villages where he can be found, timed to invite American air raids to kill the maximum number of civilians.
The second objective of the American and NATO war is to prevent a Taliban re-conquest of Afghanistan, the country it ruled from 1994 until 2001, when the U.S. organized anti-Taliban regional forces to retake the country, supported by U.S. B-52s.
This was to punish the Taliban for having given pre-2001 hospitality to bin-Laden, possessing a similar Islamic fundamentalist religious program. However the Taliban themselves were then concerned only with Afghanistan and had no foreign activities, terrorist or otherwise.
The Taliban today simply want back what they consider their country, since their tribal and ethnic group is not only the largest in Afghanistan but in the entire region, totalling an estimated 40 million people.
Many in Pakistan agree with them, including part of the army's intelligence apparatus, so that the American and NATO war against the Taliban is slowly, and one fears inexorably, merging with a struggle inside Pakistan between Islamic integrists and the new Pakistan government, which is identified with the increasingly hated Americans who keep bombing villages inside Pakistan.
The United States and its NATO allies are engaged in a war against a fanatical religious group, supported by many of the 40 million Pathan ethnic group, to support a weak, and by general acknowledgement corrupt, American-sponsored government in Kabul. Moreover, again by general agreement, they are losing this war, a prospect that will not be changed by the two U.S. brigades scheduled to reinforce the troops already there.
Washington has until now resisted initiatives, apparently coming from both sides in the war, to find compromises and a settlement.
Washington's purpose in attacking into what historically has been the most stubbornly impenetrable region in Asia, to lay hands on a man whom they do not know is there -- and even if he is, will undoubtedly leave before American troops arrive, if they arrive.
Does this sound like a stupid war? It is one of George Bush's two stupid wars. Obama might announce that Washington is shutting down both of Bush's wars, and will support whatever settlement of the fighting the Afghans, the Taliban, the Pakistanis, and their Asian neighbors can agree upon. It could say that it has a secret plan to deal with Osama bin-Ladin in its own time and its own way, which no longer will be by fighting cruel and irrelevant wars in small countries.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=356
William Pfaff
Paris, November 13, 2008 – Barack Obama has said that he is not against war, only against stupid wars. One might then reasonably ask if the present war in Afghanistan is not a stupid war?
During the election campaign the president-elect said it was the "right war" (instead of the one in Iraq), and that he would even support opportunistic illegal raids into Pakistan to seize Osama bin Laden, in emulation of that contempt for international law that when displayed by the George W. Bush administration won the United States so much condemnation.
What is this war for? To seize Osama bin Laden and his associates. The American government believes that he and his headquarters are in Pakistan, and presumably has intelligence to support that conclusion -- although it has not been good enough for many months of American air attacks and special forces operations into the badlands of the Pakistani-Afghanistan frontier to succeed in capturing him.
What level of confidence do American officials have that he still is there, despite all the effort to find him? If he is still in Pakistan's tribal region, and given that he is an intelligent man, why should he stay there, waiting to be bombed or captured? Assuming that he is still alive.
During the Vietnam war, according to Stanley Karnow's comprehensive history, the American command insisted that there was a large Communist headquarters, COSVN, "Central Office for South Vietnam," located in the so-called Fishhook region of Cambodia. That was one reason for the Nixon-Kissinger invasion of Cambodia. The combined South Vietnamese and American operation was in part motivated by the goal of finding and destroying this headquarters.
When they found it, according to Karnow, instead of being "the miniature Pentagon imagined by official U.S. spokesmen," American troops found "a scattering of empty huts, their occupants having fled weeks before."
What reason is there to think that Osama Bin Laden is less prudent than the Vietnamese? Given six years of warnings that Washington believes he is in the Pakistan tribal territories, and is trying to find him there, would it not be reasonable for him to make other arrangements?
Is it not possible that he and his headquarters would be gone by the time Americans, or their auxiliaries, the reluctant Pakistani army and frontier police, finally arrive? Assuming that they do.
We are incessantly reminded that this is a world of instant communications. Bin-Laden and his staff, for all that we know, might long ago have set themselves up in a comfortable resort hotel somewhere in the Emirates, or in the South American highlands, or the South Seas. Perhaps they have trimmed their beards, visited fashionable tailors, and now live in comfortable apartments in Paris or London, meeting in restaurants, and communicating with their collaborators through e-mails sent through constantly shifting networks of e-mail cafés.
Or perhaps he uses the ordinary Post Office. His agents may also regularly disseminate heartless rumors in Pakistan about villages where he can be found, timed to invite American air raids to kill the maximum number of civilians.
The second objective of the American and NATO war is to prevent a Taliban re-conquest of Afghanistan, the country it ruled from 1994 until 2001, when the U.S. organized anti-Taliban regional forces to retake the country, supported by U.S. B-52s.
This was to punish the Taliban for having given pre-2001 hospitality to bin-Laden, possessing a similar Islamic fundamentalist religious program. However the Taliban themselves were then concerned only with Afghanistan and had no foreign activities, terrorist or otherwise.
The Taliban today simply want back what they consider their country, since their tribal and ethnic group is not only the largest in Afghanistan but in the entire region, totalling an estimated 40 million people.
Many in Pakistan agree with them, including part of the army's intelligence apparatus, so that the American and NATO war against the Taliban is slowly, and one fears inexorably, merging with a struggle inside Pakistan between Islamic integrists and the new Pakistan government, which is identified with the increasingly hated Americans who keep bombing villages inside Pakistan.
The United States and its NATO allies are engaged in a war against a fanatical religious group, supported by many of the 40 million Pathan ethnic group, to support a weak, and by general acknowledgement corrupt, American-sponsored government in Kabul. Moreover, again by general agreement, they are losing this war, a prospect that will not be changed by the two U.S. brigades scheduled to reinforce the troops already there.
Washington has until now resisted initiatives, apparently coming from both sides in the war, to find compromises and a settlement.
Washington's purpose in attacking into what historically has been the most stubbornly impenetrable region in Asia, to lay hands on a man whom they do not know is there -- and even if he is, will undoubtedly leave before American troops arrive, if they arrive.
Does this sound like a stupid war? It is one of George Bush's two stupid wars. Obama might announce that Washington is shutting down both of Bush's wars, and will support whatever settlement of the fighting the Afghans, the Taliban, the Pakistanis, and their Asian neighbors can agree upon. It could say that it has a secret plan to deal with Osama bin-Ladin in its own time and its own way, which no longer will be by fighting cruel and irrelevant wars in small countries.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=356
More Americans slipping into bankruptcy
More Americans slipping into bankruptcy
By Tara Siegel Bernard and Jenny Anderson
Sunday, November 16, 2008
The deep troubles of the U.S. economy are pushing a growing number of already struggling Americans into bankruptcy, often with far more debt than those who filed in previous downturns.
Plummeting home values, dwindling incomes and the near disappearance of credit have proved a potent mixture. While all the usual reasons that distressed borrowers seek bankruptcy — job loss, medical bills, divorce — play significant roles, new economic forces are changing the calculus of who can ride out the tough times and who cannot.
The number of personal bankruptcy filings jumped nearly 8 percent in October from September, after marching steadily upward for the last two years, said Mike Bickford, president of Automated Access to Court Electronic Records, a bankruptcy data and management company.
Filings totaled 108,595, surpassing 100,000 for the first time since a law that made it more difficult — and often twice as expensive — to file for bankruptcy took effect in 2005. That translated to an average of 4,936 bankruptcies filed each business day last month, up nearly 34 percent from October 2007.
Robert Lawless, a professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, pointed to the tightening of credit by banks as a significant factor in the increase in October. As banks have pulled back on lending, he said, consumers have been finding it more difficult, and in many cases impossible, to use credit cards, refinance their home mortgages or fall back on their home equity lines to get them through a rough period.
"A credit crunch can drive people into bankruptcy today rather than later as sources of lending dry up," Professor Lawless said. "With the consumer credit tightening and the economy in a nosedive, this pop could just be the beginning of a long-term rise in the bankruptcy filing rate to levels that are even higher than we had before the 2005 bankruptcy law."
Not only are filings up, but recent filers have had much more credit card debt, often run up in an attempt to keep current on a mortgage that now exceeds the value of their home, bankruptcy lawyers said in interviews.
A recent study found that the typical family who filed for bankruptcy in 2007 was carrying about 21 percent more in secured debts, like mortgages and car loans, and about 44 percent more in unsecured debts, like credit cards and medical and utility bills, than filers in 2001.
Their incomes, meanwhile, remained static over those six years, according to the study, which used data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a joint effort of law professors, sociologists and physicians. Researchers surveyed 2,500 households nationwide that filed for bankruptcy in February and March 2007.
"Earlier downturns followed strong booms, so families went into recessions with higher incomes and lower debt loads," said Elizabeth Warren, a professor at Harvard Law School and, along with Professor Lawless, part of the Bankruptcy Project team. "But the fundamentals are off for families even before we hit the recession this time, so bankruptcy filings are likely to rise faster."
Not surprisingly, filings are increasing most rapidly in states where real estate values skyrocketed and then crashed, including Nevada, California and Florida. In Nevada, bankruptcy filings in October were up 70 percent compared with last year. In California, bankruptcies jumped 80 percent in the same period, while Florida's filings rose 62 percent.
In those regions, some people are trying to rescue their homes through bankruptcy proceedings, but many are just as relieved to walk away, shedding layers of debt that otherwise would have taken decades to pay off.
Tony and Carrie Forsyth, both 30, chose not to walk away from their house in Florida. The couple said they thought their financial situation would improve in 2006, when Forsyth accepted a promotion from his employer, a Michigan food distributor, that required them to move to Florida. But they could not sell their home in Ypsilanti, Michigan, so they decided to rent it out.
In June 2006, the couple headed south and bought a house for $220,000 in Tamarac, Florida, with no money down. Five months later, their tenants in Michigan stopped paying, and the family had to carry two mortgage payments, just as the adjustable-rate mortgage on their Michigan home reset to a higher interest rate. They lost the Michigan home to foreclosure in February 2007.
By that time, however, the couple, who have two young daughters, were using credit cards to pay for food, utilities and clothes. After accumulating about $20,000 in debt, they said, they realized that bankruptcy was the only way they could remain in their Florida home, whose value, meanwhile, had plunged 25 percent. They filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection this year, which permitted them to keep the house, and they agreed to repay a portion of their debts over the next three years.
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy, by contrast, provides filers with what is known as a "fresh start" because debts are forgiven. In this case, assets are liquidated, though the states allow for various exemptions. To qualify for a Chapter 7, filers need to pass a means test to determine whether they are unable to repay their debts.
Filers who are deemed able to repay a portion of their debts must file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Some debtors choose Chapter 13 because it permits them to save their primary homes from foreclosure, though they are required to catch up on their mortgage payments.
Forsyth said declaring bankruptcy was a difficult step. "Because of our Christian background, it didn't feel right," he said. "But there was no other way for us to live and support our family unless we went that route."
Forsyth added: "We are just rolling with life. You have to eat. You have to have diapers."
The Forsyths are emblematic of the new forces that have led to the sharp rise in bankruptcy filings. "Historically, a person would get behind in his mortgage because of a temporarily catastrophic financial event, such as job loss, divorce, illness," said Chip Parker, a bankruptcy lawyer in Jacksonville, Florida. "However, when these adjustable-rate mortgages started resetting from their teaser rate and clients couldn't refinance their way out of trouble, they were getting behind even though there was no catastrophic event."
Bankruptcy lawyers report that they have been having more consultations with middle-class families with six-figure incomes — including many who either bought a home during the boom or pulled out most or all of their available home equity just keep to up with the cost of living. Also caught up in the bankruptcies are real estate investors, who hoped to flip properties they had bought near the height of the market.
"There are a lot of foreclosures that haven't taken place yet because people still have available credit," said Jeffrey Tromberg, a bankruptcy lawyer in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. "We don't see them until they've maxed out their credit cards."
A similar pattern has emerged in Las Vegas, where more people are filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection because it makes more financial sense to walk away from their homes. Real estate values have plummeted, and now the local economy is also suffering. Car salesmen and casino dealers are being laid off. Valet parking attendants and masseuses are collecting less in tips.
"My clients are basically good people that got into a home the best way they could and can no longer meet their obligations because their income has gone down," said Roger Croteau, a lawyer in Las Vegas who concentrates on bankruptcy. "There is no equity to pay off their credit cards, and they are maxed out. They haven't saved enough because of housing costs."
Ellen Stoebling, a bankruptcy lawyer in Las Vegas, added: "People are using their cards to try and hold onto their property for as long as possible in hopes they can somehow talk some sense into their lender and stay in the property."
The problems are not limited to people with adjustable-rate mortgages and homes that are now worth less than they owe. Job losses are also playing a role. Bankruptcies are also up sharply in Delaware, Rhode Island and Indiana, where the unemployment rates have been climbing.
And, of course, some people continue to seek bankruptcy for the usual reasons.
Lisa Marquis, a 35-year-old mother of five in Indiana, has no medical insurance but has undergone 21 operations in the last nine years, some related to emphysema and other respiratory diseases, and others related to accidents and several miscarriages.
Marquis cannot work, but her husband earns $13.50 an hour as a truck driver — a salary that makes them ineligible for Medicaid but unable to pay their medical bills. Earlier this year, the family had to leave the mobile home they owned because the mold there was making it hard for her to breathe; they moved into a house where they paid more than $600 a month in rent. Marquis was spending three days a week in court fending off angry creditors, cutting down on the number of hours he could work.
In April, facing more than $114,000 in medical bills and less available overtime work, the Marquises filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy — the third time in less than 10 years that Marquis had to file for protection because of medical bills. Because the latest filing is a Chapter 13, they have agreed to pay some of their debts.
"We could have waited to do a 7," Marquis said. "I want to pay my debts. I didn't want to cheat people who helped to save my life."
Despite the rise in bankruptcies, academics and lawyers say they believe that many others have been discouraged from filing because of the 2005 bankruptcy law.
Warren, the Harvard law professor, said many borrowers had been left with the mistaken impression that they could no longer file. And, she argued, "the widespread perception that bankruptcy is not available to help families makes this economic crisis worse."
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=17855316
By Tara Siegel Bernard and Jenny Anderson
Sunday, November 16, 2008
The deep troubles of the U.S. economy are pushing a growing number of already struggling Americans into bankruptcy, often with far more debt than those who filed in previous downturns.
Plummeting home values, dwindling incomes and the near disappearance of credit have proved a potent mixture. While all the usual reasons that distressed borrowers seek bankruptcy — job loss, medical bills, divorce — play significant roles, new economic forces are changing the calculus of who can ride out the tough times and who cannot.
The number of personal bankruptcy filings jumped nearly 8 percent in October from September, after marching steadily upward for the last two years, said Mike Bickford, president of Automated Access to Court Electronic Records, a bankruptcy data and management company.
Filings totaled 108,595, surpassing 100,000 for the first time since a law that made it more difficult — and often twice as expensive — to file for bankruptcy took effect in 2005. That translated to an average of 4,936 bankruptcies filed each business day last month, up nearly 34 percent from October 2007.
Robert Lawless, a professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, pointed to the tightening of credit by banks as a significant factor in the increase in October. As banks have pulled back on lending, he said, consumers have been finding it more difficult, and in many cases impossible, to use credit cards, refinance their home mortgages or fall back on their home equity lines to get them through a rough period.
"A credit crunch can drive people into bankruptcy today rather than later as sources of lending dry up," Professor Lawless said. "With the consumer credit tightening and the economy in a nosedive, this pop could just be the beginning of a long-term rise in the bankruptcy filing rate to levels that are even higher than we had before the 2005 bankruptcy law."
Not only are filings up, but recent filers have had much more credit card debt, often run up in an attempt to keep current on a mortgage that now exceeds the value of their home, bankruptcy lawyers said in interviews.
A recent study found that the typical family who filed for bankruptcy in 2007 was carrying about 21 percent more in secured debts, like mortgages and car loans, and about 44 percent more in unsecured debts, like credit cards and medical and utility bills, than filers in 2001.
Their incomes, meanwhile, remained static over those six years, according to the study, which used data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a joint effort of law professors, sociologists and physicians. Researchers surveyed 2,500 households nationwide that filed for bankruptcy in February and March 2007.
"Earlier downturns followed strong booms, so families went into recessions with higher incomes and lower debt loads," said Elizabeth Warren, a professor at Harvard Law School and, along with Professor Lawless, part of the Bankruptcy Project team. "But the fundamentals are off for families even before we hit the recession this time, so bankruptcy filings are likely to rise faster."
Not surprisingly, filings are increasing most rapidly in states where real estate values skyrocketed and then crashed, including Nevada, California and Florida. In Nevada, bankruptcy filings in October were up 70 percent compared with last year. In California, bankruptcies jumped 80 percent in the same period, while Florida's filings rose 62 percent.
In those regions, some people are trying to rescue their homes through bankruptcy proceedings, but many are just as relieved to walk away, shedding layers of debt that otherwise would have taken decades to pay off.
Tony and Carrie Forsyth, both 30, chose not to walk away from their house in Florida. The couple said they thought their financial situation would improve in 2006, when Forsyth accepted a promotion from his employer, a Michigan food distributor, that required them to move to Florida. But they could not sell their home in Ypsilanti, Michigan, so they decided to rent it out.
In June 2006, the couple headed south and bought a house for $220,000 in Tamarac, Florida, with no money down. Five months later, their tenants in Michigan stopped paying, and the family had to carry two mortgage payments, just as the adjustable-rate mortgage on their Michigan home reset to a higher interest rate. They lost the Michigan home to foreclosure in February 2007.
By that time, however, the couple, who have two young daughters, were using credit cards to pay for food, utilities and clothes. After accumulating about $20,000 in debt, they said, they realized that bankruptcy was the only way they could remain in their Florida home, whose value, meanwhile, had plunged 25 percent. They filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection this year, which permitted them to keep the house, and they agreed to repay a portion of their debts over the next three years.
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy, by contrast, provides filers with what is known as a "fresh start" because debts are forgiven. In this case, assets are liquidated, though the states allow for various exemptions. To qualify for a Chapter 7, filers need to pass a means test to determine whether they are unable to repay their debts.
Filers who are deemed able to repay a portion of their debts must file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Some debtors choose Chapter 13 because it permits them to save their primary homes from foreclosure, though they are required to catch up on their mortgage payments.
Forsyth said declaring bankruptcy was a difficult step. "Because of our Christian background, it didn't feel right," he said. "But there was no other way for us to live and support our family unless we went that route."
Forsyth added: "We are just rolling with life. You have to eat. You have to have diapers."
The Forsyths are emblematic of the new forces that have led to the sharp rise in bankruptcy filings. "Historically, a person would get behind in his mortgage because of a temporarily catastrophic financial event, such as job loss, divorce, illness," said Chip Parker, a bankruptcy lawyer in Jacksonville, Florida. "However, when these adjustable-rate mortgages started resetting from their teaser rate and clients couldn't refinance their way out of trouble, they were getting behind even though there was no catastrophic event."
Bankruptcy lawyers report that they have been having more consultations with middle-class families with six-figure incomes — including many who either bought a home during the boom or pulled out most or all of their available home equity just keep to up with the cost of living. Also caught up in the bankruptcies are real estate investors, who hoped to flip properties they had bought near the height of the market.
"There are a lot of foreclosures that haven't taken place yet because people still have available credit," said Jeffrey Tromberg, a bankruptcy lawyer in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. "We don't see them until they've maxed out their credit cards."
A similar pattern has emerged in Las Vegas, where more people are filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection because it makes more financial sense to walk away from their homes. Real estate values have plummeted, and now the local economy is also suffering. Car salesmen and casino dealers are being laid off. Valet parking attendants and masseuses are collecting less in tips.
"My clients are basically good people that got into a home the best way they could and can no longer meet their obligations because their income has gone down," said Roger Croteau, a lawyer in Las Vegas who concentrates on bankruptcy. "There is no equity to pay off their credit cards, and they are maxed out. They haven't saved enough because of housing costs."
Ellen Stoebling, a bankruptcy lawyer in Las Vegas, added: "People are using their cards to try and hold onto their property for as long as possible in hopes they can somehow talk some sense into their lender and stay in the property."
The problems are not limited to people with adjustable-rate mortgages and homes that are now worth less than they owe. Job losses are also playing a role. Bankruptcies are also up sharply in Delaware, Rhode Island and Indiana, where the unemployment rates have been climbing.
And, of course, some people continue to seek bankruptcy for the usual reasons.
Lisa Marquis, a 35-year-old mother of five in Indiana, has no medical insurance but has undergone 21 operations in the last nine years, some related to emphysema and other respiratory diseases, and others related to accidents and several miscarriages.
Marquis cannot work, but her husband earns $13.50 an hour as a truck driver — a salary that makes them ineligible for Medicaid but unable to pay their medical bills. Earlier this year, the family had to leave the mobile home they owned because the mold there was making it hard for her to breathe; they moved into a house where they paid more than $600 a month in rent. Marquis was spending three days a week in court fending off angry creditors, cutting down on the number of hours he could work.
In April, facing more than $114,000 in medical bills and less available overtime work, the Marquises filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy — the third time in less than 10 years that Marquis had to file for protection because of medical bills. Because the latest filing is a Chapter 13, they have agreed to pay some of their debts.
"We could have waited to do a 7," Marquis said. "I want to pay my debts. I didn't want to cheat people who helped to save my life."
Despite the rise in bankruptcies, academics and lawyers say they believe that many others have been discouraged from filing because of the 2005 bankruptcy law.
Warren, the Harvard law professor, said many borrowers had been left with the mistaken impression that they could no longer file. And, she argued, "the widespread perception that bankruptcy is not available to help families makes this economic crisis worse."
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=17855316
The World of the Bear
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=102757
Go link for these stories:
Mike Whitney: Paulson the Bungler (11/14)
John Riley: Cornerstone Xtreme [PDF] (11/13)
BI-ME Staff: Jim Rogers Says Get Rid of Dollars, Buy Silver (11/12)
Money and Markets: Why Washington Cannot Prevent Depression (11/12)
Vanessa Drucker: Fragile State (11/12)
Doug Casey: The Glass-Steagall Act (11/11)
My Budget 360: Beware the Siren Call of Volatile Economic Markets (11/10)
John Krol: The $600 Trillion Derivatives (11/10)
Bill Fleckenstein: Can Democrats Handle the Hot Seat? (11/10)
Kambiz Foroohar: Short-Sellers: We’re Not Jackals, Just Bears (11/10)
Adam Hamilton: Stock Bull Being Born? (11/10)
Dr. Housing Bubble: Lessons From the Great Depression Part XXI (11/07)
SwissInfo: Swiss Finance Guru Sees Bankruptcy for the U.S. (11/06)
Joe Average: Time to Bunker Down [PDF] (11/05)
My Budget 360: Top Ten Best and Worst Years for the Dow [by President] (11/05)
John Pugsley: Gold and the Lessons of History (11/04)
The Curmudgeon: Deflationary Forces Dominate Despite Fed's Loose Monetary Policy (11/03)
Scott Wright: Commodities Bull Market? (11/03)
My Budget 360: Markets Face Worst October Since 1987 (11/03)
Jerry Mazza: The Halloween Economy: Trick or Treat! (10/31)
Alexei Bayer: The Looming Depression (10/31)
John Riley: The 4 Horseman Have Arrived [PDF] (10/30)
My Budget 360: Biggest Percent Gains and Losses Occur in Economic Crisis (10/30)
Kevin Phillips: Don’t Look Now, There’s a Huge Wave of Inflation Coming Towards Us (10/30)
The Curmudgeon: What Makes This Major Bear Different From Others (10/29)
Jacqueline Thorpe: Market’s Rollercoaster Ride to Continue (10/29)
Susie Gharib: One on One With Nouriel Roubini (10/29)
Dr. Housing Bubble: The Four Horsemen of the Economic Apocalypse (10/29)
The Curmudgeon: Fear Factor at All Time High (10/28)
Sharon-Brigitte Kayser: The Last Debt Orgy (10/27)
Adam Hamilton: Dollar-Driven Gold Plunge (10/27)
Andrew Barry: That Was Way Too Close For Comfort (10/27)
Mike Mish Shedlock: Will US Have Its Own “Lost Decade”? (10/24)
Aubie Baltin: How Low Can We Go? (10/24)
The Curmudgeon: Curmudgeon’s Corner (10/23)
Go link for these stories:
Mike Whitney: Paulson the Bungler (11/14)
John Riley: Cornerstone Xtreme [PDF] (11/13)
BI-ME Staff: Jim Rogers Says Get Rid of Dollars, Buy Silver (11/12)
Money and Markets: Why Washington Cannot Prevent Depression (11/12)
Vanessa Drucker: Fragile State (11/12)
Doug Casey: The Glass-Steagall Act (11/11)
My Budget 360: Beware the Siren Call of Volatile Economic Markets (11/10)
John Krol: The $600 Trillion Derivatives (11/10)
Bill Fleckenstein: Can Democrats Handle the Hot Seat? (11/10)
Kambiz Foroohar: Short-Sellers: We’re Not Jackals, Just Bears (11/10)
Adam Hamilton: Stock Bull Being Born? (11/10)
Dr. Housing Bubble: Lessons From the Great Depression Part XXI (11/07)
SwissInfo: Swiss Finance Guru Sees Bankruptcy for the U.S. (11/06)
Joe Average: Time to Bunker Down [PDF] (11/05)
My Budget 360: Top Ten Best and Worst Years for the Dow [by President] (11/05)
John Pugsley: Gold and the Lessons of History (11/04)
The Curmudgeon: Deflationary Forces Dominate Despite Fed's Loose Monetary Policy (11/03)
Scott Wright: Commodities Bull Market? (11/03)
My Budget 360: Markets Face Worst October Since 1987 (11/03)
Jerry Mazza: The Halloween Economy: Trick or Treat! (10/31)
Alexei Bayer: The Looming Depression (10/31)
John Riley: The 4 Horseman Have Arrived [PDF] (10/30)
My Budget 360: Biggest Percent Gains and Losses Occur in Economic Crisis (10/30)
Kevin Phillips: Don’t Look Now, There’s a Huge Wave of Inflation Coming Towards Us (10/30)
The Curmudgeon: What Makes This Major Bear Different From Others (10/29)
Jacqueline Thorpe: Market’s Rollercoaster Ride to Continue (10/29)
Susie Gharib: One on One With Nouriel Roubini (10/29)
Dr. Housing Bubble: The Four Horsemen of the Economic Apocalypse (10/29)
The Curmudgeon: Fear Factor at All Time High (10/28)
Sharon-Brigitte Kayser: The Last Debt Orgy (10/27)
Adam Hamilton: Dollar-Driven Gold Plunge (10/27)
Andrew Barry: That Was Way Too Close For Comfort (10/27)
Mike Mish Shedlock: Will US Have Its Own “Lost Decade”? (10/24)
Aubie Baltin: How Low Can We Go? (10/24)
The Curmudgeon: Curmudgeon’s Corner (10/23)
Saturday, November 15, 2008
The Economy Gets a Margin Call by John Mauldin
The Economy Gets a Margin Call
by John Mauldin
November15, 2008
Visit John's MySpace Page
As long-time readers know, my daughter Tiffani and I are interviewing millionaires for a book we will be writing called Eavesdropping on Millionaires. This has been one of the more personally impacting projects of my life, as the stories we hear are so very provocative. I hope we can transfer to readers of the book at least half of the impact we are personally experiencing. But at the end of each interview, we let the interviewee ask me questions. Often, they are along the line of "Do you really think we will Muddle Through?" Sometimes they ask in need of assurance and sometimes they simply think that my stance is somewhat naïve. It is something of an irony that I am called a perma-bear in some circles and a Pollyanna in others. The Muddle Through middle has been lonely of late.
So, this week I take another look at my Muddle Through stance. We look at some of the recent data on unemployment and retail sales, think about the implications of a falling trade deficit and a rising US government deficit, speculate about the potential for a serious stock market rally, and also comment on the potential for a GM bailout. There is a lot to cover, so let's jump right in.
Where Have All the Consumers Gone?
Retail sales and prices of goods imported to the US dropped by the most on record, signaling the economy may be in its worst slump in decades. Purchases fell 2.8 % in October, the fourth straight decline, the Commerce Department said today in Washington. Labor Department figures showed import prices dropped 4.7%, pointing to a rising danger of deflation, and a private report said consumer confidence this month remained near the lowest level since 1980. (Bloomberg)
Circuit City filed for bankruptcy and Best Buy said sales were down and gave even lower guidance for Christmas. Nordstrom's cut its profit forecast for the third time this year.
It is a perfect storm for retailers. Consumers are having a negative wealth effect as stock and housing prices have plunged, taking almost $20 trillion out of US consumer assets. Unemployment is rising and consumer confidence is at the lowest levels since the last major recession in 1980-82.
The unemployment numbers which came out this week were particularly grim. Jobless claims on a seasonally adjusted basis were 516,000 newly unemployed. But that masked an even deeper actual number of 540,000. The largest previous number for this week was back in 2001 and was 420,000. Actual weekly numbers can be volatile, but such an increase is certainly disconcerting.
I should point out that as of the end of September there were 3.3 million job openings, down slightly from August. It is not as if there are no jobs being created or available. But as pointed out last week, the number of people looking for work for over 8 months is high and rising fast, so there is a serious mismatch of the jobs available and the desire or ability of people to take them.
Continuing claims are now at roughly 3.5 million individuals who are getting unemployment insurance. Let's assume that each week we lose an average of 400,000 jobs. That is 20 million jobs a year. That means the US economy for the last year has created 16.5 million jobs (very roughly). So there is some robustness in the economy even as we slide deeper into recession.
But what happens if we see the number of new unemployment claims start to rise to an average of 500,000 for a period of time? Without more job creation, that would mean an increase in unemployment of 1,000,000 people in just 10 weeks. This week we have seen an increase in continuing claims of 141,000 from just last week. That, gentle reader, is very grim if it were to continue. Unemployment is likely to continue to rise throughout most of 2009, closing in on 8%.
This time of year should see some seasonal rise as retailers begin to hire for Christmas. But with retail sales down and facing the likely prospect of negative growth in Christmas sales for the first time ever, seasonal employment is evidently not responding. More comments on this below as I take up the Muddle Through economy.
Why Is the Dollar Rising?
The trade deficit is dropping slowly, from over $60 billion in July to $56 billion in September. Import prices fell and imports were down by 5.6%. On a less positive note, exports, which had been one of the bright spots in the economy, fell by 6%. The trade deficit would have been another $3 billion less if Boeing had not been on strike.
Oil prices were an average of $104 a barrel in September. For November prices will be closer to $65, down at least one third. That means the possible trade deficit for November could be a lot closer to $40 billion, the lowest since 2003 and well off the highs of almost $68 billion a few years ago.
Why is this important? Two reasons. First, it means that a lot fewer dollars are now going into the world economy. And demand for dollars is rising as the world seeks a safe haven in the current global recession, so it should not be a surprise that the dollar is rising.
The surprise is the violence, the amazing rapidity of the rise. We are seeing movements in currency prices in a week that would normally be a year's worth of volatility. It is a sign of the severity of the crisis, of the wariness of traders, that prices are so volatile.
Second, it also means fewer dollars will be coming back into the US to finance the rising government deficits. As Woody Brock (one of my favorite economists) in a recent essay points out, this is counter-intuitive, but it is nonetheless true. Dollars which go abroad must eventually find a home, and that home is going to be in US assets of some kind, usually government bonds.
Some worry about China or another large country might stop buying US bonds with their dollars. They worry that they might want to increase their holdings of euros, for example. But what that means is they take the dollars and sell them to someone who has euros. Then that country has dollars that they must then do something with. It is not as if the dollars disappear.
The only way for China (and/or the world) to really reduce their dollar balances is to stop selling products to the US consumer or to buy US assets like stocks or real estate or wheat, thus bringing the dollars back to the US.
But what in practice happens is that China and most Mideast countries on a net basis buy US government-backed debt. But if there are fewer dollars going abroad, that means there are fewer dollars to buy newly issued debt. And our government is issuing new debt at a rather startling rate.
The estimates for the deficit next year are close to $1 trillion. But if the trade deficit is "only" $500 billion, that means that the appetite of foreigners for US debt will be less than half what is needed to finance the deficit. Where does the difference come from? US citizens and corporations, primarily banks, are going to have to buy the difference or the Fed will have to monetize a portion. Or rates on longer-term debt could go high enough to entice foreigners to buy US debt.
Higher rates would be a drag on the US economy and especially the housing markets and would also cost the taxpayer a lot in additional interest-rate expenses. Total government debt is now $10.5 trillion, with the public (including non-US holdings) having $6.3 trillion. The average interest rate paid on that debt is 4.009%, and for fiscal year 2008, which ended October 31, the interest expense was $451 billion. Add another trillion and the interest paid would soon rise to $500 billion.
The US will face a serious problem in 2009. Tax revenues are going to take a very serious fall. Remember when capital gains taxes would produce a few hundred billion? Not in 2009. And income taxes will drop as unemployment expenses rise. The perceived need for government stimulus will be offset by the problem of funding the deficit. Resorting to monetizing the debt is a nuclear option. Expect even more volatility in the currency and interest-rate markets next year.
Can We Actually Muddle Through?
In addition to the above, let me list a few problems I have highlighted in the past few months. Roughly 3% of GDP growth for 2002-2007 was from Mortgage Equity Withdrawals and other debt. That stimulus is gone. Consumers are going to start saving once again, taking money from a consumer-spending-driven economy. Taxes are likely to rise, not only at the federal but at the state and local levels, as governments of all sizes are faced with growing deficits and needs. Financial institutions are deleveraging at a very fast pace. It is, as one friend told me, as if the economy at large is facing a massive margin call.
Given all of the above problems, how is it possible that we can Muddle Through?
In January of 2007 I forecast a mild recession beginning in late 2007. I was early. In January of this year, I still thought the recession would be more like that of 1990-91. Clearly, I was an optimist. It is now likely that we will see a recession as deep as 1974. This quarter is likely to see a negative growth number of 4% or more. That is deep by any standard. And I do not think that the economy will begin to actually grow before the third quarter at the earliest. It is quite likely that 2009 will be negative for the entire year, and possibly for all four quarters.
We are, as I have said, hitting the reset button on consumer spending. We are going to some lower level of consumer spending, and corporations and government are going to have to adjust their budgets. Corporate earnings will be under pressure for some time to come.
But, and this is a big but, this too shall pass. At some point we will hit a bottom. Just as irrational exuberance led us into foolish actions, we are now becoming too pessimistic. The pendulum will swing. Minsky taught us that stability breeds instability. The more stable things are, the more comfortable we are with taking risk, which ultimately creates the conditions for a normal business-cycle recession. This time, we took on a whole lot more risk than usual and are facing a deeper recession.
But the opposite is true as well. Instability will breed stability. It is, as Paul McCulley calls it, a reverse Minsky moment. We will adjust to the new environment by becoming more conservative. And that new conservative environment will bring about a new stability, albeit at lower levels. But it will be a level from which we can begin to grow once again. It has been this way since the Medes were trading with the Persians.
And here is where I may not have been clear, as the conversations mentioned at the beginning of the letter have called to my attention. My thought is that Muddle Through is the period after we are finished with the recession. I think that the future recovery when it comes will be a lot slower and longer in getting back to trend growth than normal. It will be a Muddle Through, slow-growth economy. I expect that period to now last through at least 2010. The credit crisis and the housing bubble are not problems that can be quickly or easily fixed. It will take time.
The Potential for a Large Stock Market Rally
Everyone knows that there are large amounts of hedge fund redemptions being processed. Some blame the current vicious sell-off on forced hedge fund sales as they have to meet these redemptions at the end of the quarter.
This brings up an interesting possibility. My guess is that the large bulk of that money is going back to institutions that will need to put the money to work. Where will they deploy it? If they are projecting 7-8% total portfolio returns, they cannot put that money in bonds. My guess is that it will go back to other hedge funds or into long-only managers. This money will start to go to work in mid- to late January. We could see a very large rally the first quarter of next year. For traders, this will be a chance to make some money. I think it will be a bear market rally, as the recession will still be in full swing, and we could see a pullback when that money gets fully deployed. But it will be fun while it lasts.
As traders begin to sense that possibility, we could see a serious year-end rally as well. Would I bet the farm? No, but I offer up the idea as a possibility. And I know a lot of people have large short positions that have made them a lot of money this year. Maybe it is time to think about taking profits.
And now a few thoughts on the possibility of bailing out GM.
Is GM too Big to Let Fail?
(Let me say at the outset I am truly sorry for those who have lost their jobs or are facing the possibility of a job loss, whether at GM or any other firm. I have been there, as have most people at one time or another.)
I wrote in 2004 that GM was essentially bankrupt. They owed more in pension obligations than it seemed likely they would be able to pay, without major restructuring of the union contracts. I was not alone in such an assessment, although there were not many of us. Now that assessment is common wisdom.
Bloomberg today cites sources that claim a collapse of GM would cost taxpayers $200 billion if the company were forced to liquidate. The projections also called for the loss of "millions" of auto-related jobs. GM, Ford, and Chrysler employ 240,000. They provide healthcare to 2 million, pension benefits to 775,000. Another 5 million jobs are directly related to the three auto companies. GM has 6,000 dealerships which employ 344,000 people. According to a recent study by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR), if the domestic automakers cut output and employment by 50 percent, nearly 2.5 million jobs would be lost and governments would lose $108 billion in revenue over three years. (Edd Snyder at Roadtrip blog)
How did we get to a place where the market cap of GM is a mere $1.8 billion and its stock price has dropped from $87 in early 1999 to $3.10 today? (See chart below.) Where Rod Lache of Deutsche Bank has a "price target" of zero for GM? "Even if GM succeeds in averting a bankruptcy, we believe that the company's future path is likely to be bankruptcy-like," Lache wrote.
The litany of reasons is long. At the top of the list are union contracts which mandate high costs and pension plans which cannot be met. Then there is the problem of many years of poorly designed cars, although they are now getting their act together. We can also discuss poor management and bloated costs, like paying multiple thousands of workers who are not actually working. GM is structured for the 50% market share they used to command, whereas now they only have 20%.
Wilbur Ross, a well-known multi-billionaire investor, was on CNBC saying that allowing GM to go bankrupt would throw the country into what sounded like a depression. Of course, he does have an auto parts company which supplies GM; so he, as my Dad would say, does have a dog in that hunt.
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Ross said that we as a nation are to blame for GM's problems (I am not making this up) because we do not have a national industrial policy. The US allowed other automotive companies to build plants in states that had lower labor costs, and that is the reason GM is uncompetitive. GM pays an average of $33 an hour, and those selfish other companies pay a mere $19 plus a host of benefits.
Ross evidently believes that because some states have lower taxes and right to work laws, that it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to give GM a certain type of immortality rather than suggest GM deal with its problems directly. I assume that Ross also sides with the French when they suggest that Ireland should raise taxes so they will not have to compete with Ireland for business. Such thinking is nonsense and is also unconstitutional.
Let's all acknowledge that having GM go bankrupt would not be a good thing. But it is not the end of the US automotive industry, nor even of GM. Let's think about what a GM bankruptcy might look like. In a bankruptcy, the debt holders line up to come up with a restructuring plan so that they can maximize the return of their loans or obligations. The shareholders get wiped out, but with GM down over 95%, that has largely been accomplished. That process has happened with airlines, steel companies, and tens of thousand of other companies. It is called creative destruction.
First, let's understand that the real owners of GM are the pension plans, as I wrote in 2004. They are the entities with the largest obligations and the most to lose. They are the biggest stakeholders in a successful GM. Giving them the responsibility for making a new, leaner, meaner GM with realistic union contracts would be rational; otherwise they would lose most of what they have.
Factories need to be closed. Auto sales are down to 11 million cars a year, the lowest since 1982, which was the last major recession. Automotive companies sold cars at such low prices in the last few years that sales went to 16 million a year. But the cars that have been sold will last for a long time. Few people are going to buy a new car when the old one is working fine, especially in a recession and a Muddle Through economy. Further, does GM really need eight automotive lines, some of which have been losing money for years?
A restructured GM with realistic costs could be quite competitive. They have some great cars. I drive one. It is four years old and so good I am likely to drive it for at least another four.
At some point after the restructuring, the pension plans could float the stock on the market and get some real value. If actual pensions need to be adjusted, then so be it. While that is sad for the GM pensioners, is it any sadder than for Delta or United Airlines or steel company pensioners who saw their benefits go down? For the vast majority of Americans, no one guarantees their full retirement. Why should auto trade unions be any different?
Taxpayers in one form or another are going to have to pay something. Unemployment costs, increased contributions to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, job training, relocation, and other costs will be borne. So, it is in our interest to get involved so as to minimize our costs, as well as help preserve as many jobs as possible.
Sadly, I think it is likely that a Democratic majority next year will quickly pass a bailout that will not solve any of the longer-term problems. Obama evidently wants to appoint an "automotive czar;" and the name being floated is the very liberal Michigan former Representative David Bonior, whose anti-trade and pro-union positions are well known. This is appointing the fox to guard the hen house. It is not a recipe for the restructuring that is needed.
The bailout for GM is a bailout for the trade unions and management (who not coincidentally both made large contributions to the Democratic Party and candidates). US consumers are simply going to buy fewer cars in the future. That is a fact. Spending $50 billion does not address that reality. That $50 billion can be better spent by helping workers who lose their jobs. Without serious reforms a bailout will simply postpone the problem, and there will be a need for more money in a few years. And do we think that the management which got GM into the current mess is the group to bring them out?
And as to the argument that "We bailed out Wall Street, so why not GM?" it doesn't hold water. What we did and are doing is to try and keep the financial system functioning, so we don't see the world economy simply shut down. But don't tell the 125,000 people who have lost jobs on Wall Street that it was a bailout. That number is likely to go to 200,000. No one thinks that a restructured GM would see anywhere close to half that number of job losses.
Do we protect Circuit City? Sun just announced plans to lay off 6,000 workers. Where is their bailout? Citibank announced 10,000 further job cuts today. This is a recession. And sadly that means a lot of jobs are going to be lost. GM workers should have no more right to their jobs than a Sun or Citibank or Circuit City worker.
Now, would I be opposed to a bridge loan to help in the transition? No, because a viable Detroit is good for the country and will cost the taxpayer less in the long run than if we have to pick up their pension benefits. But any money must come with realistic reforms that put in charge new management and a realistic cost structure so GM can compete.
New York, Moving, and Another One Leaves the Nest
Today, while I am writing this letter, my #2 son Chad is moving out, to an apartment not far from me, but still no longer in the house. He is 20 and eager to be on his own. He has recently taken a job at Best Buy, while trying to decide what to do next. I am happy for him, as you can clearly see the anticipation on his face. Six down and one left. Trey, the youngest, is 14, and I suppose the day will come when he too decides it is time to be on his own. That is what we as parents hope for. But there is a part of me that will miss Chad being under my roof.
Thanksgiving is coming up and I am making plans, not just for the usual big dinner but also for moving that weekend to another home not too far away. I will move my office into the same house in mid-December. The savings will be substantial, but the savings in commute time will be even more valuable. I will miss this Ballpark office, though.
I will be in New York next month (December 4) for Festivus, a holiday fundraiser sponsored by my friends at Minyanville.com. If you are there, be sure and look me up. It will be a fun weekend, as there will be dinners with friends, and Barry Habib (of the Mortgage Market Guide and one of the show's producers) has arranged for tickets to the musical Rock of Ages.
It is quite late. For some reason, this letter was harder to write than usual, but even letter writing comes to an eventual end. Have a great week.
Your ready already for recovery analyst,
John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com
Copyright 2008 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved
by John Mauldin
November15, 2008
Visit John's MySpace Page
As long-time readers know, my daughter Tiffani and I are interviewing millionaires for a book we will be writing called Eavesdropping on Millionaires. This has been one of the more personally impacting projects of my life, as the stories we hear are so very provocative. I hope we can transfer to readers of the book at least half of the impact we are personally experiencing. But at the end of each interview, we let the interviewee ask me questions. Often, they are along the line of "Do you really think we will Muddle Through?" Sometimes they ask in need of assurance and sometimes they simply think that my stance is somewhat naïve. It is something of an irony that I am called a perma-bear in some circles and a Pollyanna in others. The Muddle Through middle has been lonely of late.
So, this week I take another look at my Muddle Through stance. We look at some of the recent data on unemployment and retail sales, think about the implications of a falling trade deficit and a rising US government deficit, speculate about the potential for a serious stock market rally, and also comment on the potential for a GM bailout. There is a lot to cover, so let's jump right in.
Where Have All the Consumers Gone?
Retail sales and prices of goods imported to the US dropped by the most on record, signaling the economy may be in its worst slump in decades. Purchases fell 2.8 % in October, the fourth straight decline, the Commerce Department said today in Washington. Labor Department figures showed import prices dropped 4.7%, pointing to a rising danger of deflation, and a private report said consumer confidence this month remained near the lowest level since 1980. (Bloomberg)
Circuit City filed for bankruptcy and Best Buy said sales were down and gave even lower guidance for Christmas. Nordstrom's cut its profit forecast for the third time this year.
It is a perfect storm for retailers. Consumers are having a negative wealth effect as stock and housing prices have plunged, taking almost $20 trillion out of US consumer assets. Unemployment is rising and consumer confidence is at the lowest levels since the last major recession in 1980-82.
The unemployment numbers which came out this week were particularly grim. Jobless claims on a seasonally adjusted basis were 516,000 newly unemployed. But that masked an even deeper actual number of 540,000. The largest previous number for this week was back in 2001 and was 420,000. Actual weekly numbers can be volatile, but such an increase is certainly disconcerting.
I should point out that as of the end of September there were 3.3 million job openings, down slightly from August. It is not as if there are no jobs being created or available. But as pointed out last week, the number of people looking for work for over 8 months is high and rising fast, so there is a serious mismatch of the jobs available and the desire or ability of people to take them.
Continuing claims are now at roughly 3.5 million individuals who are getting unemployment insurance. Let's assume that each week we lose an average of 400,000 jobs. That is 20 million jobs a year. That means the US economy for the last year has created 16.5 million jobs (very roughly). So there is some robustness in the economy even as we slide deeper into recession.
But what happens if we see the number of new unemployment claims start to rise to an average of 500,000 for a period of time? Without more job creation, that would mean an increase in unemployment of 1,000,000 people in just 10 weeks. This week we have seen an increase in continuing claims of 141,000 from just last week. That, gentle reader, is very grim if it were to continue. Unemployment is likely to continue to rise throughout most of 2009, closing in on 8%.
This time of year should see some seasonal rise as retailers begin to hire for Christmas. But with retail sales down and facing the likely prospect of negative growth in Christmas sales for the first time ever, seasonal employment is evidently not responding. More comments on this below as I take up the Muddle Through economy.
Why Is the Dollar Rising?
The trade deficit is dropping slowly, from over $60 billion in July to $56 billion in September. Import prices fell and imports were down by 5.6%. On a less positive note, exports, which had been one of the bright spots in the economy, fell by 6%. The trade deficit would have been another $3 billion less if Boeing had not been on strike.
Oil prices were an average of $104 a barrel in September. For November prices will be closer to $65, down at least one third. That means the possible trade deficit for November could be a lot closer to $40 billion, the lowest since 2003 and well off the highs of almost $68 billion a few years ago.
Why is this important? Two reasons. First, it means that a lot fewer dollars are now going into the world economy. And demand for dollars is rising as the world seeks a safe haven in the current global recession, so it should not be a surprise that the dollar is rising.
The surprise is the violence, the amazing rapidity of the rise. We are seeing movements in currency prices in a week that would normally be a year's worth of volatility. It is a sign of the severity of the crisis, of the wariness of traders, that prices are so volatile.
Second, it also means fewer dollars will be coming back into the US to finance the rising government deficits. As Woody Brock (one of my favorite economists) in a recent essay points out, this is counter-intuitive, but it is nonetheless true. Dollars which go abroad must eventually find a home, and that home is going to be in US assets of some kind, usually government bonds.
Some worry about China or another large country might stop buying US bonds with their dollars. They worry that they might want to increase their holdings of euros, for example. But what that means is they take the dollars and sell them to someone who has euros. Then that country has dollars that they must then do something with. It is not as if the dollars disappear.
The only way for China (and/or the world) to really reduce their dollar balances is to stop selling products to the US consumer or to buy US assets like stocks or real estate or wheat, thus bringing the dollars back to the US.
But what in practice happens is that China and most Mideast countries on a net basis buy US government-backed debt. But if there are fewer dollars going abroad, that means there are fewer dollars to buy newly issued debt. And our government is issuing new debt at a rather startling rate.
The estimates for the deficit next year are close to $1 trillion. But if the trade deficit is "only" $500 billion, that means that the appetite of foreigners for US debt will be less than half what is needed to finance the deficit. Where does the difference come from? US citizens and corporations, primarily banks, are going to have to buy the difference or the Fed will have to monetize a portion. Or rates on longer-term debt could go high enough to entice foreigners to buy US debt.
Higher rates would be a drag on the US economy and especially the housing markets and would also cost the taxpayer a lot in additional interest-rate expenses. Total government debt is now $10.5 trillion, with the public (including non-US holdings) having $6.3 trillion. The average interest rate paid on that debt is 4.009%, and for fiscal year 2008, which ended October 31, the interest expense was $451 billion. Add another trillion and the interest paid would soon rise to $500 billion.
The US will face a serious problem in 2009. Tax revenues are going to take a very serious fall. Remember when capital gains taxes would produce a few hundred billion? Not in 2009. And income taxes will drop as unemployment expenses rise. The perceived need for government stimulus will be offset by the problem of funding the deficit. Resorting to monetizing the debt is a nuclear option. Expect even more volatility in the currency and interest-rate markets next year.
Can We Actually Muddle Through?
In addition to the above, let me list a few problems I have highlighted in the past few months. Roughly 3% of GDP growth for 2002-2007 was from Mortgage Equity Withdrawals and other debt. That stimulus is gone. Consumers are going to start saving once again, taking money from a consumer-spending-driven economy. Taxes are likely to rise, not only at the federal but at the state and local levels, as governments of all sizes are faced with growing deficits and needs. Financial institutions are deleveraging at a very fast pace. It is, as one friend told me, as if the economy at large is facing a massive margin call.
Given all of the above problems, how is it possible that we can Muddle Through?
In January of 2007 I forecast a mild recession beginning in late 2007. I was early. In January of this year, I still thought the recession would be more like that of 1990-91. Clearly, I was an optimist. It is now likely that we will see a recession as deep as 1974. This quarter is likely to see a negative growth number of 4% or more. That is deep by any standard. And I do not think that the economy will begin to actually grow before the third quarter at the earliest. It is quite likely that 2009 will be negative for the entire year, and possibly for all four quarters.
We are, as I have said, hitting the reset button on consumer spending. We are going to some lower level of consumer spending, and corporations and government are going to have to adjust their budgets. Corporate earnings will be under pressure for some time to come.
But, and this is a big but, this too shall pass. At some point we will hit a bottom. Just as irrational exuberance led us into foolish actions, we are now becoming too pessimistic. The pendulum will swing. Minsky taught us that stability breeds instability. The more stable things are, the more comfortable we are with taking risk, which ultimately creates the conditions for a normal business-cycle recession. This time, we took on a whole lot more risk than usual and are facing a deeper recession.
But the opposite is true as well. Instability will breed stability. It is, as Paul McCulley calls it, a reverse Minsky moment. We will adjust to the new environment by becoming more conservative. And that new conservative environment will bring about a new stability, albeit at lower levels. But it will be a level from which we can begin to grow once again. It has been this way since the Medes were trading with the Persians.
And here is where I may not have been clear, as the conversations mentioned at the beginning of the letter have called to my attention. My thought is that Muddle Through is the period after we are finished with the recession. I think that the future recovery when it comes will be a lot slower and longer in getting back to trend growth than normal. It will be a Muddle Through, slow-growth economy. I expect that period to now last through at least 2010. The credit crisis and the housing bubble are not problems that can be quickly or easily fixed. It will take time.
The Potential for a Large Stock Market Rally
Everyone knows that there are large amounts of hedge fund redemptions being processed. Some blame the current vicious sell-off on forced hedge fund sales as they have to meet these redemptions at the end of the quarter.
This brings up an interesting possibility. My guess is that the large bulk of that money is going back to institutions that will need to put the money to work. Where will they deploy it? If they are projecting 7-8% total portfolio returns, they cannot put that money in bonds. My guess is that it will go back to other hedge funds or into long-only managers. This money will start to go to work in mid- to late January. We could see a very large rally the first quarter of next year. For traders, this will be a chance to make some money. I think it will be a bear market rally, as the recession will still be in full swing, and we could see a pullback when that money gets fully deployed. But it will be fun while it lasts.
As traders begin to sense that possibility, we could see a serious year-end rally as well. Would I bet the farm? No, but I offer up the idea as a possibility. And I know a lot of people have large short positions that have made them a lot of money this year. Maybe it is time to think about taking profits.
And now a few thoughts on the possibility of bailing out GM.
Is GM too Big to Let Fail?
(Let me say at the outset I am truly sorry for those who have lost their jobs or are facing the possibility of a job loss, whether at GM or any other firm. I have been there, as have most people at one time or another.)
I wrote in 2004 that GM was essentially bankrupt. They owed more in pension obligations than it seemed likely they would be able to pay, without major restructuring of the union contracts. I was not alone in such an assessment, although there were not many of us. Now that assessment is common wisdom.
Bloomberg today cites sources that claim a collapse of GM would cost taxpayers $200 billion if the company were forced to liquidate. The projections also called for the loss of "millions" of auto-related jobs. GM, Ford, and Chrysler employ 240,000. They provide healthcare to 2 million, pension benefits to 775,000. Another 5 million jobs are directly related to the three auto companies. GM has 6,000 dealerships which employ 344,000 people. According to a recent study by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR), if the domestic automakers cut output and employment by 50 percent, nearly 2.5 million jobs would be lost and governments would lose $108 billion in revenue over three years. (Edd Snyder at Roadtrip blog)
How did we get to a place where the market cap of GM is a mere $1.8 billion and its stock price has dropped from $87 in early 1999 to $3.10 today? (See chart below.) Where Rod Lache of Deutsche Bank has a "price target" of zero for GM? "Even if GM succeeds in averting a bankruptcy, we believe that the company's future path is likely to be bankruptcy-like," Lache wrote.
The litany of reasons is long. At the top of the list are union contracts which mandate high costs and pension plans which cannot be met. Then there is the problem of many years of poorly designed cars, although they are now getting their act together. We can also discuss poor management and bloated costs, like paying multiple thousands of workers who are not actually working. GM is structured for the 50% market share they used to command, whereas now they only have 20%.
Wilbur Ross, a well-known multi-billionaire investor, was on CNBC saying that allowing GM to go bankrupt would throw the country into what sounded like a depression. Of course, he does have an auto parts company which supplies GM; so he, as my Dad would say, does have a dog in that hunt.
jm111508image002.gif
Ross said that we as a nation are to blame for GM's problems (I am not making this up) because we do not have a national industrial policy. The US allowed other automotive companies to build plants in states that had lower labor costs, and that is the reason GM is uncompetitive. GM pays an average of $33 an hour, and those selfish other companies pay a mere $19 plus a host of benefits.
Ross evidently believes that because some states have lower taxes and right to work laws, that it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to give GM a certain type of immortality rather than suggest GM deal with its problems directly. I assume that Ross also sides with the French when they suggest that Ireland should raise taxes so they will not have to compete with Ireland for business. Such thinking is nonsense and is also unconstitutional.
Let's all acknowledge that having GM go bankrupt would not be a good thing. But it is not the end of the US automotive industry, nor even of GM. Let's think about what a GM bankruptcy might look like. In a bankruptcy, the debt holders line up to come up with a restructuring plan so that they can maximize the return of their loans or obligations. The shareholders get wiped out, but with GM down over 95%, that has largely been accomplished. That process has happened with airlines, steel companies, and tens of thousand of other companies. It is called creative destruction.
First, let's understand that the real owners of GM are the pension plans, as I wrote in 2004. They are the entities with the largest obligations and the most to lose. They are the biggest stakeholders in a successful GM. Giving them the responsibility for making a new, leaner, meaner GM with realistic union contracts would be rational; otherwise they would lose most of what they have.
Factories need to be closed. Auto sales are down to 11 million cars a year, the lowest since 1982, which was the last major recession. Automotive companies sold cars at such low prices in the last few years that sales went to 16 million a year. But the cars that have been sold will last for a long time. Few people are going to buy a new car when the old one is working fine, especially in a recession and a Muddle Through economy. Further, does GM really need eight automotive lines, some of which have been losing money for years?
A restructured GM with realistic costs could be quite competitive. They have some great cars. I drive one. It is four years old and so good I am likely to drive it for at least another four.
At some point after the restructuring, the pension plans could float the stock on the market and get some real value. If actual pensions need to be adjusted, then so be it. While that is sad for the GM pensioners, is it any sadder than for Delta or United Airlines or steel company pensioners who saw their benefits go down? For the vast majority of Americans, no one guarantees their full retirement. Why should auto trade unions be any different?
Taxpayers in one form or another are going to have to pay something. Unemployment costs, increased contributions to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, job training, relocation, and other costs will be borne. So, it is in our interest to get involved so as to minimize our costs, as well as help preserve as many jobs as possible.
Sadly, I think it is likely that a Democratic majority next year will quickly pass a bailout that will not solve any of the longer-term problems. Obama evidently wants to appoint an "automotive czar;" and the name being floated is the very liberal Michigan former Representative David Bonior, whose anti-trade and pro-union positions are well known. This is appointing the fox to guard the hen house. It is not a recipe for the restructuring that is needed.
The bailout for GM is a bailout for the trade unions and management (who not coincidentally both made large contributions to the Democratic Party and candidates). US consumers are simply going to buy fewer cars in the future. That is a fact. Spending $50 billion does not address that reality. That $50 billion can be better spent by helping workers who lose their jobs. Without serious reforms a bailout will simply postpone the problem, and there will be a need for more money in a few years. And do we think that the management which got GM into the current mess is the group to bring them out?
And as to the argument that "We bailed out Wall Street, so why not GM?" it doesn't hold water. What we did and are doing is to try and keep the financial system functioning, so we don't see the world economy simply shut down. But don't tell the 125,000 people who have lost jobs on Wall Street that it was a bailout. That number is likely to go to 200,000. No one thinks that a restructured GM would see anywhere close to half that number of job losses.
Do we protect Circuit City? Sun just announced plans to lay off 6,000 workers. Where is their bailout? Citibank announced 10,000 further job cuts today. This is a recession. And sadly that means a lot of jobs are going to be lost. GM workers should have no more right to their jobs than a Sun or Citibank or Circuit City worker.
Now, would I be opposed to a bridge loan to help in the transition? No, because a viable Detroit is good for the country and will cost the taxpayer less in the long run than if we have to pick up their pension benefits. But any money must come with realistic reforms that put in charge new management and a realistic cost structure so GM can compete.
New York, Moving, and Another One Leaves the Nest
Today, while I am writing this letter, my #2 son Chad is moving out, to an apartment not far from me, but still no longer in the house. He is 20 and eager to be on his own. He has recently taken a job at Best Buy, while trying to decide what to do next. I am happy for him, as you can clearly see the anticipation on his face. Six down and one left. Trey, the youngest, is 14, and I suppose the day will come when he too decides it is time to be on his own. That is what we as parents hope for. But there is a part of me that will miss Chad being under my roof.
Thanksgiving is coming up and I am making plans, not just for the usual big dinner but also for moving that weekend to another home not too far away. I will move my office into the same house in mid-December. The savings will be substantial, but the savings in commute time will be even more valuable. I will miss this Ballpark office, though.
I will be in New York next month (December 4) for Festivus, a holiday fundraiser sponsored by my friends at Minyanville.com. If you are there, be sure and look me up. It will be a fun weekend, as there will be dinners with friends, and Barry Habib (of the Mortgage Market Guide and one of the show's producers) has arranged for tickets to the musical Rock of Ages.
It is quite late. For some reason, this letter was harder to write than usual, but even letter writing comes to an eventual end. Have a great week.
Your ready already for recovery analyst,
John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com
Copyright 2008 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved
China's foremost America-watcher on the Question of US Decline: Article by Staff Reporter Zhao Lingmin: "Optimistic View of Sino-US Relations "
This long interview with the Dean of International Studies at Beijing University, translated from the Chinese original by a US government service, provides a comprehensive look at the current state of world affairs and the US role in those affairs as seen from Beijing. For those concerned about how we look from abroad, in this case from a country like China that is more pro-American than many US allies now are, this article may be of interest. (N.B., the official -- Pentagon-inspired -- US government translation of the Chinese phrase "tao guang yang hui" as "concealing one's ability and biding one's time" is tendentious. A more accurate translation would be "to avoid grandstanding and focus on self-improvement." The original phrase, which refers to a scholar-official who has withdrawn from public service pending a change in policy and is awaiting possible reappointment to a government position, does not carry the sinister overtone of the Pentagon translation.)
China: Expert Wang Jisi Interviewed on Sino-US Relations, Question of US Decline
Guangzhou Nanfeng Chuang in Chinese, 8 October 2008
[Article by Staff Reporter Zhao Lingmin: "Optimistic View of Sino-US Relations -- Exclusive Interview With Professor Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University"]
In looking at Sino-US relations, we should focus on the issue of specific functionality rather than being caught up in determining the nature of such relations or engaging in broad discussions of the overall strategic situation. Facing a trade-protectionist in the United States or a Chinese foreign trade company that has suffered losses over the valuation of the RMB (renminbi), it is meaningless to say things such as "the overall situation in Sino-US relations must take priority."
The United States Has Not Declined
Nanfeng Chuang (NFC): Since the start of the Iraq war, there has been incessant talk of the decline of the United States. What is your assessment of that, and how do you see the international position of the United States at present?
Wang Jisi: The theory of the decline of the United States is not something that has just appeared in the past few years. In 1946, Mao Zedong said that the American imperialists were a paper tiger. At the time a series of events occurred, such as the launch of a satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 and, in the 1970s, the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam war and the de-linking of the dollar from gold, there were invariably people around the world who predicted the decline of the United States. There was the rapid development of the Japanese and West German economies at the end of the 1980s and in 1991 the United States asked its allies for money to fight the Gulf War, and at those times theories about the decline of the United States also abounded. Following the Iraq war, there has been an abrupt decline i n the soft power of the United States, and at present there is also the subprime mortgage crisis, so there is really nothing strange about some people being pessimistic about the United States.
In the United States, leftists such as [Emanuel] Wallerstein are forever trumpeting the decline of the United States. The problem lies in the question of what is the standard for measuring the decline of the United States? Actually, when you compare the current situation in the United States with different periods in its history, the conclusions one reaches are different. Compared to the situation around 1945 when it was at the summit of its power, the United States today has certainly declined, and that is the comparison that Wallerstein makes. Compared to the Nixon and Carter eras, the strength of the United States today has increased. Compared to the Clinton era, the relative position of the United States has also declined. When one summarizes the situation in various quarters, it is very difficult to conclude that the United States has at this point begun to go dow nhill. My sense is that the United States today is still traveling along a flat mountain top, but flat mountain tops are also uneven. As for how extensive this flat area is, no one knows, but there really is no reliable basis for saying that at this point the United States has had a setback from which it cannot recover. To date no country has been able to constitute a comprehensive challenge to the United States, and there is no question that its position as the only superpower will continue for 20-30 years.
Viewed from the perspective of the national might of the United States, its hard power in the areas of economics, the military, and science and technology have actually increased, and the sense that everyone has that the United States is already in decline mainly stems from the decline of its soft power. In that regard, other than the effects of international factors such as the Iraq war, etc., the more fundamental reason involves some domestic factors in the United States. Along with the ever increasing diversity of its races and cultures, the ethnic cohesiveness of the United States is declining. In his book Who Are We, [Samuel] Huntington has expressed that concern. The Enron incident a few years ago and the subprime mortgage crisis most recently both show that there is a major problem in financial oversight in the United States, and that the relationship bet ween the government and big business is too close. In addition, with regard to domestic politics, the conservative forces in the United States are extremely powerful, leading to a political imbalance domestically, and as to whether or not the United States has the ability to correct this, we will get an inkling of that following this year's presidential election.
Worth mentioning is the fact that, although the United States has encountered numerous difficulties, other countries have not benefited much from that. Under the subprime mortgage crisis, the global economy has been encumbered. Economically, the relationship between China and the United States is one of mutual-dependence, and there is not a situation in which they are undercutting each other. The upswing in China's power over the past few years really is not the result of a decline in the power of the United States, and similarly, none of the various factors resulting in a decline in the soft power of the United States and its unsightly reputation were created by China.
NFC: So, as you see it, what are the intrinsic values that are supporting the international position of the United States? And what is unique about the United States?
Wang: First there is the simple and uniform value that holds society in the United States together, that is, the so-called "American dream," and Americans, regardless of whether they are far left or far right, or of what race or language, all identify with this ideology. Second is the rule of law and democracy. We are opposed to the United States exporting its social system, but we should acknowledge that its system has promoted the country's development and power. Because of the domestic success of the United States, as some people around the world see it, the democracy, freedom, and rule of law of the United States are worth imitating, and this gives the United States formidable soft power. And third is the development of civil society in the United States. The emergence and development of Hollywood and Silicon V alley are results which reflect social initiative, and the soft power of the United States does not rely primarily on promotion by the government, but rather on the wellsprings of vitality and competitiveness in US society.
Society in the United States is even more powerful than the government. This is its primary unique feature, and it is also an important aspect in why many countries believe that the United States is not easy to deal with. In that sense, the relationship between China and the United States is essentially one between a country and a society. As far as the Chinese government is concerned, simply having dealings with the administrative authorities in the United States is far from sufficient, and it is also necessary to emphasize contacts with its Congress, business circles, the media, think tanks, labor unions, and religious circles, etc., to get them to understand China, and this is a very arduous task.
NFC: At present, anti-American feelings are very intense in many places around the world. What is the reason for that?
Wang: One reason is the reactionary policies of the United States. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the United States has been partial to Israel for a long time, and this is the source of anti-American feelings in the Middle East. The situation in the Iraq war, with the large number of innocent casualties, is still to this day very unstable, and it is difficult even for the Americans to state clearly whether there was more suffering during the Saddam era or today. The rise in anti-American feelings in Afghanistan and Pakistan also stems from similar causes. The selfish and unjust positions of the United States with regard to the Doha talks and the Kyoto Protocol, and the drag on the world economy by the subprime mortgage crisis are also causes for the upsurge in anti-American feelings.
Another reason is that, if a given country has been the top dog for a long time, it is bound to incur opposition. As the expression goes, "those who stand out will be attacked by others." This is a structural problem resulting from being too powerful, and there is no fundamental way to resolve it. Furthermore, the bombastic behavior of the United States has exacerbated this situation. It is just as if, in a class in school, you are stronger than the others in every area to begin with, but also not the least bit modest, being fond of the limelight and being sure not to get along with the others. Wherever the might of the United States is used, the character of individuals and the nation invariably becomes fairly widely publicized. I do not believe that a change of administrations in the United States can fundamentally alter their own behavior.
At present, China is a rising power, and it will incur more and more criticism. We need to be aware that this is an inevitable phenomenon during the course of moving forward and respond by employing moderation, being level-headed, and not publicizing it, and thus the pressure will be somewhat less. If you only read Chinese newspapers and web sites, you may feel that the entire Western media is commenting on or slandering China. Actually, if you observe the Western media carefully, you may discover that China is not at the center of various controversies or disputes. The present is, as far as China is concerned, a rare period of strategic opportunity. We must actively avoid becoming embroiled in the central maelstrom of world politics and concentrate on managing our own affairs well.
NFC: Quite a few people are extremely dissatisfied with the "policeman of the world" approach of the United States in which they meddle in the affairs of other countries everywhere. What is your view on that? And in international society, in a condition in which there is essentially no government, is there an objective need for such a "policeman" or not?
Wang: There are two situations in which the United States has been called the "world's policeman." One is when they themselves want to interfere, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the other is when other people want to get them to interfere, when the politicians in other countries want to use the United States to achieve their own objectives. For example, Georgia hoped that the United States would intervene in the Georgia-Russia conflict, and furthermore believes that the United States has not intervened enough. When some countries hold elections, they take the initiative to invite the Americans to monitor it. There have been territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea, and there are people in both countries who hope that the United States will make an appearance to mediate things. It is very difficu lt to completely distinguish between these two situations.
To be sure, the world cannot do without a "policeman." When internal unrest in some countries reaches a certain level, it threatens the security of other countries and still requires a "policeman" to control things. But this "policeman" cannot be self-appointed. The peacekeeping forces dispatched by the UN Security Council are the "world's policemen" that are recognized by everyone. As for when and how they will intervene, the rules for that must be formulated by certain international mechanisms.
China Is A Beneficiary in the World System
NFC: What is your assessment of "Pax Americana"? If the United States declines, what will happen to the world? And as far as China is concerned, what are the pros and cons of US hegemony?
Wang: The so-called "Pax Americana" does to a certain degree benefit international stability, but this is a peace under power politics and has sacrificed many rights and interests of other countries. It is morally unfair, unjust, and is also very difficult to sustain for a long time. Speaking in theoretical terms, a multipolar world will be more just than a unipolar one, but it is certain that it will not be very stable. Is not achieving both justice and stability easier said than done? In a situation in which there is no better substitute, as far as China is concerned, the workable approach is to acknowledge the existing international order and, amid that, to safeguard its own rights and interests as much as possible. This not only includes struggling with US hegemony, it also includes the other aspect of coordina ting and cooperating with the United States, working together to deal with nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy shortages, and other such problems. This is also what we commonly refer to as "fighting dual tactics with dual tactics."
The United States' ability to maintain its position in first place in the world in overall
China: Expert Wang Jisi Interviewed on Sino-US Relations, Question of US Decline
Guangzhou Nanfeng Chuang in Chinese, 8 October 2008
[Article by Staff Reporter Zhao Lingmin: "Optimistic View of Sino-US Relations -- Exclusive Interview With Professor Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University"]
In looking at Sino-US relations, we should focus on the issue of specific functionality rather than being caught up in determining the nature of such relations or engaging in broad discussions of the overall strategic situation. Facing a trade-protectionist in the United States or a Chinese foreign trade company that has suffered losses over the valuation of the RMB (renminbi), it is meaningless to say things such as "the overall situation in Sino-US relations must take priority."
The United States Has Not Declined
Nanfeng Chuang (NFC): Since the start of the Iraq war, there has been incessant talk of the decline of the United States. What is your assessment of that, and how do you see the international position of the United States at present?
Wang Jisi: The theory of the decline of the United States is not something that has just appeared in the past few years. In 1946, Mao Zedong said that the American imperialists were a paper tiger. At the time a series of events occurred, such as the launch of a satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 and, in the 1970s, the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam war and the de-linking of the dollar from gold, there were invariably people around the world who predicted the decline of the United States. There was the rapid development of the Japanese and West German economies at the end of the 1980s and in 1991 the United States asked its allies for money to fight the Gulf War, and at those times theories about the decline of the United States also abounded. Following the Iraq war, there has been an abrupt decline i n the soft power of the United States, and at present there is also the subprime mortgage crisis, so there is really nothing strange about some people being pessimistic about the United States.
In the United States, leftists such as [Emanuel] Wallerstein are forever trumpeting the decline of the United States. The problem lies in the question of what is the standard for measuring the decline of the United States? Actually, when you compare the current situation in the United States with different periods in its history, the conclusions one reaches are different. Compared to the situation around 1945 when it was at the summit of its power, the United States today has certainly declined, and that is the comparison that Wallerstein makes. Compared to the Nixon and Carter eras, the strength of the United States today has increased. Compared to the Clinton era, the relative position of the United States has also declined. When one summarizes the situation in various quarters, it is very difficult to conclude that the United States has at this point begun to go dow nhill. My sense is that the United States today is still traveling along a flat mountain top, but flat mountain tops are also uneven. As for how extensive this flat area is, no one knows, but there really is no reliable basis for saying that at this point the United States has had a setback from which it cannot recover. To date no country has been able to constitute a comprehensive challenge to the United States, and there is no question that its position as the only superpower will continue for 20-30 years.
Viewed from the perspective of the national might of the United States, its hard power in the areas of economics, the military, and science and technology have actually increased, and the sense that everyone has that the United States is already in decline mainly stems from the decline of its soft power. In that regard, other than the effects of international factors such as the Iraq war, etc., the more fundamental reason involves some domestic factors in the United States. Along with the ever increasing diversity of its races and cultures, the ethnic cohesiveness of the United States is declining. In his book Who Are We, [Samuel] Huntington has expressed that concern. The Enron incident a few years ago and the subprime mortgage crisis most recently both show that there is a major problem in financial oversight in the United States, and that the relationship bet ween the government and big business is too close. In addition, with regard to domestic politics, the conservative forces in the United States are extremely powerful, leading to a political imbalance domestically, and as to whether or not the United States has the ability to correct this, we will get an inkling of that following this year's presidential election.
Worth mentioning is the fact that, although the United States has encountered numerous difficulties, other countries have not benefited much from that. Under the subprime mortgage crisis, the global economy has been encumbered. Economically, the relationship between China and the United States is one of mutual-dependence, and there is not a situation in which they are undercutting each other. The upswing in China's power over the past few years really is not the result of a decline in the power of the United States, and similarly, none of the various factors resulting in a decline in the soft power of the United States and its unsightly reputation were created by China.
NFC: So, as you see it, what are the intrinsic values that are supporting the international position of the United States? And what is unique about the United States?
Wang: First there is the simple and uniform value that holds society in the United States together, that is, the so-called "American dream," and Americans, regardless of whether they are far left or far right, or of what race or language, all identify with this ideology. Second is the rule of law and democracy. We are opposed to the United States exporting its social system, but we should acknowledge that its system has promoted the country's development and power. Because of the domestic success of the United States, as some people around the world see it, the democracy, freedom, and rule of law of the United States are worth imitating, and this gives the United States formidable soft power. And third is the development of civil society in the United States. The emergence and development of Hollywood and Silicon V alley are results which reflect social initiative, and the soft power of the United States does not rely primarily on promotion by the government, but rather on the wellsprings of vitality and competitiveness in US society.
Society in the United States is even more powerful than the government. This is its primary unique feature, and it is also an important aspect in why many countries believe that the United States is not easy to deal with. In that sense, the relationship between China and the United States is essentially one between a country and a society. As far as the Chinese government is concerned, simply having dealings with the administrative authorities in the United States is far from sufficient, and it is also necessary to emphasize contacts with its Congress, business circles, the media, think tanks, labor unions, and religious circles, etc., to get them to understand China, and this is a very arduous task.
NFC: At present, anti-American feelings are very intense in many places around the world. What is the reason for that?
Wang: One reason is the reactionary policies of the United States. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the United States has been partial to Israel for a long time, and this is the source of anti-American feelings in the Middle East. The situation in the Iraq war, with the large number of innocent casualties, is still to this day very unstable, and it is difficult even for the Americans to state clearly whether there was more suffering during the Saddam era or today. The rise in anti-American feelings in Afghanistan and Pakistan also stems from similar causes. The selfish and unjust positions of the United States with regard to the Doha talks and the Kyoto Protocol, and the drag on the world economy by the subprime mortgage crisis are also causes for the upsurge in anti-American feelings.
Another reason is that, if a given country has been the top dog for a long time, it is bound to incur opposition. As the expression goes, "those who stand out will be attacked by others." This is a structural problem resulting from being too powerful, and there is no fundamental way to resolve it. Furthermore, the bombastic behavior of the United States has exacerbated this situation. It is just as if, in a class in school, you are stronger than the others in every area to begin with, but also not the least bit modest, being fond of the limelight and being sure not to get along with the others. Wherever the might of the United States is used, the character of individuals and the nation invariably becomes fairly widely publicized. I do not believe that a change of administrations in the United States can fundamentally alter their own behavior.
At present, China is a rising power, and it will incur more and more criticism. We need to be aware that this is an inevitable phenomenon during the course of moving forward and respond by employing moderation, being level-headed, and not publicizing it, and thus the pressure will be somewhat less. If you only read Chinese newspapers and web sites, you may feel that the entire Western media is commenting on or slandering China. Actually, if you observe the Western media carefully, you may discover that China is not at the center of various controversies or disputes. The present is, as far as China is concerned, a rare period of strategic opportunity. We must actively avoid becoming embroiled in the central maelstrom of world politics and concentrate on managing our own affairs well.
NFC: Quite a few people are extremely dissatisfied with the "policeman of the world" approach of the United States in which they meddle in the affairs of other countries everywhere. What is your view on that? And in international society, in a condition in which there is essentially no government, is there an objective need for such a "policeman" or not?
Wang: There are two situations in which the United States has been called the "world's policeman." One is when they themselves want to interfere, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the other is when other people want to get them to interfere, when the politicians in other countries want to use the United States to achieve their own objectives. For example, Georgia hoped that the United States would intervene in the Georgia-Russia conflict, and furthermore believes that the United States has not intervened enough. When some countries hold elections, they take the initiative to invite the Americans to monitor it. There have been territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea, and there are people in both countries who hope that the United States will make an appearance to mediate things. It is very difficu lt to completely distinguish between these two situations.
To be sure, the world cannot do without a "policeman." When internal unrest in some countries reaches a certain level, it threatens the security of other countries and still requires a "policeman" to control things. But this "policeman" cannot be self-appointed. The peacekeeping forces dispatched by the UN Security Council are the "world's policemen" that are recognized by everyone. As for when and how they will intervene, the rules for that must be formulated by certain international mechanisms.
China Is A Beneficiary in the World System
NFC: What is your assessment of "Pax Americana"? If the United States declines, what will happen to the world? And as far as China is concerned, what are the pros and cons of US hegemony?
Wang: The so-called "Pax Americana" does to a certain degree benefit international stability, but this is a peace under power politics and has sacrificed many rights and interests of other countries. It is morally unfair, unjust, and is also very difficult to sustain for a long time. Speaking in theoretical terms, a multipolar world will be more just than a unipolar one, but it is certain that it will not be very stable. Is not achieving both justice and stability easier said than done? In a situation in which there is no better substitute, as far as China is concerned, the workable approach is to acknowledge the existing international order and, amid that, to safeguard its own rights and interests as much as possible. This not only includes struggling with US hegemony, it also includes the other aspect of coordina ting and cooperating with the United States, working together to deal with nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy shortages, and other such problems. This is also what we commonly refer to as "fighting dual tactics with dual tactics."
The United States' ability to maintain its position in first place in the world in overall