The New Yorker
Comment
Obama's Iraq Problem
by George Packer July 7, 2008
In February, 2007, when Barack Obama declared that he was running for President, violence in Iraq had reached apocalyptic levels, and he based his candidacy, in part, on a bold promise to begin a rapid withdrawal of American forces upon taking office. At the time, this pledge represented conventional thinking among Democrats and was guaranteed to play well with primary voters. But in the year and a half since then two improbable, though not unforeseeable, events have occurred: Obama has won the Democratic nomination, and Iraq, despite myriad crises, has begun to stabilize. With the general election four months away, Obama's rhetoric on the topic now seems outdated and out of touch, and the nominee-apparent may have a political problem concerning the very issue that did so much to bring him this far.
Obama's plan, which was formally laid out last September, called for the remaining combat brigades to be pulled out at a brisk pace of about one per month, along with a strategic shift of resources and attention away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan. At that rate, all combat troops would be withdrawn in sixteen months. In hindsight, it was a mistake—an understandable one, given the nature of the media and of Presidential politics today—for Obama to offer such a specific timetable. In matters of foreign policy, flexibility is a President's primary defense against surprise. At the start of 2007, no one in Baghdad would have predicted that blood-soaked neighborhoods would begin returning to life within a year. The improved conditions can be attributed, in increasing order of importance, to President Bush's surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia's unilateral ceasefire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment. With the level of violence down, the Iraqi government and Army have begun to show signs of functioning in less sectarian ways. These developments may be temporary or cyclical; predicting the future in Iraq has been a losing game. Indeed, it was President Bush's folly to ignore for years the shifting realities on the ground.
Obama, whatever the idealistic yearnings of his admirers, has turned out to be a cold-eyed, shrewd politician. The same pragmatism that prompted him last month to forgo public financing of his campaign will surely lead him, if he becomes President, to recalibrate his stance on Iraq. He doubtless realizes that his original plan, if implemented now, could revive the badly wounded Al Qaeda in Iraq, reënergize the Sunni insurgency, embolden Moqtada al-Sadr to recoup his militia's recent losses to the Iraqi Army, and return the central government to a state of collapse. The question is whether Obama will publicly change course before November. So far, he has offered nothing more concrete than this: "We must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in."
Obama's advisers have been more forthcoming. Samantha Power, before she resigned from the campaign for making an indiscreet remark about Hillary Clinton, told the BBC, "He will, of course, not rely upon some plan that he's crafted as a Presidential candidate or a U.S. senator. He will rely upon a plan—an operational plan—that he pulls together in consultation with people who are on the ground." Last month, the Center for a New American Security, which has become something like Obama's foreign-policy think tank, released a report that argued against a timetable for withdrawal, regardless of the state of the war, and in favor of "conditional engagement," declaring, "Under this strategy, the United States would not withdraw its forces based on a firm unilateral schedule. Rather, the time horizon for redeployment would be negotiated with the Iraqi government and nested within a more assertive approach to regional diplomacy. The United States would make it clear that Iraq and America share a common interest in achieving sustainable stability in Iraq, and that the United States is willing to help support the Iraqi government and build its security and governance capacity over the long term, but only so long as Iraqis continue to make meaningful political progress." It's impossible to know if this persuasive document mirrors Obama's current thinking, but here's a clue: it was co-written by one of his Iraq advisers, Colin Kahl.
A "conditional engagement" policy is a much better fit for the present situation in Iraq. It would keep the heat on Iraqi politicians, whose willingness to reach compromise on issues like oil revenues, provincial elections, de-Baathification, and power sharing still lags well behind the government's recent military successes. It would allow for a phased withdrawal of most troops, depending on political progress and on the performance of the Iraqi Army. This, in turn, would ease the pressure on the American military and answer the rightful disenchantment in American public opinion. There will be no such thing as victory in Iraq, but the next President, if he remains nimble, may be able to keep the damage under control.
The politics of the issue is tricky, because acknowledging changed ideas in response to changed facts is considered a failing by the political class. Accordingly, Obama, on the night that he proclaimed himself the nominee, in St. Paul, made a familiar declaration: "Start leaving we must. It's time for Iraqis to take responsibility for their future." His supporters claim that the polls are with Obama, that war fatigue will make Iraq a political winner for him in November. Yet, as exhausted as the public is with the war, a candidate who seems heedless of progress in Iraq will be vulnerable to the charge of defeatism, which John McCain's campaign will connect to its broader theme of Obama's inexperience in and weakness on national security. The relative success of the surge is one of the few issues going McCain's way; we'll be hearing about it more and more between now and November, and it might sway some centrist voters who have doubts about Obama.
Obama has shown, with his speech on race, that he has a talent for candor. One can imagine him speaking more honestly on Iraq. If pressed on his timetable for withdrawal, he could say, "That was always a goal, not a blueprint. When circumstances change, I don't close my eyes—I adapt." He could detail in his speeches the functions that American troops and diplomats can continue to perform even as our primary combat role recedes: training and advising, counterterrorism, brokering deals among Iraqi factions, checking their expansionist impulses, opening talks with our enemies in the region. He could promise to negotiate all this with Iraqi leaders, emphasizing the difference between a relationship that respects the wishes of the public in both countries and one in which Iraqis are coerced into coöperation. If Obama truly wants to be seen as a figure of change, he needs to talk less about the past and more about the future: not the war that should never have been fought but the war that he, alone of the two candidates, can find an honorable way to end. ♦
ILLUSTRATION: ROBERT RISKO
Monday, June 30, 2008
Iran in the Crosshairs
Iran in the Crosshairs
by Ira Glunts / June 30th, 2008
When the United States invaded Iraq in order to destroy a nonexistent nuclear threat there were national and world protests. Opposition to that war was loudly voiced by American politicians and world leaders, as well as in mass demonstrations across the globe. Despite the protests, the war proceeded as planned. Today it seems that it is generally agreed that the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation were catastrophic mistakes.
Now the same people that gave us Iraq, and remain just about the only supporters of their own failed policy there, are signaling that it is necessary to destroy the Iranian nuclear …
(Full article …)
http://www.dissidentvoice.org/2008/06/iran-in-the-crosshairs/
by Ira Glunts / June 30th, 2008
When the United States invaded Iraq in order to destroy a nonexistent nuclear threat there were national and world protests. Opposition to that war was loudly voiced by American politicians and world leaders, as well as in mass demonstrations across the globe. Despite the protests, the war proceeded as planned. Today it seems that it is generally agreed that the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation were catastrophic mistakes.
Now the same people that gave us Iraq, and remain just about the only supporters of their own failed policy there, are signaling that it is necessary to destroy the Iranian nuclear …
(Full article …)
http://www.dissidentvoice.org/2008/06/iran-in-the-crosshairs/
A General for Obama?
Even though many of his political operatives are surely anxious for presidential candidate Obama to shore up his national security credentials by selecting a retired general as his running mate, he should not choose one. The reason is simple: the ones available simply do not have the requisite moral character and professional acumen. Today's June 30 issue of Defense News is running a new commentary by Straus Military Reform Project adviser Col. Douglas Macgregor arguing the case.
Find this commentary at http://defensenews.va.newsmemory.com/default.php?type=&token=e88c12e66111e7ec1d5c5631645fed36&pSetup=defensenews_intl, and below.
By DOUGLAS MACGREGOR
Within the American political system, a polarized celebrity culture conditioned to respond to emotional buttons, clichés and slogans, military uniforms and badges have acquired astonishing power. But Obama might think twice before attaching too much importance to the trappings of military glory. A life spent in hierarchical, rule-bound, tightly controlled military organizations is not necessarily the best preparation for accurately judging the fluid world of politics at home and abroad.
More important, nowhere in the Constitution or in any other public document that frames the government of the United States is there mention that the president, a senator, a secretary of defense or any other federal official should have served in the armed forces. Military service can be ennobling, but there is no evidence that military service confers greater moral authority on a soldier over matters pertaining to war and peace.
Perhaps this explains why Americans automatically blame politicians for whatever is wrong — and politicians are rarely blameless. However, the record shows that whereas bad political judgment in war can often be rescued through effective military leadership, the reverse is rarely true. It’s why high command in wartime requires people of the highest caliber and character. Such people, like Gens. Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman in the Civil War, John Pershing in World War I, and George Patton and Douglas MacArthur in World War II, tend to be demanding, sometimes difficult for politicians to control, and often unpredictable; but without such people, regardless of the resources available, success is impossible.
Unfortunately, the George W. Bush administration always exhibited a marked aversion to advancing men of character to the most senior posts in a way not seen since the days of President Lyndon Johnson’s administration. If they had, events might have turned out very differently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps it’s because such men would have fought the administration over its culture of torture and abuse in relation to Muslim detainees, behavior that has betrayed American values, cost us our moral authority and done us incalculable damage internationally.
Instead, the Bush administration opted for biddable corporate men who followed orders, pushed the party line, lied and dissembled where necessary.
The most disturbing example of moral gutlessness occurred when Ambassador Paul Bremer announced the decision to disband the very Iraqi Army which the top U.S. Army generals had planned to reconstitute and use to restore order. A minority of generals — John Abizaid, for example — who composed the U.S. Army leadership in Iraq knew it was a disastrous decision that virtually guaranteed the most appalling consequences. But did he or any of the generals stand up and oppose the decision or threaten to resign en masse, and speak out publicly? No, they folded — and eagerly accepted the promotions that followed.
Such moral cowardice is inexcusable. In the final analysis, the generals turned a limited military intervention to remove the corrupt leadership of a weak, incapable despot into a destructive war of occupation waged against Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. Then, they replaced Saddam Hussein’s regime with a corrupt Shi’ite Islamist Arab government with ties to Iran.
No less disappointing was the readiness of the retired generals to defend the incompetence and failure of their chosen successors by misinforming the American people about the true conditions on the ground in Iraq. Thanks to their disinformation campaign on television and radio, the disaster was concealed from the American public until the strategic consequences were so negative the only way to reduce U.S. losses was to buy off the insurgent enemy with bags of U.S. cash under the guise of the surge.
Despite the desperate need in our republic for accountability from everyone, including generals, the demand for accountability has been frustrated. Journalists who covet access cannot write stories if the generals and the Bush administration bar them from doing so. And politicians find it easier to attack each other. But the truth is, if the active and retired generals were corporate officers with a track record like Iraq, the shareholders would be up in arms, and the generals would have been fired en masse long ago.
No, Obama needs no help from former generals or from anyone sporting medals to win in November. ■
Douglas Macgregor is a former U.S. Army colonel and a decorated Gulf War combat veteran who writes for the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information, Washington.
Now that Sen. Barack Obama has emerged the victor in the fight for the Democratic presidential nomination, the pressure is on from some quarters inside the Democratic Party to find a suitable general to be his running mate. The implication is that a former general, or at least someone with military experience, will confer credibility on the Obama ticket.
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397
winslowwheeler@msn.com
Find this commentary at http://defensenews.va.newsmemory.com/default.php?type=&token=e88c12e66111e7ec1d5c5631645fed36&pSetup=defensenews_intl, and below.
By DOUGLAS MACGREGOR
Within the American political system, a polarized celebrity culture conditioned to respond to emotional buttons, clichés and slogans, military uniforms and badges have acquired astonishing power. But Obama might think twice before attaching too much importance to the trappings of military glory. A life spent in hierarchical, rule-bound, tightly controlled military organizations is not necessarily the best preparation for accurately judging the fluid world of politics at home and abroad.
More important, nowhere in the Constitution or in any other public document that frames the government of the United States is there mention that the president, a senator, a secretary of defense or any other federal official should have served in the armed forces. Military service can be ennobling, but there is no evidence that military service confers greater moral authority on a soldier over matters pertaining to war and peace.
Perhaps this explains why Americans automatically blame politicians for whatever is wrong — and politicians are rarely blameless. However, the record shows that whereas bad political judgment in war can often be rescued through effective military leadership, the reverse is rarely true. It’s why high command in wartime requires people of the highest caliber and character. Such people, like Gens. Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman in the Civil War, John Pershing in World War I, and George Patton and Douglas MacArthur in World War II, tend to be demanding, sometimes difficult for politicians to control, and often unpredictable; but without such people, regardless of the resources available, success is impossible.
Unfortunately, the George W. Bush administration always exhibited a marked aversion to advancing men of character to the most senior posts in a way not seen since the days of President Lyndon Johnson’s administration. If they had, events might have turned out very differently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps it’s because such men would have fought the administration over its culture of torture and abuse in relation to Muslim detainees, behavior that has betrayed American values, cost us our moral authority and done us incalculable damage internationally.
Instead, the Bush administration opted for biddable corporate men who followed orders, pushed the party line, lied and dissembled where necessary.
The most disturbing example of moral gutlessness occurred when Ambassador Paul Bremer announced the decision to disband the very Iraqi Army which the top U.S. Army generals had planned to reconstitute and use to restore order. A minority of generals — John Abizaid, for example — who composed the U.S. Army leadership in Iraq knew it was a disastrous decision that virtually guaranteed the most appalling consequences. But did he or any of the generals stand up and oppose the decision or threaten to resign en masse, and speak out publicly? No, they folded — and eagerly accepted the promotions that followed.
Such moral cowardice is inexcusable. In the final analysis, the generals turned a limited military intervention to remove the corrupt leadership of a weak, incapable despot into a destructive war of occupation waged against Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. Then, they replaced Saddam Hussein’s regime with a corrupt Shi’ite Islamist Arab government with ties to Iran.
No less disappointing was the readiness of the retired generals to defend the incompetence and failure of their chosen successors by misinforming the American people about the true conditions on the ground in Iraq. Thanks to their disinformation campaign on television and radio, the disaster was concealed from the American public until the strategic consequences were so negative the only way to reduce U.S. losses was to buy off the insurgent enemy with bags of U.S. cash under the guise of the surge.
Despite the desperate need in our republic for accountability from everyone, including generals, the demand for accountability has been frustrated. Journalists who covet access cannot write stories if the generals and the Bush administration bar them from doing so. And politicians find it easier to attack each other. But the truth is, if the active and retired generals were corporate officers with a track record like Iraq, the shareholders would be up in arms, and the generals would have been fired en masse long ago.
No, Obama needs no help from former generals or from anyone sporting medals to win in November. ■
Douglas Macgregor is a former U.S. Army colonel and a decorated Gulf War combat veteran who writes for the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information, Washington.
Now that Sen. Barack Obama has emerged the victor in the fight for the Democratic presidential nomination, the pressure is on from some quarters inside the Democratic Party to find a suitable general to be his running mate. The implication is that a former general, or at least someone with military experience, will confer credibility on the Obama ticket.
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397
winslowwheeler@msn.com
DE BORCHGRAVE: U.S.-Israel moment of truth?
http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/jun/30/us-israel-moment-of-truth/
DE BORCHGRAVE: U.S.-Israel moment of truth?
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Monday, June 30, 2008
COMMENTARY:
Israel's message to its only ally, the United States was quite clear. Either President Bush orders military action or Israel will have to strike on its own.
It can't wait till a new U.S. president is sworn in because the new White House tenant could well be Barack Obama. And Mr. Obama almost certainly would not approve an Israeli air strike without first going several extra miles on the U.N. and Western diplomatic track. This could even lead to the kind of rift in Israeli-U.S. relations that occurred when President Eisenhower ordered French, British and Israeli forces out of Egypt in the 1956 Suez War.
America's allies had sprung a strategic deception surprise on the United States by invading Egypt to put the Suez Canal, nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, back under international control. The Soviet Union then ordered Warsaw Pact forces to invade Hungary to suppress an anti-communist revolution.
Thus, the invasion of Suez drained whatever propaganda advantage Eisenhower could have obtained from naked Soviet aggression. Soviet leader Nikita Khruschchev even felt free to rattle his nuclear "rockets" at the United States and took credit for the humiliatingly hurried Franco-British-Israeli withdrawal from Egypt.
The juxtaposition of the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis were two of the most dramatic upheavals in international affairs in the post-World War II era. If Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities while Mr. Bush is still the commander in chief, China and Russia may be tempted to take a page out of Khruschchev's geopolitical playbook and rattle a few threatening economic missiles.
This, in turn, would be designed to get Mr. Obama to disassociate himself from any hostile action Israel might have taken against Iran. And if that didn't elicit the desired result, Iran's formidable asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities would be unleashed throughout the Gulf in particular and the Mideast in general. Iran can also make life hell for U.S. forces in Iraq and NATO forces in Afghanistan. With U.S. consumer confidence already at a 16-year low, oil would quickly skyrocket to $400 or $500 a barrel.
If, on the other hand, Sen. John McCain moves into the White House the afternoon of Jan. 20, he would presumably approve of Israeli bombing raids and Cruise missile strikes against Iran's nascent nuclear weapons capability. There is only thing worse than bombing Iran, Mr. McCain has said, and that is an Iranian nuclear bomb.
Mr. McCain is also privately critical of Mr. Bush's reluctance to cross the border from Iraq into Iran to attack al Quds barracks housing the Revolutionary Guards' Special Forces that smuggled into Iraq a steady stream of IEDs (improvised explosive devices), which kill and maim American soldiers.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen will be in Israel next weekend where he will hear the same simple message: If you don't, we have to - and will.
On May 28 and June 12, in a double-barreled exercise code-named "Glorious Spartan 08," more than 100 Israeli F-16s and F-15s and air-to-air refueling tankers engaged in exercises over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece, 900 miles from home bases. Greece cooperated in what Athens called joint maneuvers. For Jerusalem, it was a demonstration of Israel's capabilities and readiness to strike Iranian targets.
With French know-how at first, Israel began building a nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. Today, Israel is a major nuclear weapons power with an estimated 200 warheads. But Israel's political leadership, reflecting public opinion, is convinced it is living an existential crisis and that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's extremist threats to snuff out Zionism could destroy the Jewish state with one city-busting weapon in the nose cone of an Iranian missile.
Notwithstanding four unsuccessful Security Council sanction resolutions, and countless juicy carrots spurned by Tehran (including technological and financial assistance for a modern nuclear power industry), diplomats recoil in horror at the mere mention of Iranian and/or American attacks on Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei says any attack on Iran will turn the entire region into a "ball of fire" and he would resign.
But Mr. ElBaradei still talks the talk, if not the walk, when he accuses Iran of holding back information needed to clarify intelligence reports it had secretly researched nuclear bomb-making, concealed from the prying eyes of his inspectors.
Ranking U.S. and European diplomats say there is still plenty of leeway for diplomacy coupled with increased sanctions pressure. They point out that verbal bomb-thrower Mr. Ahmadinejad does not control Iran's nuclear establishment, which is in the hands of Supreme Religious Leader Ali Khamenei, who keeps pledging Iran is not interested in nukes, only nuclear power.
Also encouraging is that one of Mr. Ahmadinejad's bitter political opponents, former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, was recently elected to the powerful position of speaker of Parliament - and may unseat Mr. Ahmadinejad in 2009 elections.
That Iran is a wannabe nuclear weapons power is beyond dispute. A national hero at home for midwifing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal with plans for a uranium enrichment plant stolen from the Netherlands and a villain in the rest of the world for running a black market in nuclear secrets for the benefit of America's enemies, Dr. A.Q. Khan sold weapons secrets to Iran's mullahs beginning 23 years ago. It would be a miracle if Iran, which boasts thousands of scientists and engineers, does not have at least one powerful device in one of its many underground facilities, usually adjacent to population centers.
Three former CentCom four-stars - Anthony Zinni, John Abizaid and William J. Fallon - are on record against bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they favor high-level negotiations with Iran's mullah regime. They believe the aim should be a geopolitical deal whereby Iran allows Iraq to consolidate its pro-Western democracy, reins in Hezbollah and Hamas, the United States restores full diplomatic relations, lifts all economic sanctions - and learns to live with an Iranian bomb. As a sign of peaceful intent, the administration offered to open a consular section in Tehran to facilitate visas for Iranians wishing to visit the United States.
Four of the world's eight nuclear powers - Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India - surround Iran north, west and east. Next to these parvenus, Iran/Persia is the only ancient civilization. Like the shah the mullahs overthrew, Iran is determined to achieve the ultimate badge of power. But then major Arab players - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates - will want it next.
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.
DE BORCHGRAVE: U.S.-Israel moment of truth?
Arnaud de Borchgrave
Monday, June 30, 2008
COMMENTARY:
Israel's message to its only ally, the United States was quite clear. Either President Bush orders military action or Israel will have to strike on its own.
It can't wait till a new U.S. president is sworn in because the new White House tenant could well be Barack Obama. And Mr. Obama almost certainly would not approve an Israeli air strike without first going several extra miles on the U.N. and Western diplomatic track. This could even lead to the kind of rift in Israeli-U.S. relations that occurred when President Eisenhower ordered French, British and Israeli forces out of Egypt in the 1956 Suez War.
America's allies had sprung a strategic deception surprise on the United States by invading Egypt to put the Suez Canal, nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, back under international control. The Soviet Union then ordered Warsaw Pact forces to invade Hungary to suppress an anti-communist revolution.
Thus, the invasion of Suez drained whatever propaganda advantage Eisenhower could have obtained from naked Soviet aggression. Soviet leader Nikita Khruschchev even felt free to rattle his nuclear "rockets" at the United States and took credit for the humiliatingly hurried Franco-British-Israeli withdrawal from Egypt.
The juxtaposition of the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis were two of the most dramatic upheavals in international affairs in the post-World War II era. If Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities while Mr. Bush is still the commander in chief, China and Russia may be tempted to take a page out of Khruschchev's geopolitical playbook and rattle a few threatening economic missiles.
This, in turn, would be designed to get Mr. Obama to disassociate himself from any hostile action Israel might have taken against Iran. And if that didn't elicit the desired result, Iran's formidable asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities would be unleashed throughout the Gulf in particular and the Mideast in general. Iran can also make life hell for U.S. forces in Iraq and NATO forces in Afghanistan. With U.S. consumer confidence already at a 16-year low, oil would quickly skyrocket to $400 or $500 a barrel.
If, on the other hand, Sen. John McCain moves into the White House the afternoon of Jan. 20, he would presumably approve of Israeli bombing raids and Cruise missile strikes against Iran's nascent nuclear weapons capability. There is only thing worse than bombing Iran, Mr. McCain has said, and that is an Iranian nuclear bomb.
Mr. McCain is also privately critical of Mr. Bush's reluctance to cross the border from Iraq into Iran to attack al Quds barracks housing the Revolutionary Guards' Special Forces that smuggled into Iraq a steady stream of IEDs (improvised explosive devices), which kill and maim American soldiers.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen will be in Israel next weekend where he will hear the same simple message: If you don't, we have to - and will.
On May 28 and June 12, in a double-barreled exercise code-named "Glorious Spartan 08," more than 100 Israeli F-16s and F-15s and air-to-air refueling tankers engaged in exercises over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece, 900 miles from home bases. Greece cooperated in what Athens called joint maneuvers. For Jerusalem, it was a demonstration of Israel's capabilities and readiness to strike Iranian targets.
With French know-how at first, Israel began building a nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. Today, Israel is a major nuclear weapons power with an estimated 200 warheads. But Israel's political leadership, reflecting public opinion, is convinced it is living an existential crisis and that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's extremist threats to snuff out Zionism could destroy the Jewish state with one city-busting weapon in the nose cone of an Iranian missile.
Notwithstanding four unsuccessful Security Council sanction resolutions, and countless juicy carrots spurned by Tehran (including technological and financial assistance for a modern nuclear power industry), diplomats recoil in horror at the mere mention of Iranian and/or American attacks on Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei says any attack on Iran will turn the entire region into a "ball of fire" and he would resign.
But Mr. ElBaradei still talks the talk, if not the walk, when he accuses Iran of holding back information needed to clarify intelligence reports it had secretly researched nuclear bomb-making, concealed from the prying eyes of his inspectors.
Ranking U.S. and European diplomats say there is still plenty of leeway for diplomacy coupled with increased sanctions pressure. They point out that verbal bomb-thrower Mr. Ahmadinejad does not control Iran's nuclear establishment, which is in the hands of Supreme Religious Leader Ali Khamenei, who keeps pledging Iran is not interested in nukes, only nuclear power.
Also encouraging is that one of Mr. Ahmadinejad's bitter political opponents, former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, was recently elected to the powerful position of speaker of Parliament - and may unseat Mr. Ahmadinejad in 2009 elections.
That Iran is a wannabe nuclear weapons power is beyond dispute. A national hero at home for midwifing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal with plans for a uranium enrichment plant stolen from the Netherlands and a villain in the rest of the world for running a black market in nuclear secrets for the benefit of America's enemies, Dr. A.Q. Khan sold weapons secrets to Iran's mullahs beginning 23 years ago. It would be a miracle if Iran, which boasts thousands of scientists and engineers, does not have at least one powerful device in one of its many underground facilities, usually adjacent to population centers.
Three former CentCom four-stars - Anthony Zinni, John Abizaid and William J. Fallon - are on record against bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they favor high-level negotiations with Iran's mullah regime. They believe the aim should be a geopolitical deal whereby Iran allows Iraq to consolidate its pro-Western democracy, reins in Hezbollah and Hamas, the United States restores full diplomatic relations, lifts all economic sanctions - and learns to live with an Iranian bomb. As a sign of peaceful intent, the administration offered to open a consular section in Tehran to facilitate visas for Iranians wishing to visit the United States.
Four of the world's eight nuclear powers - Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India - surround Iran north, west and east. Next to these parvenus, Iran/Persia is the only ancient civilization. Like the shah the mullahs overthrew, Iran is determined to achieve the ultimate badge of power. But then major Arab players - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates - will want it next.
Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.
Don't Wait for World War III
Don't Wait for World War III
Act now to stop it! by Justin Raimondo The drumbeat for war with Iran is getting louder. Determined to ensure their success, by hook or by crook, the neoconservatives inside the administration, and their supporters in Israel, have launched a three-front campaign to provoke a confrontation with Tehran.
1. The Blackmail Option: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held a secret meeting recently at his home. Present were top cabinet officials and someone who has plenty of experience of the sort that interests the Israelis at the present moment: Aviam Sela, who headed up Operation Opera, the 1981 air strike against Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility. It was a bold and decisive blow against Israel's mortal enemy, which set the Iraqis back (though it drove them to create an underground program that actually was for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons by the time of the first Gulf War 10 years later). What Olmert wanted to know was whether it could be repeated in the case of Iran.
Yet no one should assume that Israel intends to act alone. An Israeli strike against Iran would be but a prelude to a much wider conflict, one that would invariably draw in Israel's one and only ally – us.
That's why the Israeli propaganda campaign directed at Iran has taken place on American terrain, aimed squarely at American public opinion and American lawmakers. Speaking at a recent AIPAC conference in Washington, Olmert declared:
"Israel will not tolerate the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and neither should any other country in the free world. The Iranian threat must be stopped by all possible means. International economic and political sanctions on Iran, as crucial as they may be, are only an initial step, and must be dramatically increased. … The international community has a duty and responsibility to clarify to Iran, through drastic measures, that the repercussions of their continued pursuit of nuclear weapons will be devastating."
There is no doubt in anyone's mind what "drastic" means, and this was underscored by his deputy prime minister, Shaul Mofaz, who recently averred that an attack on Iran is "unavoidable."
The Israelis, as is well-known, cannot take out the widely dispersed Iranian target sites all by themselves. They need U.S. cruise missiles fired from our ships in the Persian Gulf to take out the entirety of Iran's nuclear assets. The whole point of this stratagem would be to embroil the U.S. in a conflict that would soon take on regional dimensions.
2. The Blockade Option: The Israel lobby is hard at work getting support for a congressional resolution that mandates a naval blockade of Iran. This is now AIPAC's top priority in Washington, and members of Congress from both sides of the aisle have already signed on. The Senate version has attracted 32 cosponsors, while the House version has 220 cosponsors.
The resolution itself is typical AIPAC agitprop: at one point, it says that "the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate reports that the Government of Iran was secretly working on the design and manufacture of a nuclear warhead until at least 2003 and that Iran could have enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon as early as late 2009" – deftly snipping off the conclusion of the NIE that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" and substituting the Israeli assessment that Iran will go nuclear by 2009, which the National Intelligence Council concluded was "very unlikely."
The resolution, while containing boilerplate language to the effect that "nothing in this resolution will be construed as authorizing military action," goes on to demand "that the president lead an international effort to immediately and dramatically increase the pressure on the Government of Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, among other measures, banning the importation of refined petroleum products to Iran."
It is typical Orwellian Newspeak: no military action is "authorized," yet what else would a blockade involve but the use of American military assets to enforce it? This means war – and don't think for a moment that the Israel lobby hasn't got the power to push this war resolution through Congress.
3. The Infiltration Option: Congress has already approved $400 million to destabilize the Iranian regime, the first phase of the administration's war moves against Tehran, and U.S. special-ops teams have been busy. The number of violent incidents inside Iran has recently skyrocketed, and there is little doubt that the U.S. is funding and otherwise assisting terrorist activities within that country. As Seymour Hersh reports:
"The scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials."
The idea of the infiltration option is to coordinate with various minority ethnic groups, such as the Ahwazis and the Baluchis – Sunni fundamentalists of the al-Qaeda stripe who despise the Iranian Shi'ites as heretics – as well as the idiosyncratic Marxist cultists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). The goal is not just to gather intelligence, but also to provoke the regime into initiating a violent reaction. This would increase the likelihood of direct U.S. involvement, as the fighting spills over Iran's borders into Iraq and/or Pakistan.
All three options, working in tandem over the next few months, will be more than enough to provoke the Iranians into some sort of response, which can then be used as a pretext for the Americans to attack.
As in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, there is considerable opposition gathering within U.S. military and diplomatic circles. Hersh reports on a meeting between Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the Democratic caucus in the Senate, during which
"Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush administration staged a preemptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, 'We'll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America.' Gates's comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch, and another senator asked whether Gates was speaking for Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Gates's answer, the senator told me, was 'Let's just say that I'm here speaking for myself.'"
The realists in the administration – foremost among them, the top military brass – know what a disaster war with Iran would soon turn into. It would be an act of self-immolation unprecedented since Nero fiddled while Rome burned. Yet the power of the Israel lobby is formidable, the realists have little political clout, and there isn't much time to stop the momentum for war.
As craven as Barack Obama's recent performance before AIPAC was, the Lobby knows that, as president, he'll be unlikely to launch what would amount to World War III. Shmuel Bar, a former top intelligence officer and Israeli government official who now works as an analyst, recently spoke to the British Guardian:
"What is clear is that the push inside the Israeli establishment for a strike is not being driven by the timetable of Iran's mastery of the technical aspects alone, but by geopolitical considerations. That point was reinforced by Bar last week when he identified a window of opportunity for a strike on Iran – ahead of the November presidential election in the United States which could see Barack Obama take power, and possibly engage with Syria and Iran. An Obama presidency would close that window for Israel, says Bar."
The window of opportunity for the neocons to launch an attack will stay open only as long as this president is in the White House, and the Israelis know it. That's why their propaganda campaign has recently been ratcheted up to new heights of hysteria, and why they're pulling in all their chits in Congress.
The clock is ticking, and the Lobby is moving fast. Will – can – the antiwar movement move with equal speed?
What is needed, first of all, is a decisive defeat for the Lobby on the issue of Senate Resolution 580 (in the House, Congressional Resolution 362). A new war in the Middle East – or anywhere else – is the last thing the majority of Americans want, yet a fanatical and well-positioned minority will prevail if we don't act now. Call your congressional representative today and tell them, politely and calmly, that you are urging a "No!" vote on these concurrent resolutions.
There seems little doubt who and what is motivating this new push for war. Even as "moderate" a commentator as Joe Klein knows that the Lobby is up to its old tricks again, and he is being pilloried for telling the truth. In his Time column, Klein wrote:
"The notion that we could just waltz in and inject democracy into an extremely complicated, devout and ancient culture smacked – still smacks – of neocolonialist legerdemain. The fact that a great many Jewish neoconservatives – people like Joe Lieberman and the crowd over at Commentary – plumped for this war, and now for an even more foolish assault on Iran, raised the question of divided loyalties: using U.S. military power, U.S. lives and money, to make the world safe for Israel."
As I have pointed out in this space many times, the great majority of American Jews oppose this administration's crazed foreign policy, and there would be no antiwar movement of any consequence without their active support. Yet it cannot be denied – as I wrote before a single shot had been fired – that the Iraq war was launched, as Klein notes, to make the Middle East safer for Israel, just as the current push for "regime change" in Iran is energized by the same motive.
This is what it means to be an empire: foreign lobbyists and satraps gather 'round the imperial throne, scheming and plotting to gain the emperor's favor and the privilege of using his praetorians as an instrument to advance their own ends. If it wasn't the Israelis, it would be someone else – perhaps the Brits, as in the two previous world wars. In any case, until and unless we make real changes in our foreign policy – fundamental changes – we'll never get out of this box, and war clouds will loom large on our horizon well into the foreseeable future.
In the meantime, however, we have to make a start, and that means defeating Senate Resolution 580 and House Resolution 362, in what would be a rare setback for the Lobby. Go for it!
http://antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13067
Act now to stop it! by Justin Raimondo The drumbeat for war with Iran is getting louder. Determined to ensure their success, by hook or by crook, the neoconservatives inside the administration, and their supporters in Israel, have launched a three-front campaign to provoke a confrontation with Tehran.
1. The Blackmail Option: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held a secret meeting recently at his home. Present were top cabinet officials and someone who has plenty of experience of the sort that interests the Israelis at the present moment: Aviam Sela, who headed up Operation Opera, the 1981 air strike against Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility. It was a bold and decisive blow against Israel's mortal enemy, which set the Iraqis back (though it drove them to create an underground program that actually was for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons by the time of the first Gulf War 10 years later). What Olmert wanted to know was whether it could be repeated in the case of Iran.
Yet no one should assume that Israel intends to act alone. An Israeli strike against Iran would be but a prelude to a much wider conflict, one that would invariably draw in Israel's one and only ally – us.
That's why the Israeli propaganda campaign directed at Iran has taken place on American terrain, aimed squarely at American public opinion and American lawmakers. Speaking at a recent AIPAC conference in Washington, Olmert declared:
"Israel will not tolerate the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and neither should any other country in the free world. The Iranian threat must be stopped by all possible means. International economic and political sanctions on Iran, as crucial as they may be, are only an initial step, and must be dramatically increased. … The international community has a duty and responsibility to clarify to Iran, through drastic measures, that the repercussions of their continued pursuit of nuclear weapons will be devastating."
There is no doubt in anyone's mind what "drastic" means, and this was underscored by his deputy prime minister, Shaul Mofaz, who recently averred that an attack on Iran is "unavoidable."
The Israelis, as is well-known, cannot take out the widely dispersed Iranian target sites all by themselves. They need U.S. cruise missiles fired from our ships in the Persian Gulf to take out the entirety of Iran's nuclear assets. The whole point of this stratagem would be to embroil the U.S. in a conflict that would soon take on regional dimensions.
2. The Blockade Option: The Israel lobby is hard at work getting support for a congressional resolution that mandates a naval blockade of Iran. This is now AIPAC's top priority in Washington, and members of Congress from both sides of the aisle have already signed on. The Senate version has attracted 32 cosponsors, while the House version has 220 cosponsors.
The resolution itself is typical AIPAC agitprop: at one point, it says that "the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate reports that the Government of Iran was secretly working on the design and manufacture of a nuclear warhead until at least 2003 and that Iran could have enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon as early as late 2009" – deftly snipping off the conclusion of the NIE that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" and substituting the Israeli assessment that Iran will go nuclear by 2009, which the National Intelligence Council concluded was "very unlikely."
The resolution, while containing boilerplate language to the effect that "nothing in this resolution will be construed as authorizing military action," goes on to demand "that the president lead an international effort to immediately and dramatically increase the pressure on the Government of Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, among other measures, banning the importation of refined petroleum products to Iran."
It is typical Orwellian Newspeak: no military action is "authorized," yet what else would a blockade involve but the use of American military assets to enforce it? This means war – and don't think for a moment that the Israel lobby hasn't got the power to push this war resolution through Congress.
3. The Infiltration Option: Congress has already approved $400 million to destabilize the Iranian regime, the first phase of the administration's war moves against Tehran, and U.S. special-ops teams have been busy. The number of violent incidents inside Iran has recently skyrocketed, and there is little doubt that the U.S. is funding and otherwise assisting terrorist activities within that country. As Seymour Hersh reports:
"The scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials."
The idea of the infiltration option is to coordinate with various minority ethnic groups, such as the Ahwazis and the Baluchis – Sunni fundamentalists of the al-Qaeda stripe who despise the Iranian Shi'ites as heretics – as well as the idiosyncratic Marxist cultists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). The goal is not just to gather intelligence, but also to provoke the regime into initiating a violent reaction. This would increase the likelihood of direct U.S. involvement, as the fighting spills over Iran's borders into Iraq and/or Pakistan.
All three options, working in tandem over the next few months, will be more than enough to provoke the Iranians into some sort of response, which can then be used as a pretext for the Americans to attack.
As in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, there is considerable opposition gathering within U.S. military and diplomatic circles. Hersh reports on a meeting between Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the Democratic caucus in the Senate, during which
"Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush administration staged a preemptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, 'We'll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America.' Gates's comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch, and another senator asked whether Gates was speaking for Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Gates's answer, the senator told me, was 'Let's just say that I'm here speaking for myself.'"
The realists in the administration – foremost among them, the top military brass – know what a disaster war with Iran would soon turn into. It would be an act of self-immolation unprecedented since Nero fiddled while Rome burned. Yet the power of the Israel lobby is formidable, the realists have little political clout, and there isn't much time to stop the momentum for war.
As craven as Barack Obama's recent performance before AIPAC was, the Lobby knows that, as president, he'll be unlikely to launch what would amount to World War III. Shmuel Bar, a former top intelligence officer and Israeli government official who now works as an analyst, recently spoke to the British Guardian:
"What is clear is that the push inside the Israeli establishment for a strike is not being driven by the timetable of Iran's mastery of the technical aspects alone, but by geopolitical considerations. That point was reinforced by Bar last week when he identified a window of opportunity for a strike on Iran – ahead of the November presidential election in the United States which could see Barack Obama take power, and possibly engage with Syria and Iran. An Obama presidency would close that window for Israel, says Bar."
The window of opportunity for the neocons to launch an attack will stay open only as long as this president is in the White House, and the Israelis know it. That's why their propaganda campaign has recently been ratcheted up to new heights of hysteria, and why they're pulling in all their chits in Congress.
The clock is ticking, and the Lobby is moving fast. Will – can – the antiwar movement move with equal speed?
What is needed, first of all, is a decisive defeat for the Lobby on the issue of Senate Resolution 580 (in the House, Congressional Resolution 362). A new war in the Middle East – or anywhere else – is the last thing the majority of Americans want, yet a fanatical and well-positioned minority will prevail if we don't act now. Call your congressional representative today and tell them, politely and calmly, that you are urging a "No!" vote on these concurrent resolutions.
There seems little doubt who and what is motivating this new push for war. Even as "moderate" a commentator as Joe Klein knows that the Lobby is up to its old tricks again, and he is being pilloried for telling the truth. In his Time column, Klein wrote:
"The notion that we could just waltz in and inject democracy into an extremely complicated, devout and ancient culture smacked – still smacks – of neocolonialist legerdemain. The fact that a great many Jewish neoconservatives – people like Joe Lieberman and the crowd over at Commentary – plumped for this war, and now for an even more foolish assault on Iran, raised the question of divided loyalties: using U.S. military power, U.S. lives and money, to make the world safe for Israel."
As I have pointed out in this space many times, the great majority of American Jews oppose this administration's crazed foreign policy, and there would be no antiwar movement of any consequence without their active support. Yet it cannot be denied – as I wrote before a single shot had been fired – that the Iraq war was launched, as Klein notes, to make the Middle East safer for Israel, just as the current push for "regime change" in Iran is energized by the same motive.
This is what it means to be an empire: foreign lobbyists and satraps gather 'round the imperial throne, scheming and plotting to gain the emperor's favor and the privilege of using his praetorians as an instrument to advance their own ends. If it wasn't the Israelis, it would be someone else – perhaps the Brits, as in the two previous world wars. In any case, until and unless we make real changes in our foreign policy – fundamental changes – we'll never get out of this box, and war clouds will loom large on our horizon well into the foreseeable future.
In the meantime, however, we have to make a start, and that means defeating Senate Resolution 580 and House Resolution 362, in what would be a rare setback for the Lobby. Go for it!
http://antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13067
Making Progress, Without Uncle Sam
Making Progress, Without Uncle Sam
by Alan Bock
It may be that the phrases "Middle East peace" and "Israeli-Palestinian peace" are classic oxymorons, along the lines of the late George Carlin's example, "military intelligence." Certainly the history of the last several decades, perhaps the last 50 years, suggests that the safest attitude toward whatever is the latest manifestation of hope for peace among Israel and its neighbors is a pessimistic one. Based on the record, you will hardly ever be wrong. And indeed, signs emerged this week that a fragile truce between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has been made more fragile by Qassam rockets heading toward Israel.
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in the last few weeks some tentative moves toward resolving, or at least reducing, some of the many ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have taken place. The remarkable – and remarkably important – fact about all of them is that the United States has played virtually no role in any of them.
Israel and the Islamist group Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, agreed on a truce last week, which would end the rockets rained on the southern Israeli city of Sderot and the Israeli military strikes in Gaza. Unfortunately, rockets were fired into Israel on Tuesday, Israel closed border crossings on Wednesday in retaliation, and a couple more rockets were fired on Thursday. The UN has also claimed that Israel has violated the truce. Still, even though both Hamas and the Israeli government blame the other side for violating the truce, neither is proposing to call off the cease-fire.
After months of turbulence, the factions in Lebanon have reached a tentative political agreement that promises at least a semblance of orderly government. That agreement, brokered by Qatar, was quietly opposed by the U.S., in part because it would increase the formal power of Hezbollah within the Lebanese government. But the parties involved, who have to live in the country and who feared it was on the verge of a civil war – memories of the 1975-1990 have hardly disappeared from Lebanese memory – went ahead anyway.
So Israel on June 18 pushed to open peace negotiations with Lebanon. The Lebanese government immediately rebuffed the idea, but that would be the expected first reaction.
Israel is also negotiating a prisoner exchange with its longtime adversary Hezbollah. And last month Israel announced the resumption of talks with Syria, which have been on hold for eight years.
There are numerous possible explanations for all this activity directed at relative peace, though war-weariness on all sides may be the most important underlying factor. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert faces a growing corruption scandal from which he may be trying to divert attention. Hamas rules Gaza, but continuing the attack-counterattack pattern means ordinary people in Gaza face privation with few hopes for a better future.
Most extraordinary – or perhaps not extraordinary at all, but utterly predictable – is the fact that the United States has not been involved, except very peripherally, in any of these negotiations. For years – decades, really – conventional wisdom has been that progress toward resolving the numerous disputes between Israel and her neighbors can only be made if the United States takes an aggressive leadership role. Every American president since Carter has at least tried to broker an Israeli-Palestinian accord.
But U.S. influence and capabilities in the region have declined considerably since we invaded Iraq. The invasion led not to an increase in U.S. influence but an increase in the effective power of Iran. So without Uncle Sam to handle things, countries in the region are taking matters into their own hands. Egypt brokered the truce between Israel and Hamas. Qatar mediated the Lebanese accord that may have prevented another civil war. Turkey is acting as mediator in Israeli-Syrian preliminary talks.
The waning of American influence is felt in other parts of the region as well. As Leon Hadar reminded me when I spoke on the phone with him recently, we shouldn't be surprised that Saudi Arabia came up with only a token increase in oil production after President Bush personally asked for a little relief. The Saudis are convinced that the Americans destabilized the region with the invasion of Iraq and its disastrous aftermath, and they are particularly concerned about the growing regional strength of Iran, a direct result of the invasion. The U.S. now has much less leverage over the Saudis than it had in times past.
In addition, however much various neocons trumpet the Iraqi government's attack on Moqtada al-Sadr's forces as evidence of the Maliki regime's growing strength as a truly national government, the conflict would likely still be going on, with considerable bloodshed on both sides, if Iran had not intervened to broker a cease-fire. Although the U.S. is the military occupation force in Iraq, Iran has more influence both with the government and with the various Shia militias than the U.S. does.
The U.S. is not completely quiescent. Following the precedent of several previous U.S. presidents – seeking an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the last year of a term, when presidents start to think about their legacies – President Bush announced last December that he expects an Israeli-Palestinian agreement before he leaves office. Of all the initiatives in the region, however, this is the least likely to succeed anytime soon. You might even say that the bizarre combination of pushing for democracy and seeking to enhance U.S. hegemony has failed miserably.
Leon Hadar, whose book Sandstorm is still a good guide to how effectively the U.S. has destabilized the Middle East and includes a good deal of informed discussion on how the various countries in the region operate, thinks most of this activity is occurring because all the countries in the region sense the declining power and influence of the U.S. and are beginning to act in their own interests, knowing the U.S. can do little to stop them. Hadar believes there is deep support in Israel for the initiatives Ehud Olmert is undertaking. Diverting attention from the prime minister's scandals may play a small role in all this flurry of activity, but concern for the regime's survival is a stronger motive. And an increasing number of Israelis see negotiating with their neighbors rather than maintaining a constantly hostile attitude as important for Israel's long-term survival. Living in a garrison state is tiring.
In short, what we are seeing throughout the Middle East represents a gradual declaration of independence from the United States. Unlike denizens of comfortably appointed think tanks in Washington, D.C., those in the region have recent, personal experience of various kinds of conflict. It would be foolish to suggest a region-wide desire for peace, but a certain war-weariness seems to be growing. Even though regional peace may be elusive – and perhaps unlikely – the governments in the Middle East are beginning to move beyond the simplistic categorization of good and evil regimes the Bush administration has tried to impose, and are seeking some kind of modus vivendi with countries who are not leaving the neighborhood.
The lesson? Maybe the United States should stop trying to run the Middle East and let the people who live there handle things. As the next president considers how to leave Iraq as gracefully as possible, he would do well to contemplate reducing American efforts to run the rest of the region. Israel will survive, and the oil-producing countries have plenty of incentive to sell oil – perhaps more of an incentive – without U.S. ships patrolling the Persian Gulf.
Of course, the Middle Eastern countries will make mistakes, and all the initiatives described are fragile at best. But the evidence is that they will do better – indeed they are already doing better – without the precious guidance of the United States.
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=13064
by Alan Bock
It may be that the phrases "Middle East peace" and "Israeli-Palestinian peace" are classic oxymorons, along the lines of the late George Carlin's example, "military intelligence." Certainly the history of the last several decades, perhaps the last 50 years, suggests that the safest attitude toward whatever is the latest manifestation of hope for peace among Israel and its neighbors is a pessimistic one. Based on the record, you will hardly ever be wrong. And indeed, signs emerged this week that a fragile truce between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has been made more fragile by Qassam rockets heading toward Israel.
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in the last few weeks some tentative moves toward resolving, or at least reducing, some of the many ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have taken place. The remarkable – and remarkably important – fact about all of them is that the United States has played virtually no role in any of them.
Israel and the Islamist group Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, agreed on a truce last week, which would end the rockets rained on the southern Israeli city of Sderot and the Israeli military strikes in Gaza. Unfortunately, rockets were fired into Israel on Tuesday, Israel closed border crossings on Wednesday in retaliation, and a couple more rockets were fired on Thursday. The UN has also claimed that Israel has violated the truce. Still, even though both Hamas and the Israeli government blame the other side for violating the truce, neither is proposing to call off the cease-fire.
After months of turbulence, the factions in Lebanon have reached a tentative political agreement that promises at least a semblance of orderly government. That agreement, brokered by Qatar, was quietly opposed by the U.S., in part because it would increase the formal power of Hezbollah within the Lebanese government. But the parties involved, who have to live in the country and who feared it was on the verge of a civil war – memories of the 1975-1990 have hardly disappeared from Lebanese memory – went ahead anyway.
So Israel on June 18 pushed to open peace negotiations with Lebanon. The Lebanese government immediately rebuffed the idea, but that would be the expected first reaction.
Israel is also negotiating a prisoner exchange with its longtime adversary Hezbollah. And last month Israel announced the resumption of talks with Syria, which have been on hold for eight years.
There are numerous possible explanations for all this activity directed at relative peace, though war-weariness on all sides may be the most important underlying factor. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert faces a growing corruption scandal from which he may be trying to divert attention. Hamas rules Gaza, but continuing the attack-counterattack pattern means ordinary people in Gaza face privation with few hopes for a better future.
Most extraordinary – or perhaps not extraordinary at all, but utterly predictable – is the fact that the United States has not been involved, except very peripherally, in any of these negotiations. For years – decades, really – conventional wisdom has been that progress toward resolving the numerous disputes between Israel and her neighbors can only be made if the United States takes an aggressive leadership role. Every American president since Carter has at least tried to broker an Israeli-Palestinian accord.
But U.S. influence and capabilities in the region have declined considerably since we invaded Iraq. The invasion led not to an increase in U.S. influence but an increase in the effective power of Iran. So without Uncle Sam to handle things, countries in the region are taking matters into their own hands. Egypt brokered the truce between Israel and Hamas. Qatar mediated the Lebanese accord that may have prevented another civil war. Turkey is acting as mediator in Israeli-Syrian preliminary talks.
The waning of American influence is felt in other parts of the region as well. As Leon Hadar reminded me when I spoke on the phone with him recently, we shouldn't be surprised that Saudi Arabia came up with only a token increase in oil production after President Bush personally asked for a little relief. The Saudis are convinced that the Americans destabilized the region with the invasion of Iraq and its disastrous aftermath, and they are particularly concerned about the growing regional strength of Iran, a direct result of the invasion. The U.S. now has much less leverage over the Saudis than it had in times past.
In addition, however much various neocons trumpet the Iraqi government's attack on Moqtada al-Sadr's forces as evidence of the Maliki regime's growing strength as a truly national government, the conflict would likely still be going on, with considerable bloodshed on both sides, if Iran had not intervened to broker a cease-fire. Although the U.S. is the military occupation force in Iraq, Iran has more influence both with the government and with the various Shia militias than the U.S. does.
The U.S. is not completely quiescent. Following the precedent of several previous U.S. presidents – seeking an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in the last year of a term, when presidents start to think about their legacies – President Bush announced last December that he expects an Israeli-Palestinian agreement before he leaves office. Of all the initiatives in the region, however, this is the least likely to succeed anytime soon. You might even say that the bizarre combination of pushing for democracy and seeking to enhance U.S. hegemony has failed miserably.
Leon Hadar, whose book Sandstorm is still a good guide to how effectively the U.S. has destabilized the Middle East and includes a good deal of informed discussion on how the various countries in the region operate, thinks most of this activity is occurring because all the countries in the region sense the declining power and influence of the U.S. and are beginning to act in their own interests, knowing the U.S. can do little to stop them. Hadar believes there is deep support in Israel for the initiatives Ehud Olmert is undertaking. Diverting attention from the prime minister's scandals may play a small role in all this flurry of activity, but concern for the regime's survival is a stronger motive. And an increasing number of Israelis see negotiating with their neighbors rather than maintaining a constantly hostile attitude as important for Israel's long-term survival. Living in a garrison state is tiring.
In short, what we are seeing throughout the Middle East represents a gradual declaration of independence from the United States. Unlike denizens of comfortably appointed think tanks in Washington, D.C., those in the region have recent, personal experience of various kinds of conflict. It would be foolish to suggest a region-wide desire for peace, but a certain war-weariness seems to be growing. Even though regional peace may be elusive – and perhaps unlikely – the governments in the Middle East are beginning to move beyond the simplistic categorization of good and evil regimes the Bush administration has tried to impose, and are seeking some kind of modus vivendi with countries who are not leaving the neighborhood.
The lesson? Maybe the United States should stop trying to run the Middle East and let the people who live there handle things. As the next president considers how to leave Iraq as gracefully as possible, he would do well to contemplate reducing American efforts to run the rest of the region. Israel will survive, and the oil-producing countries have plenty of incentive to sell oil – perhaps more of an incentive – without U.S. ships patrolling the Persian Gulf.
Of course, the Middle Eastern countries will make mistakes, and all the initiatives described are fragile at best. But the evidence is that they will do better – indeed they are already doing better – without the precious guidance of the United States.
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=13064
The Urge to Surge by Tom Engelhardt
June 30, 2008
The Urge to Surge
by Tom Engelhardt
TomDispatch
[Note for TomDispatch readers: The following piece offers a picture of the Bush administration's 18-month "surge" in Iraq that, I believe, you'll find nowhere else. Something similar could be said of all the pieces collected in the new book, The World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age of Empire. Collectively, they offer a remarkable sense of what not just TomDispatch.com but the political Internet had to offer that you couldn't – and, to a large extent, still can't – find in the mainstream media. I hope those of you who have followed this site will consider picking up a copy of the book as a gesture of support for the work done here since we came online in December 2002. You may think you're doing TomDispatch a favor (and indeed you are), but open the covers, begin reading, and you'll find that you've done something for yourself as well. Tom]
On March 19, 2003, as his shock-and-awe campaign against Iraq was being launched, George W. Bush addressed the nation. "My fellow citizens," he began, "at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger." We were entering Iraq, he insisted, "with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people."
Within weeks, of course, that "great civilization" was being looted, pillaged, and shipped abroad. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist dictatorship was no more and, soon enough, the Iraqi army of 400,000 had been officially disbanded by L. Paul Bremer, the head of the occupying Coalition Provisional Authority and the president's viceroy in Baghdad. By then, ministry buildings – except for the oil and interior ministries – were just looted shells. Schools, hospitals, museums, libraries, just about everything that was national or meaningful, had been stripped bare. Meanwhile, in their new offices in Saddam's former palaces, America's neoconservative occupiers were already bringing in the administration's crony corporations – Halliburton and its subsidiary KBR, Bechtel, and others – to finish off the job of looting the country under the rubric of "reconstruction." Somehow, these "administrators" managed to "spend" $20 billion of Iraq's oil money, already in the "Development Fund for Iraq," even before the first year of occupation was over – and to no effect whatsoever. They also managed to create what Ed Harriman in the London Review of Books labeled "the least accountable and least transparent regime in the Middle East." (No small trick given the competition.)
Before the Sunni insurgency even had a chance to ramp up in 2003, they were already pouring billions of U.S. tax dollars into what would become their massive military mega-bases meant to last a millennium, and, of course, they were dreaming about opening Iraq's oil industry to the major oil multinationals and to a privatized future as an oil spigot for the West.
On May 1, 2003, six weeks after he had announced his war to the nation and the world, the president landed on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier returning from the Persian Gulf where its planes had just launched 16,500 missions and dropped 1.6 million pounds of ordnance on Iraq. From its flight deck, he spoke triumphantly, against the backdrop of a "Mission Accomplished" banner, assuring Americans that we had "prevailed." "Today," he said, "we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians." In fact, according to Human Rights Watch, the initial shock-and-awe strikes he had ordered killed only civilians, possibly hundreds of them, without touching a single official of Saddam Hussein's "regime."
Who's Counting Now?
Since that first day of "liberation," Iraqis have never stopped dying in prodigious numbers. Now, more than five years after the U.S. "prevailed" with such "precision," a more modest version of the same success story has once again taken the beaches of the mainstream media, if not by storm, then by siege. When it comes to Iraq, the good news is unavoidable. It's in the air. Not victory exactly, but a slow-motion movement toward a "stable" Iraq, a country with which we might be moderately content.
The president's surge – those extra 30,000 ground troops sent into Iraq in the first half of 2007 – has, it is claimed, proven the negativity of all the doubters and critics unwarranted. Indeed, it is now agreed, security conditions have improved significantly and in ways "that few thought likely a year ago."
You already know the story well enough. It turns out that, as in Vietnam many decades ago, the U.S. military is counting like mad. So, for instance, according to the Pentagon, attacks on American and Iraqi troops are down 70 percent compared to June 2007; IED (roadside bomb) attacks have dropped almost 90 percent over the same period; in May, for the first time, fewer Americans died in Iraq than in Afghanistan (where the president's other war, some seven-plus years later, is going poorly indeed); and, above all else, "violence" is down. ("All major indicators of violence in Iraq have dropped by between 40 and 80 percent since February 2007, when President Bush committed an additional 30,000 troops to the war there, the Pentagon reported.")
Think of this as the equivalent of Vietnam's infamous "body count," but in reverse. In a country where the U.S. generally occupies only the land its troops are on, the normal measures of military victory long ago went out the window, so bodies have to stand in. In Vietnam, the question was: How many enemy dead could you tote up? The greater the slaughter, the closer you assumedly were to obliterating the other side (or, at least, its will). As it turned out, by what the grunts dubbed "the Mere Gook Rule" – "If it's dead and it's Vietnamese, it's VC [Vietcong]… " – any body would do in a pinch when it came to the metrics of victory.
In Iraq today, the counting being most widely publicized runs in the opposite direction. Success now can be measured in less deaths; and, by all usual counts, Iraqi deaths have indeed been falling since the height of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing in the early months of 2007. In part, this has occurred because millions of people have already been driven out of their homes and many neighborhoods, especially in the capital, "cleansed." At the same time, in Sunni areas, significant numbers of insurgents have joined the Awakening Movement. They have been paid off by the U.S. military to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq, while, assumedly, biding their time until the American presence ebbs to take on "the Persians" – that is, the Shi'ite (and Kurdish) government embedded in Baghdad's fortified, American-controlled Green Zone.
As a result, cratered Iraq – a land with at least 50 percent unemployment, still lacking decent electricity, potable water, hospitals with drugs (or even doctors, so many having fled), or courts with judges (40 of them having been assassinated and many more injured since 2003) or lawyers, many of whom joined the more than two million Iraqis who have gone into exile – is, today, modestly quieter. But don't be fooled. So many years later, Iraqis are still dying in prodigious numbers, and significant numbers of those dying are doing so at the hands of Americans.
It's not just the family, including possibly four children under the age of 12, who died last week when a U.S. jet blasted their house in Tikrit (after their father, evidently believing thieves were about, fired shots in the air with a U.S. patrol nearby); or the manager and two female employees of a bank at Baghdad International Airport ("three criminals," according to a U.S. military statement) killed when their car was shot up by soldiers from a U.S. convoy; or the unarmed civilian, a relative of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who died in an early morning American raid in the southern town of Janaja; or the men, woman, and child in a car "which failed to stop at a [U.S.] checkpoint on the outskirts of Mosul because, according to a U.S. military statement, the two men were armed and one man inside the car made 'threatening movements'"; or, according to the UN, the estimated 1,000 dead in Baghdad's vast, heavily populated Shi'ite slum of Sadr City, mostly civilians, 60 percent women and children, in fighting in April and May in which U.S. troops and air power played a significant role.
In fact, one great difference between the "liberation" moment of 2003 and the "stabilization" moment of 2008 is simply that what began as "regime change" – missiles and bombs theoretically meant for that Saddamist deck of 55 leadership cards – then developed into a war against a Sunni insurgency, and is now functionally a war against Shi'ites as well. Particularly targeted of late has been the movement headed by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a fierce opponent of the American occupation, who is especially popular among the impoverished Shi'ite masses in Baghdad and southern Iraq. In Shi'ite areas, his party, according to a U.S. intelligence estimate, would probably win upward of 60 percent of the votes in the upcoming provincial elections, if they were fairly conducted. In recent months, the U.S. military in "support" of its Iraqi allies in the Maliki government has fought fierce battles in both the southern oil city of Basra and Sadr City against Sadr's militia, with the usual sizable numbers of civilian casualties.
In other words, despite all the talk about onrushing "stability," looked at another way, the U.S. faces an ever more complicated and spreading, if intermittent, war. With it has gone another, somewhat less publicized kind of body count. Consider, for instance, a small passage from a recent piece by New York Times correspondent Thom Shanker on inter-service rivalries in Iraq. The U.S. Army, he reports, is now ramping up its own air arm (just as it did in the Vietnam era). In the last year, it has launched Task Force ODIN, the name being an acronym for "observe, detect, identify, and neutralize," but also the über-god of Norse mythology (and perhaps a reminder of the godlike attitudes those in the air can develop toward those being "neutralized" on the ground).
With its headquarters at a base near Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's old hometown, the unit consists of only "about 300 people and 25 aircraft." Shanker calls it "a Rube Goldberg collection of surveillance and communications and attack systems, a mash-up of manned and remotely piloted vehicles, commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage, along with attack helicopters and infantry."
Here's the money paragraph of his piece with its triumphalist body count:
"The work of the new aviation battalion was initially kept secret, but Army officials involved in its planning say it has been exceptionally active, using remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in Apache helicopter strikes with missiles and heavy machine gun fire that have killed more than 3,000 adversaries in the last year and led to the capture of almost 150 insurgent leaders."
We have no idea how that figure of more than 3,000 dead Iraqis was gathered (given that we're talking about an air unit), or what percentage of those dead were actually civilians, but certainly some among them died in the recent fighting in heavily populated Sadr City. In any case, consider that number for a moment: One modest-sized Army air unit/one year = 3,000+ dead Iraqis.
Now, consider that the Air Force in Iraq in that same year, according to Shanker, "quadrupled its number of sorties and increased its bombing tenfold." Consider that significant numbers of those sorties have been over heavily populated cities, or that, according to the Washington Post, between late March and late May, more than 200 powerful Hellfire missiles were fired into Baghdad (mainly, undoubtedly, into the Sadr City area); or that the unmanned aerial vehicles, the Predator (armed with two Hellfire missiles) and the larger, far more deadly Reaper (armed with up to 14 of those missiles), carried out, according to Shanker, 64 and 32 attacks, respectively, in Iraq and Afghanistan between the beginning of March and June.
And we're not even considering here U.S. military operations on the ground in Basra earlier in the year (special forces units were sent into the city when the Iraqi military and police seemed to be buckling), or in campaigns in Sunni or mixed areas to the north of Baghdad, or simply in ongoing everyday operations. Although individual body counts are now regularly announced for specific operations (not the case in the early years in Iraq), who knows what the overall carnage amounts to. One thing can be said, however: The pacification campaign in Iraq really hasn't flagged since the Sunni insurgency gained strength in late 2003. Reformulated by Gen. David Petraeus in 2007, it's just the sort of effort that occupying Great Powers have long been known to apply to rebellious possessions.
Iraq as a Surge-athon
To fully assess just what lurks beneath the "good news" from Iraq, including those 3,000 "adversaries" that Task Force ODIN "neutralized," we would have to do a different kind of counting of which we're incapable, not because no one's doing it, but because we have minimal access to the numbers. Let me try, however, to outline briefly some of what can be known – and then you can judge the good news for yourself.
American troop strength in Iraq now stands at about 146,000. That's perhaps 16,000 more than in January 2007 just before the surge began. It's also about 16,000 more than in April 2003 when Baghdad was taken. According to Lolita Baldor of the Associated Press, the latest Pentagon plans are to order about 30,000 U.S. troops into Iraq in 2009, which would keep troop levels at or above that 140,000 mark.
In addition, a vast force of private contractors, armed and unarmed, is in the country. There is no way to know how many of these hired hands and hired guns are actually there, but it's a reasonable guess that they add up to more – possibly substantially more – than the troops on hand.
Since February 2007 in the U.S., only one "surge" has been discussed, almost nonstop – those 30,000 ground troops the president ordered largely into the Baghdad area. A surprising number of other surges have, however, been underway, even if barely noted in the U.S. These add up to a remarkable Bush administration urge to surge that puts American policy in Iraq in quite a different light.
Among these surges, for instance, has been a political surge of U.S. "advisers" and "mentors" to the Iraqi government, police, and military. In another of his superb reports for the New York Review of Books, "Embedded in Iraq," Michael Massing says that the main elements of this "little known political surge … were spelled out in a classified 'Joint Campaign Plan' completed in May 2007." It represented, he writes, a "sharp expansion."
"Specialists from Treasury and Justice, Commerce and Agriculture were assigned to government ministries to help draw up budgets and weed out sectarian elements. The Agency for International Development and the Army Corps of Engineers set up projects to boost nutrition and reinforce dams. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were stationed in Baghdad and elsewhere to help repair infrastructure, improve water and electrical systems, and stimulate the economy."
We know as well that American advisers are now deeply involved with local government bodies in contested areas; that American advisers, evidently hired from private contractors, are embedded in the key interior, defense, and oil ministries; that advisers, also hired from private contractors, are helping the Iraqi police and that a new multi-year contract with DynCorp International, which already has 700 civilian police advisers in the country, will raise that number above 800. Their mission: "to advise, train and mentor the Iraqi Police Service, Ministry of Interior, and Department of Border Enforcement."
In this period, even academics have surged into Iraq as the military has embedded anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists from the "Human Terrain System" in military units to advise on local customs and "cultural understanding." One of them, a political scientist completing her Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University, was recently killed in a bombing in Sadr City.
We know that more than 20,000 Iraqis are now in two U.S. prisons, Camp Bucca in the south of the country and state-of-the-art Camp Copper on the outskirts of Baghdad. Both of these have been continually upgraded. In this period, though, it seems that a surge in prison building (and assumedly prisoners) has also been underway. The Washington Post's Walter Pincus reports that a new "Theater Internment Facility Reconciliation Center" – i.e., prison – is being built near Camp Taji, 12 miles north of Baghdad. A "new contract calls for providing food for 'up to 5,000 detainees' [there] and will also cover 150 Iraqi nationals, who apparently will work at the facility." Another "reconciliation center" is to be opened at Ramadi in al-Anbar province.
All of this is, again, being done through private contractors, including a contract for some company to "guard" the "property" of up to 60,000 Iraqi detainees. ("The contracted personnel will be responsible for the accountability, inventory, and storage of all property.") This, reports Sharon Weinberger of Wired's Danger Room blog, is evidently in anticipation of a "surge of approximately 15,000 detainees in the upcoming six months."
In addition, the Iraqi military, with its embedded American advisers, remains almost totally dependent on the U.S. military. According to a recent Government Accountability Office report, based on "a classified study of Iraqi army battalions," just 10 percent of them "are capable of operating independently in counterinsurgency operations and that even then they rely on American support." For logistics, planning, supplies – almost everything that makes a military function – the Iraqi military relies on the U.S. military and would be helpless without it.
More than five years after Baghdad fell, there still is no real Iraqi air force. The Iraqi military now depends ever more on the quick and constant application of American air power – and U.S. air power in the region has surged in the last year and a half. The use of drones like the Predator and Reaper, whose pilots are stationed at Nellis Air Force Base outside Las Vegas and other distant spots, has also surged, doubling since the beginning of 2007. Meanwhile, new machines, including a "platoon" of 30 of the Army's experimental Micro Air Vehicles, which can hover "in one place [and] … stare down with 'electro-optical and infrared cameras,'" are being rushed into action in Iraq, which is increasingly a laboratory for the testing of the latest U.S. weaponry.
In addition, for unknown billions of dollars, the upgrading of American bases in that country, especially the mega-bases, continues, while possibly the largest embassy on the planet, a vast citadel inside Baghdad's fortified Green Zone meant to house 1,000 "diplomats" (and large numbers of guards and support staff of every sort), is nearly finished.
Finally, among the various surges of these last 18 months, there has been a surge in Bush administration demands for an American future in Iraq. In ongoing negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement, U.S. negotiators have demanded access to nearly 60 bases, control of Iraqi air space to 29,000 feet, the right to arrest Iraqis without explanation or permission, the right to bring troops into and out of the country without permission or notification, the right to launch operations on the same basis, and immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts for Americans.
In other words, wherever you might have looked over the last year or more, a surge-athon was under way. It was meant to solidify the American position in Iraq for the long term as an occupying power. Not withdrawing or drawing down, but ramping up has been the order of the day, no matter what was being debated, discussed, or written about in the United States.
That ramping up makes some sense of the "good news" and "stability" of this moment. Among other things, it's hardly surprising that weakly armed guerrilla forces (whether Shi'ite or Sunni), when faced with such a display of power, have no desire to take it on frontally.
Given the situation of Iraq more than five years after the invasion, to speak of this urge to surge and its results as "success" or as "good news" is essentially obscene. Think of Iraq instead as a cocked gun. It's loaded, it's held to your head, and things are improving only to the extent that, recently, it hasn't gone off.
Iraq itself is wreckage beyond anything that could have been imagined back in March 2003; liberation is, by now, a black joke; the Bush administration's "benchmarks" for Iraqi success remain largely unmet, and still we keep "liberating" that land, still we keep killing Iraqis in prodigious numbers. A Vietnam-style body count, once banned by an administration that wanted no reminders of the last disastrous American counterinsurgency war, is now back with a vengeance, even if violence is down. These days, in its statements, the U.S. military is counting scalps almost everywhere there's fighting in Iraq.
A Great Lie of History
"We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people." This was one of the great lies of history. And all the while, the price of oil – the one product Iraq has and, in present conditions, can't get at adequately – continues to soar. There is no "good news" in any of this, unless you happen to be an undertaker, nor is there any end to it in sight.
Of the political surge in Iraq – all those advisers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams pouring into the country – Michael Massing has written bluntly: "[I]t has been an utter failure. 'Dysfunctional' is how one visiting adviser described it, citing bitter inter-agency battles, micromanagement from Washington, and an acute mismatch between the skills of the advisers and the needs of the Iraqi government."
The same could be said – and someday undoubtedly will be said – of the rest of the U.S. effort, including the much lauded recent counterinsurgency part of it.
So let me offer this bit of advice. When you read the news, skip the "good" part. The figures demonstrating "improvement" may (or may not) be perfectly real, but they also represent an effort to dominate (as well as divide and conquer) in an essentially colonial fashion; worse yet, it's an effort barely held together by baling wire and reliant on the destruction of ever more Iraqi neighborhoods.
If you want a prediction, here it is and it couldn't be simpler: This cannot end well. Not for Washington. Not for the U.S. military. Not for Americans. And, above all, not for Iraqis.
Copyright 2008 Tom Engelhardt
The Urge to Surge
by Tom Engelhardt
TomDispatch
[Note for TomDispatch readers: The following piece offers a picture of the Bush administration's 18-month "surge" in Iraq that, I believe, you'll find nowhere else. Something similar could be said of all the pieces collected in the new book, The World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age of Empire. Collectively, they offer a remarkable sense of what not just TomDispatch.com but the political Internet had to offer that you couldn't – and, to a large extent, still can't – find in the mainstream media. I hope those of you who have followed this site will consider picking up a copy of the book as a gesture of support for the work done here since we came online in December 2002. You may think you're doing TomDispatch a favor (and indeed you are), but open the covers, begin reading, and you'll find that you've done something for yourself as well. Tom]
On March 19, 2003, as his shock-and-awe campaign against Iraq was being launched, George W. Bush addressed the nation. "My fellow citizens," he began, "at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger." We were entering Iraq, he insisted, "with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people."
Within weeks, of course, that "great civilization" was being looted, pillaged, and shipped abroad. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist dictatorship was no more and, soon enough, the Iraqi army of 400,000 had been officially disbanded by L. Paul Bremer, the head of the occupying Coalition Provisional Authority and the president's viceroy in Baghdad. By then, ministry buildings – except for the oil and interior ministries – were just looted shells. Schools, hospitals, museums, libraries, just about everything that was national or meaningful, had been stripped bare. Meanwhile, in their new offices in Saddam's former palaces, America's neoconservative occupiers were already bringing in the administration's crony corporations – Halliburton and its subsidiary KBR, Bechtel, and others – to finish off the job of looting the country under the rubric of "reconstruction." Somehow, these "administrators" managed to "spend" $20 billion of Iraq's oil money, already in the "Development Fund for Iraq," even before the first year of occupation was over – and to no effect whatsoever. They also managed to create what Ed Harriman in the London Review of Books labeled "the least accountable and least transparent regime in the Middle East." (No small trick given the competition.)
Before the Sunni insurgency even had a chance to ramp up in 2003, they were already pouring billions of U.S. tax dollars into what would become their massive military mega-bases meant to last a millennium, and, of course, they were dreaming about opening Iraq's oil industry to the major oil multinationals and to a privatized future as an oil spigot for the West.
On May 1, 2003, six weeks after he had announced his war to the nation and the world, the president landed on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier returning from the Persian Gulf where its planes had just launched 16,500 missions and dropped 1.6 million pounds of ordnance on Iraq. From its flight deck, he spoke triumphantly, against the backdrop of a "Mission Accomplished" banner, assuring Americans that we had "prevailed." "Today," he said, "we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians." In fact, according to Human Rights Watch, the initial shock-and-awe strikes he had ordered killed only civilians, possibly hundreds of them, without touching a single official of Saddam Hussein's "regime."
Who's Counting Now?
Since that first day of "liberation," Iraqis have never stopped dying in prodigious numbers. Now, more than five years after the U.S. "prevailed" with such "precision," a more modest version of the same success story has once again taken the beaches of the mainstream media, if not by storm, then by siege. When it comes to Iraq, the good news is unavoidable. It's in the air. Not victory exactly, but a slow-motion movement toward a "stable" Iraq, a country with which we might be moderately content.
The president's surge – those extra 30,000 ground troops sent into Iraq in the first half of 2007 – has, it is claimed, proven the negativity of all the doubters and critics unwarranted. Indeed, it is now agreed, security conditions have improved significantly and in ways "that few thought likely a year ago."
You already know the story well enough. It turns out that, as in Vietnam many decades ago, the U.S. military is counting like mad. So, for instance, according to the Pentagon, attacks on American and Iraqi troops are down 70 percent compared to June 2007; IED (roadside bomb) attacks have dropped almost 90 percent over the same period; in May, for the first time, fewer Americans died in Iraq than in Afghanistan (where the president's other war, some seven-plus years later, is going poorly indeed); and, above all else, "violence" is down. ("All major indicators of violence in Iraq have dropped by between 40 and 80 percent since February 2007, when President Bush committed an additional 30,000 troops to the war there, the Pentagon reported.")
Think of this as the equivalent of Vietnam's infamous "body count," but in reverse. In a country where the U.S. generally occupies only the land its troops are on, the normal measures of military victory long ago went out the window, so bodies have to stand in. In Vietnam, the question was: How many enemy dead could you tote up? The greater the slaughter, the closer you assumedly were to obliterating the other side (or, at least, its will). As it turned out, by what the grunts dubbed "the Mere Gook Rule" – "If it's dead and it's Vietnamese, it's VC [Vietcong]… " – any body would do in a pinch when it came to the metrics of victory.
In Iraq today, the counting being most widely publicized runs in the opposite direction. Success now can be measured in less deaths; and, by all usual counts, Iraqi deaths have indeed been falling since the height of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing in the early months of 2007. In part, this has occurred because millions of people have already been driven out of their homes and many neighborhoods, especially in the capital, "cleansed." At the same time, in Sunni areas, significant numbers of insurgents have joined the Awakening Movement. They have been paid off by the U.S. military to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq, while, assumedly, biding their time until the American presence ebbs to take on "the Persians" – that is, the Shi'ite (and Kurdish) government embedded in Baghdad's fortified, American-controlled Green Zone.
As a result, cratered Iraq – a land with at least 50 percent unemployment, still lacking decent electricity, potable water, hospitals with drugs (or even doctors, so many having fled), or courts with judges (40 of them having been assassinated and many more injured since 2003) or lawyers, many of whom joined the more than two million Iraqis who have gone into exile – is, today, modestly quieter. But don't be fooled. So many years later, Iraqis are still dying in prodigious numbers, and significant numbers of those dying are doing so at the hands of Americans.
It's not just the family, including possibly four children under the age of 12, who died last week when a U.S. jet blasted their house in Tikrit (after their father, evidently believing thieves were about, fired shots in the air with a U.S. patrol nearby); or the manager and two female employees of a bank at Baghdad International Airport ("three criminals," according to a U.S. military statement) killed when their car was shot up by soldiers from a U.S. convoy; or the unarmed civilian, a relative of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who died in an early morning American raid in the southern town of Janaja; or the men, woman, and child in a car "which failed to stop at a [U.S.] checkpoint on the outskirts of Mosul because, according to a U.S. military statement, the two men were armed and one man inside the car made 'threatening movements'"; or, according to the UN, the estimated 1,000 dead in Baghdad's vast, heavily populated Shi'ite slum of Sadr City, mostly civilians, 60 percent women and children, in fighting in April and May in which U.S. troops and air power played a significant role.
In fact, one great difference between the "liberation" moment of 2003 and the "stabilization" moment of 2008 is simply that what began as "regime change" – missiles and bombs theoretically meant for that Saddamist deck of 55 leadership cards – then developed into a war against a Sunni insurgency, and is now functionally a war against Shi'ites as well. Particularly targeted of late has been the movement headed by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a fierce opponent of the American occupation, who is especially popular among the impoverished Shi'ite masses in Baghdad and southern Iraq. In Shi'ite areas, his party, according to a U.S. intelligence estimate, would probably win upward of 60 percent of the votes in the upcoming provincial elections, if they were fairly conducted. In recent months, the U.S. military in "support" of its Iraqi allies in the Maliki government has fought fierce battles in both the southern oil city of Basra and Sadr City against Sadr's militia, with the usual sizable numbers of civilian casualties.
In other words, despite all the talk about onrushing "stability," looked at another way, the U.S. faces an ever more complicated and spreading, if intermittent, war. With it has gone another, somewhat less publicized kind of body count. Consider, for instance, a small passage from a recent piece by New York Times correspondent Thom Shanker on inter-service rivalries in Iraq. The U.S. Army, he reports, is now ramping up its own air arm (just as it did in the Vietnam era). In the last year, it has launched Task Force ODIN, the name being an acronym for "observe, detect, identify, and neutralize," but also the über-god of Norse mythology (and perhaps a reminder of the godlike attitudes those in the air can develop toward those being "neutralized" on the ground).
With its headquarters at a base near Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's old hometown, the unit consists of only "about 300 people and 25 aircraft." Shanker calls it "a Rube Goldberg collection of surveillance and communications and attack systems, a mash-up of manned and remotely piloted vehicles, commercial aircraft with high-tech infrared sensors strapped to the fuselage, along with attack helicopters and infantry."
Here's the money paragraph of his piece with its triumphalist body count:
"The work of the new aviation battalion was initially kept secret, but Army officials involved in its planning say it has been exceptionally active, using remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in Apache helicopter strikes with missiles and heavy machine gun fire that have killed more than 3,000 adversaries in the last year and led to the capture of almost 150 insurgent leaders."
We have no idea how that figure of more than 3,000 dead Iraqis was gathered (given that we're talking about an air unit), or what percentage of those dead were actually civilians, but certainly some among them died in the recent fighting in heavily populated Sadr City. In any case, consider that number for a moment: One modest-sized Army air unit/one year = 3,000+ dead Iraqis.
Now, consider that the Air Force in Iraq in that same year, according to Shanker, "quadrupled its number of sorties and increased its bombing tenfold." Consider that significant numbers of those sorties have been over heavily populated cities, or that, according to the Washington Post, between late March and late May, more than 200 powerful Hellfire missiles were fired into Baghdad (mainly, undoubtedly, into the Sadr City area); or that the unmanned aerial vehicles, the Predator (armed with two Hellfire missiles) and the larger, far more deadly Reaper (armed with up to 14 of those missiles), carried out, according to Shanker, 64 and 32 attacks, respectively, in Iraq and Afghanistan between the beginning of March and June.
And we're not even considering here U.S. military operations on the ground in Basra earlier in the year (special forces units were sent into the city when the Iraqi military and police seemed to be buckling), or in campaigns in Sunni or mixed areas to the north of Baghdad, or simply in ongoing everyday operations. Although individual body counts are now regularly announced for specific operations (not the case in the early years in Iraq), who knows what the overall carnage amounts to. One thing can be said, however: The pacification campaign in Iraq really hasn't flagged since the Sunni insurgency gained strength in late 2003. Reformulated by Gen. David Petraeus in 2007, it's just the sort of effort that occupying Great Powers have long been known to apply to rebellious possessions.
Iraq as a Surge-athon
To fully assess just what lurks beneath the "good news" from Iraq, including those 3,000 "adversaries" that Task Force ODIN "neutralized," we would have to do a different kind of counting of which we're incapable, not because no one's doing it, but because we have minimal access to the numbers. Let me try, however, to outline briefly some of what can be known – and then you can judge the good news for yourself.
American troop strength in Iraq now stands at about 146,000. That's perhaps 16,000 more than in January 2007 just before the surge began. It's also about 16,000 more than in April 2003 when Baghdad was taken. According to Lolita Baldor of the Associated Press, the latest Pentagon plans are to order about 30,000 U.S. troops into Iraq in 2009, which would keep troop levels at or above that 140,000 mark.
In addition, a vast force of private contractors, armed and unarmed, is in the country. There is no way to know how many of these hired hands and hired guns are actually there, but it's a reasonable guess that they add up to more – possibly substantially more – than the troops on hand.
Since February 2007 in the U.S., only one "surge" has been discussed, almost nonstop – those 30,000 ground troops the president ordered largely into the Baghdad area. A surprising number of other surges have, however, been underway, even if barely noted in the U.S. These add up to a remarkable Bush administration urge to surge that puts American policy in Iraq in quite a different light.
Among these surges, for instance, has been a political surge of U.S. "advisers" and "mentors" to the Iraqi government, police, and military. In another of his superb reports for the New York Review of Books, "Embedded in Iraq," Michael Massing says that the main elements of this "little known political surge … were spelled out in a classified 'Joint Campaign Plan' completed in May 2007." It represented, he writes, a "sharp expansion."
"Specialists from Treasury and Justice, Commerce and Agriculture were assigned to government ministries to help draw up budgets and weed out sectarian elements. The Agency for International Development and the Army Corps of Engineers set up projects to boost nutrition and reinforce dams. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were stationed in Baghdad and elsewhere to help repair infrastructure, improve water and electrical systems, and stimulate the economy."
We know as well that American advisers are now deeply involved with local government bodies in contested areas; that American advisers, evidently hired from private contractors, are embedded in the key interior, defense, and oil ministries; that advisers, also hired from private contractors, are helping the Iraqi police and that a new multi-year contract with DynCorp International, which already has 700 civilian police advisers in the country, will raise that number above 800. Their mission: "to advise, train and mentor the Iraqi Police Service, Ministry of Interior, and Department of Border Enforcement."
In this period, even academics have surged into Iraq as the military has embedded anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists from the "Human Terrain System" in military units to advise on local customs and "cultural understanding." One of them, a political scientist completing her Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University, was recently killed in a bombing in Sadr City.
We know that more than 20,000 Iraqis are now in two U.S. prisons, Camp Bucca in the south of the country and state-of-the-art Camp Copper on the outskirts of Baghdad. Both of these have been continually upgraded. In this period, though, it seems that a surge in prison building (and assumedly prisoners) has also been underway. The Washington Post's Walter Pincus reports that a new "Theater Internment Facility Reconciliation Center" – i.e., prison – is being built near Camp Taji, 12 miles north of Baghdad. A "new contract calls for providing food for 'up to 5,000 detainees' [there] and will also cover 150 Iraqi nationals, who apparently will work at the facility." Another "reconciliation center" is to be opened at Ramadi in al-Anbar province.
All of this is, again, being done through private contractors, including a contract for some company to "guard" the "property" of up to 60,000 Iraqi detainees. ("The contracted personnel will be responsible for the accountability, inventory, and storage of all property.") This, reports Sharon Weinberger of Wired's Danger Room blog, is evidently in anticipation of a "surge of approximately 15,000 detainees in the upcoming six months."
In addition, the Iraqi military, with its embedded American advisers, remains almost totally dependent on the U.S. military. According to a recent Government Accountability Office report, based on "a classified study of Iraqi army battalions," just 10 percent of them "are capable of operating independently in counterinsurgency operations and that even then they rely on American support." For logistics, planning, supplies – almost everything that makes a military function – the Iraqi military relies on the U.S. military and would be helpless without it.
More than five years after Baghdad fell, there still is no real Iraqi air force. The Iraqi military now depends ever more on the quick and constant application of American air power – and U.S. air power in the region has surged in the last year and a half. The use of drones like the Predator and Reaper, whose pilots are stationed at Nellis Air Force Base outside Las Vegas and other distant spots, has also surged, doubling since the beginning of 2007. Meanwhile, new machines, including a "platoon" of 30 of the Army's experimental Micro Air Vehicles, which can hover "in one place [and] … stare down with 'electro-optical and infrared cameras,'" are being rushed into action in Iraq, which is increasingly a laboratory for the testing of the latest U.S. weaponry.
In addition, for unknown billions of dollars, the upgrading of American bases in that country, especially the mega-bases, continues, while possibly the largest embassy on the planet, a vast citadel inside Baghdad's fortified Green Zone meant to house 1,000 "diplomats" (and large numbers of guards and support staff of every sort), is nearly finished.
Finally, among the various surges of these last 18 months, there has been a surge in Bush administration demands for an American future in Iraq. In ongoing negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement, U.S. negotiators have demanded access to nearly 60 bases, control of Iraqi air space to 29,000 feet, the right to arrest Iraqis without explanation or permission, the right to bring troops into and out of the country without permission or notification, the right to launch operations on the same basis, and immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts for Americans.
In other words, wherever you might have looked over the last year or more, a surge-athon was under way. It was meant to solidify the American position in Iraq for the long term as an occupying power. Not withdrawing or drawing down, but ramping up has been the order of the day, no matter what was being debated, discussed, or written about in the United States.
That ramping up makes some sense of the "good news" and "stability" of this moment. Among other things, it's hardly surprising that weakly armed guerrilla forces (whether Shi'ite or Sunni), when faced with such a display of power, have no desire to take it on frontally.
Given the situation of Iraq more than five years after the invasion, to speak of this urge to surge and its results as "success" or as "good news" is essentially obscene. Think of Iraq instead as a cocked gun. It's loaded, it's held to your head, and things are improving only to the extent that, recently, it hasn't gone off.
Iraq itself is wreckage beyond anything that could have been imagined back in March 2003; liberation is, by now, a black joke; the Bush administration's "benchmarks" for Iraqi success remain largely unmet, and still we keep "liberating" that land, still we keep killing Iraqis in prodigious numbers. A Vietnam-style body count, once banned by an administration that wanted no reminders of the last disastrous American counterinsurgency war, is now back with a vengeance, even if violence is down. These days, in its statements, the U.S. military is counting scalps almost everywhere there's fighting in Iraq.
A Great Lie of History
"We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people." This was one of the great lies of history. And all the while, the price of oil – the one product Iraq has and, in present conditions, can't get at adequately – continues to soar. There is no "good news" in any of this, unless you happen to be an undertaker, nor is there any end to it in sight.
Of the political surge in Iraq – all those advisers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams pouring into the country – Michael Massing has written bluntly: "[I]t has been an utter failure. 'Dysfunctional' is how one visiting adviser described it, citing bitter inter-agency battles, micromanagement from Washington, and an acute mismatch between the skills of the advisers and the needs of the Iraqi government."
The same could be said – and someday undoubtedly will be said – of the rest of the U.S. effort, including the much lauded recent counterinsurgency part of it.
So let me offer this bit of advice. When you read the news, skip the "good" part. The figures demonstrating "improvement" may (or may not) be perfectly real, but they also represent an effort to dominate (as well as divide and conquer) in an essentially colonial fashion; worse yet, it's an effort barely held together by baling wire and reliant on the destruction of ever more Iraqi neighborhoods.
If you want a prediction, here it is and it couldn't be simpler: This cannot end well. Not for Washington. Not for the U.S. military. Not for Americans. And, above all, not for Iraqis.
Copyright 2008 Tom Engelhardt
US Advised Iraqi Ministry on Oil Deals - Andrew Kramer, New York Times
US Advised Iraqi Ministry on Oil Deals - Andrew Kramer, New York Times
A group of American advisers led by a small State Department team played an integral part in drawing up contracts between the Iraqi government and five major Western oil companies to develop some of the largest fields in Iraq, American officials say. The disclosure, coming on the eve of the contracts’ announcement, is the first confirmation of direct involvement by the Bush administration in deals to open Iraq’s oil to commercial development and is likely to stoke criticism.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/middleeast/30contract.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin
A group of American advisers led by a small State Department team played an integral part in drawing up contracts between the Iraqi government and five major Western oil companies to develop some of the largest fields in Iraq, American officials say. The disclosure, coming on the eve of the contracts’ announcement, is the first confirmation of direct involvement by the Bush administration in deals to open Iraq’s oil to commercial development and is likely to stoke criticism.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/middleeast/30contract.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin
US to Expand Covert Operations in Iran - Joby Warrick, Washington Post
US to Expand Covert Operations in Iran - Joby Warrick, Washington Post
The Bush administration told Congress last year of a secret plan to dramatically expand covert operations inside Iran as part of a long-running effort to destabilize the country's ruling regime, according to a report published yesterday. The plan allowed up to $400 million in covert spending for activities ranging from spying on Iran's nuclear program to supporting rebel groups opposed to the country's ruling clerics, veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker magazine.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901881.html
The Bush administration told Congress last year of a secret plan to dramatically expand covert operations inside Iran as part of a long-running effort to destabilize the country's ruling regime, according to a report published yesterday. The plan allowed up to $400 million in covert spending for activities ranging from spying on Iran's nuclear program to supporting rebel groups opposed to the country's ruling clerics, veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker magazine.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901881.html
Sunday, June 29, 2008
Annals of National Security Preparing the Battlefield
The New Yorker
Annals of National Security
Preparing the Battlefield
The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.
by Seymour M. Hersh July 7, 2008
Operations outside the knowledge and control of commanders have eroded
Operations outside the knowledge and control of commanders have eroded "the coherence of military strategy," one general says.
L ate last year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush, and are designed to destabilize the country's religious leadership. The covert activities involve support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations. They also include gathering intelligence about Iran's suspected nuclear-weapons program.
Clandestine operations against Iran are not new. United States Special Operations Forces have been conducting cross-border operations from southern Iraq, with Presidential authorization, since last year. These have included seizing members of Al Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, and the pursuit of "high-value targets" in the President's war on terror, who may be captured or killed. But the scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials. Many of these activities are not specified in the new Finding, and some congressional leaders have had serious questions about their nature.
Under federal law, a Presidential Finding, which is highly classified, must be issued when a covert intelligence operation gets under way and, at a minimum, must be made known to Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and the Senate and to the ranking members of their respective intelligence committees—the so-called Gang of Eight. Money for the operation can then be reprogrammed from previous appropriations, as needed, by the relevant congressional committees, which also can be briefed.
"The Finding was focussed on undermining Iran's nuclear ambitions and trying to undermine the government through regime change," a person familiar with its contents said, and involved "working with opposition groups and passing money." The Finding provided for a whole new range of activities in southern Iran and in the areas, in the east, where Baluchi political opposition is strong, he said.
Although some legislators were troubled by aspects of the Finding, and "there was a significant amount of high-level discussion" about it, according to the source familiar with it, the funding for the escalation was approved. In other words, some members of the Democratic leadership—Congress has been under Democratic control since the 2006 elections—were willing, in secret, to go along with the Administration in expanding covert activities directed at Iran, while the Party's presumptive candidate for President, Barack Obama, has said that he favors direct talks and diplomacy.
The request for funding came in the same period in which the Administration was coming to terms with a National Intelligence Estimate, released in December, that concluded that Iran had halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003. The Administration downplayed the significance of the N.I.E., and, while saying that it was committed to diplomacy, continued to emphasize that urgent action was essential to counter the Iranian nuclear threat. President Bush questioned the N.I.E.'s conclusions, and senior national-security officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, made similar statements. (So did Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican Presidential nominee.) Meanwhile, the Administration also revived charges that the Iranian leadership has been involved in the killing of American soldiers in Iraq: both directly, by dispatching commando units into Iraq, and indirectly, by supplying materials used for roadside bombs and other lethal goods. (There have been questions about the accuracy of the claims; the Times, among others, has reported that "significant uncertainties remain about the extent of that involvement.")
Military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon share the White House's concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but there is disagreement about whether a military strike is the right solution. Some Pentagon officials believe, as they have let Congress and the media know, that bombing Iran is not a viable response to the nuclear-proliferation issue, and that more diplomacy is necessary.
A Democratic senator told me that, late last year, in an off-the-record lunch meeting, Secretary of Defense Gates met with the Democratic caucus in the Senate. (Such meetings are held regularly.) Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush Administration staged a preëmptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, "We'll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America." Gates's comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch, and another senator asked whether Gates was speaking for Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. Gates's answer, the senator told me, was "Let's just say that I'm here speaking for myself." (A spokesman for Gates confirmed that he discussed the consequences of a strike at the meeting, but would not address what he said, other than to dispute the senator's characterization.)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman is Admiral Mike Mullen, were "pushing back very hard" against White House pressure to undertake a military strike against Iran, the person familiar with the Finding told me. Similarly, a Pentagon consultant who is involved in the war on terror said that "at least ten senior flag and general officers, including combatant commanders"—the four-star officers who direct military operations around the world—"have weighed in on that issue."
The most outspoken of those officers is Admiral William Fallon, who until recently was the head of U.S. Central Command, and thus in charge of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March, Fallon resigned under pressure, after giving a series of interviews stating his reservations about an armed attack on Iran. For example, late last year he told the Financial Times that the "real objective" of U.S. policy was to change the Iranians' behavior, and that "attacking them as a means to get to that spot strikes me as being not the first choice."
Admiral Fallon acknowledged, when I spoke to him in June, that he had heard that there were people in the White House who were upset by his public statements. "Too many people believe you have to be either for or against the Iranians," he told me. "Let's get serious. Eighty million people live there, and everyone's an individual. The idea that they're only one way or another is nonsense."
When it came to the Iraq war, Fallon said, "Did I bitch about some of the things that were being proposed? You bet. Some of them were very stupid."
The Democratic leadership's agreement to commit hundreds of millions of dollars for more secret operations in Iran was remarkable, given the general concerns of officials like Gates, Fallon, and many others. "The oversight process has not kept pace—it's been coöpted" by the Administration, the person familiar with the contents of the Finding said. "The process is broken, and this is dangerous stuff we're authorizing."
Senior Democrats in Congress told me that they had concerns about the possibility that their understanding of what the new operations entail differs from the White House's. One issue has to do with a reference in the Finding, the person familiar with it recalled, to potential defensive lethal action by U.S. operatives in Iran. (In early May, the journalist Andrew Cockburn published elements of the Finding in Counterpunch, a newsletter and online magazine.)
The language was inserted into the Finding at the urging of the C.I.A., a former senior intelligence official said. The covert operations set forth in the Finding essentially run parallel to those of a secret military task force, now operating in Iran, that is under the control of JSOC. Under the Bush Administration's interpretation of the law, clandestine military activities, unlike covert C.I.A. operations, do not need to be depicted in a Finding, because the President has a constitutional right to command combat forces in the field without congressional interference. But the borders between operations are not always clear: in Iran, C.I.A. agents and regional assets have the language skills and the local knowledge to make contacts for the JSOC operatives, and have been working with them to direct personnel, matériel, and money into Iran from an obscure base in western Afghanistan. As a result, Congress has been given only a partial view of how the money it authorized may be used. One of JSOC's task-force missions, the pursuit of "high-value targets," was not directly addressed in the Finding. There is a growing realization among some legislators that the Bush Administration, in recent years, has conflated what is an intelligence operation and what is a military one in order to avoid fully informing Congress about what it is doing.
"This is a big deal," the person familiar with the Finding said. "The C.I.A. needed the Finding to do its traditional stuff, but the Finding does not apply to JSOC. The President signed an Executive Order after September 11th giving the Pentagon license to do things that it had never been able to do before without notifying Congress. The claim was that the military was 'preparing the battle space,' and by using that term they were able to circumvent congressional oversight. Everything is justified in terms of fighting the global war on terror." He added, "The Administration has been fuzzing the lines; there used to be a shade of gray"—between operations that had to be briefed to the senior congressional leadership and those which did not—"but now it's a shade of mush."
"The agency says we're not going to get in the position of helping to kill people without a Finding," the former senior intelligence official told me. He was referring to the legal threat confronting some agency operatives for their involvement in the rendition and alleged torture of suspects in the war on terror. "This drove the military people up the wall," he said. As far as the C.I.A. was concerned, the former senior intelligence official said, "the over-all authorization includes killing, but it's not as though that's what they're setting out to do. It's about gathering information, enlisting support." The Finding sent to Congress was a compromise, providing legal cover for the C.I.A. while referring to the use of lethal force in ambiguous terms.
The defensive-lethal language led some Democrats, according to congressional sources familiar with their views, to call in the director of the C.I.A., Air Force General Michael V. Hayden, for a special briefing. Hayden reassured the legislators that the language did nothing more than provide authority for Special Forces operatives on the ground in Iran to shoot their way out if they faced capture or harm.
The legislators were far from convinced. One congressman subsequently wrote a personal letter to President Bush insisting that "no lethal action, period" had been authorized within Iran's borders. As of June, he had received no answer.
Members of Congress have expressed skepticism in the past about the information provided by the White House. On March 15, 2005, David Obey, then the ranking Democrat on the Republican-led House Appropriations Committee, announced that he was putting aside an amendment that he had intended to offer that day, and that would have cut off all funding for national-intelligence programs unless the President agreed to keep Congress fully informed about clandestine military activities undertaken in the war on terror. He had changed his mind, he said, because the White House promised better coöperation. "The Executive Branch understands that we are not trying to dictate what they do," he said in a floor speech at the time. "We are simply trying to see to it that what they do is consistent with American values and will not get the country in trouble."
Obey declined to comment on the specifics of the operations in Iran, but he did tell me that the White House reneged on its promise to consult more fully with Congress. He said, "I suspect there's something going on, but I don't know what to believe. Cheney has always wanted to go after Iran, and if he had more time he'd find a way to do it. We still don't get enough information from the agencies, and I have very little confidence that they give us information on the edge."
None of the four Democrats in the Gang of Eight—Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, and House Intelligence Committee chairman Silvestre Reyes—would comment on the Finding, with some noting that it was highly classified. An aide to one member of the Democratic leadership responded, on his behalf, by pointing to the limitations of the Gang of Eight process. The notification of a Finding, the aide said, "is just that—notification, and not a sign-off on activities. Proper oversight of ongoing intelligence activities is done by fully briefing the members of the intelligence committee." However, Congress does have the means to challenge the White House once it has been sent a Finding. It has the power to withhold funding for any government operation. The members of the House and Senate Democratic leadership who have access to the Finding can also, if they choose to do so, and if they have shared concerns, come up with ways to exert their influence on Administration policy. (A spokesman for the C.I.A. said, "As a rule, we don't comment one way or the other on allegations of covert activities or purported findings." The White House also declined to comment.)
A member of the House Appropriations Committee acknowledged that, even with a Democratic victory in November, "it will take another year before we get the intelligence activities under control." He went on, "We control the money and they can't do anything without the money. Money is what it's all about. But I'm very leery of this Administration." He added, "This Administration has been so secretive."
One irony of Admiral Fallon's departure is that he was, in many areas, in agreement with President Bush on the threat posed by Iran. They had a good working relationship, Fallon told me, and, when he ran CENTCOM, were in regular communication. On March 4th, a week before his resignation, Fallon testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying that he was "encouraged" about the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regarding the role played by Iran's leaders, he said, "They've been absolutely unhelpful, very damaging, and I absolutely don't condone any of their activities. And I have yet to see anything since I've been in this job in the way of a public action by Iran that's been at all helpful in this region."
Fallon made it clear in our conversations that he considered it inappropriate to comment publicly about the President, the Vice-President, or Special Operations. But he said he had heard that people in the White House had been "struggling" with his views on Iran. "When I arrived at CENTCOM, the Iranians were funding every entity inside Iraq. It was in their interest to get us out, and so they decided to kill as many Americans as they could. And why not? They didn't know who'd come out ahead, but they wanted us out. I decided that I couldn't resolve the situation in Iraq without the neighborhood. To get this problem in Iraq solved, we had to somehow involve Iran and Syria. I had to work the neighborhood."
Fallon told me that his focus had been not on the Iranian nuclear issue, or on regime change there, but on "putting out the fires in Iraq." There were constant discussions in Washington and in the field about how to engage Iran and, on the subject of the bombing option, Fallon said, he believed that "it would happen only if the Iranians did something stupid."
Fallon's early retirement, however, appears to have been provoked not only by his negative comments about bombing Iran but also by his strong belief in the chain of command and his insistence on being informed about Special Operations in his area of responsibility. One of Fallon's defenders is retired Marine General John J. (Jack) Sheehan, whose last assignment was as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, where Fallon was a deputy. Last year, Sheehan rejected a White House offer to become the President's "czar" for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "One of the reasons the White House selected Fallon for CENTCOM was that he's known to be a strategic thinker and had demonstrated those skills in the Pacific," Sheehan told me. (Fallon served as commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific from 2005 to 2007.) "He was charged with coming up with an over-all coherent strategy for Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and, by law, the combatant commander is responsible for all military operations within his A.O."—area of operations. "That was not happening," Sheehan said. "When Fallon tried to make sense of all the overt and covert activity conducted by the military in his area of responsibility, a small group in the White House leadership shut him out."
The law cited by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chain of command: from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White House and the uniformed military.
"The coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue civilian influence and direction of nonconventional military operations," Sheehan said. "If you have small groups planning and conducting military operations outside the knowledge and control of the combatant commander, by default you can't have a coherent military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstruction efforts in Iraq."
Admiral Fallon, who is known as Fox, was aware that he would face special difficulties as the first Navy officer to lead CENTCOM, which had always been headed by a ground commander, one of his military colleagues told me. He was also aware that the Special Operations community would be a concern. "Fox said that there's a lot of strange stuff going on in Special Ops, and I told him he had to figure out what they were really doing," Fallon's colleague said. "The Special Ops guys eventually figured out they needed Fox, and so they began to talk to him. Fox would have won his fight with Special Ops but for Cheney."
The Pentagon consultant said, "Fallon went down because, in his own way, he was trying to prevent a war with Iran, and you have to admire him for that."
In recent months, according to the Iranian media, there has been a surge in violence in Iran; it is impossible at this early stage, however, to credit JSOC or C.I.A. activities, or to assess their impact on the Iranian leadership. The Iranian press reports are being carefully monitored by retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, who has taught strategy at the National War College and now conducts war games centered on Iran for the federal government, think tanks, and universities. The Iranian press "is very open in describing the killings going on inside the country," Gardiner said. It is, he said, "a controlled press, which makes it more important that it publishes these things. We begin to see inside the government." He added, "Hardly a day goes by now we don't see a clash somewhere. There were three or four incidents over a recent weekend, and the Iranians are even naming the Revolutionary Guard officers who have been killed."
Earlier this year, a militant Ahwazi group claimed to have assassinated a Revolutionary Guard colonel, and the Iranian government acknowledged that an explosion in a cultural center in Shiraz, in the southern part of the country, which killed at least twelve people and injured more than two hundred, had been a terrorist act and not, as it earlier insisted, an accident. It could not be learned whether there has been American involvement in any specific incident in Iran, but, according to Gardiner, the Iranians have begun publicly blaming the U.S., Great Britain, and, more recently, the C.I.A. for some incidents. The agency was involved in a coup in Iran in 1953, and its support for the unpopular regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—who was overthrown in 1979—was condemned for years by the ruling mullahs in Tehran, to great effect. "This is the ultimate for the Iranians—to blame the C.I.A.," Gardiner said. "This is new, and it's an escalation—a ratcheting up of tensions. It rallies support for the regime and shows the people that there is a continuing threat from the 'Great Satan.' " In Gardiner's view, the violence, rather than weakening Iran's religious government, may generate support for it.
Many of the activities may be being carried out by dissidents in Iran, and not by Americans in the field. One problem with "passing money" (to use the term of the person familiar with the Finding) in a covert setting is that it is hard to control where the money goes and whom it benefits. Nonetheless, the former senior intelligence official said, "We've got exposure, because of the transfer of our weapons and our communications gear. The Iranians will be able to make the argument that the opposition was inspired by the Americans. How many times have we tried this without asking the right questions? Is the risk worth it?" One possible consequence of these operations would be a violent Iranian crackdown on one of the dissident groups, which could give the Bush Administration a reason to intervene.
A strategy of using ethnic minorities to undermine Iran is flawed, according to Vali Nasr, who teaches international politics at Tufts University and is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Just because Lebanon, Iraq, and Pakistan have ethnic problems, it does not mean that Iran is suffering from the same issue," Nasr told me. "Iran is an old country—like France and Germany—and its citizens are just as nationalistic. The U.S. is overestimating ethnic tension in Iran." The minority groups that the U.S. is reaching out to are either well integrated or small and marginal, without much influence on the government or much ability to present a political challenge, Nasr said. "You can always find some activist groups that will go and kill a policeman, but working with the minorities will backfire, and alienate the majority of the population."
The Administration may have been willing to rely on dissident organizations in Iran even when there was reason to believe that the groups had operated against American interests in the past. The use of Baluchi elements, for example, is problematic, Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. clandestine officer who worked for nearly two decades in South Asia and the Middle East, told me. "The Baluchis are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as Al Qaeda," Baer told me. "These are guys who cut off the heads of nonbelievers—in this case, it's Shiite Iranians. The irony is that we're once again working with Sunni fundamentalists, just as we did in Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties." Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is considered one of the leading planners of the September 11th attacks, are Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists.
One of the most active and violent anti-regime groups in Iran today is the Jundallah, also known as the Iranian People's Resistance Movement, which describes itself as a resistance force fighting for the rights of Sunnis in Iran. "This is a vicious Salafi organization whose followers attended the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists," Nasr told me. "They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture." The Jundallah took responsibility for the bombing of a busload of Revolutionary Guard soldiers in February, 2007. At least eleven Guard members were killed. According to Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support.
The C.I.A. and Special Operations communities also have long-standing ties to two other dissident groups in Iran: the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, known in the West as the M.E.K., and a Kurdish separatist group, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, or PJAK.
The M.E.K. has been on the State Department's terrorist list for more than a decade, yet in recent years the group has received arms and intelligence, directly or indirectly, from the United States. Some of the newly authorized covert funds, the Pentagon consultant told me, may well end up in M.E.K. coffers. "The new task force will work with the M.E.K. The Administration is desperate for results." He added, "The M.E.K. has no C.P.A. auditing the books, and its leaders are thought to have been lining their pockets for years. If people only knew what the M.E.K. is getting, and how much is going to its bank accounts—and yet it is almost useless for the purposes the Administration intends."
The Kurdish party, PJAK, which has also been reported to be covertly supported by the United States, has been operating against Iran from bases in northern Iraq for at least three years. (Iran, like Iraq and Turkey, has a Kurdish minority, and PJAK and other groups have sought self-rule in territory that is now part of each of those countries.) In recent weeks, according to Sam Gardiner, the military strategist, there has been a marked increase in the number of PJAK armed engagements with Iranians and terrorist attacks on Iranian targets. In early June, the news agency Fars reported that a dozen PJAK members and four Iranian border guards were killed in a clash near the Iraq border; a similar attack in May killed three Revolutionary Guards and nine PJAK fighters. PJAK has also subjected Turkey, a member of NATO, to repeated terrorist attacks, and reports of American support for the group have been a source of friction between the two governments.
Gardiner also mentioned a trip that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, made to Tehran in June. After his return, Maliki announced that his government would ban any contact between foreigners and the M.E.K.—a slap at the U.S.'s dealings with the group. Maliki declared that Iraq was not willing to be a staging ground for covert operations against other countries. This was a sign, Gardiner said, of "Maliki's increasingly choosing the interests of Iraq over the interests of the United States." In terms of U.S. allegations of Iranian involvement in the killing of American soldiers, he said, "Maliki was unwilling to play the blame-Iran game." Gardiner added that Pakistan had just agreed to turn over a Jundallah leader to the Iranian government. America's covert operations, he said, "seem to be harming relations with the governments of both Iraq and Pakistan and could well be strengthening the connection between Tehran and Baghdad."
The White House's reliance on questionable operatives, and on plans involving possible lethal action inside Iran, has created anger as well as anxiety within the Special Operations and intelligence communities. JSOC's operations in Iran are believed to be modelled on a program that has, with some success, used surrogates to target the Taliban leadership in the tribal territories of Waziristan, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the situations in Waziristan and Iran are not comparable.
In Waziristan, "the program works because it's small and smart guys are running it," the former senior intelligence official told me. "It's being executed by professionals. The N.S.A., the C.I.A., and the D.I.A."—the Defense Intelligence Agency—"are right in there with the Special Forces and Pakistani intelligence, and they're dealing with serious bad guys." He added, "We have to be really careful in calling in the missiles. We have to hit certain houses at certain times. The people on the ground are watching through binoculars a few hundred yards away and calling specific locations, in latitude and longitude. We keep the Predator loitering until the targets go into a house, and we have to make sure our guys are far enough away so they don't get hit." One of the most prominent victims of the program, the former official said, was Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior Taliban commander, who was killed on January 31st, reportedly in a missile strike that also killed eleven other people.
A dispatch published on March 26th by the Washington Post reported on the increasing number of successful strikes against Taliban and other insurgent units in Pakistan's tribal areas. A follow-up article noted that, in response, the Taliban had killed "dozens of people" suspected of providing information to the United States and its allies on the whereabouts of Taliban leaders. Many of the victims were thought to be American spies, and their executions—a beheading, in one case—were videotaped and distributed by DVD as a warning to others.
It is not simple to replicate the program in Iran. "Everybody's arguing about the high-value-target list," the former senior intelligence official said. "The Special Ops guys are pissed off because Cheney's office set up priorities for categories of targets, and now he's getting impatient and applying pressure for results. But it takes a long time to get the right guys in place."
The Pentagon consultant told me, "We've had wonderful results in the Horn of Africa with the use of surrogates and false flags—basic counterintelligence and counter-insurgency tactics. And we're beginning to tie them in knots in Afghanistan. But the White House is going to kill the program if they use it to go after Iran. It's one thing to engage in selective strikes and assassinations in Waziristan and another in Iran. The White House believes that one size fits all, but the legal issues surrounding extrajudicial killings in Waziristan are less of a problem because Al Qaeda and the Taliban cross the border into Afghanistan and back again, often with U.S. and NATO forces in hot pursuit. The situation is not nearly as clear in the Iranian case. All the considerations—judicial, strategic, and political—are different in Iran."
He added, "There is huge opposition inside the intelligence community to the idea of waging a covert war inside Iran, and using Baluchis and Ahwazis as surrogates. The leaders of our Special Operations community all have remarkable physical courage, but they are less likely to voice their opposition to policy. Iran is not Waziristan."
A Gallup poll taken last November, before the N.I.E. was made public, found that seventy-three per cent of those surveyed thought that the United States should use economic action and diplomacy to stop Iran's nuclear program, while only eighteen per cent favored direct military action. Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to endorse a military strike. Weariness with the war in Iraq has undoubtedly affected the public's tolerance for an attack on Iran. This mood could change quickly, however. The potential for escalation became clear in early January, when five Iranian patrol boats, believed to be under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, made a series of aggressive moves toward three Navy warships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz. Initial reports of the incident made public by the Pentagon press office said that the Iranians had transmitted threats, over ship-to-ship radio, to "explode" the American ships. At a White House news conference, the President, on the day he left for an eight-day trip to the Middle East, called the incident "provocative" and "dangerous," and there was, very briefly, a sense of crisis and of outrage at Iran. "TWO MINUTES FROM WAR" was the headline in one British newspaper.
The crisis was quickly defused by Vice-Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, the commander of U.S. naval forces in the region. No warning shots were fired, the Admiral told the Pentagon press corps on January 7th, via teleconference from his headquarters, in Bahrain. "Yes, it's more serious than we have seen, but, to put it in context, we do interact with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and their Navy regularly," Cosgriff said. "I didn't get the sense from the reports I was receiving that there was a sense of being afraid of these five boats."
Admiral Cosgriff's caution was well founded: within a week, the Pentagon acknowledged that it could not positively identify the Iranian boats as the source of the ominous radio transmission, and press reports suggested that it had instead come from a prankster long known for sending fake messages in the region. Nonetheless, Cosgriff's demeanor angered Cheney, according to the former senior intelligence official. But a lesson was learned in the incident: The public had supported the idea of retaliation, and was even asking why the U.S. didn't do more. The former official said that, a few weeks later, a meeting took place in the Vice-President's office. "The subject was how to create a casus belli between Tehran and Washington," he said.
In June, President Bush went on a farewell tour of Europe. He had tea with Queen Elizabeth II and dinner with Nicolas Sarkozy and Carla Bruni, the President and First Lady of France. The serious business was conducted out of sight, and involved a series of meetings on a new diplomatic effort to persuade the Iranians to halt their uranium-enrichment program. (Iran argues that its enrichment program is for civilian purposes and is legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Secretary of State Rice had been involved with developing a new package of incentives. But the Administration's essential negotiating position seemed unchanged: talks could not take place until Iran halted the program. The Iranians have repeatedly and categorically rejected that precondition, leaving the diplomatic situation in a stalemate; they have not yet formally responded to the new incentives.
The continuing impasse alarms many observers. Joschka Fischer, the former German Foreign Minister, recently wrote in a syndicated column that it may not "be possible to freeze the Iranian nuclear program for the duration of the negotiations to avoid a military confrontation before they are completed. Should this newest attempt fail, things will soon get serious. Deadly serious." When I spoke to him last week, Fischer, who has extensive contacts in the diplomatic community, said that the latest European approach includes a new element: the willingness of the U.S. and the Europeans to accept something less than a complete cessation of enrichment as an intermediate step. "The proposal says that the Iranians must stop manufacturing new centrifuges and the other side will stop all further sanction activities in the U.N. Security Council," Fischer said, although Iran would still have to freeze its enrichment activities when formal negotiations begin. "This could be acceptable to the Iranians—if they have good will."
The big question, Fischer added, is in Washington. "I think the Americans are deeply divided on the issue of what to do about Iran," he said. "Some officials are concerned about the fallout from a military attack and others think an attack is unavoidable. I know the Europeans, but I have no idea where the Americans will end up on this issue."
There is another complication: American Presidential politics. Barack Obama has said that, if elected, he would begin talks with Iran with no "self-defeating" preconditions (although only after diplomatic groundwork had been laid). That position has been vigorously criticized by John McCain. The Washington Post recently quoted Randy Scheunemann, the McCain campaign's national-security director, as stating that McCain supports the White House's position, and that the program be suspended before talks begin. What Obama is proposing, Scheunemann said, "is unilateral cowboy summitry."
Scheunemann, who is known as a neoconservative, is also the McCain campaign's most important channel of communication with the White House. He is a friend of David Addington, Dick Cheney's chief of staff. I have heard differing accounts of Scheunemann's influence with McCain; though some close to the McCain campaign talk about him as a possible national-security adviser, others say he is someone who isn't taken seriously while "telling Cheney and others what they want to hear," as a senior McCain adviser put it.
It is not known whether McCain, who is the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been formally briefed on the operations in Iran. At the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, in June, Obama repeated his plea for "tough and principled diplomacy." But he also said, along with McCain, that he would keep the threat of military action against Iran on the table. ♦
ILLUSTRATION: GUY BILLOUT
Annals of National Security
Preparing the Battlefield
The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.
by Seymour M. Hersh July 7, 2008
Operations outside the knowledge and control of commanders have eroded
Operations outside the knowledge and control of commanders have eroded "the coherence of military strategy," one general says.
L ate last year, Congress agreed to a request from President Bush to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, according to current and former military, intelligence, and congressional sources. These operations, for which the President sought up to four hundred million dollars, were described in a Presidential Finding signed by Bush, and are designed to destabilize the country's religious leadership. The covert activities involve support of the minority Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations. They also include gathering intelligence about Iran's suspected nuclear-weapons program.
Clandestine operations against Iran are not new. United States Special Operations Forces have been conducting cross-border operations from southern Iraq, with Presidential authorization, since last year. These have included seizing members of Al Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, and the pursuit of "high-value targets" in the President's war on terror, who may be captured or killed. But the scale and the scope of the operations in Iran, which involve the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), have now been significantly expanded, according to the current and former officials. Many of these activities are not specified in the new Finding, and some congressional leaders have had serious questions about their nature.
Under federal law, a Presidential Finding, which is highly classified, must be issued when a covert intelligence operation gets under way and, at a minimum, must be made known to Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and the Senate and to the ranking members of their respective intelligence committees—the so-called Gang of Eight. Money for the operation can then be reprogrammed from previous appropriations, as needed, by the relevant congressional committees, which also can be briefed.
"The Finding was focussed on undermining Iran's nuclear ambitions and trying to undermine the government through regime change," a person familiar with its contents said, and involved "working with opposition groups and passing money." The Finding provided for a whole new range of activities in southern Iran and in the areas, in the east, where Baluchi political opposition is strong, he said.
Although some legislators were troubled by aspects of the Finding, and "there was a significant amount of high-level discussion" about it, according to the source familiar with it, the funding for the escalation was approved. In other words, some members of the Democratic leadership—Congress has been under Democratic control since the 2006 elections—were willing, in secret, to go along with the Administration in expanding covert activities directed at Iran, while the Party's presumptive candidate for President, Barack Obama, has said that he favors direct talks and diplomacy.
The request for funding came in the same period in which the Administration was coming to terms with a National Intelligence Estimate, released in December, that concluded that Iran had halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003. The Administration downplayed the significance of the N.I.E., and, while saying that it was committed to diplomacy, continued to emphasize that urgent action was essential to counter the Iranian nuclear threat. President Bush questioned the N.I.E.'s conclusions, and senior national-security officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, made similar statements. (So did Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican Presidential nominee.) Meanwhile, the Administration also revived charges that the Iranian leadership has been involved in the killing of American soldiers in Iraq: both directly, by dispatching commando units into Iraq, and indirectly, by supplying materials used for roadside bombs and other lethal goods. (There have been questions about the accuracy of the claims; the Times, among others, has reported that "significant uncertainties remain about the extent of that involvement.")
Military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon share the White House's concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but there is disagreement about whether a military strike is the right solution. Some Pentagon officials believe, as they have let Congress and the media know, that bombing Iran is not a viable response to the nuclear-proliferation issue, and that more diplomacy is necessary.
A Democratic senator told me that, late last year, in an off-the-record lunch meeting, Secretary of Defense Gates met with the Democratic caucus in the Senate. (Such meetings are held regularly.) Gates warned of the consequences if the Bush Administration staged a preëmptive strike on Iran, saying, as the senator recalled, "We'll create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America." Gates's comments stunned the Democrats at the lunch, and another senator asked whether Gates was speaking for Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. Gates's answer, the senator told me, was "Let's just say that I'm here speaking for myself." (A spokesman for Gates confirmed that he discussed the consequences of a strike at the meeting, but would not address what he said, other than to dispute the senator's characterization.)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose chairman is Admiral Mike Mullen, were "pushing back very hard" against White House pressure to undertake a military strike against Iran, the person familiar with the Finding told me. Similarly, a Pentagon consultant who is involved in the war on terror said that "at least ten senior flag and general officers, including combatant commanders"—the four-star officers who direct military operations around the world—"have weighed in on that issue."
The most outspoken of those officers is Admiral William Fallon, who until recently was the head of U.S. Central Command, and thus in charge of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March, Fallon resigned under pressure, after giving a series of interviews stating his reservations about an armed attack on Iran. For example, late last year he told the Financial Times that the "real objective" of U.S. policy was to change the Iranians' behavior, and that "attacking them as a means to get to that spot strikes me as being not the first choice."
Admiral Fallon acknowledged, when I spoke to him in June, that he had heard that there were people in the White House who were upset by his public statements. "Too many people believe you have to be either for or against the Iranians," he told me. "Let's get serious. Eighty million people live there, and everyone's an individual. The idea that they're only one way or another is nonsense."
When it came to the Iraq war, Fallon said, "Did I bitch about some of the things that were being proposed? You bet. Some of them were very stupid."
The Democratic leadership's agreement to commit hundreds of millions of dollars for more secret operations in Iran was remarkable, given the general concerns of officials like Gates, Fallon, and many others. "The oversight process has not kept pace—it's been coöpted" by the Administration, the person familiar with the contents of the Finding said. "The process is broken, and this is dangerous stuff we're authorizing."
Senior Democrats in Congress told me that they had concerns about the possibility that their understanding of what the new operations entail differs from the White House's. One issue has to do with a reference in the Finding, the person familiar with it recalled, to potential defensive lethal action by U.S. operatives in Iran. (In early May, the journalist Andrew Cockburn published elements of the Finding in Counterpunch, a newsletter and online magazine.)
The language was inserted into the Finding at the urging of the C.I.A., a former senior intelligence official said. The covert operations set forth in the Finding essentially run parallel to those of a secret military task force, now operating in Iran, that is under the control of JSOC. Under the Bush Administration's interpretation of the law, clandestine military activities, unlike covert C.I.A. operations, do not need to be depicted in a Finding, because the President has a constitutional right to command combat forces in the field without congressional interference. But the borders between operations are not always clear: in Iran, C.I.A. agents and regional assets have the language skills and the local knowledge to make contacts for the JSOC operatives, and have been working with them to direct personnel, matériel, and money into Iran from an obscure base in western Afghanistan. As a result, Congress has been given only a partial view of how the money it authorized may be used. One of JSOC's task-force missions, the pursuit of "high-value targets," was not directly addressed in the Finding. There is a growing realization among some legislators that the Bush Administration, in recent years, has conflated what is an intelligence operation and what is a military one in order to avoid fully informing Congress about what it is doing.
"This is a big deal," the person familiar with the Finding said. "The C.I.A. needed the Finding to do its traditional stuff, but the Finding does not apply to JSOC. The President signed an Executive Order after September 11th giving the Pentagon license to do things that it had never been able to do before without notifying Congress. The claim was that the military was 'preparing the battle space,' and by using that term they were able to circumvent congressional oversight. Everything is justified in terms of fighting the global war on terror." He added, "The Administration has been fuzzing the lines; there used to be a shade of gray"—between operations that had to be briefed to the senior congressional leadership and those which did not—"but now it's a shade of mush."
"The agency says we're not going to get in the position of helping to kill people without a Finding," the former senior intelligence official told me. He was referring to the legal threat confronting some agency operatives for their involvement in the rendition and alleged torture of suspects in the war on terror. "This drove the military people up the wall," he said. As far as the C.I.A. was concerned, the former senior intelligence official said, "the over-all authorization includes killing, but it's not as though that's what they're setting out to do. It's about gathering information, enlisting support." The Finding sent to Congress was a compromise, providing legal cover for the C.I.A. while referring to the use of lethal force in ambiguous terms.
The defensive-lethal language led some Democrats, according to congressional sources familiar with their views, to call in the director of the C.I.A., Air Force General Michael V. Hayden, for a special briefing. Hayden reassured the legislators that the language did nothing more than provide authority for Special Forces operatives on the ground in Iran to shoot their way out if they faced capture or harm.
The legislators were far from convinced. One congressman subsequently wrote a personal letter to President Bush insisting that "no lethal action, period" had been authorized within Iran's borders. As of June, he had received no answer.
Members of Congress have expressed skepticism in the past about the information provided by the White House. On March 15, 2005, David Obey, then the ranking Democrat on the Republican-led House Appropriations Committee, announced that he was putting aside an amendment that he had intended to offer that day, and that would have cut off all funding for national-intelligence programs unless the President agreed to keep Congress fully informed about clandestine military activities undertaken in the war on terror. He had changed his mind, he said, because the White House promised better coöperation. "The Executive Branch understands that we are not trying to dictate what they do," he said in a floor speech at the time. "We are simply trying to see to it that what they do is consistent with American values and will not get the country in trouble."
Obey declined to comment on the specifics of the operations in Iran, but he did tell me that the White House reneged on its promise to consult more fully with Congress. He said, "I suspect there's something going on, but I don't know what to believe. Cheney has always wanted to go after Iran, and if he had more time he'd find a way to do it. We still don't get enough information from the agencies, and I have very little confidence that they give us information on the edge."
None of the four Democrats in the Gang of Eight—Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, and House Intelligence Committee chairman Silvestre Reyes—would comment on the Finding, with some noting that it was highly classified. An aide to one member of the Democratic leadership responded, on his behalf, by pointing to the limitations of the Gang of Eight process. The notification of a Finding, the aide said, "is just that—notification, and not a sign-off on activities. Proper oversight of ongoing intelligence activities is done by fully briefing the members of the intelligence committee." However, Congress does have the means to challenge the White House once it has been sent a Finding. It has the power to withhold funding for any government operation. The members of the House and Senate Democratic leadership who have access to the Finding can also, if they choose to do so, and if they have shared concerns, come up with ways to exert their influence on Administration policy. (A spokesman for the C.I.A. said, "As a rule, we don't comment one way or the other on allegations of covert activities or purported findings." The White House also declined to comment.)
A member of the House Appropriations Committee acknowledged that, even with a Democratic victory in November, "it will take another year before we get the intelligence activities under control." He went on, "We control the money and they can't do anything without the money. Money is what it's all about. But I'm very leery of this Administration." He added, "This Administration has been so secretive."
One irony of Admiral Fallon's departure is that he was, in many areas, in agreement with President Bush on the threat posed by Iran. They had a good working relationship, Fallon told me, and, when he ran CENTCOM, were in regular communication. On March 4th, a week before his resignation, Fallon testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying that he was "encouraged" about the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regarding the role played by Iran's leaders, he said, "They've been absolutely unhelpful, very damaging, and I absolutely don't condone any of their activities. And I have yet to see anything since I've been in this job in the way of a public action by Iran that's been at all helpful in this region."
Fallon made it clear in our conversations that he considered it inappropriate to comment publicly about the President, the Vice-President, or Special Operations. But he said he had heard that people in the White House had been "struggling" with his views on Iran. "When I arrived at CENTCOM, the Iranians were funding every entity inside Iraq. It was in their interest to get us out, and so they decided to kill as many Americans as they could. And why not? They didn't know who'd come out ahead, but they wanted us out. I decided that I couldn't resolve the situation in Iraq without the neighborhood. To get this problem in Iraq solved, we had to somehow involve Iran and Syria. I had to work the neighborhood."
Fallon told me that his focus had been not on the Iranian nuclear issue, or on regime change there, but on "putting out the fires in Iraq." There were constant discussions in Washington and in the field about how to engage Iran and, on the subject of the bombing option, Fallon said, he believed that "it would happen only if the Iranians did something stupid."
Fallon's early retirement, however, appears to have been provoked not only by his negative comments about bombing Iran but also by his strong belief in the chain of command and his insistence on being informed about Special Operations in his area of responsibility. One of Fallon's defenders is retired Marine General John J. (Jack) Sheehan, whose last assignment was as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, where Fallon was a deputy. Last year, Sheehan rejected a White House offer to become the President's "czar" for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "One of the reasons the White House selected Fallon for CENTCOM was that he's known to be a strategic thinker and had demonstrated those skills in the Pacific," Sheehan told me. (Fallon served as commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific from 2005 to 2007.) "He was charged with coming up with an over-all coherent strategy for Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and, by law, the combatant commander is responsible for all military operations within his A.O."—area of operations. "That was not happening," Sheehan said. "When Fallon tried to make sense of all the overt and covert activity conducted by the military in his area of responsibility, a small group in the White House leadership shut him out."
The law cited by Sheehan is the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, known as Goldwater-Nichols, which defined the chain of command: from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on to the various combatant commanders, who were put in charge of all aspects of military operations, including joint training and logistics. That authority, the act stated, was not to be shared with other echelons of command. But the Bush Administration, as part of its global war on terror, instituted new policies that undercut regional commanders-in-chief; for example, it gave Special Operations teams, at military commands around the world, the highest priority in terms of securing support and equipment. The degradation of the traditional chain of command in the past few years has been a point of tension between the White House and the uniformed military.
"The coherence of military strategy is being eroded because of undue civilian influence and direction of nonconventional military operations," Sheehan said. "If you have small groups planning and conducting military operations outside the knowledge and control of the combatant commander, by default you can't have a coherent military strategy. You end up with a disaster, like the reconstruction efforts in Iraq."
Admiral Fallon, who is known as Fox, was aware that he would face special difficulties as the first Navy officer to lead CENTCOM, which had always been headed by a ground commander, one of his military colleagues told me. He was also aware that the Special Operations community would be a concern. "Fox said that there's a lot of strange stuff going on in Special Ops, and I told him he had to figure out what they were really doing," Fallon's colleague said. "The Special Ops guys eventually figured out they needed Fox, and so they began to talk to him. Fox would have won his fight with Special Ops but for Cheney."
The Pentagon consultant said, "Fallon went down because, in his own way, he was trying to prevent a war with Iran, and you have to admire him for that."
In recent months, according to the Iranian media, there has been a surge in violence in Iran; it is impossible at this early stage, however, to credit JSOC or C.I.A. activities, or to assess their impact on the Iranian leadership. The Iranian press reports are being carefully monitored by retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, who has taught strategy at the National War College and now conducts war games centered on Iran for the federal government, think tanks, and universities. The Iranian press "is very open in describing the killings going on inside the country," Gardiner said. It is, he said, "a controlled press, which makes it more important that it publishes these things. We begin to see inside the government." He added, "Hardly a day goes by now we don't see a clash somewhere. There were three or four incidents over a recent weekend, and the Iranians are even naming the Revolutionary Guard officers who have been killed."
Earlier this year, a militant Ahwazi group claimed to have assassinated a Revolutionary Guard colonel, and the Iranian government acknowledged that an explosion in a cultural center in Shiraz, in the southern part of the country, which killed at least twelve people and injured more than two hundred, had been a terrorist act and not, as it earlier insisted, an accident. It could not be learned whether there has been American involvement in any specific incident in Iran, but, according to Gardiner, the Iranians have begun publicly blaming the U.S., Great Britain, and, more recently, the C.I.A. for some incidents. The agency was involved in a coup in Iran in 1953, and its support for the unpopular regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—who was overthrown in 1979—was condemned for years by the ruling mullahs in Tehran, to great effect. "This is the ultimate for the Iranians—to blame the C.I.A.," Gardiner said. "This is new, and it's an escalation—a ratcheting up of tensions. It rallies support for the regime and shows the people that there is a continuing threat from the 'Great Satan.' " In Gardiner's view, the violence, rather than weakening Iran's religious government, may generate support for it.
Many of the activities may be being carried out by dissidents in Iran, and not by Americans in the field. One problem with "passing money" (to use the term of the person familiar with the Finding) in a covert setting is that it is hard to control where the money goes and whom it benefits. Nonetheless, the former senior intelligence official said, "We've got exposure, because of the transfer of our weapons and our communications gear. The Iranians will be able to make the argument that the opposition was inspired by the Americans. How many times have we tried this without asking the right questions? Is the risk worth it?" One possible consequence of these operations would be a violent Iranian crackdown on one of the dissident groups, which could give the Bush Administration a reason to intervene.
A strategy of using ethnic minorities to undermine Iran is flawed, according to Vali Nasr, who teaches international politics at Tufts University and is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Just because Lebanon, Iraq, and Pakistan have ethnic problems, it does not mean that Iran is suffering from the same issue," Nasr told me. "Iran is an old country—like France and Germany—and its citizens are just as nationalistic. The U.S. is overestimating ethnic tension in Iran." The minority groups that the U.S. is reaching out to are either well integrated or small and marginal, without much influence on the government or much ability to present a political challenge, Nasr said. "You can always find some activist groups that will go and kill a policeman, but working with the minorities will backfire, and alienate the majority of the population."
The Administration may have been willing to rely on dissident organizations in Iran even when there was reason to believe that the groups had operated against American interests in the past. The use of Baluchi elements, for example, is problematic, Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. clandestine officer who worked for nearly two decades in South Asia and the Middle East, told me. "The Baluchis are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as Al Qaeda," Baer told me. "These are guys who cut off the heads of nonbelievers—in this case, it's Shiite Iranians. The irony is that we're once again working with Sunni fundamentalists, just as we did in Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties." Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is considered one of the leading planners of the September 11th attacks, are Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists.
One of the most active and violent anti-regime groups in Iran today is the Jundallah, also known as the Iranian People's Resistance Movement, which describes itself as a resistance force fighting for the rights of Sunnis in Iran. "This is a vicious Salafi organization whose followers attended the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists," Nasr told me. "They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture." The Jundallah took responsibility for the bombing of a busload of Revolutionary Guard soldiers in February, 2007. At least eleven Guard members were killed. According to Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support.
The C.I.A. and Special Operations communities also have long-standing ties to two other dissident groups in Iran: the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, known in the West as the M.E.K., and a Kurdish separatist group, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, or PJAK.
The M.E.K. has been on the State Department's terrorist list for more than a decade, yet in recent years the group has received arms and intelligence, directly or indirectly, from the United States. Some of the newly authorized covert funds, the Pentagon consultant told me, may well end up in M.E.K. coffers. "The new task force will work with the M.E.K. The Administration is desperate for results." He added, "The M.E.K. has no C.P.A. auditing the books, and its leaders are thought to have been lining their pockets for years. If people only knew what the M.E.K. is getting, and how much is going to its bank accounts—and yet it is almost useless for the purposes the Administration intends."
The Kurdish party, PJAK, which has also been reported to be covertly supported by the United States, has been operating against Iran from bases in northern Iraq for at least three years. (Iran, like Iraq and Turkey, has a Kurdish minority, and PJAK and other groups have sought self-rule in territory that is now part of each of those countries.) In recent weeks, according to Sam Gardiner, the military strategist, there has been a marked increase in the number of PJAK armed engagements with Iranians and terrorist attacks on Iranian targets. In early June, the news agency Fars reported that a dozen PJAK members and four Iranian border guards were killed in a clash near the Iraq border; a similar attack in May killed three Revolutionary Guards and nine PJAK fighters. PJAK has also subjected Turkey, a member of NATO, to repeated terrorist attacks, and reports of American support for the group have been a source of friction between the two governments.
Gardiner also mentioned a trip that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, made to Tehran in June. After his return, Maliki announced that his government would ban any contact between foreigners and the M.E.K.—a slap at the U.S.'s dealings with the group. Maliki declared that Iraq was not willing to be a staging ground for covert operations against other countries. This was a sign, Gardiner said, of "Maliki's increasingly choosing the interests of Iraq over the interests of the United States." In terms of U.S. allegations of Iranian involvement in the killing of American soldiers, he said, "Maliki was unwilling to play the blame-Iran game." Gardiner added that Pakistan had just agreed to turn over a Jundallah leader to the Iranian government. America's covert operations, he said, "seem to be harming relations with the governments of both Iraq and Pakistan and could well be strengthening the connection between Tehran and Baghdad."
The White House's reliance on questionable operatives, and on plans involving possible lethal action inside Iran, has created anger as well as anxiety within the Special Operations and intelligence communities. JSOC's operations in Iran are believed to be modelled on a program that has, with some success, used surrogates to target the Taliban leadership in the tribal territories of Waziristan, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the situations in Waziristan and Iran are not comparable.
In Waziristan, "the program works because it's small and smart guys are running it," the former senior intelligence official told me. "It's being executed by professionals. The N.S.A., the C.I.A., and the D.I.A."—the Defense Intelligence Agency—"are right in there with the Special Forces and Pakistani intelligence, and they're dealing with serious bad guys." He added, "We have to be really careful in calling in the missiles. We have to hit certain houses at certain times. The people on the ground are watching through binoculars a few hundred yards away and calling specific locations, in latitude and longitude. We keep the Predator loitering until the targets go into a house, and we have to make sure our guys are far enough away so they don't get hit." One of the most prominent victims of the program, the former official said, was Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior Taliban commander, who was killed on January 31st, reportedly in a missile strike that also killed eleven other people.
A dispatch published on March 26th by the Washington Post reported on the increasing number of successful strikes against Taliban and other insurgent units in Pakistan's tribal areas. A follow-up article noted that, in response, the Taliban had killed "dozens of people" suspected of providing information to the United States and its allies on the whereabouts of Taliban leaders. Many of the victims were thought to be American spies, and their executions—a beheading, in one case—were videotaped and distributed by DVD as a warning to others.
It is not simple to replicate the program in Iran. "Everybody's arguing about the high-value-target list," the former senior intelligence official said. "The Special Ops guys are pissed off because Cheney's office set up priorities for categories of targets, and now he's getting impatient and applying pressure for results. But it takes a long time to get the right guys in place."
The Pentagon consultant told me, "We've had wonderful results in the Horn of Africa with the use of surrogates and false flags—basic counterintelligence and counter-insurgency tactics. And we're beginning to tie them in knots in Afghanistan. But the White House is going to kill the program if they use it to go after Iran. It's one thing to engage in selective strikes and assassinations in Waziristan and another in Iran. The White House believes that one size fits all, but the legal issues surrounding extrajudicial killings in Waziristan are less of a problem because Al Qaeda and the Taliban cross the border into Afghanistan and back again, often with U.S. and NATO forces in hot pursuit. The situation is not nearly as clear in the Iranian case. All the considerations—judicial, strategic, and political—are different in Iran."
He added, "There is huge opposition inside the intelligence community to the idea of waging a covert war inside Iran, and using Baluchis and Ahwazis as surrogates. The leaders of our Special Operations community all have remarkable physical courage, but they are less likely to voice their opposition to policy. Iran is not Waziristan."
A Gallup poll taken last November, before the N.I.E. was made public, found that seventy-three per cent of those surveyed thought that the United States should use economic action and diplomacy to stop Iran's nuclear program, while only eighteen per cent favored direct military action. Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to endorse a military strike. Weariness with the war in Iraq has undoubtedly affected the public's tolerance for an attack on Iran. This mood could change quickly, however. The potential for escalation became clear in early January, when five Iranian patrol boats, believed to be under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, made a series of aggressive moves toward three Navy warships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz. Initial reports of the incident made public by the Pentagon press office said that the Iranians had transmitted threats, over ship-to-ship radio, to "explode" the American ships. At a White House news conference, the President, on the day he left for an eight-day trip to the Middle East, called the incident "provocative" and "dangerous," and there was, very briefly, a sense of crisis and of outrage at Iran. "TWO MINUTES FROM WAR" was the headline in one British newspaper.
The crisis was quickly defused by Vice-Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, the commander of U.S. naval forces in the region. No warning shots were fired, the Admiral told the Pentagon press corps on January 7th, via teleconference from his headquarters, in Bahrain. "Yes, it's more serious than we have seen, but, to put it in context, we do interact with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and their Navy regularly," Cosgriff said. "I didn't get the sense from the reports I was receiving that there was a sense of being afraid of these five boats."
Admiral Cosgriff's caution was well founded: within a week, the Pentagon acknowledged that it could not positively identify the Iranian boats as the source of the ominous radio transmission, and press reports suggested that it had instead come from a prankster long known for sending fake messages in the region. Nonetheless, Cosgriff's demeanor angered Cheney, according to the former senior intelligence official. But a lesson was learned in the incident: The public had supported the idea of retaliation, and was even asking why the U.S. didn't do more. The former official said that, a few weeks later, a meeting took place in the Vice-President's office. "The subject was how to create a casus belli between Tehran and Washington," he said.
In June, President Bush went on a farewell tour of Europe. He had tea with Queen Elizabeth II and dinner with Nicolas Sarkozy and Carla Bruni, the President and First Lady of France. The serious business was conducted out of sight, and involved a series of meetings on a new diplomatic effort to persuade the Iranians to halt their uranium-enrichment program. (Iran argues that its enrichment program is for civilian purposes and is legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Secretary of State Rice had been involved with developing a new package of incentives. But the Administration's essential negotiating position seemed unchanged: talks could not take place until Iran halted the program. The Iranians have repeatedly and categorically rejected that precondition, leaving the diplomatic situation in a stalemate; they have not yet formally responded to the new incentives.
The continuing impasse alarms many observers. Joschka Fischer, the former German Foreign Minister, recently wrote in a syndicated column that it may not "be possible to freeze the Iranian nuclear program for the duration of the negotiations to avoid a military confrontation before they are completed. Should this newest attempt fail, things will soon get serious. Deadly serious." When I spoke to him last week, Fischer, who has extensive contacts in the diplomatic community, said that the latest European approach includes a new element: the willingness of the U.S. and the Europeans to accept something less than a complete cessation of enrichment as an intermediate step. "The proposal says that the Iranians must stop manufacturing new centrifuges and the other side will stop all further sanction activities in the U.N. Security Council," Fischer said, although Iran would still have to freeze its enrichment activities when formal negotiations begin. "This could be acceptable to the Iranians—if they have good will."
The big question, Fischer added, is in Washington. "I think the Americans are deeply divided on the issue of what to do about Iran," he said. "Some officials are concerned about the fallout from a military attack and others think an attack is unavoidable. I know the Europeans, but I have no idea where the Americans will end up on this issue."
There is another complication: American Presidential politics. Barack Obama has said that, if elected, he would begin talks with Iran with no "self-defeating" preconditions (although only after diplomatic groundwork had been laid). That position has been vigorously criticized by John McCain. The Washington Post recently quoted Randy Scheunemann, the McCain campaign's national-security director, as stating that McCain supports the White House's position, and that the program be suspended before talks begin. What Obama is proposing, Scheunemann said, "is unilateral cowboy summitry."
Scheunemann, who is known as a neoconservative, is also the McCain campaign's most important channel of communication with the White House. He is a friend of David Addington, Dick Cheney's chief of staff. I have heard differing accounts of Scheunemann's influence with McCain; though some close to the McCain campaign talk about him as a possible national-security adviser, others say he is someone who isn't taken seriously while "telling Cheney and others what they want to hear," as a senior McCain adviser put it.
It is not known whether McCain, who is the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been formally briefed on the operations in Iran. At the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, in June, Obama repeated his plea for "tough and principled diplomacy." But he also said, along with McCain, that he would keep the threat of military action against Iran on the table. ♦
ILLUSTRATION: GUY BILLOUT
The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.
Annals of National Security
Preparing the Battlefield
The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.
by Seymour M. Hersh
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh
Preparing the Battlefield
The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.
by Seymour M. Hersh
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh
Oil Giants Get Ready to Return to Iraq. It Was Oil, All Along by Bill Moyers and Michael Winship
Oil Giants Get Ready to Return to Iraq
It Was Oil, All Along
By BILL MOYERS
and MICHAEL WINSHIP
Oh, no, they told us, Iraq isn't a war about oil. That's cynical and simplistic, they said. It's about terror and al Qaeda and toppling a dictator and spreading democracy and protecting ourselves from weapons of mass destruction. But one by one, these concocted rationales went up in smoke, fire, and ashes. And now the bottom line turns out to be....the bottom line. It is about oil.
Alan Greenspan said so last fall. The former chairman of the Federal Reserve, safely out of office, confessed in his memoir,
"...Everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil." He elaborated in an interview with the Washington Post's Bob Woodward, "If Saddam Hussein had been head of Iraq and there was no oil under those sands, our response to him would not have been as strong as it was in the first gulf war."
Remember, also, that soon after the invasion, Donald Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, told the press that war was our only strategic choice. "...We had virtually no economic options with Iraq," he explained, "because the country floats on a sea of oil."
Shades of Daniel Plainview, the monstrous petroleum tycoon in the movie There Will Be Blood. Half-mad, he exclaims, "There's a whole ocean of oil under our feet!" then adds, "No one can get at it except for me!"
No wonder American troops only guarded the Ministries of Oil and the Interior in Baghdad, even as looters pillaged museums of their priceless antiquities. They were making sure no one could get at the oil except... guess who?
Here's a recent headline in The New York Times: "Deals with Iraq Are Set to Bring Oil Giants Back." Read on: "Four western companies are in the final stages of negotiations this month on contracts that will return them to Iraq, 36 years after losing their oil concession to nationalization as Saddam Hussein rose to power."
There you have it. After a long exile, Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total and BP are back in Iraq. And on the wings of no-bid contracts - that's right, sweetheart deals like those given Halliburton, KBR, Blackwater. The kind of deals you get only if you have friends in high places. And these war profiteers have friends in very high places.
Let's go back a few years to the 1990's, when private citizen Dick Cheney was running Halliburton, the big energy supplier. That's when he told the oil industry that, "By 2010 we will need on the order of an additional fifty million barrels a day. So where is the oil going to come from? While many regions of the world offer great oil opportunities, the Middle East, with two-thirds of the world's oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies."
Fast forward to Cheney's first heady days in the White House. The oil industry and other energy conglomerates have been headed backdoor keys to the White House, and their CEO's and lobbyists were trooping in and out for meetings with their old opal, now Vice President Cheney. The meetings are secret, conducted under tight security, but as we reported five years ago, among the documents that turned up from some of those meetings were maps of oil fields in Iraq - and a list of companies who wanted access to them.
The conservative group Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club filed suit to try to find out who attended the meetings and what was discussed, but the White House fought all the way to the Supreme Court to keep the press and public from learning the whole truth.
Think about it. These secret meetings took place six months before 9/11, two years before Bush and Cheney invaded Iraq. We still don't know what they were about. What we know is that this is the oil industry that's enjoying swollen profits these days. It would be laughable if it weren't so painful to remember that their erstwhile cheerleader for invading Iraq - the press mogul Rupert Murdoch - once said that a successful war there would bring us $20 a barrel of oil. The last time we looked, it was more than $140 a barrel. Where are you, Rupert, when the facts need checking and the predictions are revisited?
At a congressional hearing this week, James Hansen, the NASA climate scientist who exactly twenty years ago alerted Congress and the world to the dangers of global warming, compared the chief executives of Big Oil to the tobacco moguls who denied that nicotine is addictive or that there's a link between smoking and cancer. Hansen, who the administration has tried again and again to silence, said these barons of black gold should be tried for committing crimes against humanity and nature in opposing efforts to deal with global warming.
Perhaps those sweetheart deals in Iraq should be added to his proposed indictments. They have been purchased at a very high price. Four thousand American soldiers dead, tens of thousands permanently wounded for life, hundreds of thousands of dead and crippled Iraqis plus five million displaced, and a cost that will mount into trillions of dollars. The political analyst Kevin Phillips says America has become little more than an "energy protection force," doing anything to gain access to expensive fuel without regard to the lives of others or the earth itself. One thinks again of Daniel Plainview in There Will Be Blood. His lust for oil came at the price of his son and his soul
Bill Moyers is managing editor and Michael Winship is senior writer of the weekly public affairs program Bill Moyers Journal, which airs Friday night on PBS. Check local airtimes or comment at The Moyers Blog at www.pbs.org/moyers.
It Was Oil, All Along
By BILL MOYERS
and MICHAEL WINSHIP
Oh, no, they told us, Iraq isn't a war about oil. That's cynical and simplistic, they said. It's about terror and al Qaeda and toppling a dictator and spreading democracy and protecting ourselves from weapons of mass destruction. But one by one, these concocted rationales went up in smoke, fire, and ashes. And now the bottom line turns out to be....the bottom line. It is about oil.
Alan Greenspan said so last fall. The former chairman of the Federal Reserve, safely out of office, confessed in his memoir,
"...Everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil." He elaborated in an interview with the Washington Post's Bob Woodward, "If Saddam Hussein had been head of Iraq and there was no oil under those sands, our response to him would not have been as strong as it was in the first gulf war."
Remember, also, that soon after the invasion, Donald Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, told the press that war was our only strategic choice. "...We had virtually no economic options with Iraq," he explained, "because the country floats on a sea of oil."
Shades of Daniel Plainview, the monstrous petroleum tycoon in the movie There Will Be Blood. Half-mad, he exclaims, "There's a whole ocean of oil under our feet!" then adds, "No one can get at it except for me!"
No wonder American troops only guarded the Ministries of Oil and the Interior in Baghdad, even as looters pillaged museums of their priceless antiquities. They were making sure no one could get at the oil except... guess who?
Here's a recent headline in The New York Times: "Deals with Iraq Are Set to Bring Oil Giants Back." Read on: "Four western companies are in the final stages of negotiations this month on contracts that will return them to Iraq, 36 years after losing their oil concession to nationalization as Saddam Hussein rose to power."
There you have it. After a long exile, Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total and BP are back in Iraq. And on the wings of no-bid contracts - that's right, sweetheart deals like those given Halliburton, KBR, Blackwater. The kind of deals you get only if you have friends in high places. And these war profiteers have friends in very high places.
Let's go back a few years to the 1990's, when private citizen Dick Cheney was running Halliburton, the big energy supplier. That's when he told the oil industry that, "By 2010 we will need on the order of an additional fifty million barrels a day. So where is the oil going to come from? While many regions of the world offer great oil opportunities, the Middle East, with two-thirds of the world's oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies."
Fast forward to Cheney's first heady days in the White House. The oil industry and other energy conglomerates have been headed backdoor keys to the White House, and their CEO's and lobbyists were trooping in and out for meetings with their old opal, now Vice President Cheney. The meetings are secret, conducted under tight security, but as we reported five years ago, among the documents that turned up from some of those meetings were maps of oil fields in Iraq - and a list of companies who wanted access to them.
The conservative group Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club filed suit to try to find out who attended the meetings and what was discussed, but the White House fought all the way to the Supreme Court to keep the press and public from learning the whole truth.
Think about it. These secret meetings took place six months before 9/11, two years before Bush and Cheney invaded Iraq. We still don't know what they were about. What we know is that this is the oil industry that's enjoying swollen profits these days. It would be laughable if it weren't so painful to remember that their erstwhile cheerleader for invading Iraq - the press mogul Rupert Murdoch - once said that a successful war there would bring us $20 a barrel of oil. The last time we looked, it was more than $140 a barrel. Where are you, Rupert, when the facts need checking and the predictions are revisited?
At a congressional hearing this week, James Hansen, the NASA climate scientist who exactly twenty years ago alerted Congress and the world to the dangers of global warming, compared the chief executives of Big Oil to the tobacco moguls who denied that nicotine is addictive or that there's a link between smoking and cancer. Hansen, who the administration has tried again and again to silence, said these barons of black gold should be tried for committing crimes against humanity and nature in opposing efforts to deal with global warming.
Perhaps those sweetheart deals in Iraq should be added to his proposed indictments. They have been purchased at a very high price. Four thousand American soldiers dead, tens of thousands permanently wounded for life, hundreds of thousands of dead and crippled Iraqis plus five million displaced, and a cost that will mount into trillions of dollars. The political analyst Kevin Phillips says America has become little more than an "energy protection force," doing anything to gain access to expensive fuel without regard to the lives of others or the earth itself. One thinks again of Daniel Plainview in There Will Be Blood. His lust for oil came at the price of his son and his soul
Bill Moyers is managing editor and Michael Winship is senior writer of the weekly public affairs program Bill Moyers Journal, which airs Friday night on PBS. Check local airtimes or comment at The Moyers Blog at www.pbs.org/moyers.
Guess What "Surprise" Republicans Yearn For
Guess What "Surprise" Republicans Yearn For
http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn06282008.html
By ALEXANDER COCKBURN
Everybody knows it, but it took a tacky Republican operator to come right out and say it. Charlie Black, John McCain's campaign adviser, recently let drop to Fortune magazine that another terrorist attack on U.S. soil would be a "big advantage" for the Republican presidential candidate. Of course McCain lost no time in distancing himself from Black's remark, with the same bogus moral outrage with which he decries racist slurs on his opponent. "I cannot imagine why he would say it. It's not true. I've worked tirelessly since 9/11 to prevent another attack on the United States of America. My record is very clear." Black duly threw on some sackcloth and echoed McCain: "I deeply regret the comments. They were inappropriate. I recognize that John McCain has devoted his entire adult life to protecting his country and placing its security before every other consideration."
Now, Black is no novice in campaign tactics. Nearly 40 years ago he helped put Jesse Helms in the US senate, and has been an innovative dirty trickster ever since. He knew exactly what he was doing when he let drop that remark to Fortune, just as McCain no doubt approved the indiscretion. Both men know that McCain's last best hope of beating Barack Obama in the November election is to rattle the nation's teeth with vivid evocations of national emergency, and stampede the fearful voters into putting a "war hero" into the Oval Office. Both men also know that almost seven years after the Trade Towers went down, the possibility of a terrorist attack is not the prime source of disquiet for most Americans, who can barely afford to drive to work or pay the mortgage on their homes.
The signs that the "war on terror" is losing its political edge are manifold. In the months after the 9/11 attack the Bush administration faced no serious opposition in trampling the US constitution under foot in the name of national security. The Patriot Act shot through Congress with just one senatorial "No" vote, from Russ Feingold of Wisconsin. The symbol of U.S. "resolve" around the world became the prison at Guantanamo, filled to this day with men against whom no formal charges had been laid, subjected to appalling tortures and denied the right to legal counsel.
This month the U.S. courts have delivered two resounding rebuffs to the White House's efforts to say that prisoners haled to Guantanamo had no rights under U.S. law. On June 12 , in the case of Boumediene v. Bush, the US Supreme Court ruled, 5-4, that Lakhdar Boumediene, a Bosnian citizen seized in October 2001, was entitled to habeas corpus – i.e., the right under the US constitution to have an independent court of law review the legality of his detention. Justice Anthony Kennedy stated ringingly in his draft of the majority opinion, "The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times."
The right erupted in fury, denouncing "the Boumediene Five". The Wall Street Journal bellowed in an editorial that the majority justices had signed the death warrants of American soldiers fighting terror overseas. At a town hall meeting in Pemberton, N.J., McCain called it "one of the worst decisions in the history of this country." For his part Obama reiterated his "firm belief that we can track terrorists, we can crack down on threats against the United States, but we can do so within the constraints of our Constitution."
Then, this last Monday, a three-judge federal court in Washington followed swiftly in the tracks on the June 12 ruling, declaring that Hozaifa Parhat, a 33-year-old Uighur Muslim from the oppressed Xinjiang province of China, seized in Turkmenistan in 2001, had the right to seek release immediately through a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, in the space of less than a fortnight, the US courts sliced away what Bush and his lawyers have insisted for seven years to be the vital right to hold terrorists indefinitely, without charges or rights of any sort.
Judges mostly rule in tune with the temper of the times, and the decisions this month are no exception. The surmise of those who dream, like Black, of a new terrorist attack, is that if one had rocked America on June 1 of this year the judges might well have held their hand. David Addington, senior aide to vice president Dick Cheney was quoted last year by Jack Goldsmith, a former Justice Department lawyer, as having said yearningly that "we're one bomb away from getting rid of that obnoxious court," referring to the secret and in fact compliant FISA court that oversees clandestine wiretapping.
Almost every presidential election sees allegations of an imminent "October surprise". There's zero doubt what sort of surprise McCain and the desperate Republicans are yearning for.
The Truth About Petraeus' Surge , the Sixties, and much else besides
Watching the princes and princesses of the Fourth Estate last week mourning Russert, their fallen champion, I brooded as no doubt did many other CounterPunchers on the staggering failures of the Fourth Estate in the Bush era. How effortlessly they rolled from the WMD debacle into the chipper early reports of the war's glorious progress, then into promotion of the surge and now, for well over a year, into ecstatic bulletins on the Surge's success.
As antidote, I strongly recommend a detailed repot by that excellent journalist and historian. Gareth Porter, in our latest CounterPunch newsletter. Here's how Porter begins his detailed report:
Throughout 2007 and 2008, Gen. David Petraeus successfully directed the development of a propaganda scenario portraying a fierce struggle for Iraq between shadowy figures in Iran, fueling "proxy war" against the United States through its support for "special groups," and U.S. forces working to roll up those Iranian-sponsored networks.
That story line was extraordinarily useful to the Bush administration – or, more precisely, to the Bush-Cheney White House and the U.S. military command in Iraq. It served three distinct purposes simultaneously. First, it provided a new rationale for U.S. occupation in Iraq that promised to stretch years into the future – fighting Shiite foes, which were supposedly sponsored by Iran. As al Qaeda's power seemed to fade during 2007, that purpose filled what would otherwise have been a void in regard to reasons for a continued U.S. military role in the country.
Second, the assertion of Iranian troublemaking in Iraq provided a rationale for the limited attack on Iranian bases, which was Dick Cheney's ambition, and, thus, for a possible trigger for an Iranian response that could justify an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
But it also serves to divert attention from the embarrassing fact that the Bush administration and Iran have been backing the same horse in Iraq. Since early 2005, Iranian strategy has been centered on support for Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad, because those governments were led by and dependent on the political support of loyal Iraqi agents of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the time the IRGC had created the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa Party in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The Baghdad regime, therefore, represents a joint U.S.-Iranian condominium.
The "proxy war" propaganda claim has revolved around one central lie, which is that Iran has used "special groups," meaning militia groups that have broken away from Sadr, to try to force the United States out of Iraq and destabilize the Iraqi regime. The term "special groups" itself was invented not by Iran but by the U.S. military…"
Porter goes on to build up a devastating case against the mendacious constructs of Petraeus and his staff. He pinions the eager gullibility of Congress and press in swallowing the story. His piece alone is worth a subscripton to our twice-monthly newsletter.
Another excellent piece in the same newsletter is former US Senator Jim Abourezk's account of the White Clay whiskey peddlers selling alcoholic beverages to the Indians. This squalid epic goes back to the 1800s, and stretches forward to the present day. Jim was born on the Rosebud reservation, and became the nation's first Arab-American senator back in the 1970s, serving with great distinction. He remains a crusading lawyer in Sioux Falls and recounts his ongoing efforts to shut down the illegal liquor trade in White Clay which has caused so much human disaster.
Moving from the epic to the ridiculous, I have to hand Gerard DeGroot: The 60s Unplugged. A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly Decade. You think Todd Gitlin is silly? They just never let go. I write an unflattering assessment of DeGroot's preposterous work. All in the CounerPunch newsletter. Now, all you have to do is subscribe.
Ahmed Shawki and "Democracy Now"
Ahmed Shawki is usually a jovial fellow, as well as being one of the leading lights of the Trotskyist tendency known as the International Socialist Organization. What has made the Chicago-based Ahmed distinctly less jovial in the years since 9/11/2001 is unendingly bad treatment at airline security. Because of his name and ethnic contour he gets screwed around in all manner of outrageous ways.
Imagine, therefore, the fury and distress of Ahmed and his family when Amy Goodman's Democracy Now, on the unlucky day of Friday, June 13, ran a story on Shawki Ahmed Omar, an American citizen captured and detained in Iraq by United States military forces, without legal process and with no meaningful access to counsel. Democracy Now chose to illustrate this story on its site with a photograph of Ahmed Shawki, of Chicago. Dilligent efforts were immediately made to get Democracy Now to fix the problem on its site, but without getting any satisfaction from an apparently indifferent crew at the Temple of Goodman. Finally, in the middle of the following week, Goodman did okay a correction, albeit relocating Ahmed from Chicago to California.
I queried the ISO's Sharon Smith, who is married to Shawki, about the facts of the matter and here's how she answered:
Hi Alex,
No, Ahmed hasn't suddenly moved West. He still lives in Chicago, as he has since 1983. But an Ahmed Shawki with a California address is all we got in the way of a correction from DN! on Wednesday of this past week.
And even that took 5 days. After the photo appeared on Friday, June 13, presenting a photo of Ahmed Shawki from Chicago as the alleged terrorist Shawqi Ahmed Omar (please be sure that I do not wish to imply that Omar is an actual terrorist), Ahmed's photo stayed there for all the world to see until the following Monday morning. So for several days, Ahmed's photo was associated with a convicted Iraqi terrorist, and we had to wait until Wednesday for a broadcast correction (that erroneously stated Ahmed's residence as in California rather than Illinois).
Needless to say, this was a very traumatic experience for Ahmed. He faced racism before 9-11, but since then he has been pulled off airplanes and our family was driven out of our last neighborhood due to anti-Arab racism. And as we all know, various government agencies are not looking for facts, but only excuses, to further harass and incarcerate Arabs and Muslims. So this was a big deal for us. We had no direct contact with anyone at DN! but relied on mutual acquaintances to state our case, as soon as the photo appeared. We became increasingly frustrated, as the days went by and no action was taken to make this correction—which at some future point, could be crucial if Ahmed is targeted by one of the many agencies empowered to do so. Because we had no direct contact with DN!, we can't state with any accuracy what DN!'s official response was to this error on their part. And no one from DN ever attempted to contact Ahmed directly, either to apologize or to get the facts straight.
Needless to say, we are extremely disappointed by this outcome. We expected better from Democracy Now! which we have had, until now, nothing but respect. For those who purport to be bringing integrity back into the news media, we expected, well, a bit more integrity.
Sharon
In Russert's Wake
My dry-eyed remarks about Tim Russert here last week elicited a large number of enthusiastic letters from CounterPunchers astounded at the commotion at his passing. In a separate piece I did on Russert I concluded thus:
After the Watergate scandal was over in 1974 and Nixon bundled off in disgrace to California, Katharine Graham, chairman of the Washington Post Company and employer of Woodward and Bernstein, cautioned journalists: ""The press these days," she sternly told them, "should ... be rather careful about its role. We may have acquired some tendencies about over-involvement that we had better overcome. We had better not yield to the temptation to go on refighting the next war and see conspiracy and cover-up where they do not exist." Out of that warning came the failures to see conspiracy where it did exist, in the manufacture of the WMD threat and in the treatment of politics as business-as-usual, somewhat like a game -- an approach in which Russert excelled and which made him many friends and far too few enemies. He never had to lunch alone. In the 1880s, Joseph Pulitzer hung a sign in the newsroom of his paper, the New York World, which read: "The World has no friends." Russert, as the recent obsequies attest, had far too many.
A few days later, on June 25m came this amusing sequel from Chicago-based CounterPuncher, John Mauck:
Hey Alexander, Today on the Washington Post website, they had an online discussion with Len Downey [The Post's dreary editor]. Per your column I asked a simple question: Chicago: Hey Len, What is your opinion of Katharine Graham's quote: "The press these days should be rather careful about its role. We may have acquired some tendencies about over-involvement that we had better overcome. We had better not yield to the temptation to go on refighting the next war and see conspiracy and cover-up where they do not exist."
To this I got an amusing answer: Leonard Downie Jr.: It's timeless wisdom. She said that many years ago, and it was true then and it's true now. We keep that responsibility in mind every day." I thought that might crack you up. Keep up the Counterpunching!
A few other notes from my Russert mailbag:
Alex, You wrote, "Final question: Since NBC had a huge stake in Tim Russert's future ("Meet the Press" brought in $50 million a year and they paid him around $5 million a year) you'd have thought the network's executives would have taken a look at the tv screen and raised the alarm. Across the past three months he looked in increasingly awful shape, bright red in the face, overweight and sometimes with a slightly glazed, sad look. I told people I thought he was set to die of a heart attack right there in the studio, which is exactly what happened."
You weren't the only one, I never watched, but my mother-in-law, a retired nurse, thought the same thing. She saw him on MTP the Sunday before he died, and thought, he looks awful. She was really alarmed and wanted to call and urge that he get immediate medical attention!
Richard Estes
And this one from Tom Layman, in Champaign, Illinois:
Alex: Very insightful. I don't know how many times the honor-givers mentioned his interview with Cheney prior to the war as if merely asking a question lit a fire under Cheney's feet. But what stands out to me (& I have yet to bring this up elsewhere where I can reply) is his question to Dennis Kucinich in the primary debates about UFOs. The "Journalist of record" was making an obvious attempt to marginalize Dennis as a nut case. I don't recall anyone ever making that kind of leap with, say, Bush's claim that God wanted him to invade Iraq.
Tom
An architect in Nashville send this larger perspective on Russert:
Alexander:
Bravo! Finally someone speaks the truth. Sat. I was on a very challenging bike ride for my age (58, same age as Russert). I got back into biking after a bad back injury and was told it might help and was riding for a while beside a younger man(50) who was well.. rich he was riding an expensive bike. Anyway, he commented that he had left his high stress job where he was a CEO and got into this biking as it lowered his BP ( his BP was through the roof when he was CEO.) and that his Dad had died much as Tim Russert had at about the same age. "Hell he looked awful these past months" he commented.
I noted to him a number of male acquaintances, friends etc that had died of heart attacks between what I think are the make or break it years for men age 50-60.
The conversation started when he yelled to me "Hey have you noticed how no one is saying why Tim Russert died.. like working himself to death a true American role model".
He noted that he had the money but was heading in the same direction so he bought his "vanity bike" to try something else and it had led him to a better life.
Certainly there were other options for Tim also. Maybe not as drastic as giving up the helm as this ex CEO had but certainly working less hours and integrating some exercise or family and friend time in. I don't buy the family man stuff either. Way back when I had a more high profile job when my kids were very young one day they said "Daddy will you ever be home for Dinner?". I worked literally 20 minutes away and had nor been home in almost 2 years for dinner because of my job. I had gained 20 plus and smoked like hell and no exercise. Well this "OL" Marine quit that job (those type of jobs do not allow or at least in those days a way to work less) I was in my late 30's then and I still look back knowing it was the right move. I am still alive and saw my kids grow and shared much with them. I fared on the lousy side for a time for income and have not worked onprestigious projects but that all seems to mean less and less as I age.
Tennessee Architect
Nashville.
A distinctly unflattering one:
Alex,
Thanks for the article on the " Russert Send-Off ". The are some very revealing points. Like that of Russert not having any enemies despite 20 Years in the News Business. I was curious as to what his salary was and the figure you quote, 5 Million Dollars, is also revealing. Why should that be so revealing ? Let me touch upon a subject that was not brought up in your article.
In the Russert Send-Off NBC put a number of video interviews of News Media "Luminaries" and bio pieces on their website. One of those bio pieces focused on Russert's father who is quite elderly. And like most Octegenarians Russert's father has not been able to tend to his own needs. Up until recently the elder Russert has been forced to accept the generosity of his neighbors who prepared his meals and took care of his clothes. It was also revealed that Russert wanted to put his father in a "Senior Citizen's Home" against his father's wishes. You know, those places where you are warehoused until you have the dignity to kick-off. For someone like the younger Russert, with all his money, to do that to do that to his father shows you what type of family man he really was. I wonder if Russert Sr' s neighbors really know what old Tim's net worth really was ? And if they do what they think of him now ? Some "Family Man" !
Sincerely
Bob Marston
A man of the cloth had this to say:
I was sadden but not surprised that the news media ran amok and raised Mr. Russert higher than God. However, I do remember Mr. Russert, as you stated in the amen corner for the war, and I also remember that when the White House wanted to send out propaganda and disinformation, Russert was their man. Dick Cheney knew who to call, and why would Libby throw Russert name in the hat of who was told what? However, the mainstream news media had to make themselves look good especially after Scott McClellan throw them under the bus, so Russert's grandiose send off was a pat on the back for themselves. Furthermore, Russert grilled Obama about Farrakhan, but he seemed not to care about the war, poverty, economical downturns, and many of the social issues and other pertinent issues that this country faced, and Brian Williams was a part of the grilling team too. After all, these two so-called powerhouses could get away with it, just like Williams fabricated his story in Tennessee by stating that McCain was received well at the anniversary of Dr. King. McCain was booed so loudly, one could not hear the broadcast.
And to add to the knighting and apostleship of Russert, the media said that the rainbow in the sky was Russert's rainbow. However, someone's hermeneutics is displaced because the last time that I read the Old Testament, the rainbow was a covenant and a token to remind us that God would not destroy the earth in seed time and harvest by flood, and after seeing the floods in Illinois and Wisconsin, we certainly needed that reminder. Some may call me a busy body fanatical preacher, but so many lives have been lost because of the lies told to get us to Iraq, and now the oil companies hope to prosper, and Bushes Executive order 13303 will aid them. Finally, the mainstream news media has blood on its hand like Pilate, yet soap and water will not remove the stains. So in order to remove the blood stains, why not use Russert the same way as they used him along with others to sell this heinous criminal war.
Rev. S.D. Whitaker
And lastly, from Louisiana:
Hearing all this noise about Russert being such an astute political observer, I wondered whether I had missed this. He seemed somewhat conventional & low-octane prosaic to me, and a lot of his "sharp questioning" missed the mark. But the real thing I have against him is having Rush Limbaugh in his show & going on & on about how Limbaugh was a modern Walter Lippmann. In fact, I was wondering whether it was some sort of a joke, as not even Limbaugh harbored such a pretension. Limbaugh is basically an entertainer of modest, if not mediocre accomplishments, as well as an out-and-out flâneur. He has never made any claims to have inhabited a heavy-thinker bureau, but Russert slobbered all over him as if he were a philosopher king. Maybe there are some reactionaries who would earn such an encomium, but not Limbaugh or that low-life snob, William F. Buckley, jr. I never did get over how Russert was so gulled by Limbaugh & fawned over him disgustingly. Pretty soon we shall be free of all this weeping & moaning over Russert; but why didn't someone cite Don Vito Corleone? Remember when he asked Johnny Fontaine: "You spend time with your family?"
Donald Juneau
As the commotion began to subside, the New York Times ran a news story stuffed with self-aggrandizing quotes from doctors, all to the general effect that Russert had seemed to be in the best of health, his vital indicators seemed to be in the comfort zone, his pills seemed to be working, and then, gosh darn it, he keels over. Moral: the Reaper strikes when he wants and there ain't a thing a bunch of overpaid doctors can do about it.
So how come plenty of people were able to to a free, unsolicited diagnosis of T. Russert on TV and say, My God, call a doctor someone. That guy's in awful shape.
My Life with Thomas Mann
In his always entertaining and instructive column on this site The Musical Patriot David Yearsley this weekend describes the appalling sunburn inflicted on him by Thomas Mann, for reasons I shall not divulge, except to say Yearsley took Mann with him on holiday.
How many arms has Thomas Mann turned into spaghetti, lugging his vast novels around Europe in the vain hope that on some beach or restful glade the traveller will finally settle accounts with the Joseph Trilogy. When I left Oxford I took my girlfriend Jenny Barnes plus Joseph and his weighty Brothers on a tour of Mallorca. The vehicle was a Lambretta, and Thomas Mann x 3 rode postillion, right behind Jenny, who was right behind me. I wasn't used to the Lambretta or to the weight of three hardback vols of T. Mann. I would over-rev, the Lambretta would rise on its rear wheel and fall over backwards on top of Jenny and me and Thomas. One time this happened was right outside the gates of Robert Graves's house in Deya. I ripped my pants and sat on the Mann vols as Jenny sewed the pants up. Mann tagged along the whole of the trip, but I never got anywhere with him. A very over-rated novelist in my opinion.
Footnote: A shorter version of the first item in this Diary ran on The First Post last Friday. Alexander Cockburn can be reached at alexandercockburn@asis.com
http://www.counterpunch.org/cockburn06282008.html
By ALEXANDER COCKBURN
Everybody knows it, but it took a tacky Republican operator to come right out and say it. Charlie Black, John McCain's campaign adviser, recently let drop to Fortune magazine that another terrorist attack on U.S. soil would be a "big advantage" for the Republican presidential candidate. Of course McCain lost no time in distancing himself from Black's remark, with the same bogus moral outrage with which he decries racist slurs on his opponent. "I cannot imagine why he would say it. It's not true. I've worked tirelessly since 9/11 to prevent another attack on the United States of America. My record is very clear." Black duly threw on some sackcloth and echoed McCain: "I deeply regret the comments. They were inappropriate. I recognize that John McCain has devoted his entire adult life to protecting his country and placing its security before every other consideration."
Now, Black is no novice in campaign tactics. Nearly 40 years ago he helped put Jesse Helms in the US senate, and has been an innovative dirty trickster ever since. He knew exactly what he was doing when he let drop that remark to Fortune, just as McCain no doubt approved the indiscretion. Both men know that McCain's last best hope of beating Barack Obama in the November election is to rattle the nation's teeth with vivid evocations of national emergency, and stampede the fearful voters into putting a "war hero" into the Oval Office. Both men also know that almost seven years after the Trade Towers went down, the possibility of a terrorist attack is not the prime source of disquiet for most Americans, who can barely afford to drive to work or pay the mortgage on their homes.
The signs that the "war on terror" is losing its political edge are manifold. In the months after the 9/11 attack the Bush administration faced no serious opposition in trampling the US constitution under foot in the name of national security. The Patriot Act shot through Congress with just one senatorial "No" vote, from Russ Feingold of Wisconsin. The symbol of U.S. "resolve" around the world became the prison at Guantanamo, filled to this day with men against whom no formal charges had been laid, subjected to appalling tortures and denied the right to legal counsel.
This month the U.S. courts have delivered two resounding rebuffs to the White House's efforts to say that prisoners haled to Guantanamo had no rights under U.S. law. On June 12 , in the case of Boumediene v. Bush, the US Supreme Court ruled, 5-4, that Lakhdar Boumediene, a Bosnian citizen seized in October 2001, was entitled to habeas corpus – i.e., the right under the US constitution to have an independent court of law review the legality of his detention. Justice Anthony Kennedy stated ringingly in his draft of the majority opinion, "The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times."
The right erupted in fury, denouncing "the Boumediene Five". The Wall Street Journal bellowed in an editorial that the majority justices had signed the death warrants of American soldiers fighting terror overseas. At a town hall meeting in Pemberton, N.J., McCain called it "one of the worst decisions in the history of this country." For his part Obama reiterated his "firm belief that we can track terrorists, we can crack down on threats against the United States, but we can do so within the constraints of our Constitution."
Then, this last Monday, a three-judge federal court in Washington followed swiftly in the tracks on the June 12 ruling, declaring that Hozaifa Parhat, a 33-year-old Uighur Muslim from the oppressed Xinjiang province of China, seized in Turkmenistan in 2001, had the right to seek release immediately through a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, in the space of less than a fortnight, the US courts sliced away what Bush and his lawyers have insisted for seven years to be the vital right to hold terrorists indefinitely, without charges or rights of any sort.
Judges mostly rule in tune with the temper of the times, and the decisions this month are no exception. The surmise of those who dream, like Black, of a new terrorist attack, is that if one had rocked America on June 1 of this year the judges might well have held their hand. David Addington, senior aide to vice president Dick Cheney was quoted last year by Jack Goldsmith, a former Justice Department lawyer, as having said yearningly that "we're one bomb away from getting rid of that obnoxious court," referring to the secret and in fact compliant FISA court that oversees clandestine wiretapping.
Almost every presidential election sees allegations of an imminent "October surprise". There's zero doubt what sort of surprise McCain and the desperate Republicans are yearning for.
The Truth About Petraeus' Surge , the Sixties, and much else besides
Watching the princes and princesses of the Fourth Estate last week mourning Russert, their fallen champion, I brooded as no doubt did many other CounterPunchers on the staggering failures of the Fourth Estate in the Bush era. How effortlessly they rolled from the WMD debacle into the chipper early reports of the war's glorious progress, then into promotion of the surge and now, for well over a year, into ecstatic bulletins on the Surge's success.
As antidote, I strongly recommend a detailed repot by that excellent journalist and historian. Gareth Porter, in our latest CounterPunch newsletter. Here's how Porter begins his detailed report:
Throughout 2007 and 2008, Gen. David Petraeus successfully directed the development of a propaganda scenario portraying a fierce struggle for Iraq between shadowy figures in Iran, fueling "proxy war" against the United States through its support for "special groups," and U.S. forces working to roll up those Iranian-sponsored networks.
That story line was extraordinarily useful to the Bush administration – or, more precisely, to the Bush-Cheney White House and the U.S. military command in Iraq. It served three distinct purposes simultaneously. First, it provided a new rationale for U.S. occupation in Iraq that promised to stretch years into the future – fighting Shiite foes, which were supposedly sponsored by Iran. As al Qaeda's power seemed to fade during 2007, that purpose filled what would otherwise have been a void in regard to reasons for a continued U.S. military role in the country.
Second, the assertion of Iranian troublemaking in Iraq provided a rationale for the limited attack on Iranian bases, which was Dick Cheney's ambition, and, thus, for a possible trigger for an Iranian response that could justify an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
But it also serves to divert attention from the embarrassing fact that the Bush administration and Iran have been backing the same horse in Iraq. Since early 2005, Iranian strategy has been centered on support for Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad, because those governments were led by and dependent on the political support of loyal Iraqi agents of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the time the IRGC had created the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa Party in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The Baghdad regime, therefore, represents a joint U.S.-Iranian condominium.
The "proxy war" propaganda claim has revolved around one central lie, which is that Iran has used "special groups," meaning militia groups that have broken away from Sadr, to try to force the United States out of Iraq and destabilize the Iraqi regime. The term "special groups" itself was invented not by Iran but by the U.S. military…"
Porter goes on to build up a devastating case against the mendacious constructs of Petraeus and his staff. He pinions the eager gullibility of Congress and press in swallowing the story. His piece alone is worth a subscripton to our twice-monthly newsletter.
Another excellent piece in the same newsletter is former US Senator Jim Abourezk's account of the White Clay whiskey peddlers selling alcoholic beverages to the Indians. This squalid epic goes back to the 1800s, and stretches forward to the present day. Jim was born on the Rosebud reservation, and became the nation's first Arab-American senator back in the 1970s, serving with great distinction. He remains a crusading lawyer in Sioux Falls and recounts his ongoing efforts to shut down the illegal liquor trade in White Clay which has caused so much human disaster.
Moving from the epic to the ridiculous, I have to hand Gerard DeGroot: The 60s Unplugged. A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly Decade. You think Todd Gitlin is silly? They just never let go. I write an unflattering assessment of DeGroot's preposterous work. All in the CounerPunch newsletter. Now, all you have to do is subscribe.
Ahmed Shawki and "Democracy Now"
Ahmed Shawki is usually a jovial fellow, as well as being one of the leading lights of the Trotskyist tendency known as the International Socialist Organization. What has made the Chicago-based Ahmed distinctly less jovial in the years since 9/11/2001 is unendingly bad treatment at airline security. Because of his name and ethnic contour he gets screwed around in all manner of outrageous ways.
Imagine, therefore, the fury and distress of Ahmed and his family when Amy Goodman's Democracy Now, on the unlucky day of Friday, June 13, ran a story on Shawki Ahmed Omar, an American citizen captured and detained in Iraq by United States military forces, without legal process and with no meaningful access to counsel. Democracy Now chose to illustrate this story on its site with a photograph of Ahmed Shawki, of Chicago. Dilligent efforts were immediately made to get Democracy Now to fix the problem on its site, but without getting any satisfaction from an apparently indifferent crew at the Temple of Goodman. Finally, in the middle of the following week, Goodman did okay a correction, albeit relocating Ahmed from Chicago to California.
I queried the ISO's Sharon Smith, who is married to Shawki, about the facts of the matter and here's how she answered:
Hi Alex,
No, Ahmed hasn't suddenly moved West. He still lives in Chicago, as he has since 1983. But an Ahmed Shawki with a California address is all we got in the way of a correction from DN! on Wednesday of this past week.
And even that took 5 days. After the photo appeared on Friday, June 13, presenting a photo of Ahmed Shawki from Chicago as the alleged terrorist Shawqi Ahmed Omar (please be sure that I do not wish to imply that Omar is an actual terrorist), Ahmed's photo stayed there for all the world to see until the following Monday morning. So for several days, Ahmed's photo was associated with a convicted Iraqi terrorist, and we had to wait until Wednesday for a broadcast correction (that erroneously stated Ahmed's residence as in California rather than Illinois).
Needless to say, this was a very traumatic experience for Ahmed. He faced racism before 9-11, but since then he has been pulled off airplanes and our family was driven out of our last neighborhood due to anti-Arab racism. And as we all know, various government agencies are not looking for facts, but only excuses, to further harass and incarcerate Arabs and Muslims. So this was a big deal for us. We had no direct contact with anyone at DN! but relied on mutual acquaintances to state our case, as soon as the photo appeared. We became increasingly frustrated, as the days went by and no action was taken to make this correction—which at some future point, could be crucial if Ahmed is targeted by one of the many agencies empowered to do so. Because we had no direct contact with DN!, we can't state with any accuracy what DN!'s official response was to this error on their part. And no one from DN ever attempted to contact Ahmed directly, either to apologize or to get the facts straight.
Needless to say, we are extremely disappointed by this outcome. We expected better from Democracy Now! which we have had, until now, nothing but respect. For those who purport to be bringing integrity back into the news media, we expected, well, a bit more integrity.
Sharon
In Russert's Wake
My dry-eyed remarks about Tim Russert here last week elicited a large number of enthusiastic letters from CounterPunchers astounded at the commotion at his passing. In a separate piece I did on Russert I concluded thus:
After the Watergate scandal was over in 1974 and Nixon bundled off in disgrace to California, Katharine Graham, chairman of the Washington Post Company and employer of Woodward and Bernstein, cautioned journalists: ""The press these days," she sternly told them, "should ... be rather careful about its role. We may have acquired some tendencies about over-involvement that we had better overcome. We had better not yield to the temptation to go on refighting the next war and see conspiracy and cover-up where they do not exist." Out of that warning came the failures to see conspiracy where it did exist, in the manufacture of the WMD threat and in the treatment of politics as business-as-usual, somewhat like a game -- an approach in which Russert excelled and which made him many friends and far too few enemies. He never had to lunch alone. In the 1880s, Joseph Pulitzer hung a sign in the newsroom of his paper, the New York World, which read: "The World has no friends." Russert, as the recent obsequies attest, had far too many.
A few days later, on June 25m came this amusing sequel from Chicago-based CounterPuncher, John Mauck:
Hey Alexander, Today on the Washington Post website, they had an online discussion with Len Downey [The Post's dreary editor]. Per your column I asked a simple question: Chicago: Hey Len, What is your opinion of Katharine Graham's quote: "The press these days should be rather careful about its role. We may have acquired some tendencies about over-involvement that we had better overcome. We had better not yield to the temptation to go on refighting the next war and see conspiracy and cover-up where they do not exist."
To this I got an amusing answer: Leonard Downie Jr.: It's timeless wisdom. She said that many years ago, and it was true then and it's true now. We keep that responsibility in mind every day." I thought that might crack you up. Keep up the Counterpunching!
A few other notes from my Russert mailbag:
Alex, You wrote, "Final question: Since NBC had a huge stake in Tim Russert's future ("Meet the Press" brought in $50 million a year and they paid him around $5 million a year) you'd have thought the network's executives would have taken a look at the tv screen and raised the alarm. Across the past three months he looked in increasingly awful shape, bright red in the face, overweight and sometimes with a slightly glazed, sad look. I told people I thought he was set to die of a heart attack right there in the studio, which is exactly what happened."
You weren't the only one, I never watched, but my mother-in-law, a retired nurse, thought the same thing. She saw him on MTP the Sunday before he died, and thought, he looks awful. She was really alarmed and wanted to call and urge that he get immediate medical attention!
Richard Estes
And this one from Tom Layman, in Champaign, Illinois:
Alex: Very insightful. I don't know how many times the honor-givers mentioned his interview with Cheney prior to the war as if merely asking a question lit a fire under Cheney's feet. But what stands out to me (& I have yet to bring this up elsewhere where I can reply) is his question to Dennis Kucinich in the primary debates about UFOs. The "Journalist of record" was making an obvious attempt to marginalize Dennis as a nut case. I don't recall anyone ever making that kind of leap with, say, Bush's claim that God wanted him to invade Iraq.
Tom
An architect in Nashville send this larger perspective on Russert:
Alexander:
Bravo! Finally someone speaks the truth. Sat. I was on a very challenging bike ride for my age (58, same age as Russert). I got back into biking after a bad back injury and was told it might help and was riding for a while beside a younger man(50) who was well.. rich he was riding an expensive bike. Anyway, he commented that he had left his high stress job where he was a CEO and got into this biking as it lowered his BP ( his BP was through the roof when he was CEO.) and that his Dad had died much as Tim Russert had at about the same age. "Hell he looked awful these past months" he commented.
I noted to him a number of male acquaintances, friends etc that had died of heart attacks between what I think are the make or break it years for men age 50-60.
The conversation started when he yelled to me "Hey have you noticed how no one is saying why Tim Russert died.. like working himself to death a true American role model".
He noted that he had the money but was heading in the same direction so he bought his "vanity bike" to try something else and it had led him to a better life.
Certainly there were other options for Tim also. Maybe not as drastic as giving up the helm as this ex CEO had but certainly working less hours and integrating some exercise or family and friend time in. I don't buy the family man stuff either. Way back when I had a more high profile job when my kids were very young one day they said "Daddy will you ever be home for Dinner?". I worked literally 20 minutes away and had nor been home in almost 2 years for dinner because of my job. I had gained 20 plus and smoked like hell and no exercise. Well this "OL" Marine quit that job (those type of jobs do not allow or at least in those days a way to work less) I was in my late 30's then and I still look back knowing it was the right move. I am still alive and saw my kids grow and shared much with them. I fared on the lousy side for a time for income and have not worked onprestigious projects but that all seems to mean less and less as I age.
Tennessee Architect
Nashville.
A distinctly unflattering one:
Alex,
Thanks for the article on the " Russert Send-Off ". The are some very revealing points. Like that of Russert not having any enemies despite 20 Years in the News Business. I was curious as to what his salary was and the figure you quote, 5 Million Dollars, is also revealing. Why should that be so revealing ? Let me touch upon a subject that was not brought up in your article.
In the Russert Send-Off NBC put a number of video interviews of News Media "Luminaries" and bio pieces on their website. One of those bio pieces focused on Russert's father who is quite elderly. And like most Octegenarians Russert's father has not been able to tend to his own needs. Up until recently the elder Russert has been forced to accept the generosity of his neighbors who prepared his meals and took care of his clothes. It was also revealed that Russert wanted to put his father in a "Senior Citizen's Home" against his father's wishes. You know, those places where you are warehoused until you have the dignity to kick-off. For someone like the younger Russert, with all his money, to do that to do that to his father shows you what type of family man he really was. I wonder if Russert Sr' s neighbors really know what old Tim's net worth really was ? And if they do what they think of him now ? Some "Family Man" !
Sincerely
Bob Marston
A man of the cloth had this to say:
I was sadden but not surprised that the news media ran amok and raised Mr. Russert higher than God. However, I do remember Mr. Russert, as you stated in the amen corner for the war, and I also remember that when the White House wanted to send out propaganda and disinformation, Russert was their man. Dick Cheney knew who to call, and why would Libby throw Russert name in the hat of who was told what? However, the mainstream news media had to make themselves look good especially after Scott McClellan throw them under the bus, so Russert's grandiose send off was a pat on the back for themselves. Furthermore, Russert grilled Obama about Farrakhan, but he seemed not to care about the war, poverty, economical downturns, and many of the social issues and other pertinent issues that this country faced, and Brian Williams was a part of the grilling team too. After all, these two so-called powerhouses could get away with it, just like Williams fabricated his story in Tennessee by stating that McCain was received well at the anniversary of Dr. King. McCain was booed so loudly, one could not hear the broadcast.
And to add to the knighting and apostleship of Russert, the media said that the rainbow in the sky was Russert's rainbow. However, someone's hermeneutics is displaced because the last time that I read the Old Testament, the rainbow was a covenant and a token to remind us that God would not destroy the earth in seed time and harvest by flood, and after seeing the floods in Illinois and Wisconsin, we certainly needed that reminder. Some may call me a busy body fanatical preacher, but so many lives have been lost because of the lies told to get us to Iraq, and now the oil companies hope to prosper, and Bushes Executive order 13303 will aid them. Finally, the mainstream news media has blood on its hand like Pilate, yet soap and water will not remove the stains. So in order to remove the blood stains, why not use Russert the same way as they used him along with others to sell this heinous criminal war.
Rev. S.D. Whitaker
And lastly, from Louisiana:
Hearing all this noise about Russert being such an astute political observer, I wondered whether I had missed this. He seemed somewhat conventional & low-octane prosaic to me, and a lot of his "sharp questioning" missed the mark. But the real thing I have against him is having Rush Limbaugh in his show & going on & on about how Limbaugh was a modern Walter Lippmann. In fact, I was wondering whether it was some sort of a joke, as not even Limbaugh harbored such a pretension. Limbaugh is basically an entertainer of modest, if not mediocre accomplishments, as well as an out-and-out flâneur. He has never made any claims to have inhabited a heavy-thinker bureau, but Russert slobbered all over him as if he were a philosopher king. Maybe there are some reactionaries who would earn such an encomium, but not Limbaugh or that low-life snob, William F. Buckley, jr. I never did get over how Russert was so gulled by Limbaugh & fawned over him disgustingly. Pretty soon we shall be free of all this weeping & moaning over Russert; but why didn't someone cite Don Vito Corleone? Remember when he asked Johnny Fontaine: "You spend time with your family?"
Donald Juneau
As the commotion began to subside, the New York Times ran a news story stuffed with self-aggrandizing quotes from doctors, all to the general effect that Russert had seemed to be in the best of health, his vital indicators seemed to be in the comfort zone, his pills seemed to be working, and then, gosh darn it, he keels over. Moral: the Reaper strikes when he wants and there ain't a thing a bunch of overpaid doctors can do about it.
So how come plenty of people were able to to a free, unsolicited diagnosis of T. Russert on TV and say, My God, call a doctor someone. That guy's in awful shape.
My Life with Thomas Mann
In his always entertaining and instructive column on this site The Musical Patriot David Yearsley this weekend describes the appalling sunburn inflicted on him by Thomas Mann, for reasons I shall not divulge, except to say Yearsley took Mann with him on holiday.
How many arms has Thomas Mann turned into spaghetti, lugging his vast novels around Europe in the vain hope that on some beach or restful glade the traveller will finally settle accounts with the Joseph Trilogy. When I left Oxford I took my girlfriend Jenny Barnes plus Joseph and his weighty Brothers on a tour of Mallorca. The vehicle was a Lambretta, and Thomas Mann x 3 rode postillion, right behind Jenny, who was right behind me. I wasn't used to the Lambretta or to the weight of three hardback vols of T. Mann. I would over-rev, the Lambretta would rise on its rear wheel and fall over backwards on top of Jenny and me and Thomas. One time this happened was right outside the gates of Robert Graves's house in Deya. I ripped my pants and sat on the Mann vols as Jenny sewed the pants up. Mann tagged along the whole of the trip, but I never got anywhere with him. A very over-rated novelist in my opinion.
Footnote: A shorter version of the first item in this Diary ran on The First Post last Friday. Alexander Cockburn can be reached at alexandercockburn@asis.com
For Oil Contracts, a Question of Motive - Peter Goodman, New York Times
For Oil Contracts, a Question of Motive - Peter Goodman, New York Times
The question hanging over Iraq is whether its natural endowment will be used to help create a sustainable new state, or will instead be managed in ways that reward the cronies and allies of the country whose army toppled Mr. Hussein. Or perhaps both at the same time. That basic question was yanked back to the fore recently when word emerged from Baghdad, in a report in The New York Times, that the Iraqi oil ministry was close to awarding contracts to service its oil fields to some of the largest Western oil companies. While relatively small, these contracts could serve as a foot in the door for much more lucrative licenses to explore widely for Iraqi oil. Some 40 companies from around the world had jockeyed for the contracts, but they were being awarded without competitive bids, the report said.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/weekinreview/29good.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin
The question hanging over Iraq is whether its natural endowment will be used to help create a sustainable new state, or will instead be managed in ways that reward the cronies and allies of the country whose army toppled Mr. Hussein. Or perhaps both at the same time. That basic question was yanked back to the fore recently when word emerged from Baghdad, in a report in The New York Times, that the Iraqi oil ministry was close to awarding contracts to service its oil fields to some of the largest Western oil companies. While relatively small, these contracts could serve as a foot in the door for much more lucrative licenses to explore widely for Iraqi oil. Some 40 companies from around the world had jockeyed for the contracts, but they were being awarded without competitive bids, the report said.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/weekinreview/29good.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin
More `Near-nuclear' States May Loom
More `Near-nuclear' States May Loom - Associated Press
At a recent meeting of members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ukrainian chairman sought to strike an upbeat note about the future, highlighting the "public and political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons." Volodyrmyr Yelchenko was right: Statesmen as diverse as Henry Kissinger and Mikhail Gorbachev have taken up the cause of "nuclear abolition." And this year's US presidential contenders both support a more favorable American stance toward arms control. But other forces are pushing back. Renewed interest in nuclear energy, to stem global warming, is expected to give more states the technological building blocks for a bomb. The continuing revelations about the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's network, which reportedly had blueprints for a compact weapon, show that globalized nuclear smuggling is growing more sophisticated and dangerous.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/28/AR2008062801237.html
At a recent meeting of members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ukrainian chairman sought to strike an upbeat note about the future, highlighting the "public and political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons." Volodyrmyr Yelchenko was right: Statesmen as diverse as Henry Kissinger and Mikhail Gorbachev have taken up the cause of "nuclear abolition." And this year's US presidential contenders both support a more favorable American stance toward arms control. But other forces are pushing back. Renewed interest in nuclear energy, to stem global warming, is expected to give more states the technological building blocks for a bomb. The continuing revelations about the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's network, which reportedly had blueprints for a compact weapon, show that globalized nuclear smuggling is growing more sophisticated and dangerous.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/28/AR2008062801237.html
Saturday, June 28, 2008
Iran: The Threat By Thomas Powers
The New York Review of Books
Volume 55, Number 12 · July 17, 2008
Iran: The Threat
By Thomas Powers
At a moment of serious challenge, battered by two wars, ballooning debt, and a faltering economy, the United States appears to have lost its capacity to think clearly. Consider what passes for national discussion on the matter of Iran. The open question is whether the United States should or will attack Iran if it continues to reject American demands to give up uranium enrichment. Ignore for the moment whether the United States has any legal or moral justification for attacking Iran. Set aside the question whether Iran, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently claimed in a speech at West Point, "is hellbent on acquiring nuclear weapons." Focus instead on purely practical questions. By any standards Iran is a tough nut to crack: it is nearly three times the size of Texas, with a population of 70 million and a big income from oil which the world cannot afford to lose. Iran is believed to have the ability to block the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf through which much of the world's oil must pass on its way to market.
Keep in mind that the rising price of oil already threatens the world's economy. Iran also has a large army and deep ties to the population of Shiite coreligionists next door in Iraq. The American military already has its hands full with a hard-to-manage war in Iraq, and is proposing to send additional combat brigades to deal with a growing insurgency in Afghanistan. And yet with all these sound reasons for avoiding war with Iran, the United States for five years has repeatedly threatened it with military attack. These threats have lately acquired a new edge.
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney are the primary authors of these threats, but others join them in proclaiming that "all options" must remain "on the table." The option they wish to emphasize is the option of military attack. The presidential candidates in the middle of this campaign year agree that Iran is a major security threat to the United States. Senator Hillary Clinton in the last days of April threatened to "totally obliterate" Iran—presumably with nuclear weapons—if it attacked Israel. Senator Barack Obama dismissed Clinton's threat as "bluster" in the familiar Bush style but agrees that Iran cannot be permitted to build nuclear weapons, and he too insists that a US attack on Iran is one of the options which must remain "on the table." The presumptive Republican candidate, John McCain, takes a position as unyielding as the President's: Iran must abandon nuclear enrichment, stop "meddling" in Iraq with support for Shiite militias, and stop its sponsorship of "terrorism" carried out by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Any of these threatening activities, in McCain's view, might justify a showdown with Iran.
Sometimes the President's threats are chillingly explicit. In April the administration released details of the intelligence that explained an Israeli air strike last September on a large, blocklike building in which Syria, with the help of North Korea, had allegedly been building a nuclear reactor. Releasing this information, Bush said in April, was Washington's way of "sending a message to Iran and the world for that matter about just how destabilizing nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East."
The message to Iran was clear—stop or run the risk of a similar attack. Left ambiguous was the question of attack by whom—Israel, which proved itself willing with the attack in Syria, or the United States, which has more planes and missiles at its command? The kind of attack Iran might expect has been spelled out in news stories over the last few years. Some Iranian nuclear research sites are buried as much as seventy meters underground, and there are scores, perhaps hundreds of sites in all, so any serious American effort to destroy Iranian nuclear programs would require intense and numerous strikes by US bombers and missiles. For a time some administration officials lobbied to include the use of nuclear weapons in the strike options for attacking Iran's protected nuclear targets, but vigorous opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff scotched that possibility two years ago.
Yet even conventional bombing attacks are acts of war; unprovoked they are acts of aggression. Iran has said it would respond to an attack but without specifying how. Possible counterattacks might target shipping in the Persian Gulf, or US forces in Iraq or Afghanistan, or something else the US has not anticipated. Such an exchange could not long be confined to tit for tat. An all-out American bombing program might force Iran to capitulate, or it might not. The next step would be invasion, destruction of Iran's conventional army, occupation of Iran's capital, and change of Iran's regime, which has long been an openly declared policy objective of the United States.
Is there anyone outside the US government who thinks it makes sense to invite trouble on this scale? Even some insiders are of two minds. "Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need," Gates said in his speech at West Point, "and, in fact, I believe it would be disastrous on a number of levels. But the military option must be kept on the table."
Forgive me, but why? The military option is a threat; if the threat is carried out it promises widening war and the possibility of failure on the scale of disaster. Why does a policy of courting disaster have to remain on the table?
Nothing in the modern affairs of nations has been more exhaustively analyzed and debated than the utility and dangers of nuclear weapons, and yet the dangers posed by Iran with a bomb have been barely discussed. They are treated as a given. The core idea is that Iran cannot be trusted because the country is run by religious fanatics crazy enough to use a bomb if they had one. This is not the first time such arguments have been made. Some Americans, including Air Force generals, believed in the late 1940s that a preemptive war against the Soviet Union was justified by the peril of Moscow with a bomb. Twenty years later the Russians, in their turn, were so alarmed by the prospect of Beijing with a bomb that they quietly proposed to the Americans a joint effort to destroy the Chinese nuclear development effort with a preemptive attack.
The world's experience with nuclear weapons to date has shown that nuclear powers do not use them, and they seriously threaten to use them only to deter attack. Britain, France, Russia, China, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all acquired nuclear weapons in spite of international opposition. None has behaved recklessly with its new power. What changes is that nuclear pow-ers have to be treated differently; in particular they cannot be casually threatened.
More recently the examples of Iraq and Libya have suggested that international sanctions work more effectively than military threats to persuade nations to give up bomb programs. As is now well known, American fears of Saddam Hussein with a bomb were unfounded. In early 2003, when the US was loudly insisting that only military invasion and regime change could keep Saddam from acquiring a bomb, the United Nations arms inspector Hans Blix said that whether the danger was real or imaginary could be determined by international weapons inspectors in a matter of months. In the event, the Americans themselves, after a year spent ransacking Iraq for evidence of nuclear weapons activity, announced that Saddam's bomb program had been completely shut down a dozen years previously, in 1991. But despite the success of sanctions against Iraq the United States continues to speak as if only threats or actual attack might block an Iranian bomb.
Official reluctance to spell out why Tehran more than other nations cannot be trusted with a bomb has been matched by reluctance to consider why Tehran might want one in the first place. Iran's nuclear weapons program began under the Shah in the 1970s, sputtered for a time after the revolution, and was then revived after the Persian Gulf war in 1991 which evicted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The Iranian government flatly denies that it is pursuing nuclear weapons, hell-bent or otherwise. Recently the CIA released its own conclusion that Tehran had abandoned any formal R&D effort to design nuclear weapons and fit them to a delivery system.
But whether or not that is or remains true is in one sense irrelevant; the hard part—say 90 percent of the challenge—in manufacturing nuclear weapons is making fissionable material, and in that Iran appears to be well on its way to success with its new, more efficient design of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. So set aside the question of whether Iran wants an enrichment program to make bomb-grade material or only for the production of electricity; if they get either, they could get both. It is a relatively—stress relatively—simple task to turn highly enriched uranium into a weapon. Iran with highly enriched uranium poses almost the same threat as Iran with a bomb. What we ought to ask, then, is why Iran wants its own production capacity for making the stuff of bombs?
What US officials say, when they say anything at all, is that Tehran wants a bomb in order to dominate the Persian Gulf region and to threaten its neighbors, especially Israel. This is a misreading of how other nuclear powers have made use of their weapons. As tools of coercive diplomacy nuclear weapons are almost entirely useless, but they are extremely effective in blocking large-scale or regime-threatening attack. There is no evidence that Iran has a different motive, and plenty of reason for Iran to fear that attack is a real possibility.
Indeed, the Bush administration, far from trying to quiet Iran's fears, makes a point of confirming them every few months. These threats are not limited to words, but are supported with practical steps—the presence of large American armies just across Iran's borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the dispatch of the world's largest fleet of warships to cruise along Iran's Persian Gulf coastline. The Bush administration further accuses Iran of "meddling" in the affairs of its neighbors, of supplying weapons and training to Iraqis who kill Americans, and of being the world's principal state sponsor of terrorism. Fear that Saddam Hussein might provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups was the leading American justification for the invasion of Iraq, and the same concern is often cited about Iran.
The seriousness of American threats is confirmed by the fact that no significant national leader in the United States has ever disowned or objected to them in clear, vigorous, principled language. It is as if the whole country listens to the administration's threats with breath held, wondering if Bush and Cheney really mean to do as they say, and in effect leaving the decision entirely to them. Americans may count on the President to think twice, but why would leaders in Tehran, responsible for the lives of 70 million citizens, want to depend on President Bush's restraint for their survival and safety? Bush has a history. On his own authority, without the sanction of any international body, he attacked Iraq five years ago and precipitated a bloody chain of events that shows no sign of ending. It would be natural, indeed inevitable, for any government in Tehran, seeing what has happened next door, to ask what could save Iran from a similar fate. An answer is not far to seek: nuclear weapons with a reliable delivery system could do that.
The continuing military occupation of Iraq, the expansion of military efforts in Afghanistan, the desire to carry the war against the Taliban across the border into Pakistan, and the resort to military threats to force the government of Iran to give up its nuclear programs all represent examples of what has become the American approach during the Bush years to getting what it wants in the world—relying on military force to resolve political problems. How else are we to explain two wars and the threat of a third? Sometime during the Clinton years a faction of the Republican Party in exile lost patience with the accepted way of conducting foreign relations. Talking, negotiating, proposing alternatives, cajoling allies with economic and military aid, taking conflicts to the United Nations, convening conferences, sitting on commissions and issuing, repeating, and underlining warnings—in short, all the other "options on the table"—came to be seen in certain Republican circles as time-wasting, irresolute, and futile—a pattern of weakness that invites defiance.
The argument of the neoconservatives, stated in its nakedest form at the outset of the Bush administration, notes that the United States is the world's sole great power. We have a military capability that dwarfs all others. We need not defer to weak and corrupt governments that treat us with disdain.
The change was already underway when the shock of the attacks on September 11 created something like a Dirty Harry moment—an abrupt end to patience, a breaking with civility, a rejection of pettifogging legality, a brushing aside of caution in the use of force, all those Aunt Sally hesitations which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld intended to root out as part of the Pentagon's "old think." The goal was a kind of internal liberation of the national psyche—comfort with the word "imperial," unashamed acceptance of power, eagerness to put "boots on the ground," plain talk with anybody who stood in our way, prompt action if they did not step aside. Preemption was the dominant word in the new national security strat-egy issued in 2002. At West Point that spring the President said, "America will not wait to be attacked again. We will confront emerging threats before they fully materialize." The idea was in effect to clean up Dodge—to stop fooling around, remove defiant regimes, and make the Middle East safe for America and its friends.
Rarely has a theory been quashed by reality more abruptly. Iraq, as we discovered after the capture of Baghdad, had in fact posed no threat whatever, and its occupation brought a host of expensive and intractable new problems that continue to sap American strength. In Afghanistan as well, little went as planned. The Taliban was removed, not destroyed, and gradually it has returned. Pakistan, once a chief American ally in the region, now resists American pressure to pursue the Taliban into Pakistan's tribal areas. In Iraq, most American initiatives during five years of war have had the effect of strengthening the Shiite friends and allies of Iran. The government in Baghdad confers often with Iran, and the influence of Iran is heavily felt in Lebanon and Gaza. Iran dismisses all threats aimed at its nuclear programs as if the United States and Israel were powerless.
With its time in power rapidly running out, the Bush administration is mired in two frustrating wars, stretched thin militarily, living on borrowed money, and exhausted intellectually. It would be hard to name a time when the United States faced a wider range of political problems, or had better reasons to avoid additional military entanglements. Bush and Cheney concede nothing of the kind, but promise "serious consequences" for continued Iranian defiance. It is a strange fact that the locus of opposition to attack on Iran is not in Congress but in the Pentagon, where an insider told the reporter Seymour Hersh two years ago, "There is a war about the war going on inside the building." When the administration planned to add a third aircraft carrier group to the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the move was blocked by the then newly promoted chief of Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, who told friends that war with Iran "isn't going to happen on my watch."
Until his resignation in March, Fallon often contradicted and undermined the tough talk of the administration, speaking dismissively about the prospects of war with Iran. "Another war is just not where we want to go," he told the Financial Times. "This constant drumbeat of conflict...is not helpful and not useful," he said to al-Jazeera television. In recent months Fallon also traveled in Afghanistan and spoke at candid length with the military writer Thomas Barnett, who was working on an article for Esquire. When the article was ready to go to the printer Fallon invited an Esquire photographer to Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, to take his picture. War with Iran, yes or no, Barnett wrote, would "all come down to one man"—Fallon. The White House was not happy with Fallon's interference, Barnett reported. Washington rumor said Fallon's time was short. His removal, Barnett predicted, "may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year...." A week after Barnett's piece appeared in Esquire, Gates announced that Fallon was retiring at his own request. The Esquire article had been the talk of the Pentagon nonstop; leaked stories were coming from all directions. Fallon wasn't just on his way out; Gates said he would be gone by the end of the month.
Fallon's open and outspoken resistance to the idea of war with Iran represents something new and extraordinary—maybe. It is too early to be sure. But beneath the surface of recent statements by Fallon, Gates, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, something large seems to be swelling up—resistance by the Pentagon to passive acceptance of a wider war. To see the shape of the conflict one must first accept the seriousness of both parties—the administration in making its threats to stop Iran's nuclear program, and Pentagon officials when they say a wider war would be practically difficult and strategically unnecessary.
This showdown—if it is truly taking place—has been a long time coming. Ten years ago a young Army major, H.R. McMaster, published a history of American escalation of the war in Vietnam, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. McMaster's argument, stripped to its core, was that against their own best judgment the joint chiefs passively acquiesced to White House pressure to expand the war. Johnson, with his eye on a second term, did not want to be the first American president to lose a war, and the joint chiefs did not want to run their careers aground. Despite the harshness of McMaster's conclusion his book was widely read in the Pentagon and made a deep impression on a generation of rising officers, many of them now of flag rank and in positions of responsibility.[*]
When a reporter asked Gates if Fallon's departure "means we're going to war with Iran," the secretary called the idea "ridiculous." But he didn't leave it at that. He began his own campaign of public remarks stressing the importance of a peaceful resolution of the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program. As he had at West Point, Gates held fast to the administration's basic stance—"all options are on the table"—but he drained the pugnacity of the claim with Fallon-like flourishes. "We need to figure out a way to develop some leverage...and then sit down and talk with them," Gates said in mid-May. "There is no doubt that... we would be very hard-pressed to fight another major conventional war right now." Admiral Mullen sounded a similar note when he recently told a television journalist in Israel that he was "very hopeful" that the US could avoid a conflict with Iran, which he evaluated as "a very significant challenge." Mullen added:
I certainly share the concern about Iran and about the leadership, and I think it is very important that we increase as much as possible the financial pressure, the diplomatic pressure, the political pressure, and at the same time keep all the military options on the table.
Develop some leverage...sit down and talk...financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, political pressure....
These are unfamiliar words coming from the Bush administration. They roughly echo the approach of Barack Obama, who has said he would "talk" to the leaders of Iran, meaning that he would commence discussion of serious issues without first demanding con-cessions. The Bush administration rejects this idea. A few years back, at a moment when Iran still had a relatively moderate president and was prepared to offer major concessions to the US, it refused to talk to Iran at all; now it is prepared to talk, but only after Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment program. The words are slightly altered, but the stance remains intransigent.
In his recent speech to the Israeli Knesset, Bush, without naming Obama, denounced his approach as "this foolish delusion," discredited in the 1930s when the British thought they could "talk" to Hitler. In the world according to the neoconservatives no failing of character is more craven or pusillanimous than a willingness to talk to fascists, Nazis, or dictators. Bush plunged the rhetorical knife in deep: "We have an obligation to call this what it is— the false comfort of appeasement."
Bush and Cheney prefer the language of flat command that implies "or else." A long list might be appended here of their frequent warnings that the United States does not trust Iran with the knowledge to enrich bomb-grade uranium and will not tolerate an Iranian bomb. Many of these warnings have been issued in the last month or two and we may expect a continuing barrage until their final days in office. The President's frustration is plainly evident: Saddam Hussein may be gone, but Iran remains defiant, and more powerful than ever. The President's male pride seems to have been aroused; he said he was going to solve the Iranian problem and he doesn't want to back down. The intensity of Bush's desire to crush this final opponent is evident in his words and his body language, but does he retain the power to carry out his threats?
From one point of view the answer seems obvious. It is too late. With the exception only of the neoconservative faithful, every close observer of the American–Iranian standoff says that the administration's threats are empty, that the United States does not have the military resources, or the political support at home, or the agreement of allies abroad, to carry out a full-scale air attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, much less to invade and occupy the country. Two of the skeptics, Gates and Mullen, are running the Pentagon, and their cautioning remarks, only a step this side of insubordination, would seem to make attack impossible. But if attack is impossible, why does Bush talk himself into an ever-tighter corner by continuing to issue threats? Does he believe Iran will cave? Are these the only words he thinks people will still listen to? Is he hoping to tie the hands of the next president? Or is he preparing to summon the power of his office to carry out the last option on the table? One hardly knows whether to take the question seriously. It seems alarmist and overexcited even to pose it when the realities are so clear. But it is impossible to be sure—Bush has a history.
In an article I wrote in these pages in March 2003, I took up a concern that has preoccupied me ever since—the danger that the war would spread to engulf the region. That article concludes:
But a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein won't by itself provide a "decision outcome" in the present case because there are two rogue states with programs to build nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The theory says that both have to go, and if President Bush can be taken at his word, he thinks the same thing. To me, the implication seems clear: Iraq first, Iran next.
We're not free of this danger yet.
—June 19, 2008
Notes
[*] McMaster, a 1984 graduate of West Point, went on to distinguish himself in Iraq, where he later served as an adviser to the American commander there, General David Petraeus. His name was recently added by Petraeus to an official Army list of nominees for promotion to brigadier general. McMaster is also one of the Army's leading theorists of counterinsurgency.
Volume 55, Number 12 · July 17, 2008
Iran: The Threat
By Thomas Powers
At a moment of serious challenge, battered by two wars, ballooning debt, and a faltering economy, the United States appears to have lost its capacity to think clearly. Consider what passes for national discussion on the matter of Iran. The open question is whether the United States should or will attack Iran if it continues to reject American demands to give up uranium enrichment. Ignore for the moment whether the United States has any legal or moral justification for attacking Iran. Set aside the question whether Iran, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently claimed in a speech at West Point, "is hellbent on acquiring nuclear weapons." Focus instead on purely practical questions. By any standards Iran is a tough nut to crack: it is nearly three times the size of Texas, with a population of 70 million and a big income from oil which the world cannot afford to lose. Iran is believed to have the ability to block the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf through which much of the world's oil must pass on its way to market.
Keep in mind that the rising price of oil already threatens the world's economy. Iran also has a large army and deep ties to the population of Shiite coreligionists next door in Iraq. The American military already has its hands full with a hard-to-manage war in Iraq, and is proposing to send additional combat brigades to deal with a growing insurgency in Afghanistan. And yet with all these sound reasons for avoiding war with Iran, the United States for five years has repeatedly threatened it with military attack. These threats have lately acquired a new edge.
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney are the primary authors of these threats, but others join them in proclaiming that "all options" must remain "on the table." The option they wish to emphasize is the option of military attack. The presidential candidates in the middle of this campaign year agree that Iran is a major security threat to the United States. Senator Hillary Clinton in the last days of April threatened to "totally obliterate" Iran—presumably with nuclear weapons—if it attacked Israel. Senator Barack Obama dismissed Clinton's threat as "bluster" in the familiar Bush style but agrees that Iran cannot be permitted to build nuclear weapons, and he too insists that a US attack on Iran is one of the options which must remain "on the table." The presumptive Republican candidate, John McCain, takes a position as unyielding as the President's: Iran must abandon nuclear enrichment, stop "meddling" in Iraq with support for Shiite militias, and stop its sponsorship of "terrorism" carried out by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Any of these threatening activities, in McCain's view, might justify a showdown with Iran.
Sometimes the President's threats are chillingly explicit. In April the administration released details of the intelligence that explained an Israeli air strike last September on a large, blocklike building in which Syria, with the help of North Korea, had allegedly been building a nuclear reactor. Releasing this information, Bush said in April, was Washington's way of "sending a message to Iran and the world for that matter about just how destabilizing nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East."
The message to Iran was clear—stop or run the risk of a similar attack. Left ambiguous was the question of attack by whom—Israel, which proved itself willing with the attack in Syria, or the United States, which has more planes and missiles at its command? The kind of attack Iran might expect has been spelled out in news stories over the last few years. Some Iranian nuclear research sites are buried as much as seventy meters underground, and there are scores, perhaps hundreds of sites in all, so any serious American effort to destroy Iranian nuclear programs would require intense and numerous strikes by US bombers and missiles. For a time some administration officials lobbied to include the use of nuclear weapons in the strike options for attacking Iran's protected nuclear targets, but vigorous opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff scotched that possibility two years ago.
Yet even conventional bombing attacks are acts of war; unprovoked they are acts of aggression. Iran has said it would respond to an attack but without specifying how. Possible counterattacks might target shipping in the Persian Gulf, or US forces in Iraq or Afghanistan, or something else the US has not anticipated. Such an exchange could not long be confined to tit for tat. An all-out American bombing program might force Iran to capitulate, or it might not. The next step would be invasion, destruction of Iran's conventional army, occupation of Iran's capital, and change of Iran's regime, which has long been an openly declared policy objective of the United States.
Is there anyone outside the US government who thinks it makes sense to invite trouble on this scale? Even some insiders are of two minds. "Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need," Gates said in his speech at West Point, "and, in fact, I believe it would be disastrous on a number of levels. But the military option must be kept on the table."
Forgive me, but why? The military option is a threat; if the threat is carried out it promises widening war and the possibility of failure on the scale of disaster. Why does a policy of courting disaster have to remain on the table?
Nothing in the modern affairs of nations has been more exhaustively analyzed and debated than the utility and dangers of nuclear weapons, and yet the dangers posed by Iran with a bomb have been barely discussed. They are treated as a given. The core idea is that Iran cannot be trusted because the country is run by religious fanatics crazy enough to use a bomb if they had one. This is not the first time such arguments have been made. Some Americans, including Air Force generals, believed in the late 1940s that a preemptive war against the Soviet Union was justified by the peril of Moscow with a bomb. Twenty years later the Russians, in their turn, were so alarmed by the prospect of Beijing with a bomb that they quietly proposed to the Americans a joint effort to destroy the Chinese nuclear development effort with a preemptive attack.
The world's experience with nuclear weapons to date has shown that nuclear powers do not use them, and they seriously threaten to use them only to deter attack. Britain, France, Russia, China, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all acquired nuclear weapons in spite of international opposition. None has behaved recklessly with its new power. What changes is that nuclear pow-ers have to be treated differently; in particular they cannot be casually threatened.
More recently the examples of Iraq and Libya have suggested that international sanctions work more effectively than military threats to persuade nations to give up bomb programs. As is now well known, American fears of Saddam Hussein with a bomb were unfounded. In early 2003, when the US was loudly insisting that only military invasion and regime change could keep Saddam from acquiring a bomb, the United Nations arms inspector Hans Blix said that whether the danger was real or imaginary could be determined by international weapons inspectors in a matter of months. In the event, the Americans themselves, after a year spent ransacking Iraq for evidence of nuclear weapons activity, announced that Saddam's bomb program had been completely shut down a dozen years previously, in 1991. But despite the success of sanctions against Iraq the United States continues to speak as if only threats or actual attack might block an Iranian bomb.
Official reluctance to spell out why Tehran more than other nations cannot be trusted with a bomb has been matched by reluctance to consider why Tehran might want one in the first place. Iran's nuclear weapons program began under the Shah in the 1970s, sputtered for a time after the revolution, and was then revived after the Persian Gulf war in 1991 which evicted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The Iranian government flatly denies that it is pursuing nuclear weapons, hell-bent or otherwise. Recently the CIA released its own conclusion that Tehran had abandoned any formal R&D effort to design nuclear weapons and fit them to a delivery system.
But whether or not that is or remains true is in one sense irrelevant; the hard part—say 90 percent of the challenge—in manufacturing nuclear weapons is making fissionable material, and in that Iran appears to be well on its way to success with its new, more efficient design of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. So set aside the question of whether Iran wants an enrichment program to make bomb-grade material or only for the production of electricity; if they get either, they could get both. It is a relatively—stress relatively—simple task to turn highly enriched uranium into a weapon. Iran with highly enriched uranium poses almost the same threat as Iran with a bomb. What we ought to ask, then, is why Iran wants its own production capacity for making the stuff of bombs?
What US officials say, when they say anything at all, is that Tehran wants a bomb in order to dominate the Persian Gulf region and to threaten its neighbors, especially Israel. This is a misreading of how other nuclear powers have made use of their weapons. As tools of coercive diplomacy nuclear weapons are almost entirely useless, but they are extremely effective in blocking large-scale or regime-threatening attack. There is no evidence that Iran has a different motive, and plenty of reason for Iran to fear that attack is a real possibility.
Indeed, the Bush administration, far from trying to quiet Iran's fears, makes a point of confirming them every few months. These threats are not limited to words, but are supported with practical steps—the presence of large American armies just across Iran's borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the dispatch of the world's largest fleet of warships to cruise along Iran's Persian Gulf coastline. The Bush administration further accuses Iran of "meddling" in the affairs of its neighbors, of supplying weapons and training to Iraqis who kill Americans, and of being the world's principal state sponsor of terrorism. Fear that Saddam Hussein might provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups was the leading American justification for the invasion of Iraq, and the same concern is often cited about Iran.
The seriousness of American threats is confirmed by the fact that no significant national leader in the United States has ever disowned or objected to them in clear, vigorous, principled language. It is as if the whole country listens to the administration's threats with breath held, wondering if Bush and Cheney really mean to do as they say, and in effect leaving the decision entirely to them. Americans may count on the President to think twice, but why would leaders in Tehran, responsible for the lives of 70 million citizens, want to depend on President Bush's restraint for their survival and safety? Bush has a history. On his own authority, without the sanction of any international body, he attacked Iraq five years ago and precipitated a bloody chain of events that shows no sign of ending. It would be natural, indeed inevitable, for any government in Tehran, seeing what has happened next door, to ask what could save Iran from a similar fate. An answer is not far to seek: nuclear weapons with a reliable delivery system could do that.
The continuing military occupation of Iraq, the expansion of military efforts in Afghanistan, the desire to carry the war against the Taliban across the border into Pakistan, and the resort to military threats to force the government of Iran to give up its nuclear programs all represent examples of what has become the American approach during the Bush years to getting what it wants in the world—relying on military force to resolve political problems. How else are we to explain two wars and the threat of a third? Sometime during the Clinton years a faction of the Republican Party in exile lost patience with the accepted way of conducting foreign relations. Talking, negotiating, proposing alternatives, cajoling allies with economic and military aid, taking conflicts to the United Nations, convening conferences, sitting on commissions and issuing, repeating, and underlining warnings—in short, all the other "options on the table"—came to be seen in certain Republican circles as time-wasting, irresolute, and futile—a pattern of weakness that invites defiance.
The argument of the neoconservatives, stated in its nakedest form at the outset of the Bush administration, notes that the United States is the world's sole great power. We have a military capability that dwarfs all others. We need not defer to weak and corrupt governments that treat us with disdain.
The change was already underway when the shock of the attacks on September 11 created something like a Dirty Harry moment—an abrupt end to patience, a breaking with civility, a rejection of pettifogging legality, a brushing aside of caution in the use of force, all those Aunt Sally hesitations which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld intended to root out as part of the Pentagon's "old think." The goal was a kind of internal liberation of the national psyche—comfort with the word "imperial," unashamed acceptance of power, eagerness to put "boots on the ground," plain talk with anybody who stood in our way, prompt action if they did not step aside. Preemption was the dominant word in the new national security strat-egy issued in 2002. At West Point that spring the President said, "America will not wait to be attacked again. We will confront emerging threats before they fully materialize." The idea was in effect to clean up Dodge—to stop fooling around, remove defiant regimes, and make the Middle East safe for America and its friends.
Rarely has a theory been quashed by reality more abruptly. Iraq, as we discovered after the capture of Baghdad, had in fact posed no threat whatever, and its occupation brought a host of expensive and intractable new problems that continue to sap American strength. In Afghanistan as well, little went as planned. The Taliban was removed, not destroyed, and gradually it has returned. Pakistan, once a chief American ally in the region, now resists American pressure to pursue the Taliban into Pakistan's tribal areas. In Iraq, most American initiatives during five years of war have had the effect of strengthening the Shiite friends and allies of Iran. The government in Baghdad confers often with Iran, and the influence of Iran is heavily felt in Lebanon and Gaza. Iran dismisses all threats aimed at its nuclear programs as if the United States and Israel were powerless.
With its time in power rapidly running out, the Bush administration is mired in two frustrating wars, stretched thin militarily, living on borrowed money, and exhausted intellectually. It would be hard to name a time when the United States faced a wider range of political problems, or had better reasons to avoid additional military entanglements. Bush and Cheney concede nothing of the kind, but promise "serious consequences" for continued Iranian defiance. It is a strange fact that the locus of opposition to attack on Iran is not in Congress but in the Pentagon, where an insider told the reporter Seymour Hersh two years ago, "There is a war about the war going on inside the building." When the administration planned to add a third aircraft carrier group to the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the move was blocked by the then newly promoted chief of Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, who told friends that war with Iran "isn't going to happen on my watch."
Until his resignation in March, Fallon often contradicted and undermined the tough talk of the administration, speaking dismissively about the prospects of war with Iran. "Another war is just not where we want to go," he told the Financial Times. "This constant drumbeat of conflict...is not helpful and not useful," he said to al-Jazeera television. In recent months Fallon also traveled in Afghanistan and spoke at candid length with the military writer Thomas Barnett, who was working on an article for Esquire. When the article was ready to go to the printer Fallon invited an Esquire photographer to Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, to take his picture. War with Iran, yes or no, Barnett wrote, would "all come down to one man"—Fallon. The White House was not happy with Fallon's interference, Barnett reported. Washington rumor said Fallon's time was short. His removal, Barnett predicted, "may well mean that the president and vice-president intend to take military action against Iran before the end of this year...." A week after Barnett's piece appeared in Esquire, Gates announced that Fallon was retiring at his own request. The Esquire article had been the talk of the Pentagon nonstop; leaked stories were coming from all directions. Fallon wasn't just on his way out; Gates said he would be gone by the end of the month.
Fallon's open and outspoken resistance to the idea of war with Iran represents something new and extraordinary—maybe. It is too early to be sure. But beneath the surface of recent statements by Fallon, Gates, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, something large seems to be swelling up—resistance by the Pentagon to passive acceptance of a wider war. To see the shape of the conflict one must first accept the seriousness of both parties—the administration in making its threats to stop Iran's nuclear program, and Pentagon officials when they say a wider war would be practically difficult and strategically unnecessary.
This showdown—if it is truly taking place—has been a long time coming. Ten years ago a young Army major, H.R. McMaster, published a history of American escalation of the war in Vietnam, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. McMaster's argument, stripped to its core, was that against their own best judgment the joint chiefs passively acquiesced to White House pressure to expand the war. Johnson, with his eye on a second term, did not want to be the first American president to lose a war, and the joint chiefs did not want to run their careers aground. Despite the harshness of McMaster's conclusion his book was widely read in the Pentagon and made a deep impression on a generation of rising officers, many of them now of flag rank and in positions of responsibility.[*]
When a reporter asked Gates if Fallon's departure "means we're going to war with Iran," the secretary called the idea "ridiculous." But he didn't leave it at that. He began his own campaign of public remarks stressing the importance of a peaceful resolution of the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program. As he had at West Point, Gates held fast to the administration's basic stance—"all options are on the table"—but he drained the pugnacity of the claim with Fallon-like flourishes. "We need to figure out a way to develop some leverage...and then sit down and talk with them," Gates said in mid-May. "There is no doubt that... we would be very hard-pressed to fight another major conventional war right now." Admiral Mullen sounded a similar note when he recently told a television journalist in Israel that he was "very hopeful" that the US could avoid a conflict with Iran, which he evaluated as "a very significant challenge." Mullen added:
I certainly share the concern about Iran and about the leadership, and I think it is very important that we increase as much as possible the financial pressure, the diplomatic pressure, the political pressure, and at the same time keep all the military options on the table.
Develop some leverage...sit down and talk...financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, political pressure....
These are unfamiliar words coming from the Bush administration. They roughly echo the approach of Barack Obama, who has said he would "talk" to the leaders of Iran, meaning that he would commence discussion of serious issues without first demanding con-cessions. The Bush administration rejects this idea. A few years back, at a moment when Iran still had a relatively moderate president and was prepared to offer major concessions to the US, it refused to talk to Iran at all; now it is prepared to talk, but only after Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment program. The words are slightly altered, but the stance remains intransigent.
In his recent speech to the Israeli Knesset, Bush, without naming Obama, denounced his approach as "this foolish delusion," discredited in the 1930s when the British thought they could "talk" to Hitler. In the world according to the neoconservatives no failing of character is more craven or pusillanimous than a willingness to talk to fascists, Nazis, or dictators. Bush plunged the rhetorical knife in deep: "We have an obligation to call this what it is— the false comfort of appeasement."
Bush and Cheney prefer the language of flat command that implies "or else." A long list might be appended here of their frequent warnings that the United States does not trust Iran with the knowledge to enrich bomb-grade uranium and will not tolerate an Iranian bomb. Many of these warnings have been issued in the last month or two and we may expect a continuing barrage until their final days in office. The President's frustration is plainly evident: Saddam Hussein may be gone, but Iran remains defiant, and more powerful than ever. The President's male pride seems to have been aroused; he said he was going to solve the Iranian problem and he doesn't want to back down. The intensity of Bush's desire to crush this final opponent is evident in his words and his body language, but does he retain the power to carry out his threats?
From one point of view the answer seems obvious. It is too late. With the exception only of the neoconservative faithful, every close observer of the American–Iranian standoff says that the administration's threats are empty, that the United States does not have the military resources, or the political support at home, or the agreement of allies abroad, to carry out a full-scale air attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure, much less to invade and occupy the country. Two of the skeptics, Gates and Mullen, are running the Pentagon, and their cautioning remarks, only a step this side of insubordination, would seem to make attack impossible. But if attack is impossible, why does Bush talk himself into an ever-tighter corner by continuing to issue threats? Does he believe Iran will cave? Are these the only words he thinks people will still listen to? Is he hoping to tie the hands of the next president? Or is he preparing to summon the power of his office to carry out the last option on the table? One hardly knows whether to take the question seriously. It seems alarmist and overexcited even to pose it when the realities are so clear. But it is impossible to be sure—Bush has a history.
In an article I wrote in these pages in March 2003, I took up a concern that has preoccupied me ever since—the danger that the war would spread to engulf the region. That article concludes:
But a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein won't by itself provide a "decision outcome" in the present case because there are two rogue states with programs to build nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The theory says that both have to go, and if President Bush can be taken at his word, he thinks the same thing. To me, the implication seems clear: Iraq first, Iran next.
We're not free of this danger yet.
—June 19, 2008
Notes
[*] McMaster, a 1984 graduate of West Point, went on to distinguish himself in Iraq, where he later served as an adviser to the American commander there, General David Petraeus. His name was recently added by Petraeus to an official Army list of nominees for promotion to brigadier general. McMaster is also one of the Army's leading theorists of counterinsurgency.
Prisons of war, furnaces of radicalism: The global detention policy of the United States and its allies is incubating the insurgents of the future.
OPEN DEMOCRACY
6/26/08
Prisons of war, furnaces of radicalism: The global detention policy of the United States and its allies is incubating the insurgents of the future.
Paul Rogers
A long-term consequence of the Iraq war is the production of a new generation of young paramilitaries with combat experience in urban environments against the world's best equipped army (see "Afghanistan in an amorphous war", 19 June 2008). Even if the conflict in Iraq does ease in the coming months, the experience of combat there will serve well an al-Qaida movement that measures its aims in decades rather than years.
The battalions of paramilitaries in Afghanistan that fought against Soviet conscripts in the 1980s war operated in a largely rural environment, in a conflict very different from its successor. Indeed, in one of the many "blowback" effects of the "war on terror", the methods and technologies that have been learned in Iraq have now been exported back to Afghanistan. The use of roadside-bombs, for example, has escalated alarmingly in the first half of 2008, demonstrating the skills of Taliban militias as they develop their guerrilla tactics.
The jail blowback
If the combat experience gained in Iraq has been one aid to the paramilitary movements, another has been the unexpected effect of the holding by the United States and its allies of large numbers of people without trial, sometimes for years on end. The overall figures are difficult to assess, although there were indications in 2007 that at least 120,000 people have been detained since 9/11. The great majority of these have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the incarcerated also include some thousands of people across the middle east and south Asia, and hundreds in Europe.
Some details surface from time to time. It is known, for example, that the United States forces in Afghanistan are building a new prison at Bagram capable of housing 600 long-term and up to 1,100 short-term prisoners (see "A world beyond control", 22 May 2008). This is in addition to, and outside the control of, the Afghan prison system. The numbers are far higher in Iraq, where the US forces are currently detaining 21,000 Iraqis - a number exceeded by thousands more held in Iraqi prisons. The American-held number represents a decrease of 4,000 from mid-2007, though US contractors are in the process of building new prisons in the country, such as one in Taji near Baghdad (see Walter Pincus, "U.S. Official Cites 'Hardening' Of Iraqi Detainees", Washington Post, 10 June 2008).
In addition, there is a constant throughput of detainees as new people are imprisoned and others are released. At present, thirty people are detained and imprisoned by US forces every day, while fifty are released. This explains the net drop in overall numbers but also means that, at current rates, about 10,000 more Iraqis experience detention in the US system each year.
US sources report that their own personnel are getting more efficient at determining which detainees are the most radical and will be kept in prison for long periods of time. They estimate that there are approximately 8,000 detainees who cannot be proved to have committed crimes under the Iraqi judicial system and cannot therefore be handed over to the Iraqi for trial. These are people, though, who are deemed to pose such serious security threats that they must be incarcerate even without judicial process.
What this means is that there are many thousands of "hard-core" detainees in the prisons who are interacting repeatedly with much greater numbers coming through the system. It has to be remembered that all of these people are being detained without trial by what is seen as a foreign occupying force. The potential for radicalisation within prison, let alone the impact on their friends and families, is therefore considerable.
In a related issue, there has been recurrent concern within the British prison system that convicted Muslim prisoners will do their best to proselytise fellow Muslim convicts in prison for non-political offences (see Jamie Doward, "Extremists train young convicts for terror plots", Observer, 15 July 2007). The chief prisons inspector, Anne Owers, drew attention to this issue in supporting the work of Muslim chaplains while highlighting a lack of training for prison officers (see Dominic Casciani, "Warning over jail radicalisation", BBC News, 14 April 2008).
The enemy effect
The worries reflected in the British reports are shared elsewhere. The most striking example comes from the most closely guarded and controversial detention centre - Guantánamo in Cuba (see David Rose, "Guantánamo: America's war on human rights
", 23 September 2004). A remarkable report by one of the best informed of US journalists, Tom Lasseter of McClatchy Newspapers, gives some indication of the extent of the problem (see Tom Lasseter, "How Guantánamo became a terror training ground", Miami Herald, 17 June 2008).
He starts with an example that is worth quoting in full:
"Mohammed Naim Farouq was a thug in the lawless Zormat district of eastern Afghanistan. He ran a kidnapping and extortion racket, and he controlled his turf with a band of gunmen who rode around in trucks with AK-47 rifles."
"US troops detained him in 2002, although he had no clear ties to the Taliban or al-Qaida. By the time Farouq was released from the Guantánamo Bay detention camp the following year, however - after more than twelve months of what he described as abuse and humiliation at the hands of American soldiers - he'd made connections to high-level militants."
"In fact, he had become a Taliban leader. When the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency released a stack of 20 'most wanted' playing cards in 2006 identifying militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan - with Osama bin Laden at the top - Farouq was 16 cards into the deck."
The detention
In a detailed survey by the McClatchy newspaper group, sixty-six former Guantánamo detainees were interviewed and gave a picture of abuse and mistreatment of prisoners that served to build up considerable anger, resentment and above all, a pervasive anti-American mood. What also became clear, both from former detainees and some informal contacts in the US defence department, was that convinced Islamists were adept at using the prison system and the feelings of ordinary detainees to build up a group of potential recruits to their cause.
Some of the techniques were sophisticated, even if they were exploiting the kinds of structures and lines of communication that exist in most prisons. After the original Camp X-ray at Guantánamo had been replaced by Camp Delta, the detention-centre was organised into a series of units that varied in the severity of treatment depending on the perceived security threats from detainees. Those considered most dangerous and difficult were assigned to the most secure units whereas others, including many prisoners with no jihadist connections, were assigned to easier units.
However, even middle-ranking al-Qaida supporters were sufficiently experienced to avoid drawing attention to themselves, so that they could end up in an "easy" unit where they could concentrate on proselytising other inmates. As Lasseter puts it: "An angry cab driver from Kabul... may have been more likely to attack a guard and end up in Camp Three [high security] than an al Qaeda militant was." Furthermore, senior al-Qaida leaders could order middle-level supporters to cause trouble so that they would end up in a high security unit, enabling them to deliver messages as part of an effective communications network.
Lasseter's report is primarily significant because it is describing circumstances in a particularly high-security detention centre that is very well resourced and has a substantial staff of guards and detention specialists. In Iraq, the US military are dealing with tens of thousands of detainees, the great majority of whom do not turn out to be dangerous insurgents or paramilitary radicals. If even Guantánamo, with all its security and organisation, can be a paramilitary recruiting-station, then much larger and more loosely organised prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan may well be far more potent.
What this suggests, yet once more, is that yet another part of America's "war on terror" - the detention of over 120,000 people - stands to be deeply counterproductive. The end results may not become clear for years or even decades but, once again, the United States is inadvertently doing al-Qaida's job for it.
6/26/08
Prisons of war, furnaces of radicalism: The global detention policy of the United States and its allies is incubating the insurgents of the future.
Paul Rogers
A long-term consequence of the Iraq war is the production of a new generation of young paramilitaries with combat experience in urban environments against the world's best equipped army (see "Afghanistan in an amorphous war", 19 June 2008). Even if the conflict in Iraq does ease in the coming months, the experience of combat there will serve well an al-Qaida movement that measures its aims in decades rather than years.
The battalions of paramilitaries in Afghanistan that fought against Soviet conscripts in the 1980s war operated in a largely rural environment, in a conflict very different from its successor. Indeed, in one of the many "blowback" effects of the "war on terror", the methods and technologies that have been learned in Iraq have now been exported back to Afghanistan. The use of roadside-bombs, for example, has escalated alarmingly in the first half of 2008, demonstrating the skills of Taliban militias as they develop their guerrilla tactics.
The jail blowback
If the combat experience gained in Iraq has been one aid to the paramilitary movements, another has been the unexpected effect of the holding by the United States and its allies of large numbers of people without trial, sometimes for years on end. The overall figures are difficult to assess, although there were indications in 2007 that at least 120,000 people have been detained since 9/11. The great majority of these have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the incarcerated also include some thousands of people across the middle east and south Asia, and hundreds in Europe.
Some details surface from time to time. It is known, for example, that the United States forces in Afghanistan are building a new prison at Bagram capable of housing 600 long-term and up to 1,100 short-term prisoners (see "A world beyond control", 22 May 2008). This is in addition to, and outside the control of, the Afghan prison system. The numbers are far higher in Iraq, where the US forces are currently detaining 21,000 Iraqis - a number exceeded by thousands more held in Iraqi prisons. The American-held number represents a decrease of 4,000 from mid-2007, though US contractors are in the process of building new prisons in the country, such as one in Taji near Baghdad (see Walter Pincus, "U.S. Official Cites 'Hardening' Of Iraqi Detainees", Washington Post, 10 June 2008).
In addition, there is a constant throughput of detainees as new people are imprisoned and others are released. At present, thirty people are detained and imprisoned by US forces every day, while fifty are released. This explains the net drop in overall numbers but also means that, at current rates, about 10,000 more Iraqis experience detention in the US system each year.
US sources report that their own personnel are getting more efficient at determining which detainees are the most radical and will be kept in prison for long periods of time. They estimate that there are approximately 8,000 detainees who cannot be proved to have committed crimes under the Iraqi judicial system and cannot therefore be handed over to the Iraqi for trial. These are people, though, who are deemed to pose such serious security threats that they must be incarcerate even without judicial process.
What this means is that there are many thousands of "hard-core" detainees in the prisons who are interacting repeatedly with much greater numbers coming through the system. It has to be remembered that all of these people are being detained without trial by what is seen as a foreign occupying force. The potential for radicalisation within prison, let alone the impact on their friends and families, is therefore considerable.
In a related issue, there has been recurrent concern within the British prison system that convicted Muslim prisoners will do their best to proselytise fellow Muslim convicts in prison for non-political offences (see Jamie Doward, "Extremists train young convicts for terror plots", Observer, 15 July 2007). The chief prisons inspector, Anne Owers, drew attention to this issue in supporting the work of Muslim chaplains while highlighting a lack of training for prison officers (see Dominic Casciani, "Warning over jail radicalisation", BBC News, 14 April 2008).
The enemy effect
The worries reflected in the British reports are shared elsewhere. The most striking example comes from the most closely guarded and controversial detention centre - Guantánamo in Cuba (see David Rose, "Guantánamo: America's war on human rights
", 23 September 2004). A remarkable report by one of the best informed of US journalists, Tom Lasseter of McClatchy Newspapers, gives some indication of the extent of the problem (see Tom Lasseter, "How Guantánamo became a terror training ground", Miami Herald, 17 June 2008).
He starts with an example that is worth quoting in full:
"Mohammed Naim Farouq was a thug in the lawless Zormat district of eastern Afghanistan. He ran a kidnapping and extortion racket, and he controlled his turf with a band of gunmen who rode around in trucks with AK-47 rifles."
"US troops detained him in 2002, although he had no clear ties to the Taliban or al-Qaida. By the time Farouq was released from the Guantánamo Bay detention camp the following year, however - after more than twelve months of what he described as abuse and humiliation at the hands of American soldiers - he'd made connections to high-level militants."
"In fact, he had become a Taliban leader. When the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency released a stack of 20 'most wanted' playing cards in 2006 identifying militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan - with Osama bin Laden at the top - Farouq was 16 cards into the deck."
The detention
In a detailed survey by the McClatchy newspaper group, sixty-six former Guantánamo detainees were interviewed and gave a picture of abuse and mistreatment of prisoners that served to build up considerable anger, resentment and above all, a pervasive anti-American mood. What also became clear, both from former detainees and some informal contacts in the US defence department, was that convinced Islamists were adept at using the prison system and the feelings of ordinary detainees to build up a group of potential recruits to their cause.
Some of the techniques were sophisticated, even if they were exploiting the kinds of structures and lines of communication that exist in most prisons. After the original Camp X-ray at Guantánamo had been replaced by Camp Delta, the detention-centre was organised into a series of units that varied in the severity of treatment depending on the perceived security threats from detainees. Those considered most dangerous and difficult were assigned to the most secure units whereas others, including many prisoners with no jihadist connections, were assigned to easier units.
However, even middle-ranking al-Qaida supporters were sufficiently experienced to avoid drawing attention to themselves, so that they could end up in an "easy" unit where they could concentrate on proselytising other inmates. As Lasseter puts it: "An angry cab driver from Kabul... may have been more likely to attack a guard and end up in Camp Three [high security] than an al Qaeda militant was." Furthermore, senior al-Qaida leaders could order middle-level supporters to cause trouble so that they would end up in a high security unit, enabling them to deliver messages as part of an effective communications network.
Lasseter's report is primarily significant because it is describing circumstances in a particularly high-security detention centre that is very well resourced and has a substantial staff of guards and detention specialists. In Iraq, the US military are dealing with tens of thousands of detainees, the great majority of whom do not turn out to be dangerous insurgents or paramilitary radicals. If even Guantánamo, with all its security and organisation, can be a paramilitary recruiting-station, then much larger and more loosely organised prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan may well be far more potent.
What this suggests, yet once more, is that yet another part of America's "war on terror" - the detention of over 120,000 people - stands to be deeply counterproductive. The end results may not become clear for years or even decades but, once again, the United States is inadvertently doing al-Qaida's job for it.
Zionism's Dead End
June 28, 2008
Zionism's Dead End
Separation or ethnic cleansing? Israel's encaging of Gaza aims to achieve both
by Jonathan Cook
The following is taken from a talk delivered at the Conference for the Right of Return and the Secular Democratic State, held in Haifa on June 21.
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/cook.php?articleid=13058
Zionism's Dead End
Separation or ethnic cleansing? Israel's encaging of Gaza aims to achieve both
by Jonathan Cook
The following is taken from a talk delivered at the Conference for the Right of Return and the Secular Democratic State, held in Haifa on June 21.
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/cook.php?articleid=13058
A Legacy to Die For
June 28, 2008
A Legacy to Die For
by Gordon Prather
President George W. Bush says it will be about fifty years before historians can properly evaluate his legacy. Of course, that’s not true; some historians already know what Bush’s legacy will likely be: the deliberate destruction of the existing international nuclear-weapons proliferation-prevention regime.
But it is slightly comforting, isn’t it, knowing that God apparently hasn’t told Bush to precipitate Armageddon before leaving office.
According to recent reports by Mainstream Media Persons – who apparently reformat their hard-drives each night before retiring – Bush and Condi-baby are hanging their legacy hopes on the "successful" outcome of the present Six-Party (China, Russia, Japan, United States, South and North Korea) Talks.
Quoth Bush; "If North Korea continues to make the right choices it can repair its relationship with the international community."
And what would amount to North Korea making the "right choices"?
Well, for one thing, those Dirty Commies could "admit" that Bush was right to charge them in the fall of 2002 with having a "secret enriched-uranium based nuclear weapons program."
You see, way back in 1992, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, largely because of disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency about the quantities of materials to be "declared" under the Safeguards Agreement North Korea was required to conclude with the IAEA as a condition of being a no-nuke-yet signatory to the NPT.
That would never do, since at the time President Clinton was hell-bent on building his intended legacy, getting every nation – including India, Pakistan and Israel – to (a) become a NPT signatory and (b) sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Hence, the Clinton-negotiated Agreed Framework of 1994, under which North Korea agreed to not only remain a NPT-signatory, but to "freeze" its plutonium-producing reactors and related facilities and to "eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities," all subject to IAEA oversight, of course.
What did the DPRK get in return?
"The US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S."
Furthermore;
"The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations."
But Bush the Younger became President and almost immediately repudiated Clinton’s efforts to implement the Agreed Framework, telling South Korea’s president and North Korean emissaries he had no intentions of "normalizing" relations with North Korea.
And, in his first State of the Union Address, Bush essentially accused North Korea, Iran and Iraq of having clandestine nuclear weapons programs.
"States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
"I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."
But – at that time – North Korea, Iran and Iraq were NPT signatories and had their "declared" nuclear facilities subject to IAEA periodic inspection. Furthermore, both Iraq and North Korea were subject to additional stringent IAEA surveillance.
Obviously, if Bush was to advance the American Hegemony, to impose regime change on Iraq, Iran and North Korea, on the false pretext they had nukes, the IAEA nuke proliferation-prevention regime had to be discredited or superseded.
So, in October 2002, months after we now know Bush had already decided to launch a war with Iraq, Bush unilaterally abrogated the Agreed Framework, charging that North Korea had a secret enriched-uranium nuke program.
Then, Bush announced his own National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in late 2002 and developed from it the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003, whose objective was to create a web of international "counter-proliferation partnerships" to prevent "proliferators" from "carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology."
According to Bonkers Bolton – then Undersecretary of State for Non-Proliferation – the PSI was necessary because "proliferators and those facilitating the procurement of deadly capabilities are circumventing existing laws, treaties and controls against WMD proliferation." Unlike the existing UN nuke proliferation-prevention regime, "PSI is not diverted by disputes about candidacies for director general, agency budgets, agendas for meetings and the like."
By then, of course, North Korea had already withdrawn from the NPT – which rendered their IAEA Safeguards Agreement null and void – and was busily producing weapons-grade plutonium in their Soviet-built 20 MWt research reactor.
Soon the North Koreans tested – at least semi-successfully – a plutonium-based nuclear weapon.
Alarmed that Bush might launch another war of aggression, this time against their neighbor, North Korea, which might once again – as it did in 1950 – involve them, the Chinese and Russians got Bush to participate in the so-called Six-Party talks, with the objective of a negotiated peace settlement for the Korean War.
You see, in 1948, China had officially become the People’s Republic of China. But the United States refused to recognize the PRC; refused to allow them to take China veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council. In protest, the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN Security Council. Hence, neither the PRC or Soviet Union were able to veto President Truman’s UN "police action."
However, PRC and Soviet "volunteers" were able to force us into a military stalemate in 1953 at the 38th Parallel, which was the North-South boundary agreed to by Truman and Stalin at Potsdam in 1945.
The resulting armistice – which is now in its 55th year – is actually a negotiated ceasefire between the Commander of UN forces and the Commanders of the North Korean and Chinese forces.
The Fifth Round of the Six-Party talks concluded last year with all parties agreeing, inter alia, to what amounts to a "side-bar."
"The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations."
So, are we back to where Clinton had us with the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994?
Well, not quite;
For one thing, North Korea's neighbors – Russia and China – are much more powerful, economically and militarily, than they were in 1994. Furthermore, they will effectively be acting as guarantors that neither North Korea or the U.S. can unilaterally abrogate the associated U.S.-DPRK bilateral agreements.
Finally, Article IV of the Agreed Framework says,
"Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear [weapons] non-proliferation regime."
Now, what was it that Bush’s Legacy will likely be?
Oh, yes – the deliberate destruction of the existing international nuclear-weapons proliferation-prevention regime.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=13060
A Legacy to Die For
by Gordon Prather
President George W. Bush says it will be about fifty years before historians can properly evaluate his legacy. Of course, that’s not true; some historians already know what Bush’s legacy will likely be: the deliberate destruction of the existing international nuclear-weapons proliferation-prevention regime.
But it is slightly comforting, isn’t it, knowing that God apparently hasn’t told Bush to precipitate Armageddon before leaving office.
According to recent reports by Mainstream Media Persons – who apparently reformat their hard-drives each night before retiring – Bush and Condi-baby are hanging their legacy hopes on the "successful" outcome of the present Six-Party (China, Russia, Japan, United States, South and North Korea) Talks.
Quoth Bush; "If North Korea continues to make the right choices it can repair its relationship with the international community."
And what would amount to North Korea making the "right choices"?
Well, for one thing, those Dirty Commies could "admit" that Bush was right to charge them in the fall of 2002 with having a "secret enriched-uranium based nuclear weapons program."
You see, way back in 1992, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, largely because of disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency about the quantities of materials to be "declared" under the Safeguards Agreement North Korea was required to conclude with the IAEA as a condition of being a no-nuke-yet signatory to the NPT.
That would never do, since at the time President Clinton was hell-bent on building his intended legacy, getting every nation – including India, Pakistan and Israel – to (a) become a NPT signatory and (b) sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Hence, the Clinton-negotiated Agreed Framework of 1994, under which North Korea agreed to not only remain a NPT-signatory, but to "freeze" its plutonium-producing reactors and related facilities and to "eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities," all subject to IAEA oversight, of course.
What did the DPRK get in return?
"The US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S."
Furthermore;
"The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations."
But Bush the Younger became President and almost immediately repudiated Clinton’s efforts to implement the Agreed Framework, telling South Korea’s president and North Korean emissaries he had no intentions of "normalizing" relations with North Korea.
And, in his first State of the Union Address, Bush essentially accused North Korea, Iran and Iraq of having clandestine nuclear weapons programs.
"States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
"I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."
But – at that time – North Korea, Iran and Iraq were NPT signatories and had their "declared" nuclear facilities subject to IAEA periodic inspection. Furthermore, both Iraq and North Korea were subject to additional stringent IAEA surveillance.
Obviously, if Bush was to advance the American Hegemony, to impose regime change on Iraq, Iran and North Korea, on the false pretext they had nukes, the IAEA nuke proliferation-prevention regime had to be discredited or superseded.
So, in October 2002, months after we now know Bush had already decided to launch a war with Iraq, Bush unilaterally abrogated the Agreed Framework, charging that North Korea had a secret enriched-uranium nuke program.
Then, Bush announced his own National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in late 2002 and developed from it the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003, whose objective was to create a web of international "counter-proliferation partnerships" to prevent "proliferators" from "carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology."
According to Bonkers Bolton – then Undersecretary of State for Non-Proliferation – the PSI was necessary because "proliferators and those facilitating the procurement of deadly capabilities are circumventing existing laws, treaties and controls against WMD proliferation." Unlike the existing UN nuke proliferation-prevention regime, "PSI is not diverted by disputes about candidacies for director general, agency budgets, agendas for meetings and the like."
By then, of course, North Korea had already withdrawn from the NPT – which rendered their IAEA Safeguards Agreement null and void – and was busily producing weapons-grade plutonium in their Soviet-built 20 MWt research reactor.
Soon the North Koreans tested – at least semi-successfully – a plutonium-based nuclear weapon.
Alarmed that Bush might launch another war of aggression, this time against their neighbor, North Korea, which might once again – as it did in 1950 – involve them, the Chinese and Russians got Bush to participate in the so-called Six-Party talks, with the objective of a negotiated peace settlement for the Korean War.
You see, in 1948, China had officially become the People’s Republic of China. But the United States refused to recognize the PRC; refused to allow them to take China veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council. In protest, the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN Security Council. Hence, neither the PRC or Soviet Union were able to veto President Truman’s UN "police action."
However, PRC and Soviet "volunteers" were able to force us into a military stalemate in 1953 at the 38th Parallel, which was the North-South boundary agreed to by Truman and Stalin at Potsdam in 1945.
The resulting armistice – which is now in its 55th year – is actually a negotiated ceasefire between the Commander of UN forces and the Commanders of the North Korean and Chinese forces.
The Fifth Round of the Six-Party talks concluded last year with all parties agreeing, inter alia, to what amounts to a "side-bar."
"The DPRK and the U.S. will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations."
So, are we back to where Clinton had us with the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994?
Well, not quite;
For one thing, North Korea's neighbors – Russia and China – are much more powerful, economically and militarily, than they were in 1994. Furthermore, they will effectively be acting as guarantors that neither North Korea or the U.S. can unilaterally abrogate the associated U.S.-DPRK bilateral agreements.
Finally, Article IV of the Agreed Framework says,
"Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear [weapons] non-proliferation regime."
Now, what was it that Bush’s Legacy will likely be?
Oh, yes – the deliberate destruction of the existing international nuclear-weapons proliferation-prevention regime.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=13060
Talking to Iran Is Not So Controversial: Don't look now but there is a broad consensus on what the next administration should do about Iran.
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
6/25/08
Talking to Iran Is Not So Controversial: Don't look now but there is a broad consensus on what the next administration should do about Iran.
Ilan Goldenberg
If two years ago you were to tell me that the Democratic presidential nominee would make engaging with Iran a central element of his campaign, I would have thought you were joking. After all, talking to a country that has historically enjoyed a favorability rating of a whopping 10 percent in the United States and has a president known for his anti-Western rhetoric probably isn't going to be all that popular. Not to mention the fact that the most substantive interaction Americans have had with Iran over the last 30 years involved watching blindfolded hostages and burning American flags on their television screens.
Yet incredibly, in a feat that defies conventional wisdom, Barack Obama is more than just holding his own against John McCain. When it comes to Iran he has the American public and most foreign-policy experts squarely behind him.
Obama's position is that we should be willing to engage in direct talks with the Iranian regime and offer them a choice: greater economic incentives and regular diplomatic relations in exchange for greater cooperation or economic sanctions and political isolation for their intransigence. John McCain and President Bush both argue that the United States should only talk to Iran if it first agrees to the precondition of suspending its uranium-enrichment program. Essentially, they are demanding that Iran give up its most significant bargaining chip before even sitting down at the table. In the meantime, McCain has called for more robust sanctions and has continued the Bush administration's pattern of saber rattling -- even jokingly singing about "bomb, bomb, bombing" Iran.
Americans support the idea of dealing directly with the Iranian regime. A recent Gallup poll found that despite extremely low opinions of Iran, 59 percent believe it's a good idea for the president to meet with the Iranian leadership. A Public Agenda/Foreign Affairs poll taken this spring found that 47 percent of Americans believed that establishing better relations with Iran through diplomacy was the one best way for the United States to deal with Iran while 40 percent supported economic sanctions, military threats or military action. This represented a 21 point swing from the fall of 2007 when only 35 percent supported diplomatic talks as the best option and 49 percent argued for more aggressive policies.
Meanwhile, experts and former government officials from across the political spectrum are also coming to the conclusion that direct talks must be part of a comprehensive strategy. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group Report that included former Secretaries of State James Baker and Laurence Eagleburger, both Republicans, argued in December 2006 that the United States should engage Iran on the question of Iraq. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Michael Mullen, recently stated that he "would like to have a healthy dialogue with Iran." At a recent conference hosted by the centrist Center for New American Security (CNAS), Jim Dobbins, who worked with the Iranians when he was leading U.S. negotiating efforts after the war in Afghanistan, Dennis Ross, who served as special envoy to the Middle East during the Clinton Administration, and Suzanne Maloney, who was on the State Department's policy planning staff working Iran issues from 2005 to 2007, all agreed that direct talks should be an important component of U.S. strategy.
This consensus further reinforces a new CNAS report arguing that the Bush administration's continued emphasis on using military threats as leverage is actually making any diplomatic breakthrough less likely. Richard Haas, who has served in a number of Republican administrations and is currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, also supports direct talks and even a neoconservative like Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued that talks are a good idea. (Although admittedly he believes that they will likely fail, and that the outcome will be greater international support for harsher measures against the Iranian regime.)
A number of factors account for the growing consensus on Iran. First, the Iraq War has dramatically changed the country's views on the use of force. Polling over the past few years has shown a reduction in the number of Americans who see military force as the most effective tool for keeping America safe and a related increase in support for diplomacy. Before the invasion the public was led to believe that that the war would be quick, easy and cheap. But with more than 4,100 American casualties, approximately 30,000 wounded, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead, and direct costs alone topping $500 billion Americans have been reminded that war is hard, expensive, and unpredictable, and that the use of military force should only be seen as a last resort.
In addition to Iraq, the absolute failure of our Iran policy has also caused people to reconsider. The Bush administration has refused to engage with Iran at a senior level until it suspends its uranium-enrichment program. In the meantime, Iran has gone from zero to 3,000 nuclear centrifuges. Freed from its two greatest local rivals -- Saddam Hussein and the Taliban -- it has expanded its influence into Iraq, Afghanistan and across the Middle East. The supposedly tough sanctions that would dissuade the Iranian government have failed to materialize since the Russians and Chinese have offered little support for the types of economic measures that would inflict genuine pain on the Iranian regime. And there is general agreement that bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would only cause a temporary delay in its uranium-enrichment program, while guaranteeing that the regime would react by moving beyond its current civilian nuclear program and develop a bomb.
Given these bad options, the choice is no longer between engaging in direct diplomacy and trying to pressure Iran through military and economic coercion to give up its nuclear program. We must now decide between allowing Iran to continue to work against American interests, move closer toward becoming a nuclear power and increase its influence across the region, and trying to engage. Engaging in direct talks does not mean giving in to Iranian demands. But through engagement we can make our own positions clear to the Iranians and work with them on common interests. This policy of talking directly in combination with economic inducements and threats may convince the Iranian regime to bring its nuclear program under an international verification regime with the goal of it eventually being eliminated. In essence the choice has become doing nothing or trying something.
Finally, there is the question of leadership, and here Barack Obama deserves much credit for moving the conversation. When Obama first made the statement last year about direct talks with Iran it was seen as a gaffe to be taken advantage of by his Democratic rivals. But his position actually turned into an advantage in the Democratic primary. Now Obama is sticking to his guns against McCain and so far it seems to be working. It's hard to imagine that the 21-point swing on this issue over the past few months is not at least partially due to the fact that the man who may currently have the most powerful bully pulpit in the country is out there aggressively making the case for talks.
Obama's zealous advocacy has undoubtedly had an impact in the beltway as well. Foreign-policy experts factor political will into their recommendations and try not to take positions that are completely unachievable. But Obama's position has blown through the assumption that talking directly to Iran is domestically unworkable. It's also signaled to experts in think tanks around Washington that they need to start thinking carefully about exactly how the United States would conduct diplomacy with Iran because it's clear that an Obama administration will likely ask for advice on this particular question.
In the end, we should be careful not to expect too much too soon from diplomatic overtures toward Iran. Thirty years worth of grievances will not be solved overnight and the Iranian regime is still playing a malign role in Iraq, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and building a uranium-enrichment capability.
But let's not fool ourselves into thinking that diplomatic engagement with Iran is some kind of controversial fringe progressive idea. In reality, it is the consensus position. It is John McCain's and George Bush's stubborn insistence of continuing a failed policy that is out of touch.
6/25/08
Talking to Iran Is Not So Controversial: Don't look now but there is a broad consensus on what the next administration should do about Iran.
Ilan Goldenberg
If two years ago you were to tell me that the Democratic presidential nominee would make engaging with Iran a central element of his campaign, I would have thought you were joking. After all, talking to a country that has historically enjoyed a favorability rating of a whopping 10 percent in the United States and has a president known for his anti-Western rhetoric probably isn't going to be all that popular. Not to mention the fact that the most substantive interaction Americans have had with Iran over the last 30 years involved watching blindfolded hostages and burning American flags on their television screens.
Yet incredibly, in a feat that defies conventional wisdom, Barack Obama is more than just holding his own against John McCain. When it comes to Iran he has the American public and most foreign-policy experts squarely behind him.
Obama's position is that we should be willing to engage in direct talks with the Iranian regime and offer them a choice: greater economic incentives and regular diplomatic relations in exchange for greater cooperation or economic sanctions and political isolation for their intransigence. John McCain and President Bush both argue that the United States should only talk to Iran if it first agrees to the precondition of suspending its uranium-enrichment program. Essentially, they are demanding that Iran give up its most significant bargaining chip before even sitting down at the table. In the meantime, McCain has called for more robust sanctions and has continued the Bush administration's pattern of saber rattling -- even jokingly singing about "bomb, bomb, bombing" Iran.
Americans support the idea of dealing directly with the Iranian regime. A recent Gallup poll found that despite extremely low opinions of Iran, 59 percent believe it's a good idea for the president to meet with the Iranian leadership. A Public Agenda/Foreign Affairs poll taken this spring found that 47 percent of Americans believed that establishing better relations with Iran through diplomacy was the one best way for the United States to deal with Iran while 40 percent supported economic sanctions, military threats or military action. This represented a 21 point swing from the fall of 2007 when only 35 percent supported diplomatic talks as the best option and 49 percent argued for more aggressive policies.
Meanwhile, experts and former government officials from across the political spectrum are also coming to the conclusion that direct talks must be part of a comprehensive strategy. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group Report that included former Secretaries of State James Baker and Laurence Eagleburger, both Republicans, argued in December 2006 that the United States should engage Iran on the question of Iraq. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Michael Mullen, recently stated that he "would like to have a healthy dialogue with Iran." At a recent conference hosted by the centrist Center for New American Security (CNAS), Jim Dobbins, who worked with the Iranians when he was leading U.S. negotiating efforts after the war in Afghanistan, Dennis Ross, who served as special envoy to the Middle East during the Clinton Administration, and Suzanne Maloney, who was on the State Department's policy planning staff working Iran issues from 2005 to 2007, all agreed that direct talks should be an important component of U.S. strategy.
This consensus further reinforces a new CNAS report arguing that the Bush administration's continued emphasis on using military threats as leverage is actually making any diplomatic breakthrough less likely. Richard Haas, who has served in a number of Republican administrations and is currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, also supports direct talks and even a neoconservative like Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued that talks are a good idea. (Although admittedly he believes that they will likely fail, and that the outcome will be greater international support for harsher measures against the Iranian regime.)
A number of factors account for the growing consensus on Iran. First, the Iraq War has dramatically changed the country's views on the use of force. Polling over the past few years has shown a reduction in the number of Americans who see military force as the most effective tool for keeping America safe and a related increase in support for diplomacy. Before the invasion the public was led to believe that that the war would be quick, easy and cheap. But with more than 4,100 American casualties, approximately 30,000 wounded, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead, and direct costs alone topping $500 billion Americans have been reminded that war is hard, expensive, and unpredictable, and that the use of military force should only be seen as a last resort.
In addition to Iraq, the absolute failure of our Iran policy has also caused people to reconsider. The Bush administration has refused to engage with Iran at a senior level until it suspends its uranium-enrichment program. In the meantime, Iran has gone from zero to 3,000 nuclear centrifuges. Freed from its two greatest local rivals -- Saddam Hussein and the Taliban -- it has expanded its influence into Iraq, Afghanistan and across the Middle East. The supposedly tough sanctions that would dissuade the Iranian government have failed to materialize since the Russians and Chinese have offered little support for the types of economic measures that would inflict genuine pain on the Iranian regime. And there is general agreement that bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would only cause a temporary delay in its uranium-enrichment program, while guaranteeing that the regime would react by moving beyond its current civilian nuclear program and develop a bomb.
Given these bad options, the choice is no longer between engaging in direct diplomacy and trying to pressure Iran through military and economic coercion to give up its nuclear program. We must now decide between allowing Iran to continue to work against American interests, move closer toward becoming a nuclear power and increase its influence across the region, and trying to engage. Engaging in direct talks does not mean giving in to Iranian demands. But through engagement we can make our own positions clear to the Iranians and work with them on common interests. This policy of talking directly in combination with economic inducements and threats may convince the Iranian regime to bring its nuclear program under an international verification regime with the goal of it eventually being eliminated. In essence the choice has become doing nothing or trying something.
Finally, there is the question of leadership, and here Barack Obama deserves much credit for moving the conversation. When Obama first made the statement last year about direct talks with Iran it was seen as a gaffe to be taken advantage of by his Democratic rivals. But his position actually turned into an advantage in the Democratic primary. Now Obama is sticking to his guns against McCain and so far it seems to be working. It's hard to imagine that the 21-point swing on this issue over the past few months is not at least partially due to the fact that the man who may currently have the most powerful bully pulpit in the country is out there aggressively making the case for talks.
Obama's zealous advocacy has undoubtedly had an impact in the beltway as well. Foreign-policy experts factor political will into their recommendations and try not to take positions that are completely unachievable. But Obama's position has blown through the assumption that talking directly to Iran is domestically unworkable. It's also signaled to experts in think tanks around Washington that they need to start thinking carefully about exactly how the United States would conduct diplomacy with Iran because it's clear that an Obama administration will likely ask for advice on this particular question.
In the end, we should be careful not to expect too much too soon from diplomatic overtures toward Iran. Thirty years worth of grievances will not be solved overnight and the Iranian regime is still playing a malign role in Iraq, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and building a uranium-enrichment capability.
But let's not fool ourselves into thinking that diplomatic engagement with Iran is some kind of controversial fringe progressive idea. In reality, it is the consensus position. It is John McCain's and George Bush's stubborn insistence of continuing a failed policy that is out of touch.
Friday, June 27, 2008
IRAN'S ECONOMY, AND MORE FROM CRS
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2008, Issue No. 63
June 27, 2008
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
IRAN'S ECONOMY, AND MORE FROM CRS
Noteworthy new and updated reports from the Congressional Research
Service that have not been made readily available to the public include
the following.
"The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11," updated June 23, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
"Conventional Warheads For Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background
and Issues for Congress," updated May 16, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33067.pdf
"Iran's Economy," updated June 12, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34525.pdf
"The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Comparison of the Senate
Amendment to H.R. 3773 and the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment
to H.R. 3773," June 12, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34533.pdf
"Awards of Attorneys' Fees by Federal Courts and Federal Agencies,"
updated June 20, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2008, Issue No. 63
June 27, 2008
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
IRAN'S ECONOMY, AND MORE FROM CRS
Noteworthy new and updated reports from the Congressional Research
Service that have not been made readily available to the public include
the following.
"The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11," updated June 23, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
"Conventional Warheads For Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background
and Issues for Congress," updated May 16, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33067.pdf
"Iran's Economy," updated June 12, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34525.pdf
"The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Comparison of the Senate
Amendment to H.R. 3773 and the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment
to H.R. 3773," June 12, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34533.pdf
"Awards of Attorneys' Fees by Federal Courts and Federal Agencies,"
updated June 20, 2008:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Living on the Ice Shelf
From Tom Dispatch http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174949/Tomgram%3A%20%20Mike%20Davis%2C%20Welcome%20to%20the%20Next%20Epoch
Living on the Ice Shelf
Humanity's Meltdown
By Mike Davis
1. Farewell to the Holocene
Our world, our old world that we have inhabited for the last 12,000 years, has ended, even if no newspaper in North America or Europe has yet printed its scientific obituary.
This February, while cranes were hoisting cladding to the 141st floor of the Burj Dubai tower (which will soon be twice the height of the Empire State Building), the Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London was adding the newest and highest story to the geological column.
The London Society is the world's oldest association of Earth scientists, founded in 1807, and its Commission acts as a college of cardinals in the adjudication of the geological time-scale. Stratigraphers slice up Earth's history as preserved in sedimentary strata into hierarchies of eons, eras, periods, and epochs marked by the "golden spikes" of mass extinctions, speciation events, and abrupt changes in atmospheric chemistry.
In geology, as in biology or history, periodization is a complex, controversial art and the most bitter feud in nineteenth-century British science -- still known as the "Great Devonian Controversy" -- was fought over competing interpretations of homely Welsh Graywackes and English Old Red Sandstone. More recently, geologists have feuded over how to stratigraphically demarcate ice age oscillations over the last 2.8 million years. Some have never accepted that the most recent inter-glacial warm interval -- the Holocene -- should be distinguished as an "epoch" in its own right just because it encompasses the history of civilization.
As a result, contemporary stratigraphers have set extraordinarily rigorous standards for the beatification of any new geological divisions. Although the idea of the "Anthropocene" -- an Earth epoch defined by the emergence of urban-industrial society as a geological force -- has been long debated, stratigraphers have refused to acknowledge compelling evidence for its advent.
At least for the London Society, that position has now been revised.
To the question "Are we now living in the Anthropocene?" the 21 members of the Commission unanimously answer "yes." They adduce robust evidence that the Holocene epoch -- the interglacial span of unusually stable climate that has allowed the rapid evolution of agriculture and urban civilization -- has ended and that the Earth has entered "a stratigraphic interval without close parallel in the last several million years." In addition to the buildup of greenhouse gases, the stratigraphers cite human landscape transformation which "now exceeds [annual] natural sediment production by an order of magnitude," the ominous acidification of the oceans, and the relentless destruction of biota.
This new age, they explain, is defined both by the heating trend (whose closest analogue may be the catastrophe known as the Paleocene Eocene Thermal Maximum, 56 million years ago) and by the radical instability expected of future environments. In somber prose, they warn that "the combination of extinctions, global species migrations and the widespread replacement of natural vegetation with agricultural monocultures is producing a distinctive contemporary biostratigraphic signal. These effects are permanent, as future evolution will take place from surviving (and frequently anthropogenically relocated) stocks." Evolution itself, in other words, has been forced into a new trajectory.
2. Spontaneous Decarbonization?
The Commission's coronation of the Anthropocene coincides with growing scientific controversy over the 4th Assessment Report issued last year by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is mandated to establish scientific baselines for international efforts to mitigate global warming, but some of the most prominent researchers in the field are now challenging its reference scenarios as overly optimistic, even pie-in-the-sky thinking.
The current scenarios were adopted by the IPCC in 2000 to model future global emissions based on different "storylines" about population growth as well as technological and economic development. Some of the Panel's major scenarios are well known to policymakers and greenhouse activists, but few outside the research community have actually read or understood the fine print, particularly the IPCC's confidence that greater energy efficiency will be an "automatic" byproduct of future economic development. Indeed all the scenarios, even the "business as usual" variants, assume that at least 60% of future carbon reduction will occur independently of greenhouse mitigation measures.
The Panel, in effect, has bet the ranch, or rather the planet, on unplanned, market-driven progress toward a post-carbon world economy, a transition that implicitly requires wealth generated from higher energy prices ultimately finding its way to new technologies and renewable energy. (The International Energy Agency recently estimated that it would cost $45 trillion to halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.) Kyoto-type accords and carbon markets are designed -- almost as an analogue to Keynesian "pump-priming" -- to bridge the shortfall between spontaneous decarbonization and the emissions targets required by each scenario. Serendipitously, this reduces the costs of mitigating global warming to levels that align with what seems, at least theoretically, to be politically possible, as expounded in the British Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change of 2006 and other such reports.
Critics argue, however, that this represents a heroic leap of faith that radically understates the economic costs, technological hurdles, and social changes required to tame the growth of greenhouse gases. European carbon emissions, for example, are still rising (dramatically in some sectors) despite the European Union's much praised adoption of a cap-and-trade system in 2005. Likewise there has been little evidence in recent years of the automatic progress in energy efficiency that is the sine qua non of the IPCC scenarios. Although The Economist characteristically begs to differ, most energy researchers believe that, since 2000, energy intensity has actually risen; that is, global carbon dioxide emissions have kept pace with, or even grown marginally faster than, energy use.
Coal production, especially, is undergoing a dramatic renaissance, as the nineteenth century has returned to haunt the twenty-first century. Hundreds of thousands of miners are now working under conditions that would have appalled Charles Dickens, extracting the dirty mineral that allows China to open two new coal-fueled power stations every week. Meanwhile, the total consumption of fossil fuels is predicted to increase at least 55% over the next generation, with international oil exports doubling in volume.
The United Nations Development Program, which has made its own study of sustainable energy goals, warns that it will require "a 50 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions worldwide by 2050 against 1990 levels" to keep humanity outside the red zone of runaway warming (usually defined as a greater than two degrees centigrade increase this century). Yet the International Energy Agency predicts that, in all likelihood, such emissions will actually increase in this period by nearly 100% -- enough greenhouse gas to propel us past several critical tipping points.
Even while higher energy prices are pushing SUVs towards extinction and attracting more venture capital to renewable energy, they are also opening the Pandora's box of the crudest of crude oil production from Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan heavy oil. As one British scientist has warned, the very last thing we should wish for (under the false slogan of "energy independence") is new frontiers in hydrocarbon production that advance "humankind's ability to accelerate global warming" and slow the urgent transition to "non-carbon or closed-carbon energy cycles."
3. Fin-du-Monde Boom
What confidence should we place in the capacity of markets to reallocate investment from old to new energy or, say, from arms expenditures to sustainable agriculture? We are propagandized incessantly (especially on public television) about how giant companies like Chevron, Pfizer Inc., and Archer Daniels Midland are hard at work saving the planet by plowing profits back into the kinds of research and exploration that will ensure low-carbon fuels, new vaccines, and more drought-resistant crops.
As the current ethanol-from-corn boom, which has diverted 100 million tons of grain from human diets mainly to American car engines, so appallingly demonstrates, "biofuel" may be a euphemism for subsidies to the rich and starvation for the poor. Likewise "clean coal," despite a vigorous endorsement from Senator Barack Obama (who also champions ethanol), is, at present, simply a huge deception: a $40 million advertising and lobbying campaign for a hypothetical technology that BusinessWeek has characterized as "being decades away from commercial viability."
Moreover there are disturbing signs that energy companies and utilities are reneging on their public commitments to the development of carbon-capture and alternative energy technologies. The Bush administration's "marquee demonstration project," FutureGen, was scrapped this year after the coal industry refused to pay its share of the public-private "partnership"; similarly, most U.S. private-sector carbon-sequestration initiatives have recently been cancelled. In the United Kingdom, meanwhile, Shell has just pulled out of the world's largest wind-energy project, the London Array. Despite heroic levels of advertising, energy corporations, like pharmaceutical companies, prefer to overgraze the commons, while letting taxes, not profits, pay for whatever urgent, long-overdue research is actually undertaken.
On the other hand, the spoils from high energy prices continue to gush into real estate, skyscrapers, and financial assets. Whether or not we are actually at the summit of Hubbert's Peak -- that peak oil moment -- whether or not the oil-price bubble finally bursts, what we are probably witnessing is the largest transfer of wealth in modern history.
An eminent Wall Street oracle, McKinsey Global Institute, predicts that if crude oil prices remain above $100 per barrel -- they are, at the moment, approaching $140 a barrel -- the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council alone will "reap a cumulative windfall of almost $9 trillion by 2020." As in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors, whose total gross domestic product has almost doubled in just three years, are awash in liquidity: $2.4 trillion in banks and investment funds according to a recent estimate by The Economist. Regardless of price trends, the International Energy Agency predicts, "more and more oil will come from fewer and fewer countries, primarily the Middle East members of OPEC [The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries]."
Dubai, which has little oil income of its own, has become the regional financial hub for this vast pool of wealth, with ambitions to eventually compete with Wall Street and the City of London. During the first oil shock in the 1970s, much of OPEC's surplus was recycled through military purchases in the United States and Europe, or parked in foreign banks to become the "subprime" loans that eventually devastated Latin America. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the Gulf states became far more cautious about entrusting their wealth to countries, like the United States, governed by religious fanatics. This time around, they are using "sovereign wealth funds" to achieve a more active ownership in foreign financial institutions, while investing fabulous amounts of oil revenue to transform Arabia's sands into hyperbolic cities, shopping paradises, and private islands for British rock stars and Russian gangsters.
Two years ago, when oil prices were less than half of the current level, The Financial Times estimated that planned new construction in Saudi Arabia and the emirates already exceeded $1 trillion dollars. Today, it may be closer to $1.5 trillion, considerably more than the total value of world trade in agricultural products. Most of the Gulf city-states are building hallucinatory skylines -- and, among them, Dubai is the unquestionable superstar. In a little more than a decade, it has erected 500 skyscrapers, and currently leases one-quarter of all the high-rise cranes in the world.
This super-charged Gulf boom, which celebrity architect Rem Koolhaas claims is "reconfiguring the world," has led Dubai developers to proclaim the advent of a "supreme lifestyle" represented by seven-star hotels, private islands, and J-class yachts. Not surprisingly, then, the United Arab Emirates and its neighbors have the biggest per capita ecological footprints on the planet. Meanwhile, the rightful owners of Arab oil wealth, the masses crammed into the angry tenements of Baghdad, Cairo, Amman, and Khartoum, have little more to show for it than a trickle-down of oil-field jobs and Saudi-subsidized madrassas. While guests enjoy the $5,000 per night rooms in Burj Al-Arab, Dubai's celebrated sail-shaped hotel, working-class Cairenes riot in the streets over the unaffordable price of bread.
4. Can Markets Enfranchise the Poor?
Emissions optimists, of course, will smile at all the gloom-and-doom and evoke the coming miracle of carbon trading. What they discount is the real possibility that a sprawling carbon-offset market may emerge, just as predicted, yet produce only minimal improvement in the global carbon balance sheet, as long as there is no mechanism for enforcing real net reductions in fossil fuel use.
In popular discussions of emissions-rights trading systems, it is common to mistake the smokestacks for the trees. For example, the wealthy oil enclave of Abu Dhabi (like Dubai, a partner in the United Arab Emirates) brags that it has planted more than 130 million trees -- each of which does its duty in absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. However, this artificial forest in the desert also consumes huge quantities of irrigation water produced, or recycled, from expensive desalination plants. The trees may allow Sheik Ahmed bin Zayed to wear a halo at international meetings, but the rude fact is that they are an energy-intensive beauty strip, like most of so-called green capitalism.
And, while we're at it, let's just ask: What if the buying and selling of carbon credits and pollution offsets fails to turn down the thermostat? What exactly will motivate governments and global industries then to join hands in a crusade to reduce emissions through regulation and taxation?
Kyoto-type climate diplomacy assumes that all the major actors, once they have accepted the science in the IPCC reports, will recognize an overriding common interest in gaining control over the runaway greenhouse effect. But global warming is not War of the Worlds, where invading Martians are dedicated to annihilating all of humanity without distinction. Climate change, instead, will initially produce dramatically unequal impacts across regions and social classes. It will reinforce, not diminish, geopolitical inequality and conflict.
As the United Nations Development Program emphasized in its report last year, global warming is above all a threat to the poor and the unborn, the "two constituencies with little or no political voice." Coordinated global action on their behalf thus presupposes either their revolutionary empowerment (a scenario not considered by the IPCC) or the transmutation of the self-interest of rich countries and classes into an enlightened "solidarity" without precedent in history. From a rational-actor perspective, the latter outcome only seems realistic if it can be shown that privileged groups possess no preferential "exit" option, that internationalist public opinion drives policymaking in key countries, and that greenhouse gas mitigation could be achieved without major sacrifices in upscale Northern Hemispheric standards of living -- none of which seems highly likely.
And what if growing environmental and social turbulence, instead of galvanizing heroic innovation and international cooperation, simply drive elite publics into even more frenzied attempts to wall themselves off from the rest of humanity? Global mitigation, in this unexplored but not improbable scenario, would be tacitly abandoned (as, to some extent, it already has been) in favor of accelerated investment in selective adaptation for Earth's first-class passengers. We're talking here of the prospect of creating green and gated oases of permanent affluence on an otherwise stricken planet.
Of course, there will still be treaties, carbon credits, famine relief, humanitarian acrobatics, and perhaps the full-scale conversion of some European cities and small countries to alternative energy. But the shift to low, or zero, emission lifestyles would be almost unimaginably expensive. (In Britain, it currently costs $200,000 more to build a zero-carbon, "level 6" eco-home than a standard unit of the same area.) And this will certainly become even more unimaginable after perhaps 2030, when the convergent impacts of climate change, peak oil, peak water, and an additional 1.5 billion people on the planet may begin to seriously throttle growth.
5. The North's Ecological Debt
The real question is this: Will rich counties ever mobilize the political will and economic resources to actually achieve IPCC targets or, for that matter, to help poorer countries adapt to the inevitable, already "committed" quotient of warming now working its way toward us through the slow circulation of the world ocean?
To be more vivid: Will the electorates of the wealthy nations shed their current bigotry and walled borders to admit refugees from predicted epicenters of drought and desertification like the Maghreb, Mexico, Ethiopia, and Pakistan? Will Americans, the most miserly people when measured by per capita foreign aid, be willing to tax themselves to help relocate the millions likely to be flooded out of densely settled, mega-delta regions like Bangladesh?
Market-oriented optimists, once again, will point to carbon offset programs like the Clean Development Mechanism which, they claim, will allow green capital to flow to the Third World. Most of the Third World, however, probably prefers for the First World to acknowledge the environmental mess it has created and take responsibility for cleaning it up. They rightly rail against the notion that the greatest burden of adjustment to the Anthropocene epoch should fall on those who have contributed least to carbon emissions and drawn the slightest benefits from 200 years of industrialization.
In a sobering study recently published in the Proceedings of the [U.S.] National Academy of Science, a research team has attempted to calculate the environmental costs of economic globalization since 1961 as expressed in deforestation, climate change, over-fishing, ozone depletion, mangrove conversion, and agricultural expansion. After making adjustments for relative cost burdens, they found that the richest countries, by their activities, had generated 42% of environmental degradation across the world, while shouldering only 3% of the resulting costs.
The radicals of the South will rightly point to another debt as well. For 30 years, cities in the developing world have grown at breakneck speed without any equivalent public investment in infrastructure services, housing, or public health. In large part this has been the result of foreign debts contracted by dictators, payments enforced by the International Monetary Fund, and public sectors wrecked by the World Bank's "structural adjustment" agreements.
This planetary deficit of opportunity and social justice is captured in the fact that more than one billion people, according to UN-Habitat, currently live in slums and that their number is expected to double by 2030. An equal number, or more, forage in the so-called informal sector (a first-world euphemism for mass unemployment). Sheer demographic momentum, meanwhile, will increase the world's urban population by 3 billion people over the next 40 years (90% of them in poor cities), and no one -- absolutely no one -- has a clue how a planet of slums, with growing food and energy crises, will accommodate their biological survival, much less their inevitable aspirations to basic happiness and dignity.
If this seems unduly apocalyptic, consider that most climate models project impacts that will uncannily reinforce the present geography of inequality. One of the pioneer analysts of the economics of global warming, Petersen Institute fellow William R. Cline, recently published a country-by-country study of the likely effects of climate change on agriculture by the later decades of this century. Even in the most optimistic simulations, the agricultural systems of Pakistan (a 20% decrease from current farm output predicted) and Northwestern India (a 30% decrease) are likely to be devastated, along with much of the Middle East, the Maghreb, the Sahel belt, Southern Africa, the Caribbean, and Mexico. Twenty-nine developing countries will lose 20% or more of their current farm output to global warming, while agriculture in the already rich north is likely to receive, on average, an 8% boost.
In light of such studies, the current ruthless competition between energy and food markets, amplified by international speculation in commodities and agricultural land, is only a modest portent of the chaos that could soon grow exponentially from the convergence of resource depletion, intractable inequality, and climate change. The real danger is that human solidarity itself, like a West Antarctic ice shelf, will suddenly fracture and shatter into a thousand shards.
Mike Davis is the author of In Praise of Barbarians: Essays against Empire (Haymarket Books, 2008) and Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb (Verso, 2007). He is currently working on a book about cities, poverty, and global change.
Living on the Ice Shelf
Humanity's Meltdown
By Mike Davis
1. Farewell to the Holocene
Our world, our old world that we have inhabited for the last 12,000 years, has ended, even if no newspaper in North America or Europe has yet printed its scientific obituary.
This February, while cranes were hoisting cladding to the 141st floor of the Burj Dubai tower (which will soon be twice the height of the Empire State Building), the Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London was adding the newest and highest story to the geological column.
The London Society is the world's oldest association of Earth scientists, founded in 1807, and its Commission acts as a college of cardinals in the adjudication of the geological time-scale. Stratigraphers slice up Earth's history as preserved in sedimentary strata into hierarchies of eons, eras, periods, and epochs marked by the "golden spikes" of mass extinctions, speciation events, and abrupt changes in atmospheric chemistry.
In geology, as in biology or history, periodization is a complex, controversial art and the most bitter feud in nineteenth-century British science -- still known as the "Great Devonian Controversy" -- was fought over competing interpretations of homely Welsh Graywackes and English Old Red Sandstone. More recently, geologists have feuded over how to stratigraphically demarcate ice age oscillations over the last 2.8 million years. Some have never accepted that the most recent inter-glacial warm interval -- the Holocene -- should be distinguished as an "epoch" in its own right just because it encompasses the history of civilization.
As a result, contemporary stratigraphers have set extraordinarily rigorous standards for the beatification of any new geological divisions. Although the idea of the "Anthropocene" -- an Earth epoch defined by the emergence of urban-industrial society as a geological force -- has been long debated, stratigraphers have refused to acknowledge compelling evidence for its advent.
At least for the London Society, that position has now been revised.
To the question "Are we now living in the Anthropocene?" the 21 members of the Commission unanimously answer "yes." They adduce robust evidence that the Holocene epoch -- the interglacial span of unusually stable climate that has allowed the rapid evolution of agriculture and urban civilization -- has ended and that the Earth has entered "a stratigraphic interval without close parallel in the last several million years." In addition to the buildup of greenhouse gases, the stratigraphers cite human landscape transformation which "now exceeds [annual] natural sediment production by an order of magnitude," the ominous acidification of the oceans, and the relentless destruction of biota.
This new age, they explain, is defined both by the heating trend (whose closest analogue may be the catastrophe known as the Paleocene Eocene Thermal Maximum, 56 million years ago) and by the radical instability expected of future environments. In somber prose, they warn that "the combination of extinctions, global species migrations and the widespread replacement of natural vegetation with agricultural monocultures is producing a distinctive contemporary biostratigraphic signal. These effects are permanent, as future evolution will take place from surviving (and frequently anthropogenically relocated) stocks." Evolution itself, in other words, has been forced into a new trajectory.
2. Spontaneous Decarbonization?
The Commission's coronation of the Anthropocene coincides with growing scientific controversy over the 4th Assessment Report issued last year by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is mandated to establish scientific baselines for international efforts to mitigate global warming, but some of the most prominent researchers in the field are now challenging its reference scenarios as overly optimistic, even pie-in-the-sky thinking.
The current scenarios were adopted by the IPCC in 2000 to model future global emissions based on different "storylines" about population growth as well as technological and economic development. Some of the Panel's major scenarios are well known to policymakers and greenhouse activists, but few outside the research community have actually read or understood the fine print, particularly the IPCC's confidence that greater energy efficiency will be an "automatic" byproduct of future economic development. Indeed all the scenarios, even the "business as usual" variants, assume that at least 60% of future carbon reduction will occur independently of greenhouse mitigation measures.
The Panel, in effect, has bet the ranch, or rather the planet, on unplanned, market-driven progress toward a post-carbon world economy, a transition that implicitly requires wealth generated from higher energy prices ultimately finding its way to new technologies and renewable energy. (The International Energy Agency recently estimated that it would cost $45 trillion to halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.) Kyoto-type accords and carbon markets are designed -- almost as an analogue to Keynesian "pump-priming" -- to bridge the shortfall between spontaneous decarbonization and the emissions targets required by each scenario. Serendipitously, this reduces the costs of mitigating global warming to levels that align with what seems, at least theoretically, to be politically possible, as expounded in the British Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change of 2006 and other such reports.
Critics argue, however, that this represents a heroic leap of faith that radically understates the economic costs, technological hurdles, and social changes required to tame the growth of greenhouse gases. European carbon emissions, for example, are still rising (dramatically in some sectors) despite the European Union's much praised adoption of a cap-and-trade system in 2005. Likewise there has been little evidence in recent years of the automatic progress in energy efficiency that is the sine qua non of the IPCC scenarios. Although The Economist characteristically begs to differ, most energy researchers believe that, since 2000, energy intensity has actually risen; that is, global carbon dioxide emissions have kept pace with, or even grown marginally faster than, energy use.
Coal production, especially, is undergoing a dramatic renaissance, as the nineteenth century has returned to haunt the twenty-first century. Hundreds of thousands of miners are now working under conditions that would have appalled Charles Dickens, extracting the dirty mineral that allows China to open two new coal-fueled power stations every week. Meanwhile, the total consumption of fossil fuels is predicted to increase at least 55% over the next generation, with international oil exports doubling in volume.
The United Nations Development Program, which has made its own study of sustainable energy goals, warns that it will require "a 50 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions worldwide by 2050 against 1990 levels" to keep humanity outside the red zone of runaway warming (usually defined as a greater than two degrees centigrade increase this century). Yet the International Energy Agency predicts that, in all likelihood, such emissions will actually increase in this period by nearly 100% -- enough greenhouse gas to propel us past several critical tipping points.
Even while higher energy prices are pushing SUVs towards extinction and attracting more venture capital to renewable energy, they are also opening the Pandora's box of the crudest of crude oil production from Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan heavy oil. As one British scientist has warned, the very last thing we should wish for (under the false slogan of "energy independence") is new frontiers in hydrocarbon production that advance "humankind's ability to accelerate global warming" and slow the urgent transition to "non-carbon or closed-carbon energy cycles."
3. Fin-du-Monde Boom
What confidence should we place in the capacity of markets to reallocate investment from old to new energy or, say, from arms expenditures to sustainable agriculture? We are propagandized incessantly (especially on public television) about how giant companies like Chevron, Pfizer Inc., and Archer Daniels Midland are hard at work saving the planet by plowing profits back into the kinds of research and exploration that will ensure low-carbon fuels, new vaccines, and more drought-resistant crops.
As the current ethanol-from-corn boom, which has diverted 100 million tons of grain from human diets mainly to American car engines, so appallingly demonstrates, "biofuel" may be a euphemism for subsidies to the rich and starvation for the poor. Likewise "clean coal," despite a vigorous endorsement from Senator Barack Obama (who also champions ethanol), is, at present, simply a huge deception: a $40 million advertising and lobbying campaign for a hypothetical technology that BusinessWeek has characterized as "being decades away from commercial viability."
Moreover there are disturbing signs that energy companies and utilities are reneging on their public commitments to the development of carbon-capture and alternative energy technologies. The Bush administration's "marquee demonstration project," FutureGen, was scrapped this year after the coal industry refused to pay its share of the public-private "partnership"; similarly, most U.S. private-sector carbon-sequestration initiatives have recently been cancelled. In the United Kingdom, meanwhile, Shell has just pulled out of the world's largest wind-energy project, the London Array. Despite heroic levels of advertising, energy corporations, like pharmaceutical companies, prefer to overgraze the commons, while letting taxes, not profits, pay for whatever urgent, long-overdue research is actually undertaken.
On the other hand, the spoils from high energy prices continue to gush into real estate, skyscrapers, and financial assets. Whether or not we are actually at the summit of Hubbert's Peak -- that peak oil moment -- whether or not the oil-price bubble finally bursts, what we are probably witnessing is the largest transfer of wealth in modern history.
An eminent Wall Street oracle, McKinsey Global Institute, predicts that if crude oil prices remain above $100 per barrel -- they are, at the moment, approaching $140 a barrel -- the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council alone will "reap a cumulative windfall of almost $9 trillion by 2020." As in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors, whose total gross domestic product has almost doubled in just three years, are awash in liquidity: $2.4 trillion in banks and investment funds according to a recent estimate by The Economist. Regardless of price trends, the International Energy Agency predicts, "more and more oil will come from fewer and fewer countries, primarily the Middle East members of OPEC [The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries]."
Dubai, which has little oil income of its own, has become the regional financial hub for this vast pool of wealth, with ambitions to eventually compete with Wall Street and the City of London. During the first oil shock in the 1970s, much of OPEC's surplus was recycled through military purchases in the United States and Europe, or parked in foreign banks to become the "subprime" loans that eventually devastated Latin America. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the Gulf states became far more cautious about entrusting their wealth to countries, like the United States, governed by religious fanatics. This time around, they are using "sovereign wealth funds" to achieve a more active ownership in foreign financial institutions, while investing fabulous amounts of oil revenue to transform Arabia's sands into hyperbolic cities, shopping paradises, and private islands for British rock stars and Russian gangsters.
Two years ago, when oil prices were less than half of the current level, The Financial Times estimated that planned new construction in Saudi Arabia and the emirates already exceeded $1 trillion dollars. Today, it may be closer to $1.5 trillion, considerably more than the total value of world trade in agricultural products. Most of the Gulf city-states are building hallucinatory skylines -- and, among them, Dubai is the unquestionable superstar. In a little more than a decade, it has erected 500 skyscrapers, and currently leases one-quarter of all the high-rise cranes in the world.
This super-charged Gulf boom, which celebrity architect Rem Koolhaas claims is "reconfiguring the world," has led Dubai developers to proclaim the advent of a "supreme lifestyle" represented by seven-star hotels, private islands, and J-class yachts. Not surprisingly, then, the United Arab Emirates and its neighbors have the biggest per capita ecological footprints on the planet. Meanwhile, the rightful owners of Arab oil wealth, the masses crammed into the angry tenements of Baghdad, Cairo, Amman, and Khartoum, have little more to show for it than a trickle-down of oil-field jobs and Saudi-subsidized madrassas. While guests enjoy the $5,000 per night rooms in Burj Al-Arab, Dubai's celebrated sail-shaped hotel, working-class Cairenes riot in the streets over the unaffordable price of bread.
4. Can Markets Enfranchise the Poor?
Emissions optimists, of course, will smile at all the gloom-and-doom and evoke the coming miracle of carbon trading. What they discount is the real possibility that a sprawling carbon-offset market may emerge, just as predicted, yet produce only minimal improvement in the global carbon balance sheet, as long as there is no mechanism for enforcing real net reductions in fossil fuel use.
In popular discussions of emissions-rights trading systems, it is common to mistake the smokestacks for the trees. For example, the wealthy oil enclave of Abu Dhabi (like Dubai, a partner in the United Arab Emirates) brags that it has planted more than 130 million trees -- each of which does its duty in absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. However, this artificial forest in the desert also consumes huge quantities of irrigation water produced, or recycled, from expensive desalination plants. The trees may allow Sheik Ahmed bin Zayed to wear a halo at international meetings, but the rude fact is that they are an energy-intensive beauty strip, like most of so-called green capitalism.
And, while we're at it, let's just ask: What if the buying and selling of carbon credits and pollution offsets fails to turn down the thermostat? What exactly will motivate governments and global industries then to join hands in a crusade to reduce emissions through regulation and taxation?
Kyoto-type climate diplomacy assumes that all the major actors, once they have accepted the science in the IPCC reports, will recognize an overriding common interest in gaining control over the runaway greenhouse effect. But global warming is not War of the Worlds, where invading Martians are dedicated to annihilating all of humanity without distinction. Climate change, instead, will initially produce dramatically unequal impacts across regions and social classes. It will reinforce, not diminish, geopolitical inequality and conflict.
As the United Nations Development Program emphasized in its report last year, global warming is above all a threat to the poor and the unborn, the "two constituencies with little or no political voice." Coordinated global action on their behalf thus presupposes either their revolutionary empowerment (a scenario not considered by the IPCC) or the transmutation of the self-interest of rich countries and classes into an enlightened "solidarity" without precedent in history. From a rational-actor perspective, the latter outcome only seems realistic if it can be shown that privileged groups possess no preferential "exit" option, that internationalist public opinion drives policymaking in key countries, and that greenhouse gas mitigation could be achieved without major sacrifices in upscale Northern Hemispheric standards of living -- none of which seems highly likely.
And what if growing environmental and social turbulence, instead of galvanizing heroic innovation and international cooperation, simply drive elite publics into even more frenzied attempts to wall themselves off from the rest of humanity? Global mitigation, in this unexplored but not improbable scenario, would be tacitly abandoned (as, to some extent, it already has been) in favor of accelerated investment in selective adaptation for Earth's first-class passengers. We're talking here of the prospect of creating green and gated oases of permanent affluence on an otherwise stricken planet.
Of course, there will still be treaties, carbon credits, famine relief, humanitarian acrobatics, and perhaps the full-scale conversion of some European cities and small countries to alternative energy. But the shift to low, or zero, emission lifestyles would be almost unimaginably expensive. (In Britain, it currently costs $200,000 more to build a zero-carbon, "level 6" eco-home than a standard unit of the same area.) And this will certainly become even more unimaginable after perhaps 2030, when the convergent impacts of climate change, peak oil, peak water, and an additional 1.5 billion people on the planet may begin to seriously throttle growth.
5. The North's Ecological Debt
The real question is this: Will rich counties ever mobilize the political will and economic resources to actually achieve IPCC targets or, for that matter, to help poorer countries adapt to the inevitable, already "committed" quotient of warming now working its way toward us through the slow circulation of the world ocean?
To be more vivid: Will the electorates of the wealthy nations shed their current bigotry and walled borders to admit refugees from predicted epicenters of drought and desertification like the Maghreb, Mexico, Ethiopia, and Pakistan? Will Americans, the most miserly people when measured by per capita foreign aid, be willing to tax themselves to help relocate the millions likely to be flooded out of densely settled, mega-delta regions like Bangladesh?
Market-oriented optimists, once again, will point to carbon offset programs like the Clean Development Mechanism which, they claim, will allow green capital to flow to the Third World. Most of the Third World, however, probably prefers for the First World to acknowledge the environmental mess it has created and take responsibility for cleaning it up. They rightly rail against the notion that the greatest burden of adjustment to the Anthropocene epoch should fall on those who have contributed least to carbon emissions and drawn the slightest benefits from 200 years of industrialization.
In a sobering study recently published in the Proceedings of the [U.S.] National Academy of Science, a research team has attempted to calculate the environmental costs of economic globalization since 1961 as expressed in deforestation, climate change, over-fishing, ozone depletion, mangrove conversion, and agricultural expansion. After making adjustments for relative cost burdens, they found that the richest countries, by their activities, had generated 42% of environmental degradation across the world, while shouldering only 3% of the resulting costs.
The radicals of the South will rightly point to another debt as well. For 30 years, cities in the developing world have grown at breakneck speed without any equivalent public investment in infrastructure services, housing, or public health. In large part this has been the result of foreign debts contracted by dictators, payments enforced by the International Monetary Fund, and public sectors wrecked by the World Bank's "structural adjustment" agreements.
This planetary deficit of opportunity and social justice is captured in the fact that more than one billion people, according to UN-Habitat, currently live in slums and that their number is expected to double by 2030. An equal number, or more, forage in the so-called informal sector (a first-world euphemism for mass unemployment). Sheer demographic momentum, meanwhile, will increase the world's urban population by 3 billion people over the next 40 years (90% of them in poor cities), and no one -- absolutely no one -- has a clue how a planet of slums, with growing food and energy crises, will accommodate their biological survival, much less their inevitable aspirations to basic happiness and dignity.
If this seems unduly apocalyptic, consider that most climate models project impacts that will uncannily reinforce the present geography of inequality. One of the pioneer analysts of the economics of global warming, Petersen Institute fellow William R. Cline, recently published a country-by-country study of the likely effects of climate change on agriculture by the later decades of this century. Even in the most optimistic simulations, the agricultural systems of Pakistan (a 20% decrease from current farm output predicted) and Northwestern India (a 30% decrease) are likely to be devastated, along with much of the Middle East, the Maghreb, the Sahel belt, Southern Africa, the Caribbean, and Mexico. Twenty-nine developing countries will lose 20% or more of their current farm output to global warming, while agriculture in the already rich north is likely to receive, on average, an 8% boost.
In light of such studies, the current ruthless competition between energy and food markets, amplified by international speculation in commodities and agricultural land, is only a modest portent of the chaos that could soon grow exponentially from the convergence of resource depletion, intractable inequality, and climate change. The real danger is that human solidarity itself, like a West Antarctic ice shelf, will suddenly fracture and shatter into a thousand shards.
Mike Davis is the author of In Praise of Barbarians: Essays against Empire (Haymarket Books, 2008) and Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb (Verso, 2007). He is currently working on a book about cities, poverty, and global change.
Commentary: Suez and Hungary redux By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, UPI Editor at Large
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/06/26/Commentary_Suez_and_Hungary_redux/UPI-54111214492989/
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Commentary: Suez and Hungary redux
By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, UPI Editor at Large
WASHINGTON, June 26 (UPI) -- Israel's message to its only ally, the United States, was quite clear. Either President Bush orders military action, or Israel will have to strike on its own. It can't wait till a new U.S. president is sworn in. Because the new White House tenant could well be Barack Obama. And Obama almost certainly would not approve an Israeli airstrike without first going several extra miles on the U.N. and Western diplomatic track. This could even lead to the kind of rift in Israeli-U.S. relations that occurred when President Eisenhower ordered French, British and Israeli forces out of Egypt during the 1956 Suez War.
America's allies had sprung a strategic deception surprise on the United States by invading Egypt to put the Suez Canal, nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, back under international control. The Soviet Union then ordered Warsaw Pact forces to invade Hungary to suppress an anti-communist revolution.
Thus, the invasion of Suez drained whatever propaganda advantage Eisenhower could have obtained from naked Soviet aggression. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev even felt free to rattle his nuclear "rockets" at the United States and took credit for the humiliatingly hurried Franco-British-Israeli withdrawal from Egypt.
The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis were two of the most dramatic upheavals in international affairs in the post-World War II era. If Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities while Bush is still the commander in chief, China and Russia might be tempted to take a page out of Khrushchev's geopolitical playbook -- and rattle a few threatening economic missiles.
This, in turn, would be designed to get Sen. Obama, D-Ill., to disassociate himself from any hostile action Israel might have taken against Iran. And if that didn't elicit the desired result, Iran's formidable asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities would be unleashed throughout the Gulf in particular and the Middle East in general. Iran also can make life hell for U.S. forces in Iraq and NATO forces in Afghanistan. With U.S. consumer confidence already at a 16-year low, oil would quickly skyrocket to $400 or $500 a barrel.
If, on the other hand, John McCain moves into the White House on the afternoon of Jan. 20, 2009, he presumably would approve of Israeli bombing raids and cruise-missile strikes against Iran's nascent nuclear weapons capability. There is only one thing worse than bombing Iran, McCain has said, and that is an Iranian nuclear bomb.
McCain is also privately critical of Bush's reluctance to cross the border from Iraq into Iran to attack Al Quds barracks housing the Revolutionary Guards' Special Forces who smuggled into Iraq a steady stream of improvised explosive devices that kill and maim American soldiers.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen will be in Israel next weekend, where he will hear the same simple message: If you don't, we have to -- and will.
On May 28 and June 12, in a double-barreled exercise code-named "Glorious Spartan 08," more than 100 Israeli F-16s and F-15s and air-to-air refueling tankers engaged in exercises over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece, 900 miles from home bases. Greece cooperated in what Athens called joint maneuvers. For Jerusalem, it was a demonstration of Israel's capabilities and readiness to strike Iranian targets.
With French know-how at first, Israel began building a nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. Today, Israel is a major nuclear weapons power with an estimated 200 warheads. But Israel's political leadership, reflecting public opinion, is convinced it is living an existential crisis and that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's extremist threats to snuff out Zionism could destroy the Jewish state with one city-busting weapon in the nose cone of an Iranian missile.
Notwithstanding four unsuccessful U.N. Security Council sanction resolutions and countless juicy carrots spurned by Tehran (including technological and financial assistance for a modern nuclear power industry), diplomats recoil in horror at the mere mention of Israeli and/or U.S. attacks on Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei says any attack on Iran would turn the entire region into a "ball of fire" and he would resign.
But ElBaradei still talks the talk, if not the walk, when he accuses Iran of holding back information needed to clarify intelligence reports it had secretly researched nuclear bomb-making, concealed from the prying eyes of his inspectors.
Ranking U.S. and European diplomats say there is still plenty of leeway for diplomacy coupled with increased sanctions pressure. They point out that verbal bomb-thrower Ahmadinejad does not control Iran's nuclear establishment, which is in the hands of Supreme Religious Leader Ali Khamenei, who keeps pledging Iran is not interested in nukes, only nuclear power. Also encouraging is that one of Ahmadinejad's bitter political opponents, former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, was recently elected to the powerful position of speaker of Parliament -- and may unseat Ahmadinejad in 2009 elections.
That Iran is a wanna-be nuclear weapons power is beyond dispute. A national hero at home for midwifing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal with plans for a uranium enrichment plant stolen from the Netherlands and a villain in the rest of the world for running a black market in nuclear secrets for the benefit of America's enemies, A.Q. Khan sold weapons secrets to Iran's mullahs beginning 23 years ago. It would be a miracle if Iran, which boasts thousands of scientists and engineers, does not have at least one powerful device in one of its many underground facilities, usually adjacent to population centers.
Three former CENTCOM four-stars -- Anthony Zinni, John Abizaid and William J. Fallon -- are on record against bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they favor high-level negotiations with Iran's mullah regime. They believe the aim should be a geopolitical deal whereby Iran allows Iraq to consolidate its pro-Western democracy, reins in Hezbollah and Hamas, the United States restores full diplomatic relations, lifts all economic sanctions -- and learns to live with an Iranian bomb. As a sign of peaceful intent, the administration would offer to open a consular section in Tehran to facilitate visas for Iranians wishing to visit the United States.
Four of the world's eight nuclear powers -- Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India -- surround Iran to the north, west and east. Next to these parvenus, Iran/Persia is the only ancient civilization. Like the shah the mullahs overthrew, Iran is determined to achieve the ultimate badge of power. But then, major Arab players -- Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates -- will want it next.
Copyright 2008 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Commentary: Suez and Hungary redux
By ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, UPI Editor at Large
WASHINGTON, June 26 (UPI) -- Israel's message to its only ally, the United States, was quite clear. Either President Bush orders military action, or Israel will have to strike on its own. It can't wait till a new U.S. president is sworn in. Because the new White House tenant could well be Barack Obama. And Obama almost certainly would not approve an Israeli airstrike without first going several extra miles on the U.N. and Western diplomatic track. This could even lead to the kind of rift in Israeli-U.S. relations that occurred when President Eisenhower ordered French, British and Israeli forces out of Egypt during the 1956 Suez War.
America's allies had sprung a strategic deception surprise on the United States by invading Egypt to put the Suez Canal, nationalized by Gamal Abdel Nasser, back under international control. The Soviet Union then ordered Warsaw Pact forces to invade Hungary to suppress an anti-communist revolution.
Thus, the invasion of Suez drained whatever propaganda advantage Eisenhower could have obtained from naked Soviet aggression. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev even felt free to rattle his nuclear "rockets" at the United States and took credit for the humiliatingly hurried Franco-British-Israeli withdrawal from Egypt.
The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis were two of the most dramatic upheavals in international affairs in the post-World War II era. If Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities while Bush is still the commander in chief, China and Russia might be tempted to take a page out of Khrushchev's geopolitical playbook -- and rattle a few threatening economic missiles.
This, in turn, would be designed to get Sen. Obama, D-Ill., to disassociate himself from any hostile action Israel might have taken against Iran. And if that didn't elicit the desired result, Iran's formidable asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities would be unleashed throughout the Gulf in particular and the Middle East in general. Iran also can make life hell for U.S. forces in Iraq and NATO forces in Afghanistan. With U.S. consumer confidence already at a 16-year low, oil would quickly skyrocket to $400 or $500 a barrel.
If, on the other hand, John McCain moves into the White House on the afternoon of Jan. 20, 2009, he presumably would approve of Israeli bombing raids and cruise-missile strikes against Iran's nascent nuclear weapons capability. There is only one thing worse than bombing Iran, McCain has said, and that is an Iranian nuclear bomb.
McCain is also privately critical of Bush's reluctance to cross the border from Iraq into Iran to attack Al Quds barracks housing the Revolutionary Guards' Special Forces who smuggled into Iraq a steady stream of improvised explosive devices that kill and maim American soldiers.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen will be in Israel next weekend, where he will hear the same simple message: If you don't, we have to -- and will.
On May 28 and June 12, in a double-barreled exercise code-named "Glorious Spartan 08," more than 100 Israeli F-16s and F-15s and air-to-air refueling tankers engaged in exercises over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece, 900 miles from home bases. Greece cooperated in what Athens called joint maneuvers. For Jerusalem, it was a demonstration of Israel's capabilities and readiness to strike Iranian targets.
With French know-how at first, Israel began building a nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. Today, Israel is a major nuclear weapons power with an estimated 200 warheads. But Israel's political leadership, reflecting public opinion, is convinced it is living an existential crisis and that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's extremist threats to snuff out Zionism could destroy the Jewish state with one city-busting weapon in the nose cone of an Iranian missile.
Notwithstanding four unsuccessful U.N. Security Council sanction resolutions and countless juicy carrots spurned by Tehran (including technological and financial assistance for a modern nuclear power industry), diplomats recoil in horror at the mere mention of Israeli and/or U.S. attacks on Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei says any attack on Iran would turn the entire region into a "ball of fire" and he would resign.
But ElBaradei still talks the talk, if not the walk, when he accuses Iran of holding back information needed to clarify intelligence reports it had secretly researched nuclear bomb-making, concealed from the prying eyes of his inspectors.
Ranking U.S. and European diplomats say there is still plenty of leeway for diplomacy coupled with increased sanctions pressure. They point out that verbal bomb-thrower Ahmadinejad does not control Iran's nuclear establishment, which is in the hands of Supreme Religious Leader Ali Khamenei, who keeps pledging Iran is not interested in nukes, only nuclear power. Also encouraging is that one of Ahmadinejad's bitter political opponents, former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, was recently elected to the powerful position of speaker of Parliament -- and may unseat Ahmadinejad in 2009 elections.
That Iran is a wanna-be nuclear weapons power is beyond dispute. A national hero at home for midwifing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal with plans for a uranium enrichment plant stolen from the Netherlands and a villain in the rest of the world for running a black market in nuclear secrets for the benefit of America's enemies, A.Q. Khan sold weapons secrets to Iran's mullahs beginning 23 years ago. It would be a miracle if Iran, which boasts thousands of scientists and engineers, does not have at least one powerful device in one of its many underground facilities, usually adjacent to population centers.
Three former CENTCOM four-stars -- Anthony Zinni, John Abizaid and William J. Fallon -- are on record against bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they favor high-level negotiations with Iran's mullah regime. They believe the aim should be a geopolitical deal whereby Iran allows Iraq to consolidate its pro-Western democracy, reins in Hezbollah and Hamas, the United States restores full diplomatic relations, lifts all economic sanctions -- and learns to live with an Iranian bomb. As a sign of peaceful intent, the administration would offer to open a consular section in Tehran to facilitate visas for Iranians wishing to visit the United States.
Four of the world's eight nuclear powers -- Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India -- surround Iran to the north, west and east. Next to these parvenus, Iran/Persia is the only ancient civilization. Like the shah the mullahs overthrew, Iran is determined to achieve the ultimate badge of power. But then, major Arab players -- Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates -- will want it next.
Copyright 2008 by United Press International.
All rights reserved.
US Removed Nuclear Weapons from UK
From the Federation of American Scientists
The United States has withdrawn nuclear weapons from the RAF Lakenheath air base 70 miles northeast of London, marking the end to more than 50 years of U.S. nuclear weapons deployment to the United Kingdom since the first nuclear bombs first arrived in September 1954.
The withdrawal, which has not been officially announced but confirmed by several sources, follows the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ramstein Air Base in Germany in 2005 and Greece in 2001. The removal of nuclear weapons from three bases in two NATO countries in less than a decade undercuts the argument for continuing deployment in other European countries.
More: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-kingdom.php#more-259
The United States has withdrawn nuclear weapons from the RAF Lakenheath air base 70 miles northeast of London, marking the end to more than 50 years of U.S. nuclear weapons deployment to the United Kingdom since the first nuclear bombs first arrived in September 1954.
The withdrawal, which has not been officially announced but confirmed by several sources, follows the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ramstein Air Base in Germany in 2005 and Greece in 2001. The removal of nuclear weapons from three bases in two NATO countries in less than a decade undercuts the argument for continuing deployment in other European countries.
More: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-kingdom.php#more-259
Bitter Lemons Middle East Roundtable, June 26, 2008: Denmark and Islam
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 25 Volume 6 - June 26, 2008
Denmark and Islam
• Blood and blasphemy - Irfan Husain
The mere fact that a bomb had destroyed the Danish embassy was enough to satisfy millions of Pakistanis.
• Confusion of values need not cause conflict - Maryam Yasmin Hussain
The alternative to respectful dialogue is simply too frightening.
• A Jordanian perspective - Oraib Al Rantawi
Reactions to the caricatures and film have become a factor in local and regional politics.
• How the Danish cartoons prevent dialogue - Toger Seidenfaden
I am about to be indicted in a Jordanian court.
Blood and blasphemy
Irfan Husain
When a car bomb devastated the Danish embassy in Islamabad on June 2, its repercussions were felt more in the West than in Pakistan itself. Over the years, Pakistanis have become so accustomed to terror attacks that they tend to take such atrocities in their stride. And the fact is that by again publishing a sacrilegious cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad after the violent reaction last year, the Danes had not made themselves very popular in the Muslim world.
The most common reaction to the embassy bombing, even among the educated, was: "It's a terrible thing, but why did the Danes insult our Prophet?" The more zealous Pakistanis welcomed the attack with glee, saying, in effect: "Serves the Danes right!" Even when al- Qaeda accepted responsibility for the attack, there was very little sense of outrage. The fact that all eight of those killed were Muslims and Pakistanis (one of the victims was a Danish citizen of Pakistani origin) seemed to count for very little.
Two days after the attack, a text message zipped from one cell phone to the next across the country, announcing that the boycott of Danish products in the Muslim world had thus far cost the Scandinavian nation a billion dollars. No source was given for this information, but the jubilant tone was clear: "Keep it up!" the message concluded.
It is difficult for a westerner to understand the depth of the anger most practising Muslims feel about anything that is seen as an insult to their Prophet. In Europe, in particular, religious belief has weakened to the point where stand-up comics regularly poke fun at everybody from Jesus to the Pope. "The Life of Brian", the hilarious seventies comedy by Monty Python parodying Christ's life and times, remains an iconic film. For a generation brought up in this utterly secular environment where belief is an insignificant aspect of life, Muslim reaction to a few badly drawn cartoons in an unknown Danish newspaper has been absolutely baffling.
While Europe has been growing away from its religious moorings, Islam has been witnessing a resurgence. Younger Muslims are, by and large, much more rigid in their faith than their parents were. At the same time, countries like Pakistan have fewer contacts with the West at the personal level. This growing distance has made it easier for extremists to demonize the West, casting it in the role of Islam's arch-enemy. Thus, each conflict involving Muslims is presented as an anti-Islam conspiracy, whether it is the western presence in Afghanistan or Iraq, the oppression of Palestinians or Russian excesses in Chechnya. All form part of the sinister anti-Islam narrative.
In this super-charged atmosphere of paranoia and violence, publication of the cartoons in Denmark is seen as a deliberately provocative act. Muslims would never dream of running similar caricatures of Moses or Jesus, both prophets of Islam, so they cannot imagine why Christians would gratuitously insult the most revered figure in Islam. Even for sophisticated Muslims, freedom of speech does not include this kind of behavior. In a recent conference organized by the Cordoba Initiative and the Malaysian government in Kuala Lumpur, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi ex-diplomat and sometime head of the intelligence service, declared: "I can never accept that freedom of speech is morally right when it offends my faith."
To put things in the Pakistani context, one unfortunate citizen was recently sentenced to death for making remarks that witnesses swore were disrespectful of the Prophet. Under the country's blasphemy laws, anybody guilty of insulting the Prophet or desecrating the Qur'an faces the death penalty. Over the years, this legislation--introduced by then- president Zia ul-Haq over 20 years ago--has been used by people to settle scores or grab their neighbors' property. Invariably, the death sentence is converted to a life term on appeal, but in the fanatical environment that prevails in much of rural Pakistan a charge of blasphemy is hard to shake off. Innocent people have been beaten or burned to death by rampaging mobs enraged by rumors that a copy of the Quran had been burned.
Against this backdrop, the bombing of the Danish embassy in Islamabad makes for a kind of rough justice in the eyes of most Pakistanis. Never mind that Pakistan's image abroad, already at a record low, has taken a further plunge. Never mind that all those killed were Muslims who had nothing to do with the publication of the offending cartoon. Never mind, too, that most Pakistanis have not even seen the cartoon in question. The mere fact that a bomb had destroyed the Danish embassy was enough to satisfy millions of Pakistanis.
In Parliament, some members from religious parties--their numbers drastically slashed in the recent elections--urged the government to break off diplomatic relations with Denmark. Even columnists who are staunch supporters of freedom of speech argued for anti-blasphemy laws in the West.
Sadly, this is not the first cross-cultural misunderstanding between the West and the Islamic world, nor is it likely to be the last.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Irfan Husain writes two columns a week for Dawn, Pakistan's widest circulating and most influential daily. After a career in the civil service spanning 30 years, he was president of a university in Pakistan for five years. He now divides his time between England and Pakistan.
Confusion of values need not cause conflict
Maryam Yasmin Hussain
The reprinting of the Muhammad cartoons in 16 newspapers in Denmark in February ignited a lingering bitterness among Muslims across the world. The first reprinting of the cartoons, more than two years ago, might have been forgiven as a mistake by the Danish media in the name of freedom of speech. This second printing has caused widespread resentment in the Muslim world as it is considered a deliberate and premeditated attempt to offend Muslims once again. Even moderate and secular Muslims consider this second reprinting to be, at best, in very poor taste.
Previously, moderate Muslims were inclined toward reconciliation with Denmark and other European countries where the cartoons had been printed. The boycott of Danish goods was led primarily by governments in Arab and Muslim countries. Now the situation is changing. Countries like Jordan, which traditionally try to bridge the gap between Muslims and the West, are also deeply offended by the most recent cartoon affair. And the boycott is receiving more popular support and may as a result last longer and reach deeper.
On June 2, the Danish embassy in Islamabad was targeted by a car bomb in what is believed to be a reaction to the reprinting. A few days later an organization associated with al- Qaeda claimed responsibility for the bombing on its website. It was an apparent attempt at gaining popular support by bombing Denmark's political representation in the Pakistani capital. Fortunately the majority of political and religious leaders unanimously condemned the bombing.
While a marginal group of Muslims believes in violence, the majority of Muslims still have faith in a harmonious and peaceful dialogue between the West and the Muslim world to resolve their differences. The alternative to respectful dialogue is simply too frightening.
The brutal act of bombing a Danish embassy and claiming innocent lives is a strategy to disrupt relations between Pakistan and Denmark and spread hatred among people of different faiths. This should however not be an obstacle to collaboration between the West and Muslim countries. Otherwise terrorist groups all over the globe will be a step closer to achieving their goal, which seems to be the realization of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations.
It's indeed ironic that the Danish media's insistence on publishing the cartoons is in a very odd way doing such terrorists a favor by bringing a clash between the West and the Muslim world closer. And it is very unfortunate that the concept of freedom of speech is being misused. While some hold that this basic right means anything goes, it is observed differently in different parts of the world. At the time of the original cartoon controversy in 2005, David Irving was convicted of denying the Holocaust as a historical fact and sentenced to jail in Austria, a member state of the European Union. So even as the EU was expressing its support for the Danish media apparently as a matter of freedom of speech, its silence on Irving's conviction was deafening. No European or western government used its support of the right to freedom of speech to defend Irving's right to express his beliefs.
But the few extremist groups cannot be neglected. It is necessary to look into and understand their reasons for engaging in violence. This in no way entails justification: no one should accept violence as a means to resolve any kind of problem. The path to peace is only effectively pursued through dialogue.
And whatever the cause of violence--whether it is political, an outgrowth of religious extremism or a result of a lack of understanding--this should not stand in the way of mutual respect. There are areas where the Muslim world and the West do not share common ground. These differences must be accepted in the spirit of tolerance and peaceful engagement.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Maryam Yasmin Hussain is of Pakistani origin, born and raised in Denmark. She recently returned to Denmark from Pakistan where she had pursued her studies.
A Jordanian perspective
Oraib Al Rantawi
As is the case with all Muslim peoples, Jordanians are sorry whenever they see their religious symbols and fundamental beliefs exposed to abuse, defamation and cynicism. The sorrow is even greater when the perpetrators are western writers, artists or politicians. The abuse in this case becomes a provocative and aggressive act that can be classified as a "clash of civilizations" or even seemingly reflect a "crusade" against Islam and Muslims.
Recently, Jordanians have voiced their resentment and rejection of prejudice against the Prophet Muhammad. Frequently they have demonstrated and picketed. Newspapers and other media in Jordan have highlighted these protests. The campaign entitled "Except for the Messenger of Allah" has been the most obvious instance.
This very direct slogan reflects the Jordanian people's overall stance. Accordingly, campaigns have been organized to boycott first Danish and then Dutch goods. Some mega malls in Jordan have displayed this banner above vacant shelves that once held the products of these countries. While some shops withdrew from the boycott, others are still committed to it, either out of conviction or to attract customers in a competitive market.
Now for the first time, following the success of the "Messenger of Allah Unifies Us" campaign, the Danish caricatures and Dutch Fitna film are being brought to the Jordanian courts. The campaign motion, which has been admitted to court, charges some 20 Danish and Dutch figures and institutions. The charges include defaming the revelations of Islam, slandering Islam, offending the Prophet Mohammad, humiliating religious sentiments and using the internet in a manner harmful to citizens.
Nevertheless, it seems that with the passage of time and repeated recurrence of these offenses, Jordanians have become bored with the affair; new revelations cease to irritate or anger the public. Indeed, new priorities top its agenda these days--most importantly, rising prices of fuel and foodstuffs. Inflation is almost "eating up" wages and salaries, and more than 85 percent of Jordanians are suffering economically or, at best (and according to recent polls), their economic status has remained stagnant for the past three years.
This might explain why the latest campaign against the Danish caricatures and the Dutch film has been limited to a few elite figures and why their activities have not generated a broad popular response. Except for the media and press coverage that will accompany the court deliberations--especially if some of the Danish defendants appear before it, as the media predicts--the campaign is not expected to yield prominent results.
In fact, some Jordanians are now convinced that it is irrelevant to whip up Jordanian, Arab and Islamic public opinion at every "offense" or "provocation" caused by caricatures targeting Islam. This will merely encourage every unknown newspaper or communications medium and every failed journalist in the West to mount a provocation in search of international fame. These people argue that Islam and Muslims must be strong enough to avoid anger and fury over a caricature or a film.
This view does not appeal to another group of politicians and media figures who are themselves motivated to grab any opportunity to enhance their media recognition or revive their political visibility. Just as some western artists and politicians seek fame and repute when they expose Islam, so an exaggerated reaction by Jordanian and Arab artists, journalists and politicians should not be encouraged.
Yet the film and caricatures case has already entered the "local bazaar"; Islamic and non -Islamic parties and activists compete with one another to prove who is keener to defend Islam and Muslims and who best represents of the Islamic image and interests. Regretfully, successive governments have also plunged heart and soul into the cause for fear of being accused of failing to defend the Prophet. In this context, amendments have been introduced to statutes like the Press and Publication Law to limit freedom of expression and opinion under the pretext of defending religious symbols. It is sad to see Jordanians paying with their freedom and rights for "publication offences" committed thousands of miles away, under the argument that this is necessary to protect Islam from humiliation and offense.
Now that the case of the caricatures and the film has entered into local political calculations, the competition among local actors for the honor of defending Islam has motivated activities and campaigns against the "provocative West". Nor is the competition limited to local actors; it has become a component of the struggle to lead the Islamic world. If we observe the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran to challenge the Danish caricature case we can appreciate that this is a battlefield where the two poles of the Islamic world struggle to lead it. Inevitably, this results in repercussions and reactions in each Arab and Muslim country where Iran or Saudi Arabia exercises influence.
In brief, reactions to the caricatures and film have become a factor in politics: a vehicle for advancement in local politics as well as a platform for local and regional actors to contest one another.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons- international.org
Oraib Al Rantawi is director of Al Quds Center for Political Studies in Jordan and a columnist.
How the Danish cartoons prevent dialogue
Toger Seidenfaden
Large parts of the global debate about the Danish cartoons have taken on the nature of a dialogue between the deaf and the blind. In the Muslim world, millions fail to see the point of depicting and caricaturing the prophet Muhammad as a terrorist, and reject the absolute right to scorn, mock and ridicule religious Muslims asserted by the creator of the cartoons. In the West, the idea that offensive cartoons justify murderous threats and violence is completely unacceptable while freedom of speech is defended by all. The result is increasing polarization, with both sides not only asserting their values uncompromisingly but also feeding polarization, misunderstandings and further tensions.
As there is something slightly irritating about a commentator who implicitly presents his own position as equidistant between two misguided sides of a debate, thus allocating himself immediate intellectual and moral superiority (or getting himself neatly caught in the crossfire, which is perhaps closer to the truth in this case), let me make my own position in the controversy explicit: as editor of the Danish daily newspaper Politiken, I have been a prominent participant in the debate about the cartoons commissioned and published by another Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, ever since they became an issue of major national and international concern.
On the one hand, I have criticized Jyllands-Posten for the original publication, which I see as an expression of rising intolerance and islamophobia in Danish politics. I have criticized the Danish government even more strongly for its complete lack of dialogue with the ambassadors from Muslim countries in Denmark, who tried to raise the issue at an early stage. The Danish government's unwillingness to distance itself from the cartoons and refusal of dialogue is in my opinion the main transmission mechanism which--four months after the original publication--transformed what would otherwise have remained a local affair into a global crisis. Unsurprisingly, this interpretation has not met with universal approval in Denmark and my newspaper and I have been blamed for showing insufficient solidarity with Jyllands-Posten, with the government and indeed with Denmark as such, when our country was the target of strong international pressure and attacks.
On the other hand, we have published one or more of the cartoons in Politiken--including the most controversial one--at least 15 times as part of our news coverage. We have done this, despite our disapproval of the cartoons and the reasons given for their original publication, simply because they have become news and are a necessary part of what our readers must see if they are to understand all the events that have grown out of the cartoon controversy. To put it in legal and normative terms: We reprinted the cartoons, not as an act of freedom of speech, but as an act of freedom of information, as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights.
The first 14 times we did this, our practice was well understood: As editor, I did not receive a single complaint from any of our Danish Muslim readers. But on February 12, 2008, the Danish domestic intelligence service announced that it had arrested three residents of Denmark on suspicion of planning to murder Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist from Jyllands-Posten responsible for the most controversial of the cartoons. The next day, this was the main story in all Danish media, and most of them, including Politiken, reprinted Westergaard's cartoon. The fact that so many media reprinted the cartoon, while expressing outrage about a terrorist plot (not something we have much experience of in Denmark) led to this being described by news agencies as a collective act of defiance by Danish media. This is a misunderstanding. There was no consultation between media, and I believe most media reprinted the cartoons on much the same journalistic grounds as Politiken did. In the Middle East, however, this was perceived as a highly symbolic act of republication, renewing the original offense with intent, so to speak. It led to renewed tensions and a renewal of the boycott against Danish goods in a number of countries.
As a result, I am about to be indicted in a Jordanian court together with nine of my colleagues at other newspapers. Jordanian authorities apparently intend to assert their jurisdiction over Danish media on the basis of the cartoon also being reproduced on the internet. As I understand it, we will be charged with blasphemy and with an attempt to divide the Jordanian nation. I am informed that the possible penalties range from three years to life in prison.
Despite the rhetoric of those who insist on the right to provoke and sometimes demonize minorities, freedom of speech (and freedom of information) is not, in fact, completely unlimited in Europe. Legislation against libel, prohibition of racism and, in many countries, laws against blasphemy are in place. In the latter case, the need for public order is the main justification in what are largely secular societies. In the cartoon case, the Danish chief prosecutor determined that the most controversial of the cartoons does not rise to the level of offense necessary for prosecution, essentially because it can be interpreted as a satirical statement not against Islam or the prophet, but against those who misuse Islam to justify terrorism. In a civil suit by Muslim associations in Denmark against Jyllands-Posten, the local and then the superior court reached the same conclusion with regard to libel and acquitted the newspaper. It is worth noting that Danish Muslims have never taken any action against the many other Danish media--including Politiken--that have reprinted the cartoons on journalistic grounds.
I do not see the cartoon affair in Denmark and Europe as primarily about freedom of speech. In our societies, freedom of speech is only reinforced by attempts to attack it, especially when it is a small minority attacking dominant media. Threats of violence are unacceptable, but in the end they are also ineffective. In the Middle East, the situation is clearly different. Not only do I see the Jordanian case as misguided vis-a-vis Danish media, but we have seen many examples in the region of media and editors being punished for doing their job of informing the public. We live in different societies with different challenges, but this ought not to prevent us from debating all the issues that confront us. The cartoon affair is a negative case where extremists have gained the most. This can only be prevented if we stand together in defense of an open dialogue based on mutual respect and a refusal of intolerance, violence and political restraints on the media.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Toger Seidenfaden is editor-in-chief of the Danish daily, Politiken.
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 25 Volume 6 - June 26, 2008
Denmark and Islam
• Blood and blasphemy - Irfan Husain
The mere fact that a bomb had destroyed the Danish embassy was enough to satisfy millions of Pakistanis.
• Confusion of values need not cause conflict - Maryam Yasmin Hussain
The alternative to respectful dialogue is simply too frightening.
• A Jordanian perspective - Oraib Al Rantawi
Reactions to the caricatures and film have become a factor in local and regional politics.
• How the Danish cartoons prevent dialogue - Toger Seidenfaden
I am about to be indicted in a Jordanian court.
Blood and blasphemy
Irfan Husain
When a car bomb devastated the Danish embassy in Islamabad on June 2, its repercussions were felt more in the West than in Pakistan itself. Over the years, Pakistanis have become so accustomed to terror attacks that they tend to take such atrocities in their stride. And the fact is that by again publishing a sacrilegious cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad after the violent reaction last year, the Danes had not made themselves very popular in the Muslim world.
The most common reaction to the embassy bombing, even among the educated, was: "It's a terrible thing, but why did the Danes insult our Prophet?" The more zealous Pakistanis welcomed the attack with glee, saying, in effect: "Serves the Danes right!" Even when al- Qaeda accepted responsibility for the attack, there was very little sense of outrage. The fact that all eight of those killed were Muslims and Pakistanis (one of the victims was a Danish citizen of Pakistani origin) seemed to count for very little.
Two days after the attack, a text message zipped from one cell phone to the next across the country, announcing that the boycott of Danish products in the Muslim world had thus far cost the Scandinavian nation a billion dollars. No source was given for this information, but the jubilant tone was clear: "Keep it up!" the message concluded.
It is difficult for a westerner to understand the depth of the anger most practising Muslims feel about anything that is seen as an insult to their Prophet. In Europe, in particular, religious belief has weakened to the point where stand-up comics regularly poke fun at everybody from Jesus to the Pope. "The Life of Brian", the hilarious seventies comedy by Monty Python parodying Christ's life and times, remains an iconic film. For a generation brought up in this utterly secular environment where belief is an insignificant aspect of life, Muslim reaction to a few badly drawn cartoons in an unknown Danish newspaper has been absolutely baffling.
While Europe has been growing away from its religious moorings, Islam has been witnessing a resurgence. Younger Muslims are, by and large, much more rigid in their faith than their parents were. At the same time, countries like Pakistan have fewer contacts with the West at the personal level. This growing distance has made it easier for extremists to demonize the West, casting it in the role of Islam's arch-enemy. Thus, each conflict involving Muslims is presented as an anti-Islam conspiracy, whether it is the western presence in Afghanistan or Iraq, the oppression of Palestinians or Russian excesses in Chechnya. All form part of the sinister anti-Islam narrative.
In this super-charged atmosphere of paranoia and violence, publication of the cartoons in Denmark is seen as a deliberately provocative act. Muslims would never dream of running similar caricatures of Moses or Jesus, both prophets of Islam, so they cannot imagine why Christians would gratuitously insult the most revered figure in Islam. Even for sophisticated Muslims, freedom of speech does not include this kind of behavior. In a recent conference organized by the Cordoba Initiative and the Malaysian government in Kuala Lumpur, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi ex-diplomat and sometime head of the intelligence service, declared: "I can never accept that freedom of speech is morally right when it offends my faith."
To put things in the Pakistani context, one unfortunate citizen was recently sentenced to death for making remarks that witnesses swore were disrespectful of the Prophet. Under the country's blasphemy laws, anybody guilty of insulting the Prophet or desecrating the Qur'an faces the death penalty. Over the years, this legislation--introduced by then- president Zia ul-Haq over 20 years ago--has been used by people to settle scores or grab their neighbors' property. Invariably, the death sentence is converted to a life term on appeal, but in the fanatical environment that prevails in much of rural Pakistan a charge of blasphemy is hard to shake off. Innocent people have been beaten or burned to death by rampaging mobs enraged by rumors that a copy of the Quran had been burned.
Against this backdrop, the bombing of the Danish embassy in Islamabad makes for a kind of rough justice in the eyes of most Pakistanis. Never mind that Pakistan's image abroad, already at a record low, has taken a further plunge. Never mind that all those killed were Muslims who had nothing to do with the publication of the offending cartoon. Never mind, too, that most Pakistanis have not even seen the cartoon in question. The mere fact that a bomb had destroyed the Danish embassy was enough to satisfy millions of Pakistanis.
In Parliament, some members from religious parties--their numbers drastically slashed in the recent elections--urged the government to break off diplomatic relations with Denmark. Even columnists who are staunch supporters of freedom of speech argued for anti-blasphemy laws in the West.
Sadly, this is not the first cross-cultural misunderstanding between the West and the Islamic world, nor is it likely to be the last.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Irfan Husain writes two columns a week for Dawn, Pakistan's widest circulating and most influential daily. After a career in the civil service spanning 30 years, he was president of a university in Pakistan for five years. He now divides his time between England and Pakistan.
Confusion of values need not cause conflict
Maryam Yasmin Hussain
The reprinting of the Muhammad cartoons in 16 newspapers in Denmark in February ignited a lingering bitterness among Muslims across the world. The first reprinting of the cartoons, more than two years ago, might have been forgiven as a mistake by the Danish media in the name of freedom of speech. This second printing has caused widespread resentment in the Muslim world as it is considered a deliberate and premeditated attempt to offend Muslims once again. Even moderate and secular Muslims consider this second reprinting to be, at best, in very poor taste.
Previously, moderate Muslims were inclined toward reconciliation with Denmark and other European countries where the cartoons had been printed. The boycott of Danish goods was led primarily by governments in Arab and Muslim countries. Now the situation is changing. Countries like Jordan, which traditionally try to bridge the gap between Muslims and the West, are also deeply offended by the most recent cartoon affair. And the boycott is receiving more popular support and may as a result last longer and reach deeper.
On June 2, the Danish embassy in Islamabad was targeted by a car bomb in what is believed to be a reaction to the reprinting. A few days later an organization associated with al- Qaeda claimed responsibility for the bombing on its website. It was an apparent attempt at gaining popular support by bombing Denmark's political representation in the Pakistani capital. Fortunately the majority of political and religious leaders unanimously condemned the bombing.
While a marginal group of Muslims believes in violence, the majority of Muslims still have faith in a harmonious and peaceful dialogue between the West and the Muslim world to resolve their differences. The alternative to respectful dialogue is simply too frightening.
The brutal act of bombing a Danish embassy and claiming innocent lives is a strategy to disrupt relations between Pakistan and Denmark and spread hatred among people of different faiths. This should however not be an obstacle to collaboration between the West and Muslim countries. Otherwise terrorist groups all over the globe will be a step closer to achieving their goal, which seems to be the realization of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations.
It's indeed ironic that the Danish media's insistence on publishing the cartoons is in a very odd way doing such terrorists a favor by bringing a clash between the West and the Muslim world closer. And it is very unfortunate that the concept of freedom of speech is being misused. While some hold that this basic right means anything goes, it is observed differently in different parts of the world. At the time of the original cartoon controversy in 2005, David Irving was convicted of denying the Holocaust as a historical fact and sentenced to jail in Austria, a member state of the European Union. So even as the EU was expressing its support for the Danish media apparently as a matter of freedom of speech, its silence on Irving's conviction was deafening. No European or western government used its support of the right to freedom of speech to defend Irving's right to express his beliefs.
But the few extremist groups cannot be neglected. It is necessary to look into and understand their reasons for engaging in violence. This in no way entails justification: no one should accept violence as a means to resolve any kind of problem. The path to peace is only effectively pursued through dialogue.
And whatever the cause of violence--whether it is political, an outgrowth of religious extremism or a result of a lack of understanding--this should not stand in the way of mutual respect. There are areas where the Muslim world and the West do not share common ground. These differences must be accepted in the spirit of tolerance and peaceful engagement.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Maryam Yasmin Hussain is of Pakistani origin, born and raised in Denmark. She recently returned to Denmark from Pakistan where she had pursued her studies.
A Jordanian perspective
Oraib Al Rantawi
As is the case with all Muslim peoples, Jordanians are sorry whenever they see their religious symbols and fundamental beliefs exposed to abuse, defamation and cynicism. The sorrow is even greater when the perpetrators are western writers, artists or politicians. The abuse in this case becomes a provocative and aggressive act that can be classified as a "clash of civilizations" or even seemingly reflect a "crusade" against Islam and Muslims.
Recently, Jordanians have voiced their resentment and rejection of prejudice against the Prophet Muhammad. Frequently they have demonstrated and picketed. Newspapers and other media in Jordan have highlighted these protests. The campaign entitled "Except for the Messenger of Allah" has been the most obvious instance.
This very direct slogan reflects the Jordanian people's overall stance. Accordingly, campaigns have been organized to boycott first Danish and then Dutch goods. Some mega malls in Jordan have displayed this banner above vacant shelves that once held the products of these countries. While some shops withdrew from the boycott, others are still committed to it, either out of conviction or to attract customers in a competitive market.
Now for the first time, following the success of the "Messenger of Allah Unifies Us" campaign, the Danish caricatures and Dutch Fitna film are being brought to the Jordanian courts. The campaign motion, which has been admitted to court, charges some 20 Danish and Dutch figures and institutions. The charges include defaming the revelations of Islam, slandering Islam, offending the Prophet Mohammad, humiliating religious sentiments and using the internet in a manner harmful to citizens.
Nevertheless, it seems that with the passage of time and repeated recurrence of these offenses, Jordanians have become bored with the affair; new revelations cease to irritate or anger the public. Indeed, new priorities top its agenda these days--most importantly, rising prices of fuel and foodstuffs. Inflation is almost "eating up" wages and salaries, and more than 85 percent of Jordanians are suffering economically or, at best (and according to recent polls), their economic status has remained stagnant for the past three years.
This might explain why the latest campaign against the Danish caricatures and the Dutch film has been limited to a few elite figures and why their activities have not generated a broad popular response. Except for the media and press coverage that will accompany the court deliberations--especially if some of the Danish defendants appear before it, as the media predicts--the campaign is not expected to yield prominent results.
In fact, some Jordanians are now convinced that it is irrelevant to whip up Jordanian, Arab and Islamic public opinion at every "offense" or "provocation" caused by caricatures targeting Islam. This will merely encourage every unknown newspaper or communications medium and every failed journalist in the West to mount a provocation in search of international fame. These people argue that Islam and Muslims must be strong enough to avoid anger and fury over a caricature or a film.
This view does not appeal to another group of politicians and media figures who are themselves motivated to grab any opportunity to enhance their media recognition or revive their political visibility. Just as some western artists and politicians seek fame and repute when they expose Islam, so an exaggerated reaction by Jordanian and Arab artists, journalists and politicians should not be encouraged.
Yet the film and caricatures case has already entered the "local bazaar"; Islamic and non -Islamic parties and activists compete with one another to prove who is keener to defend Islam and Muslims and who best represents of the Islamic image and interests. Regretfully, successive governments have also plunged heart and soul into the cause for fear of being accused of failing to defend the Prophet. In this context, amendments have been introduced to statutes like the Press and Publication Law to limit freedom of expression and opinion under the pretext of defending religious symbols. It is sad to see Jordanians paying with their freedom and rights for "publication offences" committed thousands of miles away, under the argument that this is necessary to protect Islam from humiliation and offense.
Now that the case of the caricatures and the film has entered into local political calculations, the competition among local actors for the honor of defending Islam has motivated activities and campaigns against the "provocative West". Nor is the competition limited to local actors; it has become a component of the struggle to lead the Islamic world. If we observe the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran to challenge the Danish caricature case we can appreciate that this is a battlefield where the two poles of the Islamic world struggle to lead it. Inevitably, this results in repercussions and reactions in each Arab and Muslim country where Iran or Saudi Arabia exercises influence.
In brief, reactions to the caricatures and film have become a factor in politics: a vehicle for advancement in local politics as well as a platform for local and regional actors to contest one another.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons- international.org
Oraib Al Rantawi is director of Al Quds Center for Political Studies in Jordan and a columnist.
How the Danish cartoons prevent dialogue
Toger Seidenfaden
Large parts of the global debate about the Danish cartoons have taken on the nature of a dialogue between the deaf and the blind. In the Muslim world, millions fail to see the point of depicting and caricaturing the prophet Muhammad as a terrorist, and reject the absolute right to scorn, mock and ridicule religious Muslims asserted by the creator of the cartoons. In the West, the idea that offensive cartoons justify murderous threats and violence is completely unacceptable while freedom of speech is defended by all. The result is increasing polarization, with both sides not only asserting their values uncompromisingly but also feeding polarization, misunderstandings and further tensions.
As there is something slightly irritating about a commentator who implicitly presents his own position as equidistant between two misguided sides of a debate, thus allocating himself immediate intellectual and moral superiority (or getting himself neatly caught in the crossfire, which is perhaps closer to the truth in this case), let me make my own position in the controversy explicit: as editor of the Danish daily newspaper Politiken, I have been a prominent participant in the debate about the cartoons commissioned and published by another Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, ever since they became an issue of major national and international concern.
On the one hand, I have criticized Jyllands-Posten for the original publication, which I see as an expression of rising intolerance and islamophobia in Danish politics. I have criticized the Danish government even more strongly for its complete lack of dialogue with the ambassadors from Muslim countries in Denmark, who tried to raise the issue at an early stage. The Danish government's unwillingness to distance itself from the cartoons and refusal of dialogue is in my opinion the main transmission mechanism which--four months after the original publication--transformed what would otherwise have remained a local affair into a global crisis. Unsurprisingly, this interpretation has not met with universal approval in Denmark and my newspaper and I have been blamed for showing insufficient solidarity with Jyllands-Posten, with the government and indeed with Denmark as such, when our country was the target of strong international pressure and attacks.
On the other hand, we have published one or more of the cartoons in Politiken--including the most controversial one--at least 15 times as part of our news coverage. We have done this, despite our disapproval of the cartoons and the reasons given for their original publication, simply because they have become news and are a necessary part of what our readers must see if they are to understand all the events that have grown out of the cartoon controversy. To put it in legal and normative terms: We reprinted the cartoons, not as an act of freedom of speech, but as an act of freedom of information, as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights.
The first 14 times we did this, our practice was well understood: As editor, I did not receive a single complaint from any of our Danish Muslim readers. But on February 12, 2008, the Danish domestic intelligence service announced that it had arrested three residents of Denmark on suspicion of planning to murder Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist from Jyllands-Posten responsible for the most controversial of the cartoons. The next day, this was the main story in all Danish media, and most of them, including Politiken, reprinted Westergaard's cartoon. The fact that so many media reprinted the cartoon, while expressing outrage about a terrorist plot (not something we have much experience of in Denmark) led to this being described by news agencies as a collective act of defiance by Danish media. This is a misunderstanding. There was no consultation between media, and I believe most media reprinted the cartoons on much the same journalistic grounds as Politiken did. In the Middle East, however, this was perceived as a highly symbolic act of republication, renewing the original offense with intent, so to speak. It led to renewed tensions and a renewal of the boycott against Danish goods in a number of countries.
As a result, I am about to be indicted in a Jordanian court together with nine of my colleagues at other newspapers. Jordanian authorities apparently intend to assert their jurisdiction over Danish media on the basis of the cartoon also being reproduced on the internet. As I understand it, we will be charged with blasphemy and with an attempt to divide the Jordanian nation. I am informed that the possible penalties range from three years to life in prison.
Despite the rhetoric of those who insist on the right to provoke and sometimes demonize minorities, freedom of speech (and freedom of information) is not, in fact, completely unlimited in Europe. Legislation against libel, prohibition of racism and, in many countries, laws against blasphemy are in place. In the latter case, the need for public order is the main justification in what are largely secular societies. In the cartoon case, the Danish chief prosecutor determined that the most controversial of the cartoons does not rise to the level of offense necessary for prosecution, essentially because it can be interpreted as a satirical statement not against Islam or the prophet, but against those who misuse Islam to justify terrorism. In a civil suit by Muslim associations in Denmark against Jyllands-Posten, the local and then the superior court reached the same conclusion with regard to libel and acquitted the newspaper. It is worth noting that Danish Muslims have never taken any action against the many other Danish media--including Politiken--that have reprinted the cartoons on journalistic grounds.
I do not see the cartoon affair in Denmark and Europe as primarily about freedom of speech. In our societies, freedom of speech is only reinforced by attempts to attack it, especially when it is a small minority attacking dominant media. Threats of violence are unacceptable, but in the end they are also ineffective. In the Middle East, the situation is clearly different. Not only do I see the Jordanian case as misguided vis-a-vis Danish media, but we have seen many examples in the region of media and editors being punished for doing their job of informing the public. We live in different societies with different challenges, but this ought not to prevent us from debating all the issues that confront us. The cartoon affair is a negative case where extremists have gained the most. This can only be prevented if we stand together in defense of an open dialogue based on mutual respect and a refusal of intolerance, violence and political restraints on the media.- Published 26/6/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Toger Seidenfaden is editor-in-chief of the Danish daily, Politiken.
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Special Report from the Battlefields - Who's Actually Winning in Iraq?
Special Report from the Battlefields
Who's Actually Winning in Iraq?
By PATRICK COCKBURN
The American occupation of Iraq follows the same course as that of British rule after the First World War. At first there was imperial over-confidence following military victory and a conviction that what Iraqis did was of no importance. Then there was the shock and surprise of an Iraqi rebellion against the British in 1920 and the Americans after 2003. In both cases the occupiers responded by establishing an Iraqi national government but with limited powers. In 1930 under the Anglo-Iraqi treaty Iraq achieved nominal independence and joined the League of Nations but Britain retained two large bases and remained the predominant power in 1raq. Iraqi governments were tainted and lacked legitimacy because of Iraqis’ perception that their rulers were foreign pawns until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958.
America is now behaving in much the same way. It is negotiating a security agreement to replace the present UN mandate. It is to all intents and purposes a treaty that will determine future relations between Iraq and the US. It is not being called a treaty only because President Bush does not want to submit it to Senate approval. But in effect it continues the occupation under another name. The US will keep possession of over 50 bases though there will be a few Iraqi soldiers manning an outer perimeter so the US can say they will be in Iraqi hands. American soldiers and contractors will have legal immunity. The US will be free to carry out operations against ‘terrorists’ without informing the Iraqi government so it can arrest Iraqis or carry out military campaigns as and when it feels like it. Some of the Iraqi negotiators have been horrified by the extent of the American demands which would mean long term American control. But the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, whatever his private misgivings, believes that at the end of the day he relies on American backing. His coalition of Shia religious parties, Sunni representatives and the Kurds feel the same way.
The Iraqi-American security agreement, which Bush wants signed by July 31, is a better barometer of where real power lies in Iraq than military developments on the ground. It comes just as the Iraqi government is trying to regain control of the largest cities in the country. It has launched three military offensives since the end of March against Shia militias and Sunni insurgents, sending its army into Basra, Sadr City in Baghdad and Mosul. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers have moved into Shia districts once dominated by the Mehdi Army which follows the nationalist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. In the Sunni Arab city of Mosul the government claims it is crushing the last remnant of al-Qa’ida in Iraq and has arrested over 1,000 suspects. The aim of the prime minister Nouri al-Maliki is to show that the Iraqi state, feeble and dependant on the US since the fall of Saddam Hussein, is back in business. The operations in Basra and Mosul have bombastic names – ‘Charge of the Knights’ and ‘Roar of the Lion’ – in a bid to underline Maliki’s intention to show that the Iraqi army is the strongest non- American military power in Iraq.
At first sight the government seems to be succeeding after initial failures. The attack on the Mehdi Army in Basra on March 25 at first made no headway and Iraqi soldiers even ran out of food after a couple of days fighting. They had to be heavily reinforced by American advisers calling in US air strikes and British artillery fire. But, after a few weeks, government soldiers were taking over in districts long held by the Mehdi Army. In Sadr City—with a population of two million it is less of a district of Baghdad than a twin city—the Americans again bore the brunt of the fighting. Some 1,000 Iraqis, 60 per cent women and children according to the UN, were killed in seven weeks. In both Basra and Sadr City the clashes ended because Muqtada al-Sadr called his men off the streets under ceasefires brokered by the Iranians. The Iraqi army moved in though without the Americans. Maliki may not have won the decisive military victory he claimed, but his government looked stronger at the end of the fighting than at the beginning.
The crucial political and military question in Iraq is whether the Iraqi government’s success will be long lasting or temporary. Will it lose control once again if al-Sadr orders his militiamen back into the streets? Are al- Qa’ida and other Sunni insurgents simply lying low and waiting for American troops to leave? Again and again in the last five years, the US and its Iraqi allies have genuinely believed that they were winning on the ground only to see their supposed successes evaporate when their opponents launched a counter-attack. But for the moment at least Maliki’s grip on central government is stronger than ever. A year ago the Americans and the Kurds wanted him replaced, as did the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the biggest Shia party in his governing coalition. But Washington soon began to stress privately that it wanted Iraq to appear as politically stable as possible during an election year in the US, while the Kurds and ISCI came to believe that they could get most of what they wanted with Maliki in power. For the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis think the present government might last.
This may be misleading. The government’s position looks stronger than it is because its opponents are waiting for the Americans to leave or draw down their forces. Al-Sadr does not want to fight now because he sensibly wishes to avoid a direct military confrontation with the US army, which his lightly armed militiamen are bound to lose. This has been his strategy ever since his militiamen fought ferocious battles with the US Marines in Najaf in 2004. The Iranians are playing a more and more overt role in Iraq this year and do not want to see an intra-Shia civil war between ISCI and the Sadrists. The Iraqi Minister of Defense says that the Iraqi army will not be strong enough to stand on its own against insurgents until 2012. A further weakness of the government is that it faces crucial provincial elections in October which its constituent parties may well lose. One US military intelligence estimate is that in a fair poll the Sadrists would win 60 per cent of the vote in overwhelmingly Shia southern Iraq. The surprise government offensive at the end of March may have been launched in order to make sure that the vote can be fixed in favor of the government parties. A more Machiavellian explanation is that ISCI expected the Iraqi army to fail and wanted to lure the American army into a military confrontation with the Sadrists.
The government parties supporting Maliki now make up what some Iraqis called ‘the Council of Five’. There are the two Kurdish parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdkistan—the Dawa party to which Maliki himself belongs, ISCI and the Islamic Party of the Sunni. Their aim seems to be to be eliminate their domestic Iraqi opponents while they still have the backing of American firepower. It is a brutal plan but it might come off. Maliki could become the Iraqi version of Vladimir Putin in Russia. Like Putin, Maliki controls the state machine, a large if unreliable army and benefits from the high price of oil so he has control of over $40 billion in unspent reserves. Iraqis do not trust their own government but, like Russians when Putin first came to power in 1999, they are desperately war weary. Many people will support anybody who provides peace and security. But the analogy should not be carried too far. Putin’s enemies were fictional or in distant Chechnya, while Maliki’s opponents are real, dangerous and close by.
I was in Mosul, a city of 1.4 million people on the Tigris river in northern Iraq, on the day the government forces started their ‘Roar of the Lion’ offensive at 4 am on May 10. As had happened in Basra and Sadr City a few weeks earlier there were thousands of government troops and police guarding every street and alleyway. The entire civilian population had disappeared indoors or had fled the city. The operation, supposedly aimed at depriving al Qa’ida of its last bastion in Iraq, had been promised by Maliki some months earlier after a previous chief of police of Mosul was assassinated by a suicide bomber with explosives hidden under his police uniform. But its actual timing had caught people in Mosul by surprise so they had no time to stock up on food. Nobody was venturing onto the streets because of a curfew. In the first hours of the operation US troops shot dead men, a woman and a child in a car which failed to stop at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Mosul because, according to a US military statement, the two men were armed and one man inside the car made ‘threatening movements.’
I have been visiting Mosul ever since the Kurds and Americans captured it in 2003. Each time I go there the Kurdish authorities, who effectively run the city, allocate more armed guards to protect what ever official I am travelling with. We began the journey from Arbil in a convoy of white pick up trucks, each with a heavy machine gun in the back manned by alert- looking soldiers, some with black face masks, escorting Khasro Goran, the deputy governor of Mosul, to his office in the old Baathist headquarters on the left bank of the Tigris. The official border between Kurdistan and Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital, is the Zaab river, very low this year because of poor rainfall. But the real frontier is further down the road at a small village called Ghazik after which the road becomes increasingly dangerous. At a bridge near Ghazik police were stopping trucks and cars whose drivers had not heard of the curfew declared late the previous day. A few miles further on in a Chaldean Christian village called Bartilla we turned into a fort and exchanged our pick-ups for more heavily armoured vehicles with small windows like spy holes with thick bullet proof glass.
People in Nineveh province were taking the curfew very seriously. There are kilns processing gypsum along the road through the plain east of of Mosul city but none of them was working. Even the dreary tea houses serving food to truck drivers were closed. The Kurdish minority in east Mosul city live close to a small hill on top of which there is the mosque of Nebi Yunis, where the Prophet Jonah is supposedly buried. Usually the Kurdish districts of the city are filled with street traders but during the present operation the metal grill of every shop was down. The operation was being carried out by 15,000 troops, the three brigades of the 2nd and 3rd divisions that are normally stationed in Mosul and an extra brigade from Baghdad. I could see the black vehicles of Interior Ministry special commandos with a yellow tiger’s head insignia on their doors. American drones and helicopters passed over head but I did not see any American troops patrolling the city. There was the occasional burst of machine gunfire in the distance but no street fighting.
On the face of it the government had control of Mosul. This was not difficult to do because, unlike Baghdad and Basra, insurgents had never taken over entire districts. But everything in Nineveh province is a little different from what it looks. “The province is more like Lebanon,” said Saadi Pire, the former leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the city, “than anywhere else in Iraq.” It is divided between the Sunni Arabs, the Kurds and Christians, but many of the Kurds belong to the Yazidi sect which believes in a mixture of Zoroastrianism, Islam and Christianity. Their chief divinity is the peacock angel who rules the cosmos with six other angels. Last year a Yazidi girl who converted to orthodox Islam to marry her boyfriend was beaten to death by her relatives and in revenge Muslim Kurds dragged 23 Yazidi workers off a bus near Mosul and shot them dead. The government in Baghdad might claim that it was pursuing al Qa’ida in Mosul, but real power struggles in northern Iraq revolve around sectarian and ethnic differences. The Sunni majority in Mosul certainly see the ‘Roar of the Lion’ operation as being directed against them. Any al- Qa’ida in Mosul had long left the city for the country or had temporarily moved across the nearby Syrian border. Everybody I spoke to in Mosul expected they would be back.
In Baghdad there is also a sense that we are seeing a lull rather than end to violence. Places I used to know well still get destroyed. I used to eat in a restaurant in the al-Mansur district of west Baghdad called the Samad. It opened soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, served good food and somehow survived the next five years of violence. But at 5pm on 8 May some policemen parked their vehicle outside the restaurant and went inside to eat. A few minutes later a large car bomb parked beside the police car blew up and destroyed the Samad, killing seven people and wounding a further 19. The explosion caused a massive traffic jam. Ambulances and the fire brigade could not get through and the building beside the Samad caught fire and burned to the ground. Though the Iraqi government is claiming that al Qa’ida has been driven from Baghdad and Anbar province to the east, this is not really true. In January I went to see Colonel Ismail Zubaie, the police chief of Fallujah, who was a former insurgent fighting al-Qa’ida who had cut his brother’s throat. He seemed to be in full control of Fallujah. But in May fighters from al Qa’ida confronted Colonel Ismail’s uncle, who was a teacher, and shot him dead. The next day they sent a suicide bomber to blow up the tent where his relatives were receiving mourners. The operation, clearly an elaborate attempt to kill Colonel Ismail, shows that al Qa’ida remains well organized and with agents everywhere in the Sunni community.
The Americans lost only 21 soldiers killed in Iraq in May which are the lowest monthly casualties since February 2004. But these do not mean that the chief Republican contender senator John McCain is correct in believing that with enough resolution the American army is on the road to victory. Paradoxically, the Americans are now benefiting from their failure to turn Iraq into a virtual American colony in 2003-4. Iran and Syria no longer fear, as they once did, that as soon as the US had gained complete control of Iraq it would try to overthrow their governments. There may be those in the White House who still privately dream of doing just that, but Iraq’s neighbors no longer feel they must destabilize Iraq in order to avert the American threat to themselves. American casualties are also down because the Sunni Arab and the Shia Arab communities in Iraq are not only divided but fighting low level civil wars. Part of the old anti- American Sunni resistance has turned on al Qa’ida and allied itself to the Americans. The Sunni were driven out of most of Baghdad by the Shia militias in the sectarian civil war of 2006-7 and are increasingly marginalized. Among the Shia, once known for their impressive unity after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, internecine battles between the Shia parties in government and the Sadrists have become bloodier and more frequent.
The main supporters of Nouri al-Maliki’s government are the US and Iran. This has never been admitted by Washington but from the Iranian point of view the present Shia-Kurdish government in Baghdad is as good as it is going to get. It does not want to overthrow Maliki, but it does want to reduce American influence on him. The fighting in Basra and Sadr City between the Mehdi Army and the Iraqi government backed by the American army between March and April was in each case brought to an end by Iranian mediation. This has become very public. To arrange the ceasefires in Basra and Baghdad President Jalal Talabani twice went to see Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the Iraq-Iran border, though President Bush has denounced the Quds brigade as terrorists orchestrating attacks on US forces in Iraq. Iranian influence in Iraq is stronger than ever and the Iranians are increasingly willing to flaunt it. When the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited Baghdad this years his visit was announced in advance and he drove through the city by car. When President George W Bush comes to Baghdad it is a kept a secret until the last moment, he moves only by helicopter and he has never ventured outside the Green Zone.
Suppose Barack Obama wins the US presidential election America could withdraw its forces from Iraq over the next eighteen months without provoking an explosion of violence but only if it first had an agreement with Iran and Syria. An increase in Iranian influence in Iraq has been inevitable since 2003. Once the US had decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein the beneficiaries were always going to be the Shia religious parties, because they represented the majority of Iraqis, and they would be supported by Iran. Many of America’s problems in Iraq over the last five years have happened because Washington believed it could prevent or dilute the triumph of Iran and the Shia in Iraq.
Iranian strategy in Iraq is to keep the pot boiling but not over-boiling. They do not want the present government displaced. “The Iranians are very good at creating crises in Iraq and then solving them,” one Kurdish leader told me. Iran wants a weak Iraq, incapable of posing a threat to Tehran, and allied to itself. It wants a Shia government in power in Baghdad and the Americans out. “The three great powers of the Gulf historically are Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia,” the same Kurdish leader told me. “If Iran and Iraq act together then they will dominate the Gulf.” It may not be as easy as that. The Iraqis like the Iranians no more than they do the Americans. Muqtada al-Sadr, who is calling for an American withdrawal, has always been an Iraqi nationalist as suspicious of Iran as of the US. Paradoxically, the Shia governing parties in Baghdad, ISCI and Dawa, have traditionally had closer links with Iran than the Sadrists. ISCI was founded by the Iranians in Tehran in 1982 to be their puppet if they succeeded in defeating Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war. It is still heavily influenced by them, but at the end of the day neither ISCI nor the Sadrists want the Americans nor the Iranians to treat Iraq as a client state.
Probably the most astute politician in Iraq is Muqtada al-Sadr, who has chosen not to tell his militiamen to fight for the enclaves they controlled in Basra and Baghdad. Instead in the last days of May he called tens of thousands of his followers into the streets to protest against the a new bilateral pact between the US and Iraq that is being secretly negotiated and would govern the future political, military and economic relationship between Washington and Baghdad. “Why do they want to break the backbone of Iraq?” asked Sheikh Mohammed al-Gharrawi addressing crowds in Sadr City. “The agreement wants to put an American in each house. This agreement is poison mixed in poison, not poison in honey because there is no honey at all.”
This opposition to the occupation can only grow if Senator McCain wins the US presidential election and tries to win an outright military victory in Iraq. The US can only stay in Iraq so long as it is allied to a large part of the Sunni or Shia communities. The occupation has always depended on ‘divide and rule’. If the US is ever faced with a united opposition by both Shia and Sunni in Iraq then it will have to leave. Everybody in Iraq overplays their hand at one time or other. The US position in Iraq has slightly improved over the last year but the improvement is limited. But by trying to impose a security pact on Iraq that would turn Iraq into a client state the Washington is fueling a fresh insurgency. It is discrediting the Iraqi government and the ruling parties who will be seen as foreign pawns. If McCain wins the presidential election and tries to put the security agreement into operation then neither the occupation nor the resistance to it will end.
Patrick Cockburn is the the author of “Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq.” http://www.counterpunch.org/
Who's Actually Winning in Iraq?
By PATRICK COCKBURN
The American occupation of Iraq follows the same course as that of British rule after the First World War. At first there was imperial over-confidence following military victory and a conviction that what Iraqis did was of no importance. Then there was the shock and surprise of an Iraqi rebellion against the British in 1920 and the Americans after 2003. In both cases the occupiers responded by establishing an Iraqi national government but with limited powers. In 1930 under the Anglo-Iraqi treaty Iraq achieved nominal independence and joined the League of Nations but Britain retained two large bases and remained the predominant power in 1raq. Iraqi governments were tainted and lacked legitimacy because of Iraqis’ perception that their rulers were foreign pawns until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958.
America is now behaving in much the same way. It is negotiating a security agreement to replace the present UN mandate. It is to all intents and purposes a treaty that will determine future relations between Iraq and the US. It is not being called a treaty only because President Bush does not want to submit it to Senate approval. But in effect it continues the occupation under another name. The US will keep possession of over 50 bases though there will be a few Iraqi soldiers manning an outer perimeter so the US can say they will be in Iraqi hands. American soldiers and contractors will have legal immunity. The US will be free to carry out operations against ‘terrorists’ without informing the Iraqi government so it can arrest Iraqis or carry out military campaigns as and when it feels like it. Some of the Iraqi negotiators have been horrified by the extent of the American demands which would mean long term American control. But the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, whatever his private misgivings, believes that at the end of the day he relies on American backing. His coalition of Shia religious parties, Sunni representatives and the Kurds feel the same way.
The Iraqi-American security agreement, which Bush wants signed by July 31, is a better barometer of where real power lies in Iraq than military developments on the ground. It comes just as the Iraqi government is trying to regain control of the largest cities in the country. It has launched three military offensives since the end of March against Shia militias and Sunni insurgents, sending its army into Basra, Sadr City in Baghdad and Mosul. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers have moved into Shia districts once dominated by the Mehdi Army which follows the nationalist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. In the Sunni Arab city of Mosul the government claims it is crushing the last remnant of al-Qa’ida in Iraq and has arrested over 1,000 suspects. The aim of the prime minister Nouri al-Maliki is to show that the Iraqi state, feeble and dependant on the US since the fall of Saddam Hussein, is back in business. The operations in Basra and Mosul have bombastic names – ‘Charge of the Knights’ and ‘Roar of the Lion’ – in a bid to underline Maliki’s intention to show that the Iraqi army is the strongest non- American military power in Iraq.
At first sight the government seems to be succeeding after initial failures. The attack on the Mehdi Army in Basra on March 25 at first made no headway and Iraqi soldiers even ran out of food after a couple of days fighting. They had to be heavily reinforced by American advisers calling in US air strikes and British artillery fire. But, after a few weeks, government soldiers were taking over in districts long held by the Mehdi Army. In Sadr City—with a population of two million it is less of a district of Baghdad than a twin city—the Americans again bore the brunt of the fighting. Some 1,000 Iraqis, 60 per cent women and children according to the UN, were killed in seven weeks. In both Basra and Sadr City the clashes ended because Muqtada al-Sadr called his men off the streets under ceasefires brokered by the Iranians. The Iraqi army moved in though without the Americans. Maliki may not have won the decisive military victory he claimed, but his government looked stronger at the end of the fighting than at the beginning.
The crucial political and military question in Iraq is whether the Iraqi government’s success will be long lasting or temporary. Will it lose control once again if al-Sadr orders his militiamen back into the streets? Are al- Qa’ida and other Sunni insurgents simply lying low and waiting for American troops to leave? Again and again in the last five years, the US and its Iraqi allies have genuinely believed that they were winning on the ground only to see their supposed successes evaporate when their opponents launched a counter-attack. But for the moment at least Maliki’s grip on central government is stronger than ever. A year ago the Americans and the Kurds wanted him replaced, as did the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the biggest Shia party in his governing coalition. But Washington soon began to stress privately that it wanted Iraq to appear as politically stable as possible during an election year in the US, while the Kurds and ISCI came to believe that they could get most of what they wanted with Maliki in power. For the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis think the present government might last.
This may be misleading. The government’s position looks stronger than it is because its opponents are waiting for the Americans to leave or draw down their forces. Al-Sadr does not want to fight now because he sensibly wishes to avoid a direct military confrontation with the US army, which his lightly armed militiamen are bound to lose. This has been his strategy ever since his militiamen fought ferocious battles with the US Marines in Najaf in 2004. The Iranians are playing a more and more overt role in Iraq this year and do not want to see an intra-Shia civil war between ISCI and the Sadrists. The Iraqi Minister of Defense says that the Iraqi army will not be strong enough to stand on its own against insurgents until 2012. A further weakness of the government is that it faces crucial provincial elections in October which its constituent parties may well lose. One US military intelligence estimate is that in a fair poll the Sadrists would win 60 per cent of the vote in overwhelmingly Shia southern Iraq. The surprise government offensive at the end of March may have been launched in order to make sure that the vote can be fixed in favor of the government parties. A more Machiavellian explanation is that ISCI expected the Iraqi army to fail and wanted to lure the American army into a military confrontation with the Sadrists.
The government parties supporting Maliki now make up what some Iraqis called ‘the Council of Five’. There are the two Kurdish parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdkistan—the Dawa party to which Maliki himself belongs, ISCI and the Islamic Party of the Sunni. Their aim seems to be to be eliminate their domestic Iraqi opponents while they still have the backing of American firepower. It is a brutal plan but it might come off. Maliki could become the Iraqi version of Vladimir Putin in Russia. Like Putin, Maliki controls the state machine, a large if unreliable army and benefits from the high price of oil so he has control of over $40 billion in unspent reserves. Iraqis do not trust their own government but, like Russians when Putin first came to power in 1999, they are desperately war weary. Many people will support anybody who provides peace and security. But the analogy should not be carried too far. Putin’s enemies were fictional or in distant Chechnya, while Maliki’s opponents are real, dangerous and close by.
I was in Mosul, a city of 1.4 million people on the Tigris river in northern Iraq, on the day the government forces started their ‘Roar of the Lion’ offensive at 4 am on May 10. As had happened in Basra and Sadr City a few weeks earlier there were thousands of government troops and police guarding every street and alleyway. The entire civilian population had disappeared indoors or had fled the city. The operation, supposedly aimed at depriving al Qa’ida of its last bastion in Iraq, had been promised by Maliki some months earlier after a previous chief of police of Mosul was assassinated by a suicide bomber with explosives hidden under his police uniform. But its actual timing had caught people in Mosul by surprise so they had no time to stock up on food. Nobody was venturing onto the streets because of a curfew. In the first hours of the operation US troops shot dead men, a woman and a child in a car which failed to stop at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Mosul because, according to a US military statement, the two men were armed and one man inside the car made ‘threatening movements.’
I have been visiting Mosul ever since the Kurds and Americans captured it in 2003. Each time I go there the Kurdish authorities, who effectively run the city, allocate more armed guards to protect what ever official I am travelling with. We began the journey from Arbil in a convoy of white pick up trucks, each with a heavy machine gun in the back manned by alert- looking soldiers, some with black face masks, escorting Khasro Goran, the deputy governor of Mosul, to his office in the old Baathist headquarters on the left bank of the Tigris. The official border between Kurdistan and Nineveh province, of which Mosul is the capital, is the Zaab river, very low this year because of poor rainfall. But the real frontier is further down the road at a small village called Ghazik after which the road becomes increasingly dangerous. At a bridge near Ghazik police were stopping trucks and cars whose drivers had not heard of the curfew declared late the previous day. A few miles further on in a Chaldean Christian village called Bartilla we turned into a fort and exchanged our pick-ups for more heavily armoured vehicles with small windows like spy holes with thick bullet proof glass.
People in Nineveh province were taking the curfew very seriously. There are kilns processing gypsum along the road through the plain east of of Mosul city but none of them was working. Even the dreary tea houses serving food to truck drivers were closed. The Kurdish minority in east Mosul city live close to a small hill on top of which there is the mosque of Nebi Yunis, where the Prophet Jonah is supposedly buried. Usually the Kurdish districts of the city are filled with street traders but during the present operation the metal grill of every shop was down. The operation was being carried out by 15,000 troops, the three brigades of the 2nd and 3rd divisions that are normally stationed in Mosul and an extra brigade from Baghdad. I could see the black vehicles of Interior Ministry special commandos with a yellow tiger’s head insignia on their doors. American drones and helicopters passed over head but I did not see any American troops patrolling the city. There was the occasional burst of machine gunfire in the distance but no street fighting.
On the face of it the government had control of Mosul. This was not difficult to do because, unlike Baghdad and Basra, insurgents had never taken over entire districts. But everything in Nineveh province is a little different from what it looks. “The province is more like Lebanon,” said Saadi Pire, the former leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the city, “than anywhere else in Iraq.” It is divided between the Sunni Arabs, the Kurds and Christians, but many of the Kurds belong to the Yazidi sect which believes in a mixture of Zoroastrianism, Islam and Christianity. Their chief divinity is the peacock angel who rules the cosmos with six other angels. Last year a Yazidi girl who converted to orthodox Islam to marry her boyfriend was beaten to death by her relatives and in revenge Muslim Kurds dragged 23 Yazidi workers off a bus near Mosul and shot them dead. The government in Baghdad might claim that it was pursuing al Qa’ida in Mosul, but real power struggles in northern Iraq revolve around sectarian and ethnic differences. The Sunni majority in Mosul certainly see the ‘Roar of the Lion’ operation as being directed against them. Any al- Qa’ida in Mosul had long left the city for the country or had temporarily moved across the nearby Syrian border. Everybody I spoke to in Mosul expected they would be back.
In Baghdad there is also a sense that we are seeing a lull rather than end to violence. Places I used to know well still get destroyed. I used to eat in a restaurant in the al-Mansur district of west Baghdad called the Samad. It opened soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, served good food and somehow survived the next five years of violence. But at 5pm on 8 May some policemen parked their vehicle outside the restaurant and went inside to eat. A few minutes later a large car bomb parked beside the police car blew up and destroyed the Samad, killing seven people and wounding a further 19. The explosion caused a massive traffic jam. Ambulances and the fire brigade could not get through and the building beside the Samad caught fire and burned to the ground. Though the Iraqi government is claiming that al Qa’ida has been driven from Baghdad and Anbar province to the east, this is not really true. In January I went to see Colonel Ismail Zubaie, the police chief of Fallujah, who was a former insurgent fighting al-Qa’ida who had cut his brother’s throat. He seemed to be in full control of Fallujah. But in May fighters from al Qa’ida confronted Colonel Ismail’s uncle, who was a teacher, and shot him dead. The next day they sent a suicide bomber to blow up the tent where his relatives were receiving mourners. The operation, clearly an elaborate attempt to kill Colonel Ismail, shows that al Qa’ida remains well organized and with agents everywhere in the Sunni community.
The Americans lost only 21 soldiers killed in Iraq in May which are the lowest monthly casualties since February 2004. But these do not mean that the chief Republican contender senator John McCain is correct in believing that with enough resolution the American army is on the road to victory. Paradoxically, the Americans are now benefiting from their failure to turn Iraq into a virtual American colony in 2003-4. Iran and Syria no longer fear, as they once did, that as soon as the US had gained complete control of Iraq it would try to overthrow their governments. There may be those in the White House who still privately dream of doing just that, but Iraq’s neighbors no longer feel they must destabilize Iraq in order to avert the American threat to themselves. American casualties are also down because the Sunni Arab and the Shia Arab communities in Iraq are not only divided but fighting low level civil wars. Part of the old anti- American Sunni resistance has turned on al Qa’ida and allied itself to the Americans. The Sunni were driven out of most of Baghdad by the Shia militias in the sectarian civil war of 2006-7 and are increasingly marginalized. Among the Shia, once known for their impressive unity after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, internecine battles between the Shia parties in government and the Sadrists have become bloodier and more frequent.
The main supporters of Nouri al-Maliki’s government are the US and Iran. This has never been admitted by Washington but from the Iranian point of view the present Shia-Kurdish government in Baghdad is as good as it is going to get. It does not want to overthrow Maliki, but it does want to reduce American influence on him. The fighting in Basra and Sadr City between the Mehdi Army and the Iraqi government backed by the American army between March and April was in each case brought to an end by Iranian mediation. This has become very public. To arrange the ceasefires in Basra and Baghdad President Jalal Talabani twice went to see Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the Iraq-Iran border, though President Bush has denounced the Quds brigade as terrorists orchestrating attacks on US forces in Iraq. Iranian influence in Iraq is stronger than ever and the Iranians are increasingly willing to flaunt it. When the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited Baghdad this years his visit was announced in advance and he drove through the city by car. When President George W Bush comes to Baghdad it is a kept a secret until the last moment, he moves only by helicopter and he has never ventured outside the Green Zone.
Suppose Barack Obama wins the US presidential election America could withdraw its forces from Iraq over the next eighteen months without provoking an explosion of violence but only if it first had an agreement with Iran and Syria. An increase in Iranian influence in Iraq has been inevitable since 2003. Once the US had decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein the beneficiaries were always going to be the Shia religious parties, because they represented the majority of Iraqis, and they would be supported by Iran. Many of America’s problems in Iraq over the last five years have happened because Washington believed it could prevent or dilute the triumph of Iran and the Shia in Iraq.
Iranian strategy in Iraq is to keep the pot boiling but not over-boiling. They do not want the present government displaced. “The Iranians are very good at creating crises in Iraq and then solving them,” one Kurdish leader told me. Iran wants a weak Iraq, incapable of posing a threat to Tehran, and allied to itself. It wants a Shia government in power in Baghdad and the Americans out. “The three great powers of the Gulf historically are Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia,” the same Kurdish leader told me. “If Iran and Iraq act together then they will dominate the Gulf.” It may not be as easy as that. The Iraqis like the Iranians no more than they do the Americans. Muqtada al-Sadr, who is calling for an American withdrawal, has always been an Iraqi nationalist as suspicious of Iran as of the US. Paradoxically, the Shia governing parties in Baghdad, ISCI and Dawa, have traditionally had closer links with Iran than the Sadrists. ISCI was founded by the Iranians in Tehran in 1982 to be their puppet if they succeeded in defeating Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war. It is still heavily influenced by them, but at the end of the day neither ISCI nor the Sadrists want the Americans nor the Iranians to treat Iraq as a client state.
Probably the most astute politician in Iraq is Muqtada al-Sadr, who has chosen not to tell his militiamen to fight for the enclaves they controlled in Basra and Baghdad. Instead in the last days of May he called tens of thousands of his followers into the streets to protest against the a new bilateral pact between the US and Iraq that is being secretly negotiated and would govern the future political, military and economic relationship between Washington and Baghdad. “Why do they want to break the backbone of Iraq?” asked Sheikh Mohammed al-Gharrawi addressing crowds in Sadr City. “The agreement wants to put an American in each house. This agreement is poison mixed in poison, not poison in honey because there is no honey at all.”
This opposition to the occupation can only grow if Senator McCain wins the US presidential election and tries to win an outright military victory in Iraq. The US can only stay in Iraq so long as it is allied to a large part of the Sunni or Shia communities. The occupation has always depended on ‘divide and rule’. If the US is ever faced with a united opposition by both Shia and Sunni in Iraq then it will have to leave. Everybody in Iraq overplays their hand at one time or other. The US position in Iraq has slightly improved over the last year but the improvement is limited. But by trying to impose a security pact on Iraq that would turn Iraq into a client state the Washington is fueling a fresh insurgency. It is discrediting the Iraqi government and the ruling parties who will be seen as foreign pawns. If McCain wins the presidential election and tries to put the security agreement into operation then neither the occupation nor the resistance to it will end.
Patrick Cockburn is the the author of “Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq.” http://www.counterpunch.org/
Fight Terror With YouTube - Daniel Kimmage, New York Times opinion
Fight Terror With YouTube - Daniel Kimmage, New York Times opinion
Al Qaeda made its name in blood and pixels, with deadly attacks and an avalanche of electronic news media. Recent news articles depict an online terrorist juggernaut that has defied the best efforts by the United States government to counter it. While these articles are themselves a testimony to Al Qaeda’s media savvy, they don’t tell the whole story. When it comes to user-generated content and interactivity, Al Qaeda is now behind the curve. And the United States can help to keep it there by encouraging the growth of freer, more empowered online communities, especially in the Arab-Islamic world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/opinion/26kimmage.html?_r=1&ref=opinion&oref=slogin
Al Qaeda made its name in blood and pixels, with deadly attacks and an avalanche of electronic news media. Recent news articles depict an online terrorist juggernaut that has defied the best efforts by the United States government to counter it. While these articles are themselves a testimony to Al Qaeda’s media savvy, they don’t tell the whole story. When it comes to user-generated content and interactivity, Al Qaeda is now behind the curve. And the United States can help to keep it there by encouraging the growth of freer, more empowered online communities, especially in the Arab-Islamic world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/opinion/26kimmage.html?_r=1&ref=opinion&oref=slogin
Climate Issues Tied to US Security - Walter Pincus, Washington Post
Climate Issues Tied to US Security - Walter Pincus, Washington Post
US intelligence agencies have concluded that global climate change will worsen food shortages and disease exposure in sub-Saharan Africa over the next two decades, creating operational problems for the Pentagon's newest overseas military command. "Without food aid, the region will likely face higher levels of instability, particularly violent ethnic clashes over land ownership," probably creating "extensive and novel operational requirements," for the fledgling US Africa Command, according to a National Intelligence Assessment on the security implications of climate change by the National Intelligence Council.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/25/AR2008062502800.html
Terrorism Boost with Change of Climate? - Pamela Hess, Associated Press
Global warming is likely to increase illegal immigration, create humanitarian disasters and destabilize precarious governments and may add to terrorism - all of which could threaten U.S. national security, according to an assessment by US intelligence agencies. "Logic suggests the conditions exacerbated [by climate change] would increase the pool of potential recruits for terrorism," said Tom Fingar, deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, who testified before a joint House committee hearing Wednesday.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/terrorism-boost-with-change-of-climate/
US intelligence agencies have concluded that global climate change will worsen food shortages and disease exposure in sub-Saharan Africa over the next two decades, creating operational problems for the Pentagon's newest overseas military command. "Without food aid, the region will likely face higher levels of instability, particularly violent ethnic clashes over land ownership," probably creating "extensive and novel operational requirements," for the fledgling US Africa Command, according to a National Intelligence Assessment on the security implications of climate change by the National Intelligence Council.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/25/AR2008062502800.html
Terrorism Boost with Change of Climate? - Pamela Hess, Associated Press
Global warming is likely to increase illegal immigration, create humanitarian disasters and destabilize precarious governments and may add to terrorism - all of which could threaten U.S. national security, according to an assessment by US intelligence agencies. "Logic suggests the conditions exacerbated [by climate change] would increase the pool of potential recruits for terrorism," said Tom Fingar, deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, who testified before a joint House committee hearing Wednesday.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/terrorism-boost-with-change-of-climate/
Russian Flights Smack of Cold War - Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times
Russian Flights Smack of Cold War - Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times
Russian bombers have stepped up provocative flight exercises off the Alaskan coast, reminiscent of Cold War incursions designed to rattle US air defenses. US Northern Command, which protects North American airspace, told The Washington Times that TU-95 Bear bombers on 18 occasions the past year have skirted a 12-mile air defense identification zone that protects Alaska. The incursions prompted F-15s and F-22 Raptor fighters to scramble from Elmendorf Air Force Base and intercept the warplanes. The last incident happened in May.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/russian-flights-smack-of-cold-war/
Russian bombers have stepped up provocative flight exercises off the Alaskan coast, reminiscent of Cold War incursions designed to rattle US air defenses. US Northern Command, which protects North American airspace, told The Washington Times that TU-95 Bear bombers on 18 occasions the past year have skirted a 12-mile air defense identification zone that protects Alaska. The incursions prompted F-15s and F-22 Raptor fighters to scramble from Elmendorf Air Force Base and intercept the warplanes. The last incident happened in May.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/russian-flights-smack-of-cold-war/
Facebook in the Middle East - Nir Boms, Washington Times opinion
Facebook in the Middle East - Nir Boms, Washington Times opinion
Facebook, the popular social networking site, is becoming more than just a cyber-meeting place, growing into a powerful vehicle for social change. Squeezing out MySpace as the site of the moment and with 75 million users (more than the population of most countries around the globe,) it is the most popular meeting place in the virtual world, and like other virtual endeavors, Facebook has no borders. Its reach is as wide as the reach of the Web, or, perhaps, as wide as the reach of those who attempt to control it. Facebook offers a "virtual" platform for the advancement of political and social causes, and is quickly turning into a hotbed of "actual" activism - a cause for alarm for many autocratic regimes in the Middle East attempting to block it and curtail its reach.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/facebook-in-the-middle-east/
Facebook, the popular social networking site, is becoming more than just a cyber-meeting place, growing into a powerful vehicle for social change. Squeezing out MySpace as the site of the moment and with 75 million users (more than the population of most countries around the globe,) it is the most popular meeting place in the virtual world, and like other virtual endeavors, Facebook has no borders. Its reach is as wide as the reach of the Web, or, perhaps, as wide as the reach of those who attempt to control it. Facebook offers a "virtual" platform for the advancement of political and social causes, and is quickly turning into a hotbed of "actual" activism - a cause for alarm for many autocratic regimes in the Middle East attempting to block it and curtail its reach.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/facebook-in-the-middle-east/
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
Occupation by Bureaucracy
International Herald Tribune
Occupation by Bureaucracy
By Saree Makdisi
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/24/opinion/edmakdisi.php
A cease-fire went into effect in Gaza last week, offering some respite from the violence that has killed hundreds of Palestinians and five Israelis in recent months. It will do nothing, however, to address the underlying cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Intermittent spectacular violence may draw the world's attention to the occupied Palestinian territories, but our obsession with violence actually distracts us from the real nature of Israel's occupation, which is its smothering bureaucratic control of everyday Palestinian life.
This is an occupation ultimately enforced by tanks and bombs, and through the omnipresent threat, if not application, of violence. But its primary instruments are application forms, residency permits, population registries and title deeds. On its own, no cease-fire will relieve the beleaguered Palestinians.
Gaza is virtually cut off from the outside world by Israeli power. Elsewhere, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the ongoing Israeli occupation comprehensively infuses all the normally banal activities of Palestinians' everyday lives: applying for permission to access one's own land; applying for what Israel regards as the privilege - rather than the right - of living with one's spouse and children; applying for permission to drive one's car; to dig a well; to visit relatives in the next town; to visit Jerusalem; to go to work; to school; to university; to hospital. There is hardly any dimension of everyday life in Palestine that is not minutely managed by Israeli military or bureaucratic personnel.
Partly, this occupation of everyday life enables the Israelis to maintain their vigilant control over the Palestinian population. But it also serves the purpose of slowly, gradually removing Palestinians from their land, forcing them to make way for Jewish settlers.
Just in 2006, for example, Israel stripped 1,363 Jerusalem Palestinians of the right to live in the city in which many of them were born. It did this not by dramatically forcing dozens of people at a time onto trucks and dumping them at the city limits, but rather by quietly stripping them, one by one, of their Jerusalem residency papers.
This in turn was enabled by a series of bureaucratic procedures. While Israel continues to violate international law by building exclusively Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, it rarely grants building permits to Palestinian residents of the same city. Since 1967, the third of Jerusalem's population that is Palestinian has been granted just 9 percent of the city's official housing permits. The result is a growing abundance of housing for Jews and a severe shortage of housing for non-Jews - i.e., Palestinians.
In fact, 90 percent of the Palestinian territory Israel claimed to have annexed to Jerusalem after 1967 is today off-limits to Palestinian development because the land is either already built on by exclusively Jewish settlements or being reserved for their future expansion.
Denied permits, many Palestinians in Jerusalem build without them, but at considerable risk: Israel routinely demolishes Palestinian homes built without a permit. This includes over 300 homes in East Jerusalem demolished between 2004 and 2007 and 18,000 Palestinian homes in the occupied territories demolished since 1967.
One alternative has been to move to the West Bank suburbs and commute to Jerusalem. The wall cutting off East Jerusalem from the West Bank and thereby separating tens of thousands of Jerusalem Palestinians from the city of their birth has made that much more difficult.
And it too has its risks: Palestinians who cannot prove to Israel's satisfaction that Jerusalem has continuously been their "center of life" have been stripped of their Jerusalem residency papers. Without those papers, they will be expelled from Jerusalem, and confined to one of the walled-in reservoirs - of which Gaza is merely the largest example - that Israel has allocated as holding pens for the non-Jewish population of the holy land.
The expulsion of half of Palestine's Muslim and Christian population in what Palestinians call the nakba (catastrophe) of 1948 was undertaken by Israel's founders in order to clear space in which to create a Jewish state.
The nakba did not end 60 years ago, however: It continues to this very day, albeit on a smaller scale. Yet even ones and twos eventually add up. Virtually every day, another Palestinian joins the ranks of the millions removed from their native land and denied the right of return.
Their long wait will end - and this conflict will come to a lasting resolution - only when the futile attempt to maintain an exclusively Jewish state in what had previously been a vibrantly multi-religious land is abandoned.
Separation will always require threats or actual violence; a genuine peace will come not with more separation, but with the right to return to a land in which all can live as equals. Only a single democratic, secular and multicultural state offers that hope to Israelis and Palestinians, to Muslims, Jews and Christians alike.
Saree Makdisi is professor of English literature at the University of California, Los Angeles and author of "Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation."
Occupation by Bureaucracy
By Saree Makdisi
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/24/opinion/edmakdisi.php
A cease-fire went into effect in Gaza last week, offering some respite from the violence that has killed hundreds of Palestinians and five Israelis in recent months. It will do nothing, however, to address the underlying cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Intermittent spectacular violence may draw the world's attention to the occupied Palestinian territories, but our obsession with violence actually distracts us from the real nature of Israel's occupation, which is its smothering bureaucratic control of everyday Palestinian life.
This is an occupation ultimately enforced by tanks and bombs, and through the omnipresent threat, if not application, of violence. But its primary instruments are application forms, residency permits, population registries and title deeds. On its own, no cease-fire will relieve the beleaguered Palestinians.
Gaza is virtually cut off from the outside world by Israeli power. Elsewhere, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the ongoing Israeli occupation comprehensively infuses all the normally banal activities of Palestinians' everyday lives: applying for permission to access one's own land; applying for what Israel regards as the privilege - rather than the right - of living with one's spouse and children; applying for permission to drive one's car; to dig a well; to visit relatives in the next town; to visit Jerusalem; to go to work; to school; to university; to hospital. There is hardly any dimension of everyday life in Palestine that is not minutely managed by Israeli military or bureaucratic personnel.
Partly, this occupation of everyday life enables the Israelis to maintain their vigilant control over the Palestinian population. But it also serves the purpose of slowly, gradually removing Palestinians from their land, forcing them to make way for Jewish settlers.
Just in 2006, for example, Israel stripped 1,363 Jerusalem Palestinians of the right to live in the city in which many of them were born. It did this not by dramatically forcing dozens of people at a time onto trucks and dumping them at the city limits, but rather by quietly stripping them, one by one, of their Jerusalem residency papers.
This in turn was enabled by a series of bureaucratic procedures. While Israel continues to violate international law by building exclusively Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, it rarely grants building permits to Palestinian residents of the same city. Since 1967, the third of Jerusalem's population that is Palestinian has been granted just 9 percent of the city's official housing permits. The result is a growing abundance of housing for Jews and a severe shortage of housing for non-Jews - i.e., Palestinians.
In fact, 90 percent of the Palestinian territory Israel claimed to have annexed to Jerusalem after 1967 is today off-limits to Palestinian development because the land is either already built on by exclusively Jewish settlements or being reserved for their future expansion.
Denied permits, many Palestinians in Jerusalem build without them, but at considerable risk: Israel routinely demolishes Palestinian homes built without a permit. This includes over 300 homes in East Jerusalem demolished between 2004 and 2007 and 18,000 Palestinian homes in the occupied territories demolished since 1967.
One alternative has been to move to the West Bank suburbs and commute to Jerusalem. The wall cutting off East Jerusalem from the West Bank and thereby separating tens of thousands of Jerusalem Palestinians from the city of their birth has made that much more difficult.
And it too has its risks: Palestinians who cannot prove to Israel's satisfaction that Jerusalem has continuously been their "center of life" have been stripped of their Jerusalem residency papers. Without those papers, they will be expelled from Jerusalem, and confined to one of the walled-in reservoirs - of which Gaza is merely the largest example - that Israel has allocated as holding pens for the non-Jewish population of the holy land.
The expulsion of half of Palestine's Muslim and Christian population in what Palestinians call the nakba (catastrophe) of 1948 was undertaken by Israel's founders in order to clear space in which to create a Jewish state.
The nakba did not end 60 years ago, however: It continues to this very day, albeit on a smaller scale. Yet even ones and twos eventually add up. Virtually every day, another Palestinian joins the ranks of the millions removed from their native land and denied the right of return.
Their long wait will end - and this conflict will come to a lasting resolution - only when the futile attempt to maintain an exclusively Jewish state in what had previously been a vibrantly multi-religious land is abandoned.
Separation will always require threats or actual violence; a genuine peace will come not with more separation, but with the right to return to a land in which all can live as equals. Only a single democratic, secular and multicultural state offers that hope to Israelis and Palestinians, to Muslims, Jews and Christians alike.
Saree Makdisi is professor of English literature at the University of California, Los Angeles and author of "Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation."
The Coming Catastrophe?
The Coming Catastrophe?
The finishing touches on several contingency plans for attacking Iran
By David DeBatto
Global Research, June 23, 2008
Global Research Editor's note
We bring to the attention of our readers David DeBatto's scenario as to what might occur if one of the several contingency plans to attack Iran, with the participation of Israel and NATO, were to be carried out. While one may disagree with certain elements of detail of the author's text, the thrust of this analysis must be taken seriously.
"Israel has said a strike on Iran will be "unavoidable" if the Islamic regime continues to press ahead with alleged plans for building an atom-bomb." (London Daily Telegraph, 6/11/2008)
"Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany joined President Bush on Wednesday in calling for further sanctions against Iran if it does not suspend its uranium enrichment program." Mr. Bush stressed again that "all options are on the table," which would include military force. (New York Times, 6/11/2008)
We are fast approaching the final six months of the Bush administration. The quagmire in Iraq is in its sixth painful year with no real end in sight and the forgotten war in Afghanistan is well into its seventh year. The "dead enders" and other armed factions are still alive and well in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan again controls most of that country. Gas prices have now reached an average of $4.00 a gallon nationally and several analysts predict the price will rise to $5.00-$6.00 dollars per gallon at the pump by Labor Day. This, despite assurances by some major supporters of the decision to invade Iraq that the Iraq war "will pay for itself" (Paul Wolfowitz) or that we will see "$20.00 per barrel" oil prices if we invade Iraq (Rupert Murdoch).
One thing the Pentagon routinely does (and does very well) is conduct war games. Top brass there are constantly developing strategies for conducting any number of theoretical missions based on real or perceived threats to our national security or vital interests. This was also done prior to the invasion of Iraq, but the Bush administration chose not to listen to the dire warnings about that mission given to him by Pentagon leaders, or for that matter, by his own senior intelligence officials. Nevertheless, war gaming is in full swing again right now with the bullseye just to the right of our current mess – Iran.
It’s no secret that the U.S. is currently putting the finishing touches on several contingency plans for attacking Iranian nuclear and military facilities. With our ground forces stretched to the breaking point in Iraq and Afghanistan, none of the most likely scenarios involve a ground invasion. Not that this administration wouldn’t prefer to march into the seat of Shiite Islam behind a solid, moving line of M1 Abrams tanks and proclaim the country for democracy. The fact is that even the President knows we can’t pull that off any more so he and the neo-cons will have to settle for Shock and Awe Lite.
If we invade Iran this year it will be done using hundreds of sorties by carrier based aircraft already stationed in the Persian Gulf and from land based aircraft located in Iraq and Qatar. They will strike the known nuclear facilities located in and around Tehran and the rest of the country as well as bases containing major units of the Iranian military, anti-aircraft installations and units of the Revolutionary Guard (a separate and potent Iranian para-military organization).
Will this military action stop Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons? Probably not. It will probably not even destroy all of their nuclear research facilities, the most sensitive of which are known to be underground, protected by tons of earth and reinforced concrete and steel designed to survive almost all attacks using conventional munitions. The Iranian military and Revolutionary Guard will most likely survive as well, although they will suffer significant casualties and major bases and command centers will undoubtedly be destroyed. However, since Iran has both a functioning Air Force, Navy (including submarines) and modern anti-aircraft capabilities, U.S. fighter-bombers will suffer casualties as well. This will not be a "Cake Walk" as with the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 when the Iraqi Army simply melted away and the Iraqi Air Force never even launched a single aircraft.
Not even close.
If the United States attacks Iran either this summer or this fall, the American people had better be prepared for a shock that may perhaps be even greater to the national psyche (and economy) than 9/11. First of all, there will be significant U.S. casualties in the initial invasion. American jets will be shot down and the American pilots who are not killed will be taken prisoner - including female pilots. Iranian Yakhonts 26, Sunburn 22 and Exocet missiles will seek out and strike U.S. naval battle groups bottled up in the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf with very deadly results. American sailors will be killed and U.S. ships will be badly damaged and perhaps sunk. We may even witness the first attack on an American Aircraft carrier since World War II.
That’s just the opening act.
Israel (who had thus far stayed out of the fray by letting the U.S. military do the heavy lifting) is attacked by Hezbollah in a coordinated and large scale effort. Widespread and grisly casualties effectively paralyze the nation, a notion once thought impossible. Iran’s newest ally in the region, Syria, then unleashes a barrage of over 200 Scud B, C and D missiles at Israel, each armed with VX gas. Since all of Israel is within range of these Russian built weapons, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and virtually all major civilian centers and several military bases are struck, often with a result of massive casualties.
The Israeli Air Force orders all three squadrons of their F-16I Sufa fighter/bombers into the air with orders to bomb Tehran and as many military and nuclear bases as they can before they are either shot down or run out of fuel. It is a one way trip for some of these pilots. Their ancient homeland lies in ruins. Many have family that is already dead or dying. They do not wait for permission from Washington, DC or U.S. regional military commanders. The Israeli aircraft are carrying the majority of their country’s nuclear arsenal under their wings.
Just after the first waves of U.S. bombers cross into Iranian airspace, the Iranian Navy, using shore based missiles and small, fast attack craft sinks several oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, sealing off the Persian Gulf and all its oil from the rest of the world. They then mine the area, making it difficult and even deadly for American minesweepers to clear the straits. Whatever is left of the Iranian Navy and Air Force harasses our Navy as it attempts minesweeping operations. More U.S casualties.
The day after the invasion Wall Street (and to a lesser extent, Tokyo, London and Frankfurt) acts as it always does in an international crisis – irrational speculative and spot buying reaches fever pitch and sends the cost of oil skyrocketing. In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iran, the price of oil goes to $200.00 - $300.00 dollars a barrel on the open market. If the war is not resolved in a few weeks, that price could rise even higher. This will send the price of gasoline at the pump in this country to $8.00-$10.00 per gallon immediately and subsequently to even higher unthinkable levels.
If that happens, this country shuts down. Most Americans are not be able to afford gas to go to work. Truckers pull their big rigs to the side of the road and simply walk away. Food, medicine and other critical products are not be brought to stores. Gas and electricity (what is left of the short supply) are too expensive for most people to afford. Children, the sick and elderly die from lack of air-conditioned homes and hospitals in the summer. Children, the sick and elderly die in the winter for lack of heat. There are food riots across the country. A barter system takes the place of currency and credit as the economy dissolves and banks close or limit withdrawals. Civil unrest builds.
The police are unable to contain the violence and are themselves victims of the same crisis as the rest of the population. Civilian rule dissolves and Martial Law is declared under provisions approved under the Patriot Act. Regular U.S. Army and Marine troops patrol the streets. The federal government apparatus is moved to an unknown but secure location. The United States descends into chaos and becomes a third world country. Its time as the lone superpower is over.
It doesn’t get any worse than this.
Then the first Israeli bomber might drop its nuclear payload on Tehran.
David DeBatto is a former U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agent, Iraqi war veteran and co-author the "CI" series from Warner Books and the upcoming "Counter to Intelligence" from Praeger Security International.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...va&aid=9437
The finishing touches on several contingency plans for attacking Iran
By David DeBatto
Global Research, June 23, 2008
Global Research Editor's note
We bring to the attention of our readers David DeBatto's scenario as to what might occur if one of the several contingency plans to attack Iran, with the participation of Israel and NATO, were to be carried out. While one may disagree with certain elements of detail of the author's text, the thrust of this analysis must be taken seriously.
"Israel has said a strike on Iran will be "unavoidable" if the Islamic regime continues to press ahead with alleged plans for building an atom-bomb." (London Daily Telegraph, 6/11/2008)
"Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany joined President Bush on Wednesday in calling for further sanctions against Iran if it does not suspend its uranium enrichment program." Mr. Bush stressed again that "all options are on the table," which would include military force. (New York Times, 6/11/2008)
We are fast approaching the final six months of the Bush administration. The quagmire in Iraq is in its sixth painful year with no real end in sight and the forgotten war in Afghanistan is well into its seventh year. The "dead enders" and other armed factions are still alive and well in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan again controls most of that country. Gas prices have now reached an average of $4.00 a gallon nationally and several analysts predict the price will rise to $5.00-$6.00 dollars per gallon at the pump by Labor Day. This, despite assurances by some major supporters of the decision to invade Iraq that the Iraq war "will pay for itself" (Paul Wolfowitz) or that we will see "$20.00 per barrel" oil prices if we invade Iraq (Rupert Murdoch).
One thing the Pentagon routinely does (and does very well) is conduct war games. Top brass there are constantly developing strategies for conducting any number of theoretical missions based on real or perceived threats to our national security or vital interests. This was also done prior to the invasion of Iraq, but the Bush administration chose not to listen to the dire warnings about that mission given to him by Pentagon leaders, or for that matter, by his own senior intelligence officials. Nevertheless, war gaming is in full swing again right now with the bullseye just to the right of our current mess – Iran.
It’s no secret that the U.S. is currently putting the finishing touches on several contingency plans for attacking Iranian nuclear and military facilities. With our ground forces stretched to the breaking point in Iraq and Afghanistan, none of the most likely scenarios involve a ground invasion. Not that this administration wouldn’t prefer to march into the seat of Shiite Islam behind a solid, moving line of M1 Abrams tanks and proclaim the country for democracy. The fact is that even the President knows we can’t pull that off any more so he and the neo-cons will have to settle for Shock and Awe Lite.
If we invade Iran this year it will be done using hundreds of sorties by carrier based aircraft already stationed in the Persian Gulf and from land based aircraft located in Iraq and Qatar. They will strike the known nuclear facilities located in and around Tehran and the rest of the country as well as bases containing major units of the Iranian military, anti-aircraft installations and units of the Revolutionary Guard (a separate and potent Iranian para-military organization).
Will this military action stop Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons? Probably not. It will probably not even destroy all of their nuclear research facilities, the most sensitive of which are known to be underground, protected by tons of earth and reinforced concrete and steel designed to survive almost all attacks using conventional munitions. The Iranian military and Revolutionary Guard will most likely survive as well, although they will suffer significant casualties and major bases and command centers will undoubtedly be destroyed. However, since Iran has both a functioning Air Force, Navy (including submarines) and modern anti-aircraft capabilities, U.S. fighter-bombers will suffer casualties as well. This will not be a "Cake Walk" as with the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 when the Iraqi Army simply melted away and the Iraqi Air Force never even launched a single aircraft.
Not even close.
If the United States attacks Iran either this summer or this fall, the American people had better be prepared for a shock that may perhaps be even greater to the national psyche (and economy) than 9/11. First of all, there will be significant U.S. casualties in the initial invasion. American jets will be shot down and the American pilots who are not killed will be taken prisoner - including female pilots. Iranian Yakhonts 26, Sunburn 22 and Exocet missiles will seek out and strike U.S. naval battle groups bottled up in the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf with very deadly results. American sailors will be killed and U.S. ships will be badly damaged and perhaps sunk. We may even witness the first attack on an American Aircraft carrier since World War II.
That’s just the opening act.
Israel (who had thus far stayed out of the fray by letting the U.S. military do the heavy lifting) is attacked by Hezbollah in a coordinated and large scale effort. Widespread and grisly casualties effectively paralyze the nation, a notion once thought impossible. Iran’s newest ally in the region, Syria, then unleashes a barrage of over 200 Scud B, C and D missiles at Israel, each armed with VX gas. Since all of Israel is within range of these Russian built weapons, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and virtually all major civilian centers and several military bases are struck, often with a result of massive casualties.
The Israeli Air Force orders all three squadrons of their F-16I Sufa fighter/bombers into the air with orders to bomb Tehran and as many military and nuclear bases as they can before they are either shot down or run out of fuel. It is a one way trip for some of these pilots. Their ancient homeland lies in ruins. Many have family that is already dead or dying. They do not wait for permission from Washington, DC or U.S. regional military commanders. The Israeli aircraft are carrying the majority of their country’s nuclear arsenal under their wings.
Just after the first waves of U.S. bombers cross into Iranian airspace, the Iranian Navy, using shore based missiles and small, fast attack craft sinks several oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, sealing off the Persian Gulf and all its oil from the rest of the world. They then mine the area, making it difficult and even deadly for American minesweepers to clear the straits. Whatever is left of the Iranian Navy and Air Force harasses our Navy as it attempts minesweeping operations. More U.S casualties.
The day after the invasion Wall Street (and to a lesser extent, Tokyo, London and Frankfurt) acts as it always does in an international crisis – irrational speculative and spot buying reaches fever pitch and sends the cost of oil skyrocketing. In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iran, the price of oil goes to $200.00 - $300.00 dollars a barrel on the open market. If the war is not resolved in a few weeks, that price could rise even higher. This will send the price of gasoline at the pump in this country to $8.00-$10.00 per gallon immediately and subsequently to even higher unthinkable levels.
If that happens, this country shuts down. Most Americans are not be able to afford gas to go to work. Truckers pull their big rigs to the side of the road and simply walk away. Food, medicine and other critical products are not be brought to stores. Gas and electricity (what is left of the short supply) are too expensive for most people to afford. Children, the sick and elderly die from lack of air-conditioned homes and hospitals in the summer. Children, the sick and elderly die in the winter for lack of heat. There are food riots across the country. A barter system takes the place of currency and credit as the economy dissolves and banks close or limit withdrawals. Civil unrest builds.
The police are unable to contain the violence and are themselves victims of the same crisis as the rest of the population. Civilian rule dissolves and Martial Law is declared under provisions approved under the Patriot Act. Regular U.S. Army and Marine troops patrol the streets. The federal government apparatus is moved to an unknown but secure location. The United States descends into chaos and becomes a third world country. Its time as the lone superpower is over.
It doesn’t get any worse than this.
Then the first Israeli bomber might drop its nuclear payload on Tehran.
David DeBatto is a former U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agent, Iraqi war veteran and co-author the "CI" series from Warner Books and the upcoming "Counter to Intelligence" from Praeger Security International.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...va&aid=9437
Is War Good For the Economy?
Is War Good For the Economy?
In short: No.
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13046
In short: No.
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13046
Making Afghan Terrorists by Patrick Seale
Making Afghan Terrorists by Patrick Seale
The policies of the NATO force in Afghanistan continue to exacerbate the problems in that broken country.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1615
The policies of the NATO force in Afghanistan continue to exacerbate the problems in that broken country.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1615
Washington’s Grim Performance in the Middle East by Rami G. Khouri
Washington’s Grim Performance in the Middle East by Rami G. Khouri
The list of American foreign policy failures and weaknesses in the Middle East is long, and grim.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1618
The list of American foreign policy failures and weaknesses in the Middle East is long, and grim.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1618
The US War of Ideas at Home by Rami G. Khouri
The US War of Ideas at Home by Rami G. Khouri
The American political process of self-criticism is one reason millions want to emigrate to the United States -- and why we have few reports of young men or entire families trying to sneak into, say, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Iran or Algeria.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1623
The American political process of self-criticism is one reason millions want to emigrate to the United States -- and why we have few reports of young men or entire families trying to sneak into, say, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Iran or Algeria.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1623
Israel’s Reckless Incitement of War against Iran by Patrick Seale
Israel’s Reckless Incitement of War against Iran by Patrick Seale
As it did for the destruction of Iraq, so Israel is pressing for the destruction of Iran – persisting in seeing its ultimate long-term security in terms of military domination over the region, rather than in comprehensive peace with its neighbours.
more...
As it did for the destruction of Iraq, so Israel is pressing for the destruction of Iran – persisting in seeing its ultimate long-term security in terms of military domination over the region, rather than in comprehensive peace with its neighbours.
more...
VIDEO: Taliban: A new breed of leader
VIDEO
Taliban: A new breed of leader
Qari Ziaur Rahman, commander of the Taliban in Afghanistan's Nooristan and Kunar provinces, which border Pakistan, represents the new generation of anti-US resistance leaders and is tipped to become one of the most important Taliban commanders in the region. He spoke to Syed Saleem Shahzad in the Kunar Valley.
See also
AT WAR WITH THE TALIBAN, Part 2:
A fighter and a financier (May 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/video/ziaur-interview.wmv
Taliban: A new breed of leader
Qari Ziaur Rahman, commander of the Taliban in Afghanistan's Nooristan and Kunar provinces, which border Pakistan, represents the new generation of anti-US resistance leaders and is tipped to become one of the most important Taliban commanders in the region. He spoke to Syed Saleem Shahzad in the Kunar Valley.
See also
AT WAR WITH THE TALIBAN, Part 2:
A fighter and a financier (May 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/video/ziaur-interview.wmv
The myth of 'weapons-grade' enrichment by Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The myth of 'weapons-grade' enrichment
Amid disclosures of an Israeli dummy run for an air offensive against Iran's nuclear installations, much of the Western media recycle the lines that Tehran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and that it has amassed "weapons-grade" enriched uranium. The United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has never said this, and this after thousands of hours inspecting Iran's facilities since 2003. - Kaveh L Afrasiabi (Jun 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF24Ak04.html
Amid disclosures of an Israeli dummy run for an air offensive against Iran's nuclear installations, much of the Western media recycle the lines that Tehran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and that it has amassed "weapons-grade" enriched uranium. The United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has never said this, and this after thousands of hours inspecting Iran's facilities since 2003. - Kaveh L Afrasiabi (Jun 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF24Ak04.html
Pakistan calls the shots
Pakistan calls the shots
Washington's grand plan for a compliant Pakistani government and military is in tatters, and its carrot of economic aid may no longer be enough to secure Islamabad's cooperation in the "war on terror" against the Taliban, with dire consequences. - Syed Saleem Shahzad (Jun 24, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF25Df01.html
Washington's grand plan for a compliant Pakistani government and military is in tatters, and its carrot of economic aid may no longer be enough to secure Islamabad's cooperation in the "war on terror" against the Taliban, with dire consequences. - Syed Saleem Shahzad (Jun 24, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF25Df01.html
Russia joins the war in Afghanistan by M K Bhadrakumar
Russia joins the war in Afghanistan
With its profound hindsight into its former performance in Afghanistan, it is strange that Russia is again wading into its southern neighbor by agreeing to supply weapons to the Afghan army in the fight against the Taliban. Moscow is looking at the bigger picture, though. It has put the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the defensive and sidestepped United States-led (and Chinese) efforts to undercut its influence in Central Asia. - M K Bhadrakumar (Jun 24, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JF25Ag01.html
With its profound hindsight into its former performance in Afghanistan, it is strange that Russia is again wading into its southern neighbor by agreeing to supply weapons to the Afghan army in the fight against the Taliban. Moscow is looking at the bigger picture, though. It has put the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the defensive and sidestepped United States-led (and Chinese) efforts to undercut its influence in Central Asia. - M K Bhadrakumar (Jun 24, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JF25Ag01.html
Neo-con redux? by Ehsan Ahrari
Neo-con redux?
There's a mini revival of the neo-conservatives in the United States as they attempt to put the record straight about their policies that led to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the alliance with Pakistan. By contrast, the presidential hopefuls, Barack Obama and John McCain, are silent on key issues in these countries at a time the US's interests are under threat. - Ehsan Ahrari (Jun 25,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF26Ak01.html
There's a mini revival of the neo-conservatives in the United States as they attempt to put the record straight about their policies that led to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the alliance with Pakistan. By contrast, the presidential hopefuls, Barack Obama and John McCain, are silent on key issues in these countries at a time the US's interests are under threat. - Ehsan Ahrari (Jun 25,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF26Ak01.html
US pushes Iraqi Shi'ites closer to Iran by Gareth Porter
US pushes Iraqi Shi'ites closer to Iran
Beyond the issue of permanent United States bases in Iraq, the Shi'ite government of Nuri al-Maliki objects to a new security agreement with Washington on the grounds that it does not guarantee Iraq against foreign aggression. The Shi'ites fear possible US collaboration with Sunni Arab regimes to try to overthrow their administration, a fear that pushes them closer to Iran. - Gareth Porter (Jun 25, '08)
Beyond the issue of permanent United States bases in Iraq, the Shi'ite government of Nuri al-Maliki objects to a new security agreement with Washington on the grounds that it does not guarantee Iraq against foreign aggression. The Shi'ites fear possible US collaboration with Sunni Arab regimes to try to overthrow their administration, a fear that pushes them closer to Iran. - Gareth Porter (Jun 25, '08)
The Pentagon's merchants of war by Nick Turse
The Pentagon's merchants of war
By Nick Turse
The top Pentagon contractors, like death and taxes, almost never change. In 2002, the massive arms dealers Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman ranked one, two and three among Department of Defense (DoD) contractors, taking in US$17 billion, $16.6 billion and $8.7 billion.
Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop Grumman did it again in 2003 ($21.9 billion, $17.3 billion and $11.1 billion); 2004 ($20.7 billion, $17.1 billion and $11.9 billion); 2005 ($19.4 billion, $18.3 billion and $13.5 billion); 2006 ($26.6 billion, $20.3 billion and $16.6 billion); and, not surprisingly, 2007 as well ($27.8 billion $22.5 billion and $14.6 billion).
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF26Ak03.html
By Nick Turse
The top Pentagon contractors, like death and taxes, almost never change. In 2002, the massive arms dealers Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman ranked one, two and three among Department of Defense (DoD) contractors, taking in US$17 billion, $16.6 billion and $8.7 billion.
Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop Grumman did it again in 2003 ($21.9 billion, $17.3 billion and $11.1 billion); 2004 ($20.7 billion, $17.1 billion and $11.9 billion); 2005 ($19.4 billion, $18.3 billion and $13.5 billion); 2006 ($26.6 billion, $20.3 billion and $16.6 billion); and, not surprisingly, 2007 as well ($27.8 billion $22.5 billion and $14.6 billion).
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF26Ak03.html
Congressional Resolution Demands Bush Act on Iran
Congressional Resolution Demands Bush Act on Iran
Monday 23 June 2008
by: Maya Schenwar and Matt Renner, t r u t h o u t | Report
photo
President Bush in Germany on June 11 emphasized that "all options are on the table" when discussing taking actions against Iran if it is found to be researching or developing nuclear weapons. Expected to arrive on the House floor this week is a non-binding resolution that leaves the door open for a military blockade of Iran.
(Photo: Johannes Eisele / Reuters)
A non-binding resolution to demand that President Bush impose "stringent inspection requirements" on trade with Iran - language that leaves the door open for a military blockade - will likely come to the House floor this week, according to sources close to Congressional leadership. The legislation, H.Con.Res.362, which is paralleled by a similar Senate bill, has gained bipartisan support rapidly, with more co-sponsors signing on by the day. Once it hits the floor, it's bound to "pass like a hot knife through butter," a staffer in House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's office told Chelsea Mozen of the nonprofit Just Foreign Policy.
Trita Parsi, co-founder and president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), concurred, saying passage may happen as early as Tuesday.
"This bill will likely be put on the floor under suspension - meaning that it will pass without even a vote," Parsi told Truthout.
Bills placed under rules of suspension are usually uncontroversial. However, this one is an ominous exception, according to Parsi.
"It sets the stage for a very dangerous escalation," he said.
The most strongly worded section of the legislation is article three, which states: "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress - (3) demands that the President initiate an international effort to immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, inter alia [among other things], prohibiting the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products; imposing stringent inspection requirements on all persons, vehicles, ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran; and prohibiting the international movement of all Iranian officials not involved in negotiating the suspension of Iran's nuclear program."
The resolution makes no mention of the National Intelligence Estimate report released in December 2007, which found that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons development program in 2003.
The language regarding inspection requirements and restrictions of movement have led critics of the bill to suggest that, if implemented, this type of international sanction would amount to an embargo and would have to be put into place at gunpoint. Such action would be illegal under international law, unless approved by the UN, according to Ethan Chorin, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Middle East Program. UN approval is not mentioned in the bill.
Moreover, the resolution would unquestionably send a hostile message to Iran, according to Chorin.
"The Iranians would certainly view this as an act of war, whether or not they acted on it as such," Chorin told Truthout. "All of this would confirm the Gulf Arabs' perceptions that the US is playing an increasingly destabilizing role in the region."
However, despite the new Iran resolution's hard-line language, it counts some of Congress's most liberally voting members among its co-sponsors, including Representative Robert Wexler, an outspoken advocate of impeaching President Bush and Vice President Cheney; Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Henry Waxman, one of Congress's most vocal critics of the Bush administration's missteps; and Representative Jan Schakowsky, rated the most liberal Democrat in Congress by the nonpartisan vote-tracking project GovTrack.
Mozen cites heavy lobbying as one motivation for the resolution's widespread support. The bill was promoted by the highly influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which, according to Parsi, has been the driving force behind its momentum.
"[H.Con.Res.362] was the top agenda point of the 7,000 AIPAC members who descended on Capitol Hill two weeks ago," Parsi said.
A spokesperson for AIPAC denied allegations that the legislation would necessitate a naval blockade or military actions to accomplish its goals.
"People describing it as a blockade [are] totally inaccurate. This bill is about increasing sanctions on Iran and banning the sale of refined petroleum products to the country," AIPAC spokesperson Josh Block told Truthout, adding, "it is being misportrayed by groups like NIAC."
The self-titled America's pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, has been pushing for increased pressure on Iran to prevent that country's alleged goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Just days after the bill was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Gary Ackerman (D-New York), AIPAC put out a memo detailing its support for the intentions of the legislation. The memo does not specifically mention the proposed legislation, but contains almost identical language.
AIPAC memo:
The United States should sanction the Central Bank of Iran for its involvement in the funding of terrorism and the financing of Iran's proliferation activities.
H. Con. Res. 362 (2)(A):
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or the support of terrorist groups;
AIPAC memo:
The United States should impose sanctions on companies that have invested more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), originally passed in 1996.
H. Con. Res. 362 (2)(C):
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - energy companies that have invested $20,000,000 or more in the Iranian petroleum or natural gas sector in any given year since the enactment of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
AIPAC memo:
The United States also should use existing authority to sanction foreign entities that continue to do business with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ...
H. Con. Res. 362 (2)(D):
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - all companies which continue to do business with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
"We don't draft legislation. We support this Congressional effort. We were reflecting the sentiment of the legislation in our statements," Block said when asked about the similarities.
Jordan Goldes, press secretary for Representative Ackerman, the bill's author, did not return calls for comment on the similarities between the two documents by press time.
Besides AIPAC's strong pull, Mozen pointed to the resolution's references to diplomacy as a draw for some vocal antiwar Democrats.
"Some in Congress see such a resolution, in part because it is non-binding, as a way to forestall or prevent more serious action against Iran," Mozen said. "However, with the atmosphere as it is on the Hill, with the election debate hinging in part on the debate about Iran, most folks in favor of diplomacy won't be pro-active for it, I gather because they think this will open them up to criticism. Those in favor of stronger action on Iran are pushing for it now and they have AIPAC pushing too. As a result, the folks that want to wait it out are looking to non-binding resolutions to quiet the need for stronger action and buy them time until January. I suppose it seems like a tug-o-war with only one side tugging and the other thinking about when to tug in the future."
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy's national coordinator, noted that the bill's "non-binding" status is deceptive. The bill does not immediately do anything; it merely expresses a "sense of Congress." In itself, it does not authorize war, he added.
"It still has consequences," Naiman told Truthout. "The Kyl-Lieberman resolution was a non-binding resolution and it helped lead to the Quds Force being classified as a terrorist organization."
While liberal-leaning Congress members may perceive the passage of a non-binding resolution as a stall tactic, keeping the administration sated while waiting for a new administration to take office, Mozen called the legislation a "slippery slope" toward further tensions.
"It certainly would not be good to set such a precedent from Congress that could taint the ability of the next administration to make progress in US-Iranian relations," Mozen said.
http://www.truthout.org/article/congressional-resolution-demands-bush-act-iran
Monday 23 June 2008
by: Maya Schenwar and Matt Renner, t r u t h o u t | Report
photo
President Bush in Germany on June 11 emphasized that "all options are on the table" when discussing taking actions against Iran if it is found to be researching or developing nuclear weapons. Expected to arrive on the House floor this week is a non-binding resolution that leaves the door open for a military blockade of Iran.
(Photo: Johannes Eisele / Reuters)
A non-binding resolution to demand that President Bush impose "stringent inspection requirements" on trade with Iran - language that leaves the door open for a military blockade - will likely come to the House floor this week, according to sources close to Congressional leadership. The legislation, H.Con.Res.362, which is paralleled by a similar Senate bill, has gained bipartisan support rapidly, with more co-sponsors signing on by the day. Once it hits the floor, it's bound to "pass like a hot knife through butter," a staffer in House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's office told Chelsea Mozen of the nonprofit Just Foreign Policy.
Trita Parsi, co-founder and president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), concurred, saying passage may happen as early as Tuesday.
"This bill will likely be put on the floor under suspension - meaning that it will pass without even a vote," Parsi told Truthout.
Bills placed under rules of suspension are usually uncontroversial. However, this one is an ominous exception, according to Parsi.
"It sets the stage for a very dangerous escalation," he said.
The most strongly worded section of the legislation is article three, which states: "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress - (3) demands that the President initiate an international effort to immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, inter alia [among other things], prohibiting the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products; imposing stringent inspection requirements on all persons, vehicles, ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran; and prohibiting the international movement of all Iranian officials not involved in negotiating the suspension of Iran's nuclear program."
The resolution makes no mention of the National Intelligence Estimate report released in December 2007, which found that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons development program in 2003.
The language regarding inspection requirements and restrictions of movement have led critics of the bill to suggest that, if implemented, this type of international sanction would amount to an embargo and would have to be put into place at gunpoint. Such action would be illegal under international law, unless approved by the UN, according to Ethan Chorin, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Middle East Program. UN approval is not mentioned in the bill.
Moreover, the resolution would unquestionably send a hostile message to Iran, according to Chorin.
"The Iranians would certainly view this as an act of war, whether or not they acted on it as such," Chorin told Truthout. "All of this would confirm the Gulf Arabs' perceptions that the US is playing an increasingly destabilizing role in the region."
However, despite the new Iran resolution's hard-line language, it counts some of Congress's most liberally voting members among its co-sponsors, including Representative Robert Wexler, an outspoken advocate of impeaching President Bush and Vice President Cheney; Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Henry Waxman, one of Congress's most vocal critics of the Bush administration's missteps; and Representative Jan Schakowsky, rated the most liberal Democrat in Congress by the nonpartisan vote-tracking project GovTrack.
Mozen cites heavy lobbying as one motivation for the resolution's widespread support. The bill was promoted by the highly influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which, according to Parsi, has been the driving force behind its momentum.
"[H.Con.Res.362] was the top agenda point of the 7,000 AIPAC members who descended on Capitol Hill two weeks ago," Parsi said.
A spokesperson for AIPAC denied allegations that the legislation would necessitate a naval blockade or military actions to accomplish its goals.
"People describing it as a blockade [are] totally inaccurate. This bill is about increasing sanctions on Iran and banning the sale of refined petroleum products to the country," AIPAC spokesperson Josh Block told Truthout, adding, "it is being misportrayed by groups like NIAC."
The self-titled America's pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, has been pushing for increased pressure on Iran to prevent that country's alleged goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Just days after the bill was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Gary Ackerman (D-New York), AIPAC put out a memo detailing its support for the intentions of the legislation. The memo does not specifically mention the proposed legislation, but contains almost identical language.
AIPAC memo:
The United States should sanction the Central Bank of Iran for its involvement in the funding of terrorism and the financing of Iran's proliferation activities.
H. Con. Res. 362 (2)(A):
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian bank engaged in proliferation activities or the support of terrorist groups;
AIPAC memo:
The United States should impose sanctions on companies that have invested more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), originally passed in 1996.
H. Con. Res. 362 (2)(C):
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - energy companies that have invested $20,000,000 or more in the Iranian petroleum or natural gas sector in any given year since the enactment of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
AIPAC memo:
The United States also should use existing authority to sanction foreign entities that continue to do business with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ...
H. Con. Res. 362 (2)(D):
Congress urges the President, in the strongest of terms, to immediately use his existing authority to impose sanctions on - all companies which continue to do business with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
"We don't draft legislation. We support this Congressional effort. We were reflecting the sentiment of the legislation in our statements," Block said when asked about the similarities.
Jordan Goldes, press secretary for Representative Ackerman, the bill's author, did not return calls for comment on the similarities between the two documents by press time.
Besides AIPAC's strong pull, Mozen pointed to the resolution's references to diplomacy as a draw for some vocal antiwar Democrats.
"Some in Congress see such a resolution, in part because it is non-binding, as a way to forestall or prevent more serious action against Iran," Mozen said. "However, with the atmosphere as it is on the Hill, with the election debate hinging in part on the debate about Iran, most folks in favor of diplomacy won't be pro-active for it, I gather because they think this will open them up to criticism. Those in favor of stronger action on Iran are pushing for it now and they have AIPAC pushing too. As a result, the folks that want to wait it out are looking to non-binding resolutions to quiet the need for stronger action and buy them time until January. I suppose it seems like a tug-o-war with only one side tugging and the other thinking about when to tug in the future."
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy's national coordinator, noted that the bill's "non-binding" status is deceptive. The bill does not immediately do anything; it merely expresses a "sense of Congress." In itself, it does not authorize war, he added.
"It still has consequences," Naiman told Truthout. "The Kyl-Lieberman resolution was a non-binding resolution and it helped lead to the Quds Force being classified as a terrorist organization."
While liberal-leaning Congress members may perceive the passage of a non-binding resolution as a stall tactic, keeping the administration sated while waiting for a new administration to take office, Mozen called the legislation a "slippery slope" toward further tensions.
"It certainly would not be good to set such a precedent from Congress that could taint the ability of the next administration to make progress in US-Iranian relations," Mozen said.
http://www.truthout.org/article/congressional-resolution-demands-bush-act-iran
US General Accuses Bush Administration of War Crimes
US General Accuses Bush Administration of War Crimes
Wednesday 18 June 2008
by: Matt Renner and Maya Schenwar, t r u t h o u t | Report
photo
Abu Ghraib 37 (2005), by artist Fernando Botero
Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba (now retired) served as the deputy commanding general for support for the Third Army for ten months in Kuwait during the early days of the Iraq occupation. In a statement released today, he bluntly accuses the Bush administration of war crimes and lays down a challenge for prosecution.
In 2004, Taguba released a classified report detailing abuses committed at Abu Ghraib Prison. The "Taguba Report" (executive summary) urged Pentagon officials to follow up on its findings by enforcing adherence to the Geneva Conventions in interrogations.
Taguba retired in January 2007, later alleging that Pentagon officials had ordered him to retire for being "overzealous" in his criticisms of the military.
In light of ongoing Congressional investigations into so-called harsh interrogation techniques, and on the heels of Congressman Dennis Kucinich recently issuing articles of impeachment accusing President Bush of, among other offenses, authorizing torture, we present Taguba's latest statement for your consideration.
The full Physicians for Human Rights report outlining the medical evidence of torture perpetrated by the United States can be read at their website.
Preface to Broken Laws, Broken Lives
By Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, USA (Retired)
Maj. Gen. Taguba led the US Army's official investigation into the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and testified before Congress on his findings in May 2004.
This report tells the largely untold human story of what happened to detainees in our custody when the Commander-in-Chief and those under him authorized a systematic regime of torture. This story is not only written in words: It is scrawled for the rest of these individuals' lives on their bodies and minds. Our national honor is stained by the indignity and inhumane treatment these men received from their captors.
The profiles of these eleven former detainees, none of whom were ever charged with a crime or told why they were detained, are tragic and brutal rebuttals to those who claim that torture is ever justified. Through the experiences of these men in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, we can see the full scope of the damage this illegal and unsound policy has inflicted - both on America's institutions and our nation's founding values, which the military, intelligence services, and our justice system are duty-bound to defend.
In order for these individuals to suffer the wanton cruelty to which they were subjected, a government policy was promulgated to the field whereby the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice were disregarded. The UN Convention Against Torture was indiscriminately ignored. And the healing professions, including physicians and psychologists, became complicit in the willful infliction of harm against those the Hippocratic Oath demands they protect.
After years of disclosures by government investigations, media accounts, and reports from human rights organizations, there is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes. The only question that remains to be answered is whether those who ordered the use of torture will be held to account.
The former detainees in this report - each of whom is fighting a lonely and difficult battle to rebuild his life - require reparations for what they endured, comprehensive psycho-social and medical assistance, and even an official apology from our government.
But most of all, these men deserve justice as required under the tenets of international law and the United States Constitution.
And so do the American people.
Wednesday 18 June 2008
by: Matt Renner and Maya Schenwar, t r u t h o u t | Report
photo
Abu Ghraib 37 (2005), by artist Fernando Botero
Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba (now retired) served as the deputy commanding general for support for the Third Army for ten months in Kuwait during the early days of the Iraq occupation. In a statement released today, he bluntly accuses the Bush administration of war crimes and lays down a challenge for prosecution.
In 2004, Taguba released a classified report detailing abuses committed at Abu Ghraib Prison. The "Taguba Report" (executive summary) urged Pentagon officials to follow up on its findings by enforcing adherence to the Geneva Conventions in interrogations.
Taguba retired in January 2007, later alleging that Pentagon officials had ordered him to retire for being "overzealous" in his criticisms of the military.
In light of ongoing Congressional investigations into so-called harsh interrogation techniques, and on the heels of Congressman Dennis Kucinich recently issuing articles of impeachment accusing President Bush of, among other offenses, authorizing torture, we present Taguba's latest statement for your consideration.
The full Physicians for Human Rights report outlining the medical evidence of torture perpetrated by the United States can be read at their website.
Preface to Broken Laws, Broken Lives
By Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, USA (Retired)
Maj. Gen. Taguba led the US Army's official investigation into the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and testified before Congress on his findings in May 2004.
This report tells the largely untold human story of what happened to detainees in our custody when the Commander-in-Chief and those under him authorized a systematic regime of torture. This story is not only written in words: It is scrawled for the rest of these individuals' lives on their bodies and minds. Our national honor is stained by the indignity and inhumane treatment these men received from their captors.
The profiles of these eleven former detainees, none of whom were ever charged with a crime or told why they were detained, are tragic and brutal rebuttals to those who claim that torture is ever justified. Through the experiences of these men in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, we can see the full scope of the damage this illegal and unsound policy has inflicted - both on America's institutions and our nation's founding values, which the military, intelligence services, and our justice system are duty-bound to defend.
In order for these individuals to suffer the wanton cruelty to which they were subjected, a government policy was promulgated to the field whereby the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice were disregarded. The UN Convention Against Torture was indiscriminately ignored. And the healing professions, including physicians and psychologists, became complicit in the willful infliction of harm against those the Hippocratic Oath demands they protect.
After years of disclosures by government investigations, media accounts, and reports from human rights organizations, there is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes. The only question that remains to be answered is whether those who ordered the use of torture will be held to account.
The former detainees in this report - each of whom is fighting a lonely and difficult battle to rebuild his life - require reparations for what they endured, comprehensive psycho-social and medical assistance, and even an official apology from our government.
But most of all, these men deserve justice as required under the tenets of international law and the United States Constitution.
And so do the American people.
The Return of the Neocons by James Risen
The Return of the Neocons
Thursday 19 June 2008
»
by: James Risen, The Washington Independent
photo
(Illustration: Paul Giambarba)
Bush hawks aggressively working to rewrite accepted Iraq war history.
Ever since the Rumsfeld era at the Pentagon ended abruptly in the aftermath of the Democratic victory in the 2006 mid-term elections, the civilian hawks who ruled the Defense Dept. during the early years of the Iraq war have remained largely silent. They have not engaged publicly even as their culpability for the Iraq war's myriad failures has congealed into accepted wisdom.
But for the Pentagon troika most identified with Iraq - former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith - silence has not equaled happiness. It certainly has not meant acceptance of their fate at the hands of the many journalists, former generals and assorted ex-members of the Bush administration who have taken to the cable talk fests and the nation's media outlets to reject and denounce them. Nor does it mean they walk the aisles at Barnes & Noble with equanimity while scanning shelves filled with books that lay the fault for George W. Bush's failed presidency at their doorstep.
This anti-Pentagon historical narrative is straightforward and seems well established: Wolfowitz and Feith ran a neoconservative frat house while an arrogant, fiddling Rumsfeld roared against anyone who dared try to bring him the truth.
Neoconservatives - a loose association of pundits, politicians and analysts who put a right-wing spin on American exceptionalism and coupled that with an embrace of the doctrine of pre-emptive war - began pushing for regime change in Iraq in the 1990s. Wolfowitz and Feith brought this desire to oust Saddam Hussein with them when they joined the Bush administration.
After 9/11, neoconservatives inside and outside the administration argued for war; Washington must act because Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and might share them with terrorists. Inside the government, Rumsfeld, not a neoconservative himself, embraced and advanced these arguments, following the lead of President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Perhaps Rumsfeld also sensed that the war in Afghanistan had been too quick and remote to serve as a true demonstration of U.S. power in the Middle East.
And so, during the critical 18 months between the Sept. 11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith were united at the forefront of the administration's march to war.
Five years later, 4,000 young Americans have died. No Pentagon leaders have been so thoroughly repudiated since the days of Robert McNamara and the Vietnam War.
When the Iraq war was young, and they were at the height of their power, few men in America seemed less concerned by or more disdainful of their public critics. The image created by a compilation of Rumsfeld's most famous quotations, words that will surely appear in the first paragraphs of his obituary - "stuff happens," "democracy is messy," "You go to war with the Army you have" - is of a man too busy and important to do anything other than casually mock the little people getting in his way.
Perhaps being out of power makes one more susceptible to the slings and arrows; perhaps at night they wake with visions of a future in which some young filmmaker comes to them with a request to remake "The Fog of War." For whatever reason, it is clear that the incoming fire from the left, right and center has finally gotten to be too much. Feith, in particular, is now willing to reveal how much it all has hurt.
"You wind up having the first, second and third drafts of history shaped by the first set of leaks," Feith lamented. "You can imagine, from my point of view, that is grim to see."
Now, the Rumsfeld team is starting to fight back. Rumsfeld recently announced that he is writing his memoirs, while Feith's account, "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism," came out this spring.
In a series of lengthy interviews over several weeks, Feith explicitly stated that his objective in writing his book was to start the process of altering the accepted history of the Iraq war, to adjust the Rumsfeld team's place in history. He wants to change the narrative - before it is too late.
Feith sees his book as nothing less than the opening salvo in what he and many of his allies hope will be a major and prolonged campaign by Bush administration hawks to develop a new school of revisionist history of the early 21st century, in which they will be heroes, rather than the villains. They see this fight for historical dominance as the last battle of the war in Iraq.
How far this devolves into the "stabbed in the back" school of history remains to be seen. But the outlines are already clear.
Feith argues that the Pentagon team's historical standing has been victimized by its unilateral disarmament in the leak and access wars of the Bush administration, even as their foes at the State Dept. and the Central Intelligence Agency whispered to the press about the evil men at the Pentagon. Rumsfeld so hated leaks and leakers, Feith says, that the Pentagon team allowed themselves to be Swiftboated by the forces under Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and CIA Director George Tenet.
"It caused enormous damage to me personally," Feith said. "I wasn't in a position to contradict false and damaging things said about me."
And yet, he added, top State and CIA officials were too cowardly to raise any objections to the war during White House meetings.
Feith does not view this as journalists did at the time - which was that many in the Bush administration were reluctant to criticize Iraq policy out of fear of retribution from a powerful vice president and an intimidating secretary of defense. He sees hypocrites who went along with the war, who told the president to his face that they supported his policies, but then through bureaucratic petulance made sure that critical decisions were never made, that paralysis was the order of the day. Meanwhile, they sought to convince friends outside the administration that they were not really allied with the neoconservatives.
"What I find interesting is that they chose to not take on the strategic questions in the Situation Room when they had a chance," says Feith. "If Powell or Tenet, or somebody like that, wanted more meetings, more debates, they could have had them."
Instead, State and CIA sulked and pouted and refused to collaborate, effectively sabotaging post-war planning, Feith says. The best-laid plans for Iraq's political reconstruction put forth by the Pentagon were left stillborn in a confused inter-agency process in the weeks leading up to the invasion, he argues; and no one, certainly not National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, ever tried to bring order out of the bureaucratic chaos.
Yet it is Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith who were left holding the bag for the failures in Iraq, while pretty much everyone else seems to have skated from the judgment of history, Feith seethes. "The now-standard story portrays the president and his supporters in the administration as militaristic and reckless, closed-minded and ideological, thoughtless at best and even dishonest - and hell bent on war with Iraq from the administration's inception," he writes in his book. It is a false narrative, he writes, that "has swept the field."
Other top officials from Rumsfeld's inner circle agree that the truth is far more complex and has yet to come out. "The pundits have it pretty much wrong about Rumsfeld," said retired Air Force Gen. Richard Meyers, chairman of the joint chiefs during Rumsfeld's tenure, who is now also writing his memoirs. "I think they have it 85 percent wrong. Not many people who have written about Rumsfeld have worked with him and been in the room. I don't think anybody has captured it yet."
Wolfowitz is pleased that the counter-offensive has begun, noting that he believes that Feith, through his book, finally, "explodes some of the myths that have become conventional wisdom." Wolfowitz added, "it's a beginning point," for a serious discussion.
As the first out of the gate with a book, Feith is setting the tone for the Pentagon counter-campaign. He begins by recognizing the need to tackle big, damning issues head on. So he focuses on what he describes as the most damaging lie - that the Pentagon team was trying to anoint Ahmed Chalabi as ruler of Iraq.
"I'm putting out a bold challenge - I have gone through the documents, senior level Pentagon documents, and I can't find any documents supporting the extremely important conspiracy charge that we were plotting to anoint Chalabi," said Feith. "It is frustrating to me to deal with these canards, because no senior person at the Pentagon was proposing that."
As head of the largest Iraqi exile group operating in the West in the years before the invasion, Chalabi had gained prominence through his success at convincing key political leaders in Washington and London of the rightness of ousting Saddam. Yet he had also won powerful enemies, notably at the CIA, where officers who worked with Chalabi had concluded that he was a liar and a crook. During the run-up to the 2003 invasion, Chalabi's group, the Iraqi National Congress, began to force-feed Washington many Iraqi "defectors," who claimed to have information about Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction. His information found its way through the Pentagon right to the president, and was crucial in bolstering the public case for war.
But Chalabi's star began to fall when it turned out that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and that his defectors had been feeding disinformation to the U.S. intelligence community. The Americans broke with him in 2004, when the CIA and the National Security Agency alleged that he had told Iran that the United States had broken their codes.
His relations with the Bush administration have run hot and cold since. But it is now clear that the men who ran the Pentagon at the time of the invasion are eager to disown Chalabi.
That is easier said than done. Feith recognizes that the notion the Pentagon wanted Chalabi to rule Iraq is not only accepted as fact today, it was conventional wisdom within large swaths of the Bush administration during the run-up to the war. And the impression that Pentagon neoconservatives were pushing a huckster destroyed the Rumsfeld team's ability to gain acceptance of its post-war plans throughout the administration, he argues.
"The view that we were doing that was enormously important in influencing policy at the time," Feith said, "because the State Department and CIA opposed a series of specific measures that were designed to facilitate the political transition and general reconstruction of Iraq because they saw them all through their particular prism of antagonism to Chalabi. Every time we denied that we were trying to anoint Chalabi, people at State or CIA would say that was just part of the cover-up of our conspiracy."
Feith adds that the Pentagon leadership was actually agnostic about Chalabi. "We didn't think of ourselves as pro-Chalabi," Feith insisted, "but we didn't think of ourselves as anti-Chalabi, either."
Rather than simply pushing to anoint Chalabi, Feith says his office developed a formal plan for political reorganization built around an entity to be known as the Iraq Interim Authority. The plan - abandoned by the White House in the immediate aftermath of the invasion - called for a temporary government that would include U.S. officials, leading Iraqi exiles and Iraqis who had remained in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule. Chalabi was to be among the exiles playing a leading role, but Feith insists that no one in the Pentagon leadership ever sought to impose Chalabi as the leader.
He says that the Chalabi conspiracy charge can be disproven by the fact that the two men sent to run the post-war reconstruction - former general Jay Garner, followed by former ambassador L. Paul Bremer - were never given orders to anoint Chalabi. "If they were not told to favor Chalabi, then there couldn't have been a conspiracy," Feith said. "Then there was no drive shaft connecting the engine to the wheels."
Both Garner and Bremer said in interviews that they were never given directions by the Pentagon to anoint Chalabi. Garner, briefly in charge of reconstruction in Iraq after the invasion, said, "I heard Rumsfeld say several times I have no candidate," for ruler of Iraq. "I never saw any inclination he was pushing Chalabi."
Garner observed that "Feith, I think, was a friend of Chalabi. And he took me through the positives and negatives of the exiles and candidates, but he never told me to appoint Chalabi. It never happened that he said, 'Make Ahmed the premier.' But he respected him. He told me that he, Perle (Richard Perle, former chairman of the Defense Policy Board for Rumsfeld) and Wolfowitz had met frequently with Chalabi in the past to discuss the freedom of Iraq."
"For me, I don't like Chalabi," Garner volunteered. "He and I instantly disliked each other. He's a crook, a man who can't be trusted."
Bremer added, "Nobody ever said to me the plan was for Chalabi to have the job. Nobody ever told me to put Chalabi in power."
In an interview from Baghdad, Chalabi also insisted, "I know of no discussion at all between me and the Pentagon or any one in the U.S. government and anyone close to me, to install me in any capacity in Iraq." He complained that "the adversaries of Feith and Wolfowitz seemed to fear that I would emerge as a leader in post-war Iraq, and so they had an ABC doctrine - 'Anybody But Chalabi.'"
But while Feith sees this as solid evidence dispelling the Chalabi conspiracy charge, his legion of critics from the Bush administration remain unconvinced. They say these arguments - no orders to Garner and Bremer, no Pentagon documents supporting Chalabi's ascension - are only used by Feith as part of a legalistic effort to obscure what happened.
"Do you really think they would have written it down?" asked one former senior administration official.
The critics say that, to varying degrees, Wolfowitz and Feith at the Pentagon, Cheney at the White House, and Perle on the outside all promoted Chalabi before the war. But, they were unable to convince either Rumsfeld or, more important, Bush.
"Bush was very clear," said one former top administration official, critical of the neoconservatives, "he said, I will not put my thumb on the scales. He wasn't going to favor one guy."
And no matter how badly Wolfowitz, Feith and the others might have wanted Chalabi, they didn't have the power to install him.
Perle, perhaps Chalabi's most vocal and influential patron in Washington at the time of the invasion, said in an interview that he believes that the fact that Rumsfeld was never a Chalabi supporter was critical - since that meant the Pentagon was not going to push him on Bush.
"Rumsfeld's view was that the cream will rise to the surface," recalled Perle. "He did not want to get into the business of picking leaders for Iraq, although I don't think he ever thought that meant Iraq would be leaderless. But Rumsfeld never fought for Chalabi. The idea that he was the Pentagon's boy is wrong. One person made decisions at the DOD, and that was Don Rumsfeld. Those people who kept saying the Pentagon's policy was Chalabi didn't understand how DOD worked."
Asked whether he thought Feith and Wolfowitz would have installed Chalabi if they had been in charge, Perle said: "Early on, they would have supported a government-in-exile and the INC [the Iraqi National Congress, Chalabi's group] would certainly have been at the center of it. And to do it right there would have had to have been a transparent process.... They certainly thought that Chalabi was, if not the most competent Iraqi, at least in the top two or three."
But Chalabi was not installed, and a U.S. occupation, through Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority, was launched instead.
An anti-American insurgency followed, and now, five bloody years later, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith are just beginning their long struggle for historical redemption.
--------
James Risen is an investigative reporter for The New York Times and the author of "State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration." He won a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, for his pieces about government surveillance programs.
Thursday 19 June 2008
»
by: James Risen, The Washington Independent
photo
(Illustration: Paul Giambarba)
Bush hawks aggressively working to rewrite accepted Iraq war history.
Ever since the Rumsfeld era at the Pentagon ended abruptly in the aftermath of the Democratic victory in the 2006 mid-term elections, the civilian hawks who ruled the Defense Dept. during the early years of the Iraq war have remained largely silent. They have not engaged publicly even as their culpability for the Iraq war's myriad failures has congealed into accepted wisdom.
But for the Pentagon troika most identified with Iraq - former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith - silence has not equaled happiness. It certainly has not meant acceptance of their fate at the hands of the many journalists, former generals and assorted ex-members of the Bush administration who have taken to the cable talk fests and the nation's media outlets to reject and denounce them. Nor does it mean they walk the aisles at Barnes & Noble with equanimity while scanning shelves filled with books that lay the fault for George W. Bush's failed presidency at their doorstep.
This anti-Pentagon historical narrative is straightforward and seems well established: Wolfowitz and Feith ran a neoconservative frat house while an arrogant, fiddling Rumsfeld roared against anyone who dared try to bring him the truth.
Neoconservatives - a loose association of pundits, politicians and analysts who put a right-wing spin on American exceptionalism and coupled that with an embrace of the doctrine of pre-emptive war - began pushing for regime change in Iraq in the 1990s. Wolfowitz and Feith brought this desire to oust Saddam Hussein with them when they joined the Bush administration.
After 9/11, neoconservatives inside and outside the administration argued for war; Washington must act because Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and might share them with terrorists. Inside the government, Rumsfeld, not a neoconservative himself, embraced and advanced these arguments, following the lead of President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Perhaps Rumsfeld also sensed that the war in Afghanistan had been too quick and remote to serve as a true demonstration of U.S. power in the Middle East.
And so, during the critical 18 months between the Sept. 11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith were united at the forefront of the administration's march to war.
Five years later, 4,000 young Americans have died. No Pentagon leaders have been so thoroughly repudiated since the days of Robert McNamara and the Vietnam War.
When the Iraq war was young, and they were at the height of their power, few men in America seemed less concerned by or more disdainful of their public critics. The image created by a compilation of Rumsfeld's most famous quotations, words that will surely appear in the first paragraphs of his obituary - "stuff happens," "democracy is messy," "You go to war with the Army you have" - is of a man too busy and important to do anything other than casually mock the little people getting in his way.
Perhaps being out of power makes one more susceptible to the slings and arrows; perhaps at night they wake with visions of a future in which some young filmmaker comes to them with a request to remake "The Fog of War." For whatever reason, it is clear that the incoming fire from the left, right and center has finally gotten to be too much. Feith, in particular, is now willing to reveal how much it all has hurt.
"You wind up having the first, second and third drafts of history shaped by the first set of leaks," Feith lamented. "You can imagine, from my point of view, that is grim to see."
Now, the Rumsfeld team is starting to fight back. Rumsfeld recently announced that he is writing his memoirs, while Feith's account, "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism," came out this spring.
In a series of lengthy interviews over several weeks, Feith explicitly stated that his objective in writing his book was to start the process of altering the accepted history of the Iraq war, to adjust the Rumsfeld team's place in history. He wants to change the narrative - before it is too late.
Feith sees his book as nothing less than the opening salvo in what he and many of his allies hope will be a major and prolonged campaign by Bush administration hawks to develop a new school of revisionist history of the early 21st century, in which they will be heroes, rather than the villains. They see this fight for historical dominance as the last battle of the war in Iraq.
How far this devolves into the "stabbed in the back" school of history remains to be seen. But the outlines are already clear.
Feith argues that the Pentagon team's historical standing has been victimized by its unilateral disarmament in the leak and access wars of the Bush administration, even as their foes at the State Dept. and the Central Intelligence Agency whispered to the press about the evil men at the Pentagon. Rumsfeld so hated leaks and leakers, Feith says, that the Pentagon team allowed themselves to be Swiftboated by the forces under Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and CIA Director George Tenet.
"It caused enormous damage to me personally," Feith said. "I wasn't in a position to contradict false and damaging things said about me."
And yet, he added, top State and CIA officials were too cowardly to raise any objections to the war during White House meetings.
Feith does not view this as journalists did at the time - which was that many in the Bush administration were reluctant to criticize Iraq policy out of fear of retribution from a powerful vice president and an intimidating secretary of defense. He sees hypocrites who went along with the war, who told the president to his face that they supported his policies, but then through bureaucratic petulance made sure that critical decisions were never made, that paralysis was the order of the day. Meanwhile, they sought to convince friends outside the administration that they were not really allied with the neoconservatives.
"What I find interesting is that they chose to not take on the strategic questions in the Situation Room when they had a chance," says Feith. "If Powell or Tenet, or somebody like that, wanted more meetings, more debates, they could have had them."
Instead, State and CIA sulked and pouted and refused to collaborate, effectively sabotaging post-war planning, Feith says. The best-laid plans for Iraq's political reconstruction put forth by the Pentagon were left stillborn in a confused inter-agency process in the weeks leading up to the invasion, he argues; and no one, certainly not National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, ever tried to bring order out of the bureaucratic chaos.
Yet it is Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith who were left holding the bag for the failures in Iraq, while pretty much everyone else seems to have skated from the judgment of history, Feith seethes. "The now-standard story portrays the president and his supporters in the administration as militaristic and reckless, closed-minded and ideological, thoughtless at best and even dishonest - and hell bent on war with Iraq from the administration's inception," he writes in his book. It is a false narrative, he writes, that "has swept the field."
Other top officials from Rumsfeld's inner circle agree that the truth is far more complex and has yet to come out. "The pundits have it pretty much wrong about Rumsfeld," said retired Air Force Gen. Richard Meyers, chairman of the joint chiefs during Rumsfeld's tenure, who is now also writing his memoirs. "I think they have it 85 percent wrong. Not many people who have written about Rumsfeld have worked with him and been in the room. I don't think anybody has captured it yet."
Wolfowitz is pleased that the counter-offensive has begun, noting that he believes that Feith, through his book, finally, "explodes some of the myths that have become conventional wisdom." Wolfowitz added, "it's a beginning point," for a serious discussion.
As the first out of the gate with a book, Feith is setting the tone for the Pentagon counter-campaign. He begins by recognizing the need to tackle big, damning issues head on. So he focuses on what he describes as the most damaging lie - that the Pentagon team was trying to anoint Ahmed Chalabi as ruler of Iraq.
"I'm putting out a bold challenge - I have gone through the documents, senior level Pentagon documents, and I can't find any documents supporting the extremely important conspiracy charge that we were plotting to anoint Chalabi," said Feith. "It is frustrating to me to deal with these canards, because no senior person at the Pentagon was proposing that."
As head of the largest Iraqi exile group operating in the West in the years before the invasion, Chalabi had gained prominence through his success at convincing key political leaders in Washington and London of the rightness of ousting Saddam. Yet he had also won powerful enemies, notably at the CIA, where officers who worked with Chalabi had concluded that he was a liar and a crook. During the run-up to the 2003 invasion, Chalabi's group, the Iraqi National Congress, began to force-feed Washington many Iraqi "defectors," who claimed to have information about Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction. His information found its way through the Pentagon right to the president, and was crucial in bolstering the public case for war.
But Chalabi's star began to fall when it turned out that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and that his defectors had been feeding disinformation to the U.S. intelligence community. The Americans broke with him in 2004, when the CIA and the National Security Agency alleged that he had told Iran that the United States had broken their codes.
His relations with the Bush administration have run hot and cold since. But it is now clear that the men who ran the Pentagon at the time of the invasion are eager to disown Chalabi.
That is easier said than done. Feith recognizes that the notion the Pentagon wanted Chalabi to rule Iraq is not only accepted as fact today, it was conventional wisdom within large swaths of the Bush administration during the run-up to the war. And the impression that Pentagon neoconservatives were pushing a huckster destroyed the Rumsfeld team's ability to gain acceptance of its post-war plans throughout the administration, he argues.
"The view that we were doing that was enormously important in influencing policy at the time," Feith said, "because the State Department and CIA opposed a series of specific measures that were designed to facilitate the political transition and general reconstruction of Iraq because they saw them all through their particular prism of antagonism to Chalabi. Every time we denied that we were trying to anoint Chalabi, people at State or CIA would say that was just part of the cover-up of our conspiracy."
Feith adds that the Pentagon leadership was actually agnostic about Chalabi. "We didn't think of ourselves as pro-Chalabi," Feith insisted, "but we didn't think of ourselves as anti-Chalabi, either."
Rather than simply pushing to anoint Chalabi, Feith says his office developed a formal plan for political reorganization built around an entity to be known as the Iraq Interim Authority. The plan - abandoned by the White House in the immediate aftermath of the invasion - called for a temporary government that would include U.S. officials, leading Iraqi exiles and Iraqis who had remained in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule. Chalabi was to be among the exiles playing a leading role, but Feith insists that no one in the Pentagon leadership ever sought to impose Chalabi as the leader.
He says that the Chalabi conspiracy charge can be disproven by the fact that the two men sent to run the post-war reconstruction - former general Jay Garner, followed by former ambassador L. Paul Bremer - were never given orders to anoint Chalabi. "If they were not told to favor Chalabi, then there couldn't have been a conspiracy," Feith said. "Then there was no drive shaft connecting the engine to the wheels."
Both Garner and Bremer said in interviews that they were never given directions by the Pentagon to anoint Chalabi. Garner, briefly in charge of reconstruction in Iraq after the invasion, said, "I heard Rumsfeld say several times I have no candidate," for ruler of Iraq. "I never saw any inclination he was pushing Chalabi."
Garner observed that "Feith, I think, was a friend of Chalabi. And he took me through the positives and negatives of the exiles and candidates, but he never told me to appoint Chalabi. It never happened that he said, 'Make Ahmed the premier.' But he respected him. He told me that he, Perle (Richard Perle, former chairman of the Defense Policy Board for Rumsfeld) and Wolfowitz had met frequently with Chalabi in the past to discuss the freedom of Iraq."
"For me, I don't like Chalabi," Garner volunteered. "He and I instantly disliked each other. He's a crook, a man who can't be trusted."
Bremer added, "Nobody ever said to me the plan was for Chalabi to have the job. Nobody ever told me to put Chalabi in power."
In an interview from Baghdad, Chalabi also insisted, "I know of no discussion at all between me and the Pentagon or any one in the U.S. government and anyone close to me, to install me in any capacity in Iraq." He complained that "the adversaries of Feith and Wolfowitz seemed to fear that I would emerge as a leader in post-war Iraq, and so they had an ABC doctrine - 'Anybody But Chalabi.'"
But while Feith sees this as solid evidence dispelling the Chalabi conspiracy charge, his legion of critics from the Bush administration remain unconvinced. They say these arguments - no orders to Garner and Bremer, no Pentagon documents supporting Chalabi's ascension - are only used by Feith as part of a legalistic effort to obscure what happened.
"Do you really think they would have written it down?" asked one former senior administration official.
The critics say that, to varying degrees, Wolfowitz and Feith at the Pentagon, Cheney at the White House, and Perle on the outside all promoted Chalabi before the war. But, they were unable to convince either Rumsfeld or, more important, Bush.
"Bush was very clear," said one former top administration official, critical of the neoconservatives, "he said, I will not put my thumb on the scales. He wasn't going to favor one guy."
And no matter how badly Wolfowitz, Feith and the others might have wanted Chalabi, they didn't have the power to install him.
Perle, perhaps Chalabi's most vocal and influential patron in Washington at the time of the invasion, said in an interview that he believes that the fact that Rumsfeld was never a Chalabi supporter was critical - since that meant the Pentagon was not going to push him on Bush.
"Rumsfeld's view was that the cream will rise to the surface," recalled Perle. "He did not want to get into the business of picking leaders for Iraq, although I don't think he ever thought that meant Iraq would be leaderless. But Rumsfeld never fought for Chalabi. The idea that he was the Pentagon's boy is wrong. One person made decisions at the DOD, and that was Don Rumsfeld. Those people who kept saying the Pentagon's policy was Chalabi didn't understand how DOD worked."
Asked whether he thought Feith and Wolfowitz would have installed Chalabi if they had been in charge, Perle said: "Early on, they would have supported a government-in-exile and the INC [the Iraqi National Congress, Chalabi's group] would certainly have been at the center of it. And to do it right there would have had to have been a transparent process.... They certainly thought that Chalabi was, if not the most competent Iraqi, at least in the top two or three."
But Chalabi was not installed, and a U.S. occupation, through Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority, was launched instead.
An anti-American insurgency followed, and now, five bloody years later, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith are just beginning their long struggle for historical redemption.
--------
James Risen is an investigative reporter for The New York Times and the author of "State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration." He won a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, for his pieces about government surveillance programs.
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
Analysis in Depth: Mediterranean Flyover: Telegraphing an Israeli Punch? by Stratfor, George Friedman
STRATFOR
Analysis in Depth
Mediterranean Flyover: Telegraphing an Israeli Punch?
June 23, 2008
By George Friedman
On June 20, The New York Times published a report saying that more than 100 Israeli aircraft carried out an exercise in early June over the eastern Mediterranean Sea and Greece. The article pointed out that the distances covered were roughly the distances from Israel to Iranian nuclear sites and that the exercise was a trial run for a large-scale air strike against Iran. On June 21, the British newspaper The Times quoted Israeli military sources as saying that the exercise was a dress rehearsal for an attack on Iran. The Jerusalem Post, in covering these events, pointedly referred to an article it had published in May saying that Israeli intelligence had changed its forecast for Iran passing a nuclear threshold — whether this was simply the ability to cause an explosion under controlled conditions or the ability to produce an actual weapon was unclear — to 2008 rather than 2009.
The New York Times article, positioned on the front page, captured the attention of everyone from oil traders to Iran, which claimed that this was entirely psychological warfare on the part of the Israelis and that Israel could not carry out such an attack. It was not clear why the Iranians thought an attack was impossible, but they were surely right in saying that the exercise was psychological warfare. The Israelis did everything they could to publicize the exercise, and American officials, who obviously knew about the exercise but had not publicized it, backed them up. What is important to note is that the fact that this was psychological warfare — and fairly effective, given the Iranian response — does not mean that Israel is not going to attack. One has nothing to do with the other. So the question of whether there is going to be an attack must be analyzed carefully.
The first issue, of course, is what might be called the "red line." It has always been expected that once the Iranians came close to a line at which they would become a capable nuclear power, the Americans or the Israelis would act to stop them, neither being prepared to tolerate a nuclear Iran. What has never been clear is what constitutes that red line. It could simply be having produced sufficient fissionable material to build a bomb, having achieved a nuclear explosion under test conditions in Iran or having approached the point of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon.
Early this month, reports circulated that A.Q. Khan, the former head of Pakistan's nuclear program who is accused of selling nuclear technology to such countries as Libya, North Korea and Iran, had also possessed detailed design specifications and blueprints for constructing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on missiles available to North Korea and Iran. The blueprints were found on a computer owned by a Swiss businessman, but the reports pointedly said that it was not known whether these documents had been transferred to Iran or any other country. It was interesting that the existence of the blueprints in Switzerland was known to the United States — and, we assume, Israel — in 2006 but that, at this point, there was no claim that they had been transferred.
Clearly, the existence of these documents — if Iran had a copy of them — would have helped the Iranians clear some hurdles. However, as we have pointed out, there is a huge gap between having enriched uranium and having a deliverable weapon, the creation of which requires technologies totally unrelated to each other. Ruggedizing and miniaturizing a nuclear device requires specializations from materials science to advanced electronics. Therefore, having enriched uranium or even triggering an underground nuclear device still leaves you a long way from having a weapon.
That's why the leak on the nuclear blueprints is so important. From the Israeli and American point of view, those blueprints give the Iranians the knowledge of precisely how to ruggedize and miniaturize a nuclear device. But there are two problems here. First, if we were given blueprints for building a bridge, they would bring us no closer to building one. We would need experts in multiple disciplines just to understand the blueprints and thousands of trained engineers and workers to actually build the bridge. Second, the Israelis and Americans have known about the blueprints for two years. Even if they were certain that they had gotten to the Iranians — which the Israelis or Americans would certainly have announced in order to show the increased pressure at least one of them would be under to justify an attack — it is unclear how much help the blueprints would have been to the Iranians. The Jerusalem Post story implied that the Iranians were supposed to be c rossing an undefined line in 2009. It is hard to imagine that they were speeded up to 2008 by a document delivered in 2006, and that the Israelis only just noticed.
In the end, the Israelis may have intelligence indicating that the blueprints did speed things up, and that the Iranians might acquire nuclear weapons in 2008. We doubt that. But given the statements Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made over the years, the Israelis have to be planning based on worst-case scenarios. What the sum total of their leaks adds up to is an attempt to communicate widely that there is an increased urgency in dealing with Iran, based on intelligence that the Iranian program is farther along than previously thought.
The problem is the fact that the Israelis are communicating. In fact, they are going out of their way to communicate. That is extremely odd. If the Israelis were intending to strike Iran's nuclear facilities, they would want to be absolutely certain that as much of the equipment in the facilities was destroyed as possible. But the hard truth is that the heart of Iran's capability, such as it is, does not reside in its facilities but in its scientists, engineers and technicians who collectively constitute the knowledge base of Iran's nuclear program. Facilities can be replaced. It would take at least a generation to replace what we already regard as an insufficient cadre of expertise.
Therefore, if Israel wanted not simply to take out current facilities but to take Iran out of the nuclear game for a very long time, killing these people would have to be a major strategic goal. The Israelis would want to strike in the middle of the workday, without any warning whatever. If they strike Iran, they will be condemned widely for their actions. The additional criticism that would come from killing the workforce would not be a large price to pay for really destroying the Iranian capabilities. Unlike the Iraqi reactor strike in 1981, when the Israelis struck at night to minimize casualties, this strike against a more sophisticated program could not afford to be squeamish.
There are obviously parts of Iran's nuclear capability that cannot be moved. There is other equipment that can be, with enough warning and with more or less difficulty, moved to unknown locations. But nothing would be easier to disperse than the heart of the program — the people. They could be moved out of harm's way with only an hour's notice. Therefore, providing warning that an attack was coming makes very little sense. It runs counter to basic principles of warfare. The Israelis struck the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 with not the slightest hint of the attack's imminence. That was one of the reasons it was successful. Telegraphing your punch is not very smart in these circumstances.
The Israelis have done more than raise the possibility that an attack might be launched in 2008. They have publicized how they plan to do it. Based on the number and type of aircraft involved in the exercise — more than 100 F-15 and F-16 fighter jets — one Israeli attack scenario could involve a third of Israel's inventory of fourth-generation strike aircraft, including most of its latest-model F-15I Ra'am and F-16I Sufa fighter bombers. If Greece were the target in this exercise, then the equivalent distance would mean that the Israelis are planning to cross Jordanian airspace, transit through Iraq and strike Iran from that direction. A strike through Turkey — and there is no indication that the Turks would permit it — would take much longer.
The most complex part of the operation's logistics would be the refueling of aircraft. They would have to be orbiting in Iraqi airspace. One of the points discussed about the Mediterranean exercise was the role of Israeli helicopters in rescuing downed flyers. Rescue helicopters would be involved, but we doubt very much they would be entering Iranian airspace from Israel. They are a lot slower than the jets, and they would have to be moving hours ahead of time. The Iranians might not spot them but the Russians would, and there is no guarantee that they wouldn't pass it on to the Iranians. That means that the Israeli helicopters would have to move quietly into Iraq and be based there.
And that means that this would have to be a joint American-Israeli operation. The United States controls Iraqi airspace, meaning that the Americans would have to permit Israeli tankers to orbit in Iraqi airspace. The search-and-rescue helicopters would have to be based there. And we strongly suspect that rescued pilots would not be ferried back to Israel by helicopter but would either be sent to U.S. hospitals in Iraq or transferred to Israeli aircraft in Iraq.
The point here is that, given the exercise the Israelis carried out and the distances involved, there is no way Israel could do this without the direct cooperation of the United States. From a political standpoint in the region, it is actually easier for the United States to take out Iran's facilities than for it to help the Israelis do so. There are many Sunni states that might formally protest but be quite pleased to see the United States do the job. But if the Israelis were to do it, Sunni states would have to be much more serious in their protestations. In having the United States play the role of handmaiden in the Israeli operation, it would appear that the basic charge against the United States — that it is the handmaiden of the Israelis — is quite true. If the Americans are going to be involved in a strike against Iran's nuclear program, they are far better off doing it themselves than playing a supporting role to Israel.
There is something not quite right in this whole story. The sudden urgency — replete with tales of complete blueprints that might be in Iranian hands — doesn't make sense. We may be wrong, but we have no indication that Iran is that close to producing nuclear weapons. Second, the extreme publicity given the exercise in the Mediterranean, coming from both Israel and the United States, runs counter to the logic of the mission. Third, an attack on Iran through Iraqi airspace would create a political nightmare for the United States. If this is the Israeli attack plan, the Americans would appear to be far better off doing it themselves.
There are a number of possible explanations. On the question of urgency, the Israelis might have two things in mind. One is the rumored transfer of S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia to Iran. This transfer has been rumored for quite a while, but by all accounts has yet to happen. The S-300 is a very capable system, depending on the variety (and it is unclear which variety is being transferred), and it would increase the cost and complexity of any airstrike against Iran. Israel may have heard that the Russians are planning to begin transferring the missiles sometime in 2008.
Second, there is obviously the U.S. presidential election. George W. Bush will be out of office in early 2009, and it is possible that Barack Obama will be replacing him. The Israelis have made no secret of their discomfort with an Obama presidency. Obviously, Israel cannot attack Iran without U.S. cooperation. The Israelis' timetable may be moved up because they are not certain that Obama will permit an attack later on.
There are also explanations for the extreme publicity surrounding the exercise. The first might be that the Israelis have absolutely no intention of trying to stage long-range attacks but are planning some other type of attack altogether. The possibilities range from commando raids to cruise missiles fired from Israeli submarines in the Arabian Sea — or something else entirely. The Mediterranean exercise might have been designed to divert attention.
Alternatively, the Israelis could be engaged in exhausting Iranian defenders. During the first Gulf War, U.S. aircraft rushed toward the Iraqi border night after night for weeks, pulling away and landing each time. The purpose was to get the Iraqis to see these feints as routine and slow down their reactions when U.S. aircraft finally attacked. The Israelis could be engaged in a version of this, tiring out the Iranians with a series of "emergencies" so they are less responsive in the event of a real strike.
Finally, the Israelis and Americans might not be intending an attack at all. Rather, they are — as the Iranians have said — engaged in psychological warfare for political reasons. The Iranians appear to be split now between those who think that Ahmadinejad has led Iran into an extremely dangerous situation and those who think Ahmadinejad has done a fine job. The prospect of an imminent and massive attack on Iran could give his opponents ammunition against him. This would explain the Iranian government response to the reports of a possible attack — which was that such an attack was just psychological warfare and could not happen. That clearly was directed more for internal consumption than it was for the Israelis or Americans.
We tend toward this latter theory. Frankly, the Bush administration has been talking about an attack on Iran for years. It is hard for us to see that the situation has changed materially over the past months. But if it has, then either Israel or the United States would have attacked — and not with front-page spreads in The New York Times before the attack was launched. In the end, we tend toward the view that this is psychological warfare for the simple reason that you don't launch a surprise attack of the kind necessary to take out Iran's nuclear program with a media blitz beforehand. It just doesn't work that way.
_____________________________________________
Analysis in Depth
Mediterranean Flyover: Telegraphing an Israeli Punch?
June 23, 2008
By George Friedman
On June 20, The New York Times published a report saying that more than 100 Israeli aircraft carried out an exercise in early June over the eastern Mediterranean Sea and Greece. The article pointed out that the distances covered were roughly the distances from Israel to Iranian nuclear sites and that the exercise was a trial run for a large-scale air strike against Iran. On June 21, the British newspaper The Times quoted Israeli military sources as saying that the exercise was a dress rehearsal for an attack on Iran. The Jerusalem Post, in covering these events, pointedly referred to an article it had published in May saying that Israeli intelligence had changed its forecast for Iran passing a nuclear threshold — whether this was simply the ability to cause an explosion under controlled conditions or the ability to produce an actual weapon was unclear — to 2008 rather than 2009.
The New York Times article, positioned on the front page, captured the attention of everyone from oil traders to Iran, which claimed that this was entirely psychological warfare on the part of the Israelis and that Israel could not carry out such an attack. It was not clear why the Iranians thought an attack was impossible, but they were surely right in saying that the exercise was psychological warfare. The Israelis did everything they could to publicize the exercise, and American officials, who obviously knew about the exercise but had not publicized it, backed them up. What is important to note is that the fact that this was psychological warfare — and fairly effective, given the Iranian response — does not mean that Israel is not going to attack. One has nothing to do with the other. So the question of whether there is going to be an attack must be analyzed carefully.
The first issue, of course, is what might be called the "red line." It has always been expected that once the Iranians came close to a line at which they would become a capable nuclear power, the Americans or the Israelis would act to stop them, neither being prepared to tolerate a nuclear Iran. What has never been clear is what constitutes that red line. It could simply be having produced sufficient fissionable material to build a bomb, having achieved a nuclear explosion under test conditions in Iran or having approached the point of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon.
Early this month, reports circulated that A.Q. Khan, the former head of Pakistan's nuclear program who is accused of selling nuclear technology to such countries as Libya, North Korea and Iran, had also possessed detailed design specifications and blueprints for constructing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on missiles available to North Korea and Iran. The blueprints were found on a computer owned by a Swiss businessman, but the reports pointedly said that it was not known whether these documents had been transferred to Iran or any other country. It was interesting that the existence of the blueprints in Switzerland was known to the United States — and, we assume, Israel — in 2006 but that, at this point, there was no claim that they had been transferred.
Clearly, the existence of these documents — if Iran had a copy of them — would have helped the Iranians clear some hurdles. However, as we have pointed out, there is a huge gap between having enriched uranium and having a deliverable weapon, the creation of which requires technologies totally unrelated to each other. Ruggedizing and miniaturizing a nuclear device requires specializations from materials science to advanced electronics. Therefore, having enriched uranium or even triggering an underground nuclear device still leaves you a long way from having a weapon.
That's why the leak on the nuclear blueprints is so important. From the Israeli and American point of view, those blueprints give the Iranians the knowledge of precisely how to ruggedize and miniaturize a nuclear device. But there are two problems here. First, if we were given blueprints for building a bridge, they would bring us no closer to building one. We would need experts in multiple disciplines just to understand the blueprints and thousands of trained engineers and workers to actually build the bridge. Second, the Israelis and Americans have known about the blueprints for two years. Even if they were certain that they had gotten to the Iranians — which the Israelis or Americans would certainly have announced in order to show the increased pressure at least one of them would be under to justify an attack — it is unclear how much help the blueprints would have been to the Iranians. The Jerusalem Post story implied that the Iranians were supposed to be c rossing an undefined line in 2009. It is hard to imagine that they were speeded up to 2008 by a document delivered in 2006, and that the Israelis only just noticed.
In the end, the Israelis may have intelligence indicating that the blueprints did speed things up, and that the Iranians might acquire nuclear weapons in 2008. We doubt that. But given the statements Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made over the years, the Israelis have to be planning based on worst-case scenarios. What the sum total of their leaks adds up to is an attempt to communicate widely that there is an increased urgency in dealing with Iran, based on intelligence that the Iranian program is farther along than previously thought.
The problem is the fact that the Israelis are communicating. In fact, they are going out of their way to communicate. That is extremely odd. If the Israelis were intending to strike Iran's nuclear facilities, they would want to be absolutely certain that as much of the equipment in the facilities was destroyed as possible. But the hard truth is that the heart of Iran's capability, such as it is, does not reside in its facilities but in its scientists, engineers and technicians who collectively constitute the knowledge base of Iran's nuclear program. Facilities can be replaced. It would take at least a generation to replace what we already regard as an insufficient cadre of expertise.
Therefore, if Israel wanted not simply to take out current facilities but to take Iran out of the nuclear game for a very long time, killing these people would have to be a major strategic goal. The Israelis would want to strike in the middle of the workday, without any warning whatever. If they strike Iran, they will be condemned widely for their actions. The additional criticism that would come from killing the workforce would not be a large price to pay for really destroying the Iranian capabilities. Unlike the Iraqi reactor strike in 1981, when the Israelis struck at night to minimize casualties, this strike against a more sophisticated program could not afford to be squeamish.
There are obviously parts of Iran's nuclear capability that cannot be moved. There is other equipment that can be, with enough warning and with more or less difficulty, moved to unknown locations. But nothing would be easier to disperse than the heart of the program — the people. They could be moved out of harm's way with only an hour's notice. Therefore, providing warning that an attack was coming makes very little sense. It runs counter to basic principles of warfare. The Israelis struck the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 with not the slightest hint of the attack's imminence. That was one of the reasons it was successful. Telegraphing your punch is not very smart in these circumstances.
The Israelis have done more than raise the possibility that an attack might be launched in 2008. They have publicized how they plan to do it. Based on the number and type of aircraft involved in the exercise — more than 100 F-15 and F-16 fighter jets — one Israeli attack scenario could involve a third of Israel's inventory of fourth-generation strike aircraft, including most of its latest-model F-15I Ra'am and F-16I Sufa fighter bombers. If Greece were the target in this exercise, then the equivalent distance would mean that the Israelis are planning to cross Jordanian airspace, transit through Iraq and strike Iran from that direction. A strike through Turkey — and there is no indication that the Turks would permit it — would take much longer.
The most complex part of the operation's logistics would be the refueling of aircraft. They would have to be orbiting in Iraqi airspace. One of the points discussed about the Mediterranean exercise was the role of Israeli helicopters in rescuing downed flyers. Rescue helicopters would be involved, but we doubt very much they would be entering Iranian airspace from Israel. They are a lot slower than the jets, and they would have to be moving hours ahead of time. The Iranians might not spot them but the Russians would, and there is no guarantee that they wouldn't pass it on to the Iranians. That means that the Israeli helicopters would have to move quietly into Iraq and be based there.
And that means that this would have to be a joint American-Israeli operation. The United States controls Iraqi airspace, meaning that the Americans would have to permit Israeli tankers to orbit in Iraqi airspace. The search-and-rescue helicopters would have to be based there. And we strongly suspect that rescued pilots would not be ferried back to Israel by helicopter but would either be sent to U.S. hospitals in Iraq or transferred to Israeli aircraft in Iraq.
The point here is that, given the exercise the Israelis carried out and the distances involved, there is no way Israel could do this without the direct cooperation of the United States. From a political standpoint in the region, it is actually easier for the United States to take out Iran's facilities than for it to help the Israelis do so. There are many Sunni states that might formally protest but be quite pleased to see the United States do the job. But if the Israelis were to do it, Sunni states would have to be much more serious in their protestations. In having the United States play the role of handmaiden in the Israeli operation, it would appear that the basic charge against the United States — that it is the handmaiden of the Israelis — is quite true. If the Americans are going to be involved in a strike against Iran's nuclear program, they are far better off doing it themselves than playing a supporting role to Israel.
There is something not quite right in this whole story. The sudden urgency — replete with tales of complete blueprints that might be in Iranian hands — doesn't make sense. We may be wrong, but we have no indication that Iran is that close to producing nuclear weapons. Second, the extreme publicity given the exercise in the Mediterranean, coming from both Israel and the United States, runs counter to the logic of the mission. Third, an attack on Iran through Iraqi airspace would create a political nightmare for the United States. If this is the Israeli attack plan, the Americans would appear to be far better off doing it themselves.
There are a number of possible explanations. On the question of urgency, the Israelis might have two things in mind. One is the rumored transfer of S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia to Iran. This transfer has been rumored for quite a while, but by all accounts has yet to happen. The S-300 is a very capable system, depending on the variety (and it is unclear which variety is being transferred), and it would increase the cost and complexity of any airstrike against Iran. Israel may have heard that the Russians are planning to begin transferring the missiles sometime in 2008.
Second, there is obviously the U.S. presidential election. George W. Bush will be out of office in early 2009, and it is possible that Barack Obama will be replacing him. The Israelis have made no secret of their discomfort with an Obama presidency. Obviously, Israel cannot attack Iran without U.S. cooperation. The Israelis' timetable may be moved up because they are not certain that Obama will permit an attack later on.
There are also explanations for the extreme publicity surrounding the exercise. The first might be that the Israelis have absolutely no intention of trying to stage long-range attacks but are planning some other type of attack altogether. The possibilities range from commando raids to cruise missiles fired from Israeli submarines in the Arabian Sea — or something else entirely. The Mediterranean exercise might have been designed to divert attention.
Alternatively, the Israelis could be engaged in exhausting Iranian defenders. During the first Gulf War, U.S. aircraft rushed toward the Iraqi border night after night for weeks, pulling away and landing each time. The purpose was to get the Iraqis to see these feints as routine and slow down their reactions when U.S. aircraft finally attacked. The Israelis could be engaged in a version of this, tiring out the Iranians with a series of "emergencies" so they are less responsive in the event of a real strike.
Finally, the Israelis and Americans might not be intending an attack at all. Rather, they are — as the Iranians have said — engaged in psychological warfare for political reasons. The Iranians appear to be split now between those who think that Ahmadinejad has led Iran into an extremely dangerous situation and those who think Ahmadinejad has done a fine job. The prospect of an imminent and massive attack on Iran could give his opponents ammunition against him. This would explain the Iranian government response to the reports of a possible attack — which was that such an attack was just psychological warfare and could not happen. That clearly was directed more for internal consumption than it was for the Israelis or Americans.
We tend toward this latter theory. Frankly, the Bush administration has been talking about an attack on Iran for years. It is hard for us to see that the situation has changed materially over the past months. But if it has, then either Israel or the United States would have attacked — and not with front-page spreads in The New York Times before the attack was launched. In the end, we tend toward the view that this is psychological warfare for the simple reason that you don't launch a surprise attack of the kind necessary to take out Iran's nuclear program with a media blitz beforehand. It just doesn't work that way.
_____________________________________________
American Footprints: Bigger Wars and a Smaller Recovery by Eric Martin
AMERICAN FOOTPRINTS
6/23/08
Bigger Wars and a Smaller Recovery
Eric Martin
A key facet of the argument that we (and/or Israel) should do everything in our power (read: military strikes) to prevent the Iranians from acquiring a nuclear weapon rests on the fact that Iran is, supposedly, undeterrable. That is, that Iran's leadership is driven by religious zealotry to such an extent that, once it acquired a nuclear weapon, it would be willing to risk annihilation via nuclear counterstrike in order to launch an attack on Israel. According to this narrative, while nuclear powers such as China, the USSR, India and Pakistan might be deterred from initiating a nuclear exchange by the likelihood of mutual assured destruction, Iran's leadership would be willing to commit "national suicide" in exchange for the pyrrhic satisfaction of destroying the Israeli state.
Despite the boldness and counterintuitive nature of these claims about Iran's ostensibly unique suicidal nature, there is little actual evidence to support this tenuous argument. Iran's current regime has been in power for approximately 30 years and during that time, rather than rushing headlong toward some suicidal destiny, it has displayed a cagey knack for self-preservation. This despite ample opportunity to become a nation of martyrs.
An interesting thing happened on the way to bomb Iran because it's an undeterable, irrational actor hellbent on Israel's, and its own, destruction. John Bolton, who has been urging the Bush administration (and/or Israel) to bomb Iran using any number of justifications ("terrorist" training camps, Iran's interference in Iraq, Iran's nuclear weapons program, just because, etc.), recently sought to assuage fears that Iran could and would retaliate forcefully against US interests in the wake of a US attack on the following grounds (via Think Progress):
"Bolton gamed out the fallout from an attack on Iran. He claimed that Iran's options to retaliate after being attacked are actually "less broad than people think." He suggested that Iran would not want to escalate a conflict because 1) it still needs to export oil, 2) it would worry about "an even greater response" from Israel, 3) and it would worry about the U.S.'s response."
So let me see if I have this straight: A country that is supposedly so irrational, reckless and religiously fanatical that its leaders would be willing to countenance the end of its very existence (and that of its population) in order to carry out an unprovoked nuclear strike against Israel will be too cautious to retaliate against an actual attack on its country for fear of economic hardship and conventional military counterattacks?
In other words, Bolton is arguing that Iran's leadership is comprised of rational actors with well-honed instincts for self-preservation capable of applying a typical - conservative even - cost-benefit calculus. Except we have to bomb them because the opposite is true. Or something. Faster, please.
_______________________________________________
6/23/08
Bigger Wars and a Smaller Recovery
Eric Martin
A key facet of the argument that we (and/or Israel) should do everything in our power (read: military strikes) to prevent the Iranians from acquiring a nuclear weapon rests on the fact that Iran is, supposedly, undeterrable. That is, that Iran's leadership is driven by religious zealotry to such an extent that, once it acquired a nuclear weapon, it would be willing to risk annihilation via nuclear counterstrike in order to launch an attack on Israel. According to this narrative, while nuclear powers such as China, the USSR, India and Pakistan might be deterred from initiating a nuclear exchange by the likelihood of mutual assured destruction, Iran's leadership would be willing to commit "national suicide" in exchange for the pyrrhic satisfaction of destroying the Israeli state.
Despite the boldness and counterintuitive nature of these claims about Iran's ostensibly unique suicidal nature, there is little actual evidence to support this tenuous argument. Iran's current regime has been in power for approximately 30 years and during that time, rather than rushing headlong toward some suicidal destiny, it has displayed a cagey knack for self-preservation. This despite ample opportunity to become a nation of martyrs.
An interesting thing happened on the way to bomb Iran because it's an undeterable, irrational actor hellbent on Israel's, and its own, destruction. John Bolton, who has been urging the Bush administration (and/or Israel) to bomb Iran using any number of justifications ("terrorist" training camps, Iran's interference in Iraq, Iran's nuclear weapons program, just because, etc.), recently sought to assuage fears that Iran could and would retaliate forcefully against US interests in the wake of a US attack on the following grounds (via Think Progress):
"Bolton gamed out the fallout from an attack on Iran. He claimed that Iran's options to retaliate after being attacked are actually "less broad than people think." He suggested that Iran would not want to escalate a conflict because 1) it still needs to export oil, 2) it would worry about "an even greater response" from Israel, 3) and it would worry about the U.S.'s response."
So let me see if I have this straight: A country that is supposedly so irrational, reckless and religiously fanatical that its leaders would be willing to countenance the end of its very existence (and that of its population) in order to carry out an unprovoked nuclear strike against Israel will be too cautious to retaliate against an actual attack on its country for fear of economic hardship and conventional military counterattacks?
In other words, Bolton is arguing that Iran's leadership is comprised of rational actors with well-honed instincts for self-preservation capable of applying a typical - conservative even - cost-benefit calculus. Except we have to bomb them because the opposite is true. Or something. Faster, please.
_______________________________________________
The Coming Catastrophe?
The Coming Catastrophe?
- by David DeBatto - 2008-06-23
The finishing touches on several contingency plans for attacking Iran
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9437
- by David DeBatto - 2008-06-23
The finishing touches on several contingency plans for attacking Iran
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9437
Monday, June 23, 2008
Neo-Con Rage by Jim Lobe
LOBELOG.COM
6/22/08
Neo-Con Rage
Jim Lobe
A very good summary of how hard-line neo-conservatives see the world — and especially Israel's place in it — can be found in an interview at the National Review Online's (NRO's) website by Kathryn Jean Lopez of Caroline Glick, the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post who also serves as the Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy (CSP).
What comes through the interview is how hard-liners like Glick see the relationship between the U.S. and Israel ("the war against Israel and the war against the U.S. are one and the same"); the Manichean nature of the world ("freedom" versus "the forces of slavery and jihad," "good" versus "evil"); how they conflate different threats ("al Qaeda and Iran" as a single "enemy" whose "ultimate aim …is global domination and the destruction of the U.S."); their contempt for Europe (its "refusal to accept the true lessons of the Holocaust"); their Islamophobia ("genocidal anti-Semitism …has taken over the Islamic world"); and their need for an "enemy" to give order to their world (Obama "refuses to acknowledge that there is such a thing as an 'enemy' in international affairs. And as a consequence, he is unable to understand what an ally is.")
Glick is also furious with Condoleezza Rice and the State Department for their presumed influence over Bush and efforts to force Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians. The title of the interview is "Shackled Warrior: Israel in Bondage."
It's worth repeating: Glick is the senior fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at CSP, an organization whose board of advisers have included over the years, among many other senior Bush foreign-policy officials, the current deputy national security adviser charged with Middle East policy, Elliott Abrams. Now I don't think Abrams is quite as radical as Glick or Gaffney, but the association is not one he's ever renounced or distance himself from). Douglas Feith, the former undersecretary of defense for policy and protege of Richard Perle (another member of CSP's board of advisers), has rejoined the board, and John Lehman, an adviser to John McCain, has long served on it. (Gaffney, Abrams, Feith, Perle and Lehman all worked in the office of former Washington State Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson" at one time or another during the 1970s.)
There is one other document that I have cited before which I think summarizes the hard-line neo-con worldview particularly succinctly. It's by Dennis Prager, a California talk-show host who has stood by John Hagee despite McCain's repudiation, and it can be found here.
6/22/08
Neo-Con Rage
Jim Lobe
A very good summary of how hard-line neo-conservatives see the world — and especially Israel's place in it — can be found in an interview at the National Review Online's (NRO's) website by Kathryn Jean Lopez of Caroline Glick, the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post who also serves as the Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy (CSP).
What comes through the interview is how hard-liners like Glick see the relationship between the U.S. and Israel ("the war against Israel and the war against the U.S. are one and the same"); the Manichean nature of the world ("freedom" versus "the forces of slavery and jihad," "good" versus "evil"); how they conflate different threats ("al Qaeda and Iran" as a single "enemy" whose "ultimate aim …is global domination and the destruction of the U.S."); their contempt for Europe (its "refusal to accept the true lessons of the Holocaust"); their Islamophobia ("genocidal anti-Semitism …has taken over the Islamic world"); and their need for an "enemy" to give order to their world (Obama "refuses to acknowledge that there is such a thing as an 'enemy' in international affairs. And as a consequence, he is unable to understand what an ally is.")
Glick is also furious with Condoleezza Rice and the State Department for their presumed influence over Bush and efforts to force Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians. The title of the interview is "Shackled Warrior: Israel in Bondage."
It's worth repeating: Glick is the senior fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at CSP, an organization whose board of advisers have included over the years, among many other senior Bush foreign-policy officials, the current deputy national security adviser charged with Middle East policy, Elliott Abrams. Now I don't think Abrams is quite as radical as Glick or Gaffney, but the association is not one he's ever renounced or distance himself from). Douglas Feith, the former undersecretary of defense for policy and protege of Richard Perle (another member of CSP's board of advisers), has rejoined the board, and John Lehman, an adviser to John McCain, has long served on it. (Gaffney, Abrams, Feith, Perle and Lehman all worked in the office of former Washington State Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson" at one time or another during the 1970s.)
There is one other document that I have cited before which I think summarizes the hard-line neo-con worldview particularly succinctly. It's by Dennis Prager, a California talk-show host who has stood by John Hagee despite McCain's repudiation, and it can be found here.
Ireland’s “No”
Ireland’s “No”
June 18, 2008
Alvaro Vargas Llosa
WASHINGTON—European governments are aghast at the decision by Irish voters to reject the Treaty of Lisbon, the new attempt—three years after the collapse of the European Union’s Constitution—to move decisively toward political integration. The only country out of 27 in which ratification was put to a vote has left Eurocrats desperate to find a way to bypass their own rules and move ahead.
There is nothing surprising in this. Ever since Europe made the leap from economic to political integration with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, a substantial number of European citizens have shown contempt for top-down efforts to impose on them supranational institutions. Each time a country’s voters reject a treaty—the Danish in 1992, the French and the Dutch in 2005, the Irish in 2008—a new attempt is made to push for political integration without taking into account the things that people are finding unacceptable.
Part of the reason is the confusion of rationales and passions behind the “no” votes. In some cases, voters seem to be protesting against their own national governments, expressing their malaise in the face of an economic slowdown, or simply giving vent to nationalist instincts. In others, they have more principled reservations coming from the left and from the right. In the case of the Irish “no,” the spectrum of rejection on the Treaty of Lisbon goes from Sinn Fein, the left-wing party that used to be a front for the Irish Republican Army, to center-right groups such as the think tank Libertas, whose chairman, entrepreneur Declan Ganley, played a pivotal role in the referendum. Amid all this confusion, one thing is clear: An extraordinary number of European citizens feel alienated from the Brussels juggernaut even if they enjoy, and benefit from, the freedom of circulation and trade in Europe.
The European Union finds itself re-enacting, more than two centuries later, the polemic between the Federalists who wanted a Constitution for the United States and the Anti-Federalists who opposed what they considered the emergence of a political leviathan. There are, of course, many differences—which is why it is unclear that Europeans will ever be able to reach the kind of compromise that the Americans arrived at.
The ideological opposition to federalism was more clear-cut in 18th-century America than in 21st-century Europe—where political integration is not even called federalism. Although some Anti-Federalist groups were more concerned about losing support from their state governments once a federal entity emerged than about limiting government, on the whole the movement was consistently mindful of individual rights and fearful of bureaucracy. The Anti-Federalists lost, but they forced the Federalists to include a Bill of Rights that severely curtailed the ability of the federal government to intrude. Eventually, part of the Anti-Federalist cause evolved into the Democratic Party of Thomas Jefferson, perpetuating the pressure on the federal government to respect the boundaries (not always successfully or consistently).
The waters are much more muddied in Europe because the European Anti-Federalists, known as “Euroskeptics,” range from protectionists and globalphobics to free-traders and libertarians, and the Federalists, known as “Europhiles,” have been able to co-opt their adversaries once they gained power and became part of the club (with a few exceptions such as Czech President Vaclav Klaus, who holds a ceremonial post). Italy’s Forza Italia, a center-right party that tended to voice concerns about European bureaucracy, is now an ally of Brussels. France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, the conservative president who once promised reforms, is no less of a Europhile than Spain’s socialist prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero: Sarkozy left his mark on the Lisbon Treaty by downgrading the aspects that safeguard free trade because he believes in protecting “national champions.” The fact that Europe’s mainstream parties on the right and the left—with the exception of Britain’s opposition Conservatives—are all Europhiles means that there is no democratic mechanism for bridging the divide between the people and the Brussels bureaucracy.
In the rivalry between American Federalists and Anti-Federalists, ideas were more important than interests, whereas in the antagonism between Euroskeptics and Europhiles, interests prevail over ideas. This means that every referendum that Brussels loses is followed by new forms of centralization that disregard the citizens’ concerns over the explosion of European bureaucracy. One cannot see a meaningful Bill of Rights emerging in that context.
Alvaro Vargas Llosa is the editor of “Lessons from the Poor” and the director of the Center on Global Prosperity at the Independent Institute.
Alvaro Vargas Llosa
Send email
Alvaro Vargas Llosa is Senior Fellow and Director of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. He is a native of Peru and received his B.S.C. in international history from the London School of Economics. He is widely published and has lectured on world economic and political issues including at the Mont Pelerin Society, Naumann Foundation (Germany), FAES Foundation (Spain), Brazilian Institute of Business Studies, Fundación Libertad (Argentina), CEDICE Foundation (Venezuela), Florida International University, and the Ecuadorian Chamber of Commerce. He is the author of the Independent Institute books The Che Guevara Myth and Liberty for Latin America.
Full Biography and Recent Publications (c) 2008, The Washington Post Writers Group
CheNew from Alvaro Vargas Llosa!
The Che Guevara Myth and the Future of Liberty
Nearly four decades after his death, the legend of Che Guevara has grown worldwide. In this new book, Alvaro Vargas Llosa separates myth from reality and shows that Che’s ideals re-hashed centralized power—long the major source of suffering and misery for the poor.
June 18, 2008
Alvaro Vargas Llosa
WASHINGTON—European governments are aghast at the decision by Irish voters to reject the Treaty of Lisbon, the new attempt—three years after the collapse of the European Union’s Constitution—to move decisively toward political integration. The only country out of 27 in which ratification was put to a vote has left Eurocrats desperate to find a way to bypass their own rules and move ahead.
There is nothing surprising in this. Ever since Europe made the leap from economic to political integration with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, a substantial number of European citizens have shown contempt for top-down efforts to impose on them supranational institutions. Each time a country’s voters reject a treaty—the Danish in 1992, the French and the Dutch in 2005, the Irish in 2008—a new attempt is made to push for political integration without taking into account the things that people are finding unacceptable.
Part of the reason is the confusion of rationales and passions behind the “no” votes. In some cases, voters seem to be protesting against their own national governments, expressing their malaise in the face of an economic slowdown, or simply giving vent to nationalist instincts. In others, they have more principled reservations coming from the left and from the right. In the case of the Irish “no,” the spectrum of rejection on the Treaty of Lisbon goes from Sinn Fein, the left-wing party that used to be a front for the Irish Republican Army, to center-right groups such as the think tank Libertas, whose chairman, entrepreneur Declan Ganley, played a pivotal role in the referendum. Amid all this confusion, one thing is clear: An extraordinary number of European citizens feel alienated from the Brussels juggernaut even if they enjoy, and benefit from, the freedom of circulation and trade in Europe.
The European Union finds itself re-enacting, more than two centuries later, the polemic between the Federalists who wanted a Constitution for the United States and the Anti-Federalists who opposed what they considered the emergence of a political leviathan. There are, of course, many differences—which is why it is unclear that Europeans will ever be able to reach the kind of compromise that the Americans arrived at.
The ideological opposition to federalism was more clear-cut in 18th-century America than in 21st-century Europe—where political integration is not even called federalism. Although some Anti-Federalist groups were more concerned about losing support from their state governments once a federal entity emerged than about limiting government, on the whole the movement was consistently mindful of individual rights and fearful of bureaucracy. The Anti-Federalists lost, but they forced the Federalists to include a Bill of Rights that severely curtailed the ability of the federal government to intrude. Eventually, part of the Anti-Federalist cause evolved into the Democratic Party of Thomas Jefferson, perpetuating the pressure on the federal government to respect the boundaries (not always successfully or consistently).
The waters are much more muddied in Europe because the European Anti-Federalists, known as “Euroskeptics,” range from protectionists and globalphobics to free-traders and libertarians, and the Federalists, known as “Europhiles,” have been able to co-opt their adversaries once they gained power and became part of the club (with a few exceptions such as Czech President Vaclav Klaus, who holds a ceremonial post). Italy’s Forza Italia, a center-right party that tended to voice concerns about European bureaucracy, is now an ally of Brussels. France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, the conservative president who once promised reforms, is no less of a Europhile than Spain’s socialist prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero: Sarkozy left his mark on the Lisbon Treaty by downgrading the aspects that safeguard free trade because he believes in protecting “national champions.” The fact that Europe’s mainstream parties on the right and the left—with the exception of Britain’s opposition Conservatives—are all Europhiles means that there is no democratic mechanism for bridging the divide between the people and the Brussels bureaucracy.
In the rivalry between American Federalists and Anti-Federalists, ideas were more important than interests, whereas in the antagonism between Euroskeptics and Europhiles, interests prevail over ideas. This means that every referendum that Brussels loses is followed by new forms of centralization that disregard the citizens’ concerns over the explosion of European bureaucracy. One cannot see a meaningful Bill of Rights emerging in that context.
Alvaro Vargas Llosa is the editor of “Lessons from the Poor” and the director of the Center on Global Prosperity at the Independent Institute.
Alvaro Vargas Llosa
Send email
Alvaro Vargas Llosa is Senior Fellow and Director of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. He is a native of Peru and received his B.S.C. in international history from the London School of Economics. He is widely published and has lectured on world economic and political issues including at the Mont Pelerin Society, Naumann Foundation (Germany), FAES Foundation (Spain), Brazilian Institute of Business Studies, Fundación Libertad (Argentina), CEDICE Foundation (Venezuela), Florida International University, and the Ecuadorian Chamber of Commerce. He is the author of the Independent Institute books The Che Guevara Myth and Liberty for Latin America.
Full Biography and Recent Publications (c) 2008, The Washington Post Writers Group
CheNew from Alvaro Vargas Llosa!
The Che Guevara Myth and the Future of Liberty
Nearly four decades after his death, the legend of Che Guevara has grown worldwide. In this new book, Alvaro Vargas Llosa separates myth from reality and shows that Che’s ideals re-hashed centralized power—long the major source of suffering and misery for the poor.
Lessons for Iraq from the Former Yugoslavia
Lessons for Iraq from the Former Yugoslavia
June 23, 2008
Ivan Eland
President George W. Bush recently visited Slovenia for a summit between the United States and the 27-nation European Union. Slovenia is the only success story emanating from the violent ethnic break up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s after the Cold War ended. The reasons for its success, and lack thereof in other new states originating from the now defunct Yugoslavia, should inform policy decisions in faraway Iraq.
Unfortunately, in the 1990s, violence during Yugoslavia’s break up tended to be directly proportional to the ethno-sectarian diversity of the geographical entity. Slovenia—the most ethnically, religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous of the former Yugoslav states—had the least violence during the disintegration. After a war of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 that lasted only 10 days and killed only 70 people, Slovenia has flourished politically and economically. In contrast, in the more ethnically and religiously diverse Croatia, severe violence occurred in its subsequent war of independence. Even worse, the most ethnically and religiously heterogeneous piece of geography in the former Yugoslavia—Bosnia—had a brutal civil war with the worst atrocities committed in Europe since World War II. The Western powers, led by the United States, became involved and forced the parties into the uneasy Dayton peace accord.
The primary reason that Bosnia has not exploded into renewed civil war since the 1990s is the Dayton accord’s creation of a decentralized Bosnian state. Such a governing arrangement allows each group—the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims—to have autonomous governance and a veto over decisions by the weak central government. The structure is not perfect, but it has helped prevent further eruptions of ethno-sectarian carnage.
Although faraway geographically, culturally, ethnically, and religiously from the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, like Bosnia, is an artificial country containing many ethno-sectarian divisions. Also as in Bosnia, politically correct Western do-gooders—some of whom histrionically argue that decentralized autonomous rule by ethno-sectarian groups constitutes “apartheid”—would like a stronger central government in Iraq. In fact, the already decentralized Iraqi governance needs to allow even more autonomy to ethno-sectarian and tribally based jurisdictions. Apartheid—in which one dominant group enforces racial, ethnic, or sectarian separation using coercive means—is much different from boundaries for autonomous governance created voluntarily by ethno-sectarian groups. We in the wealthy United States may not choose this type of voluntary ethno-sectarian-based governance—although the United States does have voluntary ethnically or racially homogeneous areas—but it may be the only means to achieve a modicum of stability in some developing countries racked with internecine ethno-sectarian violence.
Unfortunately, many areas in Iraq have become more homogeneous because of forced ethnic cleansing between ethno-sectarian populations. But returning refugees to their homes would probably only rekindle the slaughter. Instead, if new autonomous regions are created, incentives may have to be provided to get them, and people stuck on the “wrong” side of the boundaries, to permanently relocate to safer areas.
In the short-term, the United States has reduced the violence in Iraq. It has done so, however, by reinforcing ethno-sectarian identities—for example, by arming and training former Sunni guerrillas and Shi’i militiamen and by relying on Iran to broker a cease-fire with the Shi’i militia of Moktada al-Sadr, instead of undertaking a U.S. attempt to defeat this force. At the same time, the United States has contradictorily demanded that these same parties reconcile and share control of a central government.
Given Iraq’s history of one group dominating the central government machinery—the Sunnis—and using it to oppress the other groups—the Kurds and the Shi’a—the groups will likely eventually fight over any significant central government power. Thus, to prevent an all-out civil war when the United States finally pulls its finger out of the dike and withdraws its military forces from the country, the power of the Iraqi government will probably have to be reduced to a weak confederation of autonomous regions based on voluntary tribal or ethno-sectarian associations. And even then, the best Iraq can probably hope for is uneasy stability—similar to than afforded to Bosnia by its weak confederation.
Ivan Eland
Send email
Ivan Eland is Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books, The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, and Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense Policy.
June 23, 2008
Ivan Eland
President George W. Bush recently visited Slovenia for a summit between the United States and the 27-nation European Union. Slovenia is the only success story emanating from the violent ethnic break up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s after the Cold War ended. The reasons for its success, and lack thereof in other new states originating from the now defunct Yugoslavia, should inform policy decisions in faraway Iraq.
Unfortunately, in the 1990s, violence during Yugoslavia’s break up tended to be directly proportional to the ethno-sectarian diversity of the geographical entity. Slovenia—the most ethnically, religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogeneous of the former Yugoslav states—had the least violence during the disintegration. After a war of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 that lasted only 10 days and killed only 70 people, Slovenia has flourished politically and economically. In contrast, in the more ethnically and religiously diverse Croatia, severe violence occurred in its subsequent war of independence. Even worse, the most ethnically and religiously heterogeneous piece of geography in the former Yugoslavia—Bosnia—had a brutal civil war with the worst atrocities committed in Europe since World War II. The Western powers, led by the United States, became involved and forced the parties into the uneasy Dayton peace accord.
The primary reason that Bosnia has not exploded into renewed civil war since the 1990s is the Dayton accord’s creation of a decentralized Bosnian state. Such a governing arrangement allows each group—the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims—to have autonomous governance and a veto over decisions by the weak central government. The structure is not perfect, but it has helped prevent further eruptions of ethno-sectarian carnage.
Although faraway geographically, culturally, ethnically, and religiously from the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, like Bosnia, is an artificial country containing many ethno-sectarian divisions. Also as in Bosnia, politically correct Western do-gooders—some of whom histrionically argue that decentralized autonomous rule by ethno-sectarian groups constitutes “apartheid”—would like a stronger central government in Iraq. In fact, the already decentralized Iraqi governance needs to allow even more autonomy to ethno-sectarian and tribally based jurisdictions. Apartheid—in which one dominant group enforces racial, ethnic, or sectarian separation using coercive means—is much different from boundaries for autonomous governance created voluntarily by ethno-sectarian groups. We in the wealthy United States may not choose this type of voluntary ethno-sectarian-based governance—although the United States does have voluntary ethnically or racially homogeneous areas—but it may be the only means to achieve a modicum of stability in some developing countries racked with internecine ethno-sectarian violence.
Unfortunately, many areas in Iraq have become more homogeneous because of forced ethnic cleansing between ethno-sectarian populations. But returning refugees to their homes would probably only rekindle the slaughter. Instead, if new autonomous regions are created, incentives may have to be provided to get them, and people stuck on the “wrong” side of the boundaries, to permanently relocate to safer areas.
In the short-term, the United States has reduced the violence in Iraq. It has done so, however, by reinforcing ethno-sectarian identities—for example, by arming and training former Sunni guerrillas and Shi’i militiamen and by relying on Iran to broker a cease-fire with the Shi’i militia of Moktada al-Sadr, instead of undertaking a U.S. attempt to defeat this force. At the same time, the United States has contradictorily demanded that these same parties reconcile and share control of a central government.
Given Iraq’s history of one group dominating the central government machinery—the Sunnis—and using it to oppress the other groups—the Kurds and the Shi’a—the groups will likely eventually fight over any significant central government power. Thus, to prevent an all-out civil war when the United States finally pulls its finger out of the dike and withdraws its military forces from the country, the power of the Iraqi government will probably have to be reduced to a weak confederation of autonomous regions based on voluntary tribal or ethno-sectarian associations. And even then, the best Iraq can probably hope for is uneasy stability—similar to than afforded to Bosnia by its weak confederation.
Ivan Eland
Send email
Ivan Eland is Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books, The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, and Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense Policy.
The answer lies in oil
The answer lies in oil
The multinationals negotiating deals to exploit oilfields in Iran and Iraq should reflect on gloomy historical precedents
In the Iraq story, it seems, the answer lies in the oil. This week we hear via the New York Times that up to five of the big oil multinationals are set to win contracts to exploit the largest and most lucrative oilfields in Iraq – including the new discoveries lying to the west of Basra and Amara.
The companies, the heirs of the famous seven sisters of the big cartels that ran large chunks of the oil business in the last century, are Exxon, Chevron, Total, Royal Dutch Shell and BP. They will benefit from the new Iraqi oil law, which has taken years to produce, and they will be granted the licences to lift the oil on a non-compete basis.
Iraq has the second- or third-largest known commercially viable oil reserves in the world – it jostles in ranking with Iran. The difficulty for both countries is that they have antiquated or non-existent infrastructure for refining and distribution. In 1991, according to a UK defence intelligence source, Iraq had only twelve "cracking" or full refining plants – and the situation can hardly be any better today.
Iran has roughly half as many again, some 18 in all, which leaves it peculiarly vulnerable. According to my source (who is now an international businessman), however, "the place is awash with crude, but they have to ship a lot of it out to get it refined, and then buy it back again". The former commander believed that the coalition force could have "knocked out" Saddam Hussein's war effort in 36 hours at the opening of Operation Desert Storm by "dropping the cracking plants". Similarly, he said, the force could do the same for Iran if it came to confrontation over nuclear weapons" proliferation: hit the oil plants rather than target elusive nuclear sites. The consequence, however, would be a tsunami in the global economy.
The non-compete bids by the big five oil companies – which appear to have been successful against some 40 others, including some from the China – raise the question of whether this was the big prize after all. Bush and Cheney have an oil background and, along with Henry Kissinger, have been obsessed with America's energy security. Even so, it is astonishing if they believed they could just grab chunks of Middle East oil generation in the old-fashioned mercantilist spirit of colonial empires of two centuries back.
The deal is odd, not only because of the non-compete bids, but also because it is very short. The companies are bidding initially for two-year contracts. Off the record, some of their officials have stressed that they do not want to appear to be war profiteers and that the aim is "to help the Iraqi oil industry to get back on its feet".
Somebody who is setting himself up to be a winner is Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister. The day the New York Times broke the story, Maliki sent thousands of Iraqi Army troops backed by American forces to "restore order" to Amara, the capital of the oil-rich Maysan province. The aim is to clear the streets of the militias, particularly those of the Mahdi army of Moqtada al-Sadr.
Last March, Iraqi army forces were ordered into Basra to clean out the Sadr militias in the week that negotiations for new Iraqi oil contracts opened in Amman, Jordan. The British got a lot of stick for letting Moqtada's mob get out of hand in the southern cities like Amara and Basra, and the Americans had to take over command of the fight there.
Twice in four months, a big move on oil has been complemented by a crackdown against the Sadrists. Maliki has decided to hitch his fortune to the muscle of the al-Hakim Clan and their Badr organisation, the militia of their Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council political party. This alliance sees itself as the leading power in the Shia community. Together, they want to exclude Moqtada from gaining power in the imminent provincial elections, above all in Basra and Maysan, which are on top of the richest oilfields in the country.
Nuri al-Maliki now sees the need to distance himself from the Americans. For three months his government has been negotiating a security pact with the Americans to give a legal basis to their presence, once the current UN security council resolution according them occupying status expires at the end of the year. The Americans have pitched high in their demands – at least 58 bases (they had asked initially for 200) and immunity from prosecution for all American personnel, military and civil including security contractors. Washington also asked to be able to arrest, charge and extradite any Iraqi citizens they suspect of evil intent.
When al-Maliki took the sketch of a deal to Tehran for approval, he got the big thumbs down. President Ahmadinejad said no, but more to the point the Supreme Guide of the Iranian Islamic Republic Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said he did not welcome any enduring American presence in Iraq. This was supported by two other major Shia clerics. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior Shia cleric in Iraq, said he did not want to see America involved institutionally in a future Iraq. The more radical Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeriri declared a fatwa against an open-ended licence for American forces in Iraq. Formerly close to Moqtada al-Sadr, they had recently become estranged. Once more reconciled, they are in harness, with Haeriri acknowledged as Moqtada's spiritual mentor.
Despite the setbacks, the Americans say negotiations continue; progress is slow, but will get there in the end, US diplomats in Baghdad are whispering.
However, deals to station foreign troops in Iran and Iraq have a very bad precedent in recent history. The status of forces agreement (Sofa) with the Shah of Iran made him even more dictatorial, according to American diplomats even then, and all but inevitably led to his overthrow and the theocratic regime of the Ayatollahs. In 1955, the British negotiated a different form of Sofa to allow the RAF bases in Iraq under the Baghdad Pact. Within two years, the royal family, who were British clients, were thrown out in an extremely bloody coup which opened the road to the Ba'ath party and, eventually, Saddam's tyranny.
One must hope that Barack Obama and John McCain have got their short histories of Iran and Iraq on the bedside table.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/20/iraq.oil
The multinationals negotiating deals to exploit oilfields in Iran and Iraq should reflect on gloomy historical precedents
In the Iraq story, it seems, the answer lies in the oil. This week we hear via the New York Times that up to five of the big oil multinationals are set to win contracts to exploit the largest and most lucrative oilfields in Iraq – including the new discoveries lying to the west of Basra and Amara.
The companies, the heirs of the famous seven sisters of the big cartels that ran large chunks of the oil business in the last century, are Exxon, Chevron, Total, Royal Dutch Shell and BP. They will benefit from the new Iraqi oil law, which has taken years to produce, and they will be granted the licences to lift the oil on a non-compete basis.
Iraq has the second- or third-largest known commercially viable oil reserves in the world – it jostles in ranking with Iran. The difficulty for both countries is that they have antiquated or non-existent infrastructure for refining and distribution. In 1991, according to a UK defence intelligence source, Iraq had only twelve "cracking" or full refining plants – and the situation can hardly be any better today.
Iran has roughly half as many again, some 18 in all, which leaves it peculiarly vulnerable. According to my source (who is now an international businessman), however, "the place is awash with crude, but they have to ship a lot of it out to get it refined, and then buy it back again". The former commander believed that the coalition force could have "knocked out" Saddam Hussein's war effort in 36 hours at the opening of Operation Desert Storm by "dropping the cracking plants". Similarly, he said, the force could do the same for Iran if it came to confrontation over nuclear weapons" proliferation: hit the oil plants rather than target elusive nuclear sites. The consequence, however, would be a tsunami in the global economy.
The non-compete bids by the big five oil companies – which appear to have been successful against some 40 others, including some from the China – raise the question of whether this was the big prize after all. Bush and Cheney have an oil background and, along with Henry Kissinger, have been obsessed with America's energy security. Even so, it is astonishing if they believed they could just grab chunks of Middle East oil generation in the old-fashioned mercantilist spirit of colonial empires of two centuries back.
The deal is odd, not only because of the non-compete bids, but also because it is very short. The companies are bidding initially for two-year contracts. Off the record, some of their officials have stressed that they do not want to appear to be war profiteers and that the aim is "to help the Iraqi oil industry to get back on its feet".
Somebody who is setting himself up to be a winner is Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister. The day the New York Times broke the story, Maliki sent thousands of Iraqi Army troops backed by American forces to "restore order" to Amara, the capital of the oil-rich Maysan province. The aim is to clear the streets of the militias, particularly those of the Mahdi army of Moqtada al-Sadr.
Last March, Iraqi army forces were ordered into Basra to clean out the Sadr militias in the week that negotiations for new Iraqi oil contracts opened in Amman, Jordan. The British got a lot of stick for letting Moqtada's mob get out of hand in the southern cities like Amara and Basra, and the Americans had to take over command of the fight there.
Twice in four months, a big move on oil has been complemented by a crackdown against the Sadrists. Maliki has decided to hitch his fortune to the muscle of the al-Hakim Clan and their Badr organisation, the militia of their Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council political party. This alliance sees itself as the leading power in the Shia community. Together, they want to exclude Moqtada from gaining power in the imminent provincial elections, above all in Basra and Maysan, which are on top of the richest oilfields in the country.
Nuri al-Maliki now sees the need to distance himself from the Americans. For three months his government has been negotiating a security pact with the Americans to give a legal basis to their presence, once the current UN security council resolution according them occupying status expires at the end of the year. The Americans have pitched high in their demands – at least 58 bases (they had asked initially for 200) and immunity from prosecution for all American personnel, military and civil including security contractors. Washington also asked to be able to arrest, charge and extradite any Iraqi citizens they suspect of evil intent.
When al-Maliki took the sketch of a deal to Tehran for approval, he got the big thumbs down. President Ahmadinejad said no, but more to the point the Supreme Guide of the Iranian Islamic Republic Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said he did not welcome any enduring American presence in Iraq. This was supported by two other major Shia clerics. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the senior Shia cleric in Iraq, said he did not want to see America involved institutionally in a future Iraq. The more radical Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeriri declared a fatwa against an open-ended licence for American forces in Iraq. Formerly close to Moqtada al-Sadr, they had recently become estranged. Once more reconciled, they are in harness, with Haeriri acknowledged as Moqtada's spiritual mentor.
Despite the setbacks, the Americans say negotiations continue; progress is slow, but will get there in the end, US diplomats in Baghdad are whispering.
However, deals to station foreign troops in Iran and Iraq have a very bad precedent in recent history. The status of forces agreement (Sofa) with the Shah of Iran made him even more dictatorial, according to American diplomats even then, and all but inevitably led to his overthrow and the theocratic regime of the Ayatollahs. In 1955, the British negotiated a different form of Sofa to allow the RAF bases in Iraq under the Baghdad Pact. Within two years, the royal family, who were British clients, were thrown out in an extremely bloody coup which opened the road to the Ba'ath party and, eventually, Saddam's tyranny.
One must hope that Barack Obama and John McCain have got their short histories of Iran and Iraq on the bedside table.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/20/iraq.oil
COURT NARROWS SCOPE OF APPEAL IN AIPAC CASE
COURT NARROWS SCOPE OF APPEAL IN AIPAC CASE
A federal appeals court handling the case of two former employees of
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) who are charged
with unlawful handling of classified information last week granted a
defense motion to limit the scope of a pending prosecution appeal.
In March, a lower court had issued a sealed 278-page court order
identifying what classified information may be disclosed, summarized or
withheld at the forthcoming trial of the AIPAC defendants. The
government appealed the order in advance of the trial, as it is
entitled to do. But at the same time it also attempted to appeal
several other prior court orders that it regarded as unfavorable
including two 2006 orders that defined the government's burden of proof
and another court opinion that limited the use of secret, non-public
evidence.
Defense attorneys objected to the reopening of prior court rulings, and
the appeals court concurred with them in a June 20 decision. A
government brief on the surviving portion of the appeal will be due on
July 25.
Selected case files from the lower court and the appeals court
proceedings can be found here:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/aipac/index.html
The AIPAC case is a subject of broad interest because it is the first
time that Americans who are engaged in protected First Amendment
activities have been prosecuted for the unauthorized receipt and
transmission of classified information, which is a relatively common
transaction among national security reporters and advocacy
organizations. (Secrecy News has frequently sought access to
information on topics or programs that we knew to be classified, and
has occasionally gained such access.)
"This is not a typical espionage case," defense attorneys told the
appeals court in an April 29 motion. "Everyone who spoke with
[defendants Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman] did so voluntarily, knew
that Rosen and Weissman were not government officials, and knew that
they did not have security clearances. Rosen and Weissman did not
receive money or material goods from foreign governments or others in
exchange for information; they did not speak in code; they did not
conduct their meetings in secret; they are not charged with serving as
agents of a foreign government, let alone with being spies; they did
not receive or pass on classified documents; they did not pay any
bribes to or threaten government officials."
Prosecutors put it differently: "This is an Espionage Act prosecution
involving two defendants who conspired to and did obtain classified
information from their government sources and then passed that
information to a foreign government, members of the news media, and
others not entitled to receive it."
But if it was a conspiracy, the government has handled it in a peculiar
way, the defense said in its April 29 motion:
"Highlighting the curious underpinnings of this prosecution, the
high-level government officials with whom Rosen and Weissman regularly
met and who, according to the Indictment, illegally disclosed
classified NDI [national defense information], have not -- with but one
exception -- been charged criminally. Indeed, one of the disclosing
officials has since received, not charges or reprimands, but a series
of promotions to one of the highest, most sensitive positions in the
government."
The "one exception" is former Pentagon official Lawrence A. Franklin,
who has been sentenced to a 12 year prison term.
The highly promoted official is David Satterfield, who has been
elevated in position three times since the AIPAC case became public in
August 2004 -- first to Principal Deputy in State's Mideast Bureau,
then to Deputy Chief of Mission with the rank of Ambassador in Iraq --
among the most sensitive diplomatic assignments in the world-- and most
recently to Principal Adviser to the Secretary of State on Iraq.
The defense attorneys' argument is not that Mr. Satterfield did
something wrong. Rather, they contend, the government's response to
the facts of the case has been erratic, inconsistent and unpredictable.
Which is to say, it has been unjust.
A federal appeals court handling the case of two former employees of
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) who are charged
with unlawful handling of classified information last week granted a
defense motion to limit the scope of a pending prosecution appeal.
In March, a lower court had issued a sealed 278-page court order
identifying what classified information may be disclosed, summarized or
withheld at the forthcoming trial of the AIPAC defendants. The
government appealed the order in advance of the trial, as it is
entitled to do. But at the same time it also attempted to appeal
several other prior court orders that it regarded as unfavorable
including two 2006 orders that defined the government's burden of proof
and another court opinion that limited the use of secret, non-public
evidence.
Defense attorneys objected to the reopening of prior court rulings, and
the appeals court concurred with them in a June 20 decision. A
government brief on the surviving portion of the appeal will be due on
July 25.
Selected case files from the lower court and the appeals court
proceedings can be found here:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/aipac/index.html
The AIPAC case is a subject of broad interest because it is the first
time that Americans who are engaged in protected First Amendment
activities have been prosecuted for the unauthorized receipt and
transmission of classified information, which is a relatively common
transaction among national security reporters and advocacy
organizations. (Secrecy News has frequently sought access to
information on topics or programs that we knew to be classified, and
has occasionally gained such access.)
"This is not a typical espionage case," defense attorneys told the
appeals court in an April 29 motion. "Everyone who spoke with
[defendants Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman] did so voluntarily, knew
that Rosen and Weissman were not government officials, and knew that
they did not have security clearances. Rosen and Weissman did not
receive money or material goods from foreign governments or others in
exchange for information; they did not speak in code; they did not
conduct their meetings in secret; they are not charged with serving as
agents of a foreign government, let alone with being spies; they did
not receive or pass on classified documents; they did not pay any
bribes to or threaten government officials."
Prosecutors put it differently: "This is an Espionage Act prosecution
involving two defendants who conspired to and did obtain classified
information from their government sources and then passed that
information to a foreign government, members of the news media, and
others not entitled to receive it."
But if it was a conspiracy, the government has handled it in a peculiar
way, the defense said in its April 29 motion:
"Highlighting the curious underpinnings of this prosecution, the
high-level government officials with whom Rosen and Weissman regularly
met and who, according to the Indictment, illegally disclosed
classified NDI [national defense information], have not -- with but one
exception -- been charged criminally. Indeed, one of the disclosing
officials has since received, not charges or reprimands, but a series
of promotions to one of the highest, most sensitive positions in the
government."
The "one exception" is former Pentagon official Lawrence A. Franklin,
who has been sentenced to a 12 year prison term.
The highly promoted official is David Satterfield, who has been
elevated in position three times since the AIPAC case became public in
August 2004 -- first to Principal Deputy in State's Mideast Bureau,
then to Deputy Chief of Mission with the rank of Ambassador in Iraq --
among the most sensitive diplomatic assignments in the world-- and most
recently to Principal Adviser to the Secretary of State on Iraq.
The defense attorneys' argument is not that Mr. Satterfield did
something wrong. Rather, they contend, the government's response to
the facts of the case has been erratic, inconsistent and unpredictable.
Which is to say, it has been unjust.
America in the World: Magoo at the Helm
Readers may be interested to read the remarks of Chas Freeman, President of the Committee for the Republic, on the question of US diplomacy. It does not make for encouraging reading -- unless you are a member of the McCain or Obama advisory teams in which case you can take comfort in knowing that the competency bar is at historic lows. Either man is almost bound to do better.
The link and text are below
http://www.mepc.org/whats/freeman.asp
America in the World: Magoo at the Helm
Remarks to the Washington World Affairs Council Summer Institute on International Affairs
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)
Washington, D.C., June 23, 20008
In the last days of the last century, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described the United States as "the indispensable nation." "We stand tall," she claimed, "and we see further than other countries into the future." She did not seek the views of any foreigners on either point. It is not recorded that many, if indeed any, agreed with her. What she said was, of course, music to American ears. But what we and non-Americans thought at the time of her smugly bumptious articulation of our self-regard is now moot. The policies the United States adopted in the first decade of this century have thoroughly refuted her theses.
A great many governments abroad now fear that Washington will behave like the ever-self-congratulatory Mr. Magoo – wandering destructively through a reality he misperceives and wreaking havoc he determinedly misinterprets as success. Few believe that our country can still combine realism with statesmanship. More tellingly, a lot have concluded that, far from involving the United States, dispensing with a role for Washington is the only way to solve problems.
Take the Middle East, for example. This is the region that, in one way or another, has been the principal focus of American foreign policy in recent years. It is also the region in which the United States has most consistently shown a preference for bluster, boycotts, and bombs and a concomitant disdain for diplomacy. I am not speaking here simply of Iraq or Iran. We have refused dialog and attempted to dissuade Israel from negotiating with Syria. We have done the same even more adamantly with Hezbollah (which, as a consequence of the US-sponsored Israeli bombing campaign of 2006, emerged as the leading force in Lebanese politics). Meanwhile, in the name of bolstering Lebanese independence from political interference by Syrian and Iranian outsiders, we have vigorously interfered in Lebanon ourselves. We have repeatedly proclaimed that it would be a sin to talk with Hamas (which, thanks to elections we insisted take place, is now the democratically empowered governing authority in all areas of Palestine not directly occupied by Israel). We have tried hard to congeal Sunni Arab antagonism to Shiite Persians into an Arab bloc we hope will join us in ostracizing and punishing Iran, which the Israelis and we repeatedly threaten to assault from the air. Our domestic politics are venomously anti-Muslim; our government has made no effort to form alliances with Islamic authorities who might articulate a credible rebuttal to Muslim extremists.
These US policies have not gone over well. Recent developments strongly suggest that they have resulted in decisions by all concerned in the Middle East to work around the United States rather than with us or through us. Consider Israel's resort to Turkey (rather than US "shuttle diplomacy") to manage proximity talks with Syria. Or Lebanon's turn to Qatar to broker the peaceful realignment of its politics, notwithstanding our investment in them. Or Israel's reliance on Egypt to mediate a cease-fire agreement with Hamas. Or the Palestinian president's decision to enlist Arab conciliators to work out Fatah's differences with Hamas, rather than concentrating on an American-proclaimed "peace process" that most in the region have come to view as a cruel fraud. Or Israel's recourse to Germany to reach understandings with Hezbollah. Or Saudi Arabia's effort to reach a modus vivendi with Iran, to align the Muslim mainstream against extremism, and to broker renewed peace between Sunnis and Shiites in preparation for interfaith dialog with Jews and Christians. All these political openings touch on interests that Washington sees as vital. All of them are taking place notwithstanding longstanding American objections to them, and all of them are unfolding in our diplomatic absence.
This is not just because Mr. Magoo has seemingly succeeded Uncle Sam at the helm. In some measure, it's because the United States has taken sides in disputes with respect to which we had traditionally maintained at least a pretense of evenhandedness. We are therefore seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It is because promiscuous efforts by the United States to impose military solutions on problems that force cannot resolve have left no room for American diplomacy. The resulting default on reality-based problem-solving by the US has created a diplomatic void that others are now filling. This trend toward working around the United States has been aggravated by widespread distaste for the arrogant and insulting phrasing of some US policy pronouncements. The undisguised disdain of some American envoys for the United Nations, the World Court, and regional organizations, and their open contempt for the views of the international communities these represent has also disinclined others to work with us if they can avoid it. Washington's political marginalization in the Middle East is a predictable result of such "diplomacy-free foreign policies."
What could not have been predicted is the reputation for incompetence our country has acquired. This has touched even our armed forces, despite their well-deserved reputation as the most professional and lethal practitioners of the arts of war on the planet. Our interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were meant to showcase this element of American power, underscore our omnipotence, and intimidate anyone tempted to resist our hegemony. Instead, these military campaigns have had the paradoxical effect of demonstrating the strategic limitations of the use of force, eroding the deterrent value of our unmatched military prowess, and proving the efficacy of asymmetric warfare as a counter to our strength. Despite the Magoo-like mutterings of the "neoconservatives" ("you've done it again, Magoo!"), when we leave Afghanistan and Iraq, we will do so much more chastened than exuberant about the potential of military power, however great, to transform the world to our advantage.
Scofflaw US behavior, the ill-considered uses of military power in wars of unilateral choice, and the contraction of freedom in the American homeland have indeed transformed our relationship with the world – but to our grave disadvantage. Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantánamo and the practice of "extraordinary rendition" have dishonored our traditions and defiled our international reputation. Militarism has debilitated our alliances, friendships, and partnerships and corroded our ability to lead. The belligerently surly, unwelcoming face we present to would-be visitors in our embassies and at our borders puts off even the most determined admirers of our society. The elements of a garrison state we have put in place at home have enfeebled our ability to inspire others with our ideas while depriving us of theirs. Much of the world is now seriously disenchanted with the United States. Most (though not all) of these self-inflicted wounds derive from our response to the atrocities of 9/11 and our policies toward the Middle East. We have shown not only that we can shoot ourselves in the foot, but that we can reload with exceptional speed and do it again and again.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice famously predicted in 2006, as Israel rained American-supplied bombs on Beirut, that Lebanon's pain represented the birth pangs of "a new Middle East." She was right, but the Middle East now emerging seems to be one in which the United States no longer has convening power, political credibility, or persuasiveness. It is a region in which all countries fear our military might but in which no country – not even Israel, despite its dependence on American subventions – defers to our leadership.
In our own hemisphere too, without many noticing, a major ebb in U.S. influence has taken place. Latin America's governments may have little in common beyond a commitment to some form of democracy and social justice, but they share a determination to assert greater autonomy from the United States. To this end, they are courting investment from China, opening markets in Europe, stalling the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, dissenting from the "Washington consensus," and crafting regional institutions and forming partnerships that not only exclude the United States but are sometimes openly antagonistic to it. Political Washington's apparent disinterest in a region it long commanded and its ideologically induced inability to respond to opportunities there (like those in a changing Cuba) have facilitated these trends. The Council on Foreign Relations' recent declaration that "the era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America is over" may be overstated, but it is not easily rebutted. The regional agenda in Latin America is increasingly set there, without reference to the United States.
This is true in Africa as well, where the United States has mounted a very significant continent-wide effort against HIV-AIDS but is, in most respects, substantially less engaged than China, Europe, and India. Africans have taken the lead – so far not very effectively, to be sure – in crisis management of issues on their continent like the mayhem in the Congo, the genocidal warfare in Sudan, and the collapse of democracy and decency in Zimbabwe. In doing so, they have largely sidelined the United States and other outside powers. In response, and to upgrade our capabilities in Africa, Washington unilaterally decided to create a US military combatant commander for the African continent and to station him and his staff there. Logic and precedent supported this initiative.
American flag officers now sit at the head of combatant commands in most other regions of the globe. The prominent role of such uniformed American proconsuls abroad reflects the extent to which our foreign relations have become skewed toward reliance on military instruments of influence. The forward presence of American generals and admirals with transnational responsibilities, unmatched fiscal resources, and wide authority to draw on the immense capabilities of our armed forces makes them the most active and visible face of our country abroad. Since they are on the spot, moreover, they tend to be more in touch with regional trends and realities than officials in Washington. That's one reason most American ambassadors are so fond of them.
As the United States saw it, the establishment of an Africa Command would elevate Africa's symbolic importance in our foreign policy. But Africans have reacted badly to the idea. They see it as an attempt to reestablish a non-African military presence on their newly decolonized continent and as an indication that American military adventurism might soon extend there. For the time being, at least, USAFRICOM remains in Stuttgart rather than within its area of operational responsibility.
The United States' strongest international ties, of course, have been with Europe, where continent-wide integration is in the final stages of erasing the divisions of the Cold War. The European Union is less than the sum of its parts, but it has emerged as the dominant factor in its region and adjacent areas. Increasingly, Europeans are charting their own course even on issues of great importance to the United States, like membership in NATO or how to deal with the return of Russia to assertive nationalism and China and India to wealth and power. The United States is, however, now valued as a participant in the Eurasian balance of power rather than as the protector of Europe against a credible external security threat. (This is so even though we have taken a second look into Putin's eyes and seen his role: he is a KGB guy playing a Tsar with post-Soviet characteristics.) There are no longer many compelling reasons for Europeans to defer to Americans even if we had not given them cause to doubt our wisdom. For the first time in the five decades since they embraced American leadership of the Atlantic community, they seem comfortable ignoring Washington's views or rejecting them outright.
This is in part because the extraordinary transatlantic solidarity of 9/11 has given way to sharp differences over international law and comity, privacy and due process of law, and the desirability of multilateral approaches to transnational issues like climate change. Very few in Europe have any sympathy for claims by American politicians that 9/11 changed everything, justifying the suspension of individual rights and the separation of powers insisted upon by Enlightenment thinkers like America's founding fathers. To a distressing extent, therefore, the Atlantic community is no longer united by shared ideals but ominously divided by emerging differences over them. Transatlantic disagreement on core values bodes ill for the prospect that these values will prevail in a world in which the center of gravity is migrating to the Asian ends of the Eurasian landmass.
Paradoxically, given the much ballyhooed shift of global wealth and power to Asia, the trend toward regional assertiveness and the decline of American influence is in some ways least obvious in the Asia-Pacific region. This reflects the realities of Chinese and Indian power in relation to the nations on their periphery. With the notable exception of Pakistan, India's neighbors have reconciled themselves to its hegemony in South Asia. The United States has recognized India's primacy there and does not seek to undermine or thwart it.
In East and Central Asia, however, Chinese hegemony remains an unwelcome conjecture, not a reality. China has repeatedly assured its neighbors that it does not and will not seek to dominate them, but none is inclined to self-insure against the risk that it might do so. In this context, the safe and easy course for most has been a carefully calibrated measure of continued association, including military cooperation, with the United States. Much of the Cold War pattern of East Asian alliances with the United States, with Japan as its lynchpin, therefore persists. From the point of view of the Asian participants in these alliances, their purpose is not, as in the past, to contain China but to insure that China will fit unthreateningly into a regional balance bolstered by American power. Meanwhile, China itself is firmly focused on its own economic and social development. It very much wishes to avoid needless confrontations with the United States. As a result, in comparison with other regions, East Asia remains relatively disinclined to challenge American views and prone to accommodate them when possible.
This deferential stance has not, however, precluded disagreements with the United States over issues like how to deal with Myanmar [Burma] and north Korea or the development of regional groupings or institutions that exclude Washington. Such groupings are a growing phenomenon, largely centered on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some of them involve various Asian-only combinations; some involve Europe. Some include Australia or India while others exclude one or both. Washington has inadvertently accelerated the trend toward exclusion of the United States from regional groupings in the Asia-Pacific region by erratic participation in key meetings and sometimes tediously insisting that they focus on terrorism or various Middle East-related issues with respect to which Asians do not share American perspectives or obsessions. Meanwhile, China and India have taken out their own insurance against American hegemony, in the form of regular trilateral meetings with Russia devoted to promoting multipolarity, respect for the United Nations Charter, and other offsets to US efforts to dictate and dominate the world order.
The fact that other countries are willing to take greater responsibility for managing the affairs of their own regions, even if they have been moved to do so mainly in reaction to perceived US errors of commission and omission, should probably be seen as a positive development. But it is certainly not a good thing for our government to be excluded from conversations on major regional or global issues. The risk is that our interests will be misunderstood or ignored when actions are taken that affect us. US policies since the end of the Cold War – especially over the eight years of the G. W. Bush Administration – have tended to isolate the United States, take us out of the diplomatic game, and leave us at the mercy of decisions and arrangements that others increasingly craft in our absence. Rediscovering the diplomatic arts of persuasion is key to recovering the role and standing we have lost.
One can learn more from catastrophe and failure than from victory or success. Students of US foreign policy since the catastrophe of 9/11, rejoice! There is a lot of material from which to extract lessons for future foreign policy.
A good place to start might be 9/11 itself. Among other things, the shocking attack on our homeland that day showed that, in the post-Cold War world, if the United States launches or sponsors military operations in other people's homelands, we should expect them to find a way to retaliate against ours. This caution remains relevant. Without intending to do so, we have installed a lot of incubators and created a lot of training opportunities for terrorists in Iraq, Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon as well as in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, we have repeatedly adjusted our military campaign plans in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have yet to adjust our diplomacy. And we have not come up with a strategy to overcome the appeal of anti-American terrorism, turn its adherents against it, slash the numbers of its recruits, or even capture its most notorious spokesmen.
Those best qualified to accomplish these tasks are mainstream Muslims, acting out of their own self-interest and in concert with us. Cultivating support in the Islamic world should therefore be a principal focus of US foreign policy. The struggle to outlaw and suppress terrorism cannot succeed without the full cooperation of allies and friends around the world too. Reinvigorating our alliances and partnerships is as essential to this task as it is to the renewal of foreign respect for American leadership in general..
In this regard, a few of the lessons that might be drawn from the global and regional trends of recent years stand out. Three have to do with rediscovering diplomacy as an alternative to militarism. Two are more substantive.
First, Woody Allen was right. "Eighty percent of success is [indeed] showing up." At the moment, the US military shows up a lot more than anyone else at the regional level. We need diplomatic counterparts to our regional combatant commanders. They should be forward-deployed and endowed with the resources and authority to address regional as well as bilateral interests. They should have a mandate to implement strategies that integrate the political, economic, cultural and informational, intelligence, and military elements of our national influence.
Second, our leaders at all levels and in all branches of government need to rediscover the art of listening. Listening is essential to successful relationship management. If we don't pay attention to the opinions of others, they will be – as we have seen – less likely to find our views persuasive. If we don't attend to their interests, they are unlikely to buy into ours. Diplomacy is not preaching to others about what they must do. This does not build partnership or elicit cooperation. Diplomacy is persuading others that they should serve our interests because their interests coincide with ours.
Third, as that consummate realist, Otto von Bismarck advised, "Be polite. Write diplomatically. Even in a declaration of war one observes the rules of politeness." Only small boys, hicks, and clueless speech writers think it clever to call foreign leaders or countries names. Statesmen understand that insults just deepen the commitment of those they target to the error of their ways. Sometimes negotiated solutions are the only solutions available at an affordable price. Discourtesy closes the door to negotiated solutions and locks it shut. Getting others to do things our way is difficult. Denigrating their character or putting derogatory labels on them can make it impossible.
Fourth, we need to clear the foreign policy decks as rapidly as we can. Our plunge into the quicksand of endless warfare abroad has already done great damage to our prestige and influence abroad and considerable injury at home. These wars are not sustainable. They cannot be conducted as we have been fighting them without destroying the very ideals we believe in and are fighting to preserve. We are corroding our civil liberties and mortgaging our posterity to foreign bankers. The money that might rebuild crumbling American infrastructure is being squandered on the destruction and botched reconstruction of vast areas of the Middle East. The wars there bring grief, pain, and uncertainty to America, as well as the places where they are fought. They confer no benefits. They divide Americans from each other and from the world. They divert us from urgent tasks of vital importance to our future. We have no plan for ending them, yet we cannot afford not to end them if we wish to recover our domestic tranquility and international standing.
Once we have relieved the myopic and deluded Mr. Magoo of his duties as helmsman, we can take a realistic look at where we are and chart a new course. This will require us belatedly to develop strategies to deal with the many pressing issues we have left largely unattended in recent years. These involve classic foreign policy issues of great consequence. How to manage our relations with emerging regional orders. How to deal with rising powers like Brazil, China, India and Russia, reemerging countries like Germany and Japan, failing states like Pakistan, or angry, isolated nations like Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar. Among the neglected issues are also many of vital importance, such as reform of the global trade, investment and monetary systems to protect our prosperity and that of the many other countries that depend on the value of our currency. Beyond this, the issues we must address include the long-overdue formulation of effective multilateral responses to transnational issues like terrorism, pandemic disease, the environment, climate change and security of food, energy and natural resource supplies.
These are formidable challenges but there is no reason to doubt that we can meet them if we marshal the world's peoples and their resources behind a common effort. For decades, the world looked to the United States for solutions. We Americans were good at providing them. We have the capacity to do so again.
In the self-indulgent final decade of the last century, Americans saw little reason to focus on foreign affairs. In the first decade of this century we have been long on assertive patriotism but short on realism, vision, and statesmanship. These are qualities we have historically exemplified. They enabled us to create a new order of peace, progress, and prosperity after the Second World War. We have the talent and ability to define a world order for the 21st Century as well. There is no other country that can make that claim, nor is there another to which the world looks for leadership. As we prepare to enter this century's second decade, we have within us the potential to rise again to the challenge of global leadership. We have the duty to do so. If the United States leads, the world will follow.
The link and text are below
http://www.mepc.org/whats/freeman.asp
America in the World: Magoo at the Helm
Remarks to the Washington World Affairs Council Summer Institute on International Affairs
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)
Washington, D.C., June 23, 20008
In the last days of the last century, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described the United States as "the indispensable nation." "We stand tall," she claimed, "and we see further than other countries into the future." She did not seek the views of any foreigners on either point. It is not recorded that many, if indeed any, agreed with her. What she said was, of course, music to American ears. But what we and non-Americans thought at the time of her smugly bumptious articulation of our self-regard is now moot. The policies the United States adopted in the first decade of this century have thoroughly refuted her theses.
A great many governments abroad now fear that Washington will behave like the ever-self-congratulatory Mr. Magoo – wandering destructively through a reality he misperceives and wreaking havoc he determinedly misinterprets as success. Few believe that our country can still combine realism with statesmanship. More tellingly, a lot have concluded that, far from involving the United States, dispensing with a role for Washington is the only way to solve problems.
Take the Middle East, for example. This is the region that, in one way or another, has been the principal focus of American foreign policy in recent years. It is also the region in which the United States has most consistently shown a preference for bluster, boycotts, and bombs and a concomitant disdain for diplomacy. I am not speaking here simply of Iraq or Iran. We have refused dialog and attempted to dissuade Israel from negotiating with Syria. We have done the same even more adamantly with Hezbollah (which, as a consequence of the US-sponsored Israeli bombing campaign of 2006, emerged as the leading force in Lebanese politics). Meanwhile, in the name of bolstering Lebanese independence from political interference by Syrian and Iranian outsiders, we have vigorously interfered in Lebanon ourselves. We have repeatedly proclaimed that it would be a sin to talk with Hamas (which, thanks to elections we insisted take place, is now the democratically empowered governing authority in all areas of Palestine not directly occupied by Israel). We have tried hard to congeal Sunni Arab antagonism to Shiite Persians into an Arab bloc we hope will join us in ostracizing and punishing Iran, which the Israelis and we repeatedly threaten to assault from the air. Our domestic politics are venomously anti-Muslim; our government has made no effort to form alliances with Islamic authorities who might articulate a credible rebuttal to Muslim extremists.
These US policies have not gone over well. Recent developments strongly suggest that they have resulted in decisions by all concerned in the Middle East to work around the United States rather than with us or through us. Consider Israel's resort to Turkey (rather than US "shuttle diplomacy") to manage proximity talks with Syria. Or Lebanon's turn to Qatar to broker the peaceful realignment of its politics, notwithstanding our investment in them. Or Israel's reliance on Egypt to mediate a cease-fire agreement with Hamas. Or the Palestinian president's decision to enlist Arab conciliators to work out Fatah's differences with Hamas, rather than concentrating on an American-proclaimed "peace process" that most in the region have come to view as a cruel fraud. Or Israel's recourse to Germany to reach understandings with Hezbollah. Or Saudi Arabia's effort to reach a modus vivendi with Iran, to align the Muslim mainstream against extremism, and to broker renewed peace between Sunnis and Shiites in preparation for interfaith dialog with Jews and Christians. All these political openings touch on interests that Washington sees as vital. All of them are taking place notwithstanding longstanding American objections to them, and all of them are unfolding in our diplomatic absence.
This is not just because Mr. Magoo has seemingly succeeded Uncle Sam at the helm. In some measure, it's because the United States has taken sides in disputes with respect to which we had traditionally maintained at least a pretense of evenhandedness. We are therefore seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It is because promiscuous efforts by the United States to impose military solutions on problems that force cannot resolve have left no room for American diplomacy. The resulting default on reality-based problem-solving by the US has created a diplomatic void that others are now filling. This trend toward working around the United States has been aggravated by widespread distaste for the arrogant and insulting phrasing of some US policy pronouncements. The undisguised disdain of some American envoys for the United Nations, the World Court, and regional organizations, and their open contempt for the views of the international communities these represent has also disinclined others to work with us if they can avoid it. Washington's political marginalization in the Middle East is a predictable result of such "diplomacy-free foreign policies."
What could not have been predicted is the reputation for incompetence our country has acquired. This has touched even our armed forces, despite their well-deserved reputation as the most professional and lethal practitioners of the arts of war on the planet. Our interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were meant to showcase this element of American power, underscore our omnipotence, and intimidate anyone tempted to resist our hegemony. Instead, these military campaigns have had the paradoxical effect of demonstrating the strategic limitations of the use of force, eroding the deterrent value of our unmatched military prowess, and proving the efficacy of asymmetric warfare as a counter to our strength. Despite the Magoo-like mutterings of the "neoconservatives" ("you've done it again, Magoo!"), when we leave Afghanistan and Iraq, we will do so much more chastened than exuberant about the potential of military power, however great, to transform the world to our advantage.
Scofflaw US behavior, the ill-considered uses of military power in wars of unilateral choice, and the contraction of freedom in the American homeland have indeed transformed our relationship with the world – but to our grave disadvantage. Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantánamo and the practice of "extraordinary rendition" have dishonored our traditions and defiled our international reputation. Militarism has debilitated our alliances, friendships, and partnerships and corroded our ability to lead. The belligerently surly, unwelcoming face we present to would-be visitors in our embassies and at our borders puts off even the most determined admirers of our society. The elements of a garrison state we have put in place at home have enfeebled our ability to inspire others with our ideas while depriving us of theirs. Much of the world is now seriously disenchanted with the United States. Most (though not all) of these self-inflicted wounds derive from our response to the atrocities of 9/11 and our policies toward the Middle East. We have shown not only that we can shoot ourselves in the foot, but that we can reload with exceptional speed and do it again and again.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice famously predicted in 2006, as Israel rained American-supplied bombs on Beirut, that Lebanon's pain represented the birth pangs of "a new Middle East." She was right, but the Middle East now emerging seems to be one in which the United States no longer has convening power, political credibility, or persuasiveness. It is a region in which all countries fear our military might but in which no country – not even Israel, despite its dependence on American subventions – defers to our leadership.
In our own hemisphere too, without many noticing, a major ebb in U.S. influence has taken place. Latin America's governments may have little in common beyond a commitment to some form of democracy and social justice, but they share a determination to assert greater autonomy from the United States. To this end, they are courting investment from China, opening markets in Europe, stalling the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, dissenting from the "Washington consensus," and crafting regional institutions and forming partnerships that not only exclude the United States but are sometimes openly antagonistic to it. Political Washington's apparent disinterest in a region it long commanded and its ideologically induced inability to respond to opportunities there (like those in a changing Cuba) have facilitated these trends. The Council on Foreign Relations' recent declaration that "the era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America is over" may be overstated, but it is not easily rebutted. The regional agenda in Latin America is increasingly set there, without reference to the United States.
This is true in Africa as well, where the United States has mounted a very significant continent-wide effort against HIV-AIDS but is, in most respects, substantially less engaged than China, Europe, and India. Africans have taken the lead – so far not very effectively, to be sure – in crisis management of issues on their continent like the mayhem in the Congo, the genocidal warfare in Sudan, and the collapse of democracy and decency in Zimbabwe. In doing so, they have largely sidelined the United States and other outside powers. In response, and to upgrade our capabilities in Africa, Washington unilaterally decided to create a US military combatant commander for the African continent and to station him and his staff there. Logic and precedent supported this initiative.
American flag officers now sit at the head of combatant commands in most other regions of the globe. The prominent role of such uniformed American proconsuls abroad reflects the extent to which our foreign relations have become skewed toward reliance on military instruments of influence. The forward presence of American generals and admirals with transnational responsibilities, unmatched fiscal resources, and wide authority to draw on the immense capabilities of our armed forces makes them the most active and visible face of our country abroad. Since they are on the spot, moreover, they tend to be more in touch with regional trends and realities than officials in Washington. That's one reason most American ambassadors are so fond of them.
As the United States saw it, the establishment of an Africa Command would elevate Africa's symbolic importance in our foreign policy. But Africans have reacted badly to the idea. They see it as an attempt to reestablish a non-African military presence on their newly decolonized continent and as an indication that American military adventurism might soon extend there. For the time being, at least, USAFRICOM remains in Stuttgart rather than within its area of operational responsibility.
The United States' strongest international ties, of course, have been with Europe, where continent-wide integration is in the final stages of erasing the divisions of the Cold War. The European Union is less than the sum of its parts, but it has emerged as the dominant factor in its region and adjacent areas. Increasingly, Europeans are charting their own course even on issues of great importance to the United States, like membership in NATO or how to deal with the return of Russia to assertive nationalism and China and India to wealth and power. The United States is, however, now valued as a participant in the Eurasian balance of power rather than as the protector of Europe against a credible external security threat. (This is so even though we have taken a second look into Putin's eyes and seen his role: he is a KGB guy playing a Tsar with post-Soviet characteristics.) There are no longer many compelling reasons for Europeans to defer to Americans even if we had not given them cause to doubt our wisdom. For the first time in the five decades since they embraced American leadership of the Atlantic community, they seem comfortable ignoring Washington's views or rejecting them outright.
This is in part because the extraordinary transatlantic solidarity of 9/11 has given way to sharp differences over international law and comity, privacy and due process of law, and the desirability of multilateral approaches to transnational issues like climate change. Very few in Europe have any sympathy for claims by American politicians that 9/11 changed everything, justifying the suspension of individual rights and the separation of powers insisted upon by Enlightenment thinkers like America's founding fathers. To a distressing extent, therefore, the Atlantic community is no longer united by shared ideals but ominously divided by emerging differences over them. Transatlantic disagreement on core values bodes ill for the prospect that these values will prevail in a world in which the center of gravity is migrating to the Asian ends of the Eurasian landmass.
Paradoxically, given the much ballyhooed shift of global wealth and power to Asia, the trend toward regional assertiveness and the decline of American influence is in some ways least obvious in the Asia-Pacific region. This reflects the realities of Chinese and Indian power in relation to the nations on their periphery. With the notable exception of Pakistan, India's neighbors have reconciled themselves to its hegemony in South Asia. The United States has recognized India's primacy there and does not seek to undermine or thwart it.
In East and Central Asia, however, Chinese hegemony remains an unwelcome conjecture, not a reality. China has repeatedly assured its neighbors that it does not and will not seek to dominate them, but none is inclined to self-insure against the risk that it might do so. In this context, the safe and easy course for most has been a carefully calibrated measure of continued association, including military cooperation, with the United States. Much of the Cold War pattern of East Asian alliances with the United States, with Japan as its lynchpin, therefore persists. From the point of view of the Asian participants in these alliances, their purpose is not, as in the past, to contain China but to insure that China will fit unthreateningly into a regional balance bolstered by American power. Meanwhile, China itself is firmly focused on its own economic and social development. It very much wishes to avoid needless confrontations with the United States. As a result, in comparison with other regions, East Asia remains relatively disinclined to challenge American views and prone to accommodate them when possible.
This deferential stance has not, however, precluded disagreements with the United States over issues like how to deal with Myanmar [Burma] and north Korea or the development of regional groupings or institutions that exclude Washington. Such groupings are a growing phenomenon, largely centered on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some of them involve various Asian-only combinations; some involve Europe. Some include Australia or India while others exclude one or both. Washington has inadvertently accelerated the trend toward exclusion of the United States from regional groupings in the Asia-Pacific region by erratic participation in key meetings and sometimes tediously insisting that they focus on terrorism or various Middle East-related issues with respect to which Asians do not share American perspectives or obsessions. Meanwhile, China and India have taken out their own insurance against American hegemony, in the form of regular trilateral meetings with Russia devoted to promoting multipolarity, respect for the United Nations Charter, and other offsets to US efforts to dictate and dominate the world order.
The fact that other countries are willing to take greater responsibility for managing the affairs of their own regions, even if they have been moved to do so mainly in reaction to perceived US errors of commission and omission, should probably be seen as a positive development. But it is certainly not a good thing for our government to be excluded from conversations on major regional or global issues. The risk is that our interests will be misunderstood or ignored when actions are taken that affect us. US policies since the end of the Cold War – especially over the eight years of the G. W. Bush Administration – have tended to isolate the United States, take us out of the diplomatic game, and leave us at the mercy of decisions and arrangements that others increasingly craft in our absence. Rediscovering the diplomatic arts of persuasion is key to recovering the role and standing we have lost.
One can learn more from catastrophe and failure than from victory or success. Students of US foreign policy since the catastrophe of 9/11, rejoice! There is a lot of material from which to extract lessons for future foreign policy.
A good place to start might be 9/11 itself. Among other things, the shocking attack on our homeland that day showed that, in the post-Cold War world, if the United States launches or sponsors military operations in other people's homelands, we should expect them to find a way to retaliate against ours. This caution remains relevant. Without intending to do so, we have installed a lot of incubators and created a lot of training opportunities for terrorists in Iraq, Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon as well as in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, we have repeatedly adjusted our military campaign plans in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have yet to adjust our diplomacy. And we have not come up with a strategy to overcome the appeal of anti-American terrorism, turn its adherents against it, slash the numbers of its recruits, or even capture its most notorious spokesmen.
Those best qualified to accomplish these tasks are mainstream Muslims, acting out of their own self-interest and in concert with us. Cultivating support in the Islamic world should therefore be a principal focus of US foreign policy. The struggle to outlaw and suppress terrorism cannot succeed without the full cooperation of allies and friends around the world too. Reinvigorating our alliances and partnerships is as essential to this task as it is to the renewal of foreign respect for American leadership in general..
In this regard, a few of the lessons that might be drawn from the global and regional trends of recent years stand out. Three have to do with rediscovering diplomacy as an alternative to militarism. Two are more substantive.
First, Woody Allen was right. "Eighty percent of success is [indeed] showing up." At the moment, the US military shows up a lot more than anyone else at the regional level. We need diplomatic counterparts to our regional combatant commanders. They should be forward-deployed and endowed with the resources and authority to address regional as well as bilateral interests. They should have a mandate to implement strategies that integrate the political, economic, cultural and informational, intelligence, and military elements of our national influence.
Second, our leaders at all levels and in all branches of government need to rediscover the art of listening. Listening is essential to successful relationship management. If we don't pay attention to the opinions of others, they will be – as we have seen – less likely to find our views persuasive. If we don't attend to their interests, they are unlikely to buy into ours. Diplomacy is not preaching to others about what they must do. This does not build partnership or elicit cooperation. Diplomacy is persuading others that they should serve our interests because their interests coincide with ours.
Third, as that consummate realist, Otto von Bismarck advised, "Be polite. Write diplomatically. Even in a declaration of war one observes the rules of politeness." Only small boys, hicks, and clueless speech writers think it clever to call foreign leaders or countries names. Statesmen understand that insults just deepen the commitment of those they target to the error of their ways. Sometimes negotiated solutions are the only solutions available at an affordable price. Discourtesy closes the door to negotiated solutions and locks it shut. Getting others to do things our way is difficult. Denigrating their character or putting derogatory labels on them can make it impossible.
Fourth, we need to clear the foreign policy decks as rapidly as we can. Our plunge into the quicksand of endless warfare abroad has already done great damage to our prestige and influence abroad and considerable injury at home. These wars are not sustainable. They cannot be conducted as we have been fighting them without destroying the very ideals we believe in and are fighting to preserve. We are corroding our civil liberties and mortgaging our posterity to foreign bankers. The money that might rebuild crumbling American infrastructure is being squandered on the destruction and botched reconstruction of vast areas of the Middle East. The wars there bring grief, pain, and uncertainty to America, as well as the places where they are fought. They confer no benefits. They divide Americans from each other and from the world. They divert us from urgent tasks of vital importance to our future. We have no plan for ending them, yet we cannot afford not to end them if we wish to recover our domestic tranquility and international standing.
Once we have relieved the myopic and deluded Mr. Magoo of his duties as helmsman, we can take a realistic look at where we are and chart a new course. This will require us belatedly to develop strategies to deal with the many pressing issues we have left largely unattended in recent years. These involve classic foreign policy issues of great consequence. How to manage our relations with emerging regional orders. How to deal with rising powers like Brazil, China, India and Russia, reemerging countries like Germany and Japan, failing states like Pakistan, or angry, isolated nations like Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar. Among the neglected issues are also many of vital importance, such as reform of the global trade, investment and monetary systems to protect our prosperity and that of the many other countries that depend on the value of our currency. Beyond this, the issues we must address include the long-overdue formulation of effective multilateral responses to transnational issues like terrorism, pandemic disease, the environment, climate change and security of food, energy and natural resource supplies.
These are formidable challenges but there is no reason to doubt that we can meet them if we marshal the world's peoples and their resources behind a common effort. For decades, the world looked to the United States for solutions. We Americans were good at providing them. We have the capacity to do so again.
In the self-indulgent final decade of the last century, Americans saw little reason to focus on foreign affairs. In the first decade of this century we have been long on assertive patriotism but short on realism, vision, and statesmanship. These are qualities we have historically exemplified. They enabled us to create a new order of peace, progress, and prosperity after the Second World War. We have the talent and ability to define a world order for the 21st Century as well. There is no other country that can make that claim, nor is there another to which the world looks for leadership. As we prepare to enter this century's second decade, we have within us the potential to rise again to the challenge of global leadership. We have the duty to do so. If the United States leads, the world will follow.
Worst of times for Iran
SPENGLER
Worst of times for Iran
Despite a surge in oil revenues, Iran's kleptocracy has pushed conditions in the country to the point of Dickensian poverty. The prices of ordinary goods are soaring out of people's reach, property values in Tehran are equal to those of Paris, and prostitutes and profiteers are everywhere. And the disappearance of half the country's oil revenues from the books makes President Mahmud Adhmadinejad's tenure the worst of times for Iran. (Jun 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF24Ak03.html
Worst of times for Iran
Despite a surge in oil revenues, Iran's kleptocracy has pushed conditions in the country to the point of Dickensian poverty. The prices of ordinary goods are soaring out of people's reach, property values in Tehran are equal to those of Paris, and prostitutes and profiteers are everywhere. And the disappearance of half the country's oil revenues from the books makes President Mahmud Adhmadinejad's tenure the worst of times for Iran. (Jun 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF24Ak03.html
The myth of 'weapons-grade' enrichment
The myth of 'weapons-grade' enrichment
Amid disclosures of an Israeli dummy run for an air offensive against Iran's nuclear installations, much of the Western media recycle the lines that Tehran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and that it has amassed "weapons-grade" enriched uranium. The United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has never said this, and this after thousands of hours inspecting Iran's facilities since 2003. - Kaveh L Afrasiabi (Jun 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF24Ak04.html
Amid disclosures of an Israeli dummy run for an air offensive against Iran's nuclear installations, much of the Western media recycle the lines that Tehran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and that it has amassed "weapons-grade" enriched uranium. The United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has never said this, and this after thousands of hours inspecting Iran's facilities since 2003. - Kaveh L Afrasiabi (Jun 23, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF24Ak04.html
Sunday, June 22, 2008
The Road to Hell by Akiva Eldar
The following is an interview by Akiva Eldar of Haaretz in the June 22 edition with Dr. Matti Steinberg, a former Shin Bet advisor and currently a professor at Hebrew University. It is a devastating critique of Israeli policy -- and by implication, US policy --over the past fifteen years in dealing with the Palestinians. Long but worth reading.
w w w . h a a r e t z . c o m
Last update - 22:46 21/06/2008
The road to hell
By Akiva Eldar
It is no coincidence that Dr. Matti Steinberg decided to conclude his book about Palestinian consciousness with a verse from Jewish sources: "Blessed is he who does not speak peace only with his tongue, and in his heart there is peace for all. Cursed is he who speaks peace with his tongue, and in his heart there is no peace" (2 Enoch). In Steinberg's story, those who speak peace only with their tongue are not necessarily speakers of Arabic, and those who have peace in their heart are not necessarily Jews.
"There is no national 'other' with whom we are more intimate than the Palestinian 'other,'" Steinberg, who was an adviser to three Shin Bet security service chiefs, writes. "Perhaps through them we will be able to learn about ourselves." Steinberg, an expert on Islamic and Middle Eastern affairs from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is considered one of the world's leading authorities on the Palestinian national movement.
Steinberg seeks to provide a response to Montaigne's plaint that we would do well to examine ourselves and devote to the study of ourselves the same time we spend in observing others and getting to know what is outside ourselves. Steinberg has not made do with the academic study of the conflict and its history. For over two decades he has been trying to open the eyes of prime ministers and senior cabinet ministers, Shin Bet chiefs and ranking Israel Defense Forces officers. His jeremiads contain not a whiff of peacenik romanticism. "Even if peace is achieved with the Palestinians, this will not usher in an idyllic pastoral age," he writes, "but there is a big difference between a tolerable situation and an intolerable one. Israel's avoidance or evasion of paying the set price of a settlement is fraught with far greater danger to its very existence as a democratic Jewish state than ceding part of the territory."
Based entirely on primary sources in Arabic, Steinberg's book ("Facing their Fate - Palestinian National Consciousness 1967-2007"; in Hebrew) relates a different story about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the one most Israelis like to tell themselves. Steinberg's ability to enter the hearts and minds of our neighbors leads him to the trenchant conclusion that peace that is not equally divided is doomed to failure. If an agreement is achieved by virtue of the "crushing dominance of one side" (i.e., Israel), it will not last long. Steinberg takes a deliberate swipe at the present government, which is wasting the short time it has left with futile bargaining over the price of peace.
"Good intentions, if they remain intentions, will lead to hell and chaos," he writes. For the past 20 years, since the Palestinian National Council decided to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 242, Steinberg has been telling everyone who wants to listen - and those who don't - that peace has one set price: the boundaries of June 4, 1967.
The big bang
Steinberg first became acquainted with the Palestinian issue in June 1967, immediately after the end of the Six-Day War, as his Armored Corps unit was cruising the main street of Gaza City on its way back home. "As a conscript of about 20," he recalls, "I was swathed in a feeling of transcendence and accomplishment, as though all our troubles were over, and henceforth security and peace would prevail. The tranquillity, and no less my consciousness, was then abruptly shattered by bursts of gunfire. I understood that a period in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict had ended, but another - no less unsettled and demanding - had begun." The book, he says, is the result of the jolt that shook him then, 40 years ago.
In an interview with Haaretz Magazine in August 2002, at the height of the second intifada, Moshe (Bogey) Ya'alon, who had just been appointed chief of staff, stated that Israel had "to burn into the Palestinian and Arab consciousness" the idea that "terrorism and violence will not defeat us." As the adviser on Palestinian affairs to the chief of the Shin Bet security service, what was your take on that concept?
"I asked then, and I still wonder, how it is possible to persuade the majority of the Palestinian public that they will not achieve their goal by terrorism, if no political opening is created for them alongside [Israel's] military activity. This kind of 'wholesale' approach toward all the Palestinians indiscriminately did indeed succeed in burning the Palestinian consciousness. But it did so in the opposite direction - of extremism - with the result that the hope of the pragmatic stream was blasted and the influence and strength of Hamas increased immeasurably. An excessive demonstration of the 'price of losing' pushed our adversary into a narrow zone of consciousness, holding that there was nothing left to lose. This paved the way for the broad legitimization, including in Fatah, of suicide bombing attacks - legitimization which previously had not existed.
"It bears noting that Bogey made his comment about half a year after the declaration of the Arab peace initiative at an Arab summit meeting in Beirut. In that initiative, the Arab collectivity, including the Palestinian Authority, expressed its explicit political desire for 'the end of the conflict' and 'natural relations' with Israel on the basis of the lines of June 4, 1967. Maybe Israel's outright rejection of the Arab initiative shows that it is the one that needs to have its consciousness burned?"
The advocates of "burning the Palestinians' consciousness" reject the underlying assumption that you and others have put forward, to the effect that Arafat and his camp are really "pragmatic."
"I am aware that Ya'alon, along with Major General (Res.) Amos Gilad, who was head of the research division in Military Intelligence, and others as well, claim today that Arafat never wanted a peace based on the two-state solution. But when I wrote a political biography of Arafat in 1996, those people did not take issue with me or refute what I wrote. There was no argument between me and Bogey, with whom I used to meet when he was GOC Central Command, over the view that the 'big bang,' namely another intifada, was inevitable. He maintained that it would happen because Arafat did not want peace; whereas I argued that the loss of political hope would erode his desire for an agreement.
"At the time, Bogey favored diverting the negotiations in the direction of the Syrians; I argued that Arafat would interpret this as a breach of faith and would hasten the explosion. It has to be asked whether casting all the blame on Arafat's impotence is not actually a projection of our own domestic political ineffectuality, resulting from the difficulty of reaching an internal decision. When people claim that they are not a partner, particularly after the declaration of the Arab initiative, this is meant to hide the fact that we are not a partner."
You are undoubtedly referring to Ehud Barak, who cooked up that mantra after the failure at Camp David. Some say you were the one who persuaded him that the Palestinians would be satisfied with 92 percent of the West Bank.
"That is arrant nonsense, factually. On Friday evening, shortly before the Camp David summit of July 2000, Barak sent me the draft of his plan for a final-status settlement. He asked for my comments urgently. I told him that I observed the Sabbath, but he insisted that this was a matter of life and death. In a document that bears the date June 17, 2000, I emphasized that the Palestinians would view his statement that 'demarcation of the borders will be based on the principle of the June 4, 1967, lines' as the major innovation and importance of the Israeli plan. I added, 'They will be apprehensive, for example, that the exceptions, which the draft calls "special arrangements," are intended to void that innovation of its substantive content, and their concern over this point will have to be allayed.' The allegation you mention is also logically absurd, because those who make it believe there is no possibility of reaching an agreement even for 100 percent of the territory."
What impact did the assertion that "there is no partner" have on negotiations?
"Barak and his executive contractors for the no-partner concept, Ariel Sharon and Shaul Mofaz, caused incalculable damage. For a prime minister to state that 'there is no partner' is tantamount to issuing a policy directive to the operative echelons to take indiscriminate action against both those who want a settlement and those who are against it. The practical implication of this approach was that there was no difference between Jibril Rajoub, who at Arafat's directive acted tirelessly against Hamas from 1997 to 2000, and made an important contribution to Israel's security, and Hamas figures such as [Sheikh Ahmed] Yassin and [Salah] Shehadeh. A direct line leads from this approach to the destruction of the Palestinian Authority, the heightening of Iranian influence and the unilateral disengagement.
"The 'consciousness burning' and 'no-partner' approach voided the Palestinian center of its strength, and the vacuum was eventually filled by Hamas and other recalcitrants. The disengagement, in its crass unilateral format, left in the lurch those with whom it is possible to reach a settlement that will end the conflict. The final result is liable to be Israel's demise as a democratic Jewish state and its slide into a disastrous binational reality."
Did you try to talk to Barak about this?
"I explained the danger entailed in that declaration, but I felt like the Dutch boy who stuck his finger in the dike - except that in my case it didn't help, and the water broke through and flooded everything. The trouble is that by being the dominant factor militarily, we have the power to realize and corroborate in retrospect concepts that are wrong from the beginning, like a mistaken appraisal that becomes self-fulfilling. I said then, and I say in the book, that Arafat, and along with him Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] and the vast majority of the Palestinian public are partners to a two-state settlement on the basis of the June 4, 1967 boundaries.
"Their rationale is that the Palestinians have already paid an intolerably high price by losing 78 percent of their patrimony between the Jordan and the Mediterranean - namely the State of Israel within the boundaries of the Green Line. The remaining 22 percent - the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - are like the 'poor man's lamb' [II Samuel 12], which they are enjoined to hold onto, come what may. All the more so is this the case when this Palestinian national interest is supported by Security Council Resolution 242, as it was implemented in the Egyptian sector, and as it was interpreted by Israel in the negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights. If Israel has logical and just demands, the burden of proof
w w w . h a a r e t z . c o m
Last update - 22:46 21/06/2008
The road to hell
By Akiva Eldar
It is no coincidence that Dr. Matti Steinberg decided to conclude his book about Palestinian consciousness with a verse from Jewish sources: "Blessed is he who does not speak peace only with his tongue, and in his heart there is peace for all. Cursed is he who speaks peace with his tongue, and in his heart there is no peace" (2 Enoch). In Steinberg's story, those who speak peace only with their tongue are not necessarily speakers of Arabic, and those who have peace in their heart are not necessarily Jews.
"There is no national 'other' with whom we are more intimate than the Palestinian 'other,'" Steinberg, who was an adviser to three Shin Bet security service chiefs, writes. "Perhaps through them we will be able to learn about ourselves." Steinberg, an expert on Islamic and Middle Eastern affairs from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is considered one of the world's leading authorities on the Palestinian national movement.
Steinberg seeks to provide a response to Montaigne's plaint that we would do well to examine ourselves and devote to the study of ourselves the same time we spend in observing others and getting to know what is outside ourselves. Steinberg has not made do with the academic study of the conflict and its history. For over two decades he has been trying to open the eyes of prime ministers and senior cabinet ministers, Shin Bet chiefs and ranking Israel Defense Forces officers. His jeremiads contain not a whiff of peacenik romanticism. "Even if peace is achieved with the Palestinians, this will not usher in an idyllic pastoral age," he writes, "but there is a big difference between a tolerable situation and an intolerable one. Israel's avoidance or evasion of paying the set price of a settlement is fraught with far greater danger to its very existence as a democratic Jewish state than ceding part of the territory."
Based entirely on primary sources in Arabic, Steinberg's book ("Facing their Fate - Palestinian National Consciousness 1967-2007"; in Hebrew) relates a different story about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the one most Israelis like to tell themselves. Steinberg's ability to enter the hearts and minds of our neighbors leads him to the trenchant conclusion that peace that is not equally divided is doomed to failure. If an agreement is achieved by virtue of the "crushing dominance of one side" (i.e., Israel), it will not last long. Steinberg takes a deliberate swipe at the present government, which is wasting the short time it has left with futile bargaining over the price of peace.
"Good intentions, if they remain intentions, will lead to hell and chaos," he writes. For the past 20 years, since the Palestinian National Council decided to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 242, Steinberg has been telling everyone who wants to listen - and those who don't - that peace has one set price: the boundaries of June 4, 1967.
The big bang
Steinberg first became acquainted with the Palestinian issue in June 1967, immediately after the end of the Six-Day War, as his Armored Corps unit was cruising the main street of Gaza City on its way back home. "As a conscript of about 20," he recalls, "I was swathed in a feeling of transcendence and accomplishment, as though all our troubles were over, and henceforth security and peace would prevail. The tranquillity, and no less my consciousness, was then abruptly shattered by bursts of gunfire. I understood that a period in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict had ended, but another - no less unsettled and demanding - had begun." The book, he says, is the result of the jolt that shook him then, 40 years ago.
In an interview with Haaretz Magazine in August 2002, at the height of the second intifada, Moshe (Bogey) Ya'alon, who had just been appointed chief of staff, stated that Israel had "to burn into the Palestinian and Arab consciousness" the idea that "terrorism and violence will not defeat us." As the adviser on Palestinian affairs to the chief of the Shin Bet security service, what was your take on that concept?
"I asked then, and I still wonder, how it is possible to persuade the majority of the Palestinian public that they will not achieve their goal by terrorism, if no political opening is created for them alongside [Israel's] military activity. This kind of 'wholesale' approach toward all the Palestinians indiscriminately did indeed succeed in burning the Palestinian consciousness. But it did so in the opposite direction - of extremism - with the result that the hope of the pragmatic stream was blasted and the influence and strength of Hamas increased immeasurably. An excessive demonstration of the 'price of losing' pushed our adversary into a narrow zone of consciousness, holding that there was nothing left to lose. This paved the way for the broad legitimization, including in Fatah, of suicide bombing attacks - legitimization which previously had not existed.
"It bears noting that Bogey made his comment about half a year after the declaration of the Arab peace initiative at an Arab summit meeting in Beirut. In that initiative, the Arab collectivity, including the Palestinian Authority, expressed its explicit political desire for 'the end of the conflict' and 'natural relations' with Israel on the basis of the lines of June 4, 1967. Maybe Israel's outright rejection of the Arab initiative shows that it is the one that needs to have its consciousness burned?"
The advocates of "burning the Palestinians' consciousness" reject the underlying assumption that you and others have put forward, to the effect that Arafat and his camp are really "pragmatic."
"I am aware that Ya'alon, along with Major General (Res.) Amos Gilad, who was head of the research division in Military Intelligence, and others as well, claim today that Arafat never wanted a peace based on the two-state solution. But when I wrote a political biography of Arafat in 1996, those people did not take issue with me or refute what I wrote. There was no argument between me and Bogey, with whom I used to meet when he was GOC Central Command, over the view that the 'big bang,' namely another intifada, was inevitable. He maintained that it would happen because Arafat did not want peace; whereas I argued that the loss of political hope would erode his desire for an agreement.
"At the time, Bogey favored diverting the negotiations in the direction of the Syrians; I argued that Arafat would interpret this as a breach of faith and would hasten the explosion. It has to be asked whether casting all the blame on Arafat's impotence is not actually a projection of our own domestic political ineffectuality, resulting from the difficulty of reaching an internal decision. When people claim that they are not a partner, particularly after the declaration of the Arab initiative, this is meant to hide the fact that we are not a partner."
You are undoubtedly referring to Ehud Barak, who cooked up that mantra after the failure at Camp David. Some say you were the one who persuaded him that the Palestinians would be satisfied with 92 percent of the West Bank.
"That is arrant nonsense, factually. On Friday evening, shortly before the Camp David summit of July 2000, Barak sent me the draft of his plan for a final-status settlement. He asked for my comments urgently. I told him that I observed the Sabbath, but he insisted that this was a matter of life and death. In a document that bears the date June 17, 2000, I emphasized that the Palestinians would view his statement that 'demarcation of the borders will be based on the principle of the June 4, 1967, lines' as the major innovation and importance of the Israeli plan. I added, 'They will be apprehensive, for example, that the exceptions, which the draft calls "special arrangements," are intended to void that innovation of its substantive content, and their concern over this point will have to be allayed.' The allegation you mention is also logically absurd, because those who make it believe there is no possibility of reaching an agreement even for 100 percent of the territory."
What impact did the assertion that "there is no partner" have on negotiations?
"Barak and his executive contractors for the no-partner concept, Ariel Sharon and Shaul Mofaz, caused incalculable damage. For a prime minister to state that 'there is no partner' is tantamount to issuing a policy directive to the operative echelons to take indiscriminate action against both those who want a settlement and those who are against it. The practical implication of this approach was that there was no difference between Jibril Rajoub, who at Arafat's directive acted tirelessly against Hamas from 1997 to 2000, and made an important contribution to Israel's security, and Hamas figures such as [Sheikh Ahmed] Yassin and [Salah] Shehadeh. A direct line leads from this approach to the destruction of the Palestinian Authority, the heightening of Iranian influence and the unilateral disengagement.
"The 'consciousness burning' and 'no-partner' approach voided the Palestinian center of its strength, and the vacuum was eventually filled by Hamas and other recalcitrants. The disengagement, in its crass unilateral format, left in the lurch those with whom it is possible to reach a settlement that will end the conflict. The final result is liable to be Israel's demise as a democratic Jewish state and its slide into a disastrous binational reality."
Did you try to talk to Barak about this?
"I explained the danger entailed in that declaration, but I felt like the Dutch boy who stuck his finger in the dike - except that in my case it didn't help, and the water broke through and flooded everything. The trouble is that by being the dominant factor militarily, we have the power to realize and corroborate in retrospect concepts that are wrong from the beginning, like a mistaken appraisal that becomes self-fulfilling. I said then, and I say in the book, that Arafat, and along with him Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] and the vast majority of the Palestinian public are partners to a two-state settlement on the basis of the June 4, 1967 boundaries.
"Their rationale is that the Palestinians have already paid an intolerably high price by losing 78 percent of their patrimony between the Jordan and the Mediterranean - namely the State of Israel within the boundaries of the Green Line. The remaining 22 percent - the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - are like the 'poor man's lamb' [II Samuel 12], which they are enjoined to hold onto, come what may. All the more so is this the case when this Palestinian national interest is supported by Security Council Resolution 242, as it was implemented in the Egyptian sector, and as it was interpreted by Israel in the negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights. If Israel has logical and just demands, the burden of proof